



Participatory and localised climate and conflict risk

Mapping and gap analysis

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1. Introduction

Climate change is reshaping lives, livelihoods, and landscapes around the world. Peacemakers and peacebuilders increasingly recognise that the scale, speed, and cascading impacts of climate change present a serious security threat that could exacerbate future conflicts. At the same time, people working on climate change recognise that adaptation to climate change is nearly impossible in the context of violent conflict that feeds on and contributes to other sources of fragility, including vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters.

Indeed, climate change is increasingly recognised both as a driver of conflict and a potential entry-point for preventing conflict and sustaining peace. As climate change mitigation and adaptation programming increasingly focuses on the needs, challenges and opportunities associated with Fragile and Conflict-affected Settings (FCS), it has become increasingly important to ensure that such engagements not only ‘do no harm’ but, where possible, are actively peace-responsive – in other words, articulate a deliberate contribution to conflict resolution and peace.

However, despite a wealth of academic, policy and practical knowledge and experience that underscores the important linkages between land, natural resources and climate change on the one hand, with conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding on the other, too often these domains remain artificially siloed. As a result, efforts to address climate change through mitigation and adaptation programming often occur independently of and disconnected from efforts to prevent conflict and foster peace; similarly, the work of peacebuilders tends not to have a strong focus on climate change, and rarely incorporates mitigation and adaptation efforts as part of their programmatic ‘DNA’.

2. About this analysis

This mapping and gap analysis is produced by TrustWorks Global with Interpeace, with a view to informing the next steps of a process to develop a framework for conducting participatory and localised climate and conflict assessments that integrate peace and conflict analysis. It is designed to serve as a preliminary starting point for discussion and to foster a deeper, shared understanding of the most useful and, indeed, impactful ways to reach the objectives of the broader assignment of which this initial analysis forms a part. To reach this goal, this analysis is divided into two key parts:

- **The first part analyses the results of a preliminary ‘mapping’ of guidance tools** that either i) focus on adaptation and mitigation to climate change and incorporate a conflict and peace lens; ii) focus on conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding with a climate mitigation and adaptation lens. Following initial discussions with Interpeace and CGIAR, ‘guidance tools’ is understood as referring predominantly to assessment methodologies and other tools that assist with programming; moreover, the mapping has a particular focus on the gender and local inclusions aspects of these guidance tools.
- **The second part analyses the results of a preliminary ‘mapping’ of climate funds**, including multi-lateral funds, climate-focused funds within development banks, and impact investors with a view to shedding light on the extent to which these funds focus on FCS contexts and incorporate a peace and conflict lens in their decision-making criteria and modalities for operating.

3. Mapping of guidance tools at the intersection of climate and conflict

3.1 Overview

The mapping demonstrates that there are a limited number of existing guidance notes and tools on climate-sensitive conflict analysis and peace-responsive climate risk assessment. However, **the tools that do exist are comprehensive enough to support peace-responsive climate mitigation and adaptation.** The criteria for the selection of guidance notes and tools for the purposes of this mapping had to include both climate change and conflict analysis. This therefore excluded many peace and conflict guidelines that do not take into consideration the impact of climate change on the one hand, and climate related risk and needs assessments that do not consider conflict and peace dynamics on the other. This means that the total body of tools and guidance, in either field, is greater still than the list below. For further details on each, please refer to Annex One: Climate and Peace Tools Mapping.

A total of **eleven relevant guidance notes and toolkits** were identified:

- *Implications of Climate change for mediation and Peace processes* – by the UN Department for Peacebuilding and Political Affairs (DPPA);
- *Conflict sensitive approaches to local climate change adaptation in Nepal* – by Saferworld;
- *Guidelines for conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change* – by Umwelt Bundesamt;
- *Toolkit and guidance for preventing and managing land and natural resources conflict: Land and conflict* – by UN Interagency Framework Team (IAFT);
- *Toolkit and guidance for preventing and managing land and natural resources conflict: Renewable Resources* – by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP);
- *Addressing climate-related security risks - Conflict sensitivity for climate change adaptation and sustainable livelihoods* - by UNEP and adelphi; and,
- *Climate change and conflict: An annex to the USAID climate-resilient development framework* - by USAID.
- *Climate Security Mechanism – Conceptual Approach* by the UN
- *Conflict Sensitivity in Land Governance: The Do No Harm Framework and Other Tools for Practitioners of Land Activities* by CDA;
- *From conflict to collaboration in natural resource management: A handbook and toolkit for practitioners working in aquatic resource systems* - by CGIAR and adelphi; and,
- *Addressing climate-related security risks – Conflict sensitivity for climate change adaptation and sustainable livelihoods* - by UNEP and adelphi, which accompanies the guidance note of the same name.

Four out of the eleven guidance notes focus on **conflict-sensitive climate adaptation programming**, with the Guidance and separate toolbox from UNEP and adelphi and the Guidelines from Umwelt Bundesamt being the most recent and the most comprehensive publications. The Toolkit and guidance notes from the UN IAFT both focus on natural resource management, while the first guidance note addresses the impact of climate change on peace mediation, which was also the only guidance note including a ‘climate-informed conflict analysis’.

The toolkits vary in their scope from natural resources management to land governance, climate security and climate adaptation. While some of the guidance notes also includes “tools”, the UNEP and adelphi toolkits on climate adaptation has a substantial number of tools included, which is superior – in terms of

its scope, quality and suitability to the task - compared to any other toolkits included in the mapping, and also most relevant with its focus on conflict sensitivity for climate adaptation.

There is a clear trend that **the most recent guidance notes and tools are also those that include the most relevant guidance on how climate change and conflict intersect**. The more recent notes are also mainly concerned with climate adaptation, with the exception of the DPPA publication on *the Implications of Climate Change for Mediation and Peace Processes*, which suggests actors from the peace and security architecture are increasingly interested in understanding how climate change impacts peace-making and peace-related activities and programmes. The following section will go more in detail with the main findings from the mapping exercise.

3.2 Main findings

It should be noted that the majority of guidance notes and toolkits identified in the course of this study **emanate from 'Western' organisations and are produced by a very limited number of organisations**, many of which do not necessarily have experience in implementing such programmes. As a result, it is possible that the guidance notes and toolkits are disconnected from programmatic realities, experience significant bias, and are likely not informed by local and/or indigenous knowledge and/or the perspectives of those most affected by the dynamics such guidance notes and toolkits seek to address.

That said, despite the limited number of existing guidance and tools at the intersection of climate change and conflict, they provide a solid basis for understanding the interaction between climate change and conflict from a 'Western' perspective. The recent publications focused on conflict-sensitive climate adaptation are especially comprehensive and have compiled many of the existing tools and guidance from other conflict and peace analysis guidelines.

The **United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and adelphi** (with funding from the European Union)- as part of their on-going multi-year partnership to develop integrated approaches to climate-conflict analysis - have published both a guidance note, a toolkit, and an evaluation and monitoring note with the title *Addressing climate-related security risks - Conflict sensitivity for climate adaptation and sustainable livelihoods*. The guidance note integrates conflict analysis into its assessment of climate-related security risks, which serves as a combination of conflict analysis and climate vulnerability assessment.¹ It uses a three-step approach to examining the interaction between climate change, peace and security: analyse the drivers of conflict; map the actors; and understand conflict dynamics.² A key difference between this three-step approach and other conflict and peace analysis approaches is the focus on including climate data throughout the assessment, including through an assessment of resilience to climate-related security risks. The guidance note provides a detailed overview, which focuses on five different dimensions – human; financial; social; natural; and physical – with useful guiding questions.

The toolkit has similarly strong components with guiding questions and checklists and a long list of additional tools, exercises, and resources, which also includes a step-by-step introduction to several mapping and analytical tools. It also includes a long list of online monitoring platforms for gathering environmental and climate data and introduces geospatial analysis exercises. **The toolkit has all the key elements required to implement a conflict-sensitive approach to climate adaptation programming.**

¹ United Nations Environment Programme, & European Union. *Addressing Climate-related Security Risks: Conflict Sensitivity for Climate Change Adaptation and Sustainable Livelihoods - Guidance Note*. 2022. p. 14.

² Ibid p. 14-15.

To complement the UNEP and adelphi guidance note and toolkit, the final report from **Umwelt Bundesamt** titled ***Guidelines for conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change*** provides with a solid overview of the existing knowledge on conflict sensitivity in climate adaptation programmes and includes several case studies. It also provides step-by-step guidance on how to integrate conflict sensitivity into different phases of an adaptation project. This includes four modules, which each provide guidance on how to integrate conflict sensitivity at every ‘typical’ phase of a climate change adaptation project cycle. The modules include: vulnerability analysis (phase 1) supplemented by a conflict analysis; Planning and Design (phase 2) supplemented by a pro-peace analysis; Implementation (phase 3) supplemented by an impact assessment; and Monitoring and evaluation (phase 4) of conflict sensitiveness [sic].³ The guide is designed to ensure that not only does an adaptation project not fuel conflict, but ideally it also promotes peace and resilience.

In addition, the **Saferworld guidance note, entitled *Conflict-sensitive approaches to local climate change adaptation in Nepal***, provides a comprehensive and very useful table covering common challenges in incorporating conflict sensitivity in climate adaptation, combined with examples of how to overcome these challenges.⁴ These challenges include: sensitivities; priorities; lack of capacity; and an abundance of analyses. The last point relates to the issue that implementing partners are expected to use various analyses, approaches, and tools, which can make the process of ensuring conflict sensitivity turn into a box-ticking exercise.⁵ The solution to overcoming this issue is to integrate conflict sensitivity into the overall adaptation project cycle instead of regarding it as a separate and additional exercise. While the Saferworld note does not provide guidance on how to integrate conflict sensitivity throughout the overall project cycle of adaptation interventions, the Umwelt Bundesamt guidelines - as previously mentioned - does exactly that. The main value from the Saferworld guidance notes lies in the Annexes, which provides tools for conducting a conflict analysis at the community level that considers the impact of climate change and provides a list of practical issues to consider for a conflict-sensitive approach, including conflict-sensitive project planning, implementation and monitoring and evaluation.

Other good practices and guiding questions can be found in some of the other guidance notes, such as the **UN Climate Security Mechanism Toolkit**; the questions and practices are extremely similar to those in the UNEP and adelphi toolkit and are sometimes more general in nature (it should be noted that the UN Climate Security Mechanism Toolbox was developed by adelphi). This is also the case for the USAID’s “Climate change and Conflict” guidance, for example, which provides with a ‘simple’ two-step approach to conducting a “climate-sensitive conflict analysis.” The approach begins with conducting a normal conflict analysis and then builds scenarios based on the analysis with the objective to explore how climate change might impact the conflict in the future. The guidance note uses assumptions concerning the potential impact of climate change as a starting point, but this risks taking a more systems and/or complex view of the role of climate change; moreover, the USAID guidance does not integrate gender-sensitive or other relevant perspectives. Compared to the UNEP and UN guidance for instance, the USAID guidance seems already outdated (NB: new guidance is due for release in early 2023).

3.3 Gender sensitivity

The relationship between climate change and gender is highlighted in the existing guidance notes and tools. **In the UNEP and adelphi guidance note, questions related to gender are included in the ‘is my project conflict sensitive’ checklist**, with an emphasis on understanding how gender inequalities may be

³ Umweltbundesamt, *Guidelines for conflict-sensitive adaptation to climate change*, 2022, p. 77-76.

⁴ Saferworld, “Conflict sensitive approaches to local climate change adaptation in Nepal.” *Guidance note*, May 2011, p. 10.

⁵ *Ibid.*

driven by underlying values and norms.⁶ There is also a question to identify the specific challenges faced by men and women, young people, and boys and girls.

The **UNEP and adelphi toolkit includes a similar checklist with questions related to gender, but also includes an additional checklist** with questions designed to inform a gender and social inclusion analysis, including identifying identity markers in which gender is one of them.⁷ The issue of daily and seasonal schedules of women, men, girls and boys are also included in the key questions table for inclusive planning and guiding questions along with questions about identifying the most marginalised women, girls, men and boys in the community. There is also a table with examples of ways to promote inclusive programming that includes several questions on promoting women's rights.

The CDA toolkit *Conflict Sensitivity in Land Governance: The Do No Harm Framework and Other Tools for Practitioners of Land Activities* also includes a **gender and social inclusion analysis tool**, which is used during the programme preparation phase to analyse the effects of conflict on groups in relation to land conflict and governance.⁸ This would be highly relevant in ensuring gender sensitivity in climate adaptation programmes.

The UN Climate Security Mechanism toolkit also highlights that the conflict analysis needs to include **how gender inequality, discriminatory norms and deep-seated power dynamics between men and women** are affecting communities impacted by climate change.⁹ Many of the other guidelines, however, lack an explicit focus on gender-sensitivity in relation to climate change and conflict. The USAID guidelines on climate change and conflict only mention gender once in relation to how climate change may have different impacts as a result of social factors, including gender.¹⁰ The Umwelt Bundesamt guidelines only include gender as a general term under social factors, but they do encourage gender aspects to be explicitly included in the conflict sensitivity approach in practice.¹¹

The issue of **gender-sensitivity in climate adaptation is highlighted in compendium by** a Scottish initiative named the **Climate Exchange**, who compiled a list of 25 different tools that can be used for gender-responsive and conflict-sensitive climate programming.¹² The tools are grouped into five themes: Gender mainstreaming; Feminist Economic Justice; Intersectional approaches; Gender-responsive climate action; and Conflict sensitivity. While the compendium suggests that the tools are to be used together in a complementary manner, many of the tools included are general conflict analysis guidance notes and some are more reports than tools. The tools included also vary in scope and none of the tools have the lens of conflict-sensitive climate adaptation or climate-sensitive conflict and peace analysis. As a result, despite the compendium having a lot of tools, none of them meets the requirements stated in the beginning of this mapping. However, the argument that there are many tools out there that can be used in a collaborative manner is still valid.

3.4 Local approaches and inclusion

There is a strong **focus on engaging with local communities and taking a local approach to climate adaptation** in FCS based on the assumption that effective climate adaptation programmes must consider local knowledge.

⁶ United Nations Environment Programme, Guidance Note, p. 10.

⁷ UNEP. *Toolbox*, 2022, p. 25.

⁸ CDA, "Conflict Sensitivity in Land Governance: The Do No Harm Framework and Other Tools for Practitioners of Land Activities." *Toolbox*, 2022, p. 20.

⁹ UN, "Toolbox: Conceptual approach." *Climate Security Mechanism*, 2020, p. 7.

¹⁰ USAID, *Climate change and conflict: An annex to the USAID climate-resilient development framework*, 2015, p. 16.

¹¹ Umweltbundesamt, *Guidelines*, 2022, p. 86.

¹² Bastick, Megan and Camille Risler, "Tools for gender-responsive and conflict-sensitive climate programming." *Climate Exchange*, June 2022, p. 7.

The Umwelt Bundesamt guidelines **advocate for empowering local actors to participate in the design of adaptation programmes** and to promote local ownership, which is to be understood as a 'bottom-up' approach to programme design and implementation.¹³ In DPPA's *The Implications of Climate Change for Mediation and Peace Processes*, mediators can more effectively prevent climate-related issues from overburdening negotiations by focusing on localised impacts of climate change that are most relevant for the stakeholders in the given context.¹⁴

A **new participatory approach that includes knowledge and perceptions from local communities** is the **climate security map tool found in the UNEP and adelphi toolkit**. This tool identifies potential climate security hotspots by engaging with local communities to gather data and information, and then create a map with layers showing geographical features, resource availability, and areas where there is ongoing conflict.¹⁵ The map can then be used to identify entry-points for climate adaptation programmes and can be used to localise existing local adaptation initiatives. This tool can help with prioritising specific areas to undertake engagements. In relation to the tool, UNEP is also developing a web-based data platform that allows practitioners and policymakers to identify and track environmental and climate drivers and threats to peace and security.¹⁶ The platform entered a new phase in November, which means that access is currently paused.

The Gender and Social inclusion analysis from the CDA toolkit also highlights issues related to social factors and the dimensions of inclusion and exclusion, which are important for **leveraging local capacities for peace and mitigating tensions**.¹⁷ The 'Dividers and Connectors analysis' also sets out to identify the local capacities for peace, and advocates for including people directly affected and local communities in gathering of information.

3.5 Gaps

While the available guidance notes and toolkits are few, they are also comprehensive and by combining all the tools identified in the toolkits and guidance notes included in this mapping, **it is not evident that anything is missing with regards to climate and conflict risk assessments with a peace lens**.

This is especially the case with the **UNEP and adelphi toolkit**, which includes an online database and relevant sources for gathering the required information for conducting a desk-based conflict analysis and climate change assessment. The interactions between climate impacts and conflict-related dynamics are very complex, and it would be unreasonable to expect a guidance note and toolkits to take into consideration every aspect in detail. The UNEP and adelphi guidance note and toolkits, however, provide a manageable guide with step-by-step approaches that would be difficult to improve. Combined with the **Umwelt Bundesamt** guidance - that compiles lessons learned from case studies and modules for integrating conflict sensitivity in the entire project phase - and the SaferWorld annexes for practical issues to consider for a conflict-sensitive approach, there appears to be little to add in terms of guidance and tools.

While the **climate-informed conflict analysis guidance note from the DPPA** does not provide practical guidance on how to conduct the conflict analysis, it does provide the most detailed description on what a climate-sensitive conflict analysis should look like. The guidance note also demonstrates that including climate-related issues in mediation and peace negotiation has a great potential for building peace and

¹³ Umweltbundesamt. *Guidelines*, 2022, p. 57.

¹⁴ DPPA. "The implications of climate for mediation and Peace processes." *DPPA Practice note*, 2022 p. 8.

¹⁵ United Nations Environment Programme, & European Union. *Addressing Climate-related Security Risks: Conflict Sensitivity for Climate Change Adaptation and Sustainable Livelihoods - toolbox*, 2022, p. 32.

¹⁶ The platform is called Strata and is currently under development. More information can be found on their website <https://unepstrata.org/>

¹⁷ CDA. *Toolbox*, 2022, p. 20.

resilience. There is potentially room for a conflict and peace analysis that integrates the impact of climate change in a meaningful and comprehensive manner, but this would be more reasonable as a separate guidance note targeted at peacebuilders rather than climate change practitioners.

It can be argued that a **gap exists between the need for local approaches to climate adaptation and the provided guidance and tools on how to integrate local approaches in the conflict and peace analysis**. Most guidance notes and tools include sections that advocate for the importance of ensuring a participatory approach to conflict-sensitive climate adaptation but do not provide guidance on how to ensure local participation in practice. Given the highly insecure and constant changing environment in FCS combined with the impact of climate change, there is indeed a need for better guidance on the practical implications for ensuring a participatory approach in these contexts.

There exists other conflict and peace analysis and conflict sensitivity tools and guidance notes that include more detailed approaches to engaging with local communities. Overcoming this challenge would therefore be achieved by **integrating tools and methods from other conflict analysis guidance notes and tools** that do not focus on the impact of climate change but provide guidance on ensuring local participation in the conflict analysis process.

4. Mapping of climate funds and their sensitivity to conflict and peace

This section of the report presents the results of a **mapping of 44 identified climate funds**, including those of multilateral and regional institutions, development finance institutions and impact investors. The mapping also includes bilateral donors and the funds dedicated to climate change. The mapping was designed to assess the extent to which climate funds are sensitive to peace and conflict-related issues through an analysis of: the extent to which climate funds focus on FCS (and which ones); the decision-making criteria for funding; the tools for ensuring projects incorporate human rights (HR); and the tools for ensuring projects ensure peace responsiveness.

4.1 The geographical focus of Climate Funds and their presence in FCS

Although most climate funds have active projects in FCS, **none of them has an explicit and/or exclusive focus on FCS**. Climate Funds' geographical scope is either unrestricted and open to everywhere there is a project worth financing, or it is focused exclusively on developing/low-income countries. There are also no funds identified with a regional focus, with most funds having funded projects in countries from more than one region. Furthermore, all the climate funds considered in this mapping, except for the 'Programmes on Sustainability' of the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), do not apply different and/or enhanced approaches when operating in FCS, or at least they do not share this information publicly.

There is limited information on the amount of funding per country or per capita, which unfortunately makes it difficult to assess how much funding is directed to FCS. Due to this issue, this assessment instead uses the number of funds focusing on each country as a proxy. While this provides us with a general understanding of which countries has the most projects funded by climate funds, it does not tell us anything about the level of funding going to each country since this information is unavailable due to low levels of transparency on the part of climate funds and international public and private actors more broadly.

Among all FCS considered – of which there are 76¹⁸ - only 19 benefit from more than 10 climate funds, with Cambodia and India sharing the most with 15 each (out of 44). Among these, only Ethiopia and Mali are ranked in the top ten TrustWorks Global's list of most severely conflict-affected countries¹⁹. This demonstrates that most funds invest in FCS that are less affected by conflict and fragility. It is also impossible to derive a climate fund's preference between conflict-affected and fragile states. The top 10 countries with the highest number of funds invested are split between 'conflict-affected' (India, Ethiopia, Colombia, Kenya, and Madagascar) and 'fragile' (Cambodia, Uganda, Bangladesh, Madagascar, and Tanzania). These dynamics are similar for the top 20 and top 30; it only slightly changes in favour of conflict-affected countries in the top 40.

Surprisingly, what clearly emerged from the mapping is that climate funds, at least the ones considered in this report, are **not necessarily focusing on the countries most affected by climate change either**. Out of the 19 countries with at least 10 funds accessed, only 8 are in the bottom 20 of the ND-GAIN Index Score – meaning those countries which are most vulnerable to climate change and least resilient according to University of Notre Dame's Global Adaptation Initiative Country Index²⁰ – with none in the bottom 5.

Table 1: List over FCS based on their ranking in the ND-GAIN Index Position

TWG Rank ²¹	Country	Number of funds	ND-GAIN ranking
20	Chad	4	182
12	Central African Republic	6	181
50	Guinea-Bissau	5	180
5	Dem Rep Congo	8	178
23	Eritrea	1	178
17	Sudan	5	177
18	Niger	10	176
1	Afghanistan	4	175
55	Zimbabwe	5	174

¹⁸ The list of FCS is based on two key categorisations. The first includes countries experiencing international and non-international conflict (conflict-affected) according to RULAC (Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts) organised in terms of battle-related deaths over the last five years. The second categorization relies upon the OECD 'multidimensional fragility framework' ranking, which analyses country contexts according to data in the economic, environmental, political, security, societal realms.

¹⁹ See the complete list in annex I

²⁰ The ND-GAIN Country Index summarizes a country's vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with its readiness to improve resilience. The ranking goes from higher to lower, with the countries in the lower end being the most vulnerable and least resilient. The lowest ranked country on the Index is Chad with 182. (The full list can be accessed here [link](#))

²¹ See Annex I for explanation

45	Liberia	10	173
8	Somalia	3	172
3	Yemen	7	171
9	Mali	11	170
40	Congo	10	169
41	Haiti	7	168
46	Madagascar	12	167
47	Uganda	14	166
42	Burundi	2	165
57	Bangladesh	14	164
4	Ethiopia	14	161
14	Burkina Faso	9	161
49	Papua New Guinea	9	160
7	Nigeria	8	158
52	Comoros	1	158
10	Myanmar	7	156
16	Mozambique	10	156
58	Sierra Leone	5	155
44	Angola	1	154
2	Syria	3	153
71	Benin	5	152
21	Kenya	13	149
59	Cambodia	15	149
15	Cameroon	12	146
19	Pakistan	7	146
48	Guinea	3	146
68	Tanzania	12	145

74	Gambia	6	144
53	Mauritania	5	143
60	Côte d'Ivoire	10	141
43	Equatorial Guinea	3	140
51	Zambia	11	138
61	Venezuela	2	138
66	Laos	10	137
75	Honduras	12	136
36	Senegal	6	134
65	Turkmenistan	2	132
70	Nicaragua	9	132
69	Togo	6	129
73	Lesotho	6	129
13	Libya	3	125
62	Solomon Islands	6	123
63	Djibouti	3	122
6	Iraq	3	120
67	Guatemala	9	119
32	Lebanon	4	117
54	Timor-Leste	1	117
72	Dem. People's Rep. Korea	2	116
28	The Philippines	8	113
27	India	15	111
29	Egypt	8	107
56	Tajikistan	6	103

24	Mexico	8	95
31	Colombia	14	91
76	Iran	2	78
26	Azerbaijan	2	77
37	Moldova	4	76
33	Jordan	10	73
25	Ukraine	8	69
30	Turkey	7	48
39	Cyprus	0	43
38	Georgia	5	42
35	China	7	39
11	South Sudan	4	NA
22	Palestine	1	N/A
34	Western Sahara	0	N/A
64	Eswatini	2	N/A

Geographically speaking:

- The countries that benefit from the majority of climate funds are located in **South and Southeast Asia**: Cambodia (15), India (15), and Bangladesh (14) are topping the list.
- When looking at sub-regions in **Africa**, countries in the East Africa region arguable receive the most funding in this order: Ethiopia (14), Uganda (14), Kenya (13), and Tanzania (12). The countries in West Africa with most funds present are Mali (11), Niger (10) and Burkina Faso (9), with all being in the top 20 most conflict-affected countries. Countries from Central Africa are also in the upper part with Cameroon (12), Congo (10) and DRC (8).
- Looking at the **MENA** region, only Jordan (10) and Egypt (8) are beneficiaries of a considerable amount of funds, while most of the countries in this region benefit from less than 5 including Palestine (1), Iran (2), and Iraq (3).
- Another region that receives less attention is **Central Asia**, with Tajikistan (6), Afghanistan (4) and Turkmenistan (2) at the top of the list.
- Notably, the countries in the **Caribbean** are among the most funded, with: Honduras (12), Guatemala (9), Nicaragua (9), and Haiti (7).
- Lastly, the only FCS in **South America** are Colombia and Venezuela, respectively with 14 and 2 funds present in the countries.

In conclusion, there are **no strong indications based on the mapping that funds focus more on climate affected or climate-vulnerable countries**. In the top ten most vulnerable countries to climate change, only Niger and Liberia benefit from more than 10 climate funds. Expanding it to the top 20 most vulnerable countries, only Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Uganda can be added from the list of countries with a high presence of climate funds. In addition, the limited number of funds in countries such as Venezuela, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan clearly show that climate funds take into consideration the political context, and that they will rather avoid funding certain regimes than funding projects in countries that are some of the most vulnerable to climate change.

4.2 Human rights, conflict-sensitivity and peace responsiveness analysis

The preliminary mapping suggest that **few funds have an explicit goal to address peace and/or conflict related issues through their climate-related grants and/or investments**, and very few have HR policies in place. Most climate funds still lack a comprehensive approach to human rights and conflict-sensitivity, let alone peace responsiveness.

However, most of the climate funds considered in this mapping do have **social/livelihoods and/or human rights dimensions**. The most common are constituted by:

- a. **Job creation and/or temporary income generation.** The Global Environment Facility (GEF) identifies its social contributions as consisting of: providing jobs and know-how to the receiving communities, allowing climate-affected locations to make use of clean energies, etc.
- b. **Adopting a multi-stakeholder approach** that involves all affected stakeholders in the decision-making processes, particularly common in relation to local communities and marginalized peoples. ASAP by IFAD for example works with partners to identify target groups through a gender-sensitive, poverty and livelihood analysis using available data, filling information gaps, and incorporating the locals' views.
- c. **Enabling entrepreneurship through capacity building activities and trainings.** This is one of the essential aspects of the due diligence process that precedes investments approval at Bamboo Capital Partners.
- d. **Improving livelihoods of nature-dependent populations like indigenous people.** As done by the Congo Basin Forest Fund, already mentioned above.
- e. **Having grievance and/or 'whistle-blower' mechanisms** in place. Comgest, to name one of many.
- f. **Building and working through partnerships with civil society organizations** and non-governmental organizations. The Global Greengrants Fund for example works with local populations that live in harmony with nature to restore it.
- g. **Fostering gender equality** by empowering women entrepreneurs and allocating resources in a gender-balanced manner. The Clean Technology Fund by CIF protects gender issues under its specific gender policy.

Based on the findings of this mapping, three incremental layers could be derived to categorize climate funds attention and care to such issues.

1. **In the first category are the climate funds that focus exclusively on climate change and/or the environment.**

Conflict-sensitive/peace promoting measures and human rights frameworks are absent. What these climate funds report on their websites is that their goal is to deliver sustainable development to areas where the sustainability lens is most often absent due to the lack of resources and/or different national priorities. Some of them do not even mention having a social dimension in their goals or impact, like the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) or the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Partnership for Market Readiness, Brown Advisory Thoughtful Investment, and the Prosperity Programming of the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office. Those who do – BlueOrchard, Symbiotics, Bamboo Capital Partners, the Forestry Program by the European Investment Bank (EIB), Adaptation Fund, BioCarbon Fund, Climate Investment Funds (CIF), Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF), Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund (GEEREF), Global Environment Facility (GEF), Congo Basin Forest Fund (CBFF), Green Investment Group (GIG) – only consider the social dimension that is strictly related to their environmental benefits.

This is best explained through an example: The CBFF aims to alleviate poverty and to improve livelihoods for communities that depend on the forest's resources. The focus on poverty and livelihoods is understood as consequence of their forest restoration programme, which aims at improving the Congo Basin's environment rather than being an explicit focus therein. In other words, it is not clear whether such social dimension is intentionally planned and implemented by CBFF or not. The same doubt applies to the other climate funds listed above.

Notably, some of these climate funds, such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility and Climate Investment Funds (CIF), are funded or directly managed by the World Bank. This makes it even more difficult to explain why such ownerships/partnerships did not contribute to make the climate funds' approaches more holistic, considering the vast themes and fields on which the World Bank works.

2. The second category comprises those **climate funds that lack a comprehensive human rights lens but are proactively committed to have social impacts.**

In this category, stakeholder engagement is a priority and significant efforts are made to ensure that stakeholders are included in decision-making processes; this is evidenced, for example, by the Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

Moreover, many of the funds in this category have in place tools to evaluate their potential social impact – like the Country Approach to Safeguards Tool of the UN-Reducing Emissions and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries Programme – whistle-blowing mechanisms and options to file complaints both for their employees and the affected stakeholders as done by Central African Forest Initiative, Bamboo Capital, Federated Hermes Limited, or by the Dutch Fund for Climate and Development, which relies on partners such as WWF, FMO and Climate Fund.

Additionally, Comgest, the only climate fund in this category to do so, explicitly recognizes and commits to respect human rights and try to apply a social lens to its monitoring and evaluation processes. However, a conflict-sensitive approach is still missing throughout this category.

3. Lastly, in the third category fall those **climate funds that apply holistic approaches to their projects and commit to achieve multiple development goals at the same time.**

These funds explicitly aim to provide benefits for the climate, the affected stakeholders, and the overall context in which they are embedded. Such funds constitute a minority of all climate funds, which includes GIZ, SIDA, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and the MDG Achievement Fund. The MDG Achievement Fund for example, as well as the other climate funds in this category, operates in multiple development sectors and therefore shapes many of its projects as 'Joint Programmes', meaning that they combine different goals such as climate change and extreme poverty, or climate change and hunger. In regard to conflict-sensitivity, only GIZ, SIDA, and SDC, among all the climate funds considered, have at least some safeguards in place. Even more limited is the disposition of funds towards operationalising 'peace responsiveness' meaning to deliberately contribute to peace through their funds in a manner that enhances collective impact, that supports inclusive, gender-responsive and locally- led change and that strengthens societal resilience to conflict and violence.

GIZ in FCS tries to work through partnerships with emergency relief specialists to increase the probabilities of success of its projects and follows the German Government's Guidelines on Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace. They also support local leaders and communities in state apparatus reconstruction processes and in building social consensus. One such example was in Mali, where they promoted cultural activities and art expression to offer young people healthy ways of expressing themselves instead of falling in the trap of radicalization. Lastly, GIZ adopts what it calls a 'Transitional Development Assistance' approach to its climate change programmes, which combines different development targets with a comprehensive approach.

SIDA provides all its employees with 'toolboxes' that describe how operations in all fields must be conducted in respect to specific issues such as the environment, poverty, gender equality, and also peace and conflict. On this last aspect, the toolbox recommends to consistently consider the potential effects on the existing tensions and conflicts when implementing a project. This includes to systematically plan and implement activities in a way that prevents or minimizes negative and maximizes positive effects on peace and conflict. Negative effects defined as the ones that exacerbates conflicts and positive effects as the ones that increase the prospects for peace (peace responsiveness). Moreover, the toolbox provides specific approaches to an integrated conflict perspective, which includes building institutional capacity, integrating conflict sensitivity in programme management, dialogue, facilitation and mediation, considering the effects of climate change on existing conflicts etc.

SDC commits to participate in conflict resolution and prevention, to strengthen public institutions and increase participation of civil society and citizens to ensure that public services meet the real needs of the population. They also support activities that foster free and peaceful elections, restoration of the rule of law, equal gender participation, minority inclusion in political processes and the prevention of violent extremism.

It is interesting to note that all three are bilateral entities with a diverse financial portfolio that includes multiple developments sectors and challenges other than just climate change. Such "blended project" approaches are only present in this category of climate funds. Hence, although additional research – including stakeholder consultations – would be required before reaching final conclusions, it seems that having a financial portfolio that includes development fields other than "just" climate change, favours the encounter of different disciplines, experiences, and approaches inside these climate funds. This allows the integration of multiple perspectives into a single and comprehensive approach, which generates holistic understandings of the issues at stake and multiple spill over effects in multiple fields. This would also

explain why peace-responsive mechanisms and/or forms of conflict-sensitivity could only be found among these climate funds.

However, it must be noted that these funds' websites and public resources do not always differentiate between how they work on climate change-related projects and on more social/people-centred projects. This means that it is not possible to ascertain from a desk review whether the approaches they describe in regard to human rights or peacebuilding projects are applied also to their work on natural resources and/or climate change. It is assumable, but not guaranteed.

5. Conclusion

Based on the mapping and analysis of existing guidance notes and tools on climate-sensitive conflict and peace analysis or conflict-sensitive climate adaptation, it can be concluded that while there are few guidance notes and tools on this topic, they are very comprehensive and provides with solid guidance and the provide various tools for integrating conflict sensitivity in climate change adaptation programming. There are some gaps when it comes to guidance on integrating local approaches in the peace and conflict analysis and how to conduct a climate-sensitive conflict analysis in practice. These gaps can arguably be bridged by integrating other conflict analysis guidance notes and tools that does not have the required climate-focus to be included in this mapping.

A few conclusions can be derived from this literature review about climate funds' HR and peace-positive contributions. A clear-cut focus on conflicts and peace-promotion is still very uncommon among climate funds. Having a social dimension though is considerably more diffused, but it is often not fully integrated as a consistent part of the financial strategies and they do not often include HR respect. Lastly, no single climate fund has an exclusive or intentional focus on FCS: they either have a global reach, or a restricted focus on low-income countries.


6. Recommendations

The mapping report and gap analysis points to the need for a reflection on the next steps of the collaboration. As discussed between Interpeace and CGIAR, the recommendations and the way forward will be finalised during the CGIAR, Interpeace and TWG workshop.

Annex:

Annex I: TrustWorks Index²² (Orange countries are conflict-affected and yellow countries are fragile states)

Fragile and Conflict-affected Setting: A RULAC and OECD-based TrustWorks Index



²² The TWG rank has been created upon the basis of two key categorisations. The first includes countries experiencing international and non-international conflict (conflict-affected) according to RULAC (Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts); these are ranked in order of battle-related deaths reported by the UCDP - starting with the countries that experienced the highest number of battle-related deaths in the period 2017-2021 (where limited data could be found, battle-related deaths were sourced from ACLED) and these are in orange. The second categorization relies upon the OECD 'multidimensional fragility framework' ranking, which analyses country contexts according to data in the economic, environmental, political, security, societal realms; these country contexts are organized in the same order as they can be found in the OECD index, minus those countries that appear in the RULAC list of conflict-affected contexts; these countries are in yellow.