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BETTER LIVESTOCK POLICIES FOR AFRICA

by

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Introduction

1. This is the first paper issued under the auspices of ALPAN - The African Livestock Policy Analysis Network. The first part of the paper sets a framework in which policy, policy making and policy analysis can be defined and the principal actors in the process of policy formulation identified. It seeks to establish, therefore, an initial set of common terms and concepts which will enable us to understand each other at the outset. We can amend the terms and concepts later as we gain experience and find that modifications are needed in our initial set to make them correspond better to reality. The second part of the paper discusses how livestock policy in Africa might be improved.

Livestock policy and performance

2. The performance of the livestock sector in sub-Saharan Africa over the last two decades has been disappointing. During the 1960s African meat production from ruminant livestock grew slightly faster than the human population but milk output grew slower. In the 1970s the performance worsened and both meat and milk output grew at only half the rate that the human population did, and the growth in output that did occur was almost entirely the result of increases in livestock numbers rather than in yields per head (Anteneh, 1984). This poor performance by the livestock sector was fairly uniformly spread across the different regions of sub-Saharan Africa with only meat production in central Africa (which is small in absolute terms) showing much favourable divergence from the general pattern. However, the performance in some individual countries was considerably better than average.
3. What were the causes of this poor performance? Not very much of it can be attributed simply to poor rainfall since the Sahelian drought occurred towards the beginning of the 1970s and the process of recovery from it should have enhanced rather than depressed rates of growth in output.



4. The inadequate development, through research, of technology to improve livestock production undoubtedly had something to do with the poor performance. So, probably, did inadequate levels of investment in the livestock sector, although we should bear in mind that much of the investment in livestock projects which did take place was extremely unsuccessful, yielding low or even negative rates of return. A higher rate of investment by itself might not have boosted output very much.
5. There is a growing consensus that a major factor in the poor performance has been the prevalence of inappropriate government policies which either positively hindered or, at least, failed adequately to assist livestock development. This growing consensus derives partly from a wider consensus that Africa's agriculture sector as a whole has suffered from inappropriate policies, and partly from the amassed experience of a large number of individuals with detailed knowledge of livestock development efforts in particular countries who believe that these efforts were frustrated because they were carried out against a policy background which made their failure almost inevitable. In illustration of this one can refer to a review of more than 30 livestock projects in Africa financed by one major donor. In the case of more than 75% of these projects inappropriate government policies were judged to be major constraints on the projects' success.
6. Neither a general consensus nor the beliefs of sundry individuals of themselves prove that it was policies rather than other factors which were at fault; and a number of those who make policies in the livestock subsectors of African countries strongly believe that often it is not the policies themselves but their inadequate or inefficient implementation that lies at the heart of the problem. Insufficient support from donor agencies is also often blamed. However, when the policy is from the start administratively and politically unfeasible it is clearly the fault of its makers not of its executors and financiers. Some of the policies that have been officially adopted required for their success a level of domestic and external financing that was disproportionate to the countries' resources and foreign support, as well as a willingness to offend powerful interest groups which was politically unrealistic to expect. In other cases policies may have been realistic at the time of their formulation but were rendered obsolete by unpredictable changes in political or economic conditions.

7. In the past there has been a lack of firm evidence, based on research, either that government policy can be effective, (for good or evil), in influencing events in the livestock field or that the results of alternative policies are sufficiently clear and predictable to enable sensible choices between alternatives to be made. Some such evidence is now being accumulated through work being done at ILCA's Policy Unit. For examples von Massow (1984) found that in the case of the majority of countries of sub-Saharan Africa for which the relevant data are available, less than two thirds of the changes in commercial dairy imports could be explained in terms of the factors which are normally cited as the main determinants, i.e. human population growth or changes in per caput income or domestic dairy production. The remaining changes have to be explained by other factors amongst which government policies are probably the most important. Anteneh (1985) has identified the decline in the quality of veterinary services that arises from a policy which permits the staff costs of such services to rise above the level of 50% of total operating costs.
8. In brief, the performance of sub-Saharan Africa's livestock sector has been poor, and a major, but not the only, contributory factor seems to have been inappropriate government policies. A revision of policies is in the case of many countries an indispensable condition for improved performance of their livestock sectors, although a revision of policies by itself is not the only thing required.

Definition of policy

9. Obviously we must not get bogged down in mere semantics; on the other hand the word "policy", which appears in the title of this paper and of the ALPAN network, is a very elastic term and we need some working definition of it from which we can all start together even if we choose to amend it thereafter. In the following paragraphs I explore slightly our concept of "policy" as demonstrated by our use of the word in the English language. I appreciate that the French equivalent of the term may have slightly different connotations.
10. A "policy" is very much like a decision or a set of decisions, and we "make", "implement" or "carry out" a policy just as we do with decisions. Like

a decision a policy is not itself a statement, nor is it only a set of actions, although, as with decisions, we can infer what a person's or organisation's policy is either from the statement he makes about it, or, if he makes no statement or we don't believe his statement, from the way he acts. But, equally, we can claim that a statement or set of actions is misleading and does not faithfully reflect the "true" policy.

11. In some other ways a policy is not like a decision. The term policy usually implies some long-term purpose in a broad subject field (e.g. land tenure), not a series of ad-hoc judgements in unrelated fields. Sometimes, however, we conceive of policy not so much as actively purpose oriented but rather as a fairly cohesive set of responses to a problem that has arisen. In the sphere of government development activities, governments have policies, plans, programmes and projects, each of these in succession being a little more short-term, more specific in place and timing than the previous and each successively more executive rather than legislative.
12. In the light of these considerations we can provisionally define a policy as a set of decisions which are oriented towards a long-term purpose or to a particular problem. Such decisions by governments are often embodied in legislation and usually apply to a country as a whole rather than to one part of it.

Functions, objectives and instruments of policy

13. It is useful to distinguish three rather different functions in relation to policies. Firstly there is policy making, the act of making the decisions concerned, and policy-making is naturally the prerogative of senior people, just how senior depending on the importance of the policy concerned. Secondly there is policy implementation - the executive activity of carrying out the decisions made. Thirdly there is policy analysis, the activity of identifying different policy choices and of examining the actual or possible impact of these alternative policies to see how successfully they comply with the policies' objectives. Policy-making, policy implementation and policy analysis may all be carried out by the same people, but in countries wealthy enough to afford the trained manpower policy implementation and analysis are often carried out by

specialist groups of middle-level officials who advise and receive instructions from the top-level policy makers. This paper is not substantially concerned with policy implementation.

14. Implicit in the concept of having or making a policy is that one has a choice or option to have this policy or some other one. If, in practice, there is no choice then there can be no policy either. But in considering options it is again useful to distinguish choices between the objectives of policy — including the objective of overcoming particular problems that have arisen — and choices between the different instruments, i.e. methods, by which these objectives are to be achieved. Objectives and instruments are conceptually distinct and both are integral to having a policy although some writers (e.g. Thomson and Rayner, 1984) restrict the scope of the term to policy instruments. Objectives and instruments are best explained by way of examples.
15. Let us take the example of policies with respect to dairy marketing systems, i.e. options between different ways of organising dairy marketing. In considering these options a government may be motivated by one or more of the following objectives:
 - a) To improve the incomes of dairy producers by paying them higher or more stable prices;
 - b) To secure plentiful and reliable milk supplies to urban consumers;
 - c) To provide milk supplies to urban consumers generally at prices they can afford;
 - d) To improve the hygiene and quality of dairy products.

These are not the only possible objectives of policy in respect to dairy marketing but they are among the most common.

16. In pursuit of these objectives a government has a wide variety of instruments that it can use. Some instruments can serve several objectives while others serve only one objective and may hinder others.
 - a) It can set up monopolistic dairy marketing organisations — private, cooperative, or parastatal ones — in order to:
 - i. Secure economies of scale in collection, processing and distribution,

- ii. Operate monopolistic or monopsonistic trading practices which enable the trading organisation to discriminate in prices and quantities for or against particular groups of consumers, producers or products, and
 - iii. Achieve improvements in quality and hygiene through direct managerial control of processing, transport and storage.
- b) It can license, inspect and regulate non-government and competitive trading organisations so as to ensure compliance with minimum standards as to price, hygiene and quality.
 - c) It can provide subsidies to producers or consumers or to particular groups thereof.

Again, this list of instruments is illustrative rather than all-inclusive. Objectives and instruments in dairy marketing are discussed in detail by Mbogoh (1984).

17. Policy makers can make choices with respect to both objectives and instruments. Such choices do not have to be totally exclusive, i.e. one does not have to pursue ruthlessly one objective to the neglect of all others. On the other hand, different objectives may and frequently do conflict. To take an example from dairy marketing, it is clearly difficult both to pay high prices to producers and to ensure low prices to urban consumers unless the government has substantial spare funds at its disposal with which to pay a heavy subsidy - a happy situation which very few if any governments in sub-Saharan Africa face. Thus although governments do not have to opt exclusively for just one objective it is important that they consider which of these objectives are the most important and how much of progress towards one objective they are prepared to sacrifice in order to make progress towards another. If policy makers can become clear in their minds about what their priorities are as between different policy objectives, it then becomes possible to select the set of instruments which most efficiently promotes those objectives. There are then, conceptually, two rather different sorts of choices to make. Firstly, choices about objectives; secondly, choices about which instruments to employ in order to pursue best those objectives.

18. This may seem obvious to the point of tedium. In practice, however, actual discussions of policy issues in developing and developed countries alike often fail to distinguish clearly between instruments and the objectives or the problems which a policy is supposed to solve. In the ensuing mental confusion special interest groups who have no real claim to priority on social, economic or even political grounds, but who are blessed with fluent spokesmen, are able to secure privileges for themselves which are costly to the nation as a whole and which a more clear-sighted approach to policy would have avoided granting.

Improvements in policy

19. The preceding parts of this paper have established that it is important that better livestock policies be adopted in Africa and have set out some basic concepts and terminology for us to use in our discussions. We now turn to considering how policies might be improved, and this also involves consideration of the defects in the past and present situations. This consideration is structured into three major categories: firstly, what are the critical policy issues; secondly, how can we design better policies and forecast what the results of different policies will be; and thirdly, how can the policy formulation process be improved?

The critical policy issues

20. Anyone with a pencil and paper and half an hour to spare can quickly draw up a list of 40 or 50 important policy issues in African livestock development, and, with further time, can add to it daily. Do we need to pick out from such lists the "critical" issues?
21. The answer is: yes, we do. Policy-making - like almost every other human activity - consumes resources which are in scarce supply. There are three principal scarce resources involved: firstly, the time of the key decision makers who, if they are to make good policies, must have adequate opportunity to discuss and reflect on the issues involved before they decide them. The second principal resource is political impetus. Once an appropriate policy is decided on it usually needs a great deal of effort to convert it from an idea into the legislation, organisation and budget

necessary for it to become a reality. This, particularly with controversial issues, requires that those who are promoting the policy lobby intensely for it and use every piece of political influence, goodwill and support they can muster to push it through. Again, such political influence is a finite resource which must not be squandered. The third important resource is the skill of the policy analysts who should be involved in researching policy issues before decisions are taken. Such skills are in particularly short supply in Africa.

22. The process of making good policies, therefore, consumes scarce resources. If these resources are used up in the process of making policies of lower priority, they will not be available for dealing with the really critical policy issues. Each country needs to concentrate its attention and policy-making resources where the benefits from doing so are highest.
23. But how, in practice, are we to select these priorities? There are two issues involved. Firstly, by what criteria should we compare the potential benefits of tackling particular policy issues; that is another way of saying how do we decide on their intrinsic importance. Secondly, how are we to predict in advance either how much of the scarce resources a particular piece of policy-making will consume or how much "benefits", in terms of these criteria, it will yield? Clearly the situation will differ from country to country, depending partly on how good or bad their existing policies are and partly on a variety of natural, social or economic factors. For example, with respect to criteria, in some countries the overall balance between production and consumption of livestock commodities is satisfactory but a serious emerging problem is the declining welfare of a particular large group of livestock owners, e.g. nomadic pastoralists. In these countries governments are likely to judge that the proper criterion for concentrating on particular policy issues is their relevance to this specific welfare problem. In other countries consumption of livestock commodities is rising rapidly but production is stagnant, with the result that imports of these commodities are growing fast and preempting foreign exchange urgently needed for other purposes. In these countries policy issues relevant to the rapid expansion of output are likely to be regarded by governments as of the highest importance.

24. Explicit in this way of describing importance is the assumption that it is importance as judged by the government of the country concerned that matters. Implicit is the assumption that governments have some kind of political or bureaucratic mechanism whereby a single "government viewpoint" can be distilled from a variety of conflicting views of different individuals or groups within the government. Neither of these assumptions is unchallengeable but they are not issues which can be pursued here.
25. In evaluating intrinsic importance the criteria are specific to each country. The experience of other countries, however, can be most useful in alerting us to patterns of developments which are likely to occur; thereby enabling us to diagnose at an early stage an emerging problem which might not otherwise be diagnosed until it had reached crisis proportions.
26. Comparison of the experience of different countries could also help us to predict the likely resource-costs and benefits of particular pieces of policy-making, but so far there have not been enough studies of livestock policy carried out, either in depth, i.e. of particular countries over long periods in time, or in breadth, i.e. comparing the experience of many different countries, to provide us yet with much objective guidance.^{2/}
27. Here at ILCA we have already made some efforts to do cross-country analysis to see whether data already collected and published by other organisations enable us to identify, over a wide range of policies, associations between particular sorts of policies and growth in livestock output in a way that would enable us to pinpoint the key policy issues. We looked, for example, at the scale of government expenditures on veterinary services and research and at input marketing systems; but we were unable to find significant relations with these variables (McClintock, 1984). However, the data we had to use were unsatisfactory in a variety of ways and we are now engaged in collecting more reliable and relevant data. In the meantime, in the absence of objective analysis, we all, as individuals, have to rely on subjective hunch to identify those policy issues where concentration of effort in policy analysis and policy-making will yield the highest returns.

Designing better policies and forecasting results

28. It is easy to point to defects in existing policies, but we also need to design better ones: and if governments are to be persuaded to pay more attention to policy issues and to abandon previous inappropriate policies and embrace new ones, they need to be convinced that these new policies will bear the fruits promised. Do policy makers have to rely solely on guesses or hunches about what the effects of new policies will be? Or is it possible to provide them with more objective guidance? Is every country a "special case" that can learn only from its own experience in policy issues, or is it possible to draw on experience already obtained in other countries? I believe that we can draw on experience elsewhere but at the same time I suppose that most of us have become wary of lines of reasoning that say that if a policy works in France/UK/USA/USSR it must work in Africa also. We cannot hope to settle in this paper the issue of the transferability of experience but it is a critically important one which we should briefly consider.
29. Let me try to illustrate it, and since I am an economist I will take the example of pricing policies for meat. Let us imagine (assume) a country with a livestock sector composed partly of commercial ranchers, partly of nomadic pastoralists and partly of mixed livestock - grain smallholder enterprises. Let us also imagine that this is a country where in the past livestock and meat prices remained quite low because of the possibility of cheap imports from abroad while at the same time its meat exports were constrained by disease regulations. Domestic livestock output has stagnated and the import bill for meat has climbed alarmingly with almost all imported meat being consumed in the main towns. Projections, based on past trends in consumption and production, predict very large and growing meat imports in the future. A recent donor-sponsored livestock sector review has called for a change in government pricing policy to raise prices to producers in order to elicit more domestic output to replace imports. The government budget is very tight, so that it will be impossible, by means of a consumption subsidy, to raise producer prices without also raising consumer prices unless marketing margins can be reduced. The domestic livestock and meat marketing system is handled by large numbers of private traders. The country has very

inadequate statistics on past levels of domestic production, consumption, trade and prices on which to base predictions of the results of policy changes. Data on growth in the human population are, however, available and reliable.

30. In deciding whether to accept the advice to adopt a price-increasing policy the government ought to consider a number of points. How rapidly will domestic consumption and production increase in the absence of changes in price? What price changes will occur anyway in the absence of a change in policy? Does the government have the ability to raise producer prices if it wants to? How much can marketing margins be reduced in order to allow increases in producer prices without corresponding rises in consumer prices? By how much will an $x\%$ rise in consumer prices affect meat consumption (price elasticity of demand)? By how much will a $y\%$ change in producer prices affect production for sale (price elasticity of supply)? What will be the income and nutritional effects on different groups of consumers and producers of a change in price policy for meat?
31. These points need consideration by the government in order to compare this (price-increasing) change in policy either with making no changes at all or, more sensibly, with some other alternative policies which might save an equivalent amount of foreign exchange. Whereas ideally one would like to base predictions about the effects of a change in price policy mainly on past experience of price policy changes within the same country, often this may be impossible either for lack of data on the past or because the country has itself recently altered so far and so fast that predictions based on its own experience may no longer be relevant. It may then have to rely on experience elsewhere.
32. I am going to be brave and hazard some opinions about the extent to which analysis of experience in other countries on these points will provide useful guidance to countries in sub-Saharan Africa which do not have experience of their own on which to rely. These opinions are summarised in Table 1 but only apply subject to the specific assumptions set out three paragraphs previously.

**Table 1. The predictability of events in one
country on the basis of experience in other countries.**

E v e n t	The extent of predictability
<u>Future changes in quantities (assuming no price change)</u>	
(i) Produced	X
(ii) Consumed	✓✓ *
<u>Future changes in prices (assuming no policy changes)</u>	
	X
<u>Ability of government to affect prices</u>	
	?✓
<u>Possible reduction in marketing margins</u>	
	✓✓ *
<u>Effect of price changes on quantities</u>	
(i) Produced	?✓
(ii) Consumed	✓
<u>Effects on different groups of producers and consumers</u>	
(i) Income	✓
(ii) Nutrition	✓

- ✓ = Direction of change predictable but size of change only poorly predictable.
- ✓✓ = Both direction and size of change are predictable with reasonable accuracy.
- * = In these cases the necessary data collection and analysis are, for the most part, already complete. In the other cases marked ✓ it is affirmed that such studies could be successfully carried out.
- X = Neither the direction nor size of change can be successfully predicted on the basis of experience in other countries.

33. On most of the points I am fairly confident about the extent to which experience in other countries can usefully guide policy and predict events in a particular country. I have put a question mark, however, against two points: the ability of government to affect prices; and the effect of price changes on the amount produced. In principle a cross-country study should be able to reveal the extent and the conditions under which a government can enforce a policy, e.g. on meat and livestock prices. However, it is a capability which is frequently overestimated and the science of assessing administrative capacity is a young one; so perhaps some caution is needed.
34. We can illustrate the kind of discrimination which needs to be exercised in drawing on experience in other countries from the case of the effect of price changes on the quantity of livestock and meat produced for sale (supplied). In brief, some controversy exists as to whether price rises are likely, in Africa, to lead to more or less livestock being supplied for slaughter. Some people argue that African livestock producers have limited needs for cash and a rise in price will merely enable them to sell less animals to obtain the same amount of cash, and that there are other factors which cause livestock owners to want to increase their herd size. Others argue that livestock owners in Africa respond in the same way as farmers do everywhere, and if prices rise they increase output. Others argue that although in the long term livestock holders will plan to increase output, in the short term, for sound economic reasons, they may withhold animals from market; and yet others argue that African pastoralists may not increase output in response to a price rise because it is not profitable for them to do so. (For further discussion see Low, 1980; Jarvis, 1980; Sandford, 1983; Ariza-Nino and Shapiro, 1984; Ndzingo, et al, 1984).
35. If we are to proceed beyond this controversy, we need to distinguish between different kinds of livestock owners who may behave in different ways and study each kind separately. For example, many traditional African pastoralists in remote areas lack access either to consumer goods on which to spend extra cash or to inputs purchaseable for cash (e.g. feed concentrates, veterinary medicines) with which to increase output. The response of such pastoralists to higher prices for their livestock

is quite likely to be to sell fewer for they have other uses to which livestock can be put. The response of commercial ranchers, however, (depending on how permanent they think an increase in prices will be) may be to sell off more animals quickly, to hold back animals temporarily from the market in order to put more weight on them, or to convert from a mainly breeding to a mainly fattening operation or vice versa. The response of mixed grain - livestock smallholders will in turn be somewhat different, and in drawing on experience from other countries we need to be very aware of the systematic similarities and differences between production systems in different countries so that we can draw only on experience which is relevant to the situation of our own countries.

36. This example of policy in respect to prices will, I hope, be useful in illustrating the extent to which experience in other countries can help policy makers. The crucial issue is how closely the natural and social aspects of the production, consumption or marketing systems in the individual country match those of other countries from whose experience it is hoped to learn. Obviously there will be no exact match and to that extent the causal sequences will not be identical either. For a variety of reasons the match is generally likely to be closer in the production system between an African country and other African countries than between an African country and countries in other parts of the world; but as the pricing example shows even then one must have close regard to the details of the production system. Experience in other continents may be more applicable to Africa in respect of consumption and marketing systems than it is for production; even so, considerable caution must be exercised.
37. By implication the example of pricing policy also shows the extent to which one particular kind of research, research which compares experience in different countries ("cross-country" research), can be useful to the same policy makers. At the moment, because of lack of policy-oriented research, policy makers often have to guess at the probable results of the policies they propose. We cannot ever expect to eliminate entirely the role of guesswork in policy-making. But good research, both cross-country research and research which analyses in depth the experience of particular countries, can greatly reduce the amount of guesswork

which has to be done and so improve the reliability with which the results of different policies can be predicted. Here at ILCA we are conducting a number of both cross-country and in-depth, single-country studies on policy issues.

Improvements in the process of policy formulation

38. Better policies in the livestock sector of sub-Saharan Africa are unlikely to be adopted on a wide scale unless the process of policy analysis and making (which, together, constitute "policy formulation") can itself be improved. By process I include such things as: the early identification of forthcoming problems and opportunities and of the policy options open to government in confronting these; the analysis of the likely benefits and costs of the various options; consultation with the interests (e.g. consumers', producers', distributors', bureaucratic, political) most closely involved so that unforeseen snags do not suddenly emerge; a clear decision in favour of a particular policy which sets out the objectives and instruments; and the management of the bureaucratic, political and legislative process so that the policy decision becomes effective.
39. I am now going to present a caricature of the process of livestock policy formulation as currently practised in sub-Saharan Africa. The caricature is cruel, mythical and does not apply closely to any one country in Africa or to any one donor. But such caricatures or "parables" are useful devices for bringing to life general principles which, in the abstract, are somewhat boring. There are probably elements in this particular caricature which correspond closely enough to actual experience to make many readers of this paper uncomfortable.

A caricature of policy formulation

40. Some years ago in country A the government changed and the new government immediately announced, without consultation with its technical services, that in future the new vaccine TRIPKIL against trypanosomiasis would be provided free of charge by the veterinary services to any stockowner requesting it^{3/}. Trypanosomiasis is only a problem in one corner of country A which traditionally has no livestock but which is

currently being opened up for commercial ranching. TRIPKIL is extremely expensive, has to be imported, and the veterinary services can only meet, at 20 000 doses annually, about half the demand for it but use 60% of their total annual budget for drugs and vaccines in doing so. TRIPKIL has to be stored in a deep freeze until 12 hours before use. The veterinary department has an alternative cheaper scheme for dealing with the problem of trypanosomiasis but lacks anyone experienced in the bureaucratic skills of "project preparation" who can prepare the necessary feasibility study to secure financing.

41. Shortly after the new government came into power donor B offered to fund a new policy unit in the ministry of livestock. Donor B has provided for the unit an expatriate policy expert, an agricultural economist who previously worked in Indonesia, and he has arrived with his micro computer and a special policy software programme for it called WONGO^{3/}. At the moment there are no other staff in the policy unit as all the local staff are away on training abroad. The director of veterinary services disapproves of the policy unit, and the policy expert reports directly to the Permanent Secretary of the ministry who until recently was a research scientist in animal genetics. The policy expert frequently sends to the Permanent Secretary thoughtful memoranda full of mathematical equations and computer print-outs. The Permanent Secretary tried to read one of these but could not understand it and, in any case, he is far too busy to do so because for several months he has spent all his time trying to get a consignment of 4-wheel drive vehicles intended for the veterinary services released from the customs warehouse.
42. The Permanent Secretary is also very busy trying to get a new US\$ 50 million tannery project ready for appraisal and financing by donor B. At this point in time the appraisal team arrives and is very impressed by the tannery project although it realizes that there are going to be problems in securing enough funds from the government's livestock ministry budget to finance the government's contribution to the project. Nevertheless, the team invites the government to send a delegation abroad to B to negotiate the project. On the last night of the appraisal team's visit they have dinner with the policy expert (who is an old colleague of the team leader's from Indonesia days) and he explains the latest output

of his WONGO programme and the solution it has found to the problem of the rising TRIPKIL subsidy.

43. When the government's negotiating team reach B they find the donor enthusiastic about financing the tannery, but at the last minute in the negotiations donor B demands, as a condition of the loan, that country A agrees to eradicate the TRIPKIL subsidy along the lines the policy expert's computer has suggested. These are that in the future TRIPKIL is to be handled exclusively by private rural pharmacies who will be required by law to stock it and sell it from their deep freezers at the wholesale price. In country A rural pharmacies have no deep freezers or any use for them except to store TRIPKIL. The negotiating delegation from country A are told by the donor that unless they agree immediately to this condition negotiations will be suspended and cannot be resumed, due to the donor's own timetable, for another 12 months. Country A's negotiating delegation agree, sign the agreement and return home. Shortly thereafter the tannery project starts and the TRIPKIL rural pharmacy legislation is enacted by presidential decree.
44. Soon after the publication of the decree the chairmen of the Rural Pharmacies Association and of the Commercial Ranchers' Cooperative - who happen to be senior officials in the governing political party - call on the President one evening and explain how the new law will ruin rural pharmacies by forcing them to buy expensive deep freezers whose cost they will not be allowed to recover from TRIPKIL's retail price. The first time the Permanent Secretary of the livestock ministry gets to know of these discussions is when these two chairmen call on him the following morning bearing a written order to him from the President requiring him to supply immediately, and free of charge, 40 000 doses of TRIPKIL and 200 deep freezers for distribution to rural pharmacies.
45. A fantastic story which we all hope could not be true. But it aptly illustrates the critical weakness of the process of much policy formulation in the livestock field in Africa: i.e.
- a) Inadequate indigenous capacity in analytic skills.
 - b) Policy makers who are too bogged down in detailed day-to-day executive work to have time to consider policy issues and

who lack experience or training in dealing with them.

- c) A failure to identify all the policy options.
- d) A policy unit whose existence and role is not accepted by one of the technical services in whose subject-area it is supposed to analyse policy.
- e) Inadequate mechanisms within the state bureaucracy to discuss policy issues.
- f) A divorce between bureaucratic "policy formulation" and the real world of economics and politics as practised by political parties and economic interests, so that "policy formulation" fails to identify practical problems (the deep freeze issue!), to come up with policies which are politically realistic, or to subject special pleading by interest groups to critical analysis in the light of the overall interest.
- g) A policy issue that is only tackled either in emergencies and by politicians without consulting their officials or when a donor applies pressure, even though it clearly needs tackling systematically in the country's own interest.
- h) A donor who is enthusiastic but naive about policy-making and who believes the timetable of policy-making in any country can be altered to fit the donor's convenience.
- i) An "old boy network" alliance between expatriate technical assistance experts and the staff of a donor that is responsible to no one, and, at the same time, both technically and politically incompetent.
- j) The use of "sophisticated" techniques for policy analysis which obscure and mystify rather than clarify issues for policy makers.

46. This section of the paper has identified a number of problems in the process of policy analysis and policy-making but has not provided any suggestion for their solution. Urgent attention needs to be given to consideration of how the process of policy formulation can be improved, and in particular:-

- a) What bureaucratic organisations and mechanisms are needed for analysis and coordination of livestock policies.
- b) What extra resources (time!) and skills are needed to facilitate good policy analysis and policy-making. Is there a role for in-service training

in policy-making for senior officials appointed late in their careers to posts involving policy issues?

- c) How can bureaucrats, economic interests and political parties best communicate with and confront each other so that legitimate interests can be taken into account and illegitimate special pleading exposed to public scrutiny?
- d) What helpful role can donors play to improve livestock policy making in Africa?

Conclusions

- 47. Policy issues are important and better policies can contribute to meeting African governments' objectives, whether these be simply increased livestock output or something else. Better policies can be introduced by concentrating on the issues of highest priority and by designing better policies to deal with these issues. Better policies can often be designed by drawing on experience from other countries, and research can be helpful in drawing the right lessons from this experience. A necessary condition for identifying the key issues and for designing better policies to deal with them is the existence of a proper process for policy formulation.

FOOTNOTES

- 1/ A version of this paper was first presented at the conference on Livestock Policy Issues in Africa, held at the International Livestock Centre for Africa from 24th to 28th September 1984.
- 2/ ILCA's Livestock Policy Unit is currently engaged in a number of studies, comparing experience in different countries, which it is hoped will throw light on this. Raikes (1981) provides some in-depth information in respect of three countries in East Africa.
- 3/ TRIPKIL and WONGO are brand names fabricated by the author and do not refer to any products actually in existence. In any case, a vaccine against trypanosomiasis does not yet exist.

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