Unraveling the effects of payments for ecosystem services on motivations for collective action
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Midler, E.; Pascual, U.; Drucker, A.G.; Narloch, U.; Soto, J.L. (2015) Unraveling the effects of payments for ecosystem services on motivations for collective action. Ecological Economics 120 p. 394–405 ISSN: 0921-8009
Permanent link to cite or share this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10568/69163
External link to download this item: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0921800915001639
This paper addresses the differential impacts on decisions towards collective action in the context of payments for ecosystem services (PES) where individual and collective rewards are conditional on a minimum collective conservation level being achieved. Interactions between the different reward types, farmers' social preferences, social ties and communication are identified. A field game experiment is conducted with Andean farmers in Peru and framed around their decisions to conserve agrobiodiversity as an impure public good. The main result is that PES schemes could be effective in motivating collective action for agrobiodiversity conservation: Individual rewards are likely to be more effective and less sensitive to social factors than collective rewards. The latter might have a positive effect on conservation when they are shared within socially closely-related groups and in situations where communication and deliberation about collective action is possible.
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