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dc.contributor.authorDrucker, Adam G.en_US
dc.contributor.authorNarloch, U.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPascual, U.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSoto, J.L.en_US
dc.contributor.authorPinto, M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorMidler, E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorValdivia, E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorRojas, W.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-25T10:12:43Zen_US
dc.date.available2016-01-25T10:12:43Zen_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/70126en_US
dc.titleDomestication of payments for ecosystem services: new evidence from the Andes.en_US
cg.subject.bioversityECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTen_US
cg.subject.bioversityECOSYSTEM SERVICESen_US
cg.subject.bioversityAGRICULTUREen_US
cg.subject.bioversityBIODIVERSITYen_US
cg.subject.bioversityFIELD EXPERIMENTATIONen_US
cg.authorship.typesCGIAR and advanced research instituteen_US
dcterms.abstractThe current project has sought to assess i) the potential of agricultural biodiversity-focused PES to serve as a cost-effective and socially equitable domesticated diversity conservation incentive scheme, as well as ii) how economic incentive mechanisms such as PES can be designed to build on and complement local institutions of collective action. Results are presented from pilot Payment for Agrobiodiversity Conservation (PACS) schemes and framed field experiments implemented in the Bolivian and Peruvian Andes aimed at sustaining diversity within quinoa, a traditional Andean grain. Findings indicate that opportunity costs of conservation vary widely not only between the two study sites, but also between community-based groups within each site. This creates opportunities to minimize intervention costs by selecting least-cost conserving farmers. However, as shown with respect to the role of wealth and cooperation in determining opportunity costs, this also has implications for the type of farmer to be included in the conservation programme. Promisingly, depending on the fairness principle deemed most important in the local context, there does not necessarily have to be a significant trade-off between the schemes’ potential cost-effectiveness and equity outcomes. The observed behavior in the farmer experimental games further supports such findings and suggests that understanding farmer perceptions of fairness can have important implications for the design of conservation incentive mechanisms, particularly given the important influence of such perceptions on the pro-social behavior that underlies much de facto conservation. Incentive mechanisms, such as PACS, that can support socially valued ends not only by harnessing selfish preferences to public ends but also by evoking public-spirited motives are also more likely to be sustainable over the long-term. The use of PACS incentives for the maintenance of traditional crop varieties and the improvement of smallholder farmer livelihoods thus appears promising for further development and up-scaling.en_US
dcterms.accessRightsOpen Accessen_US
dcterms.audienceScientistsen_US
dcterms.bibliographicCitationDrucker, A.G.; Narloch, U.; Pascual, U.; Soto, J.L.; Pinto, M.; Midler, E.; Valdivia, E.; Rojas, W. (2015) Domestication of payments for ecosystem services: new evidence from the Andes. CAPRi Working Paper No. 118. International Food Policy Research Institute. 61 p.en_US
dcterms.extent61 p.en_US
dcterms.isPartOfCAPRi Working Paperen_US
dcterms.issued2015en_US
dcterms.languageenen_US
dcterms.publisherInternational Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)en_US
dcterms.subjecteconomic developmenten_US
dcterms.subjectecosystem servicesen_US
dcterms.subjectquinoaen_US
dcterms.subjectbiodiversityen_US
dcterms.subjectagricultureen_US
dcterms.subjectfield experimentationen_US
dcterms.typeWorking Paperen_US
cg.subject.ilriRANGELANDSen_US
cg.contributor.affiliationBioversity Internationalen_US
cg.contributor.affiliationUniversity of Cambridgeen_US
cg.contributor.affiliationBasque Centre for Climate Changeen_US
cg.contributor.affiliationCentro de Investigacion de Recursos Naturales y Medio Ambienteen_US
cg.contributor.affiliationFundación PROINPAen_US
cg.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.2499/CAPRiWP118en_US
cg.placeWashington D.C. (USA)en_US
cg.contributor.crpPolicies, Institutions, and Marketsen_US
cg.creator.identifierAdam Drucker: 0000-0002-9800-6800en_US
cg.number118en_US


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