



# Biological emergencies surveillance, early warning and rapid response systems: Status and perspectives for East Africa

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Synthetic Biology Africa-Global Catastrophic Biological Risks Initiative  
Workshop

Kampala, 9-11 June 2022





Centre for  
Tropical Livestock  
Genetics and Health



Synbio Africa Global Catastrophic  
Biological Risks Initiative  
(SBA - GCBRI)

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# Outline

1. Background
2. Catastrophic biological emergencies & surveillance
3. Early warning and rapid response systems
4. Perspectives for East Africa

# 1.1 - Catastrophes categories

## Natural catastrophes

### Biological

- Epidemic
- Insect Infestation
- Animal Stampede

### Geological

- Earthquake
- Volcano
- Mass Movement (dry)

### Climatological

- Extreme temperature
- Heat/cold wave
- Drought
- Fire (farm, forest, etc.)

### Hydrological

- Flood
- Mass movement (wet)

### Meteorological

- Storm
- Cyclone
- Hurricane
- tornado

## Human induced catastrophes

Nuclear

Technological

Chemical

## Complex catastrophes

Natural Catastrophes

Humane Induced catastrophes




*Variety and types of catastrophes . Wood et al. (2013)*

## 1.2- Global catastrophic biological risks (GCBR)


- **GCBR** - biological risk that could produce sudden disasters, mass casualty events, or by other means significantly change the trajectory of humanity.
- Natural and artificial GCBR threaten humanity, directly or indirectly,

**A biological risk  
anywhere is a risk  
everywhere**




## 1.2- Global catastrophic biological risks (GCBR)

- The probability of a GCBR is hard to accurately estimate but **may be higher now than ever: need closer attention.**
- The global south (GS) carries most of the global burden of natural GCBR and are more exposed to emerging disease spillovers from all origins.



## 1.2- Global catastrophic biological risks (GCBR)

- GS should be a primary focus of efforts to **prevent** and **respond** to the **next biological catastrophes**.




Global multihazards mortality risks and distribution (2005)

Many African countries lack the capacity to deal with these threats, or their countermeasures may be too slow.

# 1.2- Global catastrophic biological risks (GCBR)

## SBA-GCBRI eastern region (16 countries)



1) Uganda (Centre)

2) Comoros

3) Ethiopia

4) Eritrea

5) Kenya

6) Rwanda

7) Seychelles

8) Somali

9) South Sudan

10) Tanzania

11) Burundi

12) Djibouti

13) Republic of the Congo

14) The Democratic Republic of Congo


15) Sudan


16) The Central Africa Republic

### Key concerns

 **≥ 7.8 million**  
people have been pushed to the very edge of starvation

 **≥ 34 million**  
people are acutely food insecure

 **Fragility in the region is acute.**  
Continued conflict in Tigray, protracted conflict in South Sudan, Sudan and Somalia threaten human and economic development gains.

 **COVID-19** aftershocks ripple through communities with declining income opportunities, lost livelihoods and diminished purchasing power.

 **≥ 9.6 million**  
Internally displaced people

 **≥ 4.7 million**  
Refugees and asylum seekers

 **≥ 12.8 million**  
Acutely malnourished children

Source: UN OCHA




## 2- Catastrophic biological emergencies & surveillance



# 2.1 - Origins of catastrophic biological emergencies

## Hot Spots for Emerging Diseases



## 2.2- Surveillance

Surveillance is the ongoing systematic identification, collection, collation, analysis and interpretation of disease occurrence and public health event data, for the purposes of taking timely, appropriate and effective action.

Surveillance is also essential for planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public health practice.

## 2.2- Surveillance

**Passive surveillance.** Routine reports submitted from health and lab facilities.

**Active surveillance.** Active search for cases in the community or risk related facilities: calls or moving physically to the facilities to carry out record review of data.

**Integrated surveillance.** Collecting data for multiple risk, using standardized tools.

Data collection & analysis system relies on two main channels of information or signal generation:


- Indicator-based surveillance (**IBS**):
- Event-based surveillance (**EBS**).

# 2.2- Surveillance



## IBS:

- Systematic (regular) identification, collection, monitoring, analysis and interpretation of structured data (indicators produced by recognized and mostly formal/institutional sources).



## EBS:

- Organized and rapid capture of information about events that are of potential risk to public health.
- Based on the screening of all available information to detect any event happening in the community.



- Facility-based surveillance
- Case-based surveillance
- Sentinel surveillance
- Syndromic surveillance
- Laboratory-based surveillance
- Disease-specific surveillance
- Community-based surveillance (CBS)

- EXAMPLES OF IBS SOURCES**
- Epidemiological surveillance
  - Mandatory notification
  - Sentinel surveillance
  - Syndromic surveillance
  - Registers
  - Mortality date
  - Laboratory data
  - Surveys/Research

- EXAMPLES OF EBS SOURCES**
- Media
  - Community
  - Internet, blogs, social networks
  - Informal networks
  - Official websites (MoH, MoA, etc.)
  - Alert networks
  - NGOs
  - Private sectors
  - Animal health
  - Environmental disasters

- Occurrence of a risk factor,
- Potential exposure for human to hazards, including chemical and radio-nuclear events;
- Sign of any biological, chemical or radiological and nuclear hazards

# 2.2- Surveillance



\* Systematic and continuous collection, analysis, and interpretation of data, closely integrated with the timely and coherent dissemination of the results and assessment to those who have the right to know so that action can be taken (Porta MA, Dictionary of Epidemiology, 5th Ed., Oxford University Press, 2008).  
 † Vital registration, cancer registries, and exposure registries.  
 § Medical and laboratory records, criminal justice information, and Lexis-Nexis.  
 ¶ Weather, climate change, and pollution.

# 2.3- Surveillance in East Africa

## East Africa steps up health emergency readiness, response

News and Press Release • Source: [WHO](#) • Posted: 6 May 2022 • Originally published: 6 May 2022 • Origin: [View original](#)



© WHO/Marta Monge

Arusha, Tanzania – Five East African countries have held their first simulation exercise since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic to improve preparedness and bolster response to health emergencies.

**Primary country:**  
[Burundi](#)

**Other countries:**  
[Kenya](#) / [South Sudan](#) / [Uganda](#) / [United Republic of Tanzania](#)

**Source:**  
[World Health Organization](#)

**Format:**  
[News and Press Release](#)

**Themes:**  
[Disaster Management](#) / [Health](#)

**Disaster type:**  
[Epidemic](#)

**Language:**  
[English](#)



# WORLD VISION KENYA ANNUAL REPORT | 2021

## DISASTER MANAGEMENT

Our Disaster Management projects seek to save lives through emergency response, relief and resilience building during and after disasters.

We work with children, families and their communities in disaster preparedness and help reduce the impact of future disasters. We focus on mitigating the effects of drought, floods, conflict, violence and other emergencies such as fire and disease outbreaks.



We are committed to helping communities cope, effectively with, and recover from disasters such as floods, drought and disease outbreaks. [ReliefWeb Press](#)

In 2021, the main disaster management interventions were around the following areas:

- Food Aid Grants
- Peace Building Grants
- Livelihood Grants
- Emergency Response Grants

**Cash Transfer**

Total Cash Transfer	Beneficiaries Reached
USD 531,857	46,787

**START FUND**  
START NETWORK

**MONTHLY RISK BULLETIN**  
ISSUED: 27 MAY 2022

Start members and their partners should consider acting on or developing risks through the Start Fund Crisis Anticipation. Click [HERE](#) for more information on Start Fund Crisis Anticipation. Click [HERE](#) for an anticipation alert note template. Click [HERE](#) for advocating anticipatory action.

### UPCOMING RISKS

#### RISK RELEVANCE:

The risk relevance rating considers the relevance of the risk to the Start Fund Crisis Anticipation. Risks are categorized with FOREWARN input.

- HIGH RELEVANCE
- MEDIUM RELEVANCE
- LOW RELEVANCE

#### INFORM GLOBAL RISK INDEX:

The [FOREWARN](#) risk index identifies countries at risk from humanitarian crises and disasters that could overwhelm national response capacity. It is made up of three dimensions - hazards and exposure, vulnerability and lack of coping capacity.




#### HIGH RELEVANCE

RISK & COUNTRY/	RISK INFORMATION	SOURCE/KEY
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>ELECTION VIOLENCE</li> <li>KENYA</li> <li>INFORM RISK CLASS: HIGH</li> </ul>	<p>There is a risk of increased violence linked to electoral events. Political parties have started with party primaries ahead of the upcoming general elections in August, which has coincided with a rise in voter looting among supporters. ACLED data reports 103 politically related voter events in April and May, resulting in 68 fatalities. IFRC highlights that near to elections have seen incidences of non-commercial conflict and displacement, and there is a need to prepare for the crisis and impact on the humanitarian situation in Kenya. In 2017, Start Network interventions in Kenya focused on crisis sub-committee for election-related violence and displacement based on findings from a CBARR analysis funded by an Analysis for Action grant. Start Fund projects were implemented used to increase and surge support to election preparation work.</p>	<p>ACLED</p> <p>CRISIS GROUP</p> <p>IFRC</p>

<https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/east-africa-steps-health-emergency-readiness-response>

# 2.3- Surveillance in East Africa

Catastrophic biological surveillance frameworks in East Africa



Source: Nsubuga et al. 2012



# International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI)



## ILRI offices and staff worldwide



Main campuses: Nairobi and Addis Ababa

Offices in 17 other countries


- Cutting-edge research infrastructures, a range of highly specialized laboratories, a gene bank and a large farm.

- Main Campuses in **Kenya & Ethiopia**,
- Offices in **17** other countries

## Research Programmes

- Livestock Genetics and Centre for Tropical Livestock Genetics and Health (CTLGH)
- Animal and human health
- BecA-ILRI hub
- Feed and forage development
- Sustainable livestock systems
- Policies, institutions and livelihoods
- Impact at scale

# Biological surveillance at the International Livestock Research Institute





Boosting Uganda's  
Investment in Livestock  
Development

# Rift Valley fever



**Kristina Roesel**

Develop a socio-economic framework to assess the impact of RVF interventions

Ex-ante analyses of control options; KAP questionnaire surveys; Gender assessments - exposure and constraints on uptake of interventions



Improve RVF surveillance and outbreak response

Outbreak investigations, Genotyping - RVF and other viruses; Serology (establish Gn/Gc distribution); Entomological studies; Risk mapping, sentinel studies



Inform the National Action Plan / Policy

Contingency plans/decision support tools (risk maps); Community trainings



## Cross-cutting :

South-south learning & regional networking/coordination (Kenya-Uganda)  
Alignment with international recommendations (e.g. OIE PPR GEP and PVS)  
Capacity development

# Antimicrobial resistance (AMR)



*Arshnee Moodley*



Understand antimicrobials (AM) use in broiler production in Uganda

Grey literature review, policy review; AMUSE tool survey



Understand transmission pathways of bacteria in poultry farms

Prevalence study (E. coli, Enterococci, Salmonella); risk factor analysis; MALDI-TOF MS



Quantification AMR in poultry farms, farm workers, environment (E. coli, Enterococci, Salmonella); WGS; residue testing at retail



Assess capacity development gaps in the implementation of the AMR National Action Plan

Support review of National AMR Action Plan; Strengthen surveillance system; Awareness creation of farmers and human-centred behaviour change campaigns



# One Health Research, Education and Outreach Centre in Africa (OHRECA)



**Bernard Bett**

<p><b>Neglected Zoonotic Diseases (NZDs)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Collection of robust empirical economic &amp; epidemiological data on the impact of One Health approaches for zoonotic disease control</li> <li>• Support needs based research on endemic zoonoses</li> </ul>	<p><b>Food Safety</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improve food safety in informal markets in Africa</li> <li>• Support behaviour change interventions on food safety</li> </ul>
<p><b>Emerging Infectious Diseases (EIDs)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supports studies to identify drivers of EIDs and generate EID hotspot maps</li> <li>• Enhance surveillance and response to EID events</li> </ul>	<p><b>Antimicrobial Resistance (AMR)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conduct Amuse, KAP, and AMR situation analyses to guide new research</li> <li>• Support refinement of AMR action plans in selected countries</li> </ul>

• Quantifying the 'Business Case' for One Health  
 • Capacity strengthening  
 • Integrated surveillance systems



# The LiveGene Program

Translating Genetic Research to Adoption & Social Value



Steve Kemp



Okeyo Mwai



## Preparing the regulatory, safety & public awareness environment




- Ground-breaking Science
- The Challenge of Adoption
- Defining the Testing Routemap

“Systems Change at the Speed of Trust”:

Establishing trust is key to regulatory progress and the eventual adoption and understanding of genome edited livestock

# 2.4 Genomic data production for biological surveillance: ILRI



Sequencers (Illumina MiSeq and NextSeq, ONT MinION, etc.)

HPC storage infrastructure

# ILRI Biorepository to support pathogen discovery

## AZIZI BIOREPOSITORY

### Bio-banking and Metagenomics Platforms for Pathogen Discovery

There has been documented increase of emergence and re-emergence of zoonotic infectious diseases in Africa in the past years. The pathogen discovery team at the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) addresses the problem in Kenya and beyond. The genomics platform at ILRI which is an integration of the bio-repository (Biobank), first and second generation sequencing platforms and high performance computing systems facilitates the pathogen discovery work.

Source of samples: Field sampling and collaborators



Sampling is a very time-consuming and expensive exercise. We have an ethical and scientific responsibility to make the best use of that effort and money.

Collaborating institutions



The system is under fulltime surveillance and monitoring



Bio-Bank System

Data captured by LIMS

Provide samples to genomics platform and receive back data

Metagenomics platform has first and second generation sequencers



Processed and analyzed data linked to sample

LIMS captures all sample metadata, storage and all data is backed up

Backup PC

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The Bioinformatics platform has 88 compute cores, 31TB of network-attached ClusterFS storage and back up systems.

Data transferred to HPC

Genebank, Pubmed (NCBI), MGRAST

### Conclusion

The biobank currently has 500,000 samples which include blood, tissues and semen among others from livestock, wildlife, human and insects collected from East, West and Central Africa among other regions. The genomics platform at ILRI has generated outputs ranging from whole/partial genome sequences of Rift Valley fever, Equine Encephalosis, Blue Tongue, African swine fever, Ndumu, Semliki forest, Dugbe, Bunyamwera, Chikungunya, Newcastle disease and Pigeon Paramyxio - viruses among other organisms including bacteria, plants and animals. A number of the genomes are also available to the public on NCBI database.

Steve Kemp | s.kemp@cgiar.org | Box 30709-00100, Nairobi, Kenya | +254 20 422 3360 | www.ilri.org

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→ 09 tanks




→ 80000 samples per tanks

→ Total capacity: 720 000 samples



**OPEN** **Microbial Diversity in Bushmeat Samples Recovered from the Serengeti Ecosystem in Tanzania**

Robab Katani<sup>1,2</sup>, Megan A. Schilling<sup>2,3</sup>, Beatus Lyimo<sup>4</sup>, Triza Tonui<sup>5</sup>, Isabella M. Cattadori<sup>1,6</sup>, Ernest Eblate<sup>4,7</sup>, Andimile Martin<sup>4</sup>, Anna B. Estes<sup>2,4</sup>, Teresa Buza<sup>2</sup>, Dennis Rentsch<sup>8</sup>, Karen W. Davenport<sup>9</sup>, Blake T. Hovde<sup>9</sup>, Samson Lyimo<sup>4</sup>, Lydia Munuo<sup>4</sup>, Francesca Stomeo<sup>5,10</sup>, **Christian Tiambo**<sup>9</sup>, Jessica Radzio-Basu<sup>1,2</sup>, Fausta Mosha<sup>11</sup>, Peter J. Hudson<sup>1,2</sup>, Joram J. Buza<sup>4</sup> & Vivek Kapur<sup>1,2,3,4\*</sup>



**Figure.** Samples from wildlife species collected from the Western Serengeti.


**Figure.** Hierarchical clustering of samples based on the relative abundance of phyla.


**SOFTWARE** Open Access




# iMAP: an integrated bioinformatics and visualization pipeline for microbiome data analysis

Teresia M. Buza<sup>1,2\*</sup>, Triza Tonui<sup>3</sup>, Francesca Stomeo<sup>3,5</sup>, **Christian Tiambo**<sup>3</sup>, Robab Katani<sup>1,4</sup>, Megan Schilling<sup>1,5</sup>, Beatus Lyimo<sup>6</sup>, Paul Gwakisa<sup>7</sup>, Isabella M. Cattadori<sup>1,8</sup>, Joram Buza<sup>6</sup> and Vivek Kapur<sup>1,4,5,6</sup>





**Fig. Species richness and diversity.** The figure clearly reveals the differences observed in species abundances when comparing the main experimental variables including sex (orange) and time post weaning (green)



**Fig. Phylogenetic relationship and annotation of samples grouped by sex variable.** The circular phylograms (a), unrooted cladogram (b), and the rectangular phylograms (c) display the relationships of the 360 samples used in the case study.

# 2.5 Potential for genomic surveillance of catastrophic biological risks in East Africa





Fig. Next-generation sequencing capacity in Africa

# As prerequisites for preparedness



# 3- Early warning & rapid response systems



## 3.1 Early warning and rapid response systems (EWRS) are intended to:

- Identify and analyse risk trends,
- alert to catastrophe risk,
- inform decision-making and,
- initiate timely responses to prevent worst consequences.



## EWRS:

- Data collection and verification and,
- **Risk analysis** identifying emergency trends and dynamics at various levels.



Based on this analysis, recommendations can be made for timely and appropriate preventive action, or early response options, to targeted stakeholders.




## 3.2 Bio-risk assessment and management

$$\text{Risk} = \text{Severity} \times \text{Likelihood}$$


*Combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm where the source of harm is a biological agent or toxin.*

### Source:

- unintentional exposure,
- accidental release or loss,
- theft, misuse,
- diversion,
- unauthorized access or
- intentional unauthorized release



# Practical risk assessment



## Biological Risk Assessment Worksheet

Tracking # \_\_\_\_\_ Building/Lab Room # \_\_\_\_\_ PI Name \_\_\_\_\_

Laboratory protocols consist of one or more procedures. Each procedure in the protocol needs an agent-specific Biological Risk Assessment. Once an agent-specific Biological Risk Assessment has been completed for the procedure, it can be used for multiple protocols by referencing its tracking number. The procedure may be performed with additional precautions, if desired, but must be no less stringent than what is calculated below at Section II.

Keep a completed copy of this worksheet in your Biosafety Manual. The *Biosafety in Microbiological and Biological Laboratories (BMBL)* 5<sup>th</sup> Edition has additional guidance on facilities, work practices, PPE, and medical surveillance.

### Section I: Complete All Data Entry in this Section

- Agent Used \_\_\_\_\_
- Is a vaccine available? Yes  No
- Risk Group of Agent (check [www.absa.org](http://www.absa.org)) 1  2  3  4  (Inactivated agents = Risk Group 1)
- Procedure \_\_\_\_\_
- For Risk Group 2-3, is there a splash potential? Yes  No
- For Risk Group 2-3, does the procedure generate aerosol or large concentration? Yes  No  (e.g., cell culture, vortex, centrifuge, aerosol chamber, sonicate)

### Section II: Data will be calculated in this Section according to the answers entered above in Section I

- Facility and Work Practices Biological Safety Levels (BSLs)  
 Facility BSL 1  2  3  4       Work Practices BSL 1  2  3  4
- Biological Safety Cabinet Class I/II  Class III
- Personal Protective Equipment Needed for Procedure: (left to right = increased protection)
  - Gloves latex/nitrile required
  - Eye safety glasses  goggles + face shield
  - Lab coat white  blue smock/coveralls  space suit
  - Respirator\* N-95/PAPR  space suit
- Medical Protection and Surveillance
  - Medical Monitoring required
  - Hearing Conservation Program
  - Vaccine recommended\*
  - Respiratory Protection Program
- Comments \_\_\_\_\_

Note: \*Vaccines and respirators require separate risk assessments.

Biosafety Officer's Signature

**Biorisk Assessment Sheet**


# Practical risk assessment

## Pathogen risk assessments

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ One for every pathogen used</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>✓ Conducted before it is brought in</li><li>✓ Determines Risk Group</li><li>✓ Required by law based on main host/target (CBSG)</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Covers all aspects of use</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>✓ Storage,</li><li>✓ containment,</li><li>✓ handling PPE</li><li>✓ SOPs for entire lifecycle</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>▪ Pathogen Safety Data Sheet (PSDS) created</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>✓ Pathogenicity,</li><li>✓ route of infection,</li><li>✓ infectious dose,</li><li>✓ survival in the environment</li></ul>

# Practical risk assessment

Genetically modified/edited organisms (GMO/GEO) present an interesting challenge for Pathogen Risk Assessments.



**GMO/GEO**

Risk can increase or decrease

- ✓ Depends on transformation and gene(s) affected
- ✓ Original organism and source of genes considered first

Reassessment of risk required with alteration of:

- ✓ Pathogenicity/virulence
- ✓ Pharmacological activity (resistance)
- ✓ Genes related to hazardous properties (Production of toxins, oncogenes,

Ability to replicate

- ✓ Attenuation
- ✓ Change in host range

Containment level of organisms


- ✓ Gene recipient and gene donor

Potential pathogenic factors of genetic info

Possible novel hazards

Survivability outside containment zone

# Practical risk assessment



**Viral  
Vectors**

Engineered viruses

- ✓ Can create *GMOs*
- ✓ Transient or permanent gene modification

Considerations similar to *GMO*


"Safety features" included in design

- ✓ Reduced risk
- ✓ Replication deficiency

Additional risk from retroviral vectors

- ✓ Modify host DNA permanently
- ✓ Potential for oncogenesis (mutation causing cancer)

# Practical risk assessment



## Synthetic Biology

Genes/sequences created synthetically

- ✓ Not found in nature
- ✓ More novel approach


Risk difficult to assess

- ✓ Effects not always predictable
- ✓ Careful assessment and testing required

Interaction with existing genes/gene products

- ✓ Unexpected risks

# Practical risk assessment



**Toxins**

Not infectious material  
or toxic chemical

- ✓ Separate risk assessment required
- ✓ Common regulated toxins listed in HPTA
  - *Schedule 1 and Part I of Schedule 5*

Considerations

- ✓ Toxicity (lethal dose and/or effective dose)
- ✓ Risk and routes of exposure
- ✓ Concentration and amount used
- ✓ Rate of action
  - Neurotoxins effective in minutes/hours
  - Cytotoxins effective in hours/days
- ✓ Availability of treatment

# Classification of biological risk by groups

- **Group 1: (no or very low individual and community risk):** A microorganism that is unlikely to cause disease
- **Group 2: (moderate individual risk, low community risk):** A pathogen that can cause disease but is unlikely to be a serious hazard to individuals, community, livestock or environment.
- **Risk Group 3: (high individual risk, low community risk):** A pathogen usually causes serious human/animal disease but does not ordinarily contaminate others.
- **Risk Group 4: (high individual and community risk):** A pathogen usually causes serious human/animal disease and can be transmitted to others directly or indirectly.



# Classification of biological risk by groups

	Slightly harmful	Harmful	Extremely harmful
Highly unlikely	Trivial risk*	Tolerable risk#	Moderate risk\$
Unlikely	Tolerable risk	Moderate risk	Substantial risk†
Likely	Moderate risk	Substantial risk	Intolerable risk¥

\* No action required, and no documentary records need to be kept.

# No additional controls required, but monitoring required to ensure that the controls are maintained.

\$ Efforts needed to reduce the risk within a defined time period. If moderate risk is associated with extremely harmful consequences, further assessment necessary to establish the likelihood of harm the need for improved control measures

† No activity authorized until the risk has been reduced. Where the risk involves work in progress, urgent action should be taken.

¥ No activity authorized to started or continued until the risk has been reduced. If it is not possible to reduce risk, work has to remain prohibited.

# Early warning and rapid response systems in East Africa: the capabilities

AU sets up Nairobi  
situation room to help  
Africa mitigate  
disasters



<https://www.voanews.com/a/au-sets-up-nairobi-situation-room-to-help-africa-mitigate-disasters/6315749.html>

# Early warning and Rapid response systems in East Africa: the capabilities



18/02/22 22 October 2021 Source(s): United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction Regional Office for Africa African Union Commission Contact information: [info@unodc.org](mailto:info@unodc.org) or [info@au.int](mailto:info@au.int)



## Africa Multi-hazard Early Warning and Action System for Disaster Risk Reduction

A Multi-hazard Early Warning/Early Action Conference was convened from 28-29 October 2021 in Nairobi, Kenya. The conference was organized by the African Union Commission (AUC) and supported by United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). The event was attended by representatives from Regional Disaster Communities (RDCs).

RELATED INFORMATION  
[Sub-Saharan Africa Disaster Risk Reduction](#)



### MULTI-HAZARD EARLY WARNING SYSTEM AND ANTICIPATORY ACTION IN EASTERN AFRICA

Enhancing collaboration and coordination among national and regional stakeholders on multi-hazard early warning systems and early actions

Feb 18, 2022 | 8:00am

Feb 18, 2022

#### Multi-Hazard Early Warning System and Anticipatory Action in Eastern Africa region

Ended

Type: Workshop


Location: Virtual

Start Date: 18 Feb, 2022 08:00 AM

Timezone: GMT +03:00 Africa/Nairobi

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# 4. Perspectives for East Africa



# Propositions for actions forwards for SBA-GCBRI

## 1. Plan from known and likely catastrophic biological risks and actions

- Improve contingency planning, from interventions back to information needs
- Identify early actions for catastrophic biological risks
- Coordinate the multiple demands on timeliness
- Share information across borders
- Involve at-risk communities, and learn from existing success

# Propositions for actions forwards for SBA-GCBRI

## 2. Information/data and analysis

- Focus Information/data needs on contingency planning
- Improve biorisk Analysis / modeling
- Broaden the information base and improve information sharing and availability
- Build real-time monitoring into information or alert systems
- Prioritize capacity building

# Propositions for actions forwards for SBA-GCBRI

## 3. Cross-cutting recommendations

- Clarify the role of governments and NGOs
- National and regional regulatory frameworks
- Face ethical issues head on
- Learn from mistakes and learn from covid-19
- Depoliticize information, analysis, and action
- Build in accountability and involve at-risk communities

# Propositions for actions forward for SBA-GCBRI

## *Some needs for capacity building*

- Training & demos for community preparedness and recovery
- Catastrophic biological risk operations coordination
- CBR public information sharing & warning
- Fatality management and Mass care (Medical surge, countermeasure dispensing & administration, materiel management and distribution)
- Nonpharmaceutical interventions and harnessing traditional knowledge
- Public and vet. health laboratory testing, Biological surveillance and epidemiological investigation
- Volunteer management .



# Thank you

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Centre for  
Tropical Livestock  
Genetics and Health



Synbio Africa Global Catastrophic  
Biological Risks Initiative  
(SBA - GCBRI)

