‐‐‐‐‐  PUBLIC EXPENDITURE AND INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW Ghana’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture Ghana Strategy Support Program (GSSP) April 2009 IFPRI – ACCRA Ghana Strategy Support Program Postal Address: c/o International Water Management Institute (IWMI) PMB CT 112, Cantonments, Accra, Ghana Local Address: CSIR Campus (Opposite Chinese Embassy) Airport Residential Area Tel: +233-(0)21-780716 Fax: +233-(0)21-784752    IFPRI HEADQUARTERS Postal Address: 2033 K Street, NW • Washington, DC 20006-1002 USA Tel: +1-202-862-5600 Skype: IFPRIhomeoffice Fax: +1-202-467-4439 E-mail: ifpri@cgiar.org www.ifpri.org  http://www.ifpri.org/themes/gssp/gssp.htm For further information: Shashi Kolavalli, Senior Research Fellow and Program Leader s.kolavalli@cgiar.org     GSSP Background Paper 17 THE GHANA STRATEGY SUPPORT PROGRAM (GSSP) BACKGROUND PAPERS ABOUT GSSP IFPRI’s Ghana Strategy Support Program (GSSP) was launched in 2005 to address specific knowledge gaps concerning agricultural and rural development strategy implementation, to improve the data and knowledge base for applied policy analysis, and to strengthen the national capacity for practical applied policy research. The primary objective of the Ghana Strategy Support Program is to build the capabilities of researchers, administrators, policymakers, and members of civil society in Ghana to develop and implement agricultural and rural development strategies. Through collaborative research, communication, and capacity-strengthening activities and with core funding from the U.S. Agency for International Development/Ghana (USAID), GSSP works with its stakeholders to generate information, improve dialogue, and sharpen decision-making processes around the formulation and implementation of development strategies. ABOUT THESE BACKGROUND PAPERS The Ghana Strategy Support Program (GSSP) Background Papers contain preliminary material and research results from IFPRI and/or its partners in Ghana. The papers have not been subject to a formal peer review. They are circulated in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The opinions are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of their home institutions or supporting organizations. Public Expenditure and Institutional Review: Ghana’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture Shashi Kolavalli Development Strategy and Governance Division, IFPRI, Ghana Regina Birner Development Strategy and Governance Division, IFPRI, USA Sam Benin Development Strategy and Governance Division, IFPRI, USA Leah Horowitz Development Strategy and Governance Division, IFPRI, Ghana Suresh Babu Knowledge, Capacity, and Information Division, IFPRI, USA Kwadwo Asenso-Okyere Knowledge, Capacity, and Information Division, IFPRI, USA Nii Moi Thompson Development Policy Institute, Ghana John Poku Consultant, Ghana Copyright © 2009 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of this material may be reproduced for personal and not-for- profit use without the express written permission of but with acknowledgment to IFPRI. To reproduce the material contained herein for profit or commercial use requires express written permission. To obtain permission, contact the Communications Division at ifpri-copyright@cgiar.org. Acronyms AEA Agricultural Extension Agent AggSSIP Agricultural Sector Support Investment Project ARI Animal Research Institute BRRI Building and Roads Research Institute CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme CAGD Controller and Accountant Generals Department CRI Crops Research Institute CSIR Council for Scientific and Industrial Research COCOBOD Ghana Cocoa Board DADU District Agricultural Development Unit DAO District Agricultural Officer DDA District Director of Food and Agriculture DDO District Development Officer FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FASDEP Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy FBO Farmer-Based Organisation FRI Food Research Institute FORIG Forestry Research Institute of Ghana GIDA Ghana Irrigation Development Authority GLSS Ghana Living Standard Survey GPRS Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Country ICOUR Integrated Company for Upper Region ICMST International Centre for Materials Science and Technology IGF Internally generated fund IIR Institute of Industrial Research ISSER Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research MDAs Ministries, Departments, and Agencies MDBS Multi Donor Budgetary Support MIS Management Information System MoFA Ministry of Food and Agriculture MoFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning MTEF Medium-term Expenditure Framework NAEP National Agricultural Extension Project NDPC National Development Planning Commission OPRI Oil Palm Research Institute PEIR Public expenditure and institutional review PGRRI Plant Genetic Resources Research Institute PNDCL Provisional National Defence Council Law RADU Regional Agricultural Development Unit RELC Research-Extension Farmer Linkage Committees R&TCP Root and Tuber Crops Projects SARI Savannah Agricultural Research Institute SRC Soil Research Center SRI Soil Research Institute STEPRI Science and Technology Policy Research Institute WRI Water Research Institute WIAD Women in Agricultural Development vi Table of Contents 1  Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1  1.1  Background ................................................................................................................... 1  1.2  Objectives of the Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (PEIR) .......................... 1  1.3  Methodology .................................................................................................................. 2  1.4  Organization of the Report ............................................................................................ 3  2  Institutional Review ................................................................................................................ 4  2.1  Conceptual Framework ................................................................................................. 4  2.2  Operational Context ...................................................................................................... 7  2.3  MoFA’s Mission and Functions ..................................................................................... 8  2.4  Organizational Capacity ................................................................................................ 9  2.5  Management and Strategic Planning .......................................................................... 14  2.6  Resources ................................................................................................................... 20  2.7  Workload and workplace conditions ............................................................................ 21  2.8  Organizational Incentives ............................................................................................ 23  3  Agricultural Expenditure Review .......................................................................................... 26  3.1  Coverage of the Agricultural Expenditure Review ....................................................... 26  3.2  Trends in Sector Expenditures .................................................................................... 26  3.3  MoFA’s Share in Public Agricultural Expenditure ........................................................ 28  3.4  Comparison of Development to Recurrent Expenditures ............................................ 29  3.5  Sources of Funds ........................................................................................................ 32  3.6  Budget Allocations....................................................................................................... 35  3.7  Financial Management: Budget Processes ................................................................. 46  3.8  Efficiency and Effectiveness of Agricultural Spending ................................................ 50  4  Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 57  4.1  Strategic Direction and Results Orientation ................................................................ 58  4.2 Strengthened Technology Development, Assessment, and Dissemination .................... 59  4.3  Effective Use of Human Resources ............................................................................ 61  4.4   Improved Expenditure Management ........................................................................... 62  References .................................................................................................................................. 65  vii List of Figures Figure 1: Conceptual Framework ...................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 2: Institutional Landscape of the Agricultural Sector ............................................ 13 Figure 4: Government expenditure on agriculture and other sectors (percent) .............. 27 Figure 5: Government expenditure on agriculture by MDA (% of total agricultural expenditure) ........................................................................................................................................ 28 Figure 6: Real government agriculture expenditure by MDA (2000 GH¢, mil.) ............... 29 Figure 7: Government development and recurrent agriculture expenditure ................... 30 Figure 8: Government agriculture development expenditure as percent of total expenditures in MDAs .............................................................................................................................. 31 Figure 9: Flow of Funds at MoFA .................................................................................... 33 Figure 12: MoFA government expenditure by functional unit (million GH¢) .................... 41 Figure 13: MoFA government expenditure in regions and districts (million GH¢) ........... 42 Figure 14: MoFA government expenditure in regions and districts ................................. 43 Figure 15: AgSSIP expenditures in regions and districts ................................................ 45 Figure 16: Value of household agricultural production per capita (GH¢) ........................ 54 Figure 17: Benefit cost analysis of public agriculture expenditures in Ghana ................. 55 viii List of Tables Table 1: Area covered and distances traveled by AEAs ............................................................. 22 Table 2: Macroeconomic indicators associated with government agriculture expenditure ......... 27 Table 3: 2007 Budget of East Akim DADU ................................................................................ 31 Table 4: Donor pledges to the agricultural sector in 2008 (GH¢ million)..................................... 33 Table 5: Donor resources to Ghana under multi-donor budgetary support (MDBS) (US$ millions) .................................................................................................................................................... 34 Table 6: Trends in Ghana revenues (GH¢ million, 2006 prices) ................................................ 34 Table 7: HIPC/poverty funds spent on the agriculture sector, by functional unit, subsector, and function (2000 GH¢ thousand) .................................................................................................... 37 Table 8. Government spending on agriculture research, by research institute and center (% of total research spending releases in 2006 and 2007) .................................................................. 38 Table 9: Actual expenditures in case study DADUs in 2006 ....................................................... 45 Table 10: Expenditures on services in case study DADUs in 2006 ............................................ 46 Table 11: Budgeted and actual inflows to MoFA in 2004 and 2005 (GH¢) ................................ 49 Table 12: Cost of providing extension services by MoFA in selected regions, 2006 .................. 52  ix Acknowledgments We are grateful to the Policy Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation Directorate of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture of Ghana for giving us the opportunity to conduct this research, and to numerous MoFA staff who supplied the needed information and insights, We are also grateful to the minister and the chief director for sharing their thoughts. We particularly appreciate the support we received from staff in the five case study districts. We also benefited greatly from discussion with a group of retired staff who provided an understanding of previous attempts at reforms and the kinds of reforms that are now needed and feasible in MoFA. Kipo Jimah provided invaluable research assistance to the team. 1 1 Introduction 1.1 Background Agriculture has been the backbone of a Ghanaian economy that has recorded positive per capita GDP growth over the last 20 years. The agriculture sector has grown rapidly at an average annual rate of 5.5 percent in recent years, benefiting from favorable weather conditions and world market prices for cocoa. However, growth patterns have been erratic over a longer period. Agricultural performance has not been uniform within subsectors and regionally: forestry and cocoa subsectors grew at double digit rates, while crops other than cocoa grew at rates ranging from 1.5 to 4.5 percent between 1991 and 2005. The high rate of expansion achieved in recent years may be difficult to sustain, as growth has been led by extensive forces. Land expansion contributed more than yield increases to growth of various crops. Yields of most crops have not increased significantly. The level of adoption of agricultural technologies is also still low in the country. Reaching the productivity targets that the country has set for different crops will require rates of growth in productivity that are far higher than what have been achieved in the past (Breisinger et al. 2008). In leading the sector, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) has revised its Food and Agriculture Sector Development policy ( FASDEP) through broad consultation. The policies of the ministry, its financial management, and the organizational capabilities to implement FASDEP II have become more important than ever, as the activities of the Ministry are increasingly financed through budget support. There are concerns that the Ministry may not have the capacity to effectively implement the policies and strategies that have been developed recently, since in the past budget support to the Ministry has not had the envisaged impact. A thorough understanding of the public expenditure environment in the Ministry is needed to develop effective strategies to strengthen its capabilities. Past studies of the Ministry have focused on either expenditure management or organizational issues dealing largely with management of and adjustment to structural changes such as decentralization. They have not considered whether linking expenditures, processes, and outcomes could improve effectiveness. Hence, there is a need to examine the internal processes relating to these two issues. 1.2 Objectives of the Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (PEIR) The overall objective of this PEIR is to generate critical insights to improve the capability of the Ministry, relating largely to public expenditure management, manpower, and organizational processes, to effectively implement the strategy that it is currently developing. More specifically, the review seeks to answer the following broad questions:  Are adequate investments made in the sector?  How effectively are funds spent in the sector and the Ministry and what are the returns?  Broadly, what are some reforms that can be implemented to make MoFA more effective in leading agricultural transformation? The review has two distinct but related components: an expenditure review that largely deals with the first two questions and an institutional review that examines the last question. The report integrates the expenditure and institutional reviews to offer some common recommendations, but the key objectives relating to the expenditure review are  to ascertain the size of public expenditure in the agricultural sector; 2  to identify indicators for measuring outcomes in the agricultural sector;  to examine budget processes and coordination in the agricultural sector for the purpose to bring about consistency in policy and expenditure to improve the provision of public goods and services; and  to assess the implications of decentralization for the provision of public goods and services in the sector. The purpose of the institutional review is to analyse the institutional arrangements in MoFA, including organizational structure and human resource management systems, to identify areas for improvement in the short and medium terms. Specific objectives are to:  identify a few critical factors that the Ministry can influence to improve its performance by developing an understanding of o staff workload through examination of core processes within a unit; o organizational capabilities and major deficiencies through examination of skills and processes; and o structural factors, both internal and external, that influence performance;  examine accountability of various units to the organization and of the Ministry to stakeholders outside, including donors, and how they may be strengthened;  examine deficiencies in performance assessment of individuals, units, and the organization; explore how recent efforts to initiate monitoring and evaluation and to establish performance indicators for budget support can be utilized, in order to improve performance assessment and accountability at various levels;  examine deficiencies in capabilities, skills in particular, to institute more effective expenditure management in the Ministry and suggest measures for overcoming them; and  examine the implications of decentralization for staff and organizational capabilities and identify measures to minimize the adverse effects. 1.3 Methodology The expenditure review primarily involved collection and analysis of data; the institutional review was more participatory. The participatory aspects included two organized consultations with senior management and consultations with a group of retired staff. The study chose to examine the workings of a few district offices, as organizational strengths and weakness are likely to be most noticeable at the points of service delivery. After a preliminary document review, the team did a scoping study at the East Akim District Agricultural Development Unit (DADU) to understand how the district offices function and to identify suitable approaches to capturing critical aspects of the functioning of the DADUs. Following the scoping study, the team presented the research plan to regional and national directors in a meeting organized in Accra. They recommended four districts for case studies, one in each of the agroecological zones to capture any differences in challenges faced by the organization in delivering the services: Dangme East in the coastal zone, Wassa Amenfi West in the forest zone, Wenchi in the transition zone, and West Mamprusi in the savannah zone. The DADUs in these districts were requested to compile the required information before the team visited the districts. During the first three weeks of February 2008, a team of consultants visited the districts to interact with staff and collected the necessary information. In the districts, senior officers were interviewed individually and group discussions were held with the field staff. In addition to this, the following data were collected from the district offices: 3 (1) details of performance assessment for one year; (2) details of dates of recruitment, promotions, and current positions of all staff; (3) annual work plans, progress, and financial reports. The staff were asked to individually provide the following information: (1) a list of activities carried out in the previous five days, including distances traveled, time spent interacting with farmers, number of farmers contacted, and so forth, and (2) history of training and promotions received during their employment with the Ministry In addition, they were asked to respond to a survey instrument that included questions relating to “world view” or mental frame of staff relating to various issues relevant to their work, perceived importance of various factors in their work environment, and perceptions of accountability structure. The survey was completed by 67 staff members. The study also utilized data collected through a survey by Institute for Statistical Social and Economic Research (ISSER) and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) as part of the project “Making Rural Service Provision Work for the Poor,” which focuses on rural water supply and agricultural extension. The survey covered households, elected and appointed District Assembly members, District Assembly staff, farmer-based organizations, agricultural extension agents, and organizations involved in rural water supply. The data presented in this report were collected in four districts (Wassa West, Wassa Amenfi East, Tolon Kumbungu, and West Gonja). The data on public agriculture expenditure were obtained primarily from the Controller and Accountant General’s Department (CAGD), MoFA, the Council for Scientific and Agricultural Research (CSIR), the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD), Ministry of Road Transport, Ghana Statistical Service, and many other institutions, as well as published data. The information from these agencies and from the case study interviews was used to analyse a number of factors relating to institutional performance. In examining the expenditures, the following were undertaken: trend analysis to assess the size and composition of public (mainly government) expenditure in the agricultural sector; unit cost analysis to assess the efficiency of providing public goods and services in the sector; benefit incidence to assess the effectiveness of delivery and utilization of public goods and services in the sector; case studies to identify the binding constraints for improving public agriculture expenditure management and delivery, and utilization of public goods and services in the sector. 1.4 Organization of the Report The report is presented in four chapters, including this introductory one. The institutional review is presented in Chapter 2, which begins with a conceptual framework that integrates both expenditure and institutional issues followed by diagnostics. Chapter 3 presents a review of expenditures. Finally, Chapter 4 offers recommendations. 4 2 Institutional Review This chapter examines the institutional factors that influence performance of the organization. It is offered in two parts where the first section offers a conceptual framework to identify critical factors and the ways in which they interact to influence performance of a complex public organization such as MoFA. The second section diagnoses the situation in MoFA, using the framework. 2.1 Conceptual Framework Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework used for the PEIR, which was adapted from standard and agriculture-specific approaches to organizational assessment (see, for example, Lusthaus, et al. 2002; Birner et al. 2006). The boxes and arrows indicate how context and organizational factors affect the ability of an organization to improve its performance in achieving its ultimate impact (Figure 1). In the case of the agricultural sector, the ultimate impact of MoFA should be to achieve food security, growth, and poverty reduction in Ghana. Mission and Functions The mission and functions of an organization emerge from the context in which it operates. Ideally, the mission and functions of agriculture-related ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) should be derived from the agricultural development strategy of a country, which is part of its broader development strategy. The conceptual framework posits that these strategies and policies are influenced by (1) the characteristics of the agricultural sector, which determine the market failures that are inherent in agricultural development and that require public sector intervention, and (2) the political and administrative context in which policies are made. Ultimately, it is a political choice as to how much state involvement a country chooses to pursue in its agricultural sector. The MDAs themselves also influence the process of formulating the agricultural strategy and identifying their mission and functions. Organizational Capacity The organizational capacity to perform is determined by the fit of the institutional structure to the functions it is expected to perform (what we call the “hardware), the planning and management processes within the institution (the “software”), and the resources available to the organization. The institutional structure of the sector is constituted by the types of MDAs that exist in it, their roles, and their coordination mechanisms as well as the internal structure of individual MDAs such as MoFA. The institutional set-up of the MDAs is typically embedded in the general system of public administration of a country, and it has legal basis. The management processes, in contrast, are softer and include aspects such as: leadership roles and styles of managers; coordination of multi-level planning processes, including stakeholder consultations; effective costing of budgets; use of monitoring and evaluation systems; and information flows and coordination mechanisms within and between MoFA and other actors. The resources available to the organization include the people that work in the organization, the financial resources available to compensate the staff and provide them with complementary inputs to perform their functions, and the infrastructure they work with. Organizational capacity also influences and is influenced by coordination and competition of the various stakeholders within the sector, including other MDAs, donors, the private sector, alternate service providers, and clients/farmers. 5 Organizational Incentives and Functioning Whether this capacity translates into performance depends on the incentives facing the organization. Institutional reforms often neglect issues of incentives and motivation, assuming that changes to institutional structures, management processes, resources and methods, or capacity alone lead to better performance. It is, however, not feasible to effectively strengthen capacity without suitable incentives or sanctions for good or poor performance. Organizational motivation depends on the pressures on the organization’s leadership or staff to perform, which may come from the political realm or elsewhere, organizational culture, including its tolerance of corruption or mismanagement, and functioning of processes in practice. Organizational Performance The goal of public sector reform in agriculture is to improve the organizational performance of MDAs. Important dimensions of organizational performance include effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and adaptability. Ultimate Impact – Reaching Sector Goals The performance of the MDAs influences the achievement of the agriculture -sector goals, such as food security, increased agricultural production, and improved livelihoods of farm families. To assess organizational performance, it is essential to collect indicators on these ultimate outcomes. However, one needs to take into account that these outcomes are also influenced by factors that lie outside the control of the MDAs, such as weather events and international prices. 6 Figure 1: Conceptual framework Sou Source: Authors Agricultural strategies and policies Characteristics and potential of the agricultural sector *Agro-ecological conditions * Farming systems * Crops/livestock * Farm size structure * Farmer-based organizations * Input and output markets / value chains Country context * Political system * Administrative system * Economic conditions * Socio-cultural factors Mission and functions of MoFA and related agencies Organizational motivation and functioning * Mission-orientation * Accountability * Functioning of processes in practice * Relationship with politicians * Corruption and mismanagement Organizational performance * Effectiveness in fulfilling functions (e.g., promoting useful technologies; Supporting market development * Efficiency * Sustainability * Adaptability Institutional set-up * Types of MDAs * Internal structure * Decentralization Strategic planning & overall management * Planning processes * M&E, data mgmt. * Coordination Other factors outside MoFA control (e.g., weather, international prices Organizational capacity Political process Ultimate impact Reaching sector goals * Food security * Growth and poverty reduction * Environmental sustainability Coordination and competition Interaction with clients and stakeholders (farmers, agribusiness, NGOs) * Competition with other service providers * Coordination/facilitation * Ability of clients to formulate demands and hold MoFA accountable Resources and their management * Financial resources * Human resources * Infrastructure 7 2.2 Operational Context Past performance of Ghana’s agriculture1 Agriculture continues to be the backbone of the economy that has recorded positive per capita GDP growth over the last 20 years. Agriculture accounts for 40 percent of GDP and about 75 percent of export earnings, and it employs 55 percent of the labor force. The agriculture sector has grown more rapidly at an average annual rate of 5.5 percent than the rest of the economy, which has expanded at 5.2 percent per year in recent years (Bogetic et al. 2007). Growth in food production has outpaced growth in population between 1995 and 2003: FAO estimates that food production increased by 3.6 percent while population grew at 2.2 percent (FAOSTAT). Although food security is not determined by availability or domestic production alone, it is encouraging to note that food deprivation has declined during this period: The number of malnourished fell from 5.8 million in 1990–92 to 2.4 million in 2001–03; the proportion of the population that is malnourished fell from 37 to 12 percent. Recent agricultural growth has benefited from favorable weather conditions and world market prices for cocoa. Although Ghana has experienced accelerated growth in the last five years, over a longer period growth has been more erratic: between 2000 and 2005, agricultural growth rates ranged from 2.1 to 7.5; between 1990 and 2006, growth rates were negative for two years and less than 4 percent for six years. Given these fluctuations and dependence on climatic conditions and land expansion, the sector is expected to grow at around 4.2 percent (Breisinger et al 2008). Agricultural performance has not been uniform within subsectors and regionally. Forestry and cocoa subsectors grew at double digit rates, while crops other than cocoa grew at rates ranging from 1.5 to 4.5 percent between 1991 and 2005. These have implications for regional growth as well, as northern Savannah is the main producer of cereals and livestock and more than 70 percent of the country’s sorghum, millet, cowpeas, groundnuts, beef, and soybeans come from the northern zone. The rate of growth achieved in recent years may be difficult to sustain, as growth has been led by extensive forces. The contribution to agricultural growth from land expansion and yield increases between 1992 and 2005 varied, but in general, land expansion contributed more than yield increases to growth of various crops. Yields of most crops have not increased significantly. In some cases, yield growth may have been negative over the last 13 years, as in the case of maize, sorghum, and yam in northern Savannah. The yield decline is attributed to continuous cropping without adequate application of nutrients. This limits the potential for area expansion- led growth of production. In cocoa too, some of the increase in production has come at the expense of destruction of valuable forests. The inability to obtain reliable supplies of raw material of acceptable quality at globally competitive prices appears to be a limitation to developing competitive agro-industries. The level of adoption of technologies is still low in the country. An analysis of GLSS data for the expenditures component of this study suggests that only about 20 percent of the households adopt various improved practices. In general, the adoption of improved seed was highest (about 25 percent of all households), followed by chemical fertilizers (21 percent), and pesticides (herbicides and insecticides, 18 percent). Between 5 and 10 percent used organic fertilizers and 1 This section draws heavily from Breisinger et al 2008. 8 purchased feed and veterinary services, while less than 1 percent of all households used irrigation. If the productivity gaps are any indication, the potential for increasing productivity is considerable. Yield gaps, the proportion of potential yields not achieved, are particularly significant for cereals and tubers: 40 percent for maize and rice; 47 percent for millet, 57 percent for cassava, and 38 percent for yams. Closing the yield gaps is likely to be far more challenging in the northern region under less favorable conditions. The productivity targets that the country has set for different crops to be achieved by 2015 are consistent with productivity levels that are required to achieve 6 percent growth. But the rates of growth in productivity that are required are much higher than the growth rates achieved in the past. Ghana’s Strategy for Food and Agricultural Development (FASDEP) A well-developed policy framework is important to set priorities and guide the activities of a ministry. The policy framework also provides the reference against which the institutional performance of a ministry can be assessed. In leading the sector, MoFA in the last 10 years has developed three policies: the Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Development Strategy in 1996; the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy (FASDEP) in 2002, which supported implementation of the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I). After four years of broader sector participation, FASDEP was revised in 2007. The revised policy, FASDEP II, identifies the following approach as a new direction: “The Government of Ghana now wants to have a focus in its efforts for greater effectiveness, sustainability and equity in impacts. In particular, a few commodities will be targeted for support. A value chain approach to agricultural development will be adopted with value addition and market access given more attention.” It explicitly recognizes the role of several ministries and organizations in transforming agriculture, and it assigns the coordination role to MoFA. Additionally, the country’s commitment to pursue the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) agenda offers an opportunity for the ministry to strengthen its leadership role. In the draft sector plan, there is considerable emphasis on effective transfer of available technologies and additional investments in research primarily to develop new varieties that thrive under harsh conditions. Other frequently cited interventions include irrigation development, development of mechanization services, value chain development, and intensification of farmer-based organizations and outgrower schemes. 2.3 MoFA’s Mission and Functions The vision, mission, and objectives that MoFA has articulated for itself appear broadly in line with the emphasis on growth and value chain development in FASDEP II. The one FASDEP II objective that does not feature strongly in MoFA organizational presentation is an objective relating to equity and poverty reduction. Nevertheless, as predicted by the conceptual framework, the organization’s mission appears to flow from sectoral policies. The mission statement could, however, be formulated more clearly given its overall importance in generating a buy-in for an organization, both internally and externally. 9 MoFA’s vision statement reads: “The vision of the ministry is to accelerate growth in agricultural productivity through modernization of the sector to enhance rural development.” 2 The ministry’s mission is “To promote sustainable agriculture and thriving agribusiness through research and technology development, effective extension and other support services to farmers, processors, and traders for improved livelihood.” MoFA defined five major objectives for itself: 1. Food security and emergency preparedness. 2. Increased growth in incomes. 3. Sustainable management of land and environment; 4. Increased competitiveness and enhanced integration into domestic and international markets. 5. Application of Science and Technology in food and agricultural development. 6. Effective institutional coordination. The objectives are clear but how the organization would go about achieving some of the objectives is not articulated adequately. A challenging one among them is facilitating the efficient functioning of input and output markets largely through the private sector. The ambiguity with regard to “how,” an area that is not well understood, often results in the organization taking up activities that are best left to other sectors. 2.4 Organizational Capacity Institutional Set-Up The current set-up of the agricultural sector in Ghana demands that, in order to achieve sector goals, MoFA should display significant coordination and leadership of the activities of various organizations or institutional units, both internal and external (Figure 2). How well MoFA is handling the horizontal and vertical coordination challenges is the topic of this section. Organization of the agricultural sector requires coordination The Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) is the lead agency for the agricultural sector. However the complexity of the institutional environment in which MoFA operates creates significant demand for horizontal coordination with numerous other organizations:  The Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) holds the major responsibility for cocoa production and is itself a complex organization with eight directorates and seven units, including the Cocoa Marketing Company (Ghana) Ltd., the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana, and the Seed Production Unit. COCOBOD was responsible for advisory services to cocoa farmers before this function was transferred to MoFA in 2001. 2 See the official website at http://mofa.gov.gh/ (accessed August 24, 2008). 10  Agricultural research is organized under the Council for Scientific and Agricultural Research (CSIR), which falls under the Ministry of Education, Science, and Sports. CSIR operates nine research institutes related to food and agriculture.  A separate Ministry of Fisheries was created from MoFA’s domain in 2005, but remerged after the 2009 change of government.  The Forestry Commission, under the Ministry of Land, Forestry, and Mines manages Ghana’s forestry resources.  The Ministry for Local Government, Rural Development, and Environment is in charge of the District Assemblies, which subsume the DADUs, as discussed below. The National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) is in charge of overall development planning, including the planning at the District level.  Other ministries relevant for agricultural development include the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Private Sector, and Presidential Special Initiative; the Ministry of Roads Transport, especially the development of feeder roads; the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs regarding, for example, agro-processing support and child labor issues; and the Ministry of Manpower, Youth, and Development, which is also involved in agricultural-based development projects. MoFA also has a complicated internal structure as discussed below. In addition to seven technical directorates, it manages four subvented agencies: the Ghana Irrigation Development Authority (GIDA), the Grain and Legume Development Board, the Irrigation Company of Upper Region, and the Veterinary Council. At the regional level, MoFA is represented by the Regional Agricultural Development Units (RADUs) and at the district level by the DADUs. In its planning activities at least, the ministry makes significant efforts to involve various organizations and identify the linkages that are required to effectively implement different activities. To what extent this is also true in implementation is not clear. Many instances suggest that failure to do so may be a common problem. For example, MoFA had little or no input in planning and implementation of crop-based (cassava and oil palm) Presidential Special Initiatives formulated and implemented under the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Private Sector, and Presidential Special Initiative. Likewise, there was very little collaboration between MoFA and the Ministry of Lands and Forestry in implementing the country’s agro forestry programs. Under FASDEP I, MoFA proposed to create an interagency committee to include representatives of the private sector to act as a national agricultural advisory committee for the sector that would oversee resource allocations, but the committee was not established. MoFA’s internal restructuring and decentralization creates opportunities and challenges Along with a complex external institutional environment, MoFA’s internal structure has become increasingly complex due to pressures to decentralize. MoFA’s current structure is partially dictated by Ghana’s public-sector reforms. Like other ministries, MoFA has four line directorates as stipulated in the Civil Service Law 1993 (PNDCL 327 (sec. 12 (1)): Finance and Administration; Policy Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation Directorate; Human Resource Development and Management; and Statistics, Research, Information, and Public Relations. MoFA has seven agriculture-specific Technical Directorates: (1) Crop Services, (2) Agriculture Extension Services, (3) Plant Protection and Regulatory Services, (4) Agricultural Engineering Services, (5) Animal Production, (6) Veterinary Services, and (7) Women in Food and Agricultural Development. MoFA is also in charge of the four sub vented organizations mentioned above. In addition, MoFA has embarked on a significant effort to decentralize its administration, following national efforts to decentralize the civil service that began with the promulgation of the 11 Civil Service Law, 1993 (PNDCL 327). MoFA’s decentralized structure now comprises 10 RADUs and 138 DADUs. While decentralization has met with considerable resistance from the bureaucracy in many sectors (G-JAS 2007), MoFA is in fact one of the ministries that has actively pursued decentralization. A detailed Handbook on the Roles and Responsibilities of MoFA Staff under Decentralization was written to clearly outline the assignment of functions to different levels in an effort to deal with the tension between national-level coordination and local adaptability inherent in decentralization of the agricultural sector. The division of responsibilities is laid out as follows:  The national directorates are assigned the roles of policy formulation, program planning, facilitation, technology sourcing, promotion of market accessibility, exercise of oversight responsibility over the regions, and coordination and evaluation of outcomes.  The RADUs are responsible for coordination and monitoring of agricultural programs and projects in the regions and districts and also for backstopping the DADUs. The 10 RADUs are headed by regional directors, who manage a staff of regional agricultural officers (RAOs).3  The DADUs are the service delivery units and are assigned the role of managing projects and programs, decentralized planning, and implementing national agricultural policies and decisions at the district level. The districts report to the regions but receive funds directly from the center, thus diminishing the regional oversight function. They are headed by district directors, a position created by decentralization, who manage a staff of district development officers (holders of at least a diploma certificate), and agricultural extension agents. Before decentralization in 1997, MoFA was organized hierarchically along departmental lines as follows: (1) head office, (2) technical departments, (3) regional offices (officers had allegiance to technical departments), and (4) district offices (officers reported to regional technical heads). Decisions regarding planning and implementation were made at the head office. All the technical departments were replicated in regions and districts; in all the districts there were officers of the various technical departments. Regional directorates functioned as intermediaries, transferring information in both directions: they offer technical backstopping and supervision and control funds to some extent. Each technical department planned its activities more or less independently with little coordination with other departments. While the ministry had a tendency under this structure to implement disjointed interventions -- each of the technical departments had autonomy to design and implement their projects without cross-departmental coordination -- accountability within the organization was perceived to be greater. Restructuring had serious implications for the functional roles, importance, and accountability of various units. Accountability to the directors based in Accra were clearer and communication flowed easier as instructions could be handed down a clear 3 The position of the Subject Matter Specialist was abolished due to unclear responsibilities. 12 vertical chain of command that encompassed a group of people that shared the same technical specialization. Restructuring diminished the role of the technical departments as project and program implementation is now assigned to the RADUs and DADUs. Under the new structure, the functional units of the technical departments do not exist at the regional and district levels. The technical directorates are now independent cost centers that are accountable for tasks that are quite different from services delivered through districts and regions (except that they may implement projects housed in them).4 Under the new system, the accountability of district and regional offices to the Office of the Chief Director has increased, while their accountability to the technical directorates decreased, as the technical directorates that were “line” organizations before have become “staff” organizations. The wider range of responsibilities held by district staff has also made their objectives less clear. The distinctions between the old and new structures are important because the organization has never gotten over the old structure. However, perceived superior accountability under simple vertical accountability structures was not always reflected in performance. The new structure is better for two reasons: it has the potential to make the organization more accountable to local governments and decentralized planning that is responsive to local needs becomes more feasible. But the structure is managerially challenging as institutions need to be crafted to facilitate the required interaction between technical and implementation units. 4 Veterinary services where specific functions are performed by district-level officers are an exception. Such services are directly related to objectives of service provision in veterinary and animal production technical directorates. 13 Figure 2: Institutional landscape of the agricultural sector District Assemblies Regional Coordinating Councils Cabinet President Parliament Committee on Agriculture Farmer-Based Organizations (FBOs) Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development National Dev. Planning Commission (NDPC) Women’s Groups Fishermen Associations Ministry of Fisheries Ministry of Lands, Forestry and Mines Water Resources Commission Forestry Commission Ministry of Education, Science and Sports Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) Research Institutes (Crop, livestock, soil, oil palm, etc.) Grain and Legume Development Board Veterinary Council Ministry of Agriculture (MoFA) Regional Agricultural Development Units (RADUs) Ghana Irrigation Development Authority (GIDA) District Agricultural Development Units (DADUs) Research Extension Linkage Committees (RELCS) Forestry Groups Cocoa Research Institute Marketing Company Units at District level (e.g., disease Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning COCOBOD Ghana Other ministries 14 2.5 Management and Strategic Planning Structural changes need to be associated with corresponding changes in process, especially given that much of MoFA’s institutional structure is fixed by broader public-sector reform processes. Those units, such as the technical directorates, that have been moved to the periphery of the structure could nevertheless be strongly tied into the accountability flows of the organization through appropriate management processes. This section looks at MoFA’s “software” – the processes and practices that dictate the flow of directions, knowledge, information, and accountability through the organization. It finds overall that process changes have not accompanied the dramatic structural changes described above, to the detriment of organizational performance. Decentralization affects MoFA’s management processes Management challenges posed by a decentralized structure such as that of MoFA are many, raising a number of questions that must be addressed:  The decentralized units now have greater control over planning and delivery of services in their units. But they are challenged to reconcile these local priorities, which may be identified through extensive participatory processes, with national priorities and strategies such as FASDEPII. What complex iterative planning processes are required to develop higher-level strategies that adequately reflect local priorities, particularly concerning budget processes?  Technical capability required for finding solutions to certain agroecological or marketing problems may exist only in the technical directorates. What mechanisms are required to ensure that the decentralized units bring the technical capabilities in the organization to bear in solving those problems?  As the technical directorates take on a supporting role in technology transfer, how can it be ensured that their activities effectively address the problems that are faced by decentralized units? How can they be kept relevant and responsive?  The district units also may not have much interest in national “public goods” such as disease surveillance or data collection. How can it be ensured that decentralization does not affect the performance of tasks that are in the national interest?  Unlike before, when more staff members in districts and regions had control over funds or had funds allocated to them, the control is now concentrated among district and regional directors, apart from project directors. Not all district and regional agriculture officers are guaranteed what they consider their fair share of allocations. Lopsided allocations may reflect local priorities, but how can rational allocations be ensured? What should be done if local priorities deviate from staff specializations? MoFA has made important efforts to meet these challenges, especially in response to the last MoFA review that focused on decentralization recommending that to improve overall efficiency in service delivery and increase the morale of its staff, MoFA needs to (1) improve its organizational structure and review job descriptions, (2) adopt a more consultative and transparent management and leadership style, and (3) improve resource allocation by shifting resources from the national level to regions and districts. As indicated above, MoFA has developed a detailed handbook on the roles and responsibilities of MoFA staff under 15 decentralization (MOFA, 2005), and the reporting system, which had almost broken down, was improved considerably. However, the evidence collected for this study suggests that considerable management challenges remain. Problems still exist in the following areas: 1. Relation of technical directorates to service delivery units (DADUs) As indicated above, the position of the technical departments does not allow them to directly play the role they could in promoting MoFA’s mission. They have been moved from line positions, in which they were directly involved in the delivery of services, to staff positions. Their staff feels largely sidelined, as a consequence. In particular, the possibilities of the staff in the technical directorates to effectively interact with district-level staff are limited. This side-lining dilutes their accountability for bringing about technical change in the sector. Within MoFA, various aspects of agriculture extension are shared among different levels, with the technical directorates playing a key role. By side-lining these units, extension has thus become technically weaker under this system. The nature of technologies that are being demonstrated indicates this technical weakening. On the basis of discussions with DADU staff and review of reports, the study team found that the technologies demonstrated are usually simple practices that may not require farmers to buy additional inputs, such as row planting. Other commonly demonstrated technologies are proper use of agro-chemicals, adoption of improved crop varieties, improved seed multiplication methods, pest and disease control, and soil fertility improvement. In Dangme East, a district that was visited, the staff reported that they demonstrated the use of organic manure, field sanitation, timely weeding of crops, appropriate timing of harvest for some crops, and the use of herbicides. These are useful technologies that can help maintain productivity and improve natural resources management, and training in them can provide needed information to farmers. But is it useful to focus on separate components of technologies —the use of certified seeds without fertilizers, fertilizer application without the use of certified seed, or row planting without the use of fertilizers or certified seeds? This does not seem to be the most effective way to transform agriculture. Significant technical changes are usually achieved through the adoption of complementary inputs. While introducing components to farmers may be a useful strategy to move them toward the adoption of total packages, inadequate demonstration of the benefits of adopting the total package may not lead them to make that jump. A number of factors may contribute to this situation: (1) the absence of strategic direction to field staff, (2) insufficient backstopping, and (3) weak attempts to promote technologies that are likely to be adopted by farmers. The technical directorates are responsible for assessing the technologies. The directorates themselves do not engage in research. They may select technologies on the shelf for suitable applications or commission technology development through research organizations, such as the CSIR or the universities. It is essential that they have a good understanding of the farmers’ needs and potential applications of technologies under various conditions. The technical directorates also test the performance of technologies under different conditions and release them to the extension system to take to farmers; they are also expected to produce extension materials to serve as references for the extension staff and to be distributed to farmers. This assessment process has weakened over the years. One reason often cited for demonstrating or promoting simple practices as opposed to a package of practices is that farmers do not adopt the latter because they are not profitable. This raises the question of whether the technologies that are recommended are assessed properly to begin with and reviewed periodically to see if they continue to be viable. While profitability may 16 vary from year to year based on changing input and output prices, farmers should be able to reasonably expect to achieve certain yields with the adoption of technologies. The maize production guide that was produced in the late nineties, for example, suggests that the cultivation of Obatampa, a popular variety of maize, yields about 18 bags per acre with recommended practices. But the baseline line studies conducted for a Food Crop Development Project suggest that Obatampa yields increased from an average of 4.5 bags per acre to only 9 to 10 bags in the selected districts in which the program was implemented. The study did not find any evidence of periodic assessment of the technologies that are promoted. Technology development and assessment needs to be a continuous process that ensures a supply of productivity-enhancing technologies that are profitable for farmers. The regions and the districts are responsible for disseminating the technologies, with the regions being responsible for coordination and monitoring of programs implemented by the districts. The regions also play a role in technology development through the organization of Research Extension Linkage Committees (RELCs) that bring together farmers and other stakeholders with the Ministry and the research community. The objective is to influence the priorities of researchers by providing an opportunity for farmers and other stakeholders to articulate their needs. Additional measures such as competitive grants are also used to create incentives for researchers to develop technologies that are appropriate. Technical backstopping has aspects that are both top-down and bottom-up. The top-down aspect ensures that extension agents disseminate appropriate technologies and that the technical solutions they offer to farmers have been vetted and approved through the assessment process. In other words, the right “products” are promoted. This aspect involves training of field staff in DADUs on the technologies and methods of dissemination. The knowledge may be passed on from technical directorates to the field through training of trainers at various levels. Demonstrations must be supervised to ensure that they adhere to established guidelines for various technologies and extension methods. In the bottom-up aspect of technical backstopping, expertise in various areas is made available to field staff to help them solve problems. This could involve identifying a new pest that they have not seen before or selecting a suitable variety of a crop for a particular environment. The information that the supervisors obtain through backstopping moves up the organization to influence the sourcing and assessment of technologies by the technical directorates. When this process works well, it results in the top-down flow of appropriate technologies. Efficient technology development, assessment, and dissemination are critical to performance of extension systems, because they ensure that technical capabilities in the organization are effectively utilized. In MoFA, however, backstopping does not appear to be serving its purpose of guiding the field staff in the choice of appropriate technologies or in effective demonstration of technologies. Decentralization, which has removed the technical directors from the direct line of implementation, has made backstopping by the technical directorates in particular demand driven. A number of factors may discourage DADUs from demanding backup. Extension agents often concentrate on promoting technologies they are already familiar with or those that do not demand inputs (such as row planting). Inviting technical assistance may also mean having to meet some of the expenses of technical staff. And if the regional agricultural officers are not senior enough, the district directors may hesitate to seek advice from them. The technical directors themselves do not have much incentive to follow up on technologies that they have recommended, as they are not involved in assessing outcomes, although it is one of their functions. An example of an activity undertaken in a district without adequate backstopping is the introduction of guinea corn in the Dangme East DADU. The staff decided to introduce guinea 17 corn in the district because the crop can perform well in conditions harsher than those required for maize cultivation. This is a good example of an extension service finding a technical solution to a local problem, but the DADU undertook this activity without involving either the region or the technical directorate. A staff member who had traveled to the north obtained some seeds for distribution in the district. It is not clear to what extent they made effective use of expertise in the organization or assessed the outcome, feeding the results. into larger strategies relating to the potential for introducing new crops under different environments. The extension staff did not appear to receive adequate direction as to what crops to focus on and what technologies to promote. Recent policy, however, does identify the crops to focus on, particularly the staples to enhance food security. Beyond this, strategies are unclear on kinds of technologies should be employed to increase productivity of these crops. Discussions with staff suggest that the kind of guidance and clarity of purpose that was often present in the implementation of National Agricultural Extension Projects is now absent in day-to-day operations of the Ministry. Apart from project activities, for which they get clear directions from project management, AEAs seem to play a significant role in determining their day-to-day activities. They identify activities that they perceive to meet the needs of farmers. About a third of the staff surveyed in the case study districts do not disagree with a statement that the work plans that they develop may not have much to do with the work plans that are drawn up at the beginning of the year, A significant portion of them also suggest that they get clear directives from above. These two statements, however, are not contradictory, since they relate to different aspects of their work. For example, such directives may relate to the targets to be achieved, rather than to the content of the work that needs to be done. Quarterly fund disbursements may be delayed two to three months in reaching the DADUs, which makes it difficult for the district staff to implement whatever plans they may have had. Not having adequate resources to pass on to AEAs also makes it difficult for supervisors to demand that certain activities be carried out. Under these circumstances, staff do the best they can to keep themselves busy. 2. Relation of technical directorates to MoFA’s leadership A problem related to the limited interaction between technical departments and DADUs is that the Ministry’s leadership appears to bypass the technical directorates in implementing programs. In interviews, staff of the technical directorates noted the decline in their interactions with the minister’s and chief director’s offices. In particular, staff expressed serious concern that many programs are initiated and implemented by the two offices without discussion with either the technical directorates or the planning unit in the Ministry. Thus, they sense that core functions of the Ministry are becoming “nontechnical.” It may well be that the difficulty of going through lengthy processes under pressure for results has led to a tendency to bypass mid-level management. However, bypassing the technical staff leads to the underutilization of one of MoFA’s most important assets--its technical expertise and experience. Therefore, making the process of dealing with the technical directorates more effective is an important area for improvement. 3. Internal communication and coordination Effective internal communication, which is key for any organization, is essential for an organization like MoFA that operates all over the country, including the remotest areas. Nevertheless, a culture of documenting and sharing information is not predominant within MoFA. This may be linked to a broader management culture in Ghana, which places more emphasis on personal relations and interactions than on institutional procedures. In fact, meetings seem to substitute for routine processes that could achieve the same objective. As a 18 consequence, meetings and travel seem to take an inordinate share of the time of senior managers. Information technologies, especially email, intranet, and internet, which could make communication over space more effective and more inclusive, have not been introduced in a consistent manner. 4. Relations between DADUs and District Assemblies The thrust of the decentralization policy was to make regional and district units much more autonomous, to make them accountable to respective local governments, and ultimately, to integrate them with the local governments. A 2002 review of MoFA found that these goals had not been achieved at that time. Rather the review characterized MoFA as a deconcentrated organization because lines of accountability remained largely within the Ministry, rather than with local authorities. The current study finds that in 2008, the situation remains essentially the same. The official linkages between DADUs and the District Assemblies are mostly concentrated in the person of the District Director of Agriculture and relations vary considerably between districts. The actual relations depend not only on the initiative of the district directors, but also on the extent to which District Assemblies are pro-active in involving sector departments in their planning and making use of the respective institutional coordination bodies and procedures. AEAs interact frequently with District Assembly members in their operational areas but mostly to gain their support in setting up meetings or similar activities. This does not imply that extension staff is accountable to assembly members. At the same time, the lagging institutional integration of the DADUs with the District Assemblies is not largely the fault of MoFA, even though the Ministry could do more from a management perspective to foster a closer relationship. Rather, institutional integration has not happened because Ghana, in general, has not moved ahead with regard to implementing decentralization. In particular, a Local Government Service, which was mandated in the Local Government Act of 1993 to make the DADU staff accountable to the District Assemblies, has not yet been implemented. Also, a composite budget, which would reflect an aggregate budget for all line ministries and local government units operating within a district, has only been implemented on a pilot basis. That the Ministry apparently has not taken far-reaching steps to sensitize field staff about future decentralization plans is of significant concern. Only half of the MoFA district staff interviewed for the ISSER-IFPRI survey had ever heard about plans to make MoFA staff part of the Local Government Service. Those who heard about it were mainly concerned about problems such as increased political interference and deteriorating working conditions. Yet there seemed little discussion on how such problems could be avoided. The MoFA management does not appear to have given much attention to the implications of complete decentralization, and if they have, they have not communicated internally on these issues, in order to assuage the field staff’s concerns about what decentralization will mean to their careers and performance of their functions. It is not clear whether change management teams have been installed to help staff understand and cope with structural changes, as recommended in an earlier review. MOFA’s planning, data management, monitoring, and evaluation functions are weak In order to fulfill its mission and make sure that Ghana reaches its goals for the agricultural sector, MoFA needs to be able to plan strategically, to collect adequate information about the development of the sector, to evaluate the outcomes of its efforts and that of other agricultural MDAs on a regular basis, and to adjust its operations accordingly. Reaching sectoral growth targets requires the ability to analyse what MoFA actually can do to increase productivity in areas where farmers’ incentives to adopt new technologies are low. The Ministry needs to be able to identify the most binding constraints and concentrate strategically on removing them, 19 while promoting the most promising options. With a Policy Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation Directorate and a Statistics, Research, Information and Public Relations Directorate, MoFA has the institutional set-up to fulfill these tasks. Unfortunately, this review finds MOFA’s processes for strategic planning, data management, and monitoring and evaluation to be weak. Timely reporting has improved considerably, and a monitoring and evaluation culture in fact has taken root. There are thus adequate controls in the ministry down to the field staff level to get done the things the ministry is interested in. However, the potential for monitoring and evaluation to contribute to reaching sector goals is still not fully used for two reasons: first, there is little emphasis on linking activities to outcomes. Second, the information collected is hardly used for management and control purposes. The reports focus on the achievement of targets for activities/outputs without paying adequate attention to the effectiveness with which the activities are carried out and their contribution to achieving the objectives. The Ministry as a whole is not held accountable for reaching its goals nor are lines of accountability within MoFA geared toward reaching those goals. The quality and reliability of the data collected are questionable, with no quality checks in the system. For example, district development officers are supposed to supervise AEAs and conduct verification checks on information submitted by AEAs at the DADU level before submission to the district Management Information System (MIS) officer. However, in reality, supervision and data verification in the field are weak. The usual reasons given for not carrying out these tasks are lack of funds to purchase fuel for motorbikes and other travel expenses. Generally, use of information for management decision-making is low at all levels. At the district level, for instance, the existing data management system is not optimally used by the DDAs, and there is very little evidence of information flow back from the regional MIS officers to the District Directorate or from the District Directorate to the AEAs. Planning in an era of decentralization is also a challenge. In decentralization theory, planning is seen as a politico–technical dialogue and process in which community participation and intersectoral and interdisciplinary collaboration are integral parts of the process, involving monitoring and evaluation of implementation to provide effective feedback. This mode of planning is at variance with traditional highly centralized planning in Ghana which has been national in scope and sectoral in nature. Relatedly, how can the Ministry make sure that decentralized planning helps meet the goals of the sector, as defined in the policy framework? Planning procedures can play an important role in this regard, and MoFA has in fact devised planning processes that require districts to take national sector goals into account. The RADUs are expected to play a major role in coordinating district-level planning and aligning it with national goals. However, this review indicates that MoFA has not yet been able to gear its decentralized machinery effectively toward reaching national goals. For example, the DADU staff members interviewed for the ISSER-IFPRI survey listed targets for their work that had no clear connection to the agricultural sector goals as specified in FASDEP. Only one interviewee mentioned production increase as a target. Another reason for the limited orientation to outcome and results of MoFA is the use of monitoring and evaluation indicators. FASDEP II lists almost 60 indicators that the Ministry should monitor. Collecting and managing information on such a broad range of indicators is challenging, and the opportunity cost of collecting such an aggregate may not be efficient. The donor community, which has a strong influence on these indicators, has contributed to problems in this regard. MoFA should instead focus monitoring and evaluation reporting by strategically selecting a few key outcome-related indicators in addition to selected key output-oriented indicators. Moreover, there is a need to “mainstream” monitoring and evaluation indicators with other management processes by making them relevant for managers as a source of information 20 to perform their tasks more effectively. It would be useful to have indicators that are relevant for managers in districts and regions to monitor the activities and outcomes. Going beyond the traditional production focus in agricultural extension, the Ministry has adopted value chain development as a strategy. But there isn’t a clear understanding of how value chain development, particularly one that is led by the private sector, should be put into operational. There are instances where activities have been coordinated that contribute to private-sector value chain development. For example, East Dangme DADU, along with the representatives of a farmer organization, assisted local tomato producers in negotiating contracts and prices with the local tomato-processing company. Another example is the Ministry’s efforts to supply planting material that would facilitate private-sector exports of pineapple from the country. On the basis of these experiences, protocols should be developed to guide the Ministry in building on private-sector initiatives to improve its own effectiveness. 2.6 Resources MOFA could make better use of the manpower it has MoFA has approximately 7,000 employees, of whom nearly 6,000 are located in regional and district offices. Ghana’s farmers-to-extension agent ratio is not unfavorable compared with other African countries (though this is based on old data). However, districts report many vacancies. Each district office is expected to have eight District Agricultural Officers (DAOs) and a number of AEAs proportional to district size. Two of the four districts studied had five DAOs and one had only four . AEA vacancies were especially high in the following districts: Walewale (9 out of 28), Wenchi (10 out of 22), Wassa Amenfi West (16 out of 32). Due to staff limitations, only about 56 percent of the operational areas have designated AEAs. DADUs commonly deal with such staff shortages by neglecting services to more remote parts of the district, which is problematic from an equity perspective. If the vacancies in these districts are representative, filling all positions in the service delivery units would require almost a doubling of the budget, which is a politically and economically untenable demand. Rather, MoFA needs to make better use of remaining staff through efficient management processes, especially those in supervisory positions. In addition, if districts had access to more physical resources to supplement their human capital (as discussed further below), they could make much more efficient use of the staff they currently employ. Most of the existing employees have the technical qualifications required for their jobs and also they perceive that they have the necessary knowledge and capabilities (according to the ISSER- IFPRI survey). At the same time, training is not used effectively to improve field-level service delivery. The bulk of training offered is concentrated among staff at higher levels and closer to Accra, as noted in an earlier study (Babu et al. 2007). AEAs in study districts attended training sessions only once every 2 to 10 years, often for only a week or less. Furthermore, MoFA has failed to introduce practices that enable others to learn from those who receive training. Staff members complain that even the mentoring that was the practice in the past is no longer the case; recruits are sent directly to villages without adequate orientation or training. With poor technical backstopping, opportunities for learning on-the-job are also limited. Considering that knowledge dissemination is one of the major tasks for which MoFA maintains a large workforce of AEAs, the failure to provide adequate knowledge to this group indicates an inefficient use of existing capacity. One method of supplementing public service providers -- outsourcing extension services to NGOs and private providers -- did not leverage additional human resources for extension, since service providers paid existing MoFA staff to provide the services, thus topping up their salaries. 21 Human resource management could assist this task MoFA has undertaken important steps to make better use of its human resources, within the constraints posed by general civil service policies. Other issues should be considered: 1. Management of information on human resources Recognizing the importance of having available adequate information on human resources, the Ministry has set up a unit dedicated to this purpose. However, processes that enable this unit to manage effectively have not been initiated and, therefore, basic information on the number and capabilities of staff in the Ministry is not available immediately. This makes the Ministry unable to effectively target training or capacity development funds. It also makes it difficult for the Ministry to predict the retirement of senior staff and put into place succession plans using well- trained individuals that are not close to retirement. 2. Staff performance assessments and promotion MoFA is not making effective use of performance assessments to ensure merit-based promotion and to bring sanctions and incentives for organizational performance. Performance assessments are not made regularly in the Ministry; often they are done only when staff members apply for promotions. Performance appraisals are largely perceived to be fair by MoFA staff. With respect to staff advancement, delayed promotions are identified as a significant performance disincentive in the Ministry. The common expectation, however, that everyone with satisfactory performance will be promoted every three years is unreasonable as there may not be adequate open positions (see MoFA Scheme of Service, Zero Draft, 2005). Even so, our data suggest that promotions between grades often do occur within three to four years, despite staff perceptions otherwise. There is some concern with regard to gender equity in promotion. While 86 percent of the male respondents believe that male and female MoFA employees have equal opportunities for promotion, only 46 percent of the interviewed female staff believe that this is the case. 3. Salary and pay scales Being part of the general public administration pay scale, MoFA has limited possibilities to use salary incentives to motivate its staff. Yet a large majority of MoFA staff in our sample believe they are paid too little to maintain a decent standard of living and paid less than staff in other departments who do comparable tasks. This perception may make it difficult for MoFA to attract talented staff. Reassuringly, there are fewer disputes about the parity of pay scales within MoFA. A commission has been set up to review the salary system across the entire public administration system, which will hopefully benefit MoFA staff. 2.7 Workload and workplace conditions MoFA’s extension agents report that they and their peers in the District Office work the “expected hours.” These expected hours vary by season, however, as almost 50 percent of staff report working less than 21 hours per week during harmattan, while only 12 percent report this during harvest season. MoFA did take serious steps to make sure that employees are in the office as required, but according to the interviews conducted, the Ministry was not able to pursue this policy, since other ministries did not have similar systems in place. What activities and functions constitute an extension agent’s workload? AEAs surveyed in this study engaged in a wide range of activities that included: 22  demonstration of improved production practices, natural resource management, or nutritional practices;  training in aspects of farm enterprise management, such as bookkeeping;  creation of awareness of an issue, such as the need to prevent forest fires or HIV/AIDS;  organization of farmer-based organizations;  input supply and credit recovery;  delivery of veterinary services; and  surveillance and information collection. These activities are undertaken by all field staff. With the introduction of the unified extension system under the World Bank-funded National Agricultural Extension Project (NAEP), only veterinary services, data collection, and WIAD activities may be performed by specialized staff. Although activities such as credit recovery take a substantial chunk of the time of extension staff in districts in which special projects are implemented, demonstration of agricultural technologies and training continue to be the key activity performed country-wide. Shortages of financial resources limit operational efficiency MoFA’s financial constraints prevent it from investing in complementary inputs that would make its investments in human capital more efficient. These include: 1. Mobility Mobility to and around an agent’s operational area is consistently reported as one of the biggest constraints to efficient work. Table 1 provides information about the areas covered and distances traveled by AEAs and their number of contacts ( farmers). Depending on staffing levels, agro-ecological conditions, and size of districts, the area covered per AEA differs considerably. They travel anywhere from 60 to 120 kilometers to visit the villages in a period of five days. They report that they usually make more than 100 contacts. A majority of AEAs in case study districts had motorbikes, and all districts had at least one vehicle. As is to be expected, both the distances traveled and the number of contacts made was higher where a greater proportion of staff had motorbikes. Those without motorbikes spent 50 percent more time traveling than those that had motorbikes – some indicated they spent almost 6 hours a day in transit. While these figures suggest that more motorbikes or other vehicles may increase the effectiveness of MoFA’s field operations, one also has to take the management challenges of providing vehicles into account. MoFA staff, who purchase motorbikes on a loan basis, frequently refuse to use them for work purposes once they fully own them. Yet if motorbikes are not individually owned, maintaining them well is a problem. Vehicles may not be well maintained in order to shorten the time when they can be auctioned off to staff. There is also evidence that available vehicles are not used effectively, and that they may be cornered by senior staff. Strategies to improve mobility need to include innovative ways to deal with these long-standing challenges. Table 1: Area covered and distances traveled by AEAs West Mamprusi Wenchi Dangme East Wassa West Average area per AEA (sq km) 334 635 51 235 23 Average distance traveled (km) 62 128 84 83 Average number of contacts 152 246 114 103 Proportion with motor bikes (%) 37.5 88.9 66.7 20.0 Source: Case studies, February 2008 2. Inputs for work and infrastructure The availability of inputs for field staff activities seems to be a major challenge. Ninety-five percent of field staff interviewed for the ISSER-IFPRI study disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement, “Inputs for the work come regularly.” Almost 80 percent indicated that protective clothing was not available. Eighty-eight percent of the MoFA staff interviewed disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement “MoFA staff in this District Office have enough resources available to carry out their work as required by professional norms.” 3. Information and communication technologies The use of cell phones has increased the communication possibilities for MoFA, both for interacting within the organization and with clients. However, many districts still do not have essentials such as copiers and fax machines. Three of the districts had two computers, a printer, and a photocopier. Districts such as Wenchi that appear to get more project funds are better equipped. However, available computers are often not supported with virus protection and efforts to provide MoFA district offices consistently with internet access have not yet proven successful. This limits the communication possibilities within MoFA, and the ability of district staff to get up-to-date information online. 2.8 Organizational Incentives In addition to the cogent policy framework, several other factors create positive performance incentives for MoFA. Ghana’s poverty reduction strategy, emphasizing agriculture as a source of growth for the country to achieve middle-income status, is one. Political concerns about food security and food self-sufficiency, which have focused additional attention on the performance of the sector, is another. Third, budgetary processes increasingly involve Parliament, which appears to use a Ministry’s perceived effectiveness in delivering growth and other benefits to determine budget share. Sector budget support from donors is also contingent on meeting some performance triggers. Finally, further fiscal decentralization, if implemented, can create competition for agricultural funding at the district level, which may generate additional incentives for MoFA to produce tangible benefits in order to be able to compete with other sectors, especially the social sectors, for District Assembly funds. The Ministry is making some efforts to increase accountability of various units in the organization. The annual “performance review” workshops that are held, to which donors and other stakeholders are also invited, are examples of such efforts, but whether these workshops will compensate for processes that need to be routine within the organization is an important question. It is encouraging to note that the Ministry has taken to heart the development of plans, 24 setting up of targets, and assessing performance in relation to targets, if the presentations made at the performance reviews are any indications. Staff motivation and accountability Earlier reviews of MoFA, such as the 2002 decentralization review have found that staff morale is generally low, especially at district and regional levels. In contrast, this assessment found that staff morale, in spite of the problems discussed above, is not as low as earlier reviews suggest. Two-thirds of district staff said that they are satisfied with their job. While salary can act as a disincentive, client recognition can be an important incentive, as almost all interviewees felt recognized by farmers and co-workers as a hard worker. Consistent possibilities for job promotion may be another source of job satisfaction. MoFA staff also identify with the mission of the organization at both the field level and middle-level management. However, among managers there is a widespread feeling of having been left out and denied the opportunity to make a contribution, as discussed above. There is a perception that not much effort is made to reward those who perform better. But what does field staff perceive that it is held accountable for? Staff perception in case study districts of what is good performance was a mix of “meeting targets and objectives,” “carrying out duties to yield good results,” and “performing well.” When asked what it is they do to please their supervisors, a third of the respondents indicated “dedication to work” and a fifth indicated “achieving the set objectives.” One in two interviewed indicated that the most important thing that they do to keep the supervisor satisfied is to submit reports regularly. While this points to the encouraging finding that a culture of setting targets and reporting numbers has taken root, staff is being held accountable for outputs rather than outcomes related to sector goals. Specifying these outcomes at the district level is a task that deserves more attention. With regard to the question of to whom field staff members feel accountable, nearly 90 percent of both AEAs and supervisory staff interviewed for the case studies felt that there are people in addition to their immediate supervisor who they need to keep happy. As expected, nearly two- thirds of the AEAs identified the director, but one in two indicated farmers. Nearly 30 percent of the supervisory staff also indicated the District Assembly and other stakeholders. Asked how they would keep them satisfied, about 30 percent indicated “submitting reports regularly” and “working effectively.” Supervisory staff also emphasized “interaction with them.” As for the actors who can sanction them, AEAs are overwhelmingly accountable to their supervisors in the districts, while DAOs also feel accountable to regional directors, and to a lesser extent the District Assembly. District officials seem to have a greater influence on DAOs than District Assembly members have on AEAs at community levels. District directors are accountable to the entire chain of command, including their Regional Director of Agriculture, Director of Extension, Minister of Agriculture, District Chief Executive, and the District Assembly. Routine processes that enhance accountability, however, still leave considerable room for improvement. Still, the extent to which individuals are assessed routinely is unclear. Reporting has become routine due to a deliberate effort by the Ministry and due to the emphasis on monitoring and evaluation. However, as indicated earlier, the managers report that there is little immediate feedback on reports so long as they supply the numbers. While reporting is emphasized, particularly the quantification of various activities, the reports give little indication of the quality of work or the outcomes. Discussions with staff at various levels suggest that there are mechanisms to punish poor performers. District directors deny allowances to staff who blatantly disregard their duties. The chief director can remove district and regional directors who do not perform well. Staff can be moved to different locations. While it may occasionally resort to punishments, the organization 25 does not make good use of instruments to reward good performers. Many suggest that simple acknowledgment of extra effort can be a motivator. Accountability of units is still weak. The Ministry is adopting encouraging measures such as annual performance reviews to bring peer pressure on divisions. These should be strengthened, but orientation to outcomes is a prerequisite to strengthening accountability. Accountability to elected political leaders is important to ensure that the organization responds to broader societal goals and citizens’ needs. This review suggests that MoFA’s accountability to the top political leadership, especially the President’s Office, is high. The budget processes also introduce accountability to parliamentarians, particularly for the fulfillment of targets in the budget statement. As indicated, accountability to the District Assembly has not yet been established in any formal sense, even though field staff interact with elected District Assembly members. Budget support does bring in some accountability to donors as well. For example, the improved timeliness of reporting reported earlier is presumably in response to a trigger in the Food and Agriculture Budget Support. This accountability can be strengthened and more strongly related to performance by choosing triggers that are outcome oriented. 26 3 Agricultural Expenditure Review 3.1 Coverage of the Agricultural Expenditure Review Agriculture is typically defined as comprising crops and livestock, fisheries, forestry, and natural resource management. For reviewing public expenditures, this definition was deemed to be too narrow. Therefore, a broader definition of agriculture, which covers all of these but also includes agricultural research, agricultural extension services and training, agricultural marketing, agricultural inputs (such as seeds, fertilizers, and chemicals), irrigation, and rural infrastructure (such as marketing information systems, post-harvest facilities) has been used. This definition is consistent with the guide developed by the Africa Union/New Partnership for Africa’s Development (AU/NEPAD) for the CAADP initiative (AU/NEPAD 2005). In addition, expenditures in many different sectors (for example, feeder roads, transport, power, education, and health) can also contribute to agricultural growth. The implication of this definition for Ghana is that the agriculture sector goes beyond MoFA to include several other MDAs, as has been discussed in the previous chapter (Figure 2). 3.2 Trends in Sector Expenditures Government expenditures in the sector, as defined above, have risen steadily by about 9.1 percent per year on average in real terms, increasing from 30.4 million in Ghanaian cedi (GH¢) in 2000 to GH¢ 58.2 in 2005. As Figure 3 shows, government’s spending on the sector accounted for about 6 percent of total government spending on average over the 2000–05 period. In terms of its size relative to the economy, which is a better measure by international standards, spending on the sector accounted for about 4.1 percent of agricultural gross domestic product (AgGDP) and 1.5 percent of GDP. These shares are considerably higher than those reported in the 2008 World Development Report ( 0.7 percent of AgGDP)(World Bank 2008). The difference is likely due to counting of expenditure by MoFA only. Nevertheless, the results show that the share of government spending in total government expenditure or agricultural GDP is actually higher than reported in the World Development Report, when agriculture-related expenditures in other MDAs, such as feeder roads, agricultural education under the National Council for Tertiary Education, food imports and agricultural presidential special initiatives, are accounted for. Comparing agriculture to some other sectors, government spending on agriculture ranks third after spending on the education and health sectors, although spending on the education sector, which continues to rise rapidly, far outweighs the others (Figure 4). Although real expenditures are increasing, the share spent on the agriculture sector has stagnated. Government spending on feeder roads and other infrastructure (highways and urban roads, communications, works and housing, and ports, harbors, and railways) accounts for only 3.1 percent of government spending and 0.8 percent of GDP, which is only slightly higher than the share spent on defense— 2.4 percent of government spending and 0.6 percent of GDP. 27 Figure 3: Government expenditure on the agricultural sector Government Agriculture Expenditure 0 30 60 90 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 20 00