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Livelihoods and Welfare

Findings from the seventh round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (January–June 2024)

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ABSTRACT

The seventh round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, was implemented between April–June 2024 with a recall period covering January to June of the same year. It follows six rounds of surveys that were carried out since the beginning of December 2021. This report documents livelihood and welfare dynamics over this survey period.

Overall, household welfare has deteriorated in Myanmar considerably over the past two years. In terms of income sources, household farming, farm wages, and non-farm businesses are the most important livelihoods in rural areas while non-farm businesses and non-farm salary employment are most important in urban areas. However, in terms of primary livelihoods, we witness a structural shift in livelihood profiles of rural households with fewer households identifying non-farm business income are their primary livelihood (4.1 percentage points decrease) while more households rely on farm wages (2.9 percentage points increase). There are also fewer reported sources of income with households on average reporting 1.6 income sources, compared to almost 2 years ago. The primary source of income is shifting to low-paying livelihoods like wage work, with remittances and assistance serve as supplementary income sources.

A combination of increasing prices and growing reliance on low paying livelihoods over the past years led to a significant decline in household purchasing power. Median real household income per adult equivalent per day declined by 8.4 percent over the past year between the first half of 2023 and 2024 and by 18.2 percent over the two-year period between the first half of 2022 and 2024. Over the same period, the headcount rate of poverty increased to 63.6 percent in the first half of 2024 from 60.9 percent a year back in 2023 and 56.2 percent two years back in 2022. Wage earning households continue to be extremely vulnerable with the lowest median real daily income per adult equivalent as well as the livelihood category with the highest level of poverty. With respect to states/regions, poverty is the highest in states engulfed by high levels of conflict, for example, Rakhine, Chin and Kayah.

A notable trend in recent years is the faster increase in urban poverty. Urban poverty increased by 9.2 percentage points over the past year from the first half of 2023 to the first half of 2024, while it increased by 14.7 percentage points over the past two years from the first half of 2022 to first half of 2024. On the other hand, rural poverty only increased by 0.2 percentage points in the past year and 4.6 percentage points in the past two years.

There are only a few strategies helping households stay out of poverty, including earning income from farming (which has partially benefited from higher output prices), migrating with the whole household, and receiving assistance or remittances. The presence of remittance income significantly reduces a household's probability of being poor by a notable 21 percentage points.

There are many inter-linked factors that have led to the deterioration in welfare in Myanmar in recent years, including escalating conflict, macroeconomic mismanagement and inflation in particular, the breakdown of social protection, and the absence or deterioration of many other critical services normally provided by the state, including healthcare and nutrition, education, agricultural extension, financial programs for the poor, infrastructure development and social protection.

1. INTRODUCTION

Myanmar's economy continues to face substantial challenges in 2024 with prolonged conflict, rising macroeconomic instability, and a difficult business environment significantly constraining economic activities. The compounded crises have driven humanitarian needs to unprecedented levels, with 18.6 million people, including six million children, requiring urgent assistance. This marks a sharp increase from previous years, reflecting escalating displacement, food insecurity, and a deteriorating economic environment (OCHA 2024; UNICEF 2024). These crises have severely disrupted livelihoods and welfare, with vulnerable populations, particularly rural households and displaced communities, facing heightened risks and limited access to basic services.

This paper provides an overview of the livelihoods and welfare of households across Myanmar for the seventh round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and sub-nationally representative phone survey (Lambrecht et al. 2023). Conducted between April and June 2024, the MHWS monitors household and individual welfare indicators such as wealth, livelihoods, food insecurity, diet quality, health shocks, and coping strategies. The analysis in this report is mainly descriptive, focusing on income and livelihoods, and income poverty.[1] Most indicators have a recall period of either one or three months, therefore the data cover the time spanning from January to June 2024.

2. LIVELIHOODS

2.1 Livelihoods and Sources of Income

In terms of both income sources and primary livelihoods, household farming and non-farm businesses are the most important livelihoods in rural areas while non-farm businesses and non-farm salary employment are most important in urban areas. We present the share of households earning income from each income source (left columns), and the share of households who identify each income source as their primary livelihood (right columns) in rural (Table 1) and urban households (Table 2).

Compared to early 2022, Q1–Q2 2024 significantly fewer rural households reporting earning income from nearly every income source, resulting in the average number of household income sources declining from 1.9 sources to 1.6 sources (left columns of Table 1). Notably, the share of households earning farm income declined by 6.5 percentage points, while the share of households earning income from non-farm wages and non-farm businesses fell by 4.8 and 10.8 percentage points, respectively. While share of rural household's whose primary livelihood is household farming (37.1 percent) changed little, between Q1–Q2 2022 and Q1–Q2 2024, the share of households reliant on farm wage labor rose by 2.9 percentage points to 15.1 percent and the share reliant on non-farm business income fell by 4.1 percentage points to 18.4 percent (right columns of Table 1).

Compared to early 2022, in Q1–Q2 2024 significantly fewer urban households report earning income from non-farm businesses, non-farm wage employment, and transfers, which has led to a decline in the average number of household income sources from 1.8 sources to 1.5 sources (left columns of Table 2). Specifically, households earning income from non-farm businesses, non-farm wages, and transfers declined by 13.5, 5.0, and 5.3

[1] See b (2024) for a description of the income poverty methodology.

percentage points respectively. Over the same period, the share of urban household dependent on non-farm businesses for their primary livelihood declined by 7.1 percentage points and the share dependent on non-farm salary employment rose by 4.9 percentage points.

Table 1. Percentage of *rural* households with income source and primary livelihood in the past three months, by survey round

	Receives income from source					Considers source the primary livelihood				
	Round 2 Q1–Q2 2022		Round 5 Q1–Q2 2023		Round 7 Q1–Q2 2024	Round 2 Q1–Q2 2022		Round 5 Q1–Q2 2023		Round 7 Q1–Q2 2024
Own farming	59.1	***	56.5	***	52.7	35.5	*	36.5		37.1
Farm wage	28.0	**	26.0		26.2	12.2	***	13.6	**	15.1
Non-farm wage	25.7	***	24.2	***	20.9	14.5		15.8	***	13.8
Non-farm salary	14.4	***	12.4		12.8	7.8	**	6.4		6.8
Non-farm business	38.4	***	30.6	***	27.6	22.5	***	19.1		18.4
Other sources	22.9	***	21.8	**	20.3	7.5	***	8.6		8.8
Land/property rentals	2.8		2.5		3.1					
Assistance/pensions	8.8	***	6.4	***	5.2					
Remittances	13.9		15.2	*	13.8					
Number of income sources	1.91	***	1.74	***	1.62					

Note: For primary livelihoods, "Other" includes households that report their livelihood to be "no employment or income". Quarters correspond to the recall period in each survey round. Q1–Q2 2022 refers to January–June 2022; Q1–Q2 2023 refers to December 2023–June 2023; Q1–Q2 2024 refers to January–June 2024. Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences compared to round 7: *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Table 2. Percentage of *urban* households with income source and primary livelihood in the past three months, by survey round

	Receives income from source					Considers source the primary livelihood				
	Round 2 Q1–Q2 2022		Round 5 Q1–Q2 2023		Round 7 Q1–Q2 2024	Round 2 Q1–Q2 2022		Round 5 Q1–Q2 2023		Round 7 Q1–Q2 2024
Own farming	10.2		9.1		9.0	4.1		3.8	*	4.9
Farm wage	4.4	**	4.3	**	5.7	1.9	***	2.5	*	3.4
Non-farm wage	32.3	***	31.2	***	27.3	19.8		21.9	**	19.0
Non-farm salary	41.1		43.1		42.0	26.3	***	28.6	**	31.2
Non-farm business	58.5	***	48.9	***	45.0	41.0	***	36.7	**	33.9
Other sources	27.3	***	23.6	*	21.7	7.0		6.3	**	7.7
Land/property rentals	5.0		4.5		3.7					
Assistance/pensions	15.5	***	11.3	***	10.2					
Remittances	11.9		11.2	*	10.9					
Number of income sources	1.79	***	1.64	***	1.54					

Note: For primary livelihoods, "Other" includes households that report their livelihood to be "no employment or income". Quarters correspond to the recall period in each survey round. Q1–Q2 2022 refers to January–June 2022; Q1–Q2 2023 refers

to December 2023–June 2023; Q1–Q2 2024 refers to January–June 2024. Asterisks indicate statistically significant differences compared to round 7: *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

2.2 Real Income Trends

Real income is the value of income after adjusting for food inflation (MAPSA 2024a) and provides a measure of the purchasing power of income over time. Real daily income per adult equivalent is presented in terms of the value of the MMK in Q2 2024.

Between Q2 2023 and Q2 2024, the real value of median household income fell by 4.9 percent in rural areas and 17.1 percent in urban areas. Over this period, nominal median income rose by 34.8 percent in rural areas and 17.5 percent in urban areas, but this was far less than the 42 percent increase in food costs over the same period. With food cost outpacing income gains in both rural and urban areas, the purchasing power of household income declined (Figure 1).

Over the MHWS full survey period (Q1 2021–Q2 2024), inflation-adjusted income exhibits a seasonal pattern, tending to fall between Q2 and Q4, then modestly rising between Q4 and Q2 in the subsequent year (Figure 1). This cyclical pattern emerges from high food inflation exceeding gains in nominal income between Q2 and Q4, a period associated with the end of the lean season in which most survey interviews would be completed prior to sales of major harvests. In contrast, between Q4 and Q2, gains in nominal income exceed moderate increases in food costs.

Figure 1. Inflation-adjusted median household income in the past 30 days (real MMK/adult equivalent/day), by location and survey round



Note: Real income is adjusted for spatial differences and temporal differences in food costs and is presented in Q2 2024 MMK. Quarters correspond to the income recall period in each survey round. Q1 2022 refers to November 2021–February 2022; Q2 2022 refers to March 2022–June 2022; Q4 2022 refers to September 2022–December 2022; Q2 2023 refers to February 2023–June 2023; Q4 2023 refers to August 2023–November 2022; Q2 2024 refers to March–June 2024.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Between Q2 2023 and Q2 2024, inflation-adjusted income from non-farm wages, non-farm businesses, non-farm salaries, and other income declined by 8.8, 9.2, 11.9, and 7.6 percent while inflation-adjusted income earned from farm wages, household farming, and remittances rose by 14.9, 14.4, and 15.4 percent (Figure 2). The 14.4 percent increase in farm income reflects farm households benefiting from large increases in food output prices. Between Q2 2023 and Q2 2024 median retail rice prices – the major crop in Myanmar –

reported in the MHWS rose by 53.6 percent. The 14.9 percent increase in farm wage income likely reflects ongoing farm wage shortages and strong demand for farm labor due to high rice prices, since crop agriculture is a large and highly labor-intensive sector.

Figure 2. Median inflation-adjusted household income from each source in households with income from the source in the past 30 days (real MMK/adult equivalent/day), by survey round



Note: Real income is adjusted for spatial differences and temporal differences in food costs and is presented in Q2 2024 MMK. Quarters correspond to the income recall period in each survey round. Q2 2022 refers to March 2022–June 2022; Q2 2023 refers to February 2023–June 2023; Q2 2024 refers to March–June 2024.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Between Q2 2023 and Q2 2024, inflation adjusted household income fell in households whose main livelihoods are non-farm wage work, non-farm businesses, and non-farm salary work, while incomes rose in households dependent on own farm income or farm wages (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Median inflation-adjusted household income in the past 30 days (real MMK/adult equivalent/day), by primary livelihood and survey round



Note: "Other" includes households that report their primary livelihood to be "no employment or income". Real income is adjusted for spatial differences and temporal differences in food costs and is presented in Q2 2024 MMK. Quarters correspond to the income recall period in each survey round. Q2 2022 refers to March 2022–June 2022; Q2 2023 refers to February 2023–June 2023; Q2 2024 refers to March–June 2024.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

The above statistics are also presented by states/regions in Appendix Tables A.1–A.5. Notably states with high levels of conflict are found to have lower real levels of income such as Kayah, Chin, Rakhine while states which are relatively stable have highest level of real income such as Nay Pyi Taw, Bago and Yangon.

3. INCOME POVERTY

3.1 Descriptive Analysis

Adjusted in accordance with food inflation, the poverty line – the cost of a basic needs bundle of goods and services[2] – increased by 13.8 percent between Q4 2023 and Q1 2024 and by 41.5 percent between Q2 2023 and Q2 2024.

Households are defined as poor when nominal household income per adult equivalent is lower than the poverty line. As with real income, we find income poverty rates follow a similar seasonal pattern, rising between Q2 and Q4 in each year and falling between Q4 and Q2 in the subsequent year (Figure 4). **In early 2023, the poverty rate was 63.7 percent for rural areas, but this rose to 74.3 percent in late 2023 before falling again to 63.9 percent in early 2024. However, urban poverty trends are less seasonal, with the trend in headcount poverty being 53.6 percent, 64.7 percent and 62.8 percent over the same periods.**

Figure 4. Income poverty headcounts (percentage of the population living in poor households), by location and survey round



Note: Quarters correspond to the income recall period in each survey round. Q2 2022 refers to March 2022–June 2022; Q4 2022 refers to September 2022–December 2022; Q2 2023 refers to February 2023–June 2023; Q4 2023 refers to August 2023–November 2022; Q2 2024 refers to March–June 2024. Asterisks show significance differences between rounds: *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

[2] The poverty line represents the cost of acquiring a basic bundle of goods and services that is estimated to meet food and non-food needs. The cost of the basic bundle is estimated in a base year—2015 in Myanmar (CSO et al. 2019)—and then in subsequent periods adjusted for food inflation to estimate its current cost. To measure poverty in the MHWS, we update the total poverty line in each round using the MHWS food price index (MAPSA 2024a).

To reduce the influence of income seasonality which likely overestimates swings in welfare,[3] we combine data from Q4 in one year and Q2 in the following year. This pooled sample thus contains data from both the lean season and a relatively more prosperous harvest period. **Comparing similar pooled periods in 2022/23 and 2023/24, nationally, income-poverty rose by 4.4 percent to 67.9 percent, encompassing a 69.2 percent poverty rate in rural areas and a 64.2 rate in urban areas** (Figure 5). The rise in pooled income-poverty was considerably higher in urban areas compared to rural areas (15.8 percent versus 4.1 percent). As a result, the urban/rural poverty gap narrowed (Appendix Table A.6).

Figure 5. Pooled income poverty headcounts (percentage of the population living in poor households), by location and period



Note: Quarters correspond to the income recall period in each survey round. Q4 2022 refers to September 2022–December 2022; Q2 2023 refers to February 2023–June 2023; Q4 2023 refers to August 2023–November 2022; Q2 2024 refers to March–June 2024.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Wage earning households continue to be the poorest livelihood group, with pooled income poverty rates of 87.7 and 81.8 percent in farm and non-farm wage earning households, respectively, in the Q4 2023 and Q2 2024 pooled period (Figure 6). Poverty among own farm households remained relatively stable (58.5 percent in Q4 2022 and Q2 2023 to 60.6 percent in Q4 2023 and Q2 2024), but non-farm business and non-farm salary livelihood groups saw 7 to 8 percentage points increases in poverty. Therefore, even though poverty rates in these households are below the national average, the gap has narrowed over time relative to wage earning households.

[3] Households often smooth consumption across seasons using savings, credit, assets, and food stocks, mitigating the effects of income seasonality. However, seasonal income metrics fail to account for intertemporal consumption smoothing, leading to potential mismeasurement of poverty.

Figure 6. Trends in pooled income poverty headcounts (percentage of the population living in poor households), by livelihood



Note: "Other" includes households that report their primary livelihood to be "no employment or income". Quarters correspond to the income recall period in each survey round. Q4 2022 refers to September 2022–December 2022; Q2 2023 refers to February 2023–June 2023; Q4 2023 refers to August 2023–November 2022; Q2 2024 refers to March–June 2024.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

In every state/region, pooled income poverty reached a new high over the last two years (Figure 7). In the most recent estimates, we find alarmingly high rates of poverty in areas engulfed by conflict, with nearly 90 percent of the population suffering from impoverishment. For example, **pooled poverty rates in** Q4 2023/Q2 2024 **were highest in Chin (87.2 percent), Kayah (91.1 percent), and Rakhine (81.8 percent)**. In Yangon, poverty rates are now as high as 57.6 percent while in Nay Pyi Taw it is 64.0 percent. The poverty rate in the remaining state/regions lies between 65 and 72 percent (see Appendix Table A.6).

Figure 7. Trends in pooled income poverty headcounts (percentage of population living in poor households), by state/region



Note: Quarters correspond to the income recall period in each survey round. Q4 2022 refers to September 2022–December 2022; Q2 2023 refers to February 2023–June 2023; Q4 2023 refers to August 2023–November 2022; Q2 2024 refers to March–June 2024. In Q2 2024, data are not statistically representative of Kayah. See MAPSA (2025).
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

3.2 Determinants of Income Poverty

In this section, we present results from a random effects Probit regression analysis to identify factors associated with household income poverty status. Regressions are conducted separately for the Q4 2022 and Q3 2023 sample and for the Q4 2023 and Q3 2024 sample. Figure 8 presents the marginal effects and Appendix Table A.8 shows the full regression results. Key results are summarized below:

- **With falling income, increasing prices, and conflict, household livelihood profiles provide less resilience than before**. Households whose main source of income is from wage work and non-farm business are more likely to be in income poverty in the most recent round of survey, and salaried households are also found to be slightly more prone to poverty relative to own farm households.
- **Receiving remittance and assistance helps to avert income poverty**. Households who received remittances are 18.9 percentage points less likely to be income poor and households who received assistance from family and friends are 4.7 percentage points less likely to be poor in the most recent round of survey.
- **Internal migration is helping households avert income poverty** by likely shifting to places with less conflict and better work opportunities**.** Recent migration by the household reduces the likelihood of income poverty by 6.8 percentage points.
- **Household size and composition matter**. Larger households (more than 5 members) and households with higher number of dependent members are 9.2 and 19.4 percentage points more likely to be poor, respectively.
- Households whose heads have only completed primary school are 6.0 percentage points more likely to be poor.
- Households in which all the adults are women are 5.8 percentage points less likely to be poor. This may be reflective of the fact that such households may have members living elsewhere who send back remittances.
- Finally, community characteristics, including shocks, matter, but to a lesser degree over time. Households which faced climatic shocks are at greater risk of being poor (2.3 percentage points). Higher median community casual wages are also associated with low poverty (5.4 percentage points for high wages levels).

Figure 8. Changes in the probability that a household is income-poor income poverty (percentage points)



Note: The dependent variable is income-based poverty. Households are defined as income poor if they have income per adult equivalent per day less than the poverty line. See Appendix Table A.8 for full regression results. The model also controls for shocks, state/region and the sex of the respondent. Quarters correspond to the income recall period in each survey round. Q4 2022 refers to September 2022–December 2022; Q2 2023 refers to February 2023–June 2023; Q4 2023 refers to August 2023–November 2022; Q2 2024 refers to March–June 2024.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

4. CONCLUSION

The combined economic and political crises in Myanmar have significantly impacted inflation and income levels, leading to an increase in poverty over the past two years. Using seven rounds of the MHWS, we highlight several worrying trends as follows.

First, over the past year there has been a reduction of livelihood diversity that potentially renders household more vulnerable to external shocks. Primary sources of income are significantly shifting to low-paying livelihoods like wage work, with remittances and assistance serving as supplementary income sources.

Second, median real household income per adult equivalent per day has declined, and the income-based poverty rate increased to 63.6 percent in Q2 of 2024 from 60.9 percent a year back in 2023 and 56.2 percent two years back in 2022. Income poverty is the highest in states engulfed by high levels of conflict.

Third, farm-wage households continue to have the lowest median real daily income per adult equivalent. Nearly 90 percent of farm wage earning households fall below the income poverty line.

Fourth, there are only a few factors helping households stay out of poverty, including earning income from farming, migrating with the whole household, and receiving assistance or remittances. The presence of remittance income significantly mitigates poverty levels, with individuals in remittance-receiving households experiencing a notable 18,9 percentage point reduction in the probability of being poor compared to those without remittance income.

A limitation of the survey-based evidence in conflict-affected settings is selection bias. Like any survey, the MHWS will struggle to capture some of the most conflict-affected areas due to limited access to cellphone and electricity, especially in Kayah and Rakhine. In addition, our ability to survey internally displaced persons (IDPs), which rose to about 3.4 million according to reports from UNHCR[4], were limited since IDPs are in the most precarious situations and have limited access to phones. Therefore, the deterioration in welfare captured through our phone survey is likely to be an underestimation of the true decline in welfare in Myanmar.

[4]Retrieved on November 18, 2024 from https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/mmr

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APPENDIX

Table A.1 Percentage of households with each income source, January–June 2024 by location

	Own farming	Farm wage	Non-farm wage	Non-farm salary	Non-farm business	Other	Number of income sources
National	40.5	20.5	22.7	20.9	32.4	20.7	1.60
Urban	9.0	5.7	27.3	42.0	45.0	21.7	1.54
Rural	52.7	26.2	20.9	12.8	27.6	20.3	1.62
Kachin	39.6	16.6	24.4	18.3	32.9	22.1	1.55
Kayah	10.5	14.3	17.5	4.8	7.2	7.5	0.62
Kayin	44.4	13.9	21.8	16.2	33.9	30.7	1.68
Chin	70.5	18.4	27.7	7.9	8.6	29.2	1.69
Sagaing	56.8	29.2	18.7	9.9	26.8	17.4	1.60
Tanintharyi	40.8	15.7	22.7	14.6	34.1	22.6	1.51
Bago	46.2	24.2	23.6	14.9	31.7	23.6	1.67
Magway	46.4	31.3	16.5	12.4	25.6	23.0	1.58
Mandalay	37.2	18.3	28.7	22.8	36.1	18.0	1.64
Mon	33.7	15.9	24.0	18.9	41.5	31.7	1.69
Rakhine	47.1	15.6	25.7	14.7	30.7	25.9	1.61
Yangon	10.5	5.7	25.3	49.4	40.8	20.1	1.55
Shan	56.7	24.7	20.2	13.9	22.1	15.6	1.55
Ayeyarwady	46.8	28.3	18.6	14.2	35.2	18.1	1.62
Nay Pyi Taw	28.2	19.0	28.6	33.9	34.7	20.1	1.68

Note: Data are not statistically representative of Kayah. See MAPSA (2025).
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Table A.2 Percentage of households by primary livelihood, January–June 2024 by location

	Own farming	Farm wage	Non-farm wage	Non-farm salary	Non-farm business	Other
National	28.2	11.8	15.2	13.6	22.7	8.5
Urban	4.9	3.4	19.0	31.2	33.9	7.7
Rural	37.1	15.1	13.8	6.8	18.4	8.8
Kachin	27.2	8.9	15.5	11.3	25.9	11.2
Kayah	7.2	13.1	14.0	3.9	6.4	55.4
Kayin	29.8	5.0	15.9	9.5	26.1	13.8
Chin	46.2	8.1	19.8	6.8	5.3	13.7
Sagaing	43.0	14.3	12.1	5.7	18.5	6.5
Tanintharyi	26.2	10.9	17.4	10.0	24.3	11.1
Bago	31.1	15.2	15.6	8.4	20.6	9.0
Magway	32.4	21.4	10.8	8.0	17.1	10.3
Mandalay	24.0	9.2	20.4	14.9	25.7	5.8
Mon	23.6	9.4	15.8	9.3	27.9	14.1
Rakhine	30.8	8.8	17.9	8.8	23.4	10.2
Yangon	5.9	4.1	17.6	36.5	29.4	6.5
Shan	41.7	13.3	12.8	8.7	14.2	9.4
Ayeyarwady	34.7	16.4	10.9	7.4	24.5	6.0
Nay Pyi Taw	16.3	10.0	21.2	19.7	25.9	7.0

Note: “Other” includes households that report their primary livelihood to be “no employment or income. Data are not statistically representative of Kayah. See MAPSA (2025).
Source: Author’s calculations based on MHWS data.

Table A.3 Inflation-adjusted median household income in the past 30 days (real MMK/adult equivalent/day), by location and survey round

	Round 1	Round 2	Round 4	Round 5	Round 6	Round 7
	Q4 2021–Q1 2022	Q1–Q2 2022	Q3–Q4 2022	Q1–Q2 2023	Q3–Q4 2023	Q1–Q2 2024
National	5,147	4,471	3,665	3,993	3,110	3,657
Urban	5,495	5,367	4,681	4,883	3,928	4,048
Rural	4,973	4,089	3,249	3,647	2,756	3,469
Kachin	3,535	2,838	3,425	3,268	2,580	2,485
Kayah	6,819	1,435	1,992	1,794	1,561	417
Kayin	3,137	3,555	3,023	3,864	2,574	3,111
Chin	2,699	992	1,386	1,052	1,006	1,208
Sagaing	5,186	3,501	2,559	3,227	2,299	3,294
Tanintharyi	4,555	3,362	4,085	3,572	2,806	3,640
Bago	6,332	4,001	3,839	4,657	3,390	4,471
Magway	4,926	3,309	2,820	2,986	2,614	2,916
Mandalay	5,517	4,516	3,990	4,139	3,491	3,872
Mon	4,941	4,562	3,833	4,130	3,286	3,906
Rakhine	3,587	2,852	2,654	3,153	2,153	1,895
Yangon	6,067	5,842	5,075	5,485	4,355	4,967
Shan	4,456	3,229	3,897	3,468	3,102	3,005
Ayeyawady	5,522	3,593	3,534	4,047	2,932	4,055
Nay Pyi Taw	4,868	5,380	4,314	4,810	3,429	4,171

Note: Real income is adjusted for spatial differences and temporal differences in food costs and is presented in Q2 2024 MMK. Data correspond to the income recall period in each survey round. Round 1 refers to November 2021–February 2022; round 2 refers to March 2022–June 2022; round 4 refers to September 2022–December 2022; round 5 refers to February 2023–June 2023; round 6 refers to August 2023–November 2022; round 7 refers to March–June 2024. In round 7, data are not statistically representative of Kayah. See MAPSA (2025).
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Table A.4 Median household income from each source in households with income from the source (MMK/adult equivalent/day), March–June 2024 by location

	Own farming	Farm wage	Non-farm wage	Non-farm salary	Non-farm business	Other
National	5,576	1,772	2,116	2,617	2,565	2,265
Urban	2,884	1,742	2,208	3,137	2,908	1,645
Rural	5,907	1,772	2,064	2,247	2,371	2,442
Kachin	5,178	1,132	1,669	1,785	2,269	1,183
Kayah	3,080	827	914	2,470	1,327	996
Kayin	3,387	1,695	2,116	2,568	2,258	2,135
Chin	1,650	697	721	1,732	1,711	1,380
Sagaing	7,088	1,491	1,901	2,196	2,309	2,495
Tanintharyi	3,107	2,586	2,279	2,155	2,688	3,097
Bago	10,176	2,239	2,704	2,621	2,488	3,035
Magway	5,998	1,399	1,721	2,097	2,139	2,711
Mandalay	6,430	1,715	2,143	2,460	2,907	2,114
Mon	6,288	1,850	2,509	2,078	2,441	2,582
Rakhine	2,153	993	856	1,402	1,231	1,424
Yangon	5,267	2,704	2,484	3,542	3,311	2,363
Shan	5,392	1,395	1,903	2,418	2,548	1,501
Ayeyarwady	6,462	2,252	2,289	2,323	2,694	1,842
Nay Pyi Taw	2,968	1,838	2,686	2,710	2,439	4,335

Note: Data are not statistically representative of Kayah. See MAPSA (2025).
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Table A.5 Median household income (MMK/adult equivalent/day), March–June 2024 by primary livelihood and location

	Own farming	Farm wage	Non-farm wage	Non-farm salary	Non-farm business	Other
National	4,965	2,505	2,974	4,543	4,117	3,155
Urban	3,567	2,702	3,267	4,967	4,265	2,745
Rural	5,071	2,489	2,795	4,277	3,947	3,403
Kachin	3,781	2,034	2,053	3,816	2,894	455
Kayah	4,492	1,169	1,382	3,531	1,681	0
Kayin	2,144	2,780	2,942	3,625	3,389	4,037
Chin	1,039	1,208	1,192	2,748	4,711	2,821
Sagaing	4,546	2,171	2,882	3,864	3,695	3,424
Tanintharyi	3,360	3,246	3,503	4,398	4,637	5,487
Bago	10,818	2,850	3,800	4,505	4,152	5,409
Magway	4,193	1,677	2,316	3,775	3,354	4,549
Mandalay	4,627	2,572	3,292	4,399	4,287	4,115
Mon	5,405	3,336	3,475	4,617	3,631	5,992
Rakhine	2,483	1,499	1,172	2,302	2,017	1,395
Yangon	12,958	2,985	3,675	5,281	5,298	6,214
Shan	4,564	2,115	2,635	4,466	3,806	195
Ayeyarwady	6,968	3,015	3,011	4,337	4,647	4,489
Nay Pyi Taw	5,224	2,593	3,184	4,526	4,403	8,353

Note: “Other” includes households that report their primary livelihood to be “no employment or income”. Data are not statistically representative of Kayah. See MAPSA (2025).
Source: Author’s calculations based on MHWS data.

Table A.6 Income poverty headcounts (percentage of the population living in poor households), by location and survey round

	Survey rounds						Pooled rounds	
	Round 1	Round 2	Round 4	Round 5	Round 6	Round 7	Rounds 4–5	Rounds 6–7
	Q4 2021–Q1 2022	Q1–Q2 2022	Q3–Q4 2022	Q1–Q2 2023	Q3–Q4 2023	Q1–Q2 2024	Q4 2022 & Q2 2023	Q4 2023 & Q2 2024
National	50.4	56.2	65.2	60.9	71.7	63.6	63.5	67.9
Urban	46.8	48.1	56.4	53.6	64.7	62.8	55.5	64.2
Rural	51.9	59.3	68.5	63.7	74.3	63.9	66.5	69.2
Kachin	68.1	75.6	68.4	64.9	74.4	74.8	66.5	73.7
Kayah	38.9	78.5	80.9	83.2	91.4	95.4	81.3	91.1
Kayin	70.8	68.2	71.0	62.3	75.6	72.6	65.6	73.9
Chin	68.4	78.0	85.4	86.3	92.5	81.4	85.5	87.2
Sagaing	50.1	62.0	73.2	65.5	78.7	64.8	69.8	72.2
Tanintharyi	57.8	55.1	60.3	62.7	77.4	65.8	62.2	72.3
Bago	43.6	42.5	62.4	55.9	68.4	56.2	59.3	62.7
Magway	51.4	61.6	71.3	68.8	75.5	68.5	70.1	72.1
Mandalay	47.0	58.4	63.2	60.0	67.9	62.4	62.3	65.2
Mon	50.6	55.2	67.2	63.7	72.3	61.8	65.1	67.1
Rakhine	62.6	68.3	78.4	72.4	83.5	80.9	75.8	81.8
Yangon	41.3	41.9	51.9	46.5	60.1	53.3	50.7	57.6
Shan	54.8	58.4	60.3	64.9	68.7	67.7	62.7	68.4
Ayeyarwady	48.1	56.6	68.3	61.3	75.1	59.9	65.3	67.7
Nay Pyi Taw	53.3	52.6	58.9	53.3	67.5	59.5	56.4	64.0

Note: Data correspond to the income recall period in each survey round. Round 1 refers to November 2021–February 2022; round 2 refers to March 2022–June 2022; round 4 refers to September 2022–December 2022; round 5 refers to February 2023–June 2023; round 6 refers to August 2023–November 2022; round 7 refers to March–June 2024. In round 7, data are not statistically representative of Kayah. See MAPSA (2025).
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Table A.7 Pooled income poverty headcounts (percentage of population living in poor households), Q4 2023 and Q2 2024 pooled sample by primary livelihood and location

	Own farming	Farm wage	Non-farm wage	Non-farm salary	Non-farm business	Other
National	60.7	87.5	81.2	60.3	64.2	60.6
Urban	63.9	81.2	78.9	54.4	61.5	60.8
Rural	60.5	88.0	82.6	69.8	66.3	60.5
Kachin	64.8	82.5	92.5	61.9	74.3	83.6
Kayah	85.5	97.9	94.0	86.2	89.3	98.7
Kayin	77.8	90.6	82.1	73.1	68.1	57.3
Chin	86.9	100.0	96.9	80.0	74.2	72.2
Sagaing	62.3	90.5	86.7	73.0	71.1	63.4
Tanintharyi	66.9	86.8	86.8	69.4	66.2	52.9
Bago	50.5	83.1	73.0	62.5	64.8	51.0
Magway	61.6	91.0	87.5	68.7	72.1	49.2
Mandalay	55.8	84.6	80.2	61.4	58.5	55.1
Mon	62.8	84.6	82.7	61.7	67.9	42.5
Rakhine	76.4	95.6	92.0	83.8	79.5	81.1
Yangon	47.5	73.0	74.9	51.4	54.0	47.5
Shan	58.5	89.9	79.5	58.9	64.3	84.0
Ayeyarwady	58.6	86.4	82.6	67.0	65.1	59.1
Nay Pyi Taw	46.5	82.2	82.0	62.8	59.7	33.6

Note: “Other” includes households that report their primary livelihood to be “no employment or income”. Quarters correspond to the income recall period in each survey round. Q4 2022 refers to September 2022–December 2022; Q2 2023 refers to February 2023–June 2023; Q4 2023 refers to August 2023–November 2022; Q2 2024 refers to March–June 2024. In Q2 2024, data are not statistically representative of Kayah. See MAPSA (2025).
Source: Author’s calculations based on MHWS data.

Table A.8 Marginal effects of household and community characteristics on household poverty status, by pooled survey rounds

Independent variables	Q4 2022 & Q2 2023	Q4 2023 & Q2 2024	Independent variables	Q4 2022 & Q2 2023	Q4 2023 & Q2 2024
Farm wage vs farm household	29.4***	26.7***	Remoteness: medium vs low	2.0**	0.3
Non-farm wage vs farm household	15.2***	17.7***	Remoteness: high vs low	0.7	0.8
Salary vs farm household	-2.9***	2.1**	Rural	4.2***	2.9***
Non-farm business vs farm household	2.0**	3.9***	Kachin vs Yangon	3.9*	8.7***
Remittances	-19.0***	-18.9***	Kayah vs Yangon	15.2***	18.2***
Assistance from family/friends	-5.3***	-4.7***	Kayin vs Yangon	3.7*	12.4***
Migrated <2 years ago	-4.1***	-6.8***	Chin vs Yangon	21.4***	29.5***
High dependency ratio	18.8***	19.4***	Sagaing vs Yangon	5.0***	8.2***
More than 5 household members	11.6***	9.2***	Tanintharyi vs Yangon	0.3	9.9***
Primary education only	7.3***	6.0***	Bago vs Yangon	-2.2*	0.1
Women only household	-3.8***	-5.8***	Magway vs Yangon	5.5***	7.6***
Respondent is female	8.0***	7.8***	Mon vs Yangon	-5.7***	-1.9
High level of insecurity	3.6**	1.6	Mon vs Yangon	4.0**	6.1***
Climate shock	2.8***	2.3***	Rakhine vs Yangon	9.6***	18.4***
Community wages: low vs high	4.7***	5.4***	Shan vs Yangon	-2.1	5.1***
Community wages: medium vs high	2.8***	0.6	Ayeyarwady vs Yangon	1.1	5.3***
			Nay Pyi Taw vs Yangon	-4.6**	0.5

Note: N= 25,062 in the Q4 2022 and Q2 2023 pooled sample and N= 24,831 in the Q4 2023 and Q2 2024 pooled sample. Quarters correspond to the income recall period in each survey round. Q4 2022 refers to September 2022–December 2022; Q2 2023 refers to February 2023–June 2023; Q4 2023 refers to August 2023–November 2022; Q2 2024 refers to March–June 2024.The dependent variable is income poverty. Households are defined as income poor if they have income per adult equivalent per day less than the poverty line. A high dependency ratio is defined as a ratio of nonworking to working household members that is greater than 1 (the median). Community insecurity and climate shocks are reported by respondent. Livelihoods refer to household's primary income source. Primary education refers to the household head. Community wages are defined as terciles of median township casual construction and agriculture wages. Remoteness is defined as the travel time to the nearest market in a city with a population of at least 50,000. Asterisks show coefficients significant at p-values * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. In Q2 2024, data are not statistically representative of Kayah. See MAPSA (2025).
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

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