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Women's Leadership in Agrifood Governance

Unpacking Gender Attitudes and Framing Effects Among Policymakers with Evidence from India and Nigeria

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ABSTRACT

Women's leadership in policy processes and formal institutions is a powerful pathway to gender equality and women's empowerment at scale, yet relatively little is known about how key decision-makers who influence access to these positions perceive women's leadership and how those perceptions can shift. This paper draws on original survey data from 407 elites from 274 agrifood organizations in India and Nigeria to examine elite gender attitudes, their responsiveness to framing interventions, and how these attitudes relate to support for policies promoting gender equality. Specifically, we ask: how do elites in agrifood governance perceive women's leadership, and how responsive are these perceptions to a targeted framing intervention? We find that elites are substantially more supportive of women's leadership than the general public in the same countries, yet male elites in particular still express strong endorsement of the idea that men make better leaders. Over half of male elites in our sample in both countries agree that men make better political leaders. A randomized framing experiment embedded in the survey shows that men's attitudes toward women's leadership are significantly influenced by how women's capabilities are framed. Messages emphasizing women's equal rights and capabilities reduce male elites' support for gender-unequal statements compared to frames that ask individuals to reject the idea of male superiority. Female elites' attitudes are more supportive overall and unaffected by framing. These findings suggest that gender messaging strategies should center on positive, equality-based frames, and that elite attitudes are critical to scaling women's leadership in agrifood governance.

Keywords: women's leadership, gender attitudes, agriculture, governance, policy processes, survey experiment

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1. INTRODUCTION

Despite three decades of global commitment to gender equality since the Beijing Declaration (UN 1995), women remain underrepresented in political leadership. Men continue to outnumber women more than three to one in legislatures, and women hold fewer than 25 percent of ministerial positions worldwide, with limited progress in recent years (UN 2025). When women are meaningfully engaged in leadership roles, their presence can reshape policy priorities and improve development outcomes. For example, women raise unique policy solutions in policy deliberations on deforestation (Clayton et al., forthcoming), and their influence is linked with better health-care outcomes and nutritional security (Swiss et al., 2012; Sraboni et al., 2014). In agrifood systems, where policies directly affect land rights, input access, and food security, women's leadership can serve as a critical lever for equity and resilience.

Yet these benefits are not automatic: the ability of women leaders to shape decisions depends not only on institutional access, but also on the attitudes of those who share power with them. The ability of women leaders to shape policies can depend on prevailing gender norms and the willingness of other decision-makers to recognize and support their authority (Clayton and Zetterberg, 2021). While much research has focused on public attitudes toward women's leadership, far less is known about how elite actors—those who shape institutional agendas, allocate resources, and control access to leadership roles—perceive women in power. These actors play a gatekeeping role in determining who is appointed, promoted, and heard in policy spaces. Their attitudes may either reinforce existing inequalities or open space for transformational change. This makes elite gender attitudes an important potential lever for advancing women's representation in policymaking and for shaping whether leadership opportunities are truly influential.

This paper investigates two related questions regarding gender attitudes and women's leadership using original survey data from 407 agrifood policy actors in India and Nigeria. These countries are two of the world's largest agricultural economies and face persistent gender inequalities in governance. India and Nigeria rank 129th and 125th, respectively, in the World Economic Forum's Global Gender Gap Index (2024), and women remain underrepresented in all stages of agrifood policy processes in both countries (Ragasa et al. 2023, 2024). We link this data with nationally representative data from World Values Survey (WVS) to analyze gaps between the elite actors in our sample and broader social norms within India and Nigeria and implement a survey experiment to test the effects of framing on elite gender attitudes.

Specifically, we ask, first, how do elite gender attitudes compare to those of the general public in each country? For example, are elites on average more or less gender egalitarian than the general public and does this vary for men and women? Second, are elite gender attitudes malleable depending on how the case for women's leadership is framed? The framing experiment tests whether different narrative approaches activate more support for women's leadership among elites—especially male elites, who often hold more traditional views. One condition uses an "equality frame" emphasizing that women are equally capable leaders. The other uses an "inequality frame" asking respondents to reject the claim that men make better leaders. By comparing responses across groups, we assess whether elite attitudes are responsive to framing.

The paper presents three key results. First, elites are on average more supportive of women's leadership than the general public, but male elites in the countries studied still hold substantial gender biases. Second, elite attitudes vary across leadership domains, with lower support for women's leadership in political and bureaucratic roles. Third, elite men's attitudes are sensitive to how messages about women's leadership are framed: equality-based frames lead to greater support compared to frames that challenge traditional male authority.

In doing so, this study contributes to the literature on gender and governance by offering new empirical evidence on elite gender norms in countries where women's political and governance empowerment are stagnating. It also highlights how elite-level norms and preferences may act as constraints—or enablers—for scaling women's leadership within national food system governance. Understanding how attitudes differ across elite and public spheres, and how they respond to different narratives, can inform more effective strategies for promoting women's voice and influence in policy processes.

2. ATTITUDES TOWARD WOMEN'S LEADERSHIP

While societal gender attitudes are widely studied, comparatively little is known about the gender attitudes of elite decision-makers—those with influence over policy, institutional practices, and political discourse. These elites play a critical role in shaping formal and informal institutions, setting norms around women's leadership, and implementing (or obstructing) gender equality measures. In agrifood systems governance, elite support is crucial to expanding women's representation, voice, and leadership within institutions that manage agricultural development, land policy, nutrition policy, and resource distribution.

Figure 1 presents a conceptual framework linking elite gender attitudes to downstream outcomes for gender equality in agrifood governance. Elite attitudes can theoretically influence the gender responsiveness of policies and programs, through mechanisms such as policy design, engagement with women's groups, public signaling, and program targeting and delivery. They can also influence the internal functioning of institutions—through hiring, promotion, support for women's quotas, and workplace policies and norms. This framework also highlights possible feedback loops: as more women enter leadership, elites may be socialized toward more egalitarian views.

Figure 1. Conceptual framework linking elite gender attitudes to gender equality outcomes in agrifood governance



Source: Authors' elaborations

While this study does not test this framework directly, the framework motivates the focus on agrifood policymaking elites and lays the conceptual foundation for this study's empirical aim: to map elite gender attitudes and to inform strategies to strengthen women's leadership and voice in agrifood systems. Specifically, the study focuses on two core questions: (1) How do elite attitudes compare to public opinion? (2) Are elite attitudes responsive to framing, or differences in how women's leadership are presented? By focusing on these pathways, we offer empirical insight into an underexplored mechanism—elite belief systems—that may either constrain or enable progress toward gender equitable agrifood governance. Before proceeding to our analysis, we review literature on gender attitudes and develop hypotheses on elite attitudes.

2.1 Sources of gender attitudes

Social role theory emphasizes how deeply embedded norms about what women and women "should" do shape public perceptions of who is qualified to lead. Women are typically viewed as nurturing and communal, while men are seen as assertive and suited to public leadership (Eagly et al., 2000). These stereotypes fuel skepticism about women's leadership competencies (Koenig et al., 2011) and subject women to higher standards when they do lead (Bauer, 2020). Matrilineal societies—where women's visible participation in leadership is normalized—provide useful counterexamples to underscore the importance of gendered social roles in shaping views. For example, Robinson and Gottlieb (2019) find smaller gender gaps in political engagement in matrilineal African societies, while Brulé and Gaikwad (2021) find that gender gaps reverse in matrilineal communities in northeast India.

Meanwhile, socialization theory suggests that exposure to women in leadership roles can gradually shift attitudes toward greater gender egalitarianism and dispel myths about women's lack of leadership competence (Mansbridge, 1999). Seeing women in public leadership sends a signal that women's voices belong in political arenas (Karp and Banducci, 2008). Evidence on the empirical links between women's representation and attitudes is mixed, however. In India, Beamen et al. (2009, 2012) find that India's 1993 constitutional amendment reserving seats for women in local government improved perceptions of women's leadership effectiveness and raised girls' career aspirations. Cross-national studies reinforce this link: higher women's parliamentary representation is associated with stronger beliefs in women's leadership competence and higher political engagement among women (Alexander, 2012; Allen and Cutts, 2018; Barnes and Burchard, 2012; Kosec et al., 2023).

However, in some settings, exposure to women leaders yields little or no attitudinal change (Clayton, 2018), particularly if their roles are seen as symbolic or politically motivated (Franceschet et al., 2012; Noh et al., 2024). In some cases, increasing women's representation has provoked backlash among men who perceive empowerment efforts and quotas as a threat (Kim and Kweon, 2022; Mansell et al., 2022; Morgan and Buice 2013). Elites may be exposed to women leaders through education, professional networks, and civil society engagement, which can support more egalitarian attitudes (Klein, 1984). Yet, they remain embedded in gendered institutions, where informal norms and power dynamics may reinforce patriarchal attitudes.

Importantly, attitudes toward women's leadership are not necessarily uniform across domains. Consistent with gendered social roles that value women's communal roles, individuals may be more open to women's leadership in the community than in formal political institutions or national policy bodies. This variation may reflect different domains of perceived competence, influence, or threat. For instance, leadership in politics may be viewed as requiring skills stereotypically associated with men like charisma, negotiation skills, and independence, while leadership in civil society or community organizations may align more with caregiving and collaboration—traits more often associated with women. In addition, elites may be more resistant to women's leadership in high-stakes or traditionally male-dominated arenas (e.g. politics) than in domains like education and health. Support for women's leadership in one domain

(e.g. local government) does not necessarily imply support in another (e.g. national parliament). Understanding domain-specific variation is crucial for tailoring messaging strategies and policy design.

2.2 The role of framing in shaping gender attitudes

Beyond the broader contextual conditions that shape gender attitudes, framing can shift attitudes by activating different norms or values (Chong and Druckman, 2007). For instance, gender quotas can be framed as promoting fairness, ensuring that women's equal capabilities are recognized and reflected in decision-making. Alternatively, gender quotas can be framed as a policy to redress discrimination and bias by changing the status quo. In Norway, support for corporate gender quotas increased when quotas were framed as promoting gender balance rather than as correcting past injustice (Tiegen and Karlsen, 2020). In Egypt, Masoud, Jamal, and Nugent (2016) find that arguments for women's political equality based in Quranic text are more persuasive than secular, rights-based appeals. These studies suggest that framing can be a powerful lever for attitude change, especially when tailored to audience values and context.

This insight is particularly relevant in settings where gender norms are deeply entrenched but elite actors may be exposed to competing discourses—through education, international engagement, and professional networks—that promote gender equality. In these contexts, how messages about women's leadership are framed may determine whether elites endorse or resist change. Attitudinal survey items frequently deployed in large-scale, cross-country surveys like Afrobarometer and World Values Survey often reflect implicit frames: questions such as "men make better leaders than women" present male leadership as the default, reinforcing normative baselines. Yet recent evidence shows that reversing the reference point—by asserting women's equality—can lead to more egalitarian responses (Bruckmüller et al., 2012; Reitman et al., 2020).

Importantly, men and women may respond differently to framing. Men's attitudes toward women's leadership may be less tied to personal identity and thus more malleable (Morgan and Buice, 2013), while women's attitudes on women's leadership specifically may be more stable, informed by deeply-held beliefs and shared identity. These findings suggest that framing is a promising lever to shift elite attitudes, particularly among male decisionmakers.

In all, the logic above suggests three testable hypotheses regarding elite gender attitudes:

- *H1 (**elite-public gap**): Elites will hold more gender egalitarian attitudes compared to the broader public*
- *H2 (**domain variation**): Attitudes toward women's leadership will vary across leadership domains (e.g. community, business, politics), with greater support in less politicized and more local spaces.*
- *H3 (**framing effects**): Elite attitudes—especially among men—will be more supportive of women's leadership when exposed to frames emphasizing women's equal capabilities, compared to frames that challenge male dominance directly.*

In what follows, we examine elite gender attitudes within India and Nigeria and test whether experimentally varying how gender equality messages are framed shifts elite support for women's leadership.

3. COUNTRY CONTEXT

Our analysis of gender attitudes focuses on elite actors within the agrifood policy process in India and Nigeria—two of the largest agriculture-based economies among low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), and both countries where women remain underrepresented in decision-making. These two countries offer a valuable basis for comparative analysis: while both face persistent gender inequalities, they differ in pace of reform and institutional design. India has introduced subnational gender quotas and experienced gradual, if uneven, gains in women's political representation. Nigeria, by contrast, has seen stagnation and in some cases regression in women's political participation. Comparing these cases enables us to broaden the sample of elites and to examine whether gender and framing effects vary substantially across these distinct environments. This enhances the external validity of the findings and speaks to the generalizability of framing-based strategies to influence elite support for gender equality.

Nigeria consistently ranks among the lowest in the world for women's political representation. In the most recent national elections, women won only 3% of Senate seats and 4% of seats in the House of Representatives (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2023). Nigeria has made no sustained progress in electing more women to parliament over the past two decades. In fact, representation has slightly declined in recent years, even as many Sub-Saharan African countries have expanded women's participation (Figure 2).

India shows more gradual improvement, with women holding 17% of seats in the upper house seats and 14% in the lower house as of 2024. These figures are close to the South Asian regional average, yet the region still lags behind most others globally (Annex Figure 1). According to the World Economic Forum (2024), India ranks 65th (out of 147 countries) in women's political empowerment, with a gender parity score of 0.251 (1.0 indicates parity). Nigeria ranks 139th with a score of 0.228. Together, India and Nigeria represent countries like many other agriculture-based LMICs where gender inequalities remain. India has made progress in closing gaps, while Nigeria has limited momentum.

Figure 2. Share of women's seats in parliament, India and Nigeria, 2000–24



Source: Data from IPU PARLINE database on national parliaments.

While both countries have constitutional and legal provisions supporting gender equality, in practice, women face persistent institutional and cultural barriers. In Nigeria, male-dominated political parties act as gatekeepers, limiting women's access to candidacy and leadership roles (Pogoson, 2012). Access to capital is another key constraint. Competing for office often requires significant financial backing—resources that most women lack (Karubi and Wasudawan, 2020). High nomination fees, dependence on male political patrons, and exclusion from elite funding networks further restrict women's candidacy (Pogoson, 2012). Women's lack of access to the same levels of funding and funding networks also affects how they are perceived by voters. Because patronage is prevalent in Nigerian electoral politics, voters often expect direct monetary benefits from candidates (Ekpenyong et al., 2015) and are aware that female candidates have fewer resources to work with.

Cultural expectations and media narratives reinforce gender stereotypes. Nigerian women in politics are often portrayed by local media as subordinate to male counterparts and lack competence (Ekeh, 2018). Female candidates themselves sometimes lean into gendered narratives to gain appeal to voters, emphasizing their religiosity, family heritage, and nurturing nature over technical competence, policy agenda, and experience (Balogun, 2018). These patterns mirror broader societal norms, where women in politics are often viewed as violating culturally assigned gender roles (Nwabunkeonye, 2014).

Women similarly face significant institutional and social barriers to political leadership in India, despite constitutional commitments to gender equality and a long history of women's political activism. While India has introduced gender quotas at the local government level through a constitutional amendment mandating that 1/3 of seats in local councils be held by women, quotas on the state level have been adopted but not yet come into effect. In 2024, the first election after passing the reservation quota at the state level, fewer than 10% of candidates were women (*The Economic Times,* 2024). Political parties often fail to provide adequate resources and support to female candidates and can push elected female leaders into symbolic roles. Brown et al. (2022) find that local pipelines matter: areas with lower local female representation nominate fewer female candidates for state and national legislative elections.

These structural and cultural constraints extend into agrifood policy systems. A recent study of women's voice and influence in agrifood organizations found that while women comprise 30-40% of staff and mid-level managers in agrifood organizations in India and Nigeria, they remain severely underrepresented in top decision-making roles. Women have limited influence in national and state-level agrifood ministries and play a marginal role in shaping policy, particularly within public sector institutions (Ragasa et al. 2023, 2024).

4. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

4.1 Data collection

4.1.1 Step 1 – Organizational landscape mapping

This study is based on original survey data collected from 241 agrifood stakeholders in Nigeria (February-March 2023) and 166 stakeholders in India (January-March 2024). The data collection was jointly conducted by IFPRI, LEAD at Krea University (India), and the Agricultural Policy Research Network (APRNet, Nigeria). The survey captured basic respondent demographics and detailed perceptions of women's empowerment and leadership within the agrifood policy process. The survey was primarily self-administered online, but enumerators also introduced the study through in-person or telephone outreach to secure institutional consent and participation.

We used a two-stage sampling approach. In stage one, we mapped organizations involved in national agrifood policymaking—including those involved in policy design, implementation, or evaluation. While the organizational mapping was at the national level, many relevant actors in the national policy process operate at the subnational level, including those working in state ministries who play an important role in implementing federal agricultural policies (in addition to forming and implementing state-level policies). Due to resource constraints and the large number of states in each country, we selected two focus states in each geopolitical zone in India and one in each geopolitical zone in Nigeria to ensure geographic and institutional diversity. Figure 3 reports the distribution of organizations in the sample in each country.

Figure 3. Distribution of sample organizations



Source: Authors.

4.1.2 Step 2 – Sampling agrifood policy actors

Respondents were sampled from a diverse set of organization types, including national- and state-level government agencies, civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private sector firms,

research institutions, and universities (Figure 4). Annex Table 1 provides descriptive characteristics of the individuals in our sample. Across both countries, 37% of respondents were women; reflecting the seniority of the elites in our sample, only 23% were under 35. Almost all respondents had at least a bachelor's degree, and the majority hold graduate degrees. Individuals hold diverse positions within agrifood organizations, though all are relatively senior.

Figure 4. Distribution of elite respondents by organization type.



Source: Authors. CSO=civil society organizations, NGO=non-governmental organizations, CSO/NGO group includes donor representatives.

4.2 Empirical strategies

4.2.1 Gender attitudes

To test H1, we compare responses from our elite survey to nationally representative public opinion data from the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS asks respondents to rate their agreement with statements on women's leadership (*Men make better political leaders than women do* and *Men make better business executives than women do*). Overall, 50% of men and women interviewed across 75 countries agree that men make better political leaders than women, and more than 40% think men make better business executives (UNDP, 2020). The same items were asked in our elite survey, along with additional statements to capture attitudes across multiple leadership domains: leadership positions in government ministries and agencies; NGOs; and agricultural cooperatives or farmer-based organizations (Coop/FBOs). We also asked about women's participation or representation in group or community activities. Asking about attitudes towards women's leadership across these domains enables us to test H2.

4.2.2 Survey experiment

To test H3, we implemented a survey experiment that randomized elites into one of two framing conditions.[1] In the first group, we used a "gender equality" frame. Respondents saw statements covering

[1] Annex Table 2 reports a balance test. Covariates are all balanced (no statistical difference) between the two frames, in Nigeria, while the sample is balanced by respondent gender, younger respondents were significantly more likely to receive the "gender equality" framing, as were respondents with lower educational attainment. We control for these covariates in the main

six leadership domains (political, business, ministerial, NGO, cooperatives and FBOs, and community). For each domain, respondents reacted to a statement asserting that women are equally as capable as men (e.g. "Women make equally good or better NGO leaders than men do."). Responses were recorded on a four-point Likert scale ranging from 1 "strongly agree" to 4 "strongly disagree."

The second group received a "gender inequality" frame, reacting to the same domains but with statements asserting male superiority (e.g. "Men make better NGO leaders than women do."). Each respondent was randomly assigned to one framing condition and asked to evaluate leadership statement across all six domains. Responses from both groups were recoded so that higher values consistently reflect more inegalitarian views and lower support for women's leadership in that domain.

A pure control group (with no framing) was not included in the experiment. The "inequality" frame—asserting that men make better leaders—mirrors the framing used in global public opinion surveys such as WVS. It thus serves as a realistic baseline for comparison, reflecting the reference point commonly used to assess gender attitudes. As in many A / B framing experiments, the aim was not to compare against a neutral absence of information but to test the impact of reframing a conventional narrative. The equality frame represents a counter-narrative that elites would nonetheless be familiar with, given their exposure to public discourse and international engagement around women's leadership. Comparing these two conditions allows us to assess whether the narrative commonly presenting women's leadership in an egalitarian framing versus asking elites to reject conventional narratives on male superiority leads to shifts in expressed attitudes.

We also designed the survey to minimize common sources of response bias in Likert scale data. To reduce central tendency bias, we excluded a middle / neutral response option. To minimize order effects, we randomized the presentation of leadership domains. We also considered the risk of acquiescence bias, where respondents might simply agree with statements regardless of content. However, as shown in Figure 5, agreement rates vary meaningfully by gender and by framing condition. If acquiescence bias were prevalent, we would expect to see large shares of respondents agree with the statement that they are presented with. However, agreement rates vary by gender and by frame, suggesting that it is likely the framing effect that mostly drives the variation in the attitudes among men respondents in both countries.

analyses.

Figure 5. Reported attitudes toward gender inequality, measured by the number of statements with support toward gender inequality (% of respondents).

(i) India



(ii) Nigeria

Source: Authors.

4.2.3 Estimating the framing effect on attitudes on women's leadership

We estimate the framing effect using the following multivariate model:

$$A_i = \alpha + \beta_1 F_i + \beta_2 G_i + \beta_3 F_i \times G_i + \gamma \boldsymbol{X}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where A_i is the attitude (support for gender inequality) of respondent i; F_i is a dummy variable indicating whether respondent i received the gender equality frame; and G_i represents the gender of the respondent and takes the value of one if the respondent is male. We also included an interaction term between the type of framing and the gender of the respondent. $\boldsymbol{X}_i$ is a set of covariates that may affect attitudes on gender equality of respondent i (see Table 1; Annex Tables 1-5 for these set of covariates, which include age, education, region, organization type, and position within the organization); and Annex Table 2 provides evidence of good randomization and balance of covariates. ε_i is the error term, and β and γ are the coefficients or the change in the gender attitude for a change in *F, G, FxG*, and set of *X*. A positive β_1 coefficient implies that attitudes are more supportive of gender inequality when respondent *i* is assigned to the gender equality frame; while a negative β_1 coefficient implies that attitudes are more supportive of gender equality when respondent *i* is assigned to the gender equality frame.

For our main indicator of interest (attitudes supporting gender inequality), we used several alternative measures and modeled them differently in the multivariate regression analysis:

- Likert scale (4=Strongly agree, 3=Agree, 2=Disagree, 1=Strongly disagree), higher values indicate greater support for inequality, tested using Mann-Whitney test of median equality and modeled as quantile (median) regression commonly used for ordered or scaled outcome indicators;

- Binary variable (1=inequality combined Strongly agree and Agree; 0=equality combined Disagree and Strongly disagree), tested using Pearson's chi-square test of equality and modeled as logistical regression commonly used for binary variables as outcome indicators; and

- Share of statements (on leadership domains) indicating inclination toward gender inequality, tested using t-test and modeled as fractional regression commonly used for proportions or shares as outcome indicators.

The main regression results are presented in Table 1, and the full model results are presented in Annex Tables 3-5. Results of the equality tests of median attitudes per leadership domain statement are presented in Annex Tables 6-7.

5. RESULTS

5.1 Elite and societal gender attitudes

We begin by evaluating H1: that elites will hold more gender egalitarian attitudes than the general public. We draw on data from our elite survey and the nationally representative WVS in India and Nigeria. As shown in Figure 6, support for the idea that men are better political and business leaders remains widespread among the public. In Nigeria, 89% of male and 69% of female citizens agreed or strongly agreed that men are better political leaders. In India, 63% of men and 50% of women expressed the same view. For business leadership, public support for male superiority is slightly lower but follows a similar gendered pattern.

By contrast, elite respondents are substantially less likely to endorse gender-unequal attitudes. In Nigeria, 53% of male elites and 14% of female elites in our sample agreed that men make better political leaders. In India, only 29% of male elites and 8% of female elites endorsed this view (Figure 6a). When we tested the statistical difference between the proportion of and median of gender attitudes of the mass public and polity elites, the data showed strong statistical difference ($p<0.00$). Even when we disaggregate the nationally representative sample and look only at those citizens that have at least a bachelor's degree, elite respondents were still significantly more egalitarian—especially among men. For example, 66% of Nigerian men and 48% of Indian men with a bachelor's degree endorsed the idea that men are better business leaders, compared to 42% and 27% of male elites, respectively (Figure 7). Consistent with H1, these findings suggest a substantial gap between elite and societal attitudes—particularly among men.[2]

[2] While the WVS data is nationally representative, the elite sample draws from the national capital and a select set of states. While the states were selected to represent a diverse set of regions and geographies within each country, it is possible that elites within a different set of states would have different attitudes. Thus, when interpreting the comparison between the elite and public samples, it is important to acknowledge that the elite sample is not a random draw of all policy elites.

Figure 6. Difference in gender attitude toward women's leadership between the public and policy elites (% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing to the statements)



Source: Authors. Note: The probability of agreement or strong agreement to the statement that men make better political and business leaders is statistically different between public and elite, for both female and male respondents ($p<0.00$). This holds even when education level is accounted for: the probability of agreement or strong agreement to the statement that men are better political and business leaders is statistically different between public and elite, with BS or higher education ($p<0.00$). Median attitudes between public and elite are statistically different at 0.00 level, based on Mann–Whitney test. When education is accounted for, median attitudes toward women's leadership in politics and business between public and elite (with BS or higher education) are different among men ($p<0.13$; $p<0.03$) but not among women ($p<0.38$; $p<0.76$) in Nigeria; different among women in India ($p<0.01$; $p<0.02$), and only on politics ($p<.01$) and not on business ($p<0.33$) for men in India. See Annex Table 8 for more details.

Figure 7. Attitude toward women's leadership by the mass public, by education level.



Source: Authors.

Beyond differences in mean gender attitudes between elites and the public, we also find key differences in the ratio of support between male and female respondents within the public and elite samples. For example, in India, among the public, the ratio of male-to-female support for the idea that men make better political leaders is 1.24—but rises to 3.63 among elites. This is largely driven by the very low share of elite women who endorse gender inegalitarian attitudes (8% in India; 14% in Nigeria). Female elites in the agrifood policy space—who have navigated male-dominated institutions—hold gender views consistent with their own competencies and abilities and quite different than male elites in the same organizations. In other words, female elites are more different in their views than women in the general public than male elites are from men in the general public.

We next explore what factors predict support for gender-egalitarian attitudes within elite and public samples. In the elite sample, covariates include age cohort, educational attainment, professional role, self-rated policy expertise, organization type, and region / zone fixed effects. In the WVS sample, we similarly control for age, age squared, an asset score index, educational attainment, whether the respondent consumes news daily, urban residence, whether the respondent is Muslim, and state fixed effects.

Across both countries and samples, respondents' gender is the most consistent predictor of gender attitudes (see Annex Tables 3-5, 9), controlling for other demographic variables. Female respondents were significantly more likely to reject gender-unequal statements across all model specifications. Among the public, education and urban residence also predict egalitarian attitudes. Age was not a significant factor.

In the elite sample, variation in gender attitudes was more modest due to the relatively homogenous nature of the sample. However, several patterns are evident. In Nigeria, older men expressed more gender-unequal views. Heads of organizations were somewhat more supportive of gender equality (in some models). Among women elites, those in NGOs were more egalitarian than those in government or academia. In India, male elites in academia were generally more egalitarian, while female heads and managers were slightly more likely to express gender-unequal views than female staff.

While these analyses are descriptive, they have several implications. There is a substantial gap between elite and societal attitudes, even when comparing elites to members of the public with higher educational attainment. Elites are, on average, more egalitarian and have more favorable assessments of women's leadership capabilities in politics and in business. However, beliefs in women's leadership competency are by no means universal, even among elites. Male elites in particular continue to have strong endorsement for gender inequalities in political and business leadership, requiring better understanding on how to more effectively shift men's attitudes toward gender equality. The combination of persistent public skepticism toward women's leadership and social biases within elite circles may make it difficult to promulgate policies and programs promoting gender equality. The results also highlight the importance of women's leadership in promoting women's representation. It is female elites in the agrifood policy process who are the most consistent champions of women's leadership.

5.2 Leadership domains

We next explore whether elite attitudes vary across leadership domains (H2). In addition to political and business leadership, respondents evaluated women's leadership roles in four other domains: government ministries, NGOs, agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations, and communities.

Across all domains, male elites were significantly more likely than female elites to say men make better leaders. Figure 8 depicts the share of male and female respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with that statement across six domains. Annex Tables 3-5 presents the full regression models, controlling

for respondent demographics. The results show greater domain-specific variation in Nigeria than in India. In Nigeria, belief in male superiority was highest among male elites for politics (53%) and government ministries (52%), and notably lower for NGOs (29%), business (41%), cooperatives / FBOs (41%), and community leadership (33%). Among Nigerian women elites, support for gender equality was high across all domains, though 23% endorsed male superiority in agricultural cooperatives—higher than in other domains. In India, male elites held more uniform attitudes across leadership domains, with moderate support for male superiority ranging from 27-33%. Among female elites, support for women's leadership was generally consistent, though attitudes toward business leadership were slightly more skeptical (Annex Table 4).

These findings underscore the importance of recognizing the potential for domain-specific variation in attitudes toward women's leadership—particularly among men. The stronger resistance to women's leadership in political and government institutions in Nigeria suggests that these domains are perceived as more power-centric or masculinized, and thus less open to women. In contrast, civil society and community-based leadership may be viewed as more collaborative and inclusive, potentially explaining greater openness to women leaders in those spaces. Higher support for male leadership in cooperatives among Nigerian women—a surprising deviation—may reflect structural realities of male-dominated membership in that context, or the economic stakes involved in these organizations. This points to the need for deeper qualitative inquiry into how gendered norms operate in specific institutional settings and for tailored strategies to amplify women's leadership across domains.

Figure 8. Share of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing that men make better leaders across leadership domains



Source: Authors.

5.3 How framing affects elites' support for women's leadership

We next examine whether elite attitudes are responsive to how women's leadership is framed (H3). Figure 9 shows the share of gender-unequal responses by framing condition across leadership domains for male and female respondents. Results from Nigeria are represented in red, while results from India are

represented in blue. For both countries, lighter bars indicate assignment to the inequality frame, while darker bars indicate assignment to the equality frame. Across almost all leadership domains in both countries, male respondents are more likely to support gender-unequal statements when presented with the inequality frame ("men make better leaders"). The exception is for male respondents in India who were relatively unaffected by framing effects when considering community leadership. Female respondents, meanwhile, on average do not change levels of support based upon framing, though there is some evidence that female respondents in India are more likely to support the idea that men make better business leaders when presented with the inequality framing.

Figure 9. Share of respondents supporting inequality by leadership domain and by frame.



Source: Authors. Lighter bars indicate assignment to the inequality frame, while darker bars indicate assignment to the equality frame.

Table 1. Results of framing on attitudes supporting gender inequality

	Nigeria			India		
	Full sample	Men	Women	Full sample	Men	Women
Outcome 1: Share of inequality statements that respondents agreed or strongly agreed on (fractional regression)						
Gender equality frame (=1)	-0.094**	-0.165***	0.037	-0.107**	-0.144**	-0.000
	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.060)	(0.040)
Male (=1)	0.217***			0.170***		
	(0.048)			(0.062)		
Mean – Inequality framing group	0.324	0.426	0.160	0.236	0.314	0.073
Outcome 2: Respondent agreed or strongly agreed to inequality statements (0/1) (Logistic regression)						
Gender equality frame (=1)	-0.094*	-0.165**	0.042	-0.122**	-0.191**	0.021
	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.080)	(0.056)	(0.078)	(0.062)
Male (=1)	0.230***			0.223***		
	(0.060)			(0.082)		
Mean – Inequality framing group	0.344	0.455	0.167	0.260	0.365	0.040
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	241	149	92	166	108	58

Source: Authors. Note: Numbers are marginal effects; numbers on parenthesis are the standard errors. Full model, with the set of controls are presented in Annex Table 3. Significant at *** indicates p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.

Table 1 reports the estimates from Eq. (1) testing systematic differences across the framing groups on the share of statements supporting gender inequality, controlling for covariates. Column 1 reports results for the full sample; Columns 2 and 3 report separate estimates for male and female respondents. For men, being assigned the gender equality frame reduced the share of gender-unequal statements endorsed by 17% ($p < 0.01$) in Nigeria and 14% ($p<0.01$) in India. This is about one additional inequality statement that male respondents would likely not endorse under the equality frame less than under inequality frame; and this is consistent across models. For women, framing had no significant effects. These results demonstrate that men's attitudes toward women's leadership are more malleable to framing interventions than women's attitudes and that equality framing specifically reduces men's endorsement of gender inequality in leadership.

Across leadership domains, framing effects varied. In Nigeria, the equality framing ("women make equally good leaders") significantly reduced male support for inequality in all leadership domains except NGOs. In India, framing effects were strongest for business, cooperative, and NGO leadership, but not significant for politics or government roles (Annex Table 4). Controlling for covariates, women's attitudes are more stable and less malleable to framing.

While our survey design minimizes many common sources of bias, including acquiescence and order effects, it is important to acknowledge key limitations. It is difficult to say, for example, whether men's reactions to the "gender inequality" frame are more about their assessment of political and social conditions or about their assessments about women's competencies. For example, if politics operates on

patronage networks in which men are more connected, then they may be accurately noting that men are more effective at operating in this context. The equality frame may evoke ideas about competency and what women deserve – equal opportunity – versus what people think works in practice. Future research using cognitive interviews or vignette-based experiments could help unpack how elites interpret these frames—whether as reflections of competence, context, or moral beliefs.

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This study sets out to better understand how elites involved in national agrifood governance view women's leadership—and whether these views are malleable. Using original survey and experimental data from over 400 policymakers and influential elites in the agrifood policy process in India and Nigeria, we investigated how elite gender attitudes compare to those of the general public, how support for women's leadership varies by domain, and how attitudes shift when the case for women's leadership is framed differently.

Three core findings emerged. First, we found that elites—especially women—hold more gender-egalitarian attitudes on average than the general public in their respective countries, even after accounting for education. This is an encouraging sign that those shaping national agrifood policy are, on average, more open to gender equality within key institutions than the populations they serve. However, male elites in both countries still express considerable endorsement for the idea that men make better leaders. In Nigeria, over half of male elites agree that men are better political leaders—a view mirrored by the broader population. In short, while elites are somewhat more progressive, large pockets of patriarchal views remain among men in influential roles.

Second, we found that attitudes toward women's leadership are not uniform across leadership domains. Political and government leadership roles drew the highest skepticism, particularly in Nigeria, while NGO and community leadership roles were viewed as more appropriate for women. This suggests that support for women's leadership is shaped not only about beliefs about gender and leadership competence, but also by the perceptions about how different domains function and women's appropriate roles within those domains. Women are more welcome in spaces perceived as collaborative and community-oriented than in high-stakes or politicized arenas.

Third, we found that how women's leadership is framed significantly influences elites' expressed attitudes—but only among men. Male elites were more supportive of women's leadership when the message emphasized equality (e.g. "women are equally capable leaders") rather than when it challenged male superiority directly. Female elites, by contrast, were largely unaffected by framing. These results suggest that a positive, rights-based messaging may be more effective than frames that require men to explicitly reject ideas that are deeply rooted in social context and culture ("men are better leaders") in shifting male elite attitudes—a critical insight for gender advocacy campaigns and for programming designed to benefit women that requires male support.

Together, these findings tell a layered story. Elite actors are more supportive of gender equality than the broader public, but support varies by gender, domain, and how the issue is presented. This reveals both the potential and the limits of relying on elites to drive progress on women's leadership: they are more open to reform than the general public, but they are not immune to deeply rooted norms and power structures.

Several limitations merit attention. First, the cross-sectional nature of our data prevents causal claims about how elite attitudes are formed or how they change over time. Second, while the experimental design reduces bias in measuring framing effects, we cannot isolate whether responses are driven by perceptions of competence, fairness, or political feasibility. Third, our sample—though diverse across sectors and geographies—may not fully capture informal power brokers or actors at lower levels of governance who also influence outcomes. Finally, framing effects were tested using simplified survey statements; real-world policy debates are more complex and dynamic.

Our findings have several practical implications for advancing women's leadership in agrifood governance. Messaging matters: framing gender inequality in terms of shared capabilities, rights, and

inclusion is more persuasive to male elites than requiring men to reject traditional ideas of male superiority in historically male roles. Avoiding zero-sum frames and emphasizing mutual benefits in messaging may help raise support. Male elites are both more resistant to change and more responsive to framing, suggesting that they should be the key targets of behavioral change campaigns. Meanwhile, female elites are strong potential allies and champions, on average. Policies to promote women's leadership may find more traction in civil society and community-based institutions while facing greater resistance in formal political and bureaucratic structures. These differences can inform sequencing and targeting of reform efforts. It is worth considering how elite-public gaps in gender attitudes present both opportunities and risks. Elites may be ahead of public opinion, but this could generate backlash if reforms are perceived as imposed or out of touch. Engaging the public alongside any elite-led initiatives to raise women's leadership may be important, and these dynamics are worth future research and investigation.

This study raises several questions for future work. First, how do elite attitudes evolve over time and under what conditions do they shift? Longitudinal data would help identify causal pathways and persistence of framing effects. Second, how do framing effects interact with institutional context—are they more potent in bureaucracies, NGOs, or political parties? Third, future work should explore how elite attitudes translate into concrete behavior, such as hiring, promotion, or policy decisions. Finally, given the context-specific nature of gender norms, there is value in replicating this study in other settings—particularly in regions undergoing rapid agrifood system transformation.

Ultimately, women's empowerment in agrifood governance depends not just on the number of women in leadership roles, but on whether existing elites believe that women's voices should be heard—and act accordingly. Elites have an important role to play in making that happen.

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ANNEXES

Annex Figure 1. Share of women parliamentarians, 2000-2024



Source: Data from IPU PARLINE database on national parliaments.

Annex Table 1. Sample elites' characteristics (% of elite respondents)

Characteristics	India (N=166)	Nigeria (N=241)
Gender		
Female	35	38
Male	65	62
Age		
<=35	26	21
36–50	52	51
51–65	20	25
> 65	2	2
Education		
Primary, secondary, diploma	4	8
Bachelor-level equivalent	16	42
Master's degree or equivalent	47	31
PhD	33	20
Professional position		
Head of the organization	22	13
Manager or decision-maker of specific program or job function in the organization	28	23
Expert in agrifood policy	9	10
Focal point or contact for gender programming in the organization	4	15
Officers, researchers, lecturers, or other staff in the organization	37	39

Source: Authors.

Annex Table 2. Balance of covariates, India and Nigeria

	Nigeria			India		
	Full sample	Inequality	Equality	Full sample	Inequality	Equality
Male (=1)	0.618	0.616	0.621	0.651	0.675	0.629
	(0.487)	(0.488)	(0.487)	(0.478)	(0.471)	(0.486)
Role in agri-food organization						
Head of organization	0.133	0.120	0.147	0.223	0.234	0.213
	(0.340)	(0.326)	(0.355)	(0.417)	(0.426)	(0.412)
Manager	0.349	0.360	0.336	0.277	0.260	0.292
	(0.478)	(0.482)	(0.474)	(0.449)	(0.441)	(0.457)
Other staff	0.519	0.520	0.517	0.259	0.273	0.247
	(0.501)	(0.502)	(0.502)	(0.439)	(0.448)	(0.434)
Education **						
Master's degree or higher	0.506	0.568	0.440	0.801	0.831	0.775
	(0.501)	(0.497)	(0.498)	(0.400)	(0.377)	(0.420)
Age *						
<= 35	0.212	0.160	0.267	0.259	0.260	0.258
	(0.409)	(0.368)	(0.444)	(0.439)	(0.441)	(0.440)
36-50	0.515	0.544	0.483	0.518	0.468	0.562
	(0.501)	(0.500)	(0.502)	(0.501)	(0.502)	(0.499)
50+	0.274	0.296	0.250	0.223	0.273	0.180
	(0.447)	(0.458)	(0.435)	(0.417)	(0.448)	(0.386)
Knowledge of agrifood policy						
Self-rated expertise in agri-food policymaking (5-point Likert scale)	0.797	0.784	0.810	0.464	0.416	0.506
	(0.057)	(0.413)	(0.394)	(0.500)	(0.496)	(0.503)
Organization type						
Government agency	0.490	0.424	0.560	0.392	0.325	0.449
	(0.501)	(0.496)	(0.498)	(0.490)	(0.471)	(0.500)
CSO/NGO/Others	0.154	0.160	0.147	0.367	0.442	0.303
	(0.361)	(0.368)	(0.355)	(0.484)	(0.500)	(0.462)
Private sector	0.191	0.208	0.172			
	(0.394)	(0.408)	(0.379)			
Research institution/University	0.166	0.208	0.121	0.241	0.234	0.247
	(0.373)	(0.408)	(0.327)	(0.429)	(0.426)	(0.434)
Observations	241	125	92	166	77	89

Source: Authors. Note: Significant difference between inequality and equality frames at *** indicates p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10, using Pearson chi-square test, applicable only for Nigeria; all covariates are balanced (no statistical differences) in India.

Annex Table 3. Fractional regression results showing framing effects across leadership domain/statement.

(a) Without state dummies

	Nigeria			India		
	Full sample	Men	Women	Full sample	Men	Women
Gender equality frame (=1)	-0.094**	-0.165***	0.037	-0.107**	-0.144**	-0.000
	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.057)	(0.045)	(0.060)	(0.040)
Male (=1)	0.217***			0.170***		
	(0.048)			(0.062)		
Role in agri-food organization (Base = Other staff)						
Head of organization	-0.191**	-0.216*	-0.201	-0.041	-0.058	0.062*
	(0.083)	(0.112)	(0.132)	(0.054)	(0.076)	(0.037)
Manager	-0.115**	-0.143**	-0.060	-0.039	-0.123	0.112**
	(0.049)	(0.063)	(0.070)	(0.059)	(0.085)	(0.045)
Education						
Master's degree or higher	-0.067	-0.161**	0.048	0.032	0.052	0.079
	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.063)	(0.058)	(0.083)	(0.054)
Age (Base = <= 35)						
36-50	-0.052	-0.094	0.060	0.166***	0.175**	0.152**
	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.093)	(0.058)	(0.076)	(0.073)
50+						-
	0.070	0.082	0.133	0.144**	0.179**	0.702***
	(0.068)	(0.087)	(0.114)	(0.064)	(0.086)	(0.203)
Knowledge of agrifood policy						
Self-rated expertise in agri-food policymaking	0.056	0.070	0.041	0.026	0.038	-0.034
	(0.057)	(0.085)	(0.071)	(0.044)	(0.062)	(0.032)
Organization type (Base = Government agency)						
CSO/NGO/Others	0.092	0.030	0.163**	-0.074	-0.124	0.066
	(0.066)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.056)	(0.076)	(0.054)
Private sector	0.026	-0.007	0.082			
	(0.068)	(0.097)	(0.081)			
Research institution/University	0.006	0.040	-0.082	-0.146**	-0.191*	-0.032
	(0.065)	(0.085)	(0.101)	(0.067)	(0.101)	(0.049)
Observations	241	149	92	166	108	58

Source: Authors. Note: Significant at *** indicates p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.

(b) With state dummies

	Nigeria			India		
	Full sample	Men	Women	Full sample	Men	Women
Gender equality frame (=1)	-0.081*	-0.134**	0.059	-0.102***	-0.135**	-0.025
	(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.064)	(0.039)	(0.058)	(0.025)
Male (=1)	0.168***			0.126**		
	(0.050)			(0.053)		
Role in agri-food organization (Base = Other staff)						
Head of organization	-0.179**	-0.188	-0.161	-0.041	-0.052	0.112**
	(0.085)	(0.117)	(0.140)	(0.062)	(0.086)	(0.055)
Manager	-0.081	-0.085	-0.080	0.003	-0.050	0.056***
	(0.050)	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.047)	(0.073)	(0.018)
Education						
Master's degree or higher	-0.046	-0.119*	0.065	-0.004	0.017	0.034
	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.078)	(0.080)
Age (Base = <= 35)						
36-50	0.003	-0.040	0.135	0.107*	0.142*	-0.011
	(0.059)	(0.076)	(0.104)	(0.056)	(0.081)	(0.040)
50+	0.134**	0.133	0.230*	0.072	0.126	-0.544***
	(0.068)	(0.088)	(0.129)	(0.070)	(0.100)	(0.141)
Knowledge of agrifood policy						
Self-rated expertise in agri-food policymaking	0.049	0.066	0.024	0.004	-0.001	-0.018
	(0.055)	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.044)	(0.061)	(0.024)
Organization type (Base = Government agency)						
CSO/NGO/Others	0.077	0.029	0.177*	-0.063	-0.123	0.045
	(0.066)	(0.085)	(0.092)	(0.055)	(0.077)	(0.028)
Private sector	0.009	-0.035	0.035			
	(0.067)	(0.096)	(0.108)			
Research institution/University	0.012	0.043	-0.138	-0.041	-0.079	0.068
	(0.066)	(0.086)	(0.100)	(0.056)	(0.091)	(0.060)
State (Base = Federal Capital Territory)						
Bauchi	0.209***	0.268***	0.145			
	(0.060)	(0.075)	(0.106)			
Delta	0.157**	0.144	0.227**			
	(0.071)	(0.105)	(0.095)			
Enugu	0.018	0.051	0.024			
	(0.066)	(0.084)	(0.109)			
Kogi	-0.061	-0.042	-0.057			
	(0.099)	(0.127)	(0.126)			
Ondo	0.064	0.125	-0.028			
	(0.062)	(0.083)	(0.086)			
Zone (Base = Central)						
West				0.148**	0.205**	-0.423***
				(0.062)	(0.100)	(0.140)
East				0.019	0.025	-0.591***
				(0.066)	(0.097)	(0.149)
North				-0.020	-0.017	-0.054
				(0.061)	(0.103)	(0.057)
South				0.259***	0.269***	0.146**
				(0.063)	(0.103)	(0.069)
Observations	221	142	79	166	108	58

Annex Table 4. Logit regression results showing framing effects across leadership domain/statement, pooled data.

	Nigeria			India		
	Full sample	Men	Women	Full sample	Men	Women
Gender equality frame (=1)	-0.081*	-0.134**	0.059	-0.102***	-0.135**	-0.034
	(0.045)	(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.039)	(0.058)	(0.034)
Male (=1)	0.168***			0.126**		
	(0.050)			(0.053)		
(In)equality statement (base=Statement 1 [politics])						
Statement 2 [government]	-0.023	-0.049*	0.025	-0.012	-0.019	-0.000
	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.047)
Statement 3 [business]	-0.100***	-0.141***	-0.025	-0.012	-0.046	0.070**
	(0.028)	(0.035)	(0.044)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.034)
Statement 4 [NGO]	-0.136***	-0.204***	-0.013	-0.012	-0.019	-0.000
	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.033)
Statement 5 [Coop/FBO]	-0.090***	-0.148***	0.013	0.000	-0.019	0.047
	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.047)
Statement 6 [Community]	-0.109***	-0.141***	-0.051	-0.012	-0.019	-0.000
	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.024)	(0.035)	(0.033)
Role in agri-food organization (Base = Other staff)						
Head of organization	-0.179**	-0.187	-0.161	-0.041	-0.052	0.148**
	(0.085)	(0.117)	(0.140)	(0.062)	(0.086)	(0.074)
Manager	-0.081	-0.085	-0.080	0.003	-0.050	0.076***
	(0.050)	(0.068)	(0.074)	(0.047)	(0.073)	(0.024)
Education						
Master's degree or higher	-0.046	-0.119*	0.065	-0.004	0.017	0.046
	(0.052)	(0.066)	(0.072)	(0.054)	(0.078)	(0.108)
Age (Base = <= 35)						
36-50	0.003	-0.039	0.135	0.107*	0.142*	-0.015
	(0.059)	(0.076)	(0.104)	(0.056)	(0.081)	(0.054)
50+	0.134**	0.133	0.230*	0.072	0.126	
	(0.068)	(0.088)	(0.129)	(0.070)	(0.100)	
Knowledge of agrifood policy						
Self-rated expertise in agri-food policymaking	0.049	0.066	0.024	0.004	-0.001	-0.025
	(0.055)	(0.075)	(0.064)	(0.044)	(0.061)	(0.033)
Organization type (Base = Government agency)						
CSO/NGO/Others	0.077	0.029	0.177*	-0.063	-0.123	0.062
	(0.066)	(0.085)	(0.092)	(0.055)	(0.077)	(0.039)
Private sector	0.009	-0.034	0.036			
	(0.067)	(0.096)	(0.108)			
Research institution/University	0.012	0.043	-0.138	-0.041	-0.079	0.090
	(0.066)	(0.086)	(0.100)	(0.056)	(0.091)	(0.081)
State (Base = Federal Capital Territory)						
Bauchi	0.209***	0.269***	0.145			
	(0.060)	(0.075)	(0.106)			
Delta	0.157**	0.144	0.227**			
	(0.071)	(0.105)	(0.095)			
Enugu	0.018	0.051	0.024			
	(0.066)	(0.084)	(0.109)			
Kogi	-0.061	-0.042	-0.057			
	(0.099)	(0.127)	(0.126)			
Ondo	0.064	0.125	-0.028			

	Nigeria			India		
	Full sample	Men	Women	Full sample	Men	Women
	(0.062)	(0.083)	(0.086)			
Zone (Base = Central)						
West				0.148**	0.205**	
				(0.062)	(0.100)	
East				0.019	0.025	
				(0.066)	(0.097)	
North				-0.020	-0.017	-0.073
				(0.061)	(0.103)	(0.077)
South				0.259***	0.269***	0.198**
				(0.063)	(0.103)	(0.093)
Observations	1326	852	474	996	648	258

Source: Authors. Note: Significant at *** indicates p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.

Annex Table 5. Logit regression results showing framing effects for each leadership domain/statement.

(a) India, Men

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Gender equality frame (=1)	-0.075	-0.115	-0.125	-0.255***	-0.214***	-0.009
	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.078)	(0.072)	(0.076)	(0.072)
Role in agri-food organization (Base = Other staff)						
Head of organization	-0.088	-0.062	-0.093	-0.063	-0.023	-0.023
	(0.110)	(0.099)	(0.110)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.091)
Manager	0.054	-0.140	-0.013	-0.046	-0.262**	0.057
	(0.094)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.122)	(0.088)
Education						
Master's degree or higher	-0.045	0.113	-0.093	0.001	0.090	0.034
	(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.093)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.088)
Age (Base = <= 35)						
36-50	0.110	0.243**	0.060	0.208*	-0.013	0.302**
	(0.105)	(0.120)	(0.099)	(0.114)	(0.103)	(0.127)
50+	0.130	0.256**	0.013	0.162	0.003	0.263*
	(0.124)	(0.130)	(0.122)	(0.129)	(0.120)	(0.143)
Knowledge of agrifood policy						
Self-rated expertise in agri-food policymaking	0.071	-0.067	-0.013	-0.030	0.013	-0.007
	(0.085)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.081)	(0.083)	(0.075)
Organization type (Base = Government agency)						
CSO/NGO/Others	-0.068	-0.129	-0.180**	-0.145*	-0.143	-0.043
	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.079)
Research institution/University	0.038	-0.198	-0.153	-0.110	-0.029	-0.033
	(0.124)	(0.124)	(0.130)	(0.118)	(0.119)	(0.111)
Zone (Base = Central)						
West	0.304**	0.258**	0.129	0.091	0.063	0.297***
	(0.122)	(0.130)	(0.135)	(0.137)	(0.141)	(0.114)
East	0.024	0.031	-0.000	0.072	0.081	-0.089
	(0.135)	(0.139)	(0.141)	(0.130)	(0.137)	(0.153)
North	-0.170	0.015	-0.026	-0.026	0.045	0.039
	(0.178)	(0.138)	(0.147)	(0.136)	(0.142)	(0.122)
South	0.329***	0.244**	0.201	0.249**	0.166	0.360***
	(0.119)	(0.121)	(0.133)	(0.124)	(0.134)	(0.100)
Observations	108	108	108	108	108	108

(b) India, Women

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Gender equality frame (=1)	-0.049	0.035	-0.074	0.021	0.019	0.021
	(0.065)	(0.067)	(0.075)	(0.062)	(0.075)	(0.062)
Role in agri-food organization (Base = Other staff)						
Head of organization		0.079	0.101			
		(0.078)	(0.118)			
Manager		0.052	0.204**			
		(0.072)	(0.089)			
Education						
Master's degree or higher		-0.080				
		(0.067)				
Age (Base = <= 35)						
36-50						
50+						
Knowledge of agrifood policy						
Self-rated expertise in agri-food policymaking	0.011	0.016	-0.080		-0.057	
	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.100)		(0.094)	
Organization type (Base = Government agency)						
CSO/NGO/Others	0.004		-0.022		0.090	
	(0.072)		(0.090)		(0.102)	
Research institution/University	-0.011		-0.012		0.077	
	(0.075)		(0.103)		(0.103)	
Observations	58	58	58	58	58	58

(c) Nigeria, Men

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Gender equality frame (=1)	-0.140*	-0.213***	-0.169**	-0.051	-0.184**	-0.054
	(0.082)	(0.078)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.070)
Role in agri-food organization (Base = Other staff)						
Head of organization	-0.295**	-0.099	-0.187	-0.194	-0.305**	-0.032
	(0.141)	(0.135)	(0.135)	(0.127)	(0.147)	(0.115)
Manager	-0.050	-0.021	-0.021	-0.137	-0.112	-0.170**
	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.087)	(0.089)	(0.078)
Education						
Master's degree or higher	-0.168*	-0.123	-0.103	-0.098	-0.118	-0.121
	(0.092)	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.082)	(0.088)	(0.081)
Age (Base = <= 35)						
36-50	-0.078	-0.161*	-0.008	0.030	0.020	-0.062
	(0.103)	(0.097)	(0.095)	(0.088)	(0.096)	(0.089)
50+	0.171	0.034	0.212*	0.186*	0.063	0.101
	(0.119)	(0.116)	(0.110)	(0.103)	(0.117)	(0.101)
Knowledge of agrifood policy						
Self-rated expertise in agri-food policymaking	0.096	0.132	0.018	0.018	0.041	0.107
	(0.106)	(0.105)	(0.098)	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.101)
Organization type (Base = Government agency)						
CSO/NGO/Others	0.094	-0.038	0.204*	0.153	-0.009	-0.257**
	(0.125)	(0.120)	(0.117)	(0.106)	(0.118)	(0.121)
Private sector	-0.016	-0.113	0.036	0.083	-0.032	-0.165
	(0.122)	(0.119)	(0.114)	(0.110)	(0.118)	(0.108)
Research institution/University	-0.003	-0.032	0.105	0.140	-0.022	0.083
	(0.125)	(0.121)	(0.110)	(0.108)	(0.116)	(0.102)
State (Base = Federal Capital Territory)						
Bauchi	0.213*	0.274**	0.414***	0.282***	0.079	0.333***
	(0.119)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(0.107)	(0.113)	(0.088)
Delta	0.049	0.214	0.370**	0.288**	0.120	-0.169
	(0.152)	(0.143)	(0.146)	(0.130)	(0.140)	(0.133)
Enugu	0.036	0.048	0.283**	-0.045	0.018	-0.062
	(0.140)	(0.138)	(0.134)	(0.158)	(0.138)	(0.119)
Kogi	-0.083	-0.019		0.087	0.084	-0.097
	(0.236)	(0.223)		(0.213)	(0.204)	(0.198)
Ondo	0.147	0.111	0.299**	0.225**	0.040	-0.036
	(0.112)	(0.112)	(0.118)	(0.109)	(0.112)	(0.098)
Observations	142	142	136	142	142	142

(d) Nigeria, women

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Gender equality frame (=1)	0.101	0.278**	0.050	0.003	-0.007	0.127
	(0.118)	(0.120)	(0.084)	(0.112)	(0.095)	(0.098)
Role in agri-food organization (Base = Other staff)						
Head of organization	0.022	-0.132	-0.109			
	(0.185)	(0.203)	(0.161)			
Manager	-0.089	-0.172	-0.254**	-0.021	0.065	0.022
	(0.133)	(0.146)	(0.120)	(0.122)	(0.103)	(0.107)
Education						
Master's degree or higher	0.018	0.120	0.088	0.051	0.022	0.224*
	(0.121)	(0.120)	(0.099)	(0.122)	(0.104)	(0.121)
Age (Base = <= 35)						
36-50	0.100	0.238	0.093	0.219	0.473**	0.061
	(0.158)	(0.157)	(0.119)	(0.183)	(0.199)	(0.159)
50+	0.202	0.259	0.251*	0.299*	0.431**	0.383**
	(0.186)	(0.210)	(0.145)	(0.179)	(0.192)	(0.195)
Knowledge of agrifood policy						
Self-rated expertise in agri-food policymaking	-0.081	-0.050	0.018	0.111	0.035	0.404*
	(0.119)	(0.111)	(0.090)	(0.126)	(0.102)	(0.216)
Organization type (Base = Government agency)						
CSO/NGO/Others	0.126	0.376**	0.091	0.276**	0.245**	0.332**
	(0.140)	(0.146)	(0.108)	(0.131)	(0.113)	(0.136)
Private sector	0.184	0.253	-0.032	-0.280	-0.307	0.303**
	(0.141)	(0.154)	(0.121)	(0.209)	(0.221)	(0.152)
Research institution/University		-0.041	-0.241	-0.402**	-0.387*	0.146
		(0.201)	(0.173)	(0.195)	(0.197)	(0.153)
State (Base = Federal Capital Territory)						
Bauchi	0.124	0.135	0.184	0.341*	0.288	0.123
	(0.195)	(0.188)	(0.150)	(0.194)	(0.197)	(0.162)
Delta	-0.008	0.332**	0.356***	0.518***	0.443**	-0.008
	(0.223)	(0.168)	(0.127)	(0.146)	(0.173)	(0.162)
Enugu			0.079	0.287	0.425**	-0.204
			(0.178)	(0.235)	(0.211)	(0.223)
Kogi	-0.038		-0.025	0.005	0.010	-0.101
	(0.219)		(0.168)	(0.185)	(0.175)	(0.156)
Ondo	0.091	-0.028	0.113		-0.139	
	(0.138)	(0.146)	(0.120)		(0.155)	
Observations	64	63	79	58	72	58

Source: Authors. Note: Significant at *** indicates p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.

Annex Table 6a. Reported attitudes toward gender inequality, India.

Group 1: Statement with gender equality framing (1 - strongly agree to 4 - strongly disagree)	Median	P-value	Median	Group 2: Statement with gender inequality framing (1 - strongly disagree to 4 - strongly agree)
(A) Total				
1 Women make equally good or better political leaders than men do	1.0	0.129	2.0	1 Men make better political leaders than women do
2 Women make equally good or better government leaders than men do	2.0	0.194	2.0	2 Men make better government leaders than women do
3 Women make equally good or better business executives and managers than men do	1.0	0.002	2.0	3 Men make better business executives and managers than women do
4 Women make equally good or better leaders of nongovernmental or non-profit organizations than men do	1.0	0.010	2.0	4 Men make better leaders of nongovernmental or non-profit organizations than women do
5 Women make equally good or better leaders of agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations than men do	2.0	0.027	2.0	5 Men make better leaders of agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations than women do
6 Women and men should have equal opportunity to represent the household in community or group activities	1.0	0.288	1.0	6 Men should represent the household in community or group activities while women should focus on house chores and childcare
Observations	89	0.000	77	Observations
(B) Men				
1 Women make equally good or better political leaders than men do	2.0	0.316	2.0	1 Men make better political leaders than women do
2 Women make equally good or better government leaders than men do	2.0	0.642	2.0	2 Men make better government leaders than women do
3 Women make equally good or better business executives and managers than men do	2.0	0.026	2.0	3 Men make better business executives and managers than women do
4 Women make equally good or better leaders of nongovernmental or non-profit organizations than men do	2.0	0.027	2.0	4 Men make better leaders of nongovernmental or non-profit organizations than women do
5 Women make equally good or better leaders of agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations than men do	2.0	0.035	2.0	5 Men make better leaders of agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations than women do
6 Women and men should have equal opportunity to represent the household in community or group activities	2.0	0.725	2.0	6 Men should represent the household in community or group activities while women should focus on house chores and childcare
Observations	56	0.001	52	Observations
(C) Women				
1 Women make equally good or better political leaders than men do	1.0	0.280	1.0	1 Men make better political leaders than women do
2 Women make equally good or better government leaders than men do	1.0	0.048	2.0	2 Men make better government leaders than women do
3 Women make equally good or better business executives and managers than men do	1.0	0.036	1.0	3 Men make better business executives and managers than women do
4 Women make equally good or better leaders of nongovernmental or non-profit organizations than men do	1.0	0.093	1.0	4 Men make better leaders of nongovernmental or non-profit organizations than women do
	1.0	0.257	1.0	

Group 1: Statement with gender equality framing (1 - strongly agree to 4 - strongly disagree)	Median	P-value	Median	Group 2: Statement with gender inequality framing (1 - strongly disagree to 4 - strongly agree)
5 Women make equally good or better leaders of agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations than men do	1.0	0.164	1.0	5 Men make better leaders of agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations than women do
6 Women and men should have equal opportunity to represent the household in community or group activities				6 Men should represent the household in community or group activities while women should focus on house chores and childcare
Observations	33	0.000	25	Observations

Source: Authors.

Annex Table 6b. Reported attitudes toward gender inequality, Nigeria

Group 1: Statement with gender equality framing (1 - strongly agree to 4 - strongly disagree)	Median	P-value	Median	Group 2: Statement with gender inequality framing (1 - strongly disagree to 4 - strongly agree)
(A) Total				
1 Women make equally good or better political leaders than men do	2.0	0.095	2.0	1 Men make better political leaders than women do
2 Women make equally good or better government leaders than men do	2.0	0.096	2.0	2 Men make better government leaders than women do
3 Women make equally good or better business executives and managers than men do	2.0	0.046	2.0	3 Men make better business executives and managers than women do
4 Women make equally good or better leaders of nongovernmental or nonprofit organizations than men do	2.0	0.119	2.0	4 Men make better leaders of nongovernmental or nonprofit organizations than women do
5 Women make equally good or better leaders of agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations than men do	2.0	0.042	2.0	5 Men make better leaders of agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations than women do
6 Women and men should have equal opportunity to represent the household in community or group activities	2.0	0.300	2.0	6 Men should represent the household in community or group activities, and women should focus on household chores and childcare
Observations	116	0.000	125	Observations
(B) Men				
1 Women make equally good or better political leaders than men do	2.0	0.023	3.0	1 Men make better political leaders than women do
2 Women make equally good or better government leaders than men do	2.0	0.012	3.0	2 Men make better government leaders than women do
3 Women make equally good or better business executives and managers than men do	2.0	0.002	2.0	3 Men make better business executives and managers than women do
4 Women make equally good or better leaders of nongovernmental or nonprofit organizations than men do	2.0	0.075	2.0	4 Men make better leaders of nongovernmental or nonprofit organizations than women do
5 Women make equally good or better leaders of agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations than men do	2.0	0.011	2.0	5 Men make better leaders of agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations than women do
6 Women and men should have equal opportunity to represent the household in community or group activities	2.0	0.078	2.0	6 Men should represent the household in community or group activities, and women should focus on household chores and childcare
Observations	72	0.000	77	Observations
(C) Women				
1 Women make equally good or better political leaders than men do	2.0	0.951	2.0	1 Men make better political leaders than women do
2 Women make equally good or better government leaders than men do	2.0	0.635	2.0	2 Men make better government leaders than women do
3 Women make equally good or better business executives and managers than men do	2.0	0.498	2.0	3 Men make better business executives and managers than women do
4 Women make equally good or better leaders of nongovernmental or nonprofit organizations than men do	2.0	0.790	2.0	4 Men make better leaders of nongovernmental or nonprofit organizations than women do

Group 1: Statement with gender equality framing (1 - strongly agree to 4 - strongly disagree)	Median	P-value	Median	Group 2: Statement with gender inequality framing (1 - strongly disagree to 4 - strongly agree)
5 Women make equally good or better leaders of agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations than men do	2.0	0.928	2.0	5 Men make better leaders of agricultural cooperatives or producer organizations than women do
6 Women and men should have equal opportunity to represent the household in community or group activities	2.0	0.713	2.0	6 Men should represent the household in community or group activities, and women should focus on household chores and childcare
Observations	44	0.660	48	Observations

Source: Authors.

Annex Table 7. Correlates of gender-unequal attitudes toward women's leadership, among mass public.

	India		Nigeria	
	Politics	Business	Politics	Business
Women (=1)	-0.122***	-0.151***	-0.141***	-0.261***
	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.031)
Education (base=BS or higher)				
Primary or lower	0.201***	0.207***	0.125***	0.126**
	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.059)
High school/diploma	0.128***	0.148***	0.110***	0.036
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.055)
Age (base= 35 or younger)				
35-50	0.075**	0.036	-0.000	-0.041
	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.039)
50+	0.052	0.036	-0.074	-0.052
	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.065)	(0.070)
Ethnic group (base=IN Hindu (Scheduled Castes) / NG Yoruba				
IN Hindu (Scheduled Tribes) / NG Hausa	-0.118	-0.200***	0.054	-0.019
	(0.072)	(0.064)	(0.071)	(0.096)
IN Hindu (Other Backward Castes) / NG Igbo	0.043	0.019	-0.082	-0.297***
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.076)	(0.097)
IN General / NG Other	-0.059	-0.072*	-0.025	-0.345***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.066)	(0.093)
Income (base=richest group)				
Poorest group	0.076	0.066	0.007	0.181***
	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.061)	(0.064)
Middle income group	0.010	0.100	-0.035	0.139**
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.053)	(0.068)
Social class [subjective] (base=Lower class)				
Class 1 [Upper class]	0.175**	0.206**	-0.081	-0.094
	(0.076)	(0.081)	(0.103)	(0.112)
Class 2 [Upper middle]	0.228***	0.231***	0.013	0.068
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.055)
Class 3 [Lower middle]	0.158***	0.139***	-0.001	0.004
	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.037)	(0.043)
Class 4 [Working class]	0.145***	0.148***	0.036	0.055
	(0.052)	(0.053)	(0.039)	(0.046)
Employment (base=unemployed)				
Full time (30+ hours/week)	-0.100**	-0.050	0.075**	0.027
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.035)	(0.055)
Part-time	-0.058	-0.001	0.070	-0.044
	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.060)	(0.101)
Self-employed	0.025	0.100	0.071**	0.012
	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.037)
Retired/pensioned	-0.112	-0.018	-0.185	-0.367*
	(0.083)	(0.083)	(0.160)	(0.217)
Rural	-0.027	0.016	0.008	0.044
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.037)

	India		Nigeria	
	Politics	Business	Politics	Business
State (base=Delhi)				
Bihar	0.025	0.120**		
	(0.053)	(0.053)		
Haryana	-0.335***	-0.320***		
	(0.054)	(0.051)		
Maharashtra	-0.111**	-0.064		
	0.056	(0.056)		
Punjab	0.020	-0.012		
	(0.061)	(0.062)		
Telangana	-0.222***	-0.256***		
	(0.052)	(0.049)		
Uttar Pradesh	0.063	0.298		
	(0.051)	(0.052)		
West Bengal	-0.053	0.055		
	(0.053)	(0.052)		
State dummies (37 states)			YES	YES
Pseudo R2	0.092	0.097	0.127	0.190
Obs	1546	1546	1161	1158

Source: Authors. Note: Modeled using logistic regression, with binary outcome variable supporting inequality (1=Agree or Strongly agree that men make better leaders). Significant at *** indicates p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.

Annex Table 8. Correlation between attitudes toward women's leadership among mass public and among policy elites.

	Statement: Men make better political leaders				Statement: Men make better business leaders			
	Binary (logit regression)		Likert scale (quantile regression)		Binary (logit regression)		Likert scale (quantile regression)	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
India								
Mass public (=1)	0.253***	0.388***	1.000***	1.000	0.224***	0.269***	1.000	1.000*
	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.306)	(0.761)	(0.080)	(0.086)	(0.960)	(0.589)
Education (1=BS or higher)	-0.119***	-0.158***	0.000	0.000	-0.145***	-0.117**	0.000	-0.500*
	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.315)	(0.847)	(0.038)	(0.047)	(0.427)	(0.267)
Age (1=35 or younger)	0.006	-0.169***	0.000	-1.000***	0.047	-0.175***		
	(0.032)	(0.039)	(0.139)	(0.371)	(0.033)	(0.039)		
Pseudo R2	0.024	0.059	0.025	0.101	0.028	0.044	0.025	0.064
Obs	976	704	976	704	966	688	966	688
Nigeria								
Mass public (=1)	0.174**	0.252**	1.000***	1.000	0.197**	0.184*	1.000***	-1.000
	(0.075)	(0.111)	(0.357)	(1.281)	(0.080)	(0.105)	(0.324)	(1.732)
Education (1=BS or higher)	-0.112**	-0.322***	-1.000***	0.000	-0.110*	-0.241***	0.000	-1.000
	(0.053)	(0.076)	(0.2710)	(0.206)	(0.057)	(0.075)	(0.265)	(0.895)
Age (1=35 or younger)	-0.006	0.017	0.000	0.000	0.057	0.032	0.000	0.000
	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.189)	(0.171)	(0.039)	(0.046)	(0.157)	(0.919)
Pseudo R2	0.048	0.078	0.067	0.058	0.048	0.041	0.023	0.094
Obs	687	624	687	624	687	620	687	620

Source: Authors. Note: Significant at *** indicates p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10.

Annex Table 9. Association of gender-unequal attitudes and gender policy support by men elites in Nigeria.

Outcome: Supporting gender-related policy…	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Share of inequality statements	0.181	-0.007	-0.317***	-0.191***	-0.176***	-0.120	-0.097	-0.111**
	(0.123)	(0.084)	(0.078)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.066)	(0.056)
Gender equality frame (=1)	0.002	-0.034	-0.102*	-0.070	-0.041	-0.007	0.015	-0.042
	(0.036)	(0.058)	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.054)	(0.043)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	149	149	149	149	149	149	149	149

Source: Authors. Note: Modeled via logistical regression. Numbers are marginal effects; numbers on parenthesis are the standard errors. Significant at *** indicates p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.10. Gender policies are 1=Subsidizing the cost of child care; 2=Extending paid parental leave; 3=Cash transfer targeting women; 4=Women's quotas for policymaking committees; 5=Women's quotas for leadership and decisionmaking in government agencies; 6=Women's quotas for business leadership; 7=Policies to strengthen women's land rights and access to land; 8=Women's quotas and targets for agricultural and business trainings and extension services. Respondents were asked to rate their support to each of these policies: 1=Strongly agree, 2=Agree, 3=Disagree, 4=Strongly disagree. We aggregated 1 (Strong agree) and 2 (Agree) to imply support to the policy. We saw no statistical effects of attitudes and no additional framing effects (beyond effects via attitudes) on policy support among women elites.

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