IWMI
RESEARCH
R E P O R T
Implementing Integrated
131 River Basin Management:
Lessons from the Red
River Basin, Vietnam
François Molle and Chu Thai Hoanh
I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Water  Management
I n s t i t u t e
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IWMI Research Report 131
Implementing Integrated River Basin
Management: Lessons from the Red River
Basin, Vietnam
François Molle and Chu Thai Hoanh
International Water Management Institute
P O Box 2075, Colombo, Sri Lanka
i
The authors: François Molle is a Principal Researcher at the “Institut de Recherche pour
le Développement” (IRD), France, and has been collaborating with the International Water
Management Institute (IWMI) during the last ten years. His work focuses on issues of river
basin management, water governance and water policies. He is theme leader for water
policies in the Mekong Program on Water, Environment and Resilience
(www.mpowernet.org/mweb.php?pg=60) and the co-editor of Water Alternatives; and Chu
Thai Hoanh is a Principal Researcher at IWMI and is based at the Southeast Asia office in
Vientiane, Lao PDR. His work focuses on regional water management and development
scenario analysis in the Mekong Basin. He is theme leader for irrigation in the Mekong
Program on Water, Environment and Resilience (www.mpowernet.org/mweb.php?pg=60).
Molle, F.; Hoanh, C. T. 2009. Implementing integrated river basin management: Lessons
from the Red River Basin, Vietnam. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management
Institute. 33p. (IWMI Research Report 131)
/ river basin management / water resource management / development projects /
governance / water law / water policy / institutional development / organizational change /
Vietnam /
ISSN 1026-0862
ISBN  978-92-9090-708-4
Copyright © 2009, by IWMI. All rights reserved. IWMI encourages the use of its material
provided that the organization is acknowledged and kept informed in all such instances.
Cover photograph shows Red River Basin with its delta in North Vietnam (Source: Hole-
filled seamless SRTM data V1, 2004, International Centre for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT),
available from (gisweb.ciat.cgiar.org/sig/90m_data_tropics.htm).
Please send inquiries and comments to: iwmi@cgiar.org
A free copy of this publication can be downloaded at
www.iwmi.org/Publications/IWMI_Research_Reports/index.aspx
ii
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to express their sincere and warm thanks to all the persons that have provided
time and information to this study: Colin Steley, Nguyen Chi Cong, Ly Minh Dang, Do Hong Phan, Ha
Luong Thuan, Pham Xuan Su, Nguyen Van Sinh, Nguyen Xuan Tiep, Le Van Hoc, Bui Nam Sach,
Truong Trong Luat, Thai Gia Khanh, Nguyen Thuy Hang, Nguyen Thi Thu Thuy, Bui Cong Quang,
Pham Quoc Hung, Tran Thi Le Anh, Nguyen Minh Son, Ta Quang Toan, Lan Anh, Pham Van Lam and
Olivier Gilard.
Project
This paper presents findings from project number 50 titled
“Multi-scale Mekong Water Governance: Inter-disciplinary Research
to Enhance Participatory Water Governance from Local Watershed
to Regional Scales” of the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and
Food (CPWF) which is implemented under the M-Power network.
Partners
The following organizations collaborated in the research conducted for this report:
International Water Management Institut de Recherche pour le
Institute (IWMI), Southeast Asia Développement” (IRD), Montpellier,
Regional Office (IWMI-SEA), France.
Vientiane, Lao PDR.
Donors
Funding for project number 50 of the CGIAR Challenge Program on Water and Food is provided by the
following organizations.
International Fund for Agricultural Echel-Eau, Montpellier, France.
Development (IFAD), Rome, Italy.
iii
Contents
Acronyms and Abbreviations vi
Summary vii
Introduction 1
Institutional Change in the Vietnamese Water Sector 2
Integrated Water Resources Management in the Red River Basin:
Starting a Process 7
Analysis and Lessons Learned 12
Conclusion and the Way Forward 19
References 23
v
v
Acronyms and Abbreviations
2RRBSP Second Red River Basin Sector Project
ADB Asian Development Bank
CSBO Cau Sub-Basin Organization
DARD Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (Provincial level)
DoNRE Department of Natural Resources and Environment (Provincial level)
DSBO Day Sub-Basin Organization
DWR Department of Water Resources, MARD
DWRM Department of Water Resources Management, MoNRE
DWR(HWM) Department of Water Resources and Hydraulic Works Management, MARD
ESCAP United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
GWP Global Water Partnership
IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management
IWARP Institute for Water Resources Planning, MARD
LWR Law on Water Resources
MARD Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
MoNRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment
MOST Ministry of Science and Technology
NEA National Environmental Agency, MOST
NWRC National Water Resources Council
PPC Provincial People’s Committee
RBM River Basin Management
RBO River Basin Organization
RBPMB River Basin Planning Management Board
RRBO Red River Basin Organization
RRC Red River Committee
S-RBO Sub-RBO
ONWRC Office of the National Water Resources Council
VEPA Vietnam Environment Protection Agency
vi
Summary
In the last decade many Southeast Asian countries The report shows that the promotion of IWRM
have remodeled part or all of their water policies. icons such as RBOs by donors has been quite
Development banks, notably the Asian Development disconnected from the existing institutional
Bank (ADB), and multilateral cooperation agencies framework. In contradiction with IWRM principles,
have been quite influential in supporting the RBOs were established under the Ministry of
adoption of policies and reforms that embody Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD), with
principles held as modern and internationally little means and power, while the ONWRC remained
sanctioned. This includes the drafting of national dormant. The RRBO was set up on the premise
policy and laws, the creation of ‘apex bodies’, the that a RBO was needed, but it was soon found that
establishment of river basin organizations (RBOs), basin-wide participation was both difficult and
the privatization of public companies, and increased unnecessary, with the focus being shifted to lower
financial contribution from users (e.g., through water sub-basin levels.
pricing and the formation of water user groups). The report also shows that if policy reforms
While these principles and reforms provide sound promoted by donors and development banks have
and useful guidelines for national water policies at triggered some changes, these changes may have
a certain level of generalization, their confrontation come not as a result of the reforms themselves but,
with reality has more often than not yielded rather, due to the institutional confusion they have
disappointing results. created when confronted with the emergence of the
Vietnam has recently adopted several of these MoNRE, which itself was largely destined – at first
policy recommendations. A new Law on Water – to solving land rather than water issues. For the
Resources released in 1998 was followed by the MoNRE, the river basin scale became crucial for
creation of an ‘apex body’ (the Office of the National grounding its legitimacy and finding its roles among
Water Resources Council (ONWRC) in 2000), and the established layers of the administration, while for
three RBOs (in 2001), before the Ministry of Natural MARD, RBOs became a focal point where power
Resources and Environment (MoNRE) was set up over financial resources and political power might
in 2002. Although institutional changes are often potentially be relocated at its expense. Thus, the
gradual, these few years of experience in reforming collision of donor-driven projects to establish RBOs
the water sector offer an opportunity to examine the and the conflict between MARD and MoNRE helped
implementation of these new policy frameworks. strengthen changes in the direction of a better
The present report focuses on the establishment of separation of duties and integrated planning. It is too
the Red River Basin Organization (RRBO), but early to assess whether this transition towards a
expands its analysis to the wider transformations of separation of the operation and regulation roles will
the water sector that impinge on the formation and be sustained, and whether RBOs will be endowed
effectiveness of this organization. A few reflections with substantial power. However, institutional change
on the policy process are drawn from this analysis, is shown to result from the interaction between
albeit in a tentative form given the relatively limited endogenous processes and external pressures, in
period of time considered here. ways that are barely predictable.
vii
Implementing Integrated River Basin Management:
Lessons from the Red River Basin, Vietnam
François Molle and Chu Thai Hoanh
Introduction
In the last decade, many southeast Asian confrontation with reality has frequently yielded
countries have remodeled part or all of their water disappointing results. Water reforms have been
policies. This is due to recurring crises (water marred by physical, environmental and
shortages, flood damage, pollution, etc.) and also sociopolitical complexities that had generally not
due to global initiatives and networking that have been anticipated (Sampath 1992; Mollinga and
given greater public salience to water issues, and Bolding 2004); water pricing reforms have seldom,
the influence of development banks and cooperation if ever, achieved the gains anticipated (Dinar and
agencies that have been pushing for reforms (Molle Saleth 2005; Molle and Berkoff 2007); IWRM has
2005). In Asia, principles of Integrated Water gained wide acceptance but has proved hard to
Resources Management (IWRM) and river basin operationalize (Biswas 2004; Molle et al. 2007); the
management (RBM) have been fostered by several promotion of ‘apex bodies’ and RBOs in Asia has
organizations, among others, the ADB, the World also yielded mixed results (Newborne 2006). Many
Bank, the Global Water Partnership (GWP), and analysts have discussed and questioned the
United Nations Economic and Social Commission conditions and the possibility of transfers. For
for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), and also by example, the Australian experience to the Mekong
regional events (e.g., Southeast Asian water River Basin (Chenoweth 1999; Pigram 2001;
forums) and networks (e.g., Network of Asian River Malano et al. 1999; Birch et al. 1999), in particular,
Basin Organizations). The ADB, in particular, has the possibility to “leapfrog” from one particular
been quite active in supporting the adoption of situation to a model developed in another country
policies and reforms, from member countries, that (Shah et al. 2001).
embody principles held as modern and Vietnam has recently adopted several of these
internationally sanctioned. This includes the policy recommendations. A new Law on Water
drafting of national policy and laws, the creation of Resources (LWR 1998), in 1998, was followed by
’apex bodies’ (i.e., inter-ministerial councils, the creation of an ‘apex body’ (the ONWRC) in
supported by permanent offices, that define overall 2000, and three RBOs in 2001, before MoNRE was
guidelines and policies on water issues) (ADB set up in 2002. Although institutional changes are
2000; Birch 2004; Arriens 2004), the establishment often incremental, these few years of experience in
of RBOs, the privatization of public companies, reforming the water sector offer an opportunity to
and increased financial and other contributions from examine the implementation of these new policy
users (e.g., through water pricing and the formation frameworks. The present report first provides some
of water user groups). information about the water sector in Vietnam,
While these principles and reforms provide then focuses on the establishment of the RRBO
sound and useful guidelines for national water but expands its analysis to the wider
policies at a certain level of generalization, their transformations of the water sector that impinge on
1
the formation and effectiveness of this organization. from this analysis, albeit in a tentative form given
A few reflections on the policy process are drawn the relatively limited period of time considered here.
Institutional Change in the Vietnamese Water Sector
The transformations of the Vietnamese water government to make “concrete provisions for the
sector have dovetailed with both historical and organization and activities of the agency managing
political events and, more recently, economic the planning of the river basin”. State management
reforms. Figure 1 provides a quick bird’s-eye view functions are clearly assigned to MARD, line
of its main benchmarks during the past 60 years. agencies, and People’s Committees of the
It is interesting to note that a Red River provinces: Article 58 of Chapter 7 specifies that “The
Committee was established in 1961, under the then Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development is
Ministry of Water Resources, and that its answerable to the government for the carrying out of
permanent office later transformed into the Institute the State management function on water resource”.
for Water Resources Planning and Management. Two years after the passing of the Law, in
The main current actor in the water sector, MARD, June 2000, the National Water Resources Council
emerged in 1995 with the merging of three (NWRC) was established as an apex body that
ministries: Agriculture-Food Industry, Forestry, and was meant to advise the government on strategies
Water Resources. and policies regarding national water resources,
major river basin plans and inter-basin water
transfers, management of international water
The Law on Water Resources sources and resolution of water-related conflicts
between ministries and agencies, or ministries and
Work on the drafting of the Law on Water provinces. It was to be chaired by the Vice Prime
Resources began after the policy changes (Doi Moi Minister, assisted by the Minister of MARD, and
– ‘reform’ in Vietnamese) of 1986 and was had 18 members belonging to the various
supported by the World Bank through the provision ministries concerned. The ONWRC was
of legal experts. As many as 17 drafts were established within MARD (under the Department of
developed before the final version was approved by Water Resources and Hydraulic Works
the National Assembly of Vietnam in April 1998 and Management) in June 2001 and received its annual
enacted on January 1, 1999 (Malano et al. 1999). budget from this ministry.
The Law does not mention “integrated One year later, River Basin Planning
management” and there are only two occurrences Management Boards (RBPMB) were created in
of “Integrated use of the water resource” stated. three major river basins, namely the Mekong (Cuu
The principle of managing of water resources by Long), Dong Nai and Red-Thai Binh, to manage,
river basin is enshrined in the Law, but not i.e., to coordinate, river basin planning
prominently. Article 20 merely states that “The management, pursuant to Article 64 of the Law on
regulation and distribution of water resource for use Water Resources. The RBPMB were three-tiered
purposes must be based on the planning of the RBOs with a governing Board, a managing Office
river basin and the real potential of the water or Secretariat (placed under the Institute for Water
source and must ensure the principle of fairness, Resources Planning (IWARP)), and stakeholders.
reasonability and priority in the quantity and quality Their role was only defined later by a decision on
of water for l iving.” Article 64 enjoins the their regulation issued in 2004.
2
FIGURE 1. Summary of institutional change in the water sector. Note: Boxes with green color relate to RBO activity.
3
The Advent of the Ministry of Natural management of water resources including
Resources and Environment rainwater, surface water, groundwater, and seawater
in river basins, in land and sea territory of the
The creation of MoNRE in August 2002 was an Socialist Republic of Vietnam” (MoNRE 2003;
important part of the reforms aimed at emphasis added). Among other things, the
‘modernizing’ the State, separating public department was made responsible for developing
administrative agencies from public service delivery “legal documents, policies, strategies, long-term,
agencies and promoting the separation of five-year, and annual plans, programs, and projects
regulation/management (handled by MoNRE) from on water resources protection, exploitation,
operation or construction (handled by line utilization and development.”
agencies), that were launched in 2001 (Su et al.
2004; Hydrosult and Arcadis 2005). This created a
somewhat odd situation due to the fact that RBOs MARD versus MoNRE: Turf Battle over
were being implemented at the same time under Roles
the purview of a sectoral ministry (MARD), with the
support of donors who had launched the Second Two months after Decision No. 600, in July 2003,
Red River Basin Sector Project (2RRBSP) Government Decree 86/2003/ND-CP on the
approximately a year prior to the advent of MoNRE. “Functions, tasks, powers and organizational
This raises the question of why the MoNRE structure of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
emerged in a context that it was not, apparently, Development” confirmed MARD’s duty with regard
ready for (in particular, it was not envisioned in the to “state management functions over agriculture,
Law on Water Resources and that made it hard to forestry, salt industry, water resources and rural
transfer the water resource management functions development nationwide” (GoV 2003a; emphasis
and responsibilities for RBM - that had just been added). It must submit drafts of laws, ordinances
entrusted to MARD - to MoNRE). Partial answers and other legal documents, and also strategies,
to this riddle are that MoNRE was established master plans of development, long-term, five-year
mainly to deal with the pressing issues at the time term and annual plans, and key programs, projects
of integrating land administration and environmental on the domains being put under its management to
management, especially pollution control, that the government and Prime Minister.
were beyond the capacity of the former General Perhaps, as a means of repositioning itself
Department of Land Administration; and that the within this new administrative environment and
role of MoNRE in water management was initially bolstering its claim to a management role, the
not a major concern. On November 11, 2002, MARD Minister issued a Decision on September 4,
Government Decree No. 91 specified the functions, 2003 that specified the functions and organization
responsibility, authority and the organizational of the Department of Water Resources (DWR), in
structure of MoNRE as a “government body to replacement of the Department of Water Resources
exercise the state function of management over the and Hydraulic Works Management. Its state
land, water resources, minerals, environment, management function over water resources in the
meteorology, hydrogeography, measuring and entire nation included exploration, operation and
mapping in the national scope…” (GoV 2002). protection of water resources for hydraulic works,
This was followed by the MoNRE Decision No. rural water supply and drainage, RBM, protection
600/2003/QD-BTNMT of May 8, 2003 on the from waterlogging and drought in the whole
functions and responsibilities of the Department of country. In response to donors, MARD also
Water Resources Management (DWRM) that designed operational regulations for the RBOs that
readily put MoNRE on a collision course with were placed under its purview (MARD 2004).
MARD. The Decision specified that the DWRM With both ministries claiming “state
was an agency within MoNRE with the “function to management functions” for water, the confusion
assist the Minister in implementing state and inter-ministerial conflict heightened and led to
4
several strategic moves. MARD issued a Decision regulate water allocation, water quality, and
in April 2004 which established a General Office for environmental changes altogether.
River Basins Planning Management with the At the peak of these debates, in June 2003, a
mandate to assist the Director of the DWR in task force including representatives from MARD,
collaborating with ministries, agencies and provincial MoNRE and several donors published its
people’s committees (PPC) to implement the recommendations to solve the gridlock between the
functions and responsibilities of the RBPMBs. The two ministries in a report titled “Transition of Water
structure of the Office provided space for the Resource Management from MARD to MoNRE”
Director of the DWRM of MoNRE on a seemingly (GoV 2003b). Integrated planning (basin master
equal footing as the DWR and the IWARP (of plans) and operational management was left to
MARD). However, the Director of DWRM reportedly MARD, with its RBOs and line agencies. Although
shunned the initiative and sent representatives to the report advocated a transfer of the responsibility
attend the meetings. for supporting RBOs from IWARP to DWRM, the
With the confusion created with reference to “degree to which a planning capability is built up in
“State management functions” in both government MoNRE or whether the IWARP or part of it is
decrees (Nos. 91/2002 and 86/2003), MARD transferred” was left unspecified (GoV 2003b).
endeavored to establish semantic distinctions In late 2004, the government requested
based on its legal role as the host’ of RBOs. Since MoNRE (in coordination with MARD) to prepare a
water management had to be carried out at the government decree on RBM (CRDE and IESD
basin level and since the Law on Water Resources 2006) that would, in particular, modify Government
provided for RBOs to be hosted by MARD, all the Decree 86/2003 and “remove the function of
State functions related to planning and coordinating river basin management of MARD”
construction, in particular, would be based on basin (Hydrosult and Arcadis 2005). MoNRE, in turn,
plans prepared by that Ministry. MoNRE, in turn, requested and received support from ADB and
would be responsible for state water management DANIDA to draft the decree. In March 2005, the
at the national level, and not at the river basin draft of the Decree on “River Basin Management”
level. Presumably its role would be confined to challenged MARD’s “ownership” of management at
designing national strategies and regulation norms, the basin level (GoV 2005). MoNRE is to lead the
such as rules to allocate water and pollution appraisal of a ten-year river basin plan (which “sets
standards. It would not be directly involved in basin- the broad objectives, policies and priorities on water
wide development plans and construction, activities resources protection, exploitation, development and
which traditionally drain the largest parts of the util ization and protection of water-related
state budget. MoNRE’s perception, on the other environment in the basin”), seek comments from
hand, was that “the function of state management NWRC, and submit final appraisals to the prime
of water resources has been handed over from minister. The decree also dramatically reshuffled
MARD to MoNRE” (Trang 2005; Cong 2007). responsibilities by introducing advisory River Basin
Other arguments in this turf battle referred to Councils, shifting decision-power to MoNRE, and
the respective weaknesses of the two ministries. limiting MARD to performing actions defined and
MARD, on the one hand, was decried as being monitored by MoNRE.
narrowly focused on irrigation and flood issues,
heavily biased towards structural and engineering
approaches (Nghia 2004a), and its involvement in Competing Strategies
regulation issues were contrary to the principle of
separation of power between regulation and In April 2006, MoNRE tried to re-establish
operation. MoNRE, on the other hand, was held as ownership of the policy process and published a
being technically weak (especially at the provincial “National Water Resources Strategy towards the
level, with its incipient departments: DoNRE), year 2020” (MoNRE 2006), which acknowledges
without the competence needed to monitor and that “The Law on Water Resources… has not been
5
effectively applied and is now not suitable to deal After all, this could be good news. If MARD’s
with new situations.” It re-asserts the principles of role is about structural development and operation
IWRM, notably the separation of functions of waterworks, why would it conflict with MoNRE,
(regulation and operation), integrated RBM, which conceives of management at a higher level,
licensing of water use and discharge, and the with more consideration to environmental health?
protection, efficient exploitation and sustainable Both also agree with the necessity to reason water
development of water resources. It entrusts MoNRE resource development and management at the
with the task of establishing “river basin plans and basin level. As discussed later, the conflict revolves
water resources plans for all regions and managing around the decision-making power on planning,
the implementation of the plans” and calls for a what is to be done or not, and the implications in
review and amendment of the Law on Water terms of budget flows within the bureaucracies.
Resources.1 In the face of such recurring contradictions,
This strategy re-asserts the prime importance Standing Prime Minister Nguyen Sinh Hung
of river basin planning and management as a layer convened a meeting on March 5, 2007 to hear the
of decision-making that both clearly rests with opinion of ministers from MARD and MoNRE. The
MoNRE and defines the conditions under which Notice 43/2007/TB-VPCP on the conclusion of that
operational agencies will have to perform their meeting (GoV 2007) confirmed the intention of
tasks and duties. This view was, unsurprisingly, transferring basin planning to the latter and
not shared by MARD which issued its own Strategy requested MoNRE to prepare a new draft decree on
for sustainable national water resources RBM and modifications of decrees 86/2003/ND-CP
management and development (MARD 2006a). The and 91/2002/ND-CP.
MARD strategy recapitulates past public
investments in water resource development in
different regions, the achievements in terms of Internal Tensions within MARD and
irrigation, drainage and flood control, the staffing of MoNRE
water services, and reviews all the projected water
demand and investment needs for each region. The If the lack of institutional clarity severely affected
focus is clearly on the conventional management of the two ministries and their relationships, it also
supply in order to respond to new and growing impacted the distribution of roles and duties within
needs, including the requirements induced by each of the two ministries. The responsibility for
cities, industries, tourism, aquaculture, salt RBM was first entrusted to the IWARP of MARD
production, or agricultural diversification, and the because of the 1998 Law on Water Resources
necessity to ensure environmental flows (or at least (see Figure 2). While in 2003 the IWARP, in its
minimum flows to downstream areas). This is what capacity as the Office of the RRBO, had been
distinguishes the new approach from earlier selected as the Implementing Agency (IA) of the
planning studies that “were mainly implemented to orientation phase of the 2RRBSP, the (second)
meet development requirements of the agricultural design phase of the project saw the DWR insisting
sector” (MARD 2006a). The strategy markedly on playing this role, arguing that the IWARP as a
differs from the strategy of MoNRE and does little (technical) planning institute devoid of state
to enlarge the scope of MARD beyond its management functions could not play such a role.
traditional role. This move may suggest a desire to keep control of
1 The strategy also includes conventional orthodox views of a change in “water management from a subsidized, supply-focused
approach into a demand-focused approach that recognizes the commercial nature of water service products,” emphasizes pricing,
cost recovery and even trading of entitlements in a market, but does little to underline the intrinsic necessity of hard choices and
trade-offs in water management, sticking to a depoliticized and non-conflicting view of IWRM.
6
FIGURE 2. Schematic summary of main government organizations involved.
the fringe benefits associated with projects but also MoNRE was also affected by the unclear
a more profound concern for a possible dilution of definition of the mandates of its different
decision power over infrastructural planning. departments. Because it was mainly created from
This reaffirmation of the power of the DWR had an aggregation of various departments and
also been paralleled by a claim to relocate RBOs agencies of existing ministries and agencies,
under the DWR. However, since the department’s water quality fell under the responsibility of
main duty was to manage dams, sluices and both the DWRM and the Vietnam Environment
pumps – often through the intermediary of semi- Protection Agency (VEPA). However, the
independent companies – the justification for such conflict between these two departments has been
a move would be quite weak and would overtly limited, possibly because the functions of
come into conflict with the principle of separation both departments have not been fully
of duties. implemented yet.
Integrated Water Resources Management in the Red River Basin:
Starting a Process
The First Red River Basin Organization Not surprisingly, the basin was given priority in the
process of establishing RBOs in the country.
The Red River is the second largest river in During the final phase of the passing of the
Vietnam. It is an international river that originates new Law on Water Resources,2 the ADB
in China and traverses Vietnam before emptying approached the Vietnamese Government and
into the East Sea. Administratively, the Red River proposed a three-year (1998-2000) TA (Technical
Basin covers or overlaps 26 provinces and its Assistance) titled “Red River Basin Water Resource
population totals 28 million (in 2002), including Management Project” which, according to Wright
Hanoi, the capital city. It supports a large irrigated (1999), would “assist the government to establish
area (650,000 hectares (ha), mostly in the delta) a ‘river basin commission’ for the Red River Basin,
and is subject to recurrent problems of flooding. to manage the planning of water resource
2 According to Wright (1999) “The government has requested the Asian Development Bank to provide support for improving water
resources management in the Red River Basin, in view of its importance to the national economy.”
7
management and facilitate improved stakeholder makers from the 26 provinces intersecting the Red
involvement and agency coordination in the River Basin. Three top priority issues with regard to
process”. Other goals included improved water resource management in the entire Red River
coordination between provinces, capacity building, Basin emerged from these workshops: 1) irrigated
the establishment of the Red River Basin agriculture; 2) water supply and sanitation combined
Resources Data Directory, and the writing of a with pollution; and 3) flood control together with
“basin profile”. Re-affirming that the strong “legal reforestation and protection (Nghia 2004a).
backing” of the law sets the stage for RBM, the TA The operation regulation of the first three RBOs
tried to set things in motion. (including the RRBO) was specified by a
On April 9, 2001, the MARD created the Red- ministerial decision in April 2004 (MARD 2004).
Thai Binh River Basin Planning Management Board The role of the RBOs is unambiguously to serve as
(more simply RRBO). In the same year, another technical coordinating and advisory bodies to
ADB TA (3528-VIE) was started and dedicated to MARD, “assessing planning alternatives, basic
capacity building for water resource management investigation projects, inventory and assessment of
including three sub-projects, the first of which was water resources in the river basin; [and] submitting
meant to build the capacity of the NWRC and the follow-up recommendations and proposals to
incipient RBOs through study tours, awareness MARD and authorized state agencies.”- Other
raising workshops, assistance in drafting official missions include data exchange and management,
documents, and by “carrying out activities to coordination with other ministries and agencies,
expose key people to the meaning and benefits of capacity building, and awareness raising. RBOs
IWRM” (ADB 2001b). are to meet twice a year, and are chaired by a
Although MARD had agreed to the Vice Minister of MARD, assisted by the General
establishment of the NWRC and the RBOs, which Director of the DWR and a department level leader
remained under its full control, its lack of interest of MoNRE. Members include leaders of PPCs from
was manifest. After a few initial meetings in 2000, provinces located in the basin, leaders of DWR,
the NWRC did not meet for nearly two years. The IWARP, DWRM, and other water-related
lack of funding, office facilities, and operational departments from other ministries as well as their
guidelines for the RRBO, were held as the main provincial affiliates.
constraints to proper data management and Phase I of the 2RRBSP served as a screening
communication, and to field investigations of the process which made it clear that the 25 provinces
current status of the basin (Nghia 2004b). have a few issues in common (aside from those
In 2001, another TA (the 2RRBSP) funded by already taken care of, such as flood or dam
the ADB and the Governments of the Netherlands operations) and that IWRM should be implemented
and France was signed but its inception workshop to tackle actual problems at a lower scale. It was
was only held two years later, in October 2003. also hoped that the institutional conflict around the
Seven percent of this US$156 million project was role of RBOs would be minimized when moving to
targeted for capacity building for the RRBO, public a lower scale where agreements and arrangements
awareness, and a pilot water licensing and among smaller groups would perhaps be easier.
wastewater discharge permit system (in the Cau The Cau and the Day River sub-basins emerged as
River). Although the 2RRBSP was initially designed strong candidates for pilot testing RBM. In October
as a two-phase project (design and implementation) 2004, phase II of the project started with five
it was decided to start with an initial orientation different components, addressing: IWRM in the Cau
phase that would clarify the issues at stake and River Sub-basin, strategic flood management in the
their perception by, and level of priority for, Red River Delta, IWRM at sub-basin level in
stakeholders in the basin’s provinces (Shearwater selected upland provinces, IWRM in the Day-Nhue
2003). During the second half of 2003, the Office of River Sub-basin (focused on water quality issues),
the RRBO organized 25 workshops involving key and support to the Office of the RRBO (2RRBSP
staff from water relevant sectors and decision- 2006).
8
The Cau Sub-RBO the creation of a Cau River Committee chaired by
the PPC’s chairmen. This initiative was undertaken
As early as 1997, and, therefore, long before talks by the then provincial departments of the Ministry
about RBOs began, the six provinces traversed by of Science and Technology, under the Environment
the Cau River (Figure 3) decided to jointly tackle Programme, but did not catch the interest of the
the issue of water pollution in the basin. It resulted RRBO when this was later established (CRDE and
in the formulation of a Master plan on IESD 2006).
Environmental and Landscape Protection and the In May 2006, MARD established the Cau Sub-
government subsequently gave the green light to Basin Organization (CSBO) as an advisory body
FIGURE 3. Location of six provinces in the Cau River Basin. Source: 2RRBSP (2006).
9
under direct control of the RRBO chaired by explaining why the effective definition and
MARD. The CSBO is to be chaired permanently by implementation of allocation rules, water quality
the vice-chairmen of the Thai Nguyen PPC. In monitoring, improvement of irrigation management
September 2006, the RRBO issued Decision No. or reservoir operation were left to phase III of the
7 that defined the “Organization and Working project which is due to start in early 2007.
Regulation for the Cau River Sub-basin The objectives of the Cau River component of
Organization”. The CSBO, located within the phase III of the 2RRBSP included technical issues
DARD, appears to be a mere appendix of the and governance (Shearwater 2007): Assess
RRBO, with the main task of advising the RRBO pollution emissions and associated environmental
in water resource assessments, planning options, health impacts/risks; provide assessment of
monitoring of implementation, and definition of options; facilitate informed inclusive decision-
priorities (MARD 2006b). This Decision was passed making; support implementation by PPCs of agreed
rather hastily, so that phase III of the 2RRBSP IWRM activities; assist in the periodic review of the
would not be delayed further, and involved limited mandate and structure of the CSBO; and help build
deliberation on the degree of autonomy of the its capacity. So far, the CSBO is heavily dominated
CSBO and its relationship with line agencies. by the Thai Nguyen Province and this might prove
As mentioned above, the Cau River Basin was to be a weakness for solving inter-provincial issues.
selected because it presented a “real IWRM The strong subordination of the CSBO to the
challenge” (ADB 2006) identified during the initial central level of MARD, through the RRBO, is also
stages of phase II of the 2RRBSP. These likely to annihilate any sense of ownership by the
challenges include water scarcity shared among provinces concerned. While ADB’s TA sees the
the four lower provinces and conflicts in allocating active participation of the CSBO and other
the water of the Nui Coc Reservoir, which is used stakeholders in the sub-basin as essential in the
for a) irrigation, b) supplying water to Thai Nguyen resolution of problems, it is not clear who is going
City, c) diluting pollution in the Cau River, and d) to participate and how.
supporting recreational and tourist uses in the Other issues are linked to the conflict in duties
reservoir itself. The project, thus, included several at the ministerial level. With the establishment of
components that looked at varied issues such as the CSBO, the existing Environmental Committee,
water balance, storage potential, irrigation for example, should ideally merge with the CSBO
performance in the Song Cau system, aquaculture and incorporate its environmental master plan with
potential and crop diversification. the general plan for the basin in the future. This
However conventional they may appear, these has not happened but the CSBO should include
issues proved to be more intractable than expected three staff from provincial DoNRE for environmental
and studies were hindered by the lack of data on issues, two from DARD for irrigation and one with
water flows and land use, and the limited time and a NGO background for participatory irrigation
means available to carry out extensive fieldwork. policies. The Cau River Basin does face problems
Pollution issues were also not fully captured of water allocation, pollution control and inter-
because of patchy data and an inadequate provincial coordination. Whether these problems
regulation framework. The polluter-pays principle call for a Sub-RBO (S-RBO) with a permanent role
enshrined in the Law on Water Resources clearly or not is unsure. The fact that provinces have not
appeared insufficient to solve the problems, not only been able to solve coordination problems in the
because of confusion over standard definitions and past might indicate a need for some kind of
with monitoring but also due to inadequate intervention by the central government, at least to
enforcement capacity. Most polluting factories in enable, and assist in, resolution mechanisms. But
the area are State enterprises, allegedly old and such an intervention may also meet with the
inefficient, which would be bankrupt overnight if passivity of provinces that feel subjected to central
they had to treat their effluents. This contributes to power.
10
The Day Sub-RBO Planning and Investment of the provinces, DARD,
DoNRE, Department of Science and Technology,
In 2003, following the example of the Cau River, the etc., totaling 60 persons. The regulation for the
six chairmen of the PPCs concerned with the Day DSBO was approved in September 2006.
River met in an attempt to solve water quality and A legitimate question is, what is the added
environmental problems in the basin. The Day River value of the DSBO, compared with the earlier inter-
branches off the Red River upstream of Hanoi provincial committee? Is there a need to create
capital, although this natural connection was later new and permanent offices or would a more
sealed, transforming the river into the receptacle of informal mechanism be sufficient? Officers in the
Hanoi’s main drain, the Nhue River (Figure 4). The DSBO reported several advantages of the new
Nhue and the Day rivers are, thus, the most setting: First, the DSBO is officially recognized and
polluted waterways in Northern Vietnam. Domestic carries more weight when requesting interventions
and industrial pollution combines with such as the opening of the head reach of the Day
agrochemicals used in agriculture. One of the River. Second, it allows coordination of actions and
polders traversed by these rivers (the Bac Nam Ha decisions. For example, the ban on floating
polder) is also subject to water shortages during vegetables (which obstructs the flow of water) in
the winter-spring crop season. A gate is, therefore, one province would be circumvented by people
under construction at the head of the river in order growing them in other provinces, if the interdiction
to allow approximately 30-40 cubic meters per was not taken jointly. Third, the DSBO offers better
second (m3/s) of water to be transferred from the opportunities for officers from each province to be
Red River into the Day River. aware of what the other provinces plan in terms of
FIGURE 4. Location of the Day River Basin. Source: 2RRBSP (2006).
The Day Sub-Basin Organization (DSBO) was water management structures (e.g., gates or flood
officially set up in December 2005. As with the control structures) and, thus, to anticipate and flag
CSBO, the chair is rotated (every two years) possible impacts on their own province.
among the chairs/vice-chairs of the six PPCs The DSBO also illustrates the limited power of
concerned. Members include the Department of provincial offices vis-à-vis the central ministries.
11
Since the Bac Nam Ha polder overlaps with several Who Wants RBOs? Reformulating the
provinces, the Bac Nam Ha Irrigation Company Project
comes under the direct jurisdiction of MARD. Local
provincial officers resent the lack of decision power With all these plans for phase III under discussion,
that prevents them from defining their own priorities. the project suddenly took an abrupt change of
Yet, at the moment, the actions proposed by the direction. The ADB and the Embassy of the
DSBO for 2007 look more like a wish list and still Netherlands cancelled two of the four components
carry little weight; and rules for decision-making planned for component A of the project. The Cau
and joint deliberation are yet to be defined. component was cancelled because of MARD’s
The main problem for the river continues to be delay in defining an operating budget and
pollution caused mainly by Hanoi. Obviously, the appointing staff for the CSBO, lack of demand by
improvement of water disposal and treatment in the provinces, and lasting confusion on whether
capital depends on the establishment of responsibility for integrated RBM would eventually
regulations and their enforcement but, more rest with MARD or MoNRE. The Day component
crucially, on the financial resources that the state is going to be carried out by MoNRE,
decides to devote to solving the problem (building independently of the DSBO and chaired by MARD
treatment stations, upgrading obsolete industrial which, again, stands in total contradiction with the
units, etc.). Although the DSBO may contribute to idea of IWRM, as expressed by RBOs.
stressing the urgency of such actions, its clout is On 24 May 2007, the Office of the Government
probably marginal at the moment. It is, thus, a informed that the issue of transferring
legitimate question to ask whether water quality responsibilities from MARD to MoNRE would only
management demands an integrated inter-sectoral be resolved as part of a wider process of reducing
approach requiring the formation of a permanent S- the number of ministries and rationalizing their
RBO or if it is primarily a question of investment in mandates/functions. At the same time, the
treatment facilities around the Hanoi capital (and Ministry of Finance recommended abolition of
the decision to mobilize huge public funds to irrigation service fees, signaling that major policy
tackle water pollution problems). shifts might be on the way.
Analysis and Lessons Learned
The RRBO: A Blueprint or an management, the project’s pilot water licensing
Endogenous Solution? and wastewater discharge permit systems would
demonstrate the benefits of IWRM. Project
The earlier chronology of reforms and ADB TAs consultants found themselves in a situation where
showed that the relevance of RBOs in general,3 the RRBO would have to be trained without having
and of the RRBO in particular, was largely first asserted its legitimacy with regard to the
un-questioned and allegedly anchored in provisions ministries concerned and to the provinces. They
of the Law on Water Resources: Beyond capacity were also unsure of what the main issues were that
building for the RRBO and public awareness and the RRBO would have to address, aside from water
education programs for water resource quality in the Cau and Day rivers. As mentioned
3 “RBOs need to be formed in major river basins“ (ADB 2001a).
12
earlier, a first and quite successful Diagnostic and It is apparent that many of the driving
Orientation phase allowed to scope out what the concepts pushed forward heavily draw on “best
perceptions of line agencies and provincial practices” supposedly sanctioned at the
representatives were regarding water challenges in international level. RBM, for example, is introduced
the Red River Basin. as “an internationally accepted approach providing
Phase I of the project found that the Red River the required levels of stakeholder involvement in
Basin is not short of water and “demonstrated that water resource management decisions, and
basin-wide participation is both difficult and coordination across the many government agencies
unnecessary as the 26 provinces and 25 million with responsibilities and functions in the water
people do not share common IWRM challenges” sector in a large river basin” (Wright 1999).
(Shearwater 2005). This timely realization helped Similarly, there is intense and repeated borrowing
put the project on a new track and the focus from overarching consensual concepts like
shifted from conventional basin master planning to sustainable development, IWRM, or participatory
“doing a few important water management things management that tend to sound hollow when
well,” and from the whole river basin to the sub- decontextualized. The Law on Water Resources,
basin level. At this stage, the risk arose that for example, although it was soon to appear to be
IWRM might appear as a solution looking for a obsolete4 in the wake of the establishment of
problem and ADB expressed its concern that the MoNRE and RBOs, was presented as providing “a
participants of the initial phase “hadn’t identified a modern, dynamic, and realistic legal framework in
‘real’ IWRM issue” (Shearwater 2005). The issue of accordance with current international principles”
allocation of water from the Nui Coc Reservoir was (MARD and DANIDA 2000). This discourse
singled out as an IWRM challenge that combined percolated into national policy documents5 but
issues of water quality and allocation, and often sounded more like a rhetorical concession
concerned two or three provinces. rather than a reflection of a change in mind-sets.6
This reformulation of the project raises some Although there are incentives for national decision-
more general questions on the nature of the policy makers, as well as for international consultants,7 to
process. It suggests that the weight of external rely heavily on these general concepts, they run
actors in this process, particularly development the risk of generating proposals that will later – if
banks and bilateral cooperation agencies, is quite implemented – find themselves at odds with reality.
significant, prompting two different questions: 1) The nature of short-term projects and TAs, with
are the concepts put forward, proposed or rigid – and frequently unrealistic - time frames and
sometimes imposed, relevant to the problems disbursement schedules, also contributes to
experienced in Vietnam? and 2) if these concepts creating such situations. For example, the initial
are sound, is their introduction timely and drive to distil principles of IWRM and RBM for the
consistent with the actual bureaucratic and political Red River foundered on its later confrontation with
configuration in the country? reality, with a shift towards sub-basin issues.
4 MoNRE (2006) admitted that “the Law on Water Resources has not really penetrated into our lives, has not been effectively
applied and is now not suitable to deal with new situations.”
5 For example, the National Water Resources Council website states that “The Law on Water Resources has reflected almost worldwide
concepts and principles on integrated water resources management” (NWRC 2007).
6 Integrated use of the water resource is mentioned only twice in the 1998 Law on Water Resources and is defined as “making
rational use of, and developing the potential of, a water source and limiting the negative effect of water for integrated service of
many purposes.” IWRM is now said to be the topmost priority of MARD (Su et al. 2004).
7 National decision-makers understand that a degree of acceptance of these concepts (irrespective of whether they believe in them)
is the oil that lubricates relationships with donors and the international level; experts and consultants, who often have very little
time to do project feasibility studies, also ground a part of their legitimacy in the manipulation of these concepts whose hegemonic
nature provides a degree of protection against criticism, unless or until completely discredited.
13
It may also be the case that concepts are discuss or learn about new concepts and this
applied or proposed in an untimely fashion. has “created unnecessary disputes” (CRDE and
Management regimes require bureaucratic IESD 2006).
configurations, legal frameworks and governance
patterns that are consistent with these regimes.
Pushing for a particular regime when these Vertical and Sectoral Integration
conditions are not met may just be wishful thinking
with little chance of success. The first Red River Core aspects of IWRM include integration of water
Basin Water Resource Management Project was management, the coordination of actions, but also
planned to assist the government in establishing a the distribution of decision-making power, across:
“river basin commission” for the Red River Basin to
manage the planning of water resource • the legislative power, represented by the
management and facilitate improved stakeholder National Assembly at the central level and the
involvement and agency coordination in the People’s Councils at lower (province or city
process” (Wright 1999). These intentions, with equivalent to province, district and commune)
hindsight, conflict with the fact that the RRBO was levels;
to be set up under the control of MARD and basin • the executive power exercised by the central
planning, notably water infrastructure development, government and three nested parallel levels of
would remain its prerogative. In that sense, the PPCs at province (or city), district and
institutional setting was not suitable, and probably commune levels that are elected by the
adverse, to the implementation of IWRM principles, corresponding Councils; and
in general, and RBOs, in particular. This
contradiction, that was to be made explicit later by • the ministries and line agencies at the central
the creation of MoNRE and by its very claim to a government level, with their representative
division of roles and responsibilities, was also departments at the province and district, or
painfully clear to consultants of the Red River sometimes, communal levels, that are
Basin Water Resource Management Project (see administratively under the PPCs.
for example, Taylor and Wright 2001). Yet, such These nested levels must be integrated
evidence did not warrant an early reconsideration or vertically but also horizontally: for example,
a revision of the project. provinces need to collaborate to tackle the issues
A similar disjuncture between intended goals they have in common; while within the same
and reality was apparent in DANIDA’s 2000-2005 province (just as at the ministerial level) line
program aimed at supporting the implementation of agencies must also harmonize their actions.
the Law on Water Resources. The program stated With specific problems identified at the sub-
that the Law “provides a modern, dynamic, and basin level, institutional concerns shifted to
realistic legal framework… [and] defines new establishing S-RBOs and defining their role and
responsibilities and functions which have potential position vis-à-vis the Red River parent organization.
to bring water resource management in Vietnam in The role of the RRBO itself, for lack of major
line with proven international principles and issues that would justify its existence, was
practices” (MARD and DANIDA 2000). Yet, the redefined as one of supporting S-RBOs, since it
same document reports that much concern has also became clear that these new organizations
been raised over the dual role of MARD as both would not have the technical capacity to address
custodian of national resources and providers of inter-provincial issues; the position of MoNRE, in
services (irrigation, drainage, flood control, etc.). particular, appeared to be very weak because it
Such undesirable contradictions, although well- could only count with a recently established
recognized by consultants, dictated compromise DoNRE, unqualified staff, and no data collection
and half-way solutions. Other analysts also note network that could give an idea of what the
that officials have only had a few opportunities to situation was.
14
FIGURE 5. Articulation of governance levels in the Red River Basin.
Under present arrangements, the S-RBO is, central government. In that, they may benefit from
therefore, subject to several lines of control and the dynamics of the 2RRBSP which tends to
accountability, as sketched out in Figure 5. The S- promote the ownership of the S-RBO by the
RBO is first strongly under the control of MARD, provinces. This application of the principle of
because it is an appendix of the RRBO, and also subsidiarity (RBOs should be governed by their
because of the central contribution of DARD to its own constituents), however, may not entirely fit the
staff. But it is also partly controlled by PPCs, first, prevailing situation. Although provinces have state
because they chair it, and, second, because the management functions within their boundaries, it is
heads of the provincial departments that staff it are clear that such a definition is unsatisfactory
reputed to be more accountable to their provincial because many interventions in the water cycle do
leaders than to their ministries. have an impact on downstream or other areas.
The role of the S-RBO remains advisory but it Problems that clearly travel across provinces are
clearly created a space in the governance structure supposed to be handled by MARD or by other
which could offer opportunities for shifts in the relevant ministries. It is not clear whether this way
distribution of power. At the moment, both the of internalizing externalities, by going one level up
MARD and the provinces are somehow worried to the ministry, should be replaced by resorting to
about the possible emergence of an intermediate a S-RBO at an intermediate level. If so, the
level of decision-making; MARD is concerned by a responsibilities of the S-RBO have to be defined
dilution of its power to plan infrastructural and there is potential for replicating at that level
development, while provinces are concerned by the the infighting that is currently occurring at the
transfer of powers from the provinces to an inter- ministerial level. The benefits of such a move are
provincial body with discretionary and overriding also not very clear for the provinces themselves.
power (CRDE and IESD 2006). First, they are aware of their limited technical
It may well be that the current status quo capacity but they may also be concerned with the
includes a tacit shared preference for keeping S- access to central government subsidies since at
RBOs with limited power. Yet, as it stands, the S- present most inter-provincial issues are, generally,
RBO also constitutes a window of opportunity for not only taken care of – but also funded – at the
provinces to assert a larger independence from the national level.
15
The eventual cancellation of the Cau S-RBO reshaping the distribution of power that underlies
sub-component of the 2RRBSP may thus be a prior institutional arrangements is unlikely to be
reflection of the fact that without clear redistribution effective (Evans 2004).
of bureaucratic power and responsibilities the The wording of the decisions on RBOs has,
status quo is the option that is likely to prevail. therefore, been the object of much scrutiny and
RBOs might be accepted – or tolerated – as long debate, both “within the bureaucracy and among
as they are associated with TAs, projects and associated experts in Vietnam” (Taylor and Wright
benefits from external funding, and as long as they 2001). At the time the profile of the RRBO was
are kept under the control of MARD; but their being outlined, it was clear, in particular, that the
durability is dubious as soon as this support RRBO should be a coordinating agency “which
wanes. could not adopt any state management power or
function”. If it did, this would conflict with the
powers of the MARD and other agencies. It is safe
Separation of Power … Without Power to assume that MARD accepted the idea of setting
Shift RBOs after making sure that it would not threaten
its established role and that it would be confined
It has become a standard policy recommendation to a coordinating role. Since MoNRE had not been
of “modern water management arrangements” to created at the time of establishing the first three
separate the roles of water resources manager and RBPMBs in 2001, these were set up under MARD.
operators as much as possible, so that powerful The challenge only emerged with the setting up
line agencies in charge of hydropower or irrigation, of MoNRE, which claimed the river basin level as
to name the most obvious, do not pursue sectoral the scale where it should exercise its state
(over)development, with little consideration for management function. The contradiction between
economic soundness or social/environmental the very role of MoNRE and its lack of power over
impacts. (Wright 1999; Millington 2000; Arriens RBM is obvious, as stressed in the preceding
2004). While the manager ensures regulation of the section.
water sector (by setting standards, allocating and If we compare official mandates, strategies,
monitoring water use, establishing environmental work plans and actual activities of MARD and
protection rules, coordinating planning, etc.), the MoNRE, especially in their claim to manage water
operator takes care of structures or reservoirs at the basin level, it is clear that the overlapping is
according to the rules set. The regulation functions limited to a few issues. The core of the conflict is
are best decentralized to the river basin level and eventually quite circumscribed and lies with
encapsulated in a RBO. Above these two levels, planning.
apex bodies, in the form of inter-ministerial
councils that meet two or three times a year, are
also expected to give overall policy guidance and Who Holds the Rubber Stamp?
review adequate legislations.
When the regulation and operating roles are It is apparent from MARD’s documents that its
held by the same ministry (MARD) separating main concern remains focused on structural
these roles means that substantial decision- issues, on matching demand and supply, and on
making power will have to be shifted from that flood control and mitigation. MARD remains very
ministry to the (new) regulating body (MoNRE, in much engineering-oriented and one may wonder
the present case). Therefore, such a shift requires why it would strive to control regulatory issues
the new distribution of roles and duties to be such as the allocation of permits, the definition of
reflected in new legislation (formal level) but also to dam rule curves, pollution standards and control of
buildup a regulator endowed with sufficient human effluents, or the identification and protection of
power and technical expertise (practical level). wetlands and other fragile ecosystems, even if
Designing new formal rules without simultaneously carried out at the basin level.
16
Analysis of various documents and interviews “development and implementation of the river basin
with officials suggest that the Gordian knot lies plans” and entrusted it to MoNRE (GoV 2005).8
with planning, taken in the old sense of identifying This may help explain why the decree remained in
structural interventions that will allow the increased a draft form.
use of water or a better protection from floods and
droughts. In continuous planning, and subsequent
construction activities, lies the professional A Narrow Definition of Participation
gratification of planners and technicians and resides
the assurance of sustained budgets. Sustained Emphasis on participation has become a major
budgets, especially in a context where both design feature of development projects, in general, and of
and construction work are increasingly outsourced, ADB’s policy, in particular (ADB 2000; Molle 2005).
open the way for people with decision-making Since the early involvement of foreign and
power to benefit from investment flows. With multilateral donors, particularly in Northern
structural investments constituting 64% of the Vietnam, participatory approaches have been
MARD’s budget, the stakes are high since central to water projects. In 1999, for example,
realignment of decisional power necessarily entails Wright (1999) announced that “a major feature of
a redistribution of benefits. In 2006, the total the proposed RRBO is that it will provide a forum
budget of MARD was US$200 million of which for all major stakeholders to discuss, negotiate and
US$126 million was allocated to investment for agree upon recommendations for planning
development. decisions to be submitted to the government…
Since RBOs are potentially endowed with the irrigators will have an increased say in planning
power to draw basin plans and, possibly, to screen decisions which impact on their sub-sector”.
these plans before final approval, it is not surprising IWRM, too, is supposed to incorporate a healthy
to observe a dual strategy of a) maintaining RBOs dose of participation from stakeholders. The
as symbolic advisory bodies with reduced concept is based on “an expectation that
autonomous technical capacity; and b) controlling interested groups and organizations will coordinate
RBOs in case their screening power would be and participate directly as far as possible” (Taylor
strengthened. Furthermore, since RBOs are largely and Wright 2001).
promoted by foreign partners and are, thus, likely The Law on Water Resources, however, is
to be associated with the future delivery of loans parsimonious with regard to participation (Molle
and projects, they may also ‘attract’ more 2005). It contains 71 occurrences of “State,” 49
investments, which makes their control even more occurrences of “Government,” but none of
desirable. In other words, the legitimacy of RBOs “participation” or “participatory.” This can, perhaps,
as ‘registration chambers’ for projects – rubber- be attributed to the particular conception that
stamped with the seal of IWRM – can be attractive people are effectively represented by local people’s
for the departments traditionally involved in committees and other official organizations.
structural interventions. Although it may appear as a way to sideline civil
While Decree 91/2002/ND-CP, that established society, such a conception is also genuinely
MoNRE as the manager of water resources, did not ingrained in local political discourse and culture; in
address the crucial point of infrastructural planning, that sense, participation strangely resonates with
the 2005 draft Decree on Integrated River Basin socialist ideology and the notion of “civil society”
Management (see section, MARD versus MoNRE: may seem redundant. It is abundantly clear from
Turf Battle over Roles, above) included official documents that the statement: “involvement
8 It is worth noting that in a properly set up regulatory and oversight body, the need for implementation should not arise with respect
to that body. One of the intentions of a split responsibility model is precisely to constrain un-warranted investment and infrastructure
development through rational planning and allocation of resources.
17
of stakeholders is important for integrated water loi, derived from a Chinese term for water
resources management” (Lai 2002), refers to the resources, as equivalent to irrigation (or thuy nong
involvement of all ministries and provinces in Vietnamese, i.e., water use for agriculture). This
concerned. was partly due to irrigation being the most
Likewise, ADB’s consultants continue to put important water use in Vietnam. Since the early
emphasis on participation (Sach 2004) and to use 1990s MARD stressed that thuy loi should be
the term ‘stakeholder’, while (implicitly) translated as water resources, not irrigation, as a
understanding it as the people’s committees, at means of bolstering its legitimacy for water
the provincial level and below. Their main hope is resource management. MoNRE, consequently,
to support a process whereby local stakeholders avoids using the term thuy loi and prefers tai
(mostly provincial authorities) would contribute to nguyen nuoc, a more literal term introduced by the
the elaboration of priority issues in IWRM, to Law on Water Resources to designate water
identify and assess a wide range of options to resources (CRDE and IESD 2006).
address these issues, and to select preferred Another important semantic feature is the term
options for IWRM (Shearwater, 2004). used for ‘organization’ when talking of RBOs. The
Regarding non-governmental organizations Law on Water Resources first talked of “agencies
(NGOs), Taylor and Wright (2001) reckon that there managing the planning of the river basin”. Agency
are a few groups in Vietnam that could easily (co quan in Vietnamese), is a general term for
participate in a consultative role and, although government bodies or offices, except in a few
NGOs do exist, they “would not be considered special cases such as the National Environmental
eligible to take a formal role in an RBO”. In August Agency (NEA) or VEPA. The use of a general
2003, the ADB wrote to MARD requesting advice term, thus, left the RBOs rather unspecified. The
regarding an appropriate mechanism for involving first three RBOs were subsequently referred to as
NGOs in IWRM under Part A (Shearwater 2004). River Basin Planning Management Boards
MARD agreed to consider a proposal for NGO (RBPMB), when they were established in 2001.
involvement but it seems that this did not arouse Boards or councils (hoi dong in Vietnamese) usually
particular interest from the NGO Resource Center make or orient decisions for specific functions but
or from individual NGOs. Thus, whether out of lack do not implement these decisions. The RBPMB
of interest, preparedness or political space, NGOs were, thus, meant to be advisory and only take
are marginally represented, if at all, and general decisions. In 2004, the boards in the basin
participation – although ubiquitous at a rhetorical started to be called ‘RBOs’. ‘Organization’ is
level – remains a concept that applies to the generally translated as to chuc, when used for
relative contributions and distribution of decision- independent associations such as NGOs, but in
making power between administrative levels. the case of the RBO it is translated as ban and is
meant to implement certain functions or actions
decided by a committee or boards. It signals that
The Power of Words RBOs are now construed as more than boards or
committees.
Words, and their meanings, are resources in policy Translations from and to English also offer
debates. General, ill-defined, or terms with more opportunities for confusion, whether that is used
than one meaning may be appropriated and used intentionally or not. Donors and consultants
strategically by different parties. Translations, in constantly made the point that RBOs were
the present case between English and enshrined in the Law despite evidence that their
Vietnamese, also offer some opportunity for conception of such organizations was quite
hijacking terms as well as being a fertile ground for distinct from that which had been defined. Some
confusion. words are also ambiguous: the English term
In the past, many Vietnamese as well as ‘management’ may apply to an irrigation canal, a
government authorities considered the words thuy dam, or an organization. Recently, the term has
18
been used as an equivalent of ‘regulation’; the regulation and the legal framework setting and is
water manager establishes the rules, may monitor part of the translation of ‘state management
their application, and has the final say on planning function’. It also applies in ‘management of
options, while day-to-day ‘management’ comes planning’ (quan ly quy hoach) (supervision of the
under the word ‘operation’. A similar multi- execution in terms of activities, funding, etc.),
meaning word in Vietnamese is quan ly. It applies which is an unclear function linking management
to dam operation and supervision as well as to and planning (quy hoach).
Conclusion and the Way Forward
Water management problems at the basin level are particular) has been addressed at the central level
not new in the Red River Basin. As early as 1961, since the 1960s at least. Control of sediments also
a committee, the Hong (Red) River Committee was requires action on land use practices in the upper
formed to address issues of basin planning, floods, basin but this can be handled by nationwide
and dam management. At that time, flood control, programs. Just like water quality problems, which
either by dike or reservoirs, was the most tend to affect sub-basins such as the Cau or the
important objective. The office of the Committee Day, allocation issues are not too salient at the
was placed under the then Ministry of Water basin level because of the relative abundance of
Resources with members from various ministries water and this tends to be more significant within
and is considered to have been quite effective the polders or sub-basins like the Cau.
(CRDE and IESD 2006). In contrast, the Yet, the emergence of the MoNRE in the
establishment of the RRBO in 2001 owed a lot to institutional landscape created conditions for
development banks and cooperation agencies who RBOs, once a concession to donors by MARD, to
promoted apex bodies, IWRM and RBOs. Due to become an object of internal struggle and as such
the lack of other acceptable options, but somewhat a valuable asset. For MoNRE, the river basin-level
inconsistently and in contradiction with its was a new layer of administration it could
mandate, the RRBO was set up under MARD, with legitimately claim and that would allow the new
a few members of staff and a small budget, and ministry to assert its role and authority amid
remained for three years without internal official traditional administrative layers. RBOs opened a
regulation. political space for a possible reorganization of
The orientation phase of the 2RRBSP responsibilities and reshuffling of power. Not
undertook to convene authorities and technical surprisingly, this prompted MARD to do its utmost
officials from relevant ministries and from the 25 to keep control over RBOs resulting in a
provinces intersecting the basin to identify priority confrontation – through antagonistic decrees and
issues; it found basin-wide participation “both strategies – between the two ministries.
difficult and unnecessary”, leaving the RRBO with It is thus the struggle for conserving both
little more than the role of overseeing its offspring autonomy in planning and the current procedures
at the sub-basin level. The lack of relevance of a of financial decision-making that is at the core of
RBO at the basin level that would coordinate inter-ministerial infighting. This is not an
provincial actions does not mean that there are no uncommon situation as also illustrated in the case
basin-wide issues. As noted earlier, flood of Thailand. Experience in other countries also
management (with respect to dam operation, in shows that with the decline of irrigation and
19
drainage works and dam construction and the Ministry of Water Resources, in which MARD and
concomitant rise of environmental issues, MoNRE would be merged. Proponents of this
investments in both studies and infrastructure tend option claim that integration should be done
to shift towards environmental studies and through a concentration of all water-related issues
treatment stations, with a corresponding shift in and powers under the same Ministry, allowing
money flows within the administration. This shift, sectoral conflicts to be internalized. This is a
from MARD to MoNRE, does not occur without common counterproposal of irrigation agencies
friction and provides a good background for seeking to counter weakening of their power (as in
explaining the present situation. Thailand, for example); this, of course, would not
The confusion created begs for some clear-cut separate regulatory and operation functions and
arbitration. Several options have, and are, being would be a major setback for those who see the
discussed. The first option, probably favored by actual confusion as the price to be paid for such
international partners, would be a clear revision or a separation.10 (This option seems to have been
amendment of decrees 91/2002 and 86/2003, a discarded in the definition of 22 new ministries in
transfer of the mandate for RBM and RBO from July 2007).
MARD to MoNRE, accompanied by adequate A fourth option, perhaps, would be to address
staffing and funding, and a revision of the Law on the excess control of the center on basin issues
Water Resources9 to account for these changes. by devolving more power to RBOs and promoting
Such a shift, however, would take time to ownership of the provinces concerned. Yet,
materialize at the provincial level where MARD is provinces still do not have the technical capacity to
likely to remain firmly dominant – and the reaction handle many technical issues and are financially
of provinces would remain uncertain. dependent on the center for large-scale and inter-
A second option is to shift the state function basin investments.
of water resources management from MoNRE to In 2008, the situation remains unclear. RBOs
MARD to combine with other related functions of are not mentioned in either of the new decrees
MARD such as forest management and flood (GoV 2008a, 2008b) that specify the functions,
control. An advantage of this option is the responsibil ity, authority and organizational
availability of staff under MARD who have structure of MARD and MoNRE. In the decree
experience in water resources planning. However, relative to MARD, only functions of management
this would ascribe overall management functions to of irrigation systems and disaster are indicated
the MARD (agriculture, forestry and fisheries) which while in the decree relative to MoNRE, only
is the largest water ‘user’, with little likelihood of functions of water resources management,
moving away from past problems of poor standing member of NWRC and National Mekong
management and over-exploitation, especially Committee are mentioned. Instead, RBOs are the
because other water users are not well represented subject of a decree drafted by MoNRE (on the
in the existing RBOs (Cong 2007). model of the 2005 decree) and posted on a
A third option would be MARD indirectly government website for public comments between
reasserting control through the reformation of a the end of 2007 and March 2008.11 In this draft
9 A new ADB TA on “Review Law on Water Resources” is expected to be implemented during the period December 2008 to December
2009 to help the government review the current legal system applying to the water sector - including urban, rural, and river basin
water subsectors - and establish a statutory framework for IWRM principles in line with the objectives of the National Water Resources
Strategy (NWRS). DWRM is the implementing agency of this TA.
10 As stated by Biswas (2004), “The consolidation of institutions, in the name of integration, is likely to produce more centralization
and reduced responsiveness of such institutions to the needs of different stakeholders, which is not an objective that the current
societies and international institutions prefer at present.”
11 See www.chinhphu.vn/portal/page?_pageid=33,2091855&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL. Unlike other Decrees posted during
the same period, no public comment on this RBO draft Decree was given on this website.
20
decree, unsurprisingly, MoNRE is to play a major “now need to become fully functional,” and be
role in RBM and the structure of the RBOs “assisted through the early stages of formation
depends on the size (large, inter-provincial and and growth to become sustainable, capable and
provincial) of the basin. respected bodies in the water sector,” while “MARD
What lessons can be drawn from the should do as much as possible to create the
interactions between endogenous and exogenous necessary conditions for successful strategic
factors in the institutional process observed? planning.”
Despite the efforts deployed by several TAs, Critics will point to a variant of top-down and
attempts at grafting attributes of ‘modern’ water untimely imposition of concepts and reforms by
policies in the Vietnamese bureaucratic foreign experts and development banks
configuration were not very successful at first. This (Bandaragoda 2006); a new version of the Model-
was largely due to the lack of buy-in from T (or copycat) syndrome in development described
Vietnamese officials and the bundling of various by Chambers (1997); and to the ‘decontextualized’
reforms with TAs. For example, NWRC’s promotion of general principles that generate the
influence has been negligible and, after a few need for what these actors are precisely ready to
meetings, the Council discontinued its activities offer, be it loans, technical assistance or projects
between 2001 and 2003; RBOs in the country that are meant to produce draft legislations, sector
were supported by foreign partners and largely reviews, profiles, strategies, or master plans and to
ceased activities as soon as donor assistance ‘strengthen’ participation by various forms of
ended; and the Law on Water Resources, once capacity building.
deemed a modern and solid basis for IWRM, was An important point that needs to be
soon candidate to revision. Some Vietnamese emphasized is the gap between the formal
off icials feel that TAs were prepared by mandate of newly established institutions and the
international consultants without taking into way these operate in practice. There is pervasive
account the complexity of Vietnamese over-enthusiasm on the expected performance of
institutional structure and its weak legislation, these institutions. For example, in 2001, a report
echoing Evans’ (2004) critique of “the presumption of the ADB president to the board of directors
that the most advanced countries have already (ADB 2001b) stated that the RRBO was “expected
discovered the one best institutional blueprint for to be fully operational by June 2002 and to convene
development and that its applicability transcends the first meeting of the [Red River Basin] council.”
national cultures and circumstances.” Yet, even if apex bodies or RBOs are active there
The operation mode seems to be to establish is no assurance that they will fulfi l l their
institutions that fit international models and comply coordination and negotiation roles as expected. In
with regional ADB policies, even if other aspects of contrast to the conventional IWRM principles, which
the administrative and political configuration are tend to see the balancing of objectives of equity,
lacking, or are even in contradiction with them. efficiency and environmental sustainability as
Unsurprisingly, once these institutions are resulting from well-meaning and informed
established they need substantial ‘assistance’ to negotiation, new arenas of interaction do not
become effective, or in some cases simply active, necessarily lead to desirable outcomes. In
in particular if these are new and do not fit into the Thailand, for example, the apex body was decried
existing government structure. Thus, the Law on by some as a forum for ministries to engage in turf
Water Resources “gives a great deal of valuable battles or horse-trading rather than for optimizing
guidance… but further work will be required to coordination (Newborne 2006). Likewise, RBOs do
develop both policy and legislation on important not necessarily optimize decisions because
topics coming under the LWR”, newly-hatched outcomes depend on the distribution of power
RBOs “need to be activated and strengthened… (horizontally and vertically) rather than on the mere
and their functions and mode of operation need to existence of an institution that is supposed to
be clarified” (ADB 2001a), the NWRC and ONWRC ensure coordination.
21
More positively, others will consider this and owed l i t t le to external influence. The
process as a variant of the muddling-through type confluence of donor-driven projects on establishing
of policy planning (Lindblom 1970), where it is RBOs and the conflict between MARD and
important to make small and incremental steps MoNRE that put the river basin scale as a
towards a general desirable blueprint whenever contested issue, helped strengthen changes in
that is possible; hoping that contradictions will the direction of a better separation of duties and
gradually solve themselves out. MoNRE, or RBOs, integrated planning (although - just like in Thailand
for example, have been created in adverse - it seems that MoNRE does not aim at a mere
environments but their principle may be activated regulatory role and also claims planning
by a few champions who, with time and the functions). The river basin scale is crucial for
sustained influence of donors, will work to achieve defining legitimacy and roles but is also a level at
increased consistency. The Law on Water which power over financial resources and political
Resources may be rewritten to enshrine a new power could be defined. In a context where state
division of roles between MARD and MoNRE. enterprises are moved out of ministries and where
Of course, there is no assurance that this will most consultancy work is being outsourced,
happen. Policy reforms may abort, be power will reside in planning and in the decision-
discontinued, or simply be rejected (as it happened making on what shall receive priority, where and
in many countries like Pakistan, Thailand or Sri when, and who shall do the job. It is too early to
Lanka, to take Asian examples; Bandaragoda assess if, and how, MoNRE and RBOs will,
2006). Processes can revert themselves, especially eventually, substantially reshape the institutional
when they have gone too far in too little time: landscape, but such evolutions can only be slow.
MoNRE could be swallowed by MARD that would The question as to what the best way forward
reincarnate into an all-powerful water ministry (as is for external partners – somewhere between
floated by officials in 2006; see Olszak 2006). But mechanical interventionism and a wait-and-see
the alternative is to dismiss possible external attitude – is likely to remain. In practice,
influence and wait for things to sort themselves out; institutional change is linked to political evolution,
with equal uncertainty about whether something is to the ever-changing power configuration of
going to happen at all. individuals and groups within the state and the
With hindsight, it seems that the policy administration who carry out varied projects,
reforms on RBOs promoted by donors and sometimes enlightened sometimes not, and
development banks have tr iggered some subject to an uncertain mix of endogenous and
changes. Surprisingly, these changes may have exogenous influences. It may be always possible,
come as a result of the institutional confusion with hindsight, to opt for one or another path.
they have created when confronted with the Whether the rather indiscriminate grafting of the
emergence of the MoNRE, rather than being due formal attributes of IWRM will bear fruits may
to the reforms themselves. MoNRE was itself eventually depend on internal processes whereby
largely destined, at first, to help solve land and different individuals and groups will use the space
environmental issues rather than water issues, created to push for their agendas.
22
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IWMI Research Reports
131. Implementing Integrated River Basin Management: Lessons from the Red River
Basin, Vietnam. François Molle and Chu Thai Hoanh. 2009.
130. Economic Gains of Improving Soil Fertility and Water Holding Capacity with
Clay Application: The Impact of Soil Remediation Research in Northeast Thailand.
Rathinasamy Maria Saleth, Arlene Inocencio, Andrew Noble and Sawaeng
Ruaysoongnern. 2009.
129. Adaptive Water Resource Management in the South Indian Lower Bhavani Project
Command Area. Mats Lannerstad and David Molden. 2009.
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Net Benefits of Irrigation. Fitsum Hagos, Godswill Makombe, Regassa E. Namara
and Seleshi Bekele Awulachew. 2009.
127. Drivers and Characteristics of Wastewater Agriculture in Developing Countries:
Results from a Global Assessment. Liqa Raschid-Sally and Priyantha Jayakody.
2008.
126. Climate Change Impacts on Hydrology and Water Resources of the Upper Blue
River Basin, Ethiopia. Ungtae Kim, Jagath J. Kaluarachchi and Vladimir U.
Smakhtin. 2008.
125. The Lower Krishna Basin Trajectory: Relationships between Basin Development
and Downstream Environmental Degradation. Jean-Philippe Venot, Bharat R.
Sharma and Kamineni V. G. K. Rao. 2008.
124. Institutions, Impact Synergies and Food Security: A Methodology with Results
from the Kala Oya Basin, Sri Lanka. Rathinasamy Maria Saleth, Ariel Dinar,
Susanne Neubert, Bandi Kamaiah, Seenithamby Manoharan, Sarath
Abayawardana, Ranjith Ariyaratne and Shyamalie de Silva. 2007.
123. India’s Water Future to 2025–2050: Business-as-Usual Scenario and Deviations.
Upali A. Amarasinghe, Tushaar Shah, Hugh Turral and B. K. Anand. 2007.
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Robert J. Zomer, Deborah A. Bossio, Antonio Trabucco, Li Yuanjie, D. C. Gupta
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121. Shifting Waterscapes: Explaining Basin Closure in the Lower Krishna Basin, South
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Related Publications
Bandaragoda, J. 2006. Institutional adaptation for integrated water resources management: 
An effective strategy for managing Asian River Basins. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water 
Management Institute. 27p. (IWMI Working Paper 107)
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International Water Management Institute, IWMI-TATA Water Policy Program. 2002. The 
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I n t e r n a t i o n a l
Water Management ISSN: 1026-0862
I n s t i t u t e ISBN: 978-92-9090-708-4