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Monitoring Individual Migration in Myanmar

December 2021 – June 2024

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ABSTRACT

Drawing on data from seven rounds of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), conducted between December 2021 and June 2024 with over 12,000 respondents per round, this report examines individual migration, migration in which one or a few household members leave the household. Over the two-and-a-half-year period from December 2021 to June 2024, an estimated 9 million household members aged 15 and older—17 percent of the total population and 28 percent of the adult population—migrated from their households. During this time, the states of Kachin, Kayin, and Mon reported the highest migration rates, with over 35 percent of the adult population migrating.

In January through June 2024, nearly nine percent of households reported sending migrants. However, the proportion of individuals migrating within Myanmar for work declined, while more individuals migrated for reasons such as marriage, education, or safety. Additionally, it is estimated that six percent of households had members migrate abroad to evade conscription laws. Urban households and those in Yangon were particularly likely to send members abroad to avoid conscription.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the face of escalating conflict, economic collapse, and the introduction of compulsory military conscription, migration has become an increasingly critical coping strategy for households across Myanmar. In February 2021, Myanmar experienced a military coup that plunged the country into a severe political crisis. In the aftermath, security conditions deteriorated rapidly, and the economy weakened significantly. By November 30, 2024, the UNHCR (2024) estimated that Myanmar had 1.18 million refugees and asylum-seekers abroad, and a total of 3.48 million internally displaced people.

Since 2022, clashes have intensified between the Tatmadaw, the People's Defense Force (PDF), and various ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), inflicting significant losses on the military junta. By late 2023, the Myanmar military's forces had dwindled to fewer than 100,000 soldiers, down from over 200,000 prior to the coup (ISP Myanmar, 2024). In response, the State Administration Council (SAC) announced plans for mandatory conscription in early 2024, aiming to recruit 60,000 soldiers annually, beginning with 5,000 recruits per month starting in April 2024 (The Irrawaddy, 2024).

The conscription law was officially enacted on February 10, 2024, targeting men aged 18–35. The first training cohort was scheduled for mid-2024, although preparations were still underway at the time of the announcement (The Irrawaddy, 2024). The law sparked widespread opposition, particularly among younger individuals who voiced their resistance on social media. Many expressed plans to avoid conscription by marrying or joining a religious order, while others signaled intentions to join armed resistance groups or flee the country altogether (The Irrawaddy, 2024). The first batch of conscripts was expected to begin training between June and August 2024, with completion anticipated between November 2024 and January 2025 (ISP Myanmar, 2024; The Irrawaddy, 2024).

Households in Myanmar are not only being displaced by conflict but are also grappling with the impacts of a crumbling economy. The global crisis—largely driven by the war in Ukraine starting in February 2022—combined with financial mismanagement by Myanmar's military government, has led to skyrocketing prices for food, fuel, and fertilizers. Consequently, the welfare of the majority of Myanmar's population has deteriorated even further.

Different segments of Myanmar's population migrate. Some families send members abroad in search of work, while others move internally, seeking safety or better livelihoods. Youth are increasingly at the forefront of these movements, particularly as they attempt to avoid conscription or contribute to household income amid economic hardship.

In this working paper, we analyze the characteristics and the drivers of individual migration in Myanmar, or migration in which one or a few household members leaves the household. To do this we rely on data from the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS). We consider anyone who left their household to be a migrant, except for those individuals who left for vacation, health reasons, or who were away only temporarily.

2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

This analysis employs rounds 2 through 7 of the nationally representative MHWS to update the migration trends in Myanmar. The MHWS rounds cover a recall period from December 2021 to June 2024. The sampling strategy and household and population weights provide estimates that are nationally, regionally, and urban/rural representative (Lambrecht et al., 2023). In each of these rounds, respondents were asked whether household members aged 15 years or older had migrated from the household since the previous round's interview date. This binary migration outcome is used as the key variable of interest throughout the analysis.

A roster was used to capture who left the household in each MHWS round. However, the way it was administered and to whom it was administered differed across rounds. In rounds 2 and 3, only households who had been surveyed in previous rounds were asked if household members migrated. Therefore, the households added to the sample in rounds 2 and 3 have been excluded from this analysis. This includes 4,356 households in round 2 and 2,498 households in round 3. We re-weighted the remaining respondents in round 2 and round 3, so that the estimates would come closer to being nationally representative. Additionally, in round 2, the migration questions were only asked to households that had a change in the number of members within each demographic and age group, therefore migration in this round is likely underestimated.

In round 4, households added to the sample were asked if anyone left the household in the three months prior to the interview. Therefore, all migrants are included in the general round 4 analysis. However, new respondents were only asked if a member had recently migrated for work, not for other reasons. Further, the round 4 questionnaire only allowed for a maximum of two migrants per new household, one internal and one international migrant. This presumably leads to an underestimation of migration among households added to the sample. Rounds 5, 6, and 7 contain a detailed roster for both households added to the sample and re-surveyed households.


The final pooled sample includes 65,616 households across the six rounds. We also conduct an analysis using three panel samples, or households that were surveyed in multiple MHWS rounds. The year panel from December 2021 to December 2022 consists of households interviewed in rounds 1 through 4. The year panel from April 2022 to June 2023 is all households in round 3 through round 5. The year panel from March 2023 to June 2024 is all households in round 6 through round 7. For this analysis we examine if the household had at least one migrant over the year period, instead of in a three-month period.

3. COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS OF MIGRATION LEVELS

The movement of households and individuals has increased in Myanmar since the coup. One indicator of this movement is the large number of households reporting a departure or influx of residents. In our survey, households were asked if in the last three months they witnessed a large departure of residents and/or a large influx of migrants in their communities. Between January 2022 and June 2022, seven percent of households reported a large departure of residents in their communities and eight percent reported a large influx of migrants in their communities (Figure 1). This jumped to 16 percent a year later. Two years later, in January through June 2024, 21 and 22 percent of respondents reported a large departure of residents and a large influx of migrants, respectively. Across all the periods, movement has been consistently higher in urban areas.


There was enormous heterogeneity in the movement of households within states/regions. In Kayah 51 percent of households reported a large departure of residents, followed by 43 percent in Chin and 36 percent in Rakhine and Tanintharyi (Figure 2). In Kayah, 61 percent of households reported a large influx of migrants, followed by 36 percent in Rakhine, and 35 percent in Kayin (Figure 2). Differences in the reported influxes and departures suggest that Chin and Ayeyarwady are losing population.

Figure 1. Perceptions of the level of migration within the community




Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Figure 2. Large influx and departure of migrants within the community, respondent perceptions



We asked households to assess the level of conscription risk in their community, specifically whether they perceived that some or many young people were being recruited or forced into an army due to conscription laws. A map of perceived conscription is reported at the township level in Figure 3. Sixty-one percent of households in Ayeyarwady reported a risk of conscription, followed by 45 percent in Bago and Yangon, and 42 percent in Shan. In every state/region, 15 percent of households identified conscription as a serious risk.

Figure 3. Respondents' perceptions of conscription within the community



4. ESTIMATES OF INDIVIDUAL MIGRATION

Over the two and a half years, from December 2021 to June 2024 an estimated 9,108,058 household members 15 and older, 17 percent of the population and 28 percent of the adult population, left their households (Table 1). Table 1 provides estimates of total and average monthly migration as well as the average and maximum months between surveys, as migration is measured from one survey round to the next. The length between Round 6 and Round 7 was the longest (an average of 7 months), and migration was 1.3 million, lower than the previous round, but higher than the migration estimates in roughly the same period last year.

Table 1. Estimated number of individuals 15 and older that have migrated between Dec 2021 – Jun 2024


Dates	Maximum months between surveys	Average months between surveys	Number of migrants	Number of migrants divided by average months
R1 Dec 2021–R2 Jun 2022	7	4	2,022,838	535,035
R2 Apr 2022–R3 Aug 2022	5	2	1,438,247	669,531
R3 Jul 2022–R4 Dec 2022	6	4	1,866,653	508,522
R4 Oct 2022–R5 Jun 2023	8	5	1,123,657	210,304
R5 Mar 2023–R6 Nov 2023	9	5	1,393,326	278,665
R6 Aug 2023–R7 Jun 2024	10	6	1,263,337	210,556
Total			9,108,058	

Note: Maximum months between surveys is the maximum number of months between when a household was interviewed in the current and preceding round of MHWS. The average months between the surveys is the average time between the current and preceding round interviews. For R1 Dec 2021–R2 Jun 2022, this means that one household was interviewed seven months apart, but most households were interviewed four months apart.

Source: Author’s calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Figure 4 presents the number of migrants older than 15 who left their households between December 2021 and June 2024 by state/region of departure. The largest number of migrants were from the most populous state Yangon, where over 1.19 thousand adult household members left their homes (Figure 4). Following this trend, Ayeyarwady and Mandalay, the states with the next largest populations, had the next highest number of migrants during the two-and-a-half-year period. However, when considering the population of each state/region, Kachin had the highest percentage of migrants with nearly 40 percent of the adult population leaving their households over the period. Kayin, Mon, Tanintharyi, Kayah, and Rakhine also had migration rates over 30 percent of the adult population. This metric does not account for whole household migration, which is prevalent in heavy conflict locations, nor does it account for migrants who may have returned.

Figure 4. Number and percentages of individual migrants older than 15 who migrated between Dec 2021 – Jun 2024, by state/region of departure



Source: Author’s calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Using the pooled data from the seven rounds of MHWS collected between December 2021 and June 2024, an average of 11 percent of households over the period had a member leave since the previous round (Table 2). The number of households with a migrant was 9 percent in the most recent

period, slightly lower than the end of 2023, but higher than the number in the same periods in 2023 and 2022. Individual migration from rural areas was significantly greater than urban migration in the pooled sample, but this was not the case in the most recent period of August 2023 through June 2024. Table A. 1 shows the percentage of MHWS households with a migrant by state/region.

Table 2. Percentage of households with at least one migrant across MHWS rounds

	Dec 2021– Jun 2022	Apr 2022– Aug 2022	Jul 2022– Dec 2022	Oct 2022– June 2023	Mar 2023– Nov 2023	Aug 2023– Jun 2024	Pooled
National	13.5	9.9	13.5	8.3	9.3	8.6	10.5
Urban	13.9	9.7	13.3	6.9	8.3	8.0	10.0
Rural	13.4	10.0	13.6	8.8 ***	9.7 **	8.8	10.7 ***
Obs.	7,786	9,630	9,186	12,953	12,898	13,163	65,616

Note: Asterisks on rural show significant differences between rural and urban at p-values * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Author’s calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

When we consider the one-year panel (the households that remained in the sample across two rounds) between December 2021 and December 2022, 25 percent of households had at least one migrant over the year. When we consider the one-year panel between July 2022 and June 2023, 26 percent of households had at least one migrant over the year. Rural migration was significantly greater than urban migration in 2022 and 2023. Spanning the year between March 2023 and June 2024 (Table 3), 17 percent of households had a migrant, much lower than in the two previous periods. Further, urban and rural migration were nearly the same. In the full panel, December 2021 to June 2024, 25 percent of households had a migrant in only one round whereas 15 percent of households had migrants in more than one round (Table A. 2). Over the same period, 15 percent of households had more than one migrant (Table A. 3).


Table 3. Percentage of panel households with at least one migrant

	Panel Dec 2021– Dec 2022	Panel Apr 2022– June 2023	Panel Mar 2023– June 2024
National	25.4	27.4	17.2
Urban	25.2	27.4	16.7
Rural	26.1 *	28.7 ***	17.5
Obs.	4,831	6,822	8,022

Note: Asterisks on rural show significant differences between rural and urban at p-values * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Author’s calculations based on MHWS panel data.

Between August 2023 and June 2024, Tanintharyi had the highest percentage of households with a migrant (Figure 5). This is followed by Kachin and Kayin with 13 percent of households reporting migration during the period. Individual migration was the lowest in Kayah and Rakhine, the two most conflict-affected states during this period. Rural migration was higher than urban migration in all states/regions but Rakhine, Kayah, Ayeyarwady, and Tanintharyi.

Figure 5. Percentage of MHWS households with a migrant in the pooled sample by state/region, Aug 2023 – Jun 2024



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Table 4 shows a comparison of the main migration drivers for the individual migrants from October 2022 to June 2023 and from August 2023 to June 2024 by location. Nationally, migrants in both periods were most likely to have left for work within Myanmar (35 percent of migrants from August 2023 to June 2024). In the most recent period, more urban migrants (36 percent) left for this reason compared with rural migrants (32 percent). At the national level, the second largest reason for leaving was marriage or divorce. This was equally prevalent among urban migrants and rural migrants. The third largest driver was leaving to work abroad at 15 percent. Table A. 4 – Table A. 9 further break down migration reasons and characteristics by round, state/region, gender, and relation to head.

Table 4. Main purpose for migration, Aug 2023 – Jun 2024

	National		Rural		Urban	
	Oct 22– Jun 23	Aug 23– Jun 24	Oct 22– Jun 23	Aug 23– Jun 24	Oct 22– Jun 23	Aug 23– Jun 24
Lives elsewhere in Myanmar for work	37.7	35.2 *	26.5	31.8 **	41.6	36.4 ***
Lives abroad for work	13.2	14.6	8.1	11.6 **	14.9	15.7
Lives elsewhere after marriage/divorce	15.2	24.1 ***	17.5	23.2 ***	14.4	24.4 ***
Lives elsewhere for school	7.6	10.1 ***	4.7	8.6 ***	8.6	10.7 **
Lives elsewhere for safety	0.8	4.5 ***	0.6	6.5 ***	0.9	3.8 ***
Lives elsewhere for other reasons	25.6	11.6 ***	42.6	18.3 ***	19.6	9.1 ***

Note: Asterisks on Aug-Jun show significant differences between Aug 23–Jun 24 and Oct 22–Jun 23 at p-values * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

At the same time, there were large shifts in drivers between the two periods. The percent of migrants who left rural areas to work elsewhere in Myanmar declined considerably from 46 percent of migrants in October 2022 to June 2023 to 32 percent of migrants in August 2023 to June 2024. Further, the percentage of rural migrants who left to work abroad also declined, from 18 percent in October 2022 -June 2023 to 12 percent in August 2023 to June 2024. Instead, rural migrants moved for marriage or for their own safety. This is the first period in which a considerable number of individual migrants cited moving elsewhere due to safety concerns. It is likely that this difference is

a result of conscription. In urban areas, there was also an increase in the number of individual migrants moving for safety as well as school. Table A. 10 and Table A. 11 show a deeper look into households with a migrant who left for safety reasons across the survey rounds.

Table 5 shows the migrant characteristics for the period between August 2023 and June 2024. On average, migrants were 29 years old. In this period, rural migrants were older than their urban counterparts, which was the opposite in the previous period, urban migrants were previously older than rural migrants. Unsurprisingly, migrants who left for school were the youngest with an average age of 19. Migrant household members were usually sons or daughters of the household head (59 percent). In this period, a considerably larger proportion of urban migrants were sons/daughters of the head, 63 percent, compared to 51 percent in rural areas. This again contrasts with the previous period, during which a higher proportion of rural migrants were sons or daughters of the household head. Nearly 75 percent of urban migration was a son/daughter of the head or a son/daughter-in-law or grandchild. This change in the demographics of migration — younger and son/daughter — in urban areas is likely a result of conscription. Interestingly, in rural areas there was a large increase in heads migrating to 11 percent. Table A. 12 shows a regression output for the drivers of households sending individual migrants. Battles, coping mechanisms, number of migrants per capita, high food prices, recent household moves, distance to city, and income type all have significant relationships with sending migrants.

Table 5. Characteristics of migrants, Aug 2023 – Jun 2024

	National	Rural	Urban
Average Age			
Lives elsewhere in Myanmar for work	27.1	29.1 ***	26.4
Lives abroad for work	26.0	26.7	25.9
Lives elsewhere after marriage/divorce	29.2	30.5 *	28.7
Lives elsewhere for school	19.2	19.0	19.3
Lives elsewhere for safety	36.8	39.6	35.3
Lives elsewhere for other reasons	41.7	42.1	41.4
All migrants	28.9	31.5 ***	27.9
Percentage by relation to head			
Head	8.6	11.2 ***	7.6
Spouse of head	3.3	3.7	3.1
Son/daughter	59.4	50.6 ***	62.7
Son-in-law/daughter-in-law	8.6	8.1	8.8
Grandchild/great grand child	3.5	3.6	3.5
Parent/parent-in-law	3.1	4.0	2.8
Brother or sister	5.3	6.1	5.1
Other relative	6.9	10.5 ***	5.6
Observations	3,425	1,068	2,357

Note: This is the pooled sample from round 6 and round 7 of MHWS. Asterisks on rural show significant differences between rural and urban areas at p-values * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

5. MIGRATION FROM CONSCRIPTION

In the following section, we specifically explore the impact of conscription on migration. Between April 2022 and June 2024, there was a consistent number of households with at least one male and/or female child, as well as a consistent number of households with at least one male and/or female adult (36–65) and senior (66+) (Table 6). However, when we look at female and males between 17 and 35 (those eligible for conscription) we see a statistically significant drop in the

number of households with members in this age group. Between September and November 2023, 56 percent of households had a female aged 17 to 35 living in the household. By April through June 2024, this figure declined by 6 percentage points to 50 percent. Similarly, 48 percent of households had a male aged 17 to 35 living in the household during the same earlier period. However, this proportion declined by 7 percentage points in April–June 2024, reaching 41 percent.


Table 6. Percentage of households with male and female members, by age and survey round

	Apr - Jun 22	Jun-Aug 22	Oct-Nov 22	Apr-Jun 23	Sep -Nov 23	Apr- Jun 24
HH has at least one female child (0–4)	12.1	11.9	13.0	11.9	12.5	13.1
HH has at least one male child (0–4)	12.8	12.4	13.1	11.8	12.3	13.5
HH has at least one female child (5–16)	34.4	33.2	32.8	31.3	32.0	31.8
HH has at least one male child (5–16)	33.4	32.0	32.2	31.5	31.1	31.2
HH has at least one female (17–35)	59.9	59.3	56.5	56.0	55.8	50.0
HH has at least one male (17–35)	50.3	50.7	48.8	48.4	48.4	41.2
HH has at least one female (36–65)	74.8	73.5	73.6	73.7	72.4	74.0
HH has at least one male (36–65)	65.7	64.2	64.2	64.2	63.4	63.4
HH has at least one female (66+)	16.9	13.7	13.3	12.3	11.9	12.9
HH has at least one male (66+)	11.4	9.5	9.8	9.4	9.7	10.2

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Using a list experiment, we estimate the percentage of households that had a member migrate abroad because of conscription (Figure 6). Nationally, six percent of households had a member move abroad because of conscription. If these estimates are accurate, individual migration flows from conscription made up most of the migration flows in April 2024–June 2024. Using the household roster, we estimate that 9 percent of households had an individual migrant. Of those, 35 percent—or approximately 3 percent of all households—were economic domestic migrants, suggesting that the remaining 6 percent may have left due to conscription (Table A. 13). A higher percentage of households had a member leave due to conscription in urban areas than in rural areas. Further, 16 percent of households in Yangon had a member move abroad due to conscription. Finally, both households in severely conflict affected areas and in military control areas sent members abroad to avoid conscription.

Figure 6. Estimates of migration abroad due to conscription, Apr – Jun 2024



Source: Author’s calculations based on MHWS data.

6. CONCLUSION

The findings from the MHWS underscore how migration has evolved as a critical coping strategy in response to escalating conflict, economic instability, and the introduction of compulsory conscription. Between December 2021 and June 2024, more than 9 million household members—17 percent of the population and 28 percent of the adult population—left their homes. While migration for employment opportunities within Myanmar remains a key driver, an increasing number of individuals are migrating for other reasons, including marriage, education, safety, and to work abroad. The introduction of mandatory conscription in early 2024 has further reshaped migration dynamics, as many young men and women have sought to evade military service by leaving their households, with an estimated 6 percent of households sending migrants abroad for this reason during April–June 2024.

These shifts highlight the growing complexity of migration in Myanmar. While conflict and economic hardship have historically driven internal displacement and migration, the fear of conscription has introduced new pressures, particularly among youth and households in urban areas such as Yangon. Regions like Bago, Tanintharyi, and Yangon have seen notable increases in migration rates, reflecting the interplay between conscription, regional conflict dynamics, and household survival strategies.

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APPENDIX

Table A. 1. Percent of MHWS households with a migrant by state/region

State/Region (%)	Round 2	Round 3	Round 4	Round 5	Round 6	Round 7	Pooled
Myanmar	13.5	9.9	13.5	8.3	9.3	8.6	10.5
Ayeyarwady	12.5	8.0	15.8	7.0	10.2	7.9	10.2
Bago	10.3	8.0	11.7	9.6	6.8	10.4	9.5
Chin	25.6	11.0	18.4	11.7	7.1	6.1	13.3
Kachin	18.3	12.0	20.7	12.7	17.8	11.5	15.5
Kayah	26.7	11.9	10.2	7.3	13.5	6.8	12.7
Kayin	15.3	12.9	15.7	11.7	9.5	9.6	12.4
Magway	10.2	11.5	13.3	10.6	8.5	8.1	10.4
Mandalay	12.2	9.0	12.7	7.8	9.0	8.5	9.9
Mon	15.6	11.2	14.0	9.8	13.4	10.0	12.3
Nay Pyi Taw	16.1	7.4	15.4	7.7	9.6	8.5	10.8
Rakhine	16.4	15.3	14.5	9.5	13.6	5.0	12.4
Sagaing	12.5	8.4	10.9	9.1	10.0	8.1	9.8
Shan	15.0	10.8	15.0	6.5	8.5	7.9	10.6
Tanintharyi	16.8	12.9	21.1	4.2	10.6	13.5	13.2
Yangon	14.3	9.9	10.6	6.7	6.4	8.9	9.5

Note: Asterisks show significance at p-values * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Asterisks for each round denote significant differences compared to the same group in the prior round.

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Table A. 2. Number of rounds that households had a migrant, percentage of sample

Number of rounds	R1–R4	R2–R5	R6–R7	R1–R7
0	72.6	71.6	82.0	60.0
1	20.0	19.3	16.9	25.3
2	6.5	7.5	1.1	10.6
3	0.9	1.4	0.0	3.6
4	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.4
5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Table A. 3. Number of total migrants across rounds, percentage of sample

Number of migrants	R1–R4	R2–R5	R6–R7	R1–R7
0	72.6	71.6	82.0	60.0
1	13.5	14.1	12.6	19.4
2	9.0	8.4	3.9	10.9
3	2.8	3.2	1.0	5.2
4	1.3	1.5	0.3	1.9
5	0.8	1.2	0.1	2.6

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Table A. 4. Characteristics of migrants, Mar 2023 – Jun 2024 MHWS, by round

	National	Round 6	Round 7
Percentage of Migrants			
Lives elsewhere in Myanmar for work (%)	35.2	38.2 ***	32.1
Lives abroad for work (%)	14.6	11.6 ***	17.6
Lives elsewhere after marriage/divorce (%)	24.1	22.4 *	25.7
Lives elsewhere for school (%)	10.1	13.2 ***	6.9
Lives elsewhere for other reasons, including safety (%)	4.5	0.6 ***	8.5
Lives elsewhere for other reasons (%)	11.6	14.0 ***	9.1
Percentage of Female			
Lives elsewhere in Myanmar for work (%)	41.2	41.6	40.7
Lives abroad for work (%)	36.5	34.7	37.7
Lives elsewhere after marriage/divorce (%)	51.3	50.8	51.7
Lives elsewhere for school (%)	51.5	49.3	56.0
Lives elsewhere for other reasons, including safety (%)	51.6	77.6 **	49.8
Lives elsewhere for other reasons (%)	55.1	56.8	52.5
All migrants (%)	46.1	46.2	45.9
Average Age			
Lives elsewhere in Myanmar for work	27.1	26.6	27.8
Lives abroad for work	26.0	27.2 ***	25.0
Lives elsewhere after marriage/divorce	29.2	28.4 *	30.0
Lives elsewhere for school	19.2	18.9	20.1
Lives elsewhere for other reasons, including safety	36.8	40.3	36.5
Lives elsewhere for other reasons	41.7	41.7	41.8
All migrants	28.9	28.2 **	29.7
Percentage by Relation to Head			
Head (%)	8.6	8.4	8.8
Spouse (%)	3.3	1.9 ***	4.6
Son/Daughter (%)	59.4	62.1 **	56.8
Son-In-Law/Daughter-In-Law (%)	8.6	8.2	9.0
Grandchild/Great Grandchild (%)	3.5	3.6	3.4
Parent/ Parent-In-Law (%)	3.1	2.8	3.5
Brother/Sister (%)	5.3	5.2	5.5
Other Relative (%)	6.9	6.8	7.0
Observations	3,425	1,747	1,678

Note: Asterisks show significance at p-values * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Asterisks for each round denote significant differences between round 4 and 5.

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS round data.

Table A. 5. Migration reasons in R7, by state

State/Region	Lives elsewhere in Myanmar for work	Lives abroad for work	Lives elsewhere after marriage/divorce	Lives elsewhere for school	Lives elsewhere for safety	Lives elsewhere for other reasons
Ayeyarwady	46.7	12.5	25.6	11.7	2.9	16.9
Bago	30.8	31.8	26.8	6.0	4.8	12.9
Chin	69.3	21.6	9.4	6.6	1.1	0.0
Kachin	58.4	4.8	11.9	23.0	6.1	20.5
Kayah	27.1	43.9	10.4	26.5	3.4	4.9
Kayin	30.9	44.8	14.9	18.9	2.5	12.3
Magway	32.0	25.4	23.4	11.0	3.7	17.9
Mandalay	42.4	16.5	30.6	14.1	0.9	14.7
Mon	31.7	33.0	20.2	24.2	2.1	22.5
Nay Pyi Taw	36.7	36.0	23.8	2.3	5.3	6.7
Rakhine	26.5	7.4	20.0	29.5	0.0	22.5
Sagaing	45.8	14.1	30.7	7.9	1.1	16.7
Shan	35.4	17.4	34.1	15.8	3.6	15.5
Tanintharyi	27.6	45.6	32.3	1.6	0.0	11.0
Yangon	36.9	20.4	33.2	9.6	1.9	19.8

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Table A. 6. Percentage of migrants that are female in R7, by state

State/Region	Lives elsewhere in Myanmar for work	Lives abroad for work	Lives elsewhere after marriage/divorce	Lives elsewhere for school	Lives elsewhere for safety	Lives elsewhere for other reasons
Ayeyarwady	49.0	28.3	46.2	77.3	72.2	62.5
Bago	55.7	34.4	48.7	22.8	42.7	67.0
Chin	11.3	42.5	84.9	73.7	36.3	50.0
Kachin	43.9	58.5	78.5	58.0	19.3	49.7
Kayah	33.7	50.5	100.0	83.3	58.0	0.0
Kayin	26.7	55.6	9.9	47.1	30.1	38.2
Magway	36.5	24.0	43.8	39.1	39.2	66.1
Mandalay	31.1	36.2	43.0	72.3	29.9	44.6
Mon	53.0	34.1	49.6	57.4	65.2	44.2
Nay Pyi Taw	38.5	43.7	50.0	0.0	23.8	100.0
Rakhine	53.6	27.4	46.6	55.8	73.3	81.4
Sagaing	36.0	60.8	53.6	68.1	82.1	63.8
Shan	41.5	41.9	67.2	56.3	49.5	34.1
Tanintharyi	42.9	53.1	59.4	0.0	78.2	30.1
Yangon	31.5	26.3	58.1	56.0	45.2	38.1
National	40.7	37.7	51.7	56.0	49.8	52.5

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Table A. 7. Average age of migrants in R7, by state

State/Region	Lives elsewhere in Myanmar for work	Lives abroad for work	Lives elsewhere after marriage/divorce	Lives elsewhere for school	Lives elsewhere for safety	Lives elsewhere for other reasons
Ayeyarwady	27.0	24.2	30.2	21.1	45.7	51.5
Bago	27.3	24.4	28.7	24.1	43.1	30.5
Chin	21.6	19.6	64.9	34.0	35.9	16.0
Kachin	29.5	23.0	34.0	19.4	43.6	33.0
Kayah	38.7	22.3	00.0	17.2	34.2	23.0
Kayin	35.7	22.9	34.9	00.0	18.1	35.4
Magway	27.1	24.6	39.0	20.8	33.7	46.0
Mandalay	26.8	26.4	29.2	20.1	36.2	39.3
Mon	34.6	25.5	32.0	23.9	39.9	38.6
Nay Pyi Taw	24.2	20.1	29.1	16.2	20.7	66.0
Rakhine	20.5	33.6	31.0	16.9	42.0	63.9
Sagaing	26.2	25.9	25.6	21.0	32.7	42.6
Shan	27.9	25.2	28.2	19.6	32.4	29.8
Tanintharyi	28.3	28.6	28.0	18.0	15.9	31.5
Yangon	30.9	25.0	29.7	17.9	40.6	45.5
National	27.8	25.0	30.0	20.1	36.5	41.8

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Table A. 8. Percentage of migrants by relation to head R7, by state

State/Region	Head (%)	Spouse (%)	Son/Daughter (%)	Son-In-Law/Daughter-In-Law (%)	Grandchild /Great Grandchild (%)	Parent/Parent-In-Law (%)	Brother/Sister (%)	Other Relative (%)
Ayeyarwady	6.5	2.6	55.9	7.5	2.9	6.7	8.2	8.7
Bago	7.0	6.0	65.3	8.1	5.5	1.7	2.8	3.5
Chin	3.3	3.3	66.2	3.8	3.7	8.4	0.4	11.0
Kachin	14.3	8.9	47.1	2.3	3.8	4.3	2.4	11.8
Kayah	9.8	7.7	66.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	13.5	0.0
Kayin	18.7	2.2	45.0	11.9	6.0	1.9	0.0	7.9
Magway	12.7	5.2	57.5	3.2	0.5	4.3	5.0	11.8
Mandalay	5.6	3.4	58.8	12.7	3.5	2.9	5.3	6.0
Mon	9.7	11.0	60.8	3.5	4.0	0.0	8.3	2.8
Nay Pyi Taw	6.2	0.7	65.7	12.8	0.9	2.1	6.9	0.0
Rakhine	1.9	5.5	69.1	3.4	1.1	11.9	1.0	6.1
Sagaing	9.3	4.6	59.7	12.6	3.6	0.9	3.1	6.0
Shan	8.1	4.5	58.4	9.1	3.3	1.4	4.8	7.7
Tanintharyi	5.6	4.3	53.3	12.7	3.4	0.0	13.0	7.2
Yangon	11.9	4.0	45.4	11.4	3.6	5.8	7.5	8.6
National	8.8	4.6	56.8	9.0	3.4	3.5	5.5	7.0

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Table A. 9. Percentage of migrants by relation to head

	Round 3	Round 4	Round 5	Round 6	Round 7
Head	18.7	13.7 ***	4.6 ***	8.4 ***	8.8
Spouse of head	6.6	4.7 *	3.4 *	1.9 **	4.6 ***
Son/daughter	51.8	56.8 **	63.9 ***	62.1	56.8 **
Son-in-law/daughter-in-law	5.1	8.2 ***	8.5	8.2	9.0
Grandchild/great grand child	3.9	3.0	3.1	3.6	3.4
Parent/parent-in-law	2.7	3.4	3.4	2.8	3.5
Brother or sister	5.1	4.8	5.5	5.2	5.5
Other relative	5.9	4.9	7.3 **	6.8	7.0

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Table A. 10. Percentage of households with a safety migrant, by round

	Jul 2022– Dec 2022	Oct 2022– June 2023	Mar 2023– Nov 2023	Aug 2023– Jun 2024	Pooled
National (%)	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.0	0.3
Urban (%)	0.0	0.1	0.1	1.3	0.4
Rural (%)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.9 *	0.3
Obs.	9,186	12,953	12,898	13,163	77,716

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Table A. 11. Percentage of migrant households with a migrant leaving due to safety concerns, by round

	Jul 2022– Dec 2022	Oct 2022– June 2023	Mar 2023– Nov 2023	Aug 2023– Jun 2024	Pooled
National (%)	0.4	1.5	0.3	3.7	1.3
Urban (%)	0.3	1.4	0.0	5.5	1.6
Rural (%)	0.5	1.6	0.4	3.0	1.3
Obs.	1,297	1,118	1,398	1,226	7,205

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Table A. 12. Drivers of households sending individual migrants

	Household sends migrants
Number of battles	0.016*** (0.005)
Number of migrants per capita	0.026*** (0.008)
Household uses a coping mechanism	0.014** (0.006)
Negatively affected by high food prices	0.022*** (0.005)
Average farm wage in community	-0.007*** (0.002)
Landless household	-0.021*** (0.006)
Household moved after the coup	0.072*** (0.009)
Travel time to the city	0.039*** (0.014)
More than five family members	-0.021*** (0.007)
Farm income	0.019*** (0.006)
Non-farm business income	0.017*** (0.005)
No income	0.115*** (0.008)
Non-farm wage	0.006 (0.005)
Farm wage	0.002 (0.006)
Rental income	-0.022* (0.013)
Respondent is female	0.004 (0.005)
Respondent has at most primary education	0.002 (0.006)
Number of children	-0.003 (0.003)
Rural	-0.010 (0.007)
Kayah	-0.098*** (0.018)

Kayin	0.013 (0.022)
Chin	-0.046** (0.021)
Sagaing	-0.046*** (0.017)
Tanintharyi	-0.034 (0.021)
Bago	-0.035** (0.018)
Magway	-0.019 (0.018)
Mandalay	-0.032* (0.018)
Mon	-0.010 (0.021)
Rakhine	-0.020 (0.019)
Yangon	-0.044** (0.019)
Shan	-0.037** (0.017)
Ayeyarwady	-0.031* (0.018)
Nay Pyi Taw	0.009 (0.024)
Observations	17,625

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

Table A. 13. Results of list experiment to estimate effect of conscription on migration

	Migration within Myanmar			Migration to abroad			
	Coeffie	SE	P-value	Coeffie (%)	SE	P-value	
National	0.014	0.019	0.461	6	0.019	0.001	***
Rural	0.001	0.022	0.963	6	0.022	0.006	***
Urban	0.105	0.031	0.055	* 10	0.031	0.001	***
Yangon	-0.011	0.089	0.898	16	0.050	0.002	***
Conflict severe	0.023	0.030	0.433	6	0.030	0.032	**
Military control area	0.000	0.029	0.987	7	0.029	0.016	**

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS pooled data.

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