What do we know about THE FUTURE OF FOOD SYSTEMS? What do we know about THE FUTURE OF FOOD SYSTEMS? What do we know about THE FUTURE OF FOOD TRADE? Joseph Glauber (IFPRI) and Sherwin Gabriel (IFPRI) Key messages • Trade in agriculture and food products increased dramatically over the past 20 years, driven by population and income growth that resulted in consumption exceeding production in many coun- tries. Productivity growth grew as well, allowing countries with sur- plus production to meet global import demand. Reforms in the global trading system have reduced import barriers, also encourag- ing trade. • As a result, imports as a percentage of total consumption have increased steadily (particularly in low-income countries) and fore- casts for the near term (next 10 years) as well as longer-term projec- tions (to 2050) suggest that these trends will continue. • Climate change will pose continued challenges as production shifts due to increased temperatures and more variable rainfall. Trade will be necessary to help mitigate the impacts of these changes, so the global trading system must remain open and free of harm- ful distortions. CHAP TER 13 73 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/175019 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/175019 RECENT TRENDS AND CHALLENGES Global trade in food products exceeded a record US$2 trillion in 2022 (WTO 2024). Over the past 20 years, global food trade more than tripled in nominal value and, accounting for inflation, more than doubled in real terms (Figure 1). Developing countries are now playing a far larger role in global trade than they did 25 years ago (Figure 2). In 1995, developing countries accounted for only about 25 percent of global food imports and 30 percent of global food exports; by 2023, developing coun- tries accounted for about 42 percent of global food trade. Productivity gains and technological innova- tions like double cropping in Brazil have helped devel- oping countries increase export shares. Income and population growth have also spurred changes in diets, resulting in increased consumption of meat and dairy and processed food products. For some developing countries (for example, China), this has meant greater dependence on imports for feedstuffs and other agricul- tural products. Another consequence of the growth of production in developing countries and in regions like the Black Sea following the breakup of the former Soviet Union is the growing diversification away from traditional suppliers like the United States, the European Union (EU), Canada, and Australia (Figure 3). Market concentration has declined for most cereals and oilseeds as global export- ers including Brazil (soybeans, maize, animal products), Russia (wheat), Ukraine (wheat, maize, and sunflower oil), and Malaysia and Indonesia (palm oil) have grown in rel- ative importance. With much of that growth occurring in the Southern Hemisphere, global production is more resilient to regional weather shocks. Moreover, diversi- fied production means that producers in one hemisphere can often react within months of a production shortfall in another region, effectively reducing the global cycle to six months. Exceptions exist. Rice exports remain rel- atively concentrated in the exporting countries of South and Southeast Asia. Most palm oil production comes from Indonesia and Malaysia (though this is mitigated by its Figure 1  Value of world food trade, 1980–2022 Source: WTO Stats Portal. Note: Trade value deflated by U.S. Consumer Price Index (1982–1984 = 100). 2.5M Nominal Inflation- adjusted 1980 2020201020001990 0.5M 1.0M 1.5M 2.0M 0 M ill io n U S$ 74 Figure 2  Developing countries’ share of agricultural trade, 1995–2023 Source: UNCTAD Data Hub, https://unctadstat.unctad.org/ Note: All food items (SITC 0 + 1 + 22 +4). Pe rc en t o f g lo b al a g ri cu lt ur al a nd fo o d tr ad e Imports Exports 1995 2015 2020201020052000 50% 30% 40% 20% Figure 3  Concentration of global grain and oilseed exports, 1980/1981–2024/2025 Source: USDA/FAS/PSD Online, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/app/index.html#/app/home Note: HHI = Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index based on export quantities. H H I 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.7 0 1980/1981 1990/1991 2000/2001 2010/2011 2020/2021 Soybeans Corn (maize) Rice Wheat 75 https://unctadstat.unctad.org/ https://apps.fas.usda.gov/psdonline/app/index.html#/app/home relative substitutability with other vegetable oils that are more regionally diversified). On the import side, increased demand means that many countries are increasingly dependent on foreign sup- plies. Import penetration rates at the global level have increased for wheat, rice, feed grains (barley, maize, oats, and sorghum), and vegetable oils (Figure 4). Not all of those imports go toward food consumption. Feed grains are primarily used as animal feed or in industrial uses such as biofuel production (though white maize is primarily consumed as food). Of the cereals, rice remains relatively thinly traded — imports account for only about 10 percent of global consumption. However, for many countries in sub-Saharan Africa such as Senegal or Benin, rice imports play a significant role in overall diets, particularly in urban areas. Regionally, imports are important for much of Central America and non-MERCOSUR countries of South America, sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Southeast Asia (Figure 5). The wheat-consuming countries of North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia are particularly depen- dent on imports, with import dependency rates in excess of 75 percent in countries such as Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. The disruption in wheat trade follow- ing Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 demonstrated how vulnerable importing countries can be when supplies are adversely affected. Fortunately, the global trading system proved resilient, and countries were able to source food supplies (albeit at higher prices). LATEST FORESIGHT RESEARCH Near-term forecasts by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (OECD/ FAO 2024) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA/ ERS 2024) estimate that imports as a share of global con- sumption will continue to grow for most cereals and oil crops over the next 10 years. The forecasts reflect continu- ing production growth in major exporting regions such as South America and the Black Sea region to meet grow- ing demand in net food-importing regions like the Middle East and North Africa, China, and sub-Saharan Africa. Figure 4  Imports as a share of total domestic use, 1960/1961–2024/2025 Source: USDA/FAS PSD database, October 11, 2024. Note: Domestic use includes food, feed, and industrial use. Pe rc en ta g e 50% 30% 40% 0% 10% 20% Vegetable oil (palm, rapeseed, soybean, and sunflower) Wheat Rice Feed grains (barley, maize, oats, and sorghum) 1960/1961 1970/1971 1980/1981 1990/1991 2000/2001 2010/2011 2020/2021 76 In addition, projections from IFPRI’s IMPACT1 model sug- gest that global food trade will continue to expand over the longer term (Cenacchi et al. 2025 [Chapter 36 in this publication]; Robinson et al. 2024). Net exports of rice and wheat are projected to increase by more than 90 percent between 2020 and 2050, as rice production in India grows rapidly and as wheat production in Russia and Ukraine expands. Net exports of maize are projected to rise by 70 percent over the same period, driven by higher pro- duction in Brazil and Ukraine. The United States is the world’s largest net exporter of maize. Projections suggest, however, that growing domestic demand for bioethanol could significantly erode exportable supplies to the global market. This decrease is projected to be more than offset by rising maize exports from Latin America and Eastern Europe. By 2050, almost 90 percent of net maize exports are projected to come from seven countries. 1 International Model for Policy Analysis of Agricultural Commodities and Trade. Over the same period, climate change is expected to weigh on maize yields in several countries in which it is a key staple. For example, in Malawi, where maize accounts for one-half of daily per capita calories, rain- fed yields are projected to be around 15 percent lower in 2050 than 2020. With little change in cultivated area expected, domestic maize production is also expected to fall by 15 percent over the period. This comes alongside an anticipated increase of 17 million in Malawi’s popula- tion. As projected production and food demand for maize move in different directions, the country is likely to require significant imports to cover maize shortfalls. IMPACT pro- jections suggest that net imports of maize could near 80 percent of Malawi’s food demand by 2050, a signifi- cant increase over current levels. With few expected net exporters of maize in the region — South Africa’s capacity to export maize is expected to decline significantly over the projection period — Malawi may be pushed to import from the major exporters noted above. The distance from these markets implies that trade costs will also exert pres- sure on the cost of staple foods. Figure 5  Cereal import dependency Source: FAOSTAT Note: Import dependency less than 0 indicate that the country is a net cereal exporter. Data reflect 3-year average (2020–2022). 0% 10% 25% 75% Percentage 77 Several countries in East and Southern Africa are simi- larly vulnerable to this risk, which can materially affect food security and foreign exchange reserves. Table 1 identifies countries in the region where import depen- dency on maize is expected to rise sharply between 2020 and 2050. This trend is not unique to maize in East and Southern Africa. Rice is an important staple in several countries in Asia, West Africa, and Latin America. Table 2 shows a selection of countries by region where rice import depen- dency is projected to increase significantly between 2020 and 2050. In the West and Central African countries iden- tified, the import share of rice is already high, but these are expected to increase even more. Countries that have been close to self-sufficiency, such as Bangladesh, are expected to import as much as one-quarter of rice food demand by 2050. Rice trade dependency is expected to be significant. Rice net exports are projected to be highly concentrated, with India’s share of global net exports predicted to double to 70 percent between 2020 and 2050. This follows signifi- cant growth in rice production in India, while that of other Table 1  Maize net imports as a share of maize food demand in selected countries in East and Southern Africa Country Maize contribution to average daily calorie availability (2020) Maize net imports as a share of maize food demand 2020 2050 Malawi 50% 2.5% 78.8% Zambia 40% Net exporter 40.7% Kenya 26% 25.9% 57.9% Tanzania 25% Net exporter 63.3% Mozambique 22% 25.8% 80.1% Source: IFPRI, IMPACT projections. Table 2  Rice net imports as a share of rice food demand in selected countries Country Rice contribution to average daily calorie availability (2020) Rice net imports as a share of rice food demand 2020 2050 West and Central Africa Guinea 37% 54% >100% Guinea-Bissau 51% 42% 57% Côte d'Ivoire 24% 66% 84% Sierra Leone 43% 40% 78% Latin America and the Caribbean Costa Rica 15% 63% 78% Ecuador 15% 26% 65% Panama 24% 24% 61% Peru 18% 13% 60% South Asia and Southeast Asia Bangladesh 70% 2% 24% Indonesia 43% Net exporter 12% Source: IFPRI, IMPACT projections. 78 major exporters, such as Thailand and Viet Nam, slows over the projection period. Wheat markets are less concentrated than rice and maize. IMPACT projections suggest that wheat net exports could grow by more than 90 percent between 2020 and 2050, with much of this growth driven by increased production in Russia and Ukraine. Wheat products are an important sta- ple in most countries, and an especially important part of the food culture in Central and West Asia and North Africa. Table 3 shows countries in these regions where wheat import dependency is expected to increase significantly. KEY GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR FORESIGHT RESEARCH Food and agricultural trade grew substantially over the past 25 years, in part because of a more liberal trad- ing regime under the World Trade Organization, but the global trading system faces challenges. Over the past 10 years, multiple trade disruptions occurred, including: conflicts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which threat- ened global cereal and oilseed markets (Glauber and Laborde 2023); trade disputes, such as the recent trade war between the United States and China; export restric- tions such as India’s restrictions on rice exports, affect- ing almost 40 percent of global rice exports (Glauber and Mamun 2024); logistical disruptions affecting key choke- points such as the Red Sea and the Panama Canal; and supply disruptions due to lockdowns and other responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Threats of increased protectionism under the new US administration and elevated trade tensions between China and other trading partners such as Canada and the EU could derail progress at a time when trade is becom- ing increasingly important. Climate change will mean an increasing dependency on trade to meet global food needs. The disruptions to trade flows caused by weather extremes and subsequent recon- struction can undermine global supply chains (Verschuur, Koks, and Hall 2023). Trade barriers and other distortions can thwart the move- ment of food and agricultural products, exacerbating food shortages when production shocks reduce global supplies. It is thus critical that the global trading system continue to facilitate trade by: reducing border mea- sures and other trade-distorting measures; improving foresight and market analysis, such as through the G20 Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), to bet- ter inform policy and investment choices; and promot- ing trade facilitation for lesser developed countries and developing countries highly dependent on imports to meet food needs. Table 3  Wheat net imports as a share of wheat food demand in selected countries in Central Asia, West Asia, and North Africa Country Wheat contribution to average daily calorie availability (2020) Wheat net imports as a share of wheat food demand 2020 2050 Afghanistan 60% 49% 83% Turkmenistan 51% 12% 49% Syria 49% 66% >100% Uzbekistan 42% 44% 85% Pakistan 37% Net exporter 53% Source: IFPRI, IMPACT projections. 79 INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE A world free of hunger and malnutrition IFPRI is a CGIAR Research Center 1201 Eye St, NW, Washington, DC 20005 USA  |  T. +1-202-862-5600  |  F. +1-202-862-5606  |  Email: ifpri@cgiar.org  |  www.ifpri.org  |  www.ifpri.info Handle: https://hdl.handle.net/10568/175019 © 2025 International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). This publication is licensed for use under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY 4.0). This chapter was supported by the CGIAR Research Initiative on Foresight and the CGIAR Science Program on Policy Innovations. We would like to thank all funders who supported this research through their contributions to the CGIAR Trust Fund. The authors of this chapter are Joseph Glauber, a Research Fellow Emeritus at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI); and Sherwin Gabriel, a Scientist in the Foresight and Policy Modeling Unit at IFPRI. Related chapters on the future of food system drivers and impacts, regional and national perspectives, food commodities, and foresight tools are available in our Table of Contents. Citation: Glauber, J., and S. Gabriel. 2025. ”What Do We Know About the Future of Food Trade?” In What Do We Know About the Future of Food Systems?, eds. K. Wiebe and E. Gotor, Chapter 13. Washington, DC: IFPRI. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/175019 Photo credit: Tarcisio Schnaider/Shutterstock References Cenacchi, N., T.B. Sulser, and A. 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