IFPRI Discussion Paper 02178 April 2023 Is Irrigation Fit for Purpose? A Review of the Relationships between Scheme Size and Performance of Irrigation Systems Nancy McCarthy Claudia Ringler Mure Agbonlahor A.B. Pandya Biniam Iyob Nicostrato Perez Natural Resources and Resilience Unit INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), a CGIAR Research Center established in 1975, provides research-based policy solutions to sustainably reduce poverty and end hunger and malnutrition. IFPRI’s strategic research aims to foster a climate-resilient and sustainable food supply; promote healthy diets and nutrition for all; build inclusive and efficient markets, trade systems, and food industries; transform agricultural and rural economies; and strengthen institutions and governance. Gender is integrated in all the Institute’s work. Partnerships, communications, capacity strengthening, and data and knowledge management are essential components to translate IFPRI’s research from action to impact. The Institute’s regional and country programs play a critical role in responding to demand for food policy research and in delivering holistic support for country-led development. IFPRI collaborates with partners around the world. AUTHORS Nancy McCarthy (nmccarthy@leadanalyticsinc.com) is CEO of Lead Analytics. Claudia Ringler (c.ringler@cgiar.org) is Director of the Natural Resources and Resilience Unit of the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington DC. Nicostrato Perez (n.perez@cgiar.org) is a Research Fellow in IFPRI’s Natural Resources and Resilience Unit, Washington DC. Mure Agbonlahor (agbonlahoru@africa-union.org) is Senior Agricultural Production and Marketing Officer at the Africa Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. A.B. Pandya (abpandya@yahoo.co.uk) is Secretary General of the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage (ICID), New Delhi, India. Biniam Iyob (biyob@usaid.gov) is Senior Policy Advisor, Office of Policy, Analysis and Engagement, Bureau for Resilience and Food Security, U.S. Agency for International Development, Washington DC. Notices 1 IFPRI Discussion Papers contain preliminary material and research results and are circulated in order to stimulate discussion and critical comment. They have not been subject to a formal external review via IFPRI’s Publications Review Committee. Any opinions stated herein are those of the author(s) and are not necessarily representative of or endorsed by IFPRI. 2 The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the map(s) herein do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) or its partners and contributors. 3 Copyright remains with the authors. The authors are free to proceed, without further IFPRI permission, to publish this paper, or any revised version of it, in outlets such as journals, books, and other publications. Abstract Irrigation is increasingly being called upon to help stabilize and grow food and water security in the face of multiple crises; these crises include climate change, but also recent global food and energy price crises, including the 2007/08 food and energy price crises, and the more recent crises triggered by the COVID- 19 pandemic and the war on Ukraine. While irrigation development used to focus on public, large-scale, surface- and reservoir-fed systems, over the last several decades, private small-scale investments in groundwater irrigation have grown in importance and are expected to see rapid future growth, particularly in connection with solar-powered pumping systems. But is irrigation ‘fit-for-purpose’ to support population growth, economic development, and multiple food, energy and climate crises? This paper reviews how fit-for-purpose irrigation is with a focus on economies of scale of surface and groundwater systems, and a particular examination of systems in Sub-Saharan Africa where the need for expansion is largest. The review finds challenges for both larger surface and smaller groundwater systems in the face of growing demand for irrigated agriculture and dwindling and less reliable water supplies. To support resilience of the sector, we propose both a holistic design and management improvement agenda for larger surface systems, and a series of suggestions to improve sustainability concerns of groundwater systems. The design of large-scale irrigation systems, and particularly those that are built and managed to support basic food security, needs to include more flexibility for farmers to adjust cropping patterns to today’s more rapidly changing food prices, and agricultural input costs. Large-scale systems that support smaller irrigated areas with more decentralized management have shown most promise, as they combine lower individual design cost per system unit with more flexible irrigation management. In water-scarce systems, the design should include low-cost, precision water application systems to address increased competition for limited water resources, actively support multiple uses of irrigation water (such as livestock watering and domestic uses) and should ensure timely delivery of water supplies. It is unrealistic to expect recovery of irrigation investment costs in systems that limit farmers to growing food security crops. In groundwater systems, land size and growing costs of digging deeper wells, as well as associated higher pumping costs, are key investment considerations that might price smaller farmers out of irrigation development opportunities. For groundwater systems, more research is needed to locate “weather- independent” groundwater resources, that is groundwater sources that are renewable and support an entire production season. Moreover, for groundwater development to flourish the development of regulatory and management frameworks that enable smallholders to benefit from irrigation beyond the near term will be key. Additionally, support to accessing technologies needs to improve; requiring scale economies in equipment and other services. While large-scale systems are often less dependent on area rainfall than smaller systems, providing greater resilience to weather extremes, smaller surface and groundwater systems are often located in closer proximity to input and output markets that increase incentives for farmers to make a profit. There is no doubt that irrigation will need to expand in places where water resources are accessible, food insecurity levels critical and climate extremes render rainfed systems increasingly challenging. Given the growing number of recent crises and the worsening levels of undernutrition over almost a decade, it is essential that the sector’s full potential is developed, while increasing sustainability and reducing environmental externalities. But the future of irrigation cannot repeat the past; systems will need to be developed with greater fit-for- purpose, that is, more flexibility of cropping patterns, with more incentives and agency for farmers, including women farmers, and with more productive water use in mind. Sustainable irrigation contributes greatly to reducing global, national and local food prices and, if intentionally designed and managed, can shield farmers from energy price fluctuations as well thus growing resilience to multiple crises. iii Acknowledgments This paper was made possible through support provided by the Office of Policy, Analysis and Engagement, Bureau for Resilience and Food Security, U.S. Agency for International Development, under the terms of the Strengthen Evidence-based Policy Making in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean (IFPRI/ReSAKSS), Award # AID-BFS-I0-17-00001, and under the umbrella of the NEXUS Gains initiative that works at the critical intersection of food, energy, and water security while preserving the ecosystems underlying food systems in selected transboundary river basins. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the CGIAR or the U.S. Agency for International Development. iv 1. Introduction Irrigation development has been essential for both people and the planet. Irrigation has increased food production, productivity and therefore increased the availability and access to food by lowering prices of key staple crops, particularly rice and wheat. Irrigation has also been essential for the production of other key crops, such as sugarcane, maize, fruits and vegetables and cotton (Ringler and Zhu, 2015, Figure 1). Irrigation has thus been an important contributor to reducing the number of people at risk of hunger. Figure 1 Water consumption of key crops from irrigation and field precipitation, in billion cubic meters, calculated for 2020 Source: Authors based on IFPRI-IMPACT simulations. Through higher yields and through more intense use of existing crop areas, in the form of double- or triple-cropping, irrigation has reduced pressure to expand land areas into fragile tropical forest and savannah systems. Without irrigation, dramatic additional conversion of forest to crop areas would have been required to achieve current food production levels (Evenson and Rosegrant 2003). Our own analysis, developed as part of this paper, finds that if no additional irrigation development takes place during 2010-2050 beyond maintenance of current systems, an additional 32 million hectares (ha) of forest and other lands would need to be converted to crop production, an area similar to the arable area of Ukraine. 1 Asia accounts for about 70% of irrigated area, while the share of area irrigated is lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2). While rainfed agriculture dominates in most countries, food production in some countries, such as Egypt and Pakistan, relies almost entirely on access to irrigation. Figure 2: Distribution of irrigated area across the globe Note: Data from various recent years. Source: Authors based on FAO AQUASTAT data. Irrigation development can, however, not continue as in the past. Population and economic growth have multiplied demands on quasi-static freshwater resources, with growth in the domestic and industrial sectors, as well as for renewable energy production, outpacing growth in the agriculture sector (Rosegrant et al. 2002). There are also increased demands for preserving at least some environmental uses of water to counteract rapid freshwater and other biodiversity loss. Environmental water uses are critical as freshwater-related ecosystems host around one third of all vertebrate species and 10 percent of all species in wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes, all severely threatened by water depletion, pollution and other degradation (Stayer and Dudgeon, 2010). Population and economic growth factors are not only increasing demands for domestic, industrial and environmental uses of water but are also putting pressure on developing additional irrigation to meet increases in food demand. Irrigation is also increasingly called upon to stabilize food production in the face of growing climate variability and climate change. Finally, water and food systems need to jointly adjust to other crises, such as the 2 COVID-19 pandemic, which has interrupted global supply chains, leading to calls for increased local and national food self-sufficiencies supported by irrigation, or the war on Ukraine which has led to energy and food price spikes and the disruption of wheat and vegetable oil markets and further calls for more localized food production, even in countries with limited land and water resources. As an example, to address wheat import shortages as a result of the war on Ukraine, Egypt announced plans to expand irrigated wheat area by 2 million acres (AL Monitor, March 3, 2022). Irrigation is considered a key climate action area, which is reflected in the many nationally determined contributions that propose the expansion of irrigation as an adaptation strategy. As an example, 16 out of 20 Feed-the-Future countries list irrigation as an adaptation and sometimes also as a mitigation strategy (in the latter case, focusing on solar irrigation or the system of rice intensification). At the same time, all of these crises, and particularly climate change, affect the ability of irrigation to support food security and various other water uses. As an example, Biemans et al. (2019) note that in the pre-monsoon season up to 60 percent of irrigation withdrawals in the Indus River Basin depend on snow and glacier melt, accounting for 11 percent of crop production. While dependence on glacier melt is more limited in the Ganges basin, they find that a total of 129 million farmers in both basins depend on meltwater that will eventually dry up with advancing climate change. Other river systems depending on glacier flows from the Himalayan Water Tower include the Yangtze and Brahmaputra (Immerzeel et al. 2010). At the same time, irrigation contributes to, and can even be the origin of local conflicts and some diseases. Examples are local conflicts between pastoralists and irrigators over areas that pastoralists used for grazing in the past but are now being used for dry-season irrigation (for example, Mbonile, 2005). Moreover, in some cases, irrigation water has been a source of water harboring new diseases, such as the West Nile virus or malaria carrying mosquitoes (for example, Mangani et al., 2022). Given these new realities, irrigation development, more than ever before, needs to be “fit-for-purpose.” With food insecurity, water shortages and climate extreme events on the rise, irrigation needs to jointly contribute to food security and nutrition, to income generation and poverty alleviation, and to climate resilience and environmental sustainability by using water more efficiently. The ability of the irrigation development and practice to meet these triple roles will determine how “fit-for-purpose” it is. We know that many previous irrigation investments have not delivered hoped-for benefits, often leading costly failures (Higginbottom et al., 2021; McCarthy & Winters, 2022). Moreover, levels of food insecurity, 3 economic and other crisis and climate extremes also affect policy decisions on investing or not in irrigation as well as on the types and size of irrigation that will be promoted. We posit that irrigation investments that take into account irrigators’ preferences and constraints – are more likely to be sustained. However, oftentimes there is a mismatch between the government and donors’ stated purpose (on which estimated benefits are calculated) and what the irrigators prefer given their constraints. So, assumptions driving irrigation system investments are often not met. A major aspect to consider is the size of the investment, because in many irrigation systems, there are likely to be both economies of scale and scope over certain investment decisions, and diseconomies over others. Different types of irrigation are also likely to be linked to different non-irrigation benefits from irrigation development, such as livestock watering or domestic uses of water. Choices on system size, water delivery technologies, and management structures will affect the extent to which irrigators’ benefit from the system and their incentives to contribute to system performance. There is a gap in empirical evidence on the link between irrigation system size and performance, and the link between performance and the investors’ stated purpose of the system fills a gap in the literature. Here, we attempt to partially fill that gap. Following a review of the evolution of major types of irrigation systems since the 1970s, we discuss evidence on the economies (or diseconomies) of scale and scope in irrigation system investments. This is followed, in turn, by an assessment of the performance of irrigation systems of different sizes and scopes. In the analysis, we consider multiple benefit streams and impacts from irrigation, including for poverty alleviation, environmental sustainability, food security and nutrition. 2. Evolution of types and sizes of irrigation systems We distinguish between two major types of systems: surface and groundwater systems. 2.1 Surface water systems Surface water schemes are generally owned and operated by the government, by irrigator associations, and to a lesser extent, by private businesses. Although there are differences in technologies and institutions for water storage and delivery amongst the different surface water schemes, they are sufficiently similar to consider likely economies of scale in the construction, operation and maintenance of such schemes. 4 Several authors have described the “build-deteriorate-rebuild” cycle that characterize many government and donor-funded surface-water irrigation schemes in both sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Southeast Asia (SEA) during the 1970s and 1980s (Alam, 1991; Higginbottom et al., 2021; Inocencio et al., 2007; Kikuchi et all., 2021; Shah, 2011; Suhardiman & Giordano, 2014). Evidence suggests that this cycle was in part caused by the particularities of large-scale systems, many of which were requested by national governments to grow staple crops with the goal of increasing food security (Darko et al., 2016), rather than for profit maximization. State ownership of irrigation and land resources, and limited control of farmers over cropping schedules and timing and quantity of water access, moreover, limited the incentives of irrigating farmers to improve water productivity (Meinzen-Dick, 2014). The relatively greater ease of multilateral banks of investing in rehabilitating systems over financing new systems as well as the limited generation of irrigation service fees has also contributed to the neglect of maintaining surface systems by national irrigation agencies. Other surface investments failed or deteriorated due to the focus on expensive, complex imported technology that could not readily be maintained or repaired on site (Darko et al., 2016) and possibly because of the capture by outside investors or national elites of irrigated land (Adamczewski et al., 2015). Yet other factors that contributed to the secular decline in publicly funded surface irrigation projects included growing environmental concerns over water depletion and the adverse impacts of large reservoirs associated with large-scale irrigation systems on aquatic ecosystems, such as migrating fish, and downstream water users (Wisser et al., 2013; World Commission on Dams, 2000). Svendsen and Rosegrant (1994) note that during the 1980s external support to large irrigation development in Asia, the region with by far the largest developed area, declined by half compared to levels in the 1970s. Decline in funding, driven by declining food prices and growing investment costs, directly translated into a decline in irrigated area growth from 2.0-2.5 percent per year in the 1970s to less than 0.5 percent per year in the 1980s. This then led to a focus on investments in smaller-scale schemes in the 1990s, in line with lower food prices and a more limited set of areas that could be profitably developed for irrigation. But these too followed a similar cycle and by the turn of the millennium many donors had dramatically reduced investments in surface water schemes (Fanadzo & Ncube; 2018; Inocencio et al., 2007; van Koppen et al., 2017; Venot et al., 2012). Despite these documented difficulties, given the experience of the 2007/2008 food price spikes, continued and growing rates of poverty and food insecurity, and climate change related increases in the 5 frequency and severity of weather events, governments and donors have renewed interest in both small and large irrigation schemes. As an example, the World Bank (2013) has called for a doubling of irrigated area in Africa and the G-8 Statement on Global Food Security1 asked for substantial investment in food production on the continent including through expanding irrigation. 2.2 Groundwater irrigation Groundwater irrigation relies on extracting water from underground, either shallow groundwater or deeper aquifer sources. Individual groundwater irrigation took off with the advent of affordable, individual pump sets and cheaper well drilling technology in the 1970s and 1980s. Groundwater irrigation expanded most rapidly in South Asia as a result of the availability of high water tables due to runoff and seepage and percolation from canal systems; and due to electricity subsidies in several Indian states (Lee et al., 2018; Shah, 2011; Shivakoti et al., 2019; Sikdar, 2019; Mukherji, 2022). Groundwater extraction’s negative environmental impact, such as groundwater mining, that is extraction of groundwater beyond return flows, soon became apparent (Stratton Syre and Taraz, 2019). Groundwater irrigation has also expanded in SSA, although at a slower pace (c.f. Cobbing & Hiller, 2019; Gaye & Tindimugaya, 2019; Laube et al., 2008; Pavelic et al., 2013; Ringler et al., 2020; Shah et al., 2020; Villhoth, 2013). Policies that favored the expansion of groundwater in Asia included reducing or eliminating tariffs on pumping equipment, the subsequent development of domestic production of pumping equipment in some Asian countries, the fact that large-scale surface water schemes were inefficient, and the provision of fuel subsidies or free electricity for pumping (Balasubramanya & Lele, 2021; Shah et al., 2020). Given population densities and the longer history of intensive groundwater irrigation, many countries in SA are concerned with the negative impacts of over-extraction, particularly negative impacts on the environment, land subsidence, and water quality. In SSA, however, with lower population densities, and shorter and slower history of groundwater irrigation, many researchers argue that poverty and food insecurity concerns should shift the overly cautious approach to groundwater irrigation toward the adoption of policies and investments that support a more rapid expansion of groundwater use (Cobbing & Hiller, 2019). Groundwater irrigation generally affords more flexibility for farmers, since they can control the timing of extraction as well as the crops they choose to grow. On the other hand, well drilling and pumping can be highly expensive. While most groundwater development has been smallholder driven, there are still 1 https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/07/20080708-6.htm l 6 significant gaps between relatively richer smallholders who have been able to draw down groundwater sources and smallholders who cannot afford deeper wells. The most recent technological change of solar-driven motor pumps is expected to further accelerate groundwater irrigation, particularly if initial high capital costs can be overcome (Xie et al., 2021). The key challenge with groundwater irrigation is its governance due to the invisibility of the resource, and the large numbers of smallholder farmers that depend on groundwater systems. Progress in groundwater governance is urgently needed to avoid large groundwater table declines in local areas. Economies of scale and scope of groundwater systems are generally different from those applicable to surface water schemes, and relate to size of pumping equipment available to farmers in the market, and to groundwater irrigation-related service provision, where service costs decline as the number of irrigators increase. 3. Economies and Diseconomies of Scales It is useful to consider the conditions under which economies, or diseconomies, of scale and scope arise, and their influence on investment decisions. For surface water schemes, economies of scale may operate at all stages of irrigation development and operations, and to a lesser extent, management. While economies of scale are well-documented in terms of construction, the economies of scale in irrigation scheme design have been less well documented. Inocencio et al. (2007) note that professional human resources are indivisible, scarce resources that drive economies of scale in irrigation schemes. Building on the Inocencio et al. (2007) work, Fujiie (2011) document very large economies of scale in design, noting that in most cases, design expenditures go towards high opportunity cost human resources, often recruited internationally. There can be large economies of scale in operations and management as well, though these likely differ depending on the management structure. As an example, a public irrigation management entity, a parastatal firm, or Water User Associations might have full O&M responsibilities, or responsibilities can be shared between WUAs, the government or the parastatal firm. For WUA managed schemes, evidence suggests that economies of scale will operate over operations (such as administrative and financial tasks), and potentially maintenance and repair activities per unit of irrigable area. However, transactions costs associated with coordination, cooperation, monitoring and enforcement may actually increase at an increasing rate (diseconomies of scale) and thus may overwhelm economies of scale in other O&M activities at larger schemes. For public irrigation management and parastatals, there can 7 also be administrative and financial economies of scale in managing as scheme size increases; such as costs of maintenance and repair. This is particularly true if only larger schemes can support a full-time on-site manager and/or investments in equipment needed for maintenance. However, public irrigation managers and parastatals might face challenges communicating with farmers who often do not trust government agencies, as compared to WUAs, and as such transaction costs on collecting irrigation fees and information on system breakage might be even higher with parastatal management as scheme size increases. Joint management seeks to harness economies of scale in administrative, financial, maintenance and repair works at the main and often secondary infrastructure levels, while minimizing diseconomies of scale in monitoring, coordination and cooperation by shifting responsibility for O&M of tertiary infrastructure to the WUA level. In very large schemes, even WUAs are often broken into smaller blocks of user associations, to minimize diseconomies of scale. For groundwater, the main issues related to scale are really only relevant for small landholdings, where unit costs of irrigation equipment can be relatively cheaper as landholdings increase. A related issue concerns threshold cropland sizes. The costs (and risks) of drilling a well, investing in a pump and constructing water delivery structures, combined with operating and maintenance/repair costs, means that both fixed and variable costs may swamp gross revenues for farmers with landholdings below a certain threshold, especially those that grow relatively low value crops (Shah et al., 2020). Unsurprisingly, many studies have shown that costs of individual irrigation equipment (or lack of access to finance) are the key factor reducing uptake of solar and other irrigation pumps (for example, Xie et al., 2021). Diseconomies of scale in groundwater management often result once over-extraction becomes a concern. The SA experience, as well as experiences from other countries around the world, documents that when extraction rates become high enough for water tables to drop, land to subside, and water quality to decline (pollution, salinity), there are significant diseconomies of scale in managing this “invisible” resource across the relevant area, e.g. aquifer. The more users within a given, contiguous aquifer, the more difficult it is to negotiate, coordinate, monitor and enforce extraction rates. Technology, especially for monitoring groundwater observation wells, continues to advance and become less expensive which can help alleviate these costs. But enforcement of groundwater management has been challenging all over the world. While one would not want to be accused of being overly cautious, it stands to reason that resources should be dedicated to understanding what sustainable management of the aquifer would look like as the number of irrigators increase in the SSA context, to avoid the negative 8 consequences of over-withdrawals in many SA contexts, but also in parts of China, Iran, and the United States, among others. The stated purpose of the irrigation system investment can influence the type of irrigation system investment (surface water, groundwater), and the extent to which assumptions underpinning the stated purpose can then affect system performance. For instance, achieving national food security has been the stated purpose of a number of investments in large-scale surface water irrigation scheme investments, primarily for rice production (Kenya, Mali, Senegal, most Asian systems). For schemes with a national food security purpose, the primary assumption is that meeting that objective is possible while at the same time guaranteeing that irrigators’ returns are sufficient to attract farmers to irrigate across all relevant seasons, and participate in maintenance as required. Such schemes tend to be inflexible with respect to crop choices (often rice only), in timing of cropping activities, in water access, and in method of aggregation, amongst others (for example, Office du Niger, Mali). Where such schemes are not well managed (water delivery is unreliable; timing of complimentary services (land preparation) and inputs (fertilizer) are not available or delayed; or primary and secondary infrastructure not maintained, farmers may choose not to irrigate and to not participate in maintenance of tertiary infrastructure. This then leads to the build-deteriorate-rebuild cycle. On the other hand, food security of irrigating households is often the stated purpose for supporting many individual investments in groundwater (Ethiopia, Ghana, Zambia, India, etc.). For food security at the household level, the primary assumption is that the benefits from producing irrigated crops for sale or home consumption, such as vegetables, are high enough to justify the costs. Where pumping technology and diesel costs are high and/or irrigators do not have the resources or skills to maintain the pumping equipment, or cannot obtain complementary inputs, the incentives to adopt and sustain irrigation might be limited. For investments that seek to increase nutritional quality of household diets, the primary assumption is that the irrigation technology and other conditions are suitable for producing more nutrient-dense crops for home consumption or irrigated crops that can be sold on the market with funds being used to purchase other food items. Women play important roles in ensuring that irrigated production supports household nutrition. Manual water application, which is often used in household irrigation application, is often very labor intensive, which dissuades adoption of irrigation beyond very small plots. In other cases, the stated purpose is to support the adoption of high-value crops for sale. Due to economies of scope in aggregating crop production for sale, such investments would need to be large enough to attract purchasers, and often require complementary investments in market-related 9 infrastructure (for example, tomatoes for Ghana and Mozambique; and onion and tomatoes in Niger and Nigeria). Groundwater irrigation, which allows for the farmer to choose what and when to cultivate can also help farm households achieve more diverse and nutritious diets (Namara et al., 2014; Shah et al., 2013; van Koppen, Hope, & Colenbrander, 2013). However, as with irrigation scheme participation, a number of authors also document that it is generally wealthier farmers who invest in groundwater equipment (Kafle et al., 2022 for Ethiopia; Giordano et al., 2012 for Ghana; Shah et al., 2013 covering 9 countries in SSA). To ensure equitable access to groundwater resources, Shah et al. (2020) note that government support to groundwater irrigation expansion was very strong in many South Asian countries, including enabling imports of affordable pumps and tubewells, and even free drilling. Free drilling would considerably lower the costs and the risks faced by smallholders where siting the well is difficult. The authors argue that different packages of subsidies and government investment and services helped many countries in South Asia to avoid elite capture of groundwater resources. Of course, fuel subsidies also increase access by poorer farmers but can also have severe negative consequences on the environment from overextraction (Shah et al., 2020; Balasubramanya & Lele, 2022; Chauduri et al., 2021 and references cited therein). For high value crops, the primary assumption is that irrigators are sufficiently integrated into the value chain so that they can purchase the necessary complimentary inputs, produce high quality crops, have sufficient bargaining power and reliable connections with purchasers. Schemes with high-value crops and national food security purposes often also expect irrigators to crop multiple seasons within the year, which is based on the assumption that irrigators’ opportunity costs of allocating labor to irrigation are relatively low throughout the seasons. Where irrigators have high opportunity costs of labor in the dry season(s), cropping rates may fall well below the project implementers’ expectations. The stated purpose may also be to specifically support household nutrition and women’s bargaining power; these investments tend to also focus on supporting the adoption of relatively low-cost irrigation technology for home gardens. The Irrigation Innovation Laboratory for Small-Scale Irrigation (ILSSI) has identified several potential pathways through which irrigation can positively influence food security, nutrition, and health outcomes, including 1) a production pathway, 2) an income pathway, 3) a water supply path-way, and 4) a women’s empowerment pathway, while also noting a fifth, negative pathway that links irrigation to water pollution and disease via the application of fertilizers and pesticides and via supporting vector-borne diseases, such as malaria or schistosomiasis, respectively (Domènech, 2015; 10 Passarelli et al., 2018). Several studies undertaken with support of ILSSI have confirmed the existence of the production and income pathways (for example, Baye et al., 2022; Mekonnen et al., 2022; Mekonnen et al., 2019) whereas increased availability of irrigation technology and irrigation water sources do not, on their own, lead to increased women’s empowerment (Bryan and Mekonnen, 2023) or improved WASH outcomes. 4. Economies and Diseconomies of Scale: Evidence from the literature 4.1. Economies of Scale for Surface Water Schemes Inocencio et al. (2007) collected data on 314 irrigation schemes based on information provided in project completion reports for irrigation projects funded by the World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), covering schemes in SSA, SEA, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), SA and East Asia. Data were available on total project cost, irrigated area, whether new construction versus rehabilitation, time and cost overruns, whether the primary crops to be grown were staples or high-value cash crops and major irrigation source and delivery mechanisms, amongst other variables. Many of the projects actually consisted of constructing and rehabilitating multiple schemes, so the authors collected information on the total irrigation scheme area and the average size of sub-schemes. From the information, the authors constructed the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) for each project. The authors found that irrigation projects in SSA tended to be much smaller than those in other regions, but that staff weeks spent on project development and implementation supervision were about the same, indicating high, and relatively fixed, professional costs per hectare irrigated for SSA projects. On the other hand, SSA projects did not face higher time and cost overruns, compared to other regions, but these were relatively high in all cases. Nonetheless, SSA projects faced the highest total and hardware unit costs – more than double unit costs of SEA projects. The authors then define “success” projects as those with an EIRR greater than 10% and “failure” projects as those with EIRRs less than 10%. The results show that average total costs for SSA are close to other regions. But, costs of failed projects are much higher than other regions, and a lower proportion of projects are deemed as successful, though SSA and SEA are relatively similar at 56% and 59%, respectively. Finally, simple descriptive statistics indicate that successful projects are likely to be far larger than failure projects in both SSA and all other regions, likely in part due to the fact that such projects have lower unit costs (project size and unit total costs have a correlation coefficient of -.77). The regressions of EIRR and project costs reinforce the 11 descriptive analysis. Yet, it is difficult to determine if economies of scale in irrigation scheme size were at play because many projects included multiple activities, including construction of a number of new and rehabilitated schemes of different sizes under one project. They use both project size and average size of irrigation schemes; combined, the results suggest that larger projects with several, smaller-sized irrigation schemes lead to higher EIRR’s2. Finally, the regression results suggest that schemes where the primary crops grown are high-value cash crops perform better than those where staple crops are mainly grown. Building on Inocencio et al. (2007), Fujiie et al. (2011) also gather data from project completion reports, but focus only on SSA projects. Because schemes in SSA tend to be smaller than in other regions, the authors consider schemes to be “large” if they are over 100 hectares (ha), small if they fall between 5- 100 ha3. The authors also use the EIRR as their measure of project performance. As in Inocencio (2007), the authors use project size to examine returns to scale. One of the more interesting results is that both small and large projects exhibit decreasing unit costs when looked at separately. Thus, they find economies of scale within each category, but also diseconomies across scales. As noted in footnote 2 however, these results should be interpreted cautiously due to very few observations for small projects that are concentrated in one country and implemented by one donor; almost all projects are in the large category. The authors then look at construction cost, high-value overhead cost (professionals involved in design and supervision, for example), and low-value overhead costs. The observed relationship between and within scheme size is reflected in construction and overhead costs. However, the share of overhead costs to total costs is much higher for small versus large projects. Their evidence also suggests that the economic viability of irrigation schemes under 10,000 ha is very weak, and “it appears kind of crazy” to invest in projects between 100 – 1000 ha (Fujiie et al., 2011, page 51). For small projects to be economically viable, overhead costs must be driven down, consistent with results found in Inocencio et al. (2007). Unfortunately, Fujiie et al. (2011) did not include data on primary crops grown, or other metrics of project purpose. 2 The authors use the Fadama project in Nigeria as an example of successful large project funding many small-scale irrigation investments, mainly tubewell-based systems to secure water from shallow aquifers. However, subsequent studies found much smaller benefits in general, and declining benefits over time (Dayo et al., 2020; Villacis et al., 2022). 3Unfortunately, there are just four small projects and seven micro projects; with 8 projects being implemented by JIICA in Uganda, which limits the generalizability significantly. 12 A potentially important cost missing from the analyses in Inocencio et al. (2007) and Fujiie et al. (2011) are environmental costs associated with poor design and/or management, both within the irrigation scheme and externally. Negative environmental impacts of surface water schemes, particularly those that rely on large reservoirs created by dams on major rivers, include reduced sediment transport leading to erosion on lands downstream (Lebdi, 2016; Penvenne, 1996), soil salinization (FAO, 2011; Lebdi, 2016; Rengassamy, 2006), loss in biodiversity (Avellán et al., 2018; Majoro et al., 2016), greater intensity of use of fertilizer and pesticides that negatively impacts water quality (Lefore et al., 2019), and, higher rates of water-borne or related diseases (Derne et al., 2015; Majoro et al., 2016). Though we have found no studies that explicitly compare negative environmental impacts across different surface water scheme sizes, it is likely that the larger schemes that significantly divert and store water generate relatively greater negative environmental impacts. 4.2. Economies of Scale for Groundwater Irrigation A number of studies review the evidence on groundwater volumes and current withdrawal rates, and most show that almost all countries in SSA have significant potential to expand groundwater irrigation, though determining the extent of “optimal” withdrawals is hampered by severe lack of data at higher resolutions (Cobbing & Hiller, 2019; McDonald et al., 2012; Pavelic et al., 2013; Wijnen et al., 2018; Xie et al., 2014; You et al., 2011). Pavelic et al. (2013) evaluate the groundwater potential for 13 countries in SSA associated with the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), taking into account water needs for irrigation as well as domestic use, industrial use, livestock and ecosystem services. The authors note that groundwater irrigation constitutes less than 0.5% of recharge currently across the 13 countries, so even with conservative assumptions, they argue that groundwater irrigation can be developed on 13.5 million ha – a dramatic expansion from the 109,000 ha estimated to be irrigated by groundwater at that time. Many authors argue that the vast groundwater resources combined with high poverty and vulnerability mean that policies and programs should rapidly foster extensive development while simultaneously developing the monitoring, research capacity, and institutional frameworks to manage groundwater resources at local (basin) levels (Cobbing & Hiller, 2019; Ringler et al., 2021; Xu et al., 2019). Simultaneously expanding groundwater irrigation and developing the regulatory and management framework is essential to enable smallholders to benefit from irrigation and to reduce or avoid problems associated with over-use. Given the lack of functioning regulatory systems, negative impacts of overdrafting (higher pump costs, lower water quality, etc.) have also already been felt in local areas of SSA despite limited overall development, such as Mauritania and 13 Djibouti (Cobbing & Hiller, 2019), eastern Ethiopia (Hagos et al., 2011), and Nigeria (Altchenko & Villholth, 2015). Evidence of economies of scale in groundwater irrigation in SSA is very limited. Dhawan (1978) finds large economies of scale for tubewell-based systems in India, when considering 7 different cost components from equipment to administrative costs. Mushtaq, Khan and Hafeez (2008) evaluate economies of scale in pond water storage for small, medium and large-scale ponds in China. They find diseconomies of scale for small ponds, and economies of scale for medium and large-scale ponds. Small ponds, even the lowest cost, are not profitable, however, so the authors suggest group or community ponds as a way to achieve economies of scale associated with large ponds. On the other hand, Villholth (2013, and references cited therein) discuss the evidence for diseconomies of scale in well drilling, as unit costs of excavation tend to increase as the depth increases. There is more evidence of cropland threshold barriers, where available equipment or operational costs are too expensive for those with landholdings of less than 1 or 2 ha (Agrawal & Jain, 2018; Namara et al., 2014; Ringler, 2021; Shah et al., 2020; Villholth, 2013). A series of World Bank projects in Niger suggests that economies of scale motivated the project team to switch from targeting subsistence smallholders cropping staples to commercially-oriented farmers with cropland between one and six ha as well as a switch to high-value crops such as onions and tomatoes (Abric et al., 2011). A number of studies also find that farmers with larger landholdings were more likely to adopt groundwater irrigation and high- value crops, except for use of buckets to irrigate small gardens (Owusu et al., 2013; Serote et al., 2021). Technological advancements should continue to lower unit costs of pumps and tubewells and potentially increase the range of pump systems available to increase “divisibility” of the asset, while alternative fuel sources can reduce pumping costs (Agrawal & Jain, 2018; Shah et al., 2020). For instance, solar-powered pumps do require a relatively high fixed-cost investment, though pumping costs are then limited to maintenance and repair. Where diesel costs are high, solar can provide an attractive alternative if financing modalities can be developed (Shah et al., 2020; Xie et al., 2021). There can also be economies of scale and/or scope in expanding groundwater irrigation for groundwater service and equipment providers, such as well drillers, pumps (Wang et al., 2007), equipment repair tradespeople and MFIs to supply credit (Abric et al., 2011; Agrawal & Jain, 2018; Villholth, 2013 and references cited therein; Shah et al., 2020; Soumaila, 2021). Irrigation equipment providers may also find it more profitable to devise alternative financing mechanisms to reach clients that are otherwise priced out of the market, such as pay-as-you go financing (Mukherji et al., 2017) and rent-to-own 14 financing (Kunen et al., 2015; Bastakoti et al., 2019). These economies may be even more likely if government and/or donor projects to support groundwater investment also invest in complementary services, such as roads or cold storage facilities, etc. (Abric et al., 2011; You et al, 2011; Mwamakamba et al., 2017; Pittock et al., 2017; Ringler et al., 2020). Greater numbers of groundwater irrigators may additionally help to alleviate the barriers to smallholder adoption. With sufficient demand, pump owners could provide pumping services, so that smallholders would only need to invest in well drilling. Providing pumping services has been observed in some African countries, particularly those who import relatively cheaper pump sets from India and China (Agrawal & Jain, 2018; de Fraiture & Clayton, 2019; Merrey & Lefore, 2018; Shah et al., 2020). In some South Asian countries, arrangements to sell excess capacity to neighbors have also arisen, though no such cases had been observed by Shah et al. (2020) in Africa. Selling excess water is common in some SA countries, such as in Bangladesh, where buying in groundwater from neighboring farmers leads to benefits equivalent to owning the irrigation equipment (Bell et al., 2015). 4.3. Evidence from datasets looking at the correlation between size and performance, surface irrigation schemes For irrigation schemes – as opposed to groundwater-based irrigation – we can also evaluate evidence from two small datasets on irrigation project performance from McCarthy and Winters (2022) (30 observations) and Higgenbottom et al. (2021) (75 observations). The McCarthy & Winters’ dataset captures all irrigation projects in SSA that were implemented by the World Bank, IFAD, and Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) since 2000 and for which program completion reports were available. The authors collected data on basic project characteristics (funding, irrigated area, source of irrigation water, primary crops grown, amongst others), on problems identified in the completion reports, and various measures related to scheme performance including quality of infrastructure at endline. Unfortunately, in many cases, the irrigation infrastructure itself was not completed until close to the end of the project, meaning that quality assessments are not likely to pick up potential issues with sustainability, as other authors have noted (Redicker et al., 2022; Higginbottom et al., 2021). For our purposes, we instead use a dichotomous variable capturing threats to sustainability as a project performance indicator; the index takes a value of 1 when major threats to sustainability are discussed in the completion reports, and a value of 0 when threats to sustainability are discussed as minor. 15 Given the dataset, it made sense to split the sample into irrigated area terciles, where small schemes range from 100 – 2250 ha, medium schemes range from 2500 – 6400 ha, and large schemes range from 7,000 to 161,000 ha. The largest project by far is a World Bank project in Tanzania covering just under 161,000 ha, the next largest is an MCC project with 28,000 ha in Senegal. Table 1 below gives descriptive statistics by size of the irrigated area. Our first observation is the very high cost per irrigated hectare in small irrigation projects, at nearly $17,600. This observation is quite consistent with the figures provided in Fujiie et al. (2011). Small projects tend to invest in very costly infrastructure. For instance, the MCC project in Cabo Verde spent over US$4 million to develop 111 hectares, with a very extensive and expensive system of dikes, boreholes, reservoirs and pumping stations. Cabo Verde has very low annual rainfall, and is often subject to multi-year droughts. Even so, this sophisticated system, which also relies on drip irrigation, is considered to have high threats to sustainability, and farmers have not been able to switch to high-value crops as foreseen in the project proposal due to transportation and other market-related barriers. A World Bank project in Senegal, with an irrigated area of 1320 ha at project completion, cost of over US$27,000 per hectare. At least some of the spending went towards the development of an additional 3680 ha that were not completed by the end of the project, thereby driving up costs per hectare completed. Funding per irrigated hectare for medium projects was US$8535, while it was just US$2430 for large-scale projects, again consistent with evidence in Fujiie et al. (2011) and Inocencio et al. (2007). Interestingly, for 50% of small-scale schemes, the primary crops cultivated are high-value crops, whereas only 10% of medium and large- scale schemes produced such crops. High value crops can be vegetables consumed by the household, increasing dietary diversity and nutritional quality, or they can be mainly sold for cash in markets. The large schemes mainly focus on rice production in support of food self-sufficiency objectives. Major threats to sustainability are identified for 90% of small projects, 60% of medium projects, and for 50% of large projects. We have seven indicators of problems identified in the completion reports, for which we create seven dichotomous variables. These include variables that take the value of 1 if the respective document mentions project delays, project design problems, thin or absent markets for crop inputs and outputs and/or for goods and services to maintain irrigation infrastructure, and problems related to collective action. Problems related to fee payments take a value of one if documents noted low rates of fee recovery, and/or that water fees are too low to cover repairs and maintenance, and/or if irrigators revenue is simply too low to cover repair and maintenance fees. Problems related to conflicts takes a value of 1 if conflicts between head and tail irrigators, tenure insecurity, or land 16 conflicts more broadly were mentioned. Finally, problems associated with use and enforcement of regulations takes a value of 1 if irrigation water is used by non-irrigators, unregulated water withdrawals, and/or sedimentation are mentioned as problems4. As shown in Table 1, many problems occur at similar rates across the size categories, with some differences. For instance, project delays occur in 100% of medium- and large-scale projects, but “only” in 70% of small projects. Interestingly, project design issues plague both small and medium projects, but only 20% of large projects. This suggests that more effort is spent in the feasibility and preparation stages for larger projects. Both Redicker et al. (2022) and Higginbottom (2021) discuss the impact of the lack of solid planning and preparation on irrigation system performance, though they do not break this observation down by scheme size. Medium projects face greater difficulties with fee payments than small or large projects. This would be consistent with greater benefits from cash cropping at small schemes, and integration into staple value chains at large schemes. Large projects are more likely to face land-related conflicts than small and medium projects. Few of the projects in this database directly support farmer-led irrigation development (FLID). There are only four projects where groundwater is the primary source of irrigation water, and only some activities under the World Bank’s Fadama II project supports FLID as groundwater irrigation adopted and practiced at the individual, or small group, irrigator level (the other projects have groups of farmers irrigating within perimeters organized similarly to small surface water schemes). The costs per hectare for the Fadama II project are quite low at US$265, and, in 2012, the completion report found only minor threats to sustainability. And yet, Dayo et al. (2020) document that 81.5% of Fadama beneficiary households indicated that irrigation canals were not functional when interviewed in 2019, and nearly 100% indicated that sprinklers were not functional5. Villacis et al. (2022) use nationally representative, three-period panel data for Nigeria collected by the World Bank’s LSMS-ISA, and find that irrigation covered just 2.5% of cropland nationally, on average, over the three periods. Their data covers three waves between 2010 – 2016. We complement the Villacis et al. (2022) analysis by adding the 2019 LSMS round data and find that just 2.25% of households irrigated at least one plot in the previous year. 4 We include use by non-irrigators as a potential problem when it is explicitly mentioned by the reviewer as a potential threat to sustainability of the system per se. However, irrigators themselves might prefer multiple uses of irrigation water, even if this does threaten sustainability in the long run. These benefits tend not to be included in assessments at the irrigation system level, while costs to the environment are also often ignored. Benefits and costs are more likely to be assessed at the household or natural resource level. 5 It is unclear what proportion of all households surveyed had acquired sprinklers or had access to irrigation canals with Fadama project support. 17 Table 1: Irrigation Schemes and Threats to Sustainability Small Medium Large Mea # Obs. Mean # Obs. n # Obs. Mean Major Threats to Sustainability 10 90% 10 60% 10 50% 2935 Irrigated Area (ha) 10 954 10 3824 10 3 Cost per ha (USD/ha) 10 17592 9 8535 10 2430 Cash-Crop Focus 10 50% 10 10% 10 10% Project Delays 10 70% 10 100% 10 100% Project Design Flaws 10 60% 10 50% 10 20% Problems with Fee Collection 10 50% 10 80% 10 50% Thin Markets 10 40% 10 60% 10 60% Collective Action Problems 10 60% 10 60% 10 70% Land Conflicts 10 40% 10 50% 10 70% Inappropriate Scheme Use 10 60% 10 50% 10 30% Source: McCarthy and Winters (2022). Higginbottom et al. (2021) use data from project completion reports and other irrigation scheme-related documentation for schemes constructed in SSA, to put together a database that includes data on the proposed size of the scheme when the project was approved, country and year of project completion. They also identified the area currently being used for irrigation using geo-spatial techniques to generate the proportion of currently irrigated area relative to project proposal size, which they use as a measure of project performance. They included irrigation projects completed between 1947 and 2010, with about 80% of projects completed between 1970 and 1995. They also matched other geo-spatial information to the dataset, including the mean and coefficient of variation of precipitation and potential evapotranspiration, population within a 20 km2 radius of each scheme in 2015, travel time to nearest major town in 2015, and the average of the World Bank’s Doing Business Government Effectiveness index over the period 1996-2017. Using their database, we create three categories of project proposal size: small schemes that range from 200 to 2250 ha (26 observations); medium schemes that range from 2500 to 10000 ha (21 observations); and large schemes that are greater than 10000 ha (32 observations). Because scheme size has declined over the decades (pairwise correlation coefficient of year completed and proposal size is -.37), we exclude projects implemented before 1970 (8 schemes) and after 1995 (8 schemes), leaving 18 63 observations. Table 2 below presents descriptive statistics for these schemes by proposal size category. We first note that current irrigation is 63% of proposal size for small schemes, which drops to 19% for medium schemes and then increases to 32% for large schemes. Small schemes were actually more likely to expand from original proposal size (5 of 23 schemes) than medium-scale schemes, followed by large schemes. However, large-scale schemes were much less likely to suffer from design flaws and inappropriate use. The stronger performance of small schemes in terms of area still in operation is at first glance somewhat contradictory to the evidence in Inocencio et al. (2007) and Fujiie et al. (2011) though it is worth recalling that these two papers used net benefits as a performance metric, while actual area still irrigated mainly captures benefits alone. The results are also somewhat at odds with McCarthy & Winters (2022), where threats to sustainability were considered major for 90% of small schemes. The primary difference between the datasets is that the Higginbottom data pertain to schemes completed between 1970 and 1995, whereas the McCarthy & Winters dataset covers projects completed from 2001 – 2021. The better performance of earlier schemes may be due to “selection”, where areas most suitable for small-scale irrigation infrastructure were selected as project sites at earlier dates. However, there is not enough evidence to establish whether selection is the key driver of this difference. Medium schemes have the lowest average current irrigation proportion, at just 19%, and no schemes expanded to be larger than the proposed area. Large schemes fall in between, with 32% average current irrigation proportion. However, even though small schemes have higher percent of area still irrigated, the average absolute area is much smaller than large schemes (670 ha vs. 16,395 ha), and even medium schemes (970 ha). Looking at other scheme characteristics, we note that small schemes were more likely to be constructed in areas that subsequently had relatively large populations, followed by medium and then large schemes, consistent with the patterns for travel times to major urban centers. The governance effectiveness index is also highest (least negative) for small schemes, with medium schemes having the lowest score. Small schemes are also located in areas with relatively high rainfall and low rainfall variability. These results suggest that greater market access and higher population densities combined with relatively high government effectiveness at the national level enabled small schemes to endure longer than medium and large schemes that are located in more isolated areas, and for medium schemes located in countries with particularly poor government effectiveness. Additionally, more favorable rainfall environments – higher average and more stable rainfall where small scale schemes are 19 located – suggests these factors contribute to better performance vis-à-vis medium schemes; both small and medium schemes are often reliant on surface water storage that varies with rainfall. Large schemes, on the other hand, are more likely to be constructed in areas with lower rainfall, but generally with access to water for irrigation that is less correlated with rainfall patterns. Table 2: Irrigation System Performance Small Medium Large # Obs. Mean # Obs. Mean # Obs. Mean Proposal Size (ha) 23 1057 18 4883 22 51234 16,39 Actually Irrigated Size (ha) 23 671 18 935 22 5 % Currently Irrigated 23 63% 18 19% 22 32% Population 23 354648 18 12302 7 22 80433 Travel Time, Urban Center 23 30 18 76 22 113 Government Effectiveness Index 23 -0.62 18 -1.06 22 -0.91 Mean Annual Rainfall 23 881 18 785 22 712 Coef. Variation, Annual Rainfall 23 1.71 18 2.06 22 2.09 Source: Higginbottom et al. (2021). 5. Other Factors Affecting Performance of Irrigation Schemes and Groundwater Irrigation6 5.1 Irrigation System Design As captured in Table 1, project delays and design flaws are documented as ubiquitous problems that threaten scheme sustainability captured in project completion reports. For irrigation schemes, there are two distinct issues, quality of the built infrastructure and whether the irrigation system – even if well- built – is capable of being financially viable. A number of authors document poor quality infrastructure, including poorly placed intake valves, improper drainage, and use of poor-quality materials (World Bank, 2015 (ICR for Niger project); Adekunle et al., 2015; Saïdou & Kossou, 2009; Osman, 2015; Webb, 1991). Additionally, some designs make it particularly difficult to monitor water use, avoid illegal irrigation (diverting water to non-scheme plots), and ensure distribution is fair and according to schedule 6 This section draws heavily on a literature review of irrigation scheme performance provided in McCarthy & Winters (2022). 20 (Adekunle et al., 2015). Design flaws can severely affect incentives for irrigators to pay fees and/or engage in collective maintenance. 5.2 Financial Viability Financial viability is related to whether the scheme is fit for purpose. For instance, van Averbeke et al. (2011) document the transfer of sophisticated pumping and overhead irrigation systems in South Africa to WUAs where members were relatively poor, irrigating less than 2 ha of mainly subsistence crops, and also relatively isolated from markets in which to sell cash crops. Obviously, such schemes were never going to be financially viable and many subsequently collapsed. Chidenga (2003) documents the Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) process in Zimbabwe, where irrigators were rather suddenly expected to absorb all pumping costs previously borne by the government; the rationale provided was that smallholders would then be able to switch to high-value crops and thus be able to afford pumping costs. Overly optimistic assumptions about small irrigator profitability has plagued, and continues to plague, irrigation project proposals, so that schemes with high O&M costs continue to be built or rehabilitated (Higginbottom et al., 2021; Redicker et al., 2022). More emphasis on designs that lower O&M costs but ensure reliable delivery of water of good quality would more likely lead to improved scheme performance, fee payment rates and adequate labor contributions to collective maintenance. A wide range of papers provide evidence that lack of market access – for crop production inputs, crop outputs (particularly for high value cash crops), irrigation maintenance goods and services, and irrigation water service providers – have severe negative impacts on irrigation scheme performance and adoption of groundwater irrigation (Emaleaf, 2017; Sonda & Ngaruko, 2017; Maleza and Nishimura, 2017; Sharaunga & Mudhara, 2018; World Bank, 2021). For irrigation schemes reliant on irrigator fees and collective action for maintenance, a number of authors also document that greater access to markets, especially for cash crop sales, increases fee payment rates and collective labor for maintenance (Nhundu & Mushunje, 2010; Poulton, Dorward & Kydd, 2010; Totin et al, 2014; Fanadzo & Ncube, 2018; Masasi & Ng’ombe, 2019). Irrigation scheme performance is also related to opportunity costs of labor; where alternative labor opportunities are relatively unremunerative in the dry season, irrigation rates are more likely to reach project goals and irrigators are more likely to provide labor for maintenance (Emaleaf, 2017; Kahuro, 2012; Saidu et al., 2019). 21 5.3 Tenure Security For irrigation schemes, tenure security increases incentives to pay fees and contribute to repair and maintenance activities that provide benefits over multiple cropping seasons. For groundwater irrigation, tenure security will increase incentives to make on-farm investments, such as digging wells and boreholes, constructing channels, and laying pipes. A number of articles find that tenure security over plots in irrigation schemes increases collective contributions to O&M, and increases incentives to adopt groundwater irrigation equipment (Damianos & Giannakopoulos, 2002; Meinzen-Dick, 2014; Mutambara et al., 2016; Fanadzo & Ncube, 2018; Sharaunga & Mudhara, 2018; Wijnen et al, 2018). 5.4 Water Scarcity and Reliability of Irrigation Water Supply Incentives to abide by scheme operation regulations and contribute to maintenance or to maintain groundwater irrigation equipment and conveyance structures should be higher where rainfall is relatively scarce but irrigation water supply is relatively stable. Extreme water scarcity in North African countries is mentioned as a critical factor motivating irrigator participation in maintenance and fee payment (World Bank, 2021). On the other hand, Vandersypen et al. (2015) argue that abundant water supplies in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme reduces incentives for irrigators to perform maintenance activities. However, Akuriba et al. (2020) find that small-scale schemes with relatively high average rainfall in Ghana performed better across a range of performance metrics. Schemes where water availability is more directly tied to rainfall, such as the small dam schemes in the north of Ghana, may thus perform better in areas with higher and less variable rainfall. Greater reliability of water delivery has been associated with better scheme performance in a number of cases (Chidenga, 2003; Kahuro, 2012; Maleza & Nishimura, 2007; World Bank, 2021). For groundwater irrigation, Wijnen et al. (2018) note that more research is needed to locate “weather-independent” groundwater resources that can still be exploited cost effectively. Similar to the small dams in Ghana case, many groundwater irrigators rely on shallow aquifers that are rainfall dependent and thus highly variable, discouraging adoption. 5.5 Operational Capacity A large number of studies and project completion reports suggest that under-performance of irrigation schemes is often associated with lack of requisite skills and knowledge needed to operate the system, ensure timely maintenance and repairs, ensure irrigators comply with their obligations, and solve 22 conflicts when they arise. As noted above, in most cases, surface water schemes generally rely on WUAs for O&M at the tertiary level, with the state or parastatals having responsibility for bulk water provision and usually secondary infrastructure. At the WUA level, especially in the context of IMT, insufficient resources to train WUA members in terms of group leadership, financial and administrative skills, and the technical expertise required to maintain the scheme often led to poor performance (Chidenga, 2003; Kahuro, 2012; van Averbeke et al., 2011). Many IMT schemes rapidly devolved responsibilities – in some cases responsibilities for the entire system – in countries such as Madagascar, South Africa and Zimbabwe, primarily to reduce pressures on government budgets rather than to empower irrigators with little attention paid to WUA capacity building (Chidenga, 2003; Marcus, 2007; van Averbeke et al., 2011). This occurred and continues to occur, despite early research establishing the importance of capacity building in IMT (Chancellor & Hide, 1996; Frederiksen & Perry, 1995; Merrey, 1995; Patil & Lele, 1995; Sargadoy et al., 1985). The organizational structure should reflect the principles of “optimal devolution” or subsidiarity, where authority, roles and responsibilities are assigned at the administrative level that is most cost-effective at providing O&M services (Meinzen-Dick, 1997; Berger et al., 2007; Andersson & Ostrom, 2008; Blomquist et al., 2010; Brousseau et al., 2010). Vaguely defined and/or overlapping responsibilities can significantly reduce scheme performance (World Bank, 2021; Meinzen-Dick, 2014). The ability of WUA members, particularly on relatively small schemes in isolated locations, will simply never be able to afford major maintenance or repairs; they are much less likely to have the resources to hire private sector contractors on reasonable terms (Chidenga, 2003; van Averbeke et al., 2011). For groundwater irrigation, O&M issues are less of an issue. But, irrigation equipment and infrastructure still requires routine maintenance and repairs, so that irrigators either have to acquire the skills and knowledge required to perform maintenance and repair by themselves, or have the capacity to source (and pay for) service providers. At the supra-irrigator level, however, groundwater irrigation systems can impose daunting operational issues of monitoring and “invisible” resource and effectively managing extraction rates across multiple irrigators and other water users such as municipalities, industry, etc. (Wijnen et al., 2018; World Bank, 2017). While of limited relevance at this time in most African contexts, experiences in South Asia, Latin America and the United States suggest that managing over-extraction can be very costly, and often ineffective. 23 5.6 Collective Action Capacity In most systems, WUAs have roles and responsibilities for O&M, from complete responsibilities generally on smaller schemes to responsibilities for tertiary infrastructure O&M at large schemes. There is a large literature on factors that favor collective action, from Ostrom’s design principles (Ostrom, 1993) to social-ecological frameworks captured in extensions to the Institutional Analysis and Development conceptual model applied to irrigation systems (Anderies, et al., 2004; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004; Meinzen-Dick, 2014; Ostrom, 2011). Factors favoring collective action include well-defined resources and well-defined users, the ability to monitor irrigators use and management practices, the ability to levy graduated sanctions reflecting the nature of irrigation non- compliance, trust in leadership, social cohesion to manage social, cultural and economic heterogeneity amongst irrigators, and the number of irrigators (which should favor collective action starting from low levels, but may hinder collective action after a certain point unless sub-groups are formed within a federated structure). McCarthy et al. (2001) and McCarthy & Winters (2022) also argue that since collective action entails transaction costs, the larger gains to collective action versus non-cooperation also favor collective action to provide public goods, e.g. locations where rainfall is scarce and erratic but irrigation water is sufficient and stable. 6. Country Case Studies 6.1 Senegal Senegal developed irrigated areas primarily in the 1980s, although limited additional expansion has occurred since then, and the total irrigated area is just about 5% of the cultivated area (FAO AQUASTAT). The Senegal River Valley (SRV) has both the largest area currently in crop production at 108000 has, and also has the largest potential to expand irrigated agriculture, at about 130000 additional ha (Diouf et al., 2015). The infrastructure of medium- and large-scale systems completed in the late 1980s and early 1990s degraded over time, with insufficient water delivery and thus abandonment of fields (Harris et al., 2021). The potential problems with long-term sustainability were presaged in an irrigation proposal document by CILSS (1979), which identified a number of possible constraints to success that, for the most part, were not adequately addressed in the following decades. Constraints included: extent of salt intrusion and difficulties with appropriate drainage (often due to poorly implemented preparatory feasibility studies; the fact that, for hydro-engineering reasons, large-scale schemes were sited in relatively isolated areas with limited local farmer populations; property rights and tenure issues 24 associated with new settlements; lack of familiarity of year-round farming and maintenance requirements on the part of irrigators; the intertwined problems associated with lack of parastatal management to provide required irrigation services in a timely manner and subsequent low irrigation fee payment rates; and, under-resourced and under-skilled management. These constraints led to low cropping intensities and low yields, furthering the cycle of non-fee payment and eventually abandonment. Despite these constraints and limited evidence on how to address these constraints, the CILSS document describes the development of two major dams (Diama and Manantali) required for the second phase to ensure year-round controlled irrigation – up to 375,000 ha, which has never materialized. Different sources instead suggest that this second phase increased the irrigated area to between 110,000 – 120,000 ha (USAID, n.d.; ). Interestingly the CILSS document notes that small-scale village level perimeters were performing better than large-scale schemes in terms of higher rice yields, lower construction costs per hectare, and to a lesser extent maintenance7. There is also some discussion of potential negative environmental impacts particularly on mangrove land, but the authors do not discuss how these negative impacts could be minimized. Harris et al. (2021) provide results of an evaluation of a large-scale irrigation project implemented by the Millennium Challenge Corporation five years after it was completed in 2016. The authors found that though targets for building and rehabilitating infrastructure were met, production goals fell far short of objectives. For instance, for the Senegal River Valley (SRV) larger-scale schemes, the project expected to increase cropping intensity to 150%, but intensity was just 78% five years after completion, due in part to logistical challenges related to land preparation in consecutive seasons. Additionally, the expansion of production of tomatoes and onions – which provide much higher net revenue margins (Manikowski & Strapasson, 2016) – remains far below expected levels, at just 20%. The authors also noted that while infrastructure remains in good condition, maintenance of canals through dredging threatens longer- term sustainability. In addition to investments in large-scale schemes, the MCC project also invested in building and rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure at a smaller scheme; this scheme faced similar problems to the larger schemes. Estimated rates of return for the SRV large schemes was just 1.8%, and negative for the smaller-scale scheme. A new JICA project (JICA, 2019) also intends to increase rice self-sufficiency to lessen the trade deficit, even though other evidence suggests that vegetable crops give higher net revenues and that urban 7 Pump maintenance at these smaller schemes was in the hands of the parastatal at that time. 25 consumers apparently prefer imported rice (Manikowski & Strapasson, 2016). The JICA project targets two areas that were also targeted by the MCC project, Dagana and Podor, and intends to fund irrigation development and rehabilitation at both small (less than 100 ha) and medium scale schemes. The project document executive summary states that the main constraints to low cropping intensity are deteriorating canal networks and lack of drainage systems, while in section 6, constraints due to availability of seed, and inappropriate operation and maintenance are also mentioned. Yet, the project activities focus overwhelmingly on technical issues. Both the CILSS (1979) document and results presented in the MCC report suggest that in addition to technical issues, O&M problems and market conditions also significantly affected economic rates of return (and thus low fee payments) and threatened longer-term sustainability of funded schemes. Given these experiences in Senegal, plus all of the other empirical evidence, it is unlikely that an overwhelming focus on technical details will ensure sustainability8. Sakurai (2016) evaluated the efficiency of rice production in large and small irrigation schemes operating in the SRV. The author finds that rice farmers in the large schemes receive significantly higher yields and net profits than those in small schemes; the author attributes this to more professional management and ability to take advantage of economies of scale in O&M at the larger schemes. This is the only research arguing that large scheme management may have improved over time as management shifted from a government parastatal to irrigator unions; but, since the analysis focused on household level data, this remains a hypothesis regarding the relatively better performance of large-scale schemes. The results also focus on irrigator profitability, and do not consider negative environmental impacts. For instance, Manikowski & Strapasson (2016) document a wide range of negative externalities, including large losses from loss of inland fishing, loss of forest products, loss of wetlands and mangrove lands, and negative health impacts; the authors argue that the negative impacts far outweigh any positive benefits to farmers9. The authors also show that onion and tomato farming provides much higher net revenues, but irrigated crop production still overwhelmingly favors rice production. The latter may be due to 8 While the document gives more details on the technical work, it may be that the short descriptions of supporting farmer groups to undertake O&M and maintenance may be more sophisticated than what appears in the proposal; however, the proposal only mentions “tools” to be used by farmers organizations on which they will be trained, and four sentences on sub-component 3.2, enhancing the capacity of farmer organizations, and a list of O&M Manuals to be produced under sub-component 3.4. 9 It remains unclear from the literature how much of these losses are actually due to dam construction and completely controlled irrigation; CILSS (1979) note that flood recession agriculture had been largely abandoned due to the droughts in the 1970’s, which continued into the 1980’s while Manikowski & Strapasson assume that all of the land use changes were due to the dams alone. Likely, it is somewhere in between. 26 “lock-in” in terms of value chain development, long-standing contractual relationships, and government policies and donor programs to promote rice production for self-sufficiency as identified in the JICA (2019) proposal. Some recent investments in irrigation by donors have focused on small schemes and even individual adoption of pumping equipment, including the promotion of solar-powered pumps and drip irrigation kits (Feed the Future, 2022). Smaller schemes tend to focus on vegetable and fruit production; Paglietti & Machado (2016) calculate that these small-scale schemes provide 90% of vegetables sold in the local market. There is limited recent evidence of how these schemes are performing, and the extent to which solar powered and/or drip irrigation systems are generating profits and are being maintained over time. To date, most evidence suggests that pump-based systems are more likely to be adopted by wealthier, male farmers (Kafle et al., 2022; Namara et al., 2014; Ringler et al., 2020), but it is too early to determine whether more recent projects have been able to reach a broader range of farmers. More research on how to increase women’s access to irrigation systems is needed. In summary, there may be opportunities to support large-scale scheme rehabilitation, but the extremely limited empirical evidence on their functioning – and any additional negative environmental and social externalities that might be generated with rehabilitation – seriously hampers the development of credible project proposals. The strong emphasis on rice-only cultivation in large schemes needs to be reconsidered in light of market conditions for rice versus horticulture crops. More serious attention is needed to understand how best to incentive irrigators to pay fees and contribute to maintenance and improve the functioning of WUAs, outside of vaguely expressed trainings and operations manuals. Secondly, support to smaller-scale pump-based operations is more likely to be successful where motorized pumping is combined with affordable energy such as solar and access to maintenance and repair service providers. Water quality monitoring systems should also be in place, to monitor water table levels and variability as well as salinization to improve management and use, and to help those dependent on groundwater pumping to devise mechanisms to avoid negative environmental impacts of over-extraction. 6.2 Zambia Zambia is a landlocked country in Eastern Africa and, outside of its northern province, slated to become hotter and drier with climate change (Hamdudu & Ngoma, 2020). Irrigation has been expanding relatively slowly but steadily since the 1980s, increasing from just 20,000 ha in 1985 to about 160,000 27 has by 2010 (Akayombokwa et al., 2015), though still well below the 2.75 million ha with irrigation potential (MACO/FAO, 2004). In contrast to Senegal, the largest fraction of irrigated land is irrigated by smallholders using private equipment to extract water, primarily from shallow aquifers and wetlands, and to a lesser extent, river diversions (Akayombokwa et al., 2015). Using nationally representative survey data, Ngoma et al. (2019) find that 18% of households irrigate at least one plot, often for cultivating vegetables and fruit. However, 85% of irrigators rely on bucket irrigation so that irrigated plots are very small. Survey results also showed that just 4.6%, 3.6% and 2.6% of irrigators used motorized pumps, irrigation canals, and hand/treadle pumps, respectively. van Koppen et al. (2012) purposively selected four districts and locations within those districts where irrigation was extensively practiced in order to evaluate which technologies were best adapted to local conditions. The authors found that bucket irrigation is still the predominant technology, though river diversion and canal systems were adopted by 47% of irrigators in Mpika district, while 28% of irrigators used motor pumps in Chibombo district. Very few irrigators had adopted manual pumps. It is worth noting that treadle pumps have been widely promoted by international donors and NGOs for at least the last two decades (Merrey et al., 2008), but adoption of manual pumps remains limited (Ngoma et al., 2019); and are unlikely to grow in use as motorized pumps have become more available. Van de Zande (2022) find that farmers overwhelmingly prefer motorized pumps in Ethiopia, Kenya and Zambia, though they also prefer solar panels to provide energy for those pumps. The authors also note two additional features of pump systems that are attractive to farmers but generally neglected in the literature, that the pumps be portable so they can be secured at night preventing theft, and the ability of the system to generate sufficient additional electricity for home lighting and charging cellphones. Commercially-oriented smallholders also value an irrigation system that can also generate electricity for home appliances. However, the number of people interviewed was quite small, so these remain tentative conclusions. Ngoma et al. (2019) find that those who practice irrigation are found in areas with relatively high seasonal rainfall, consistent with irrigation water availability being dependent on rainfall. This dependence is expected since most irrigators are using water from shallow aquifers and/or wetlands. Other household factors included tenure security, as were wealth metrics; however, the data did not enable the authors to determine causality between wealth and irrigation. With respect to larger irrigation schemes, these are generally associated with private, often outgrower, schemes where the private sector is in charge of O&M, involved in sourcing inputs and are often 28 vertically integrated with agro-processing (Akayambokwa et al., 2015). This is quite different from Senegal and other countries, where most large schemes began as public schemes that subsequently became owned, operated and maintained by the irrigators or irrigators jointly with the government through IMT. Currently, the government is supporting the development of “three tier” irrigation sites that would be operated and maintained by a private investor, with a first tier of irrigators being large- scale commercial farmers using center pivots or other sophisticated water distribution systems, a second tier of commercial-oriented small-scale farmers (between 1 – 5 ha) under sprinkler systems, and smallholders practicing flood irrigation with pumps (Akayambokwa et al., 2015). A number of authors argue that these public-private partnerships using the three-tier model are most likely to generate the greatest net benefits to smallholders and other irrigators, but there is still little hard evidence to support this argument (Akayambokwa et al., 2015; Bangwe & van Koppen, 2019; Hambolo et al., 2019). The authors argue that such schemes efficiently capture economies of scale in O&M, in sourcing inputs and in securing output markets, while reducing or eliminating the transactions costs of cooperation where smallholders are responsible for O&M. On the other hand, a number of other authors question whether the three-tier and similar approaches really reduce poverty and improve food security for the smallholders involved (German & Parker, 2019; Harnish et al., 2019; Manda et al., 2018; Manda et al., 2020; Remy & Cochet, 2019). Remy & Cochet (2019) provide a very detailed analysis of one sub-project under the World Bank’s Irrigation Development Support Program, which was meant to provide irrigation and remuneration to smallholders affected by the development of the Kariba dam, constructed in 1959. The authors documented the long delays, and argued that the smallholders had not been adequately compensated for lost land, equipment and in some cases, houses; additionally, they question whether the large commercial irrigators would pay a fair rental, since how rent will be set and shared remains unclear eight years after the project began. Evidence from South Africa suggests that PPP schemes often do not provide medium- to long-term benefits, often because the large irrigators and/or the private investor pull out of such investments when they themselves do not realize sufficient profits (van Averbeke et al., 2011). In summary, given this mixed evidence on the performance of PPP’s with respect to productivity and poverty reduction – especially for newer PPP schemes – it is critical to generate additional evidence of the performance of these schemes, particularly for poorer smallholders, and those that have provided their own land to the scheme. With respect to smallholder private investment in irrigation equipment, the evidence suggests that manual pumping options are not attractive to smallholders, but that 29 motorized pumps may become attractive as investment and operating costs decline and financing mechanisms reach more smallholders. In addition to labor costs, another factor that makes manual pumping less attractive is that the shallow aquifers and wetlands that supply water for pumping are highly dependent on rainfall, which is becoming more erratic across most of the country. Accessing somewhat deeper aquifers may provide a more reliable supply, but there is simply too little evidence to understand groundwater dynamics and thus where groundwater may be more reliable across the country. 6.3 Nepal Nepal has a long history of irrigation systems, including government-built and managed systems, as well as many farmer-managed systems. According to the government’s Irrigation Master Plan 2019 (Ministry of Energy, Water Resources and Irrigation (MEWR), 2019), 75% of irrigated land is under farmer- managed systems. Area irrigated has increased to 1.435 million ha in 2019 from about 0.93 million ha in 1990 (MEWR, 2019), most of which is found in the valley areas. Large schemes are either under agency (AMIS) or joint management with the irrigation agency and communities (JMIS), or are farmer managed (FMIS), with about 50% under each system – though the land area in FMIS is only about 15% of AMIS/JMIS land area (MEWR). Most AMIS and JMIS are large schemes that tend to be located in the valleys; they typically encompass multiple communities. These schemes have high capital requirements for maintenance and often face difficulties in fostering community participation in maintenance activities. FMIS tend to be located in the hill and mountainous areas, are much smaller but are also developed by and based within a community, which can lead to less costly O&M. There remains ample scope to extend surface and groundwater irrigation, but there is also scope to increase crop intensity (MEWR, 2019). The new irrigation master plan has ambitions to increase area by 535,000 ha, although many projects to develop these additional irrigated areas will also include hydropower generation. The government of Nepal also intends to continue its Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) policy, and sees four possible organizational entities to which large-scale schemes can be transferred: local government, private operator under contract, water user cooperative (WUC), and joint agency-WUA management. Transfers to local government are likely to be preferred when the hydraulic boundaries of the system fall with a single local government jurisdiction and where local government have the necessary resources or access to resources and both the organizational and technical skills to take over full control; for this capacity building and ongoing support might be needed. Transfers to private operators cannot be done at present due to the lack of civil work contractors with proven capacity; however, the 30 government intends to explore helping to develop this capacity. Transfers to WUC are likely to be preferred when the system is relatively small-scale and O&M is relatively less intensive, though there is limited evidence on how WUCs may perform in the Nepal context. Transfers to agency – WUA joint management has been on-going, but performance is below expectations, with agency underperformance inducing WUA underperformance. As with transfers to private operators, better performance will be related to the ability to establish and maintain a transparent monitoring system that is not too costly. Both government and farmer managed irrigation systems depend on the functioning of WUAs, though to different extents; in AMIS, irrigators retain responsibility for O&M over tertiary systems, while in JMIS, irrigators generally retain responsibility for O&M at the secondary and tertiary levels, and FMIS have full responsibility for the system, though they may receive some government support for high-cost repairs or maintenance (MEWR, 2019). A number of studies have found that farmer managed schemes, which are usually “small” schemes (less than 25 ha following government’s definition), are more likely to be effective at reducing poverty primarily because head and tail end use conflicts are lower, and poor farmers are able to fully control a reliable source of water (Bhatta et al., 2006; IWMI, 2007; IWMI and Earthscan, 2007; MEWR, 2019). ADB (2012) also argues that government managed schemes are more likely to suffer from O&M problems than farmer managed systems; the authors also state that both high quality design and construction as well as well-functioning O&M systems are required to achieve hoped for gains in terms of yields, cropping intensity and poverty reduction. A number of studies find that strong social cohesion, trust in leadership, effective leadership, better quality infrastructure, equitable and transparent enforcement of rules and regulations that are seen as fair, and the capacity to levy sanctions all led to better system performance and irrigator outcomes (Bastakoti et al. 2010; Khanal et al., 2021; Lam, 1998; Ostrom, 2011; Pokharel, 2016; Regmi, 2008; Thapa & Scott, 2019). These findings are quite consistent with the collective action and irrigation literature cited above. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2022) show that there are also additional pressures that may affect performance of farmer-managed irrigation schemes both now and in the future, such as migration by men. The authors show that women irrigators have been able to fill responsibilities initially held by men who now migrate, but the O&M systems themselves need to adjust to less male labor, e.g. by allowing women irrigators to pay for labor services. It should be noted, however, that few of the studies evaluating the performance of farmer managed schemes are based on rigorous research protocols and adequate sample sizes. And, there has been little change in agricultural productivity per hectare over the last few decades, rather, 31 production increases have largely been obtained through expanding land (Anik et al., 2017; MEWR, 2019; NPC, 2017). There is limited empirical evidence on the performance of jointly managed systems. Mishra & Molden (1996) describe the IMT process at the Nepal West Gandak Irrigation System; the authors argue that the process appeared to be successful at least in the short term. The authors argue that this success was due the formation of a system-level WUA and civil works at the main, which motivated the tertiary-level WUAs to become active and to harness resources to maintain tertiary infrastructure. However, Roth & Vincent (2013) find that the West Gandak system had deteriorated, that only 19% of irrigators joined WUAs and that 74% judged that operations were currently poor and worse than before the IMT process began. The authors note that two levels of water user groups were formed, 132 tertiary level groups and 11 WUA federations, of which only a few remained by 1992. Lack of government investment in O&M at the main and secondary levels, poor construction quality at the tertiary level, floods and siltation making maintenance relatively expensive, and the fact that a full transfer of responsibilities was realized soon after all contributed to system decline. On the other hand, the authors argue that joint management at another site, the Khageri Irrigation System, was more successful, and it was also smaller at 3,900 ha. The authors argue that the relatively simpler water control technologies and drawing water from a silt-free river lowered maintenance costs, while rain water scarcity and relatively knowledgeable farmers favored collective action. Roth & Vincent (2013) argue that the IMT process was too top-down, that it was unclear what property would be transferred to the WUAs (land, equipment, forest areas), that WUAs lacked the necessary legal support to enforce their authority to collect irrigation fees, uneven support to participatory processes combined with dominance of government engineers in the process, and the problems created by over-expectations of the extent of government funding for maintenance and repairs. WUAs either evolved over time to manage pressing problems or simply stopped functioning. The authors argue that having design principles based on previous experience for WUA development is useful, but they need to accommodate social and political realities to endure that these institutions are seen as fair and effective by irrigators. But, the authors argue that technical designs are critical and must be matched to the irrigators capacity to implement O&M through WUAs and be consistent with their irrigated farm objectives. Since the early 2010’s, there has been very little research to evaluate which factors and processes support successful joint management, despite the continued IMT process that will likely continue to be dominated by joint management. 32 In summary, large-scale schemes are still the dominant irrigation system in the country and will likely remain so for many years. The government is continuing its IMT process, but very limited evidence suggests that results are likely to continue to be disappointing unless new mechanisms are put in place to take advantage of economies of scale at the main and secondary levels, but capitalize on the ability of WUAs to voice irrigators’ concerns, monitor the condition of tertiary infrastructure, motivate fee payment and maintenance labor where relevant, and address local conflicts. What limited evidence there is points to the need to determine what facets of system O&A should be transferred to which levels especially in larger, more complex systems. Farmer managed systems apparently perform better, and their support particularly in mountainous and hilly regions should promote food security, but outmigration by families and male migration and subsequent land abandonment need to be carefully understood if longer-term objectives are to be met. 7. Research and Management Based on the review of various irrigation sizes and types we propose the following management and research agenda to strengthen the resilience and sustainability of all types of irrigation systems. 7.1. Surface water schemes For surface systems, excessively optimistic expectations of irrigator profitability on behalf of project proposers should be abandoned as they automatically set up systems for failure, particularly if the design and investment incorporate overly complex and expensive system components for which costs can never be recovered and whose maintenance is impossible with local resources. Instead, irrigation system designers need to adapt systems to local capacities, needs and should also consider broader (including multiplier) benefits from irrigation, such as lower local food prices, improved domestic water security, and increased employment opportunities from forward and backward linkages of systems. Second, for all surface systems, more research and capacity building to explicitly reduce transactions costs of collective action capacity is needed. Surface water schemes have potentially large economies of scale in design, construction, and operations, and for major maintenance and repair works. These economies of scale need to be better balanced with potential dis-economies of scale associated with transactions cost of collective action where WUAs are part of the management structure (costs of coordination, cooperation, monitoring and 33 enforcing use rules). More research on the appropriate management of large-scale system through more empowered groups of women and men farmers is needed. For smaller schemes that are more likely to grow a diverse set of more profitable crops, design quality needs to improve to reduce system failure, while research needs to focus on reducing cost and accessibility of service provision for major maintenance and repairs. 7.2 Groundwater irrigation Contrary to surface systems, groundwater irrigation is more naturally fit-for-purpose from a smallholder point of view, except for very small landholdings that might not be able to afford initial investment. Technological advances continue to increase the “divisibility” of pump assets and lower unit costs of pumping. Moreover, informal groundwater markets are common in SA countries allowing smaller farmers to access water pumped by better-off pump owners (Acharyya 2019). Both lower the threshold cropland size. To support expansion of groundwater, new business and finance models that allow smallholders to access the technologies are needed. Evidence strongly suggests that cheaper, non-motorized groundwater extraction is not attractive to smallholders, and thus provides limited climate resilience and food production growth. Key research and management challenges relate to better governance of groundwater resources to avoid over- extraction, groundwater degradation and pollution and to increase replenishment. In a country like Nepal, linkages between springs and ground and surface water supply need to be better understood and springs preserved. More research is also needed to identify current and future renewable locations for groundwater extraction and the impacts of alternative groundwater pumping technologies on environmental sustainability and equity. In almost all – if not all – cases, making and enforcing groundwater regulations has been very costly and not very effective; and, costs of doing so are likely to exhibit diseconomies of scale. More research and pilots are needed to improve groundwater governance everywhere. More research is also needed to incentivize sustainable pumping when farmers switch from fuel to solar-operated pumping systems. We provide a more detailed checklist that irrigation investors should consider in Appendix 1. 34 8. Concluding Comments With respect to surface water schemes, the evidence suggests large economies of scale in design, construction, operations and major maintenance and repair works. In particular, smaller schemes are unlikely to be able to afford major equipment for maintenance or to hire-in expensive services for maintenance and repairs. At the same time, evidence also suggests that there are diseconomies of scale in management and routine maintenance where these activities rely on collective action, and costs of collective action can rise substantially as scheme size increase. Larger schemes can also capture the economies of scale by having professional or parastatal organizations manage the main and secondary infrastructure, and avoid diseconomies of scale by having WUAs manage blocks of tertiary infrastructure. Overall, the evidence suggests that net benefits are likely to be lowest in the medium scale schemes, which fall between 100 – 2250 ha. These schemes are likely to face higher collective action transactions costs than small schemes but are much more expensive to build per ha than larger schemes. A notable caveat is that the net benefits of larger schemes are often calculated without taking into account negative environmental impacts, which can be substantial in some cases. Even when surface water scheme infrastructure is well-built, it may not be fit for purpose. Large scale schemes whose purpose is to ensure national food security are sometimes run by private companies with skilled staff, but they are also often run by parastatals that do necessarily have the incentives to ensure the schemes are effectively managed and maintained. They also often impose fairly rigid rules on types of crops to grow, crop calendars, etc. Large scheme rules and regulations may not align with irrigator’ seasonal budget constraints, crop preferences, household food security goals and market opportunities, while inefficient operations may dampen income from cropping. On the other hand, irrigation water availability at larger schemes are often less dependent on area rainfall than smaller systems, providing greater resilience to weather extremes. Medium-scale schemes often focus on staple crop production. While irrigators may have more leeway to choose crops than those in large systems, when and what to crop are also often regulated. While this may align better with irrigators food security goals, the scheme maintenance needs are often greater than what irrigators can provide given the low value of staple crops. Small schemes allow greater flexibility on cropping activities, and they are more likely to involve high-value cropping. These may better meet irrigators’ objectives, at least where irrigators’ returns are sufficient to cover their share of maintenance needs. However, irrigation water availability is often more rainfall dependent and thus riskier in both medium and small 35 scale schemes vis-à-vis large schemes, which disincentives irrigators from engaging in water sensitive high-value crops and contributing to scheme maintenance. For individual investments in groundwater, there are limited economies of scale, except over a range of very small landholdings that depends on pumping technologies available. Threshold land sizes may also be important when adoption requires cropland to exceed a certain threshold given the currently available technologies. There are potential economies of scale for groundwater service providers, as costs per unit of service delivery will decrease relatively steeply as the number of irrigators increases from a low level. Evidence from Asia suggests that widespread adoption of irrigation can crowd-in additional service providers, giving further incentives to adopt irrigation. There is not much evidence of this occurring in SSA as yet. There are also potentially large diseconomies of scale in regulating groundwater, particularly when there are multiple users and uses of groundwater. There is a good deal of evidence of the costs of overextraction in South Asia and elsewhere, though many countries in SSA are not yet facing such a threat. The primary benefit of individual groundwater pumping is the flexibility it provides to the individual farmer to choose what and when to irrigate, and thus to choose for themselves the purpose of irrigation. Whether a particular project promoting a specific type of groundwater irrigation is fit for purpose depends to a large extent on the net benefits realized from a specific technology. In particular, most evidence suggests that irrigators strongly prefer motorized pumps to manual pumps. Motorized pumps are more likely to require a minimum land size even for high-value crops and thus are more likely to be adopted by relatively wealthier farmers. A project that focuses on manual pumps for affordability in order to increase nutrition and dietary diversity will not be fit for purpose if their target group is unwilling to adopt manual pumps even to cover relatively small areas. Fuel costs will also determine the extent to which irrigators benefit; solar is more expensive to invest in but cheaper to run, while diesel or electric pumps are a cheaper investment but more costly to run (at least without massive subsidies). And, more sophisticated pumps require more sophisticated maintenance and repairs. A project focusing on household food security though high-value crops for home consumption and marketing may not be fit for purpose if it is located in a relatively isolated area with very costly access to spare parts and skilled maintenance people. Finally, if a project focused on building climate resilience is operating without knowledge of the dynamics of the groundwater resource, and there is no effective government 36 regulation of extraction, negative impacts of overextraction may overwhelm benefits to irrigation over relatively short period of time. This too would not be fit for purpose. Turning to our case study findings, the Senegal experience suggests that recent large-scale rehabilitation of surface water schemes has been very expensive, continues to underperform, and faces significant threats to sustainability. This is in part due to the fact that schemes have been asked to recover costs and cover O&M while focusing on food security crops, generally rice in West Africa. Moreover, negative environmental and social externalities have been under-estimated. Irrigation institutions have remained weak and are not fit for purpose in terms of fee recovery and O&M of tertiary infrastructure. Groundwater irrigation has been under-developed, but has recently started to increase from very low levels. While the potential is very high, particularly in Eastern Senegal, appropriate institutions will be required to support sustainable and equitable use. Unlike elsewhere in Asia or Africa, in Zambia, most of the large-scale irrigation infrastructure is operated by the private sector or within the context of public-private partnerships. The government is pursuing a three-tier model of irrigation scheme development, where schemes will include smallholders (< 1 ha), commercially oriented smallholders (1-5 ha) and larger scale commercial farmers. The objective is to capture economies of scale in O&M of main and secondary infrastructure and avoid diseconomies of scale in collective action required for maintaining tertiary infrastructure. These schemes often require smallholders to provide land, labor and other resources. Evidence is both scarce, mainly anecdotal, and mixed. To work, the large commercial farmers and private companies must crowd in market participants and service providers and generate sufficient profits to ensure their effective O&M at the main and secondary levels. With respect to groundwater irrigation, evidence suggests that manual pumps are not attractive to smallholders, and their adoption is likely to continue to decrease as motor pumps become more affordable. However, expansion of motorized pumping remains slow, hampered by the relatively high costs of pumps, fuel and well-drilling, and lack of maintenance and repair services. Nepal has a mix of larger irrigation systems in the lowlands or terai while smaller schemes dominate the more mountainous regions. The government embarked on an IMT program in the 1990s, which is still in progress. The largest schemes tend to still be operated by the government (agency managed irrigation schemes, AMIS), while full transfer has occurred at smaller schemes (farmer managed irrigation schemes (FMIS). The legal framework allows for jointly managed systems (JMIS), but there is limited evidence on how widespread and/or effective these systems are. Some research suggests that problems with agency maintenance of the main and secondary infrastructure has had negative impacts 37 on WUA performance. Some evidence also suggests unclear roles and responsibilities at different administrative levels have also hindered performance. There has been almost no research evaluating and comparing scheme performance across the AMIS, JMIS and FMIS in the past ten years (at least, no research available in English). A unique feature of agriculture and irrigation systems in Nepal is the growing number of women responsible for scheme operation due to the high share of men migrating abroad for work. Groundwater irrigation continues to expand, mainly via shallow tubewell irrigation. At least in the Terai, there is potential to continue expansion, which is slowed by fuel costs, relatively high costs to buy or rent pumps, delays when pumping equipment is shared by a group, and difficulties in repairing broken pumpsets. In the mid-hills, lift irrigation is practiced but very costly due the high lift that needs to be covered by the pumps. Overall, the evidence shows both successes and failures at multiple scales for surface water schemes and for projects promoting groundwater adoption, the latter particularly in Africa. The results also suggest the factors that must be included when designing an irrigation investment for systems of both types and all sizes. 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Markets for inputs and crop outputs are well-developed, and irrigators can make sufficient profit to afford O&M fees under a range of input and crop prices d. Where the scheme will be used intensively; irrigators have incentives to crop at least two seasons (low opportunity costs of allocating labor to cropping across all relevant seasons) e. Where relevant, irrigators have the incentives and management capacity to provide labor for maintenance at the tertiary level. f. Scheme provides sufficient water on time g. Irrigation water availability is sufficient and reliable h. Flexibility in system operation to allow farmers some independence in crop choice i. Rainfall is low and unreliable j. Land and water tenure security k. Limited environmental impacts l. Equitable access, for example, through inclusive WUAs Medium Schemes: a. Moderate economies of scale in construction and scope of O&M b. Local availability of goods and services to repair and maintain scheme (e.g. equipment for desilting) c. Markets for inputs and crop outputs are sufficiently developed, and irrigators can make sufficient profit to afford O&M fees under most input and crop price realizations d. Well-defined and clear roles and responsibilities for polycentric governance, especially where schemes must rely on periodic costly maintenance and repair work 51 e. Proven capacity of water user groups to pay fees and provide labor for scheme maintenance at the tertiary, or perhaps even secondary, levels. f. Tenure security for irrigators, any potential land conflicts resolved Small Schemes a. If constructed for multi-season irrigation, irrigators have incentives to irrigate, e.g. when there are limited off-farm opportunities or where irrigation provides relatively high returns b. If irrigators mainly crop subsistence crops, the system must be relatively low maintenance by design c. Availability of materials for routine O&M and small repairs d. State willing to retain some responsibility for larger-scale maintenance e. Proven capacity of water user groups to pay fees and/or provide labor for routine scheme maintenance at all operational levels. Groundwater 1. Target irrigator group has the capacity and incentives to invest in groundwater pumping equipment 2. Diesel or electricity needed to operate motorized pump is reliable and affordable; alternatively solar pumps are accessible / affordable 3. Irrigators can be trained in routine pump maintenance 4. Availability of spare parts, repair service providers 5. Legal framework for monitoring and managing use of groundwater 6. Capacity to enforce legal framework 7. Schemes can support multiple water uses, including domestic uses 52 ALL IFPRI DISCUSSION PAPERS All discussion papers are available here They can be downloaded free of charge INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE www.ifpri.org IFPRI HEADQUARTERS 1201 Eye Street, NW Washington, DC 20005 USA Tel.: +1-202-862-5600 Fax: +1-202-862-5606 Email: ifpri@cgiar.org