2023 FSIN Joint analysis for better decisions Food Security Information Network 2 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 Required citation FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises. 2023. GRFC 2023. Rome. All rights reserved. Reproduction and dissemination of material in this information product for educational or other non-commercial uses are authorized without any prior written permission from the copyright holders provided the source is fully acknowledged. Reproduction of material in this information product for resale or other commercial purposes is prohibited without written permission. Applications for such permission should be addressed to the Food Security Information Network Secretariat, email: fsin-secretariat@wfp.org The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food Security Information Network (FSIN), its constituent parties and its partners concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. ©FSIN 2023 3 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 Acknowledgements et Nutritionelle et Nutritionelle de la sécurité alimentaire de la sécurité alimentaire y Nutrición y Nutrición en Fases en Fases Clasi�cación Integrada de la Seguridad Alimentaria en Fases Clasi�cación Integrada de la Seguridad Alimentaria en Fases CLUSTER Global NUTRITION This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the European Union. This report was made possible in part through support provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development's Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Agency for International Development. The collaborative process that produced the seventh annual Global Report on Food Crises 2023 started in December 2022 and was made possible through the commitment of individuals and partner organizations. The drafting and review process of the GRFC is facilitated by the Secretariat of the Food Security Information Network and relies on the contribution of data, technical expertise, feedback and participation of individuals from the 16 GRFC partner organizations.   Special thanks to the FSIN team who once again worked tirelessly to produce the document, listen to reviewers and enrich the product based on their feedback; the Senior Committee who provided guidance; the Technical Working Groups who brought their knowledge and expertise to deepen the analysis; and the communications colleagues who ensure that the findings and messages of the GRFC are known. Thanks are also extended to all the individuals based in regions and countries who brought their expertise to the product. The names listed below are by no means exhaustive for a product of this nature:  FSIN Secretariat Federica Carfagna, Lynn Clark, Carlos Manuel Estevez Reyes, Giulio Fabris, Maria Paola Guerra, Sue MacDonald, Sara Mchattie, Patricia Velasco, Emily Olsson, Anna-Leena Rasanen, Annika Stanley and Katy Williams.  GRFC partners  Anteneh Dobamo, Lavinia Antonaci, Immaculate Atieno, Vicente Anzellini, Andrew Beckingham, Helene Berton, Eric Branckaert, Ennie Shonhiwa Chikwanha, Sophie Chotard, Alessandro Costantino, Anne Celine Delinger, Nana Dlamini, Abdi Fidar, Gwenaelle Garnier, Valerie Gatchell, Nick Goetschalckx, Shannon Hayes, Nikki Alexandra Herwanger, Tim Hoffine, Lena Hohfeld, Arif Husain, Baoua Issoufou, Sally James, Douglas Jayasekaran, Damien Joud, Kudzayi Kariri, Brenda Lazarus, José Lopez, Oliver Maes, Hamadoun Mahlamoudou, Abdul Majid, Williams Massaoud, Aurélien Mellin, Quraishia Merzouk, Naser Mohmand, Charity Mumbua, Anuradha Narayan, Mary Njenga, Theuri Terry Njeri, Cinzia Papavero, Jonathan Pound, Hasina Rakotomanana, Felix Rembold, Brendan Rice, Javier Rodriguez Corrales, Vanessa Roy, José Ruiz Espí, Luca Russo, Mohamed Salem, Duncan Samikwa, Edgar Scrase, Ricardo Sibrián, JungEun Sohn, Christine Strassmaier, Ahmed Sulaiman, Felicia Takavarasha, Gaolathe Thobokwe, Philippe Tomas, Laura Tosi, Monika Tothova, Jose Manuel Veiga Lopez-Pena, Roosmarijn Verstraeten, Joseluis Vivero, Rob Vos, Anne Wagner, Lisamarie Zammit and Mario Zappacosta. 4 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 Wasting Pregnant and lactating women Contents Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 THE GLOBAL REPORT ON FOOD CRISES 2023 | IN BRIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 CHAPTER 1 A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF FOOD CRISES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 What is the Global Report on Food Crises? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Spotlight | The impact of the war in Ukraine on global food crises . . . . . . . . 13 Spotlight | Timely action saves lives and money . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Acute food insecurity overview, 2022–23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Table of acute food insecurity estimates, 2021–23 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 CHAPTER 2 REGIONAL OVERVIEWS OF FOOD CRISES IN 2022 . . . . . . . .35 Central and Southern Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 East Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 West Africa and the Sahel, and Cameroon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 Latin America and the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Middle East and North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Spotlight | Countries of concern with data gaps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 CHAPTER 3  MAJOR FOOD CRISES IN 2022 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 Angola (Cunene, Huíla and Namibe) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Bangladesh (Cox’s Bazar) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Cameroon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Central African Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 Colombia (refugees and migrants) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .84 Democratic Republic of the Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85 Dominican Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .88 Eswatini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89 Ethiopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93 Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Honduras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104 Madagascar (Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109 Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Mauritania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Myanmar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 Namibia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120 Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Pakistan (Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 Palestine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .129 Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .134 Sri Lanka . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .138 Syrian Arab Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .140 United Republic of Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .144 Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149 Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .154 TECHNICAL NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .156 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .170 The Global Network Against Food Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 Trends graphs for numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 2 or above . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 Map disclaimer The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on all the maps in this document do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Dotted line represents approximately the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir agreed upon by India and Pakistan. The final status of Jammu and Kashmir has not yet been agreed upon by the parties. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas). Acutely food-insecure people Host communities Conflict/insecurity Displacement camps Infectious diseases Weather extremes/drought Weather extremes/flooding Health and nutrition services Food insecurity/lack of access to healthy diets Maternal and child-feeding practices Nutrition Economic shocks Agricultural pests Livestock Displacement – Returnees Displacement – Refugees Displacement – Internally displaced people (IDPs) Key to icons 5 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 3RP Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan ACAPS Assessment Capacities Project ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project ALG Liptako–Gourma Authority (Autorité de Développement Intégré de la Région du Liptako Gourma) AMN Acute malnutrition AML African migratory locusts ARI Acute respiratory infection ASAL Arid and semi-arid lands ASAP Anomaly Hotspots of Agricultural Production AWD Acute watery diarrhoea BAY Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states (Nigeria) CADC Central America Dry Corridor CARI Consolidated Approach to Reporting Indicators of Food Security CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CEPAL United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean CH Cadre Harmonisé CILSS Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control CONASUR Conseil National de Secours d’Urgence et de Réhabilitation, (National Emergency Response and Rehabilitation Council), Burkina Faso  COVID-19 Coronavirus disease 2019 CPI Consumer Price Index DEVCO International Cooperation and Development of the European Commission DGPC Direction Générale de la Protection Civile (Haiti) DHS Demographic and Health Survey DRC Danish Refugee Council DRPIA Direction Régionale de la Protection Industrielle et Animalière DTM Displacement Tracking Matrix ECHO European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations of the European Commission EC-JRC European Commission – Joint Research Centre ECLAC United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States (Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO)) EFSA Emergency Food Security Assessment ENCOVI Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida EIU Economist Intelligence Unit ENA Essential Needs Assessment E-VAC Emergency Vulnerability Assessment Committee FAO Food and Agriculture Organization FAO-GIEWS FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture FCS Food Consumption Score FCT Federal Capital Territory FEWS NET Famine Early Warning Systems Network FSC Food Security Cluster FSIN Food Security Information Network FSNAU Food Security and Nutrition Assessment Unit FSNMS Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System FSNWG Food Security and Nutrition Working Group GAM Global Acute Malnutrition GDP Gross Domestic Product gFSC Global Food Security Cluster GHO Global Humanitarian Overview GNAFC Global Network Against Food Crises GNC Global Nutrition Cluster GRFC Global Report on Food Crises HDI Humanitarian Development Index HIV/AIDS Human immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired immune deficiency syndrome HNAP Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme HNO Humanitarian Needs Overview HRP Humanitarian Response Plan ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDMC Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre IDP Internally displaced people IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development (in Eastern Africa) ILO International Labour Organization IMF International Monetary Fund INGD National Institute for Disaster Management (Mozambique) IOM International Organization for Migration IPC Integrated Food Security Phase Classification IPC FRC Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Famine Review Committee ISCG Inter Sector Coordination Group (Bangladesh) IYCF Infant and Young Child Feeding JME Joint Malnutrition Estimates JMP Joint Monitoring Programme JRP Joint Response Plan LGA Local government area MAD Minimum Acceptable Diet MAM Moderate Acute Malnutrition MCNA Multi-Cluster Needs Assessment MDD Minimum Dietary Diversity MENA Middle East and North Africa MFB Minimum Food Basket MICS Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey MoH Ministry of Health MPI Multidimensional poverty index MUAC Mid-Upper Arm Circumference NFSS Nutrition and Food Security Surveillance NGCA Non-Government-Controlled Area (Ukraine) NNS National Nutrition Survey NRC Norwegian Refugee Council OAS Organization of American States  OCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights PCBS Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics PDM Post-Distribution Monitoring PLW Pregnant and lactating women R-ARCSS Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan REVA Refugee influx Emergency Vulnerability Assessment RMRP Refugee and Migrant Response Plan RPCA Food Crisis Prevention Network (Réseau de Prévention des Crises Alimentaires) RRM Rapid Response Mechanism (Yemen) SADC Southern African Development Community SAM Severe Acute Malnutrition SBA Sana’a-based Authority (Yemen) SDG Sustainable Development Goal SEFSEC Socio-Economic & Food Security Survey (Palestine) SENS Standardised Expanded Nutrition Survey SFSA Seasonal Food Security Assessment SICA Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana SISAAP Système d’Information sure la Sécurité Alimentaire et d’Alerte Précoce SMART Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions SMEB Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket SNNPR Ethiopian Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region SOFI The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World TWG Technical Working Group UBOS Uganda Bureau of Statistics UEMOA Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine UN United Nations UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNRWA UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East USAID United States Agency for International Development USD United States dollar VAC Vulnerability Assessment Committee VASyR Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene WB World Bank WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization WoAA Whole of Afghanistan Assessment ZimVAC Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee Acronyms 6 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 More than a quarter of a billion people are now facing acute levels of hunger, and some are on the brink of starvation. That’s unconscionable. This seventh edition of the Global Report on Food Crises is a stinging indictment of humanity’s failure to make progress towards Sustainable Development Goal 2 to end hunger, and achieve food security and improved nutrition for all. In fact, we are moving in the wrong direction. Conflicts and mass displacement continue to drive global hunger. Rising poverty, deepening inequalities, rampant underdevelopment, the climate crisis and natural disasters also contribute to food insecurity. As always, it is the most vulnerable who bear the brunt of this failure, facing soaring food prices that were aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic and, despite some declines, are still above 2019 levels due to the war in Ukraine. All this, while humanitarian funding to fight hunger and malnutrition pales in comparison to what is needed. This crisis demands fundamental, systemic change. This report makes clear that progress is possible. We have the data and know-how to build a more resilient, inclusive, sustainable world where hunger has no home — including through stronger food systems, and massive investments in food security and improved nutrition for all people, no matter where they live. With collective action and a commitment to change, we can ensure that every person, everywhere, has access to the most basic of human needs: food and nutrition. António Guterres Secretary-General of the United Nations Foreword © U N PH O TO /M ARK G ARTEN 7 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 Source: IPC TWG 2022, CH 2022, HNO 2022 and 2023, REACH 2023 . DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO ETHIOPIA AFGHANISTAN NIGERIA YEMEN MYANMAR SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC SUDAN UKRAINE PAKISTAN 0 5000000 10000000 15000000 20000000 25000000 30000000 Ukraine Colombia Tot Sudan Syrian Arab Republic Myanmar Yemen Afghanistan Nigeria Ethiopia Democratic Republic of the Congo 0 5000000 10000000 15000000 20000000 25000000 30000000 Ukraine Colombia Tot Sudan Syrian Arab Republic Myanmar Yemen Afghanistan Nigeria Ethiopia Democratic Republic of the Congo 0 5000000 10000000 15000000 20000000 25000000 30000000 Ukraine Colombia Tot Sudan Syrian Arab Republic Myanmar Yemen Afghanistan Nigeria Ethiopia Democratic Republic of the Congo 0 5000000 10000000 15000000 20000000 25000000 30000000 Ukraine Colombia Tot Sudan Syrian Arab Republic Myanmar Yemen Afghanistan Nigeria Ethiopia Democratic Republic of the Congo 0 5000000 10000000 15000000 20000000 25000000 30000000 Ukraine Colombia Tot Sudan Syrian Arab Republic Myanmar Yemen Afghanistan Nigeria Ethiopia Democratic Republic of the Congo 3 .8M 23 .6M 15 .2M 18 .3M 13 .8M 6 .1M 5 .6M11 .7M 22 .6M Countries/territories with the highest numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent in 2022 and the share of analysed population in these phases IPC/CH Phase 5 Non IPC/CH moderate + severe acute food insecurity IPC/CH Phase 3+ Non IPC/CH moderate + severe acute food insecurity IPC/CH Phase 4 IPC/CH Phase 3 Numbers of people in: Share of analysed population in: 8 .9M 12 .1M 8 .6M 3 .1M 26% 21% 12% 46% 55% 27% 55% 24% 25% 43% 1 .2M 6 .0M 2 .6M 31 000 IPC/CH Phase 1+2 and non IPC/CH food secure + marginally food secure IPC/CH Phase 3+ and non IPC/CH moderate + severe acute food insecurity Total population of GRFC countries/territories The Global Report on Food Crises 2023 | In brief The findings of the GRFC 2023 suggest that achieving the goal of ending hunger by 2030 is ever more challenging as the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity has increased for the fourth consecutive year. Nearly 258 million people in 58 countries/territories were in Crisis or worse acute food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above, or equivalent) in 2022 – up from 193 million in 53 countries/territories in 2021. As the graph (top right) shows, while there has been an increase in the population analysed, this is the highest on record since the GRFC started reporting these data in 2017. This marks the fourth consecutive year of rising numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent due to persistently high numbers in some countries, worsening situations in others, as well as increased analysis. More than 40 percent of the population in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent in the GRFC 2023 resided in just five countries/territories – the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Nigeria (21 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT)) and Yemen. People in seven countries faced extreme lack of food even after full employment of coping strategies at some point during 2022. More than half of the 376 400 people in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) were in Somalia (214 100), but these extreme conditions also affected populations in South Sudan (87 000), Yemen (31 000), Afghanistan (20 300), Haiti for the first time in GRFC history (19 200), Nigeria (3 000) and Burkina Faso (1 800). Around 35 million people were in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) in 39 countries. No disaggregated data by IPC phase were available for Ethiopia or Zimbabwe in 2022. Households in this extremely severe situation face large food gaps, which are either reflected in high acute Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 . 253M people were in Stressed (IPC/CH Phase 2) in 41 countries/ territories with IPC/CH analyses 258M people – 22 .7% of the analysed population – in 58 countries/territories faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2022 Number of people in GRFC countries/territories facing acute food insecurity, 2016–2022 Source: FSIN, using data from 2016–2022 . The Global Report on Food Crises 2023 estimates that over a quarter of a billion people were acutely food-insecure and required urgent food assistance in 58 food-crisis countries/ territories in 2022. This is the highest number in the seven-year history of the GRFC. What is the GRFC? The GRFC 2023 is a collaborative effort among 16 partners to achieve an independent and consensus- based assessment of acute food insecurity that informs humanitarian and development action. Published by the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) in support of the Global Network against Food Crises (GNAFC), the GRFC is the reference document on global, regional and country-level acute food insecurity in 2022. The analysis is based mainly on data obtained through the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) or the Cadre Harmonisé (CH), which estimate the populations in need of food, nutrition and/or livelihood assistance. When data from these sources are not available, the GRFC utilizes the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), the World Food Programme’s (WFP) Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators (CARI) and country-specific Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNO). 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000 M IL LI O N S 1600 1200 800 400 0 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 105 .0 123 .5 112 .7 134 .8 155 .3 192 .8 257 .8 48  countries 51  countries 53  countries 55  countries 55  countries 53  countries 58  countries 8 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 malnutrition rates and excess mortality or mitigated by use of emergency coping strategies. Around half of the total population identified in IPC/CH Phase 4 was found in four countries – Afghanistan, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Sudan. Recurrent shocks are driving up acute food insecurity The food crises outlined in the GRFC are the result of interconnected, mutually reinforcing drivers – conflict and insecurity, economic shocks and weather extremes. In 2022, these key drivers were associated with lingering socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19, the knock-on effects of the war in Ukraine and repeated droughts and other weather extremes. Conflict/insecurity was the most significant driver in 19 countries/territories where 117.1 million people were in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent. This is fewer than in 2021 when conflict was considered the main driver across 24 countries/territories with 139 million people in these phases of acute food insecurity. The lower estimate is because economic shocks surpassed conflict as the main driver of acute food insecurity in three countries still affected by protracted crises – Afghanistan, South Sudan and the Syrian Arab Republic. Six of the seven countries/territories with populations facing Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) – Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan and Yemen – have protracted conflicts, while the very severe levels of acute food insecurity in Haiti are attributable to escalating gang violence in the capital. Economic shocks (including the socioeconomic impacts of COVID-19 and the repercussions of the war in Ukraine) became the main driver in 27 countries with 83.9 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent – up from 30.2 million people in 21 countries in 2021. The economic resilience of poor countries has dramatically decreased, and they now face extended recovery periods and less ability to cope with future shocks. Weather extremes were the primary driver of acute food insecurity in 12 countries where 56.8 million people were in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent, more than double the number of people (23.5 million) in eight countries in 2021. These extremes included sustained drought in the Horn of Africa, devastating flooding in Pakistan, and tropical storms, cyclones and drought in Southern Africa. High levels of child wasting in food‑crisis countries curbs development and wellbeing Malnutrition is multidimensional, and child nutritional status is determined by multiple factors. The GRFC demonstrates that areas with high levels of acute food insecurity tend to have high levels of child wasting, which, when combined, stymie the development and wellbeing of populations in the short, medium and long term. In 30 of the 42 major food crises analysed in the GRFC 2023 where data on malnutrition were available, over 35 million children under 5 years of age suffered from wasting, with 9.2 million of them severely wasted (the most lethal form of undernutrition and a major contributor to child mortality). Out of the total estimated children with wasting in those countries, about 65 percent lived in nine out of the ten countries with the highest number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent. The global food crisis has worsened the undernutrition Primary drivers of acute food insecurity in countries with food crises Food crises are the result of multiple drivers. The GRFC has based this infographic on the predominant driver in each country/territory. * Number of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent. Source: FSIN, GRFC 2023 . 58 countries/ territories 19 countries/ territories (117 .1M people*) 27 countries (83 .9M people*) 12 countries (56 .8M people*) Conflict/ insecurity Weather extremes Economic shocks The impact of the war in Ukraine on food crises around the world Percentage increase (December 2021–22) in the price of staple foods in GRFC‑qualifying countries The war in Ukraine has had an outsized impact on global food systems due to the major contributions Ukraine and the Russian Federation make to the production and trade of fuel, fertilizers and essential food commodities like wheat, maize and sunflower oil. The timing of the war also contributed to this impact as higher international commodity prices in the first half of 2022 compounded the macroeconomic challenges that countries continued to face after the COVID-19 pandemic. This was particularly true for GRFC countries/territories as they were more likely to be exposed to commodity market volatility given many of their positions as low-income net food- importing countries. Although global food prices had fallen by the end of 2022, they remained well above pre-pandemic levels. Domestic food prices, by contrast, experienced an increase but have yet to decline. In fact, food prices increased in all GRFC countries/territories in 2022, with food inflation being over 10 percent in 38 out of the 58 countries/territories with food crises by the end of the year. Their governments’ abilities to mitigate risks and insulate citizens from food price inflation through policy measures, such as stimulus payments and subsidies, was limited given their over-extended public budgets after the COVID-19 pandemic. Nearly all of the countries whose currencies lost value at an abnormally fast rate in 2022 were GRFC countries/territories. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Source: WFP Dataviz, 2023 . <0 percent 0–10 percent 21–50 percent >100 percent11–20 percent 51–100 percent Country not selected for analysisData unavailable 9 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 situation of adolescent girls and women whose livelihoods, income and access to nutritious food have been disproportionately affected by conflict, climate change, poverty and other economic shocks, including that of the COVID-19 pandemic from early 2020 (UNICEF, March 2023). Number of forcibly displaced people in food‑ crisis countries is the highest in GRFC history Displacement is both a driver and a consequence of food insecurity. People forced to flee their homes lose access to their livelihoods (including safe access to food, water and other necessities) while also facing major barriers to income, humanitarian aid, healthcare, and other essential services, exacerbating their vulnerability to food insecurity and undernutrition. By mid-2022, the number of displaced people globally, including refugees, asylum seekers, Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and other people in need of international Source: GRFC Displacement TWG, 2023 .  53 .2M IDPs in 25  food-crisis countries/ territories 72 .8M displaced people 19 .7M Refugees and asylum-seekers in 55 food-crisis countries/ territories Number of forcibly displaced people in food‑crisis countries/territories, 2022 protection, had reached 103 million, around 14 million more people than at the end of 2021 (UNHCR; IOM, December 2022). In 2022, displacement was caused by (i) major conflicts, including the ongoing war in Ukraine and persisting conflicts in the Central Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin and the Middle East; (ii) severe economic crises pushing people to migrate, such as from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and (iii) climate change and weather extremes including the atypical La Niña phenomenon that began in September 2020 and persisted to late 2022, exacerbating drought conditions in the Horn of Africa and causing unusually heavy rainfall and flooding in Asia, East Africa and West Africa. By the end of 2022, nearly 53.2 million people were internally displaced in 25 countries/territories identified as food crises in the GRFC 2023. The countries with the highest numbers of IDPs in 2022 nearly mirrored the list of the 10 food crises with the largest numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent. In 2022, about 19.7 million refugees and asylum seekers were hosted in 55 out of the 58 food-crisis countries/ territories identified in this GRFC edition, marking a significant increase from 15.3 million people in the 52 food-crisis countries/territories in 2021. According to projections available for 38 of the 58 countries/territories as of March 2023, up to 153.4 million people are projected to be in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent in 2023. However, the acute food insecurity situation in these food-crisis countries/territories is likely to be further affected by a number of shocks that occurred in early 2023 and were not factored into the current available estimates. These include tropical cyclone Freddy in Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique, the earthquakes in the Syrian Arab Republic and Türkiye, and the escalating conflict in the Sudan. Around 310 000 people are projected to be in IPC/CH Phase 5 across six countries/territories – Burkina Faso, Haiti, Mali, Nigeria (26 states and the FCT), Somalia and South Sudan with almost three quarters of them in Somalia. No projection data are available for Yemen. In Nigeria (26 states and the FCT), Somalia and Kenya, Numbers of children with wasting in countries with largest numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent in 2022 Estimates for Nigeria cover only the Northeast and the Northwest states while estimates for Democratic Republic of the Congo cover 150 health zones and 189 territories. Data were not available for Ukraine. Source: GRFC Displacement TWG, 2023 .  Myanmar Syrian Arab Republic Pakistan Yemen Sudan Democratic Republic of the Congo Afghanistan Ethiopia Nigeria 5 .93M 4 .80M 3 .22M 2 .78M 2 .75M 2 .20M 0 .64M 0 .36M 0 .29M Children under 5 years with severe wasting Children under 5 years with moderate wasting NIGERIA (Northeast and Northwest states) ETHIOPIA AFGHANISTAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO SUDAN YEMEN PAKISTAN SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC MYANMAR In Afghanistan, very high levels of acute food insecurity and child wasting persisted, underpinned by the lingering impacts of decades of conflict on livelihoods, high food prices and widespread drought. © W FP/PARASTO H AKIM 152 .0–153 .4M people – 18% of the analysed population – in 38 countries/ territories projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PROJECTION 2023 Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 and 2023, Cadre Harmonisé . 251 .0M people were projected to be in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in 34 countries/ territories with available IPC/CH analyses 1 0 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 a total of 8 million additional people are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity in 2023 compared with 2022. In Nigeria, this is primarily due to conflict as well as an increase in analysis coverage, while in Kenya and Somalia it is largely due to the prolonged drought in the Horn of Africa.  Economic shocks are projected to be the main driver of acute food insecurity in most of these countries/ territories as national economic resilience has been severely undermined by a slow recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, further exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. Persisting high food prices coupled with unsustainable debt levels in a number of food-crisis countries amid high interest rates and currency depreciation are expected to further erode households’ food access and constrain the fiscal capacity of governments to deliver assistance. As of March 2023, food prices were at exceptionally high levels in Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Myanmar, Namibia, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan and Zimbabwe. Conflict/insecurity is expected to be the main driver in many countries/territories, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, Yemen, Myanmar and Ukraine. Forecast to return in June 2023, the El Niño phenomenon is likely to result in dry weather conditions in key cropping areas of Central America, Southern Africa and Far East Asia, while excessive rainfall and possible flooding is foreseen in Near East Asia and East Africa.   In Central and Southern Africa, conflict/insecurity are expected to remain the primary driver of acute food insecurity in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, while economic shocks, compounded by the knock-on effects of the war in Ukraine, are likely to further erode the purchasing power and resilience of households. Weather extremes including the February 2023 tropical cyclone Freddy in Madagascar, Malawi and Mozambique will undermine food security throughout 2023. In East Africa, weather extremes including the severe, three-year drought across the Horn of Africa, economic challenges, and conflict and insecurity affecting livelihoods, markets and humanitarian access continue to drive dire levels of acute food insecurity across many countries in 2023. Significant efforts in the scale-up of multi-sectoral humanitarian assistance, supported by slightly more favourable than foreseen rains are contributing to a moderate improvement in some areas, although livelihood recovery will take time. In the Sudan, the onset of clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces in mid-April triggered a suspension of humanitarian assistance and will likely lead to a deterioration of livelihoods, internal displacement and acute food insecurity.  In West Africa and the Sahel (including Cameroon), the levels of acute food insecurity during the June–August 2023 lean season are projected to be the highest on record, driven by worsening conflict and insecurity, particularly in the Central Sahel and Lake Chad Basin areas, and increased economic shocks, including rampant inflation and currency depreciation, notably in Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia. At the country level, the number of people in CH Phase 3 or above is projected to increase in Nigeria (also due to expanding analysis coverage), Burkina Faso, Senegal, Liberia and Gambia – and decline in nine others. Burkina Faso and Mali have populations projected to be in IPC Phase 5. In Asia, economic malaise including high food, fertilizer and fuel prices along with transport and supply chain disruptions, and limited resources to respond to increasing social and economic demands, will continue to drive acute food insecurity in Afghanistan, Bangladesh (Cox’s Bazar), Myanmar and Pakistan. Weather extremes, conflict in Myanmar and the repercussions of decades of conflict in Afghanistan will remain important drivers. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the number of people in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent in 2023 is projected to decline at the regional level, largely due to increased food availability from the 2022 harvests in some countries, but this could be short-lived due to high food prices and low household purchasing power. In Haiti, the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity was projected to increase slightly due to urban insecurity and gang violence, high inflation as well as the lingering impacts of previous natural disasters. In the Middle East and North Africa, acute food insecurity is expected to worsen for Lebanese residents and Syrian refugees in Lebanon driven by further deterioration of the economic situation and rampant inflation. Even before the devastating February 2023 earthquakes, the 2023 food security outlook for the Syrian Arab Republic was precarious. Earthquake- affected areas were home to almost 3 million IDPs, and the destruction and losses of physical capital (especially in agriculture) are estimated at USD 5.2 billion. In Yemen, significantly above-average prices of food and essential non-food commodities are expected to drive large food consumption gaps. Even though active fighting has abated in the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, the impacts of conflict and mass displacement are expected to persist throughout 2023. The way forward The magnitude of people facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above is daunting, but it is that very scale that drives urgency. Earlier intervention can reduce food gaps and protect assets and livelihoods at a lower cost than late humanitarian response. Yet too often the international In Somalia, Famine has not materialized so far and is not expected in the first half of 2023 due to many factors including slightly better-than-expected early 2023 agricultural production and scaled-up multisectoral assistance. © W FP/PATRICK M W AN G I community waits for a Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) classification before mobilizing additional funding. By this stage, livelihoods have collapsed, lives and futures have been lost, and social networks disrupted with deleterious impacts on the lives of an unborn generation. Populations in IPC/CH Phase 3 are already unable to meet their minimum food needs or are compelled to protect food consumption by engaging in coping strategies that will harm their future ability to access food and sustain their livelihoods. In IPC/CH Phase 4, households face large food gaps, which are either reflected in high acute malnutrition levels and excess mortality or mitigated by using emergency coping strategies that severely corrode their wellbeing and livelihoods. Urgent action is needed for households in IPC/CH Phase 3 and 4 to ensure immediate wellbeing, to support their ability to sustain themselves, and to protect families from making choices that are likely to lead to worse outcomes. C H A P T E R 1 A G L O B A L O V E R V I E W O F F O O D C R I S E S Chapter 1 | A global overview of food crises 9 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 report and the GRFC 2023 Mid-Year Update. In 2023, we anticipate producing a GRFC 2023 regional report for West Africa and the Sahel. The GRFC as a global public good: partnership, consultation and consensus The production of the GRFC is coordinated by the Food Security Information Network in support of the Global Network Against Food Crises. It is the product of a collaboration among 16 partners consisting of regional intergovernmental bodies, donors, technical bodies, clusters and UN agencies. The result is an independent reference document that aims for consensus-driven analysis and that has been validated and endorsed by global and regional experts in the fields of food security, nutrition and displacement. All 16 partners participate in the following: • Technical Working Groups (displacement, food security, nutrition) consisting of technical experts from each of the partner agencies who contribute data and analysis, participate in the review of content, and make recommendations to the Senior Committee for endorsement. • Senior Committee consisting of senior representatives from each partner agency who make the final decision on content and coordinate institutional clearance. What is a food crisis? A food crisis occurs when levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition rise sharply at local or national levels, raising the need for emergency food assistance. The GRFC processes aim to distinguish a food crisis from chronic food insecurity based on the interaction of shocks experienced in 2022, and that affect one or more of the pillars of food security: food availability, food access, food utilization and food stability. Food crises are more likely among populations already suffering from prolonged food insecurity and malnutrition, and in areas where structural factors increase their vulnerability to shocks.  What is the Global Report on Food Crises? The Global Report on Food Crises 2023 (GRFC 2023) provides an overview of the world’s worst food‑crisis countries for which external humanitarian assistance was necessary in 2022 . It refers more specifically to a subset of these countries that had available data on which GRFC partners agreed. Its purpose is to be a useful and evidence-based reference document for food security and nutrition analysts, policymakers, decision-makers and advocates. To inform policies and programming that respond to these multidimensional crises, policymakers require clear, timely and reliable data and analyses. However, information is often conflicting and derived from various sources and based on different methodologies that lack a consensus-based standard. The GRFC responds to these constraints by providing information based on a rigorous methodology and a highly consultative process. It provides detailed information about regions, countries and populations experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity in 2022, and projections for 2023. It examines the main drivers of these food crises, and provides analysis of seven years of GRFC data and the latest available information on displacement and nutrition. This global report (GRFC 2023) is part of an annual suite of products, which includes the GRFC 2023 IGAD regional The foundation of the GRFC: an evidence‑based public good A strong partnership A highly consultative process A compilation of multiple consensus-based food security and nutrition analyses A technical document of reference on food crises The GRFC provides several levels of analysis in each chapter . In this 2023 edition, there are three ‘Spotlights’ to provide a more in‑depth analysis and draw the reader’s attention to three major issues: the impact of the war in Ukraine on global food crises; the importance of timely humanitarian action in food‑crisis contexts; and countries of concern with data gaps . Chapter 1 | A global overview of food crises This section presents a thematic analysis of the global food crises of 2022 and projections for 2023, based on the peak estimates for both years. It provides aggregate figures on acute food insecurity, identifies the key drivers and factors contributing to food crises, and presents a focused analysis of the most severe acute food insecurity situations since the GRFC began publication in 2017. In a table, it provides 2021, 2022 and 2023 peak estimates for all GRFC selected food crises. A global brief on displacement and nutrition is also included. Chapter 2 | Regional overviews of food crises This section presents a consolidated food security analysis for six regions – Central and Southern Africa; East Africa; West Africa and the Sahel, and Cameroon; Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; and the Middle East and North Africa – for 2022 and projections for 2023 where available. It also presents nutrition and displacement analyses. Europe is not included since Ukraine is the only country selected and it is included as a major food crisis in chapter 3 while the global impact of the war in Ukraine is included as a spotlight within chapter 1. Chapter 3 | Major food crises in 2022 This chapter features individual analyses of the 42 countries/territories identified as ‘major food crises’. All of them have at least 1 million people or 20 percent of their country population or migrant/refugee population in IPC/ CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent. These country briefs present the 2022 peak estimate of populations in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent, and the highest available projection for 2023. They include maps, a brief narrative on year-on-year changes and seven-year trends where possible, key drivers, as well as information on forcibly displaced populations and nutrition. Technical Notes This section provides the technical details regarding the information described in the GRFC including key terminology, data sources and methodologies, GRFC processes and protocols, as well as comparability challenges and limitations. It also contains references for the categorization of undernutrition and acute food insecurity indicators. Appendices All key terms and terminology used in the GRFC are listed in the Glossary for easy reference. As the GRFC refers to peak estimates of acute food insecurity, appendix 2 provides all available IPC/CH results for specific countries/territories dating back to 2016 where available thus providing additional information to the chapter 3 country briefs, which helps the reader consider the seasonal aspect of acute food insecurity. HOW TO READ THE REPORT FBack to Contents Chapter 1 | A global overview of food crises 1 0 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 Country selection and coverage The GRFC follows a specific process to identify countries and populations within a country for inclusion in the report, to identify which faced food crises and which are major food crises . The consideration of countries/territories for potential inclusion in the GRFC 2023 identified those that experienced a shock in 2022 and for which there was evidence that the magnitude and/or severity of the food crisis exceeded local resources and capacities to respond. Reference is made to countries that requested assistance, as monitored by FAO-GIEWS, or hosted refugee populations. As in past years, the GRFC 2023 did not longlist high-income countries, even if they had populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity, nor did it include countries that did not request humanitarian assistance for populations facing high levels of acute food insecurity. A rigorous selection process has been employed over the seven years of the GRFC’s existence. The selection process for the GRFC 2023 considered 73 qualifying countries/territories for potential inclusion. Following a review of the evidence, the GRFC Technical Working Group validated acute food insecurity estimates for 58 countries/territories, of which 42 were identified as major food crises. In all seven years, 38 countries consistently qualified as food crises, of which 19 were identified as major food crises. See Technical Notes . The selection of countries/territories for inclusion in the GRFC 2023 was based on the availability of data and their methodology meeting the GRFC partners’ specific requirements for acute food insecurity estimates, further described in the Technical Notes. Major food crises were then identified based on the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity. See table, right . PRE-SELECTION OF QUALIFYING COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES SELECTION AND GROUPING OF COUNTRIES/TERRITORIES IDENTIFICATION OF MAJOR FOOD CRISES 48 countries/territories that requested external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by FAO-GIEWS: • i n 2022 or • at least once in the past 3 years or • for at least 3 years in the past 10 years 25 low- or middle-income countries/territories were not selected for analysis by FAO-GIEWS, but requested external assistance as a result of: • hosting refugee populations who were assisted by UNHCR and WFP • having over 1 million or at least 20 percent of its population forcibly displaced • �having populations affected by conflict and insecurity, weather extremes and/or economic shocks Countries were excluded if they were high-income countries, if they did not ask for FAO or WFP assistance, or if the shocks had little impact on food security. 42 of the selected countries/territories were identified as major food crises in 2022 based on meeting one or more of the following criteria: • at least 20 percent of the country population in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent • at least 1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent • any area in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) or above • included in the IASC humanitarian system- wide emergency response level 3 countries/territories identified73 countries/territories identified58 countries/territories identified42 1 2 3 15 of the 73 countries/territories identified had data gaps or did not meet GRFC partners’ requirements to produce estimates of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) or equivalent. The remaining 58 food-crisis countries/ territories are grouped into 7 regions: • Central and Southern Africa • East Africa • West Africa and the Sahel, and Cameroon • Asia • Europe (Ukraine) • Latin America and the Caribbean • Middle East and North Africa countries/territories identified58 FBack to Contents Chapter 1 | A global overview of food crises 1 1 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 Geographical coverage Countries that requested external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by FAO‑GIEWS in 2022, at least once in the past three years or for at least three years in the past ten years Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Kenya, Lebanon (residents and Syrian refugees), Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Uganda, Ukraine, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Countries/territories that were considered for inclusion in the GRFC 2023 Countries/territories that did not meet GIEWS criteria but experienced a shock or shocks to food security in 2022, for which they requested external assistance from FAO and/or WFP Angola, Colombia (residents, refugees and migrants), Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador (residents, refugees and migrants), El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Nepal, Nicaragua, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Peru (residents, refugees and migrants), Philippines, Tajikistan, Togo, Tonga. Countries that did not meet GIEWS criteria but had populations in need of humanitarian assistance as a result of hosting refugee populations who were assisted under the WFP/UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding Algeria (Sahrawi refugees), Egypt (Syrian refugees), Iran (Afghan refugees), Jordan (Syrian refugees), Rwanda (refugees), Türkiye (Syrian refugees). The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Source: FSIN, GRFC 2023 . MAP 1.1 Countries that requested external assistance for food and/or faced shocks as assessed by FAO-GIEWS in 2022, at least once in the past three years or for at least three years in the past ten years Countries/territories that did not meet GIEWS criteria but experienced a shock or shocks to food security in 2022, for which they requested external assistance from FAO and/or WFP Countries that did not meet GIEWS criteria but had populations in need of humanitarian assistance as a result of hosting refugee populations who were assisted under the WFP/UNHCR MoU Indicates migrants/refugee populations (colour coding as shown in this key) FBack to Contents Chapter 1 | A global overview of food crises 1 2 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 * A Famine classification requires evidence on food security, nutrition and mortality at or above IPC Phase 5 thresholds. If there are insufficient data for Famine classification but the available information indicates that Famine is likely occurring or will occur, then the Famine classification is called ‘Famine Likely’. It is important to note that Famine and Famine Likely are equally severe. IPC/CH acute food insecurity phase description and response objectives Phase Phase description and priority response objectives Phase 1 None/Minimal Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income. Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction. Phase 2 Stressed Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies. Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods. Phase 3 Crisis Households either: • have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or • are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies. URGENT ACTION required to protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps. Phase 4 Emergency Households either: • have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or • are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation. URGENT ACTION required to save lives and livelihoods. Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. (For Famine classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)* URGENT ACTION required to revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods. Acute food insecurity data sources Since food security data are derived from varied sources based on different methodologies, the GRFC relies primarily on data from Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and Cadre Harmonisé (CH) analyses . These are government-endorsed, multistakeholder, consensus-based processes that result in a classification of the magnitude and severity of acute food insecurity based on a convergence of evidence and are comparable across countries, i.e. phase classification in one country is equivalent to phase classification in another. They categorize populations into five phases of severity, from Phase 1 (no or minimal acute food insecurity) to Phase 5 (Catastrophe/Famine). See table, right . Through a consensus-based process, country IPC/CH multistakeholder Technical Working Groups generate an estimate of populations in each phase, based on a convergence of available evidence. The GRFC primarily presents populations in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above), who face high levels of acute food insecurity and need external humanitarian assistance to reduce food consumption gaps, and to protect and save livelihoods and lives. Non‑IPC/CH sources When an IPC/CH analysis is not available, the Technical Working Groups evaluate the use of other sources of evidence. These include: FEWS NET analyses which are IPC-compatible; WFP Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators (CARI), which uses household-level analysis to report moderate and severe levels of acute food insecurity, but without comparable disaggregation into Phases 3, 4 and 5 (populations that face ‘moderate acute food insecurity’ and ‘severe acute food insecurity’ as per WFP’s CARI methodology are reported as an approximation to populations facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above); and food insecurity data contained in Humanitarian Needs Overviews (HNOs), which are based on different methodologies and on government-endorsed multistakeholder processes. Not all these methodologies underlying the HNOs ‘Population in Need’ (PIN) estimates are endorsed as acute food insecurity estimates by the GRFC partnership: for example, in the case of Myanmar and Palestine, estimates of acute food insecurity were based on data that did not meet GRFC partnership requirements. However, the partnership gave more weight to the HNO multistakeholder endorsement of PIN estimates for those two countries/territories, which resulted in their inclusion in the report. The GRFC does not include information based on other methodologies that have not been endorsed by the GRFC partnership. These include Household Economy Assessments, the Food Insecurity Experience Scale, rCARI (remote data collection) and single indicators, such as the Food Consumption Score, that only report on one dimension of food insecurity.Desk research complements this acute food insecurity data with other information sources to provide a more comprehensive analysis of each country’s food, nutrition and/or displacement crisis. The global and regional overviews, presented in chapters 1 and 2, collate the country/territory-level data and, in doing so, illustrate the regional and global interconnectedness of the drivers and consequences of food crises. Peak estimates The GRFC 2023 reports the highest estimate of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above) for each country/territory included in the GRFC – also known as the peak estimate – out of all potential analyses available during the year. As acute food insecurity can be seasonal or the consequence of a shock, the peak figure does not necessarily reflect the situation throughout the year in that country and can be based on a projection. In some cases, the analysis spans two calendar years, therefore the peak estimate may straddle both 2021 and 2022, or 2022 and 2023. Data gaps Some countries were considered for inclusion but not analysed for the GRFC 2023 because they faced data gaps, as in the case of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Eritrea. Data gaps can also be driven by lack of processes to systematically collect information and lack of funding to conduct assessments, as well as lack of access due to insecurity. Projections for 2023 IPC, CH and FEWS NET methodologies ‘project’ the acute food insecurity situation based on the most likely expected scenario by developing assumptions on the evolution of food security drivers and their impacts on food security outcomes. As of March 2023, projections were available for 38 of the GRFC 2023 countries/ territories. Six countries had analyses for which the 2022 peak came at the end of the year and extended into 2023. All data presented in the GRFC 2023 are the latest available as of 17 March 2023. FBack to Contents Chapter 1 | A global overview of food crises Spotlight 1 3 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 Spotlight | The impact of the war in Ukraine on global food crises While the war in Ukraine has had devastating impacts on the country and its people, it has also created ripple effects around the world . When the war began in February 2022 – after eight years of conflict in the eastern parts of the country – the global economy was still recovering from the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and many low- and middle-income countries had limited capacity to cope with an additional shock due to growing debt, high inflation, rising commodity prices, slower growth and tightened financial conditions. These macroeconomic challenges intensified with the start of the war and jeopardized the food and nutrition security of millions beyond Ukraine’s borders. Already high prices rose further with the onset of the war The Russian Federation and Ukraine were major suppliers of agricultural commodities, exporting around a quarter of the world’s wheat and barley and more than two-thirds of its sunflower oil in 2021 (FAOSTAT, February 2023). The war, subsequent closure of Ukrainian Black Sea ports and increase in protectionist trade policies led to a sharp contraction in the global supply of staple goods, causing food prices to rise beyond their pre-war high. In March 2022, the global food price index reached its highest level since FAO records began, with the largest spikes seen in the cereal and vegetable oil indices (FAO, February 2023). The war also caused already-elevated fertilizer and freight costs to surge, indirectly placing additional upward pressure on food prices by increasing the cost of production and transport. In 2021, the Russian Federation was the top exporter of nitrogen fertilizers, the second leading exporter of potassic fertilizers and the third leading exporter of phosphorous fertilizers (FAO, December 2022). Although sanctions did not target food or fertilizers, full or partial bans on imports of Russian energy commodities and increased transport and insurance costs contributed to higher fertilizer prices, especially nitrogen-based ones, for which natural gas is a key production input. In response, the Russian Federation imposed a series of export restrictions on food and fertilizers,1 including exports of nitrogen and complex-nitrogen fertilizers, which further complicated the situation (USDA, June 2022). Freight costs also rose dramatically with the lack of access to Black Sea ports, destruction of infrastructure, 1 See the full list of Russian export restrictions here: https://www. foodsecurityportal.org/tools/COVID-19-food-trade-policy-tracker. trade restrictions, increased insurance costs and higher fuel prices. Countries compensated by importing critical components and commodities from different markets, which often increased transit times and costs. Between February and May 2022, the price of transporting dry bulk goods, such as grains, increased by nearly 60 percent and was expected to lead to a nearly 4 percent increase in global food prices (UNCTAD, June 2022). To address potential supply disruptions shortly after the war began, countries introduced export restrictions on food and fertilizers in the form of bans, quotas, licensing requirements and taxes, which were meant to protect domestic supply and contain price increases. However, these measures came at the expense of global markets, fuelling disruptions and further unsettling prices. At this trend’s peak in May 2022, nearly 17 percent of global food Percentage increase (December 2021–22) in the price of staple foods in GRFC-qualifying countries/territories Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Rwanda and Türkiye were selected for inclusion in the GRFC only because they were hosting refugee populations in need of humanitarian assistance. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Final boundary between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan has not yet been determined. Final status of the Abyei area is not yet determined. Source: WFP Dataviz, 2023 . <0 percent 0–10 percent 21–50 percent >100 percent11–20 percent 51–100 percent Country not selected for analysisData unavailable MAP 1.2 FBack to Contents https://www.fao.org/faostat/en/ https://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/ https://www.fao.org/3/cc3317en/cc3317en.pdf https://www.fas.usda.gov/data/impacts-and-repercussions-price-increases-global-fertilizer-market https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/osginf2022d2_en.pdf Chapter 1 | A global overview of food crises Spotlight 1 4 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 and feed exports (expressed in calories) were affected by restrictions implemented across 23 countries (IFPRI, January 2023). International commodity prices have declined but remain well above pre‑pandemic levels Prices for food, fertilizers, energy and freight began to recede mid-2022 due to a variety of factors, but they remain well above pre-pandemic levels. The reduction in commodity exports from the Russian Federation2 and Ukraine was partially offset by exports from countries such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (UNCTAD, June 2022), and from the European Union. The expiry of some countries’ protectionist policies helped to ease upward pressure on commodity prices (IFPRI, January 2023). An additional factor in the fall in global prices and stabilization of commodity markets was the signing of the Black Sea Grain Initiative by the Russian Federation, Türkiye and Ukraine in July 2022. The agreement allowed for the renewal of agricultural commodity exports from selected Black Sea ports in Ukraine, and the concomitant memorandum of understanding facilitated food and fertilizer exports from the Russian Federation (UN, July 2022). The initiative was extended for 120 days in November 2022 and then again in March 2023 for an unspecified amount of time (UN, March 2023). Knock‑on impacts have contributed to a cost‑of‑living crisis The current global inflationary surge started with global supply chain bottlenecks linked to the socioeconomic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and was then exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. Global inflation has been pushed higher since 2021 due in large part to the increase in food prices, reaching a four-decade high of 8.8 percent in 2022 (IMF, October 2022). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that, from 2021 to mid-2022, food price inflation alone eroded global living 2 The Central Bank of Russia stopped publishing detailed trade data with the start of the war in Ukraine, making it difficult to gauge the country’s trade position. The data available suggests that the volume of Russian commodity exports decreased during the first half of 2022 and then increased during the second half. standards at the same rate that headline inflation did over the five years that preceded the COVID-19 pandemic (IMF, September 2022). While every country was negatively impacted by food price inflation and cost-of-living increases (WB, August 2022; WB, February 2023), the magnitude of these impacts was not homogeneous and greatly depended on countries’ exposure and coping capacity. Low- and middle-income countries were more vulnerable (CGIAR, March 2023; IMF, September 2022) and, as a result, millions of people in food-crisis countries/territories were driven back into poverty (UNDP, July 2022). High food prices adversely affect low-income populations, as they spend a larger share of their incomes on food. These households also tended to rely more heavily on cereals and other cheaper, energy-dense foods, which left them more open to the market volatility witnessed during 2021 and 2022 (CGIAR, March 2023). Increasing magnitude and severity of food crises The war in Ukraine intensified the magnitude and severity of food crises by exacerbating food access issues at both the macro and household levels. At the start of 2022, many GRFC countries’/territories’ economies were under fiscal pressure and vulnerable to additional shocks, and were dragged further into a cycle of high prices, inflation, increasing debt burdens and currency depreciation with the onset of the war.3 The ability of governments to mitigate risks and insulate citizens from food price inflation and cost-of-living increases through policy measures, such as stimulus payments and subsidies, was limited given their overextended public budgets after the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, 78 percent of the 42 countries/territories identified as major food crises in the GRFC 2023 were net food importers. Many, especially those in Africa and the Middle East, sourced staple foods from the Russian 3 Many of the countries with food crises had additional underlying drivers that contributed to acute food insecurity and malnutrition, such as conflict and climate shocks. Shares of wheat import volumes from the Russian Federation and Ukraine in 2021, tonnes Shares of sunflower oil import volumes from the Russian Federation and Ukraine in 2021, tonnes ALGERIA DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO LEBANON NICARAGUA SIERRA LEONE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO EGYPT LEBANON MADAGASCAR PAKISTAN 42% (2 .40M) 87% (0 .35M) 88% (16 493) 25% (18 635) 84% (695) 93% (460) 12% (0 .09M) 42% (0 .07M) 21% (0 .53M) 25% (1 .46M) 1% (0 .006M) 11% (2 000) 77% (930) 43% (32 320) 74% (0 .56M) 21% (0 .03M) 54% (1 .35M) 33% (2 .36M) 12% (0 .05M) 1% (229) 23% (270) 32% (24 221) 16% (135) 7% (35) 14% (0 .11M) 37% (0 .06M) 25% (0 .61M) Imports from other countriesImports from UkraineImports from Russian Federation Imports from other countriesImports from UkraineImports from Russian Federation Source: FAOSTAT . Source: FAOSTAT . FIGURE 1.1 FIGURE 1.2 FBack to Contents https://www.ifpri.org/blog/food-export-restrictions-have-eased-russia-ukraine-war-continues-concerns-remain-key https://www.ifpri.org/blog/food-export-restrictions-have-eased-russia-ukraine-war-continues-concerns-remain-key https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/osginf2022d2_en.pdf https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/osginf2022d2_en.pdf https://www.ifpri.org/blog/food-export-restrictions-have-eased-russia-ukraine-war-continues-concerns-remain-key https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1123062 https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1123062 https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2023-03-18/note-correspondents-the-extension-of-the-black-sea-grain-initiative https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/09/09/cotw-how-food-and-energy-are-driving-the-global-inflation-surge https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/b5de315c82b1a3bb32bf30057aad9b74-0320012022/original/Food-Security-Update-LXVIII-Aug-11-2022.pdf https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/b5de315c82b1a3bb32bf30057aad9b74-0320012022/original/Food-Security-Update-LXVIII-Aug-11-2022.pdf https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/40ebbf38f5a6b68bfc11e5273e1405d4-0090012022/related/Food-Security-Update-LXXIX-February-23-2023.pdf https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211912423000056?dgcid=author https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211912423000056?dgcid=author https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/IMF-Notes/2022/English/INSEA2022004.ashx https://reliefweb.int/report/world/addressing-cost-living-crisis-developing-countries-poverty-and-vulnerability-projections-and-policy-responses https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211912423000056?dgcid=author Chapter 1 | A global overview of food crises Spotlight 1 5 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 Federation and Ukraine in 2021, which further increased their exposure to the price fluctuations in global markets. See figures 1 .1 and 1 .2.4 GRFC country/territory import dependence extended to fertilizers from the Russian Federation and Belarus too, with more than 60 percent of them being fully reliant on imports of nitrogenous, phosphate and potash fertilizers – over half of which were countries with major food crises (IFPRI, February 2023). Unlike with food imports, fertilizer dependence was spread across Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. Elevated international commodity prices in 2022 meant that GRFC countries/territories were spending more to import less food and fertilizers, which is particularly detrimental to the net food importers (FAO, November 2022). These widening trade deficits then weakened local currencies. The US dollar appreciation compounded currency devaluations as most commodities on the global market are priced in US dollars. As a result, food and fertilizer imports became even more expensive in these domestic markets, fuelling overall price inflation and restarting the high price cycle (UNCTAD, June 2022). By the end of 2022, food prices had increased in all GRFC countries/territories, with food inflation being over 10 percent in 47 out of the 73 countries/territories (WFP, February 2023). See map 1 .2. The rate of change varied throughout the year as prices for certain foods adjusted with crop seasonality, currency fluctuations and/or policy actions. Moreover, nearly all of the countries whose currencies lost value at an abnormally fast rate relative to the US dollar in 2022 were GRFC countries/territories (WFP, February 2023). See map 1 .3. As GRFC countries/territories sunk deeper into the high price cycle, the ability of governments to cope with the compounding effect of the war in Ukraine was limited by import reliance and high debt obligations after the COVID-19 pandemic. Before the onset of the war, high volumes of debt qualified over 70 countries to participate in the G20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative, and 36 of the eventual 48 participants experienced food crises 4 Total domestic supply of wheat and wheat products, as well as sunflower seed oil, are from 2020. This is the latest data available and indicative of the total supply in 2021 in these countries. in 2022 (WB, February 2023). By the end of 2022, over a quarter of GRFC countries/territories had public debt over 60 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (IMF, October 2022). Governments took some measures (mostly temporary ones) to lessen the burden of high prices on vulnerable households. Several GRFC countries/territories were part of the group that imposed export restrictions to improve domestic availability and prices of certain goods. For instance, Lebanon is imposing an export ban on milled grain products, bread, sugar, fruits and vegetables through the end of 2023. Another group of GRFC countries/territories enacted domestic policies to support vulnerable households. A June 2022 survey by the IMF found that low- and middle-income countries were more likely to implement subsidies, customs duties and/or price freezes rather than cash transfers or voucher programmes (IMF, September 2022). For instance, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and the United Republic of Tanzania provided production support through fertilizer subsidies while the Government of Honduras distributed seeds and fertilizers to households in extreme poverty in vulnerable regions. Despite the implementation of policies to insulate citizens, vulnerable households in GRFC countries/ territories bore the brunt of the impacts. Many had previously taken on debt, sold assets and/or depleted food stocks to cope with the livelihood losses and inflation from the COVID-19 pandemic and had to continue these practices into 2022 (WB, September 2022). To cope with the further reduction in purchasing power, populations with low incomes in both developed and developing countries may be forced to make trade- offs, such as reducing portions and skipping meals, that negatively affect current and future food and nutrition security (FAO, December 2022). A 2022 analysis found that food inflation was associated with higher risks for wasting and severe wasting: across all children aged under 5 years, a 5 percent increase in the real price of food was associated with a 9 percent higher risk of wasting and a 14 percent higher risk of severe wasting (IFPRI, December 2022). Food‑crisis countries with the largest local currency depreciation relative to the US dollar, December 2022–February 2023 The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations. Source: WFP, February 2023 . UKRAINE 29% SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC 92% PAKISTAN 54% SRI LANKA 79% ZIMBABWE 549% DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 81% GHANA 88% SIERRA LEONE 72% SOUTH SUDAN 63% ETHIOPIA 56% EGYPT 94% MAP 1.3 FBack to Contents https://www.foodsecurityportal.org/node/1947 https://doi.org/10.4060/cc2864en https://doi.org/10.4060/cc2864en https://unsdg.un.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/GCRG_2nd-Brief_Jun8_2022_FINAL.pdf https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/economic_explorer/macro-economics/inflation https://dataviz.vam.wfp.org/version2/reports/global-coverage-currencies-jan-2022 https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/debt/brief/covid-19-debt-service-suspension-initiative https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2022/October https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/IMF-Notes/2022/English/INSEA2022004.ashx https://www.imf.org/-/media/Files/Publications/IMF-Notes/2022/English/INSEA2022004.ashx https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099240009222235145/pdf/P17658501ab8730040bdd30a901d04e538d.pdf https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099240009222235145/pdf/P17658501ab8730040bdd30a901d04e538d.pdf https://www.fao.org/3/cc3317en/cc3317en.pdf https://www.ifpri.org/blog/global-food-price-crisis-threatens-cause-global-nutrition-crisis-new-evidence-127-million Chapter 1 | A global overview of food crises Spotlight 1 6 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 Spotlight | Timely action saves lives and money Following the devastating famine in Somalia in 2011, the international community sought to ensure that there would be no repeat of the failures that led to it . Yet more than a decade on, too often the international community waits for a Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) classification before mobilizing additional funding . Decision‑makers should not wait for Famine declarations before scaling up assistance An area classification of Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) is reached when one in five households face an extreme lack of food, about one in three children suffer from acute malnutrition, and two adults or four children in every 10 000 die each day due to starvation or due to the interaction of malnutrition and disease. But areas classified in IPC Phase 3 or 4, particularly if for a sustained period, already have higher-than-average levels of excess mortality and morbidity. In 2011, Somalia experienced a devastating famine that killed over a quarter of a million people – half of them children under the age of 5 (FSNAU, May 2013). Some 43 percent of these deaths – primarily children – occurred before IPC Phase 5 criteria were met and many occurred outside the areas classified in IPC Phase 5 (Maxwell et al ., 2018). In Somalia in 2022, an estimated 43 000 excess deaths occurred – half among children under 5 years old – even after a relatively big scale-up in humanitarian response, due to the impacts of the prolonged severe drought in the Horn of Africa as well as global price rises, ongoing insecurity and the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic (UNICEF & WHO, March 2023). The high levels of acute food insecurity already faced by the 143.7 million people in Crisis (IPC/CH Phase 3) and 35 million people in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) in 2022, combined with the high burden of acute malnutrition in most of the food-crisis countries, already contributed to loss of livelihoods and even death. Equally important is the future impact in terms of people’s physical and mental development, and that of their offspring, and the human and social capital of communities, even nations. Urgent food and livelihood assistance is required for populations in IPC/CH Phase 3 and 4 In IPC/CH Phase 3, households are already unable to meet their minimum food needs and either suffer from those food deficits outright or are forced to make the choice to protect food consumption by engaging in coping strategies that will harm their future ability to access food and sustain their livelihoods. For example, they may sell significant productive assets, forgo essential healthcare, or withdraw children from school so that they can eat. As households start to resort to coping mechanisms, the most nutritionally vulnerable – children, and pregnant and breastfeeding women – will start to bear the consequences of food consumption gaps, resulting in high or above-average acute malnutrition levels. It is at this point that action is needed to ensure immediate wellbeing, support households’ ability to sustain themselves and protect families from the dilemma of making choices that are likely to lead to worse outcomes in the future. Over time, sustained pressure from drivers such as conflict, economic shocks and weather extremes, as well as lack of social support or opportunity to recover from shocks, exhausts people’s abilities to cope. This, in turn, drives further deterioration in household food security and increases reliance on external assistance to manage growing consumption gaps. Under such circumstances, and without successful recovery and development initiatives, there will be a perpetual need for urgent humanitarian action and a growing risk of deteriorating into Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4). In IPC/CH Phase 4, households face large food gaps, which are either reflected in high acute malnutrition levels and excess mortality or mitigated by using emergency coping strategies that severely corrode their wellbeing and livelihoods. For instance, households may turn to eating seeds intended to be used for the next planting season, selling their last breeding animal, or selling their land or house to access food. Assistance is urgently needed in these cases to save households from mortgaging their futures and livelihoods to avoid hunger. Early investment and action not only saves lives – it saves money A 2020 study in Ethiopia found that routine support provided under the Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Programme and humanitarian assistance saved an estimated USD 859 million in one year in reduced aid costs as well as avoided income and livestock losses at the household level. Increased cash/ resilience investments would have increased savings to USD 871 million (Cabot Venton C., 2020). A 2012 modelling study in Wajir county in Kenya estimated the total cost of late humanitarian response to be USD 257 million in a high-magnitude drought affecting 367 000 people (Cabot Venton et al ., June 2012). Following the identification of Risk of Famine in Somalia in 2017, USD 1.1 billion of emergency funding was mobilized and in 2022 the projection of Famine in some areas and among some population groups raised USD 980 million. Despite the evidence about the cost-effectiveness of anticipatory investment, in 2016, 2018, 2019, 2020 and 2021, only around half of that amount was allocated, despite 0.4–0.6 million people remaining in IPC Phase 4 each year (GNFC, 2022). Timely action mitigates intergenerational impacts A Famine classification or projection attracts political attention and resources, but it also signifies political and humanitarian failure. By this stage, lives and futures have already been lost, livelihoods have collapsed, and social networks disrupted with deleterious impacts on the lives of an unborn generation. The Dutch famine birth cohort study that followed children born during the 1944–45 famine found that children who were born or in utero during the famine experienced lifelong challenges including higher mortality and morbidity, and mental health conditions, and that these effects were passed on to the next generations (BMJ, accessed 10 April 2023). The failure to accelerate progress on addressing the drivers of acute food insecurity and undernutrition is perpetuating a system of reliance on humanitarian aid that was not designed or resourced to respond to cyclical and predictable shocks at such scale (Save the Children International and Oxfam International, May 2022). Indeed, the magnitude of people facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above is daunting, but it is that very scale that drives urgency. Earlier intervention can reduce food gaps and protect assets and livelihoods at a lower cost than late humanitarian response. Urgent action is needed for populations experiencing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above Source: IPC . Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income. Phase 1 Minimal Phase 2 Stressed Phase 3 Crisis Phase 4 Emergency Phase 5 Catastrophe/Famine Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress- coping strategies. Households have food consumption gaps with high or above usual acute malnutrition OR accelerated depletion of livelihoods assets OR resort to crisis coping strategies. Households have large food consumption gaps resulting in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality OR face extreme loss of livelihood assets OR resort to emergency coping strategies. Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident. Action for disaster risk reduction and livelihoods protection Urgent action required FBack to Contents Chapter 1 | A global overview of food crises 1 7 | G L O B A L R E P O R T O N F O O D C R I S E S 2 0 2 3 Acute food insecurity overview, 2022–23 In 2022, 258 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 58 countries/territories with available data, up from 193 million in 53 countries in 2021 . This marks the fourth consecutive year of rising numbers of people in Crisis or worse (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent) due to persistently high numbers in some countries/territories, worsening situations in others, as well as increased analysis .  Between 2021 and 2022, there was a 25 percent increase in the total population analysed and a 34 percent increase in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, indicating a year-on-year rise in the magnitude of acute food insecurity in the food crises identified in this GRFC. The prevalence of the population in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent increased from 21.3 percent of the overall analysed population to 22.7 percent between the two years.   When comparing the same 48 countries/territories analysed in 2021 and 2022, the population facing IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent increased from 191.4 million people to 228.6 million and the share of people in these phases from 21.8 percent to 22.5 percent in 2022. There were differences in analysis coverage at country level resulting in a 15.5 percent increase in the analysed population between the two years in these countries. See Technical Notes .  Out of the 58 food-crisis countries included in the GRFC, 42 were identified as major food crises because they had more than 1 million people or 20 percent of the population in IPC Phase 3 or above or equivalent. In the majority of these, levels of acute food insecurity increased and were the highest in the history of the report while in some numbers were stable or declined.   Seven food-crisis countries/territories were included in the report as major food crises for the first time – Colombia (refugees and migrants), Dominican Republic, Guinea, Mauritania, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Lebanon – either because data became newly available or levels of acute food insecurity increased to the extent that they met the inclusion thresholds. *This includes people facing IPC/CH Phase 5 outside of the peak period of acute food insecurity in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso and Nigeria. **No data disaggregated by phase are available for these countries/ territories. Source: IPC TWGs, 2022; HNO; WFP CARI; FEWS NET . Source: IPC TWGs, 2022 . 54 .2M of them were in seven countries/ territories with HNO analyses** 19 .0M of them were in seven countries with WFP CARI analyses** 5 .5M of them were in three countries with FEWS NET analyses** 253 .0M people were in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) in 41 countries/territories with IPC/CH analyses 179 .0M of them were in 41 countries/ territories with IPC/CH analyses 258 .0M people – 22 .7% of the analysed population – in 58 countries/territories faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2022 143 .7M 35 .0M 0 .38M* - 50,000,000 100,000,000 150,000,000 200,000,000 250,000,000 CARI IPC/CH FEWS HNO ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY PEAK 2022 Populations in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2022 Seven countries/territories had populations in Catastrophe (IPC/CH Phase 5) at some point during 2022. Of the 376 000 people in this phase, 57 percent of them were in Somalia and 23 percent in South Sudan. In Yemen, Afghanistan, Haiti, Nigeria and Burkina Faso, populations in this phase have also been identified in the course of 2022. See figure 1 .3. Famine (IPC/CH Phase 5) is used to classify an area in which there is evidence that levels of acute food security, acute malnutrition and mortality are widespread and critical – at or above IPC/CH Phase 5 thresholds.  In localized parts of Somalia and Yemen, a Risk of Famine was identified in 2022 according to worst-case scenarios, although it did not materialize in either country. In Somalia, scaled-up humanitarian assistance and better-than-forecast (though still below average) October–December rains gave the country some respite from the prolonged drought and benefited crops and livestock. In Yemen, the return to almost normal functioning of Al Hodeidah port, the truce in hostilities, seasonality and humanitarian assistance prevented a worst-case scenario. Populations in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) in 2022 The population in Emergency (IPC/CH Phase 4) reached 35.0 million people in 39 countries or 4 percent of the analysed population with IPC/CH data. Around half of the total population identified in IPC/ CH Phase 4 were in four countries, each with more than Phase 3 Phase 5Phase 4 Countries/territories with over 1 million people in IPC/CH Phase 4 in 2022 Source: IPC TWGs, 2022; and CH . AFGHANISTAN YEMEN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO SUDAN SOUTH SUDAN PAKISTAN HAITI SOMALIA KENYA NIGERIA - 1,000,000.00 2,000,000.00 3,000,000.00 4,000,000.00 5,000,000.00 6,000,000.00 7,000,000.00 Nigeria Kenya Somalia Colombia Haiti Pakistan South Sudan Sudan Democratic Republic of the Congo Yemen Afghanistan - 1,000,000.00 2,000,000.00 3,000,000.00 4,000,000.00 5,000,000.00 6,000,000.00 7,000,000.00 Nigeria Kenya Somalia Colombia Haiti Pakistan South Sudan Sudan Democratic Republic of the Congo Yemen Afghanistan 6 .1M 3 .8M 3 .1M 2 .6M 1 .8M 1 .5M 1 .2M 1 .2M 2 .9M 5 .6M FIGURE 1.4 14% 18% 4% 6% 23% 13% 18% 9% 8% 1% Share of analysed population in Phase 4Numbers of people in Phase 4 Numbers of people facing Catastrophe in (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 7 countries in 2022 *This is not the same analysis as the one showing the acute food insecurity peak in 2022. No new information by IPC phase was available for Ethiopia in 2022. Source: IPC TWGs, 2022; and CH . SOMALIA SOUTH SUDAN YEMEN AFGHAN