ADDRESSING SEED SECURITY IN DISASTER RESPONS HV 635 .Al c. LINKING RELIEF WITH DEVELOPMENT to ise Sperling, Tom Remington, " Jon M Haugen and Sigrid Nagoda 1 de Agricultura Tropica l for Tropical Agricultura OcRS CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES ' ~ . ., Norwegiar Ministry of <...1 L ADDRESSING SEED SECURITY IN DISASTER RESPONSE LINKING RELIEF WITH DEVELOPMENT /¡ Edited by 1 4 Louise Sperling, Tom Remington, Jon M Haugen, and Sigrid Nagoda UNICA ) O~ 1 1 (J .M tJ. Ctü N y 0~JL.UMI:.I'I¡ACIUN 1 3 f.BR . 2005 ·' '' ,. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Citation: Copyright © lnternational Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) Cali, Colombia L. Sperling, T. Remington, J. M. Haugen, and S. Nagoda (Eds.) 2004. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Reliefwith Development. Cali, Colombia: Intemational Center for Tropical Agriculture. ISBN: 958-694-071-3 ~19 Contents Acknowledgements Dedication Overview of Findings and Reflections Louise Sperling, Tom Remington, Jon M. Haugen Drought, CiviJ Strife, and Seed Vouchers & Fairs: The Role of the Trader in the Local Seed System Steve Walsh, Jean-Marie Bihizi, Christophe Droeven, Bonaventure Ngendahayo, Balthazar Ndaboroheye, Louise Sperling Seed Vouchers & Fairs and Agrobiodiversity in Western Uganda Robbert P. van der Steeg, Tom Remington, Mikkel Grum, Emilly Kemigisha Comparison of Seed Vouchers & Fairs and Direct Seed Distribution: Lessons Learned in Eastern Kenya and Critical Next Steps Michael Makokha, Paul Omanga, Anne Onyango, Jane Otado, Tom Remington The Use of Informal Seed Producer Groups for Diffusing Root-Rot Resistant Varieties during Periods of Acute Stress Reuben Otsyula, Gideon Rachier, Nashon Ambitsi, Roselyn Juma, Christine Ndiya, Robín Buruchara, Louise Sperling The Case of Cassava Brown Streak Disease in Coastal Areas of Northern Mozambique LeifTore Trredal, Trygve Berg Relief Seed Assistance in Ethiopia Paula J. Brame), Sigrid Nagoda, Jon Magnar Haugen, Dereje Adugna, Taye Dejene, Tesfaye Bekele, LeifTore Trredal A Review of Seed Security Strategies in Malawi M. Alexander R. Phiri, Rowland Chirwa, Jon Magnar Haugen Relief Seed Assistance in Zimbabwe Paula J. Brame!, Tom Remington III V V 15 / 29 45 69 ~ 91 111 135 / 159 Acknowledgements This volume results from extensive on-the ground assessments in seven African countries. There are many people to thank for its coming to fruition. Two sets of donors had the vision to fund comprehensive follow-up of emergency interventions. From the United S tates Agency for Intemational Development, Laura Powers ofthe Office ofForeign Disaster Assistance and Eric Witte ofthe Economic Growth and Agricultura! Trade Unit ha ve been relentless in trying to find out what really happens- and in improving emergency practice. Lillian Wikstmm ofthe Section for Humanitarian Affairs at the Ministry ofForeign Affairs in Norway has also shown particular interest in improving crisis response. A range of practitioners also had the honesty and energy to look at the effects of a range of their activities. We particularly want to recognize the foll ow organizations: for the Mozambique case: Save the Children-USA/Mozambique, the District Director of Agriculture in Memba, CARE/Mozambique; for the Malawi case: ActionAid Malawi, Save the Children UK/Malawi, Plan International Malawi ; World Vis ion Malawi, Concern Universal Malawi , Catholic Development Commission of Malawi (CADECOM, CRS implementing partner); for the Zimbabwe case: CRS/Zimbabwe, SC-UK/ Zimbabwe, CTDT (CRS implementing partner), the SADC Seed Security Network; for the Ethiopia case: CARE/Ethiopia, CRS/Ethiopia, F AO/Ethiopia; for the eastern Kenya Case: F AO/Kenya; for the western Kenya Case: Kenyan Agricultura\ Research lnstitute/Kakamega and the Organic Matter Management Network (OMMN); for the Burundi case: CRS/Burundi ; and for the western Uganda case: CRS Uganda and the lnternational Plant Genetic Resource lnstitute (IPGRI). There is also a set of individuals and institutions, whose expertise spurred the project members to pursue issues more clearly: we acknowledge particularly Steve McSween of SCF-USA/Mozambique, Mikkel Grum of IPGRI , Jean Claude Rubyogo of CIAT, Trygve Berg and Cary Fowler of NORAGRIC in Norway, and from the FAO, Paul Rossiter, David Cooper, Tom Osborn, and Leslie Lipper. Finally, we thank our respective organizations for allowing us to work together in this unusual alliance, uni ting research and emergency efforts and the ski lis of international and national research centers and nongovernmental organizations. Our recognition to CIAT/ A frica, CRS-East and Central A frica, and CARE Norway for enabling this coll aboration. Dedication "To the many farm families who never seem to catch a break-yet who show tremendous courage and resilience in the face of disaster. And to the many practitioners who do their best to assist-against formidable odds and often at considerable ri sk." V Overview of Findings and Reflections Introduction Louise Sperling Tom Renilngton J on M. Ha u gen This volume contains eight case studies managed by CIA T, CRS, and CARE Notway in a project entitled, Assisting disaster-affected and chronically stressed communities in East, Central and Southern Africa: Focus on small farmer systems. The case studies were undertaken to evaluate various forms of emergency seed aid in the field and to couple these with analyses ofthe broader seed and crop systems. The objectives were to understand if and how vulnerable farmers are being helped by the kinds of assistance they receive-and how to move fotward on improving practice. The work was undertaken over a two-year period, in seven countries in A frica. In all cases, the seed aid practitioners were also engaged in the evaluations and reflections, so that "lessons leamed" could immediately influence the "next steps of practice." It is to the credit of the participating national agricultura! research systems and nongovemmental organizations (NGOs) that they were willing to take a hard look at the effectiveness oftheir interventions. Equally, the donors, both USAID/OFDA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Notway, are to be lauded for promoting substantive follow-up on emergency assistance because such follow-up is rare. Table 1 gives the broad overview of the major features of the case studies: the countries in which they were undertaken, the stresses that originally triggered a decision to supply seed-related assistance, and the types of interventions that eventually unrolled. Note that the analyses ofthe real stresses changed as the work progressed. Table 2 hones in on the salient (defining) questions ofeach field program. Five ofthe cases address key features of specific interventions (such as introductions of new varieties), while three present overviews of the practice and evolution of seed aid on a country-wide basis. In the volume that follows, case study abstracts provide findings specific to the intervention and context. In this introduction, we step back-and reflect on the broader findings that emerge from this rare opportunity to examine seed aid across countries, across stresses, across interventions, and across different types of seed systems. Addressiflg Seed Securit)· in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development 1 Uven•iew oJ Findings and Rejlections Tahle l. CIAT/CRS/CARE-Norway Project: Major Descriptors Case study descriptors Countries Content Burundi , Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Uganda, Zimbabwe Drought, civil strife, flood , plant disease (and crop breakdown), distorted political economy Trigger Stresses lnterventions Crop foci • Direct seed distribution • Seed vouchers and fairs • Starter packs and targeted input distribution • Community-based seed production Maize, beans, cassava, sorghum, rice, millet, cowpeas, bananas, sweet potatoes also: wheat, barley, vanilla , cocoa, moringa Tahle 2. CIAT/CRS/CARE-Norway Projecl: Defming Questions Specific site Defining question Analysis of Specific lnterventions Eastern Kenya Northern Burundi Western Uganda Western Kenya Northern Mozambique Direct seed distribution and seed vouchers and fairs: what is their relative cost -effectiveness? Seed vouchers and fairs and the role of traders: who benefits? Seed vouchers and fairs: real agro-biodiversity gains? +----- lntroductions of new (self-pollinated) varieties in period of crop breakdown: do informal farmer producer groups move quality seed, and quickly? lntroductions of new varieties in a period of crop breakdown: are there special concerns with vegetatively propagated material? Overview of Seed Relief and Evolution of Practice Malawi Ethiopia Zimbabwe Direct seed distributions Seed vouchers and fairs Starter packs/targeted input programs Community-based seed production Direct seed distributions/local procurement Direct seed distributions tlddn•ssing St't'd Sl'curity in /Jisaster Response: Linking Relief with Drvelopment 2 L. Sperling, T. Rmzinglon , afl(l } .M. Haugen General fmdings: See d system s under stress Acute response implem ented in chronic stress contexts Emergency seed system assistance was delivered in six out of the eight cases in response to what was characterized asan acute stress. That is, acute seed insecurity was presumed to have been brought on by distinct, short-duration events that affected a significan! portian of the population. However, more in-depth analysis, in all six cases, showed the problems to be of a more chronic, systemic nature: e.g., declining productivity, water-related stress, ongoing civi l unrest, and/or misplaced political policies . The other two cases, both of crop breakdowns (one in westem Kenya with beans and the other in northem Mozambique with cassava), were the only ones in which prior assessments (or diagnoses) actually took place. These revealed that the "acute manifestation" was due to more systemic biotic, abiotic, and economic pressures: build-up ofplant disease, lack ofcrop rotations, declining farm sizes. The result of an "acute" response in a more chronically stressed context means that the problem is not al leviated and that seed system assistance is then needed~again and again. However, the effects of giving "acute" aid in chronic stress contexts are not just neutral (and may have a negative impact). During the second and third rounds of a id, one is not just starting from the same ( compromised) baseline. lncreasing evidence, within and beyond these case studies, demonstrates that aid given again and again distorts farmers' own seed procurement strategies (see Malawi case herein and Kenya case, Sperling, 2002), undermines local seed/grain market functioning (Burundi case herein), and even compromises the development of more commercial seed suppl y systems (Zimbabwe case herein and Tripp and Rohrbach, 200 1 ). So, there are negative effects of giving acute seed aid on a repeated bas is, particularly for vulnerable fanners, for local and regional traders, and for the developers ofprivate enterprise. Chronic seed distribution promotes the em ergence of a re lief seed system Seed aid distribution is taking place in a large number of countries: onc season, two seasons, three seasons, and beyond. The giving ofseed aid is itselfbecoming a "chronic" acti vity. Table 3 summarizes the number of years seed a id has been given in severa( of the countries under study. Figures ha ve been amassed from actual govemment records, from NGO reports, and from the accounts of implementers working on the ground. There seem to be few checks for stopping such assistance (simply when funds dry up?) and deliberate exit strategies have not bccn planned. Table 3. Chronic Seed Aid Distribution Country Burundi Eastern Kenya Ethiopia Malawi Zimbabwe Seed Aid Distributions 22 seasons since 1995 1992/93, 1995/97' 2000/02, 2004 Food aid 22 years since 1983/84 Seed aid on and off during the same period 9 seasons or more since 1992 Near continuous since 1991 (food aid, seed aid, or both) Addressing Sel'd SecurÍ/_1' in /J isaster Response: Linking RPliPj tcith /Jet•elopmenl 3 1 Overvieu· ofFindings and Rejlections The rise of a chronic seed aid system has been identified as a profítablc business opportunity for the entrepreneurial, who specialize in quick deli very ofa small range ofcrops. lt has also led to the rise ofa separate seed system based on relief, i.e., a "relief seed system" (see the Eth iopia and Zimbabwe cases). Relief seed systems are created to assist farm communities in post-disaster contexts and are based on the assumption that other seed channels (in both the formal and farmcr seed systems) are simply nonfunctional. Relief seed systems have evolved dramatically and differentially in di fferent countries in A frica, but their rise has been quick and steady. They seem to be of two basic types: in Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Malawi, there are commercially based reliefseed systems. This is because of the importance ofmaize as a commerc ial crop and the dominance of commercial maize in the seed market. In countries without a significant maize-based commercial seed sector (like Burundi ) or those with a niche market (Ethiopia), donors and relief agencies have always relied on the farmer seed system to source their seed for emergency redistribution. The functioning of such systems involves a straightforward set of steps: a disaster is declared, seed need is assumed, and then a well-establi shed chain of suppliers moves into action. No diagnosis and an assumption of lack of seed trigger seed-related disaster responses The lack of any diagnosis related to the seed system has now beco me a commonplace observation within the disaster literature (Sperling and Cooper, 2003). In practice, one of four strategies is employed for "assessing" seed security and none is sufficiently accurate or timely for assessing seed security among vulnerable farming populations: • No assessment is done at all-and seed need is assumed. • Food security assessments are effected-and seed need is assumed. • A crop production fall (decline) is measured- and seed need is assumed. • Lengthy surveys of fam1ing and rural production systems are completed- and the results are analyzed and written up-after emergency seed has been delivered. Within the cases documented here, only two instances of diagnosis or problem assessment were noted. Both were research-driven and related to an analysis of progressive crop fai lure--due to plant di sease/farming system pressures. In the absence ofseed-related needs assessment, the default option has been to assume that there is a lack of available seed. This has been done in a wide range of disaster contexts since the start of seed aid practice. Two sources of concrete information, from very different perspectives, indicate how incorrect this automatic assessment of lack of availabil ity often is. l . A growing number of studies have actually traced where farmers in "disaster" si tuations sourced the seed they planted- in areas where seed aid distribution had taken place. Table 4 indicates that in contexts where precise data were examined (and with larger sample s izes), relatively little of the seed sown came from emergency aid (with the importance of the assistance varying by crop and context) . This means that, as farmers were lining up to become beneficiaries of free seed aid, they were s imu ltaneously sourcing non-a id channels to access most of their needed seed supplies. Aed Securit_l in Disaster Response: Linkiug Relief 1áth IJe¡•elopmPnt 11 1 Overview of Findi ngs and Rejlections Our understanding now of the importance of local grain/seed markets is also contributing to the SSSA guides and shifting the focus of methods beyond assessing what farmers actually have in their hands (own production and home stocks) to what they can access. Two key parameters shape market analysis in the SSSA in particular. Differences between the seed and grain on offer need to be factored in across crops, and a spatial overlap must be la id o ver market zones and zones of agroecological adaptation .. In all cases, elements of a comprehensive SSSA thinking guide are in place- and such seed security assessments- as distinct from food-need calcu lations- should be encouraged in the coming years. Only with more focused seed security assessments can we hope to more toward more tailored support responses. Tahle 5. The Relation between Harvest (Home Production) and Seed Needed for Sowing (Theoretical Example, Eastern Mrica) Crop Surface area per household Seeding rates per hectare Sowing needs per surface sown (1,1.¡ ha) Multiplication rates of seed Harvest per surface sown (1,1.¡ ha) % of harvest needed to meet basic sowing needs Source: SSSA Guide (CIAT/CRS/CN, forthcoming). Factoring in chronic stress needs from the beginning of an emergency response Beans Sorghum 1,1.¡ ha Y. ha 100 10 25 kg 2.5 8 100 200 250 12.5 1.0 Finally, we highlight an implication of one of our key find ings: that much ofthe acute response is being implemented in more chronically stressed contexts, where a swath of the population is continually vulnerable- usually dueto poverty. In such a context, the emergency response should explicitly work through a lens that anticipates features of such chronic stress. At a mínimum, interventions should be avoided that (a) expose farmers to increased risk and (b) have the potential to undermine functioning systems. In a positive vein, interventions should be promoted that (a) counter the stress but which al so (b) aim to strengthen farmers' own capacities, bolster the functioning of their farming systems, and stimulate growth in the local economy. We now know firmly, mostly through seed systems studies, that seed (in)security is rarely about seed- and almost always about poverty. Hence, those implementing emergency responses should now face the obligation to squarely address this poverty link--even during periods of stress. References Bramel, P. and T . Remington. (Forthcoming). CRS seed vouchers &fairs: An analysis oftheir use in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Gambia. Nairobi: Catholic ReliefServices. CIAT/CRS/CN. (Forthcoming) . Seed system security assessment (SSSA). Toolfor use in emergenCJ' contexts. Cali, Colombia: Jnternational Center for Tropical Agriculturc (with Catholic Relief Services and Care Norway). (Draji) Acúlressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development ~----"-12_1 _ L. Sperling, T. Remington, and }.M. Haugen Ferguson, M. 2003. Assessment of the impact of the 2000 jloods on crop diversity in Mozambique. Final Report. Nairobi: Plant Diversity and Genomics Center. Longley, C. , R. Jones, M.H. Ahmed, and P. Audi. 2001. Supporting local systems in Southern Somalia: A developmental approach lo agricultura/ rehabilitation in emergency situations. AgRen Network Paper No. 11 5 (July 2001 ). London: Overseas Development lnstitute. Sperling, L. 1997. The effects of the Rwandan war on crop production and varietal diversity: A comparison of two crops. In War and crop diversity, edited by L. Sperling. AGREN Network Paper No. 75. London: Overseas Development Institute. ' Sperling, L. 2002. Emergency seed aid in Kenya: Sorne case study insights on lessons learned during the 1990's. Disasters 26(4):329- 342. i Sperling, L. and D. Cooper. 2003. Understanding seed systems and strengthening seed security. Background paper prepared for workshop on Effective and Sustainable Seed Relief: A Stakeholder Workshop, Rome, 26--28 May 2003. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization ofthe United Nations. Tripp, R. and D. Rohrbach. 200 l. Policies for African seed enterprise development. Food Policy 26(2): 147-161. Addressing Seed Ser·urity in /J isaster Response: Linking Relirf with Develupment . 131_-- 1 'Drought, Civil Strife, and Seed Vouchers & Fairs: The Role of the Trader in the Local Seed Systemf Steve Walsh, Jean-Marie Bihizi, Christophe Droeven, Bonaventure Ngendahayo, Balthazar Ndaboroheye, Louise Sperling1 Ahstract This case study describes the role of seed fairs in supporting, stimulating, and strengthening the local seed system. It analyzes local channels ofseed supply with a focus on understanding how they function in times of stress and how seed vouchers and fairs support local seed traders. The study is based on 41 semi-structured interviews conducted with seed traders who participated in seed vouchers and fairs in Kirundo Province, Burundi, in February 2003. Results of the study show that seed traders at seed voucher and fa ir activities are an experienced and specialized group with formidable trading skills. Selling seed is more likely to be the primary occupation and exclusive revenue opportunity for women. Barriers to entry into the trade seed are not excessive. Seed fairs have a positive impact on the local seed system by stimulating social capital and kinship ties between traders and buyers, building seed-sourcing relationships that extend beyond the seed fair, and providing capital, which is predominantly allocated to local comrnercial and farm activity. The case should encourage seed aid practitioners in Burundi and beyond to take a longer-term and more holistic approach towards assessing and addressing seed needs. lt is also expected to help practitioners design and implement seed fairs that stimulate further local enterprise and give farmers access toa range ofinnovations, including access to new varieties, new products, and the varied inputs needed to intensify production. lntroduction Located on the westem edge of the Rift Valley, Bumndi is a land of hills and mountains with 11 agroecological zones. The central plateau is scattered with countless streams, which create a landscape of steep-sided hills and wetlands in the val leys. The rainfall pattem is bimodal with rainfall peaking in April. The driest period occurs from June to September. The short rainy season usually lasts from October to December but is more hazardous and variable in length than the long ra iny season, from February to May. l. S. Walsh, J .M. Bihizi, C. Droeven, B. Ngendahayo, B. Ndaboroheye are affiliated with Cathol ic Relief Serví ces, Burundi. L. Sperling is with the lntemational Center for Tropical Agricu lture (CIAT). Addressing Seed Securi!y in Disaster Respoi!Se: Linki ng Relief wilh Development . 15 1 Drought, Civil Strife, and Seed Vouchers & Fairs: The Role of the Trader in the Local Seed Systern Burundi 's economy is essentially based on agriculture, with small fanns providing over 90% of the population 's livelihood. The land-use system is diverse and comprised, with regional differences, of various components, including coffee, tea, maize, sugar, potatoes, and other food-based cropping systems. The natural vegetation has been degraded to the point where there is little forest left except in the highest elevations. The population of Burundi was estimated at 6,600,000 in 1998, with a growth rate of over 3% per year. In 1990, the average population density was estimated at 180 inhabitants per square kilometer. However, this figure varíes greatly from regían to region, with sorne areas showi ng a population density as high as 400 inhabitants per square kilometer. Land pressure is one of the prime underlying causes of the Burundian conflict and is a significant contributing factor to food insecurity. Since 1993, civi l unrest and conflict has caused over 200,000 deaths and displaced over 700,000 people, both internally and externally. Burundian civil society has been undennined as a result of a combination of massive population displacement, a poorly functioning and substantially underfunded public sector, and continued fear and mistrust among large segments ofthe population. With the signing ofthe Arusha Accords in April 2000, the arrival of a government of transition in November 200 1, the peaceful transition of the presidency in May 2003, anda cease tire between majar belligerents in October 2003, there is significant hope that Burundi has turned the comer. Context of the study: The region and farming system, and recent interventions This study is took place in Kirundo Province, in the extreme northwest of the country, bordering Rwanda and covering an area of 1700km2. The province is divided into two natural agroecological zones: the Bugesera zone, which covers 65% ofthe province 's total surface and has an average alti tude of !350m, and the Bweru zone, with an average altitude of 1600 meters covering the remaining 35%. The study is focused on the Bugesera zone, which has the ecological characteristics of dry areas with poor rainfall of 900- 11 OOmm/year, a very long dry season of seven to eight months, and poorly developed schlerophyllic vegetation. Kirundo Province enjoys a fertil e soil, which can, under optimal conditions, produce a large variety of food and cash crops. The Bugesera zone 's economy is based on agriculture and Jivestock. The region is traditionally a producer of beans and sorghum, but bananas, coffee, cassava, and sweet potatoes are al so cultivated there. Agricultura! production and food security at the household leve! ha ve been devastated by the combined effects of drought and política! crisis. For the last six years, all ofKirundo Province, and particularly the Bugesera zone, has experienced asevere rain shortfall with declines of 70% of the nonn for 2000 and 200 l . Farming families characterized as very poor and poor, with an average land area of less than one hectare under cultivation, make up 65% of households in the region. Households deemed "average," wi th one to two hectares under cultivation, represent 25% of the households. "Rich" households, accounting for 10% ofKirundo Province, have an average oftwo or more hectares under cultívatíon.2 In Kirundo Province, as elsewhere in Burundi , seed assessments are based on assessments of household food security. without distinguishing between issues of access and availability (where access refers to 2. Based on compilation of assessments of household food economy conducted by WFP and Save the Children-UK in Kirundo Province, July 2000 and January 2001 . Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking ReLief with Developmenl 16 S. Walsh et al. adequate means of acquiring desired seed through cash, barter, and social networks; availability refers to the presence of sufficient quantities of desired seed within reasonable proximity to people at critica! sowing periods). This conventional approach to seed aid tends to become a Pavlovian response to a misdiagnosed problem.3 Moreover, assessments have been based on seasonal calculations without regard to potentially more chronic problems related to seed systems. Traditional seed and tools interventions are, at a mínimum, two to three times the cost per beneficiary of seed fairs, while the economic benefits, to the community at large (who do not receive agricul tura! inputs from the intervention) are negligible.4 With conventional seed distribution, there is little evidence that the intervention supports the local seed system or addresses more chronic seed-system problems. Conventional seed distribution, under the coordination of the Food an Agricultura! Organization of the United Nations (F AO) is the dominant intervention through which seed needs are addressed in Burundi. The summary ofFAO-coordinated responses in the table be low is not exhaustive but it does provide a good representation ofboth the scale and scope of the international community 's emergency agriculture response over the past six years. Table l . Summary of F AO-Coordinated Responses lo Agricultural Emergencies, 1997- 2002 Metric T ons of Hoes Total Households Households served Year Beans (units) Served by season 1997* 1232 o 166,155 83,077 1998* 2937 210,640 367,962 183,981 1999* 4742 271,829 547,472 273,736 2000* 5020 115,725 596,185 298,092 2001* 7107.5 206,800 677,352 338,676 2002A** 2557.5 166,500 205,500 205,500 So urce: F AO Burundí. * Two agricultura! seasons. ** One agricultura! season. Catholic ReliefServices (CRS), Burundi has, up to the date ofthi s study, used an altemative approach to respond to seed needs in Kirundo Province. Over the course ofthree agricultura! seasons leading up to this case study, approximately 30 ,000 fanning households have had their seed needs met through the seed voucher and fa ir (SV &F) approach. 5 This approach responds to problerns of seed access, where farming families lack the income, resources, or social capital needed to access seed. The approach 3. " In Pavlovian or 'respondent ' conditioning we simply increase the magnitude of the response elicited by the conditioned stimulus and shorten the time which elapses between stimulus and response ."- Skinner, B. F. ( 1953). Science and Human Behavior, 65. 4. Numbers are derived from CRS experience with seed and tools interventions and seed fairs in Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, where the average cost ofseed per beneficiary ranged from $4.4 1 to $ 11 .02 per household ('Getting Offthe Seeds and Tools Treadmill with CRS Seed Vouchers and Tools'- Disasters Joumal , 2002, Volume 26(4); 3 16-328.) 5. Through 2003, CRS and local partners have carried out seed fairs in Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gambia, Kenya, Malawi, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambía, and Zimbabwe, serving over 400,000 farming households recovering from man-made or climate-induced disaster. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Rclicf with Development 17 1 Drought. Civil Strife, and Seed Vouchers & Fairs: The Role ofthe Trader in the Local Seed Srstem involves supplying farming households that lack access with a voucher that is used to acquire seed . The vouchers are later redeemed by seed traders for cash. No formal assessment ofseed needs was conducted for any ofthe Kirundo seed fa irs. Comrnunities were targeted for seed based on a seasonal assessment conducted by F AO and provincial authorities. CRS, in coordination with local authorities, was given the mandate to respond to seed needs for specific communes in Kirundo Province. Local authorities, in consultation with the govemor of the Province and the Provincial Departrnent for Agriculture and Livestock (DPAE), selected the specific comrnunities for seed fair interventions. Coverage was, in principie, lOO% in the communiti es selected. The Burundi OFDA-funded study focuses on the SV &F traders, large and small, who participated in the Kirundo seed fairs.6 The aim is threefold: ( 1) to understand and quantify the impact ofSV &F at the farm leve!, (2) to get a better assessment of the economic effects of SV &F events on small seed traders, and (3) to get a better understanding of how the traditional seed system functions, its strengths and weaknesses, so as to design and implement interventions explicitly geared to alleviating acute and chronic challenges. Moving heyond access: The need to understand the local seed system and the residual impact of seed vouchers and fairs The results from the Kirundo seed fairs indicated that when subsidies in the form of a voucher redeemable in local currency are provided to stimulate demand among seed-needy households, local seed suppliers respond favorably by providing seed that is adequate in both quantity and quality. Hence, during the three agricultura! seasons preceding this study, seed needs in Kirundo Province could be more aptly characterized as being caused by lack of access as opposed to lack of availabili ty. Otherwise stated, there was sufficient seed to meet total seed demand for the dominant crops in the seed system, but a number of farming households lacked the buying power and/or kinship networks to access this seed. O ver 1200 exit interviews were conducted among seed-voucher holders at the Kirundo seed fairs ( 40 per seed fair), which showed that the average seed package obtained by recipients was greater in quantity than that received by conventional distribution and that this amount of seed was sufficient to meet their planting needs. The average package received by voucher-holding farm families over the three agricultura! seasons was 20kg beans, lkg sorghum, 0.5kg maize, and 0.33kg groundnuts; the voucher value for each fami ly was US$ 6.00. Additionally, the price at which thi s seed was obtained through the SV &F approach did not indicate any problem with seed availabili ty. Local market prices for bean seed, the dominant crop in the Kirundo system and the dominant seed provided by seed a id practitioners, showed no price spikes at the time of any ofthe Kirundo seed fairs that would indicate a lack of seed availabili ty. There were price premiums paid at the Kirundo seed fairs (lO% to 20% higher than to the same seed available at local markets in Kirundo). This is attributed to voucher recipients being required to spend their vouchers on the day received, at the seed fair organized by CRS, and with seed suppliers who were registered by CRS. 6. Trader is used throughout this document to refer to everyone who exchanges seed for vouchers at seed fairs: those who bring seed from their own production to the fair, those who source seed on credit and pay it back credit after the fair, and those who never take actual title to what they bring, reimbursing to thc owner for what has been sold and handing back unsold seed to the owner after the seed fa ir. Addressíng Seed s~rurity in Disaster Response: Linking Reliif with Development . 18 1 S. Walsh el al. Seed quality (defined here as seed that is known and preferred by farrners and adapted to local farming conditions) is more problematic. Using the yardstick of conventional seed relief in Burundi, which is sourced almost exclusively in Burundi from large traders and undergoes no process that would differentiate it in quality from the seed available in local markets, the seed sourced through seed fairs is deemed superior by farming farnilies. Exit interviews from the Kirundo seed fairs indicated that farmers preferred the seed from seed fairs as opposed to seed from conventional distribution for three reasons: ( 1) seed fair seed is more adaptable to local soils, (2) seed fairs provide fanners an opportunity to choose the seed they want and negotiate its price, and (3) seed fairs provide farmers an opportunity to buy seed from traders they know. Seed fairs in Kirundo may have provided adequate seed quantity to needy farming households, but the issue of getting new varieties into the hands of farrners in a demand~driven fashion, and understanding how this approach through the local seed system can improve seed quality in the medium to long term, remains a major challengé. The exit interviews from the Kirundo fairs point to the potential for this approach to support the local seed system, and perhaps address more chronic problems related to the seed system. Seed traders reported reinvesting proceeds from the seed fairs into seed production and seed trade, but the behavior of the seed traders in time ofacute and chronic stress, and the characteristics ofseed suppliers in the region, was not we\1 enough appreciated or understood to provide a more robust argument for how seed vouchers and fairs might support the local seed system. The Kirundo seed fairs confinned the need for a better understanding of how the local seed system functions under both acute and chronic stress, thus exploring the potential for seed fa irs to address both chronic and acute shocks to the seed system, which could be seen as being driven by "access" as well as "availability." They also established the need for a better understanding ofthe profi le and characteristics of seed traders, particularly women, who constitute a third of all seed traders. In addition, the fairs demonstrated a positive impact on the local economy but pointed to the need for a better understanding of how they affect the local economy and the local seed system. Methodology This study was conducted in collaboration with local goveming authorities in Kirundo Province and the PDAE. Both CRS and CIA T aided with the fieldwork. In February 2003, preliminary (participatory and semi~structured) interviews with local traders and farmers, suggested four key insights: • There has been no problem with seed availabili ty in recentyears; the last real problem was in 1999. • In normal times, most traders source their seed directly from farmers; only in a crisis do they buy from traders. • Smal l vendors greatly appreciate seed fairs because fairs provide them with fourfold income in one day, compared to other sales channe ls, and they don't have to extend credit. Traders suggested putting new varieties on offer at lower prices than local vanetles so as to stimulate initial client interest. Traders also asked to be provided credit by CRS to bring these varieties to the fair. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: U nking Relief wíth Development ' 19 1 Drought. Civil Strife, and Seed Vouchers & Fairs: The Role ofthe Trader in the Local Seed System In July 2003, a questionnaire was developed to target seed traders who had part icipated in the Kirundo seed fairs during the previous agricultura! season. The questionnaire was pre-tested over two days, and fi eld interviews were completed in early August 2003. Semi-structured interviews were conducted by three CRS staffwho had been in volved in the planning and implementation ofseed fairs in Kirundo over the preceding three agricultura! seasons. The questionnaire consisted of thirty questions and was divided into four sections: • Seed-trader profile • Seed characterizationlsources and sales channels/sourcing in stress periods • Seed fair operations and the seed fair impact • Trader observations A total of 41 seed traders who had participated in the Kirundo fairs during the previous agricultura) season were interviewed (16 women and 25 men), roughly half ofthe approximately 80 seed traders who had participated in the fairs. Traders were chosen from different sites within Kirundo where the seed fa irs were held, specific emphasis was placed on gender representation from all of the fa ir sites and representation of traders from the three main categories: sma ll (having gross revenues of less than US$ 500 during the previous agricultura) season), medium (gross revenues of more than US$ 500 and Jess than USS 2,500 during the previous agricultura) season), and large (gross revenues of more than US$ 2,500 during the previous agricultura) season). Findings Seed trader profile More than half of the traders interviewed indicated that they had traded seed for more than 1 O years; fewer than 20% had been at it for five years or less. This appears to show that seed traders-at least those at the seed fairs- are a well established group. This may also indicate that traders are specialized and that trading seed may, ata mínimum, require a medium-term investment in building trade relations and acquiring knowledge specific to the trade. Twenty percent ofthe traders interviewed described themsel ves as full -time seed traders; 63% described themselves principally as traders who also do sorne agriculture; the remaining 17% described themselves principally as farmers who also do some trade. Among those self-described as full-time seed traders, only one was mal e. Ofthe 16 female traders, only one described herself as more of a farmer than a trader. This further supports the idea that seed traders are a specialized group. This difference between male and fcmale traders with regard to their self-definiti on oftheir trader status indicates a female bias among traders and potentia lly a Jack of access to Jand among female traders (as is the case for Burundian women in general). More than 75% ofthe traders (33) reported seeing a growth in volume and product line since they started trading seed . This could be attributed to reinvesting profits into their trade and the generally well-established nature of the group interviewed. This could also mean that this sub-set of traders (seed-fai r traders) is more entrepreneurial. Note that with a single exception (a sunflower specialist), the seed traders tended not to specialize in any particular crop; they various ly sold beans, sorghum, maize, and groundnuts. Addressing Seed S1•rurity in Disasler Respotw•: Linking Relief wilh Developm enl 20 1 '------ S. Walsh el al. Start-up assets for seed traders Traders were asked about the assets they had needed when they started trading seed. Over one-third said they started with no access to financia! capital or credit, making due with their own stock of seed, access to land, and their own means of transport. Over two-fifths ( 18) indicated starting up with only financia) capital or credit, which includes bank loans, loans from family and friends, and credit for seed from larger seed traders as well as family and friends. Almost two-thirds of the traders started up without access to transport. Traders were asked if their start-up assets were suffícient. Nearly one-third of traders ( 12/41 ) indicated that their start-up assets were sufficient and that this was dueto seed coming from their own production, gifts from friends and relatives, and small loans from friends. Among the two-thirds who considered their start-up assets insuffícient, access to credit for financing was the biggest challenge. Traders were asked if there are special requirements, such as knowledge and connections, that are necessary for a seed trader to start in the trade. Aside from assets, social relationships and kinship ties appear to be important: a large majority of traders (28) mentioned the need for the support of parents, fami ly, friends, and neighbors. However, a sa lid minority ( 13) saw no need for anything special and indicated that they started with their own stock and made due with what they had. Seed characterization/sources and sales channels/sourcing in stress periods Distinguishing seed from grain Traders were asked if they distinguish between seed for sowing and grain for eating, for the crops they sell . More than ha lf the traders (23/41) said they made a distinction between seed for planting and grain for eating. Fifteen indicated that the population at large does not make this distinction. Only three said they made no distinction because when they were selling they were notable to determine the buyer's intended end use. Traders distínguishing seed from grain provided the following reasons for such distinction: sorne varieties are separated because of price variations due to end use, such as with white sorghum for porridge versus the more expensive red sorghum for beer. Beans are separated because at harvest they are mixed, yet there are price variations within the mixture, and sorne varieties, like yellow beans, may be more susceptible to infestation and should be separated out befare storage. Traders were asked to discuss the sources ofthe grain versus the sources ofthe seed that they sold. AJI of the traders considered the sources to be the same. They noted no difference in production but rather in processíng for end use, storage, or for price. Five ofthe six traders who had gross revenues ofmore than US$ 2,500 during the previous agricul tura! season sorted grain from seed. Among these five, four ofthem sorted by variety for beans and one sorted by grain for beans. For traders with gross revenues of more than US$ 500 and less than US$ 2,500 during the previous agricultura! season, 45% sorted seed from grain. Addressing Seed Serurity in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development . 21 1 Drought. Civil Strife. and Seed Vouchers & Fairs: Tite Role ofthe Trader in the Local .Seed s~·stem For small traders, who had gross revenues ofless than US$ 500 during the previous season, 66% sorted seed from grain . Sources of seed u.sed in trade Table 2 is based on the total vol u me of seed sold by thc traders during the previous agricultura! season and thus portrays an aggregate of al l seed sourced by a ll 4 1 traders. Table 2. Sources of Total Volume of Seed Sold among 4 1 Trade•·s in Season 2003 8 Sources Vol u me Own Rural collector Stockist WFP (metric tons) Farmers production /trader /trader (Distribution ) Crop Beans 504.65 231.9 32.05 124.4 116.3 100% 46% 6% 25% 23% Sorghum 7.4 4.45 1.25 0.2 1.500 100% 60% 17% 3% 20% Maize 6.7 0.8 5.900 100% 12% L 88% Groundnuts 3.724 1.7 0.284 1.740 100% 46% 7% 47% Own production and direct on-farm sourcing accounted for at least half o f the crops refcrenced above. Maize, however, is an anomaly here; Kintndo is not known for its maize production and WFP's food distribution s provide a ready stock for consumption. Rural collectors are small traders, based at trading centers and in proximity to farmers, who procure seed directl y from fanners. They rarely sell retai l and usua ll y, but not always, ho ld the sccd to sell to other traders, large as well as small. Rural co llectors are an important link in the supply chain, providing the human faceto much ofthe credit and capital that reaches the fanner. Stockists are small traders who advance capital and credit to intennediaries who, in tum, source seed from fam1crs and then provide the seed to the stockist. Stockists are more likely to hold seed and to sell retail. Large traders (who had gross rcvenues of more than US$ 2,500 during the previous agricultura! season) were far more likely to source seed from their own production than small or medium traders, and "own production'' for large traders was likely to take on a different meaning. Subcontracting and crcdit arrangements with fanners were likely to be considered "own production" for many ofthe large tradcrs. Sale channels Cash was used to source 71% of the total bean seed sold among a ll traders in 20038; credit was provided for 23%. Addressing Seed Securit.l in Oisaster Re.!¡ullw·: Unking H.elief with Development 22 S. Walsh el al. Social capital is extremely important in seed sa les, as evidenced by over 40 separare seed fairs where decisions about "whom to bu y from" were based on whether the trader was known to the buyer and carne from the same area (a phenomenon that could also be linked to soil specificity and bears further research). And credit is considered a necess ity to establish social relations. In table 3 the use of credit by traders, critica! for building on social capital and kinship, is indirectly indicated. Seed fa irs represented a tremendous market for all seed traders, with generally higher prices than local markets: approximately 12% to 20% above local market prices, on average. Table 3. Channels for Sale of Total Volume o f Seed Sold among 41 Traders in Season 2003B Volume L Volume by sales channel (metric tons) Means of Crop (metric tons ) Direct sale on CRS seed sale Market Traders fairs Beans 503.35 115.96 207.9 180.49 Cash Direct 100 % 23% 41% 36% Sorghum 7.4 4.88 2 0.52 Cash Oirect 100% 66% 27% 7% Maize 6.7 6.55 0.15 Cash Direct 100% 1 98% 2% Groundnuts 3.724 1.32 1.700 0.704 Cash Direct 100% 35% 46% 19% i Sourcing seed durin.g p eriods of stress The seed traders described two distinct stress periods in the recent past, one due to drought ( 1997- 2000) and an earlier one dueto civil war ( 1993- 1995). lnitially, blanket statements were made to characterize the stress: Trader characterizations of the drought stress: l . no seed on market 2. prohibitively high prices of seed brought in by large traders from the region 3. everyone living off aid from NGOs and WFP 4. even grain planted did not germinate 5. heavy migration among the able-bodied Trader characterizations of the civil war stress: 1 . no seed on market 2. own production insufficient for food needs 3. even large local traders had no seed Acúlressing Se,.d Securit y in Disaslcr Response: Linhing Relief with Development 23 1 Drought, Civil Strife, and Seed Vouchers & Fairs: The Rule uf the Trader in the Local Seed Sptem However, when asked to comment in more detail (on dates, regions)-if there was any time when planting material was absolutely not avai lable, the majority of seed traders (32/41) said that there was nevera time in their experience when seed or planting material was absolutely not available. Although expensive during the drought period, bean seed was available from other parts of Kirundo Province, although sorne traders stated that even when seed was avai lable, it was useless to sow because of the drought. Nine ofthe traders said there were times when there was no seed available at all. Specifically in reference to the drought, they said they could not find seed beca use all the seed had been bought up and distributed by NGOs. These traders did not sell during this period. When asked to reflect on ea eh crop sold and where it is sourced in times of stress, 1 O of the traders said they sourced beans regionally (Rwanda, Tanzania), most renting a vehicle. Eleven said they sourced beans by traveling on bicycle to other parts ofKirundo Province, and nine said they sourced beans from other regions ofBurundi, using a vehicle. The definitions of access and availability depend on the size of the trader 's business and access to transport. Although seed was available even during times of profound stress, larger traders had a better chance of sourcing volume because they had access to transport to regional markets and a greater likelihood of having cash or credit. Sourcing seed during thi s period was possible but difficult, with many traders giving up. Major sources during this period were small traders on bicycle from Rwanda and large traders bringing seed in from the region (Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and other parts of Burundi). Sourcing under stress by trader size All six ofthe large traders reported sourcing during periods ofstress from Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, and other regions ofBurundi, using vehicles. The majority of these revenues go back into the agricultura( economy as investments or repayment of debts. Over 80% of the revenue generated by seed traders from fairs is a llocated to commerce, agriculture, or debt repayment. Commercia l activity, which includes extending trade credit, accounted for 43% of seed fair revenue, while repayment of debts accounted for 27%. There was significant overlap among these categories, as credit for seed fairs was considered "commerce" among some traders and "debt" among others . Only 13% of seed fa ir revenue was invested into agriculture and livestock. Household consumption accounted for 17% of revenues. This includes medica! expenses, school fees, home construction, and clothing. Social capital Social capital is both a widely cited special quality for traders at start-up and an important factor in developing and expanding their trade. Knowing the trader and having a relationship with him or her appears to be an important factor in determining from whom to buy seed. In this light, seed fairs provide a mechanism to build on existing social capital and perhaps can help us gain insights into the challenges of getting new varieties into the hands of farmers. According to seed traders, the decision to purchase from one trader as opposed to another is based on the adaptability of the seed on offer, precision of the scales, the trader's honesty, the confidence the buyer has in the trader, price, and the welcome the trader offers. Addressing Seed Securit)' in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development . 24 1 - ---- S. Walsh el al. Rough ly half (22) of the seed traders interviewed stated that their seed fair customers had also beco me generous customers outside the seed fairs. So me of these traders noted that they had sourced seed from these same buyers at harvest. Gender: The female métier bias Data from the seed fair trade payout sheets over the three agricultura! seasons leading to this study showed a growing role for female traders. The total number of individual traders paid in the first agricultura! season was 346, 18% ofwhom were female. fn the second agricultura! season, 23% (of289 traders) were female, and in the third season of January 2003, out of 49 1 traders, 3 1% were fema le. This increase of 66% between the first and third seed fairs seems to indicate that seed fai rs provide an o o o o 7 mterestmg mcome opportumty to women. The case study revealed that full-time traders may be disproportionately female. Male traders, except for very large traders, tend to have other sources of livelihood and hence are far less Iikely to describe themselves as full-time traders. Only one of the 16 female traders identified herself as more of a farrner than a trader, which may indicate a lack of access to land for female traders and hence a far greater likelihood that trade would consti tute their dominant means of livelihood. These findings point to the importance of seed trading as an occupation and income opportunity for fema les. Seed aid practitioners should pay particular attention to des igning interventions that provide access to female traders, particularly small traders, as they appear to play an important role in local seed supply channels and seed trade is a valuable income opportunity for thi s vulnerable sub-set which derives less entitlement from land than medium to large traders. Encouraging traders who don 't come to the fairs Twenty-two of the traders (o ver half) said that there were traders who don ' t come to the fairs but who should be encouraged to participate. The reasons gi ven for them not coming included being intimidated by larger traders; being afraid that they would not sell anything at the fair and would then be left holding a stock ofunsold seed; and not having access to transpot1. Additionally, it was noted that many organiza- tions and comrnunity groups with seed, such as farmer associations, farrner cooperatives, and the Pro- vincial Department for Agriculture and Livestock (DPAE), did not regularly participate in seed fairs. Trader observations At the end ofthe questionnaires, traders were asked ifthey had any questions or comments. A sample of their responses is given below. • Why are yo u asking these questions? You asked these sorts of questions during the last seed fairs in February 2003. • Why can't we receive vouchers too? • Can CRS give us credit? • We have realized that in identify ing beneficiaries, you don 't work in close co llaboration with the local administration. • We like the fairs. Organize more. We are partners; you should do more discussions with us so that in the end we can end this repetitive problem of lack of seed. 7. The data masks the actual number oftraders and the actua l numbers by gender as a trader attending every discrete seed fa ir event in a given agricultura! season is counted each time they attend an event. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Reliefwith Development . 25 1 Drought, Civil Strife, and Seed Vouchers & Fairs: The Role nfthe Trader in the Local Seed System Lessons learned and recommendations l. Traders are a specialized group but the barriers to entry for traders are not excessive The study indica tes that SV &F traders are an experienced and specialized group with formidable trading skills. Also, while access to credit or capital is an important start-up asset, it is nota prerequisite. Nearly one-third of the traders in this study started up with little more than their own production and support from family and friends . Seed aid practitioners should make full use of the existing network of seed traders in designing and carrying out seed aid and agricultura) interventions. 2. There is a need for a robust field-.friendly seed diagnostic tool to distinguish access from availability, as these terms can vary in meaning Although 75% of the traders interviewed sa id there was never a time when seed was " totally unavailable," those who made this s tatement were overwhelmingly large-scale traders with access to transport and cash or credit, who were able to source seed regionally. The definitions of access and availability appear to vary with the size of the trader and his or her access to transport. Seed aid practitioners should develop a diagnostic tool that focuses on seed traders and looks at access and availability for different categories oftraders. Such a tool should focus on the existing channels of seed supply, looking at the different categories, so that seed aid practitioners have a more robust view of the local seed supply channels before designing interventions. 3. Seed fairs support the local seed system, the predominant sourcing channel for seed in good and bad times, and have a positive residual impact on the local economy Seed fairs have a pos itive impact on the local seed system by stimulating social capital and kinship ties between traders and buyers. The seed fairs provide a forum through which seed sourcing relationships are built and extended. This building of social capital is particularly important in cash-poor rural economies and in societies recovering from conflict. Seed fairs also provide capital for the local economy, capital that is predominantly allocated to commercial and farro activity. The residual impact of the seed fairs include extending credit lines, both for traders and others, and stimulating expenditures, which has a knock-on effect on the local economy, such as supporting home construction. Seed aid practitioners and donors should fund and support seed aid and agricultura! interventions that have an explicit link to the local seed system, as opposed to being in competition with it. Development and seed aid practitioners should pay particular attention to the efficiency and impact of demand-driven subsidies, such as vouchers, on rural-based livelihoods and economies. 4. Within the seed trade there is a female métier bias Seed trading is more likely to be a primary employment and revenue opportunity for women. Female traders play an important role in the seed trade, accounting for a large share ofthe small and very small Acldrn~ing Seed Security in Di.sa.ster Responsr: Linking Relief with Development 26 1 - - -- S. Walsh el al. traders. Female traders in this study appeared to have less access to land than their male counterparts, as reflected by only one of the 16 female traders identifying herself as more of a farmer than a trader. Seed aid practitioners should pay particular attention to designing interventions that explicitly target female traders, particularly very small-scale traders, who are more likely to count seed trade as a main source of livelihood. 5. Seed fairs provide a demand-driven mechanism for stimulating the spread of new varieties Promising new varieties may ha ve a greater likelihood of propagation if local traders are leveraged and new varíeties are introduced in more of a demand-driven fashion. The links between the formal and informal seed sector are underexploited and the seed fair is one forum where researchers, formal- sector seed players, and seed traders can work within the same milieu towards the same end, meeting the farmer's demand for seed. Seed aid practitioners and researchers should focus more on local seed traders when exploring how to introduce promising new material into the seed system. References Anderson, M.B. 2000. Options for a id in conjlict: Lessons from.fleld experience, local capacities for pea ce project. Cambridge, MA, USA: Collaborative for Development Action. CIA T and CRS. 200 l . Assisting disaster-affected and chronical/y stressed communities in East and Central Africa: Focus on sma/lfarmer seed systems. Proposal submitted to USAID/OFDA. Cali, Colombia: Intem ational Center for Tropical Agriculture. CRS. 2002. Supporting Burundian communities capacity to address seed needs ofthe most marginal disaster affectedfamilies in Burundi through the seedjáir approach. Proposal submitted to USA ID/OFDA. Baltimore, MD, USA: Catholic Relief Services. Dreze, J. andA. Sen. 1989. Hunger and public action. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press. FAO. 1997. Developing seed securi ty strategies and programmes for food security in developing counties. In Proceedings ofthe /nternational Workshop on Seed Security for Food Security, Florence, ftaly, 30 November-1 December 1997. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization ofthe United Nations. Available on-Iine at http://www. fao.org/ag/agp/agps/georgof/Georgo l.htrn ( accessed October 2004 ). FAO. 1998. Proceedings of the Jnternational Workshop on Developing lnstitutional Agreements and Capacity to Assist Farmers in Disaster Situations to Restare Agricultura! Systems and Seed Security Activities, Rome, /ta~y. 3-5 November 1998. Ro me: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. A vai lable on-line at http://www.fao.org/W AICENT/F AOINFO/AGRlCUL T/AGP/AGPS/Norway/Tabcont.htm (accessed October 2004). ICRISA T, CRS, and O DI. 200 l. Seeds for survival: Jncreasing the ejfectiveness.for emergency seed a id programmes in enhancing seed security in the Greater Hom of Aji-ica. Fifth quarterly report, submitted to USAID/OFDA. Nairobi: lntemational Crops Research lnstitute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. Remington, T., J. Maroko, S. Walsh, P. O manga, and E. Charles. 2002. Getting off the seed-and-tools treadmill with CRS seed vouchers and fairs. Disasters 26(4):316- 328. Available on-line at http://www. foodaidmanagement.org/Tzehay/crs8 198.pdf ( accessed September 2004 ). Sperling, L., U. Scheidegger, and R. Buruchara. 1996. Designing Seed Systems úth Sma/1 Farmers: Principies Derivedfrom Bean Research in the Great Lakes Region of Ajrica. AgREN Network Paper No. 60. London: Overseas Development lnstitute. Addressing Seed Sewrity in Disaster RespomP: Unking Relúf·¡áth Development 27 1 Drought, Civil Strife, and Seed Vouchers & Fairs: The Role ofthe Trader in the Local Seed Systern J Sperling, L. 1997. The effects ofthe Rwandan war on crop production and varietal diversity: A Comparison oftwo crops. AgREN Network Paper No. 75. London: Overseas Development Institute. Walsh, S., M. Ngendahayo and C. Droeven 2003. Placíng the fam1íng family at the center ofthe process through seed demand is met: CRS/Burundi 's experience with seed vouchers and fairs in Kirundo Province. (Draft.) Presented at FAO Seed Practitioners Workshop, Rome, 26 May 2003. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization ofthe United Nations. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster RespOIISe: Linking Relief with Development . 28 1 I/ Seed Vouchers & Fairs and Agrobiodiversity in W estern Uganda 1; · Robbert P. van der Steeg, Tom Remington, Mikkel Grum, E mili y Kemigisha 1 Abstract Rebel activities in westem Uganda from 1996 until early 2002 displaced a large number of people a relatively short distance from their homes. Following a cessation of hostilities, people began retuming back to their farms. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) organized seven seed vouchers and fairs to assist people in accessing seed. With seed vouchers and fairs, beneficiaries receive vouchers that they can exchange for locally sold seeds. The sellers, in tum, are reimbursed in cash for the CRS vouchers. These seed fairs were evaluated by the Intemational Plant Genetic Resources Insti tute (IPGRI), which also did a detailed agrobiodiversity analysis. The study showed that sales at seed fairs were dominated by a relatively small number of crops and varieties Many more crops and varieties that exist in the region were not on offer. On average, beneficiaríes bought only two crops and one variety of each crop. Withín the wider comrnunity, no importan! varieties were lost during the war. The conclusion is that when an organization wants to include strengthening ofagrobiodiversity in a seed aid activity, it needs to plan this thrust explicitly. One method, explained in this paper, is the seed diversity fair, where seed sellers can win prizes for having a diversity of seeds to sell. lntroduction In 1996, rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) began harassing people in the Ruwenzori Mountains of westem Uganda, displacing an estimated 150,000 persons. In Bundibugyo (figure 1), people fled to nearby camps guarded by the Ugandan army. By February 2002, 1ife had begun to retum to normal and people began retuming to their farms. During their di splacement, their farms had been neglected, houses destroyed, and assets lost. The climate ofwestem Uganda supports the production ofa wíde diversity ofcrops . Cassava, bananas, and sweet potatoes are important food crops, and groundnuts, rice, and beans are grown for consumption and sale. The cropping system has been described as the "banana and coffee system," where coffee, introduced after the Second World War, replaced cotton, which had been predominant in the system (Parsons, 1970). Recently, however, coffee has been on the decline in favor of diversified cash cropping, with a bias towards cocoa. l. Robbert P. van der Steeg is with IPG RI-SSA; Tom Remington is with CRS-EARO; Mikkel Grum is with IPGRI-SSA; Emilly Kemigisha is with CRS-Uganda. Addressing Seed Security in Disasler Response: Linking Relief with Developrnent . 29 1 ~--~ Seed Vouchers & Fairs and Agrobiodil•ersity in Western Cganda DEMOCRAT~ REPUBUC 0~\ ) CONGO (ORC) ~e ~ Albe Ruwe Mts. UGANOA SUDAN • Gulu •• Figure l. Bundibugyo is located northwest of Forl Portal in the Ruwenzori Motmtains In response to the conflict and repeated displacement, Catholic Relief Scrvices (CRS) planned and implemented a series of seed voucher and fair (SV &F) events. (These events, developed by CRS, support secd demand, in contrast to direct seed distribution, which supports supply.) The lntemational Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI), which has a special interest in biodiversity and experience with seed diversity fairs in Mali, was invited to carry out an extemal, real-time, evaluation of these events. In the SV &F approach, vouchers are issued to farm families identified as seed insecure (as indicated by repeated or prolonged displacement). Voucher recipients then negotiate seed purchases with sellers at special seed markets or fairs. At the end ofthe day, sellers redeem the vouchers for cash. Communities benefit two ways: ( 1) the seed insecure are able to choose the seed they want, and (2) the seed secure are able to sell seed (Remington et al. , 2002). Addressing Sred Secu rii.J in /Jisaster Rr.1po11se: l.inkinl( Rrlief 1cith D<·vclopment 30 1 H.. P. mn der Steeg el a l. Planning and implementation of seed vouchers & fairs Before the seed fa ir, local CRS staff conducted a survey in which 19 farmers were asked what assets had been lost and what assets they had succeeded in reacquiring. The interviewed farmers had been displaced an average of four years each. Nine out of the 19 reported the loss of crops and farms among their top three lost assets. When asked to rank their most important crops, rice, beans, soybeans, vani ll a, groundnuts, and cocoa emerged as the top six . Fanners reported that in norma l years, they acquired planting material for these crops from a wide range of sources, through social networks and from the govemment, as well as the ir own seed stocks . However, during the survey year, they responded overwhelmingly that they had had to source rice, beans, soybeans, and groundnuts in the local market. In addition, 278 potential seed sellers ( 17 1 women and 107 men) were identified and interv iewed. In addit ion to determining their supply of seed and planting material for di fferent crops, this survey was used to in form potential sellers of the upcoming seed fairs. Ofthose interviewed, 93 responded that they would be able to sell rice, 11 7 had beans, six could sell maize, 23 had vani lla. 38 would be able to provide groundnuts, and one could sell cocoa. Women dominated the rice and bean sellers, and w hile the men had more vanilla than the women, men and women respondents indicated they were eq ual ly able to sell groundnuts . What made this group interesting was thatthe majority ofthem reported fam1ing as their primary occupation (77% ofthe women and 85% ofthe men). The remaining 23% ofthe women sellers identified themselves principally as traders. In addit ion to traders, severa l of the men li sted thei r occupation as carpenter. While many farmers citcd seed insecurity as a result or di splacement, many others were indeed able to provide the demanded seeds. Over many years, farmer decisions and selections have resulted in a diverse cropping system in Bundibugyo. Th is combination of crops and varie ties is referred to as agrobiodiversity in this article. Agrobiodiversity has three majar advantages (Grum et al. , 2002; IPGRI, 1999): • lt fulfil s different uses. For example, not all banana varieties can be used for local brcw. • lt optimizes different resources (labor. land, cash). • lt mitigates unpredictabi li ty due to water, soil , and pcsts. Research questions The scope of this study was to look at the impact ofseed vouchers and fairs on agrobiodiversity, within the context of agricultura! recovery from conflict. The central research question was What was thc influence o f the conflict and of thc sccd vouchcrs & fairs on agrobiodivcrsity? The fol lowing questions related to the effectiveness of the seed vouchers & fairs were asked: • How do farmers normally acquire seed? • How did they obtain seed this year? • How would they ha ve acquired seed in the absence of seed vouchers & fairs? • What crops and varieties did voucher holders acqu ire at the fairs? • What did voucher holders want to purchase that was not available at the fa irs? • Did the people plant the seed they acquired in exchange for their vouchers? :lddn·ssit1g Srnl Securil) in /Ji.w.,ln He.1ponse: Linking Relieflcith Ot•relopmrn/ 31 Seed Vouchers & r(úrs and Agrobiodiuersity in Westem L 'gandu Related to the impact on agrobiodiversity, the following questions were asked: • What crops and varieties are available in the region? • Why do people have specific crops and varieties? • Have any new varieties been acquired recently? • Have any varieties been lost recently? • If so, what was the reason for the loss? • What varieties were on offer at the fair and why? • What varieties were not on offer at the fair and why not? • Did the seed fair increase agrobiodiversity? Methodology Data was collected with two surveys. The first, "real time" survey was administered to the beneficiaries on the day of the fairs. The second survey was carried out two months later, using the four-square analysis method. "Real time" evaluation At each of the seed fair sites, six community enumerators administered the survey to departing participants. Responses were recorded for 183 beneficiaries (6% of the 3100 beneficiaries ). Four-square analysis The four-square analysis is a method that helps obtain g reater detail on agrobiodiversity at the vi llage and farm level. In it, a group of farmers brings a sample of each variety he or she is growing. A large cross is drawn on the ground to distinguish four categories or squares (figure 2). Large area Small area Many households Many households -' Large area Small area Few households Few households Figtll"e 2. The four squares A voluntecr displays the first sample and the other farmers decide whether it is grown on a large or a small area and whether or not it is grown by many or by few households. After the first sample has been placed in the square, another farmer takes hislher varieties and puts them in the correct square. Ifthere is airead y a variety in that square, the group has to decide if it is grown more or less than the first crop. This goes on until all crops are placed. Farmers quickly grasp the process and begin to coordinate it. After all the existing varieties ha ve been placed, the farmers discuss and identify crops or varieties that ha ve been los t. For each variety, the following information was collected: • What is the variety name? • When was it first used? Addressing SPed Srcurily in Disasler Respume: Linking Relief wilh Developmenl 32 1 R.P. van der Steeg et al. • When was it last used? • What was the geographical so urce of the variety? • How was the variety first obtained (what was the initial source)? • Positive traits of the variety • Negative traits ofthe variety • What was the normal seed channel? • How was it obtained during the displacement? • How was it obtained this current season? This process results in a display of the present state of the plant genetic resources and history of each crop in the area-in this case, Bundibugyo. Important events that changed the number of varieties as well as the sources of new varieties al so carne out in our survey (Sthapit et al. , 2001 ). The four-square analysis can be adjusted for different purposes (see box 1 ). At one location the people in charge did not use the four-square analysis correctly and it was therefore not useful to include those results in our analysis. The results from only six locations have been synthesized for this report. 1 Box l. Alternative four squares The four squares can be used in many different ways. lt can be used for animals (large/small scale by many or few households) or for crops in general, not just varíeties. You can even explain why people drink a lot of Coca Cola and not so much Fanta citron. We have also heard people using it to look at low-inpuVhigh-input, low-outpuVhigh-output activities on farms. This was done in the case of labor restrictions and income possibilities related to HIV/AIDS (Ard Lengkeek, personal communication). Or if you want to compare how a system was 30 years ago, you divide the people into young and otd. Men and women often have different perceptions. Possibilities are endless. In general, we see the four-square analysis too! as simple and understandable for everybody and therefore appropriate for a lot of participatory research. Results Three thousand one hundred families from three sub-counties were targeted in seven seed fairs. Each beneficiary received vouchers worth a total ofUS $7.50. From the farmers' perspective, a variety name is the basic unit for distinguishing varieties. The same variety can have a different name or varieties with the same name might perform differently in different villages. Within a village, different varietal names generally indicate a niche of use or growth. Research leads us to believe that diversity in names represents diversity within crops. The four-square analysis provided useful information. In total , participants mentioned 35 crops and 23 1 varieties that they were currently growing in the region. Each village seemed to have a number ofunique varieties, based on names alone. Adding six varieties brought to the fairs but not mentioned during the four-square analyses, we arrived at a total of237 varieties. Ten crops and 24 varieties were present at the seed fairs. However, the enumerators did not name cocoa, groundnuts, maize, soybeans, and vanilla by variety, which meant that diversity was undercounted. We estima te that there were in fact a total of 76 varieties on offer at the fairs. ----~----------- Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Re.1ponse: Linking ReliPj with Development 33 1 St>ed Vouch ers & Fairs and Agrobiodi1•ersity in Wt>stem L 'ganda Notably absent at the fairs were bananas, swect potatoes, and cassava. Planting material ofthese crops is not exchanged in ordinary markets; during the preliminary survey, fanners explained that vegetatively propagated crops are usually sold in situ , so that you can get a perspective ofthe full crop when you are buying. Based on the amount of money spent on ea eh crop, one can see that beans and rice were the majar crops purchased at the seed fa ir (figure 3). Crop at the seedfair 50% .-------~~-------------------------------------. 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Figure 3. Money used on specific crops during the seed fair (The per·centage is the percenlage of money that was registered by the questiom1aires.) With rice and beans being the most traded crops (83% of the total), it is interesting to look at their distribution as described through the four-square analysis. Table l. Bean Varie ties in the Four-Square Analysis Place in Mean number of Mean number %at Crop name square varieties per location Range at the fair the fair Beans Large area 1.67 0-3 1.17 70% nseedfair = 130 Many hh (we registered Large area o o a bean transfer 130 times) few hh Small area 0.83 0-3 0.33 40% many hh Small area 3.33 1-5 0.67 20% few hh Note: The analysis is based on infonnation from six locations. At each location, we compared what we saw in the four-square analyses with the data collected during thc seed fa ir. From the four-square analysis, we can see that most ofthe rice varieties are grown by few people on a small area, and only 20% of the varieties were seen at the seed fair. When a variety is common in one location, it is very likely to appear in another location as well, including the seed fairs. In fact, the more comrnon a certain variety is, the more likely it is to show up at the seed fair. In table 2 one can see how this pattem emerged with rice. ·ldtlrl'ssing Seed Securit) in Disaster Response: Linking Re/ief ráth /)erelopmenl 34 R.P. van der Steeg et al. Table 2. Rice Varieties in the Four-Square Analysis Place in Mean number of Mean number Crop name square varieties per location Range at the fair % at the fa ir Rice nseefair = Large area 1.50 1-2 1.20 80% 99 (99 is the Many hh amount of Large area o o transactions of rice recorded) few hh Small area o o many hh Small area 2.17 1-4 0.40 18% few hh Note: The analysis was based on information from six locations. At each location. we compared what we aw during the four-square analyses with the data col lected during the seed fair. We can also see that rare varieties are less likely to show up at the fair. For example, rice has fewer varieties and there are also fewer varieties on the market. There were two rice varieties at the seed fair that were not mentioned in the four-square analysis. These were not widely traded (figure 4 ). 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Kamusesere Kaputura Mesi Tatu Padere Figure 4 . Money used on specific val"ieties during the seed fair (Note that the percentage is the percentage of money is •·egister ed b y the questionnaires.) Jt is interesting to note that during the four-square analysis, people did not mention four of the varieties ofbeans that were present at the seed fairs. While this is 27% ofthe number ofvarieties we recorded during the four-square analyses, financially each of these varieties represents less than 1% of the total amount traded at the seed fair, so their contribution is insignificant. The conclusion concemíng crop agrobiodi versity is that both demand and suppl y focus on the important varieties- those grown by many households in large areas. Rare varieties are either not so ld by farmers, not purchased by traders, or they may be mixed with the dominant variety and therefore lost in a varietal mixture. The varieties purchased at the seed fair Most participants purchased rice and beans (table 3). Addressing Seed Securily in /Jisaster Response: Linking Relief with Developmcnt 35 Seed l'ouchers & Fairs and Agrobiodiversity in Westem Cganda Table 3 . Sunnna ry of Transactions al the Seed Fair Number of Estimated total Number of Transactions number of varieties (based on the transactions Number of bought Percent 6% ofthe (extrapolated to different crops when women beneficiaries 100% of the bought when buying this purchasing Crop interviewed) beneficiaries) buying this crop crop this crop Rice 100 1694 1.97 1.97 35% Beans 130 2202 1.75 1.97 45% Groundnuts 39 660 2.21 2.21 38% Soybeans 14 237 3 3.07 22%* Moringa 11 186 2.91 2.91 11 %* V anilla 8 135 2.88 3.00 50%* Cocea 7 118 1.86 1.86 20%* Onions 5 84 2.8 3.20 40%* Maize 2 34 3 3 100%* --- *Sample size smallcr than 15; sometimes the gender is not known. O ver two-thirds of participants bought beans, and more than hal f of participants bought rice. The table shows the average number of crops bought and thc average number of varieties a partic ipant acquired when buying a specific crop. In the case of soybeans, for example, thi s means that when a pcrson bought soybeans, he or she also bought two other crops. According to the survey, 37% of the participants were women. For rice, beans, and groundnut, there is no clear gender preference (Chi-square test, 0.90 reliabili ty), a lthough women seem to ha ve a slight (not signiticant) preference for beans, vanilla, and onions (however, the sample size for vanilla and onions is small). According to participants, 89% of all the seeds they bought were of good quality, 5% were average, and in 6% ofthe cases, quality was not deterrnincd. Almost a ll ofthe participants (98%) stated that they were already working ful l time on their farrn. This d id not mean, however, that they were not spending nights in the camps for intemally displaced persons. Ninety percent stated that they would not have been able to get seeds for growing without the fair; thc mai n reason given being lack of funds (52% of all beneficiaries). Eight percent claimed that thc seed fair would he lp them pay school fees, indicating that the seed fa ir enabled them to divert money from buying seed to other priorities. Availabüity of seed al the fair ineteen percent of the farrners c laimed that they wanted a specitic variety or crop that was either not avai lable or not available in suftic ient quantity to satisfy demand. In a ll cases, farrners knew where to obtain thc variety. Therefore, we can conclude that no desired varieties were lost. Addressing Se('(/ Securily in /Jisasler R1•sponse: Linking Relief with Devt•lopment 36 1 R.P. 11an der. /eeg el al. Seed source During the four-square analysis, we asked where participants sourced their seed for each variety. Severa] sources were possible ( fi gure 5). Sources of seed • Before the war • After the war 20% 10% 0% Relatives Market Own CRS and Friends Figure 5. Plant sources of crops before and after the war, recor·ded al the seed fair (The pe r centages are the percentages of farme r groups that used the specific source . The total of the colurnns before the war makes lOO% and after· the war makes 100% .) The year of our survey, participants received a lmost 20% oftheir seed at the seed fairs- a so urce that did not exist befare. Own saved seed was reduced by 10%, seeds from social networks by 5%, and seed purchased at the market by 4%, indicating that the conflict and displacement resulted in a shi ft in seed sources, especially in a reduction of own saved seed. lnfluence of the war and seed fair on agro-biodiversity The crops and varieties that are available in tlw r egion In table 4, one can see how the crops mentioned by participants were categorized in the four-square analyses. Table 4 shows the crops grown in fi ve locations. The maximum number of times a crop can be mentioned is therefore fi ve. It is puzzling that there were only two maize transactions at the fairs bccause maize is grown on large areas by most households in the region. Although sweet potatoes are an important crop in four ofthe locations, cassava in three, and yams in two, they were absent from the fairs. This indicates a need to devise an altemative mcchani sm to facilitate exchange of thcse crops when promoting agrobiodiversity is a priori ty. Thf' varie ties at the seed fair During the four-square analysis, farmers mentioned most often the following characteristics of popular varieties: • income generating • a crop that also can be used as a food crop • high yielding • short duration Addressing Seed Securit.\ in Disaster Hf'sponse: Linking Rrlief with f),.,.,.fopmcnt 37 1 Seed Vouchers & Fairs and Agrobiodiversity in Westem l ganda • good taste • used al so for firewood ( cassava, coffee, cocoa) • additional uses (oil, coffee, flour, lotion) • resistant to diseases • not labor intensive (no weeding) • problems with drought, wind, or water logging Although farmers maintained that the rice variety kamusesere was not grown before the war, it was in high demand at the fairs. lt yields three times ayear and provides a source of income as wcll as food. The fact that it emerged during the conflict indicates that confl ict and displacement do not hinder acccss to new crops and varieties- and may actually present new opportunities. Table 4. Crops in the Region Large area, many households Rice (5) , Sweet potatoes (4) , Maize (4), Cocoa (3), Bananas (3,) Beans (3), Cassava (3), Yams (2), Palm oil tree (2), Pawpaws (1 ), Vanilla (1 ), Mangoes (1) Large area, few households Coffee (1) Not grown anymore Small area, many households Moringa (4), Palm oil (3), Beans (2), Mangoes (2), Oranges (2), Fenensi (1 ), Cocoa (2), Cassava (2), Bananas (2), Groundnuts (2), Soybeans (2), Jackfruit (2), V anilla (1 ), Dodo (1 ), Maize (1 ), Eggplants (1 ), Sugarcane (1 ), Pumpkins (1 ), Pawpaws (1) Small area, few households Avocados (5), Tomatoes (5), Onions (5), Sugarcane (4), Coffee (4), Pineapples (4), Eggplants (4), Vanilla (3), Soybeans (3), Groundnuts (3), Yams (3), Oranges (3), Green grams (3), Passion fruit (3), Pumpkins (3), Mighobe (2), Sesame (2), Mangoes (2) , Cabbages (2) , Green dodo (2) , Jackfruit (2), Pawpaws (2), Sweet potatoes (1 ), lrish potatoes (1 ), Pigeon Peas (1 ), Dodo (1 ), Moringa (1 ), Sorghum (1 ), Nswiga (1) Sorghum (4), Wheat (3), Sesame (2), Millet (2), Banana fruit (1 ), Pumpkins (1 ), lrish potatoes (1) Note: This exercise was repeated in five locations. The numbers in parenthesis indicatc how often a certain crop was put in the specific square, which gives an overvicw ofthe importance ofthe crops across the fi vc locations. The exercise was also repeated for each crop with the varieties placed in the different squares. Change in agro-biodiversity Farmers had stopped planting 2% ofthe 23 1 varieties that existed prior to the conflict, but had added 14 new varieties, which represents a 2% net increase in agrobiodi versity. No varieties were mentioned as having been lost due to the conflict; rather, it appears that old varieties were replaced by new varieties with superior characteristics (better yield, shorter maturation, higher market value, etc). During the post seed fair evaluation, we also asked when a variety was introduced. We were able to trace 94 varieties (figure 6). Addrcssing Sced Securit_1· in Disa.ster Response: Linking Relief with DP1wlopment 38 1 R.P. van der Stee el al. A stable ecosystem genera ll y has more or less the same amount of species over time and we can regard the agro-ecosystem the same way. Change in agrobiodiversity is a normal process. We can see that every decade new varieties come into the system, and we may presume that others exit the system. This is called "variety tumover" or replacement (McGuire, 2000). Twenty-fi ve of the 89 varieties that were introduced in the period from 1940 to the present were introduced by the govemment; fi ve were introduced by NGOs. The rest, 59 varieties, were from individuals or the source was unknown. Yariety tumover in an iso lated area like Bundibugyo is dominated by fam1er-to-fam1er exchange, with a secondary contribution from the formal sector. Period of origin of varieties 18r-------------------------~.-------------------------¡ 16 +------------------------- 14 +------------- 12 +------------- 10+------------- 8 +-------------- 6 +------------- 4 +------- 2 +---'----- 0 -+------~ 1920- 1930- 1940- 1950- 1960- 1970- 1980- 1990- 2000- 1929 1939 1949 1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 Figure 6. Pet·iod of origin of varieties in the Btmdibugyo at·e a (These are varieties that are still grown there. V arieties that were introduced in the same period but are no longer grown are not include d in this graph. This probably m e ans that in the period 1940-1969 m an y more varietie s were introduced than are shown here .) Discussion Diversity at the seed fairs The four-square analysis presented a very diverse farming system, but we saw that the majority of participants bought only two crops and varieties at the seed fairs. Although no farmer would have al! or even most of the 237 varieties, every farm would have substantially more varieta l di versity than the two varieties that farmers acquired at the fairs. Therefore, we can conclude that seed vouchers and fai rs do not significantly contribute to an increase in the agrobiodiversity on the average farm. lt is not clear why varieties grown by many people on a small area were poorly represented at the seed fair. There are severa] possible explanations: it could mean that they are also poorly represented at regular markets, but it could al so mean that a seed fa ir is an exceptional event and sellers bring a different set of varieties compared to what they normally would. This may depend on what they think they will sell on the basis of information they obtain before the fair. A ltematively, it might also be a question of demand since these varieties are cultivated on small areas for consumption. Without strong demand, sellers would not bring them to the fair. It might also be an issue of price. If rare varie ties are more expensive, sell ers might believe that the demand will be low. Addre.: Linkirrg Relief with Dewlopmerrt 46 1 M. Makokha el al. Few know where, when, and how to market their produce because they lack market information and have been unable to organize themselves into effective marketing groups. Consequently, they rely on local markets and middlemen who rarely offer attractive prices. Poor infrastructure further complicates the time\y delivery of inputs and sale of produce. The problem ís most severe during the rainy seasons because most roads become impassable. Transport is costly and often very unreliable. High transport costs ínflate the cost of inputs and reduce profits from commodity sales. Although many producers have traditionally relied on family labor, availability is no longer guaranteed since most ofthe young people are either in school or have left in search ofpaid employment in urban centers. Few fanners can afford hired labor because of the need to finance education, health, food, and clothing, among other things. Although policies to improve the quality of living in the ASALs have been forrnulated , their implementation has been poor. Drought and its effect on agricultura[ production in eastern Kenya The ASALs of the eastem Kenya region are characterized by a bimodal rainfall pattem with peaks in April (the long rains) and November (short rains). Ranging between 400mm and 800mm annually, with a mean of700mm, rainfall is scant, unreliable, and poorly distributed . The short rains receive a mean of 400mm and are more reliable compared to long rains, which ha ve a mean of 300mm. The seasonal rainfall during the 12 years ffom 1990 to 2001 is presented in figure 1 for Katumani Station, which is located in Machakos and is representative of ASAL areas. lt can be seen that the long rains were below average in nine of the 12 years and above average only in three. The more-reliable short rains were abo ve average in five of the 12 years, average in two, and below average in five. The majority of the households in the ASAL agro-ecosystems depend on crops for their food security. The prolonged droughts that result from below-average rainfall, such as occurred between 1990 and 70 60 e 50 .S e: -~ 40 ,- ~. Total LR _ ,....., O Total SR ~¡n-- r- r--- t- ....... o ,...... ,....., r- e: 30 :::l o '--- r--- 1--- r--= - - '--- - ;--- " E 20 < 1-- f-- r--- - - f-- 1-- - ¡-- - ¡-- 10 o 1-- r-- ,........ - - ,........ - - ¡-- _j _: '-~ '-c...,... '-'--.-- -~ -~ '-- .......... L......~ -~ '--'--.-- - 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 o Years Figure 1 : Comparison of r·ainfall in short and long rains in Katumani Machakos, 1990-2001 2001 , compel most farm families to exhaust all their available grain, includ ing what is normally kept for seed. Thus, food insecurity is usually associated with seed insecurity. For instance, in the year 2000, the estimated 178,978 households that required food in ASAL districts also required seed. Seed delivery systems in Kenya Two seed delivery systems, the formal and infmmal, are operational in Kenya. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Rcspoi!Se: Linking Reliefwith Developmenl . 47 1 ----· Comparison o( Seed Vouchers & Fairs and Direct Seed Distribution In the formal seed production system, processing, packaging, labeling, and marketing of certified seed is done by registered producers. This normally involves prívate or public seed companies with outlets in many parts of the country, especially in town centers. Leading seed companies in Kenya include the Kenya Seed Company, East African Seed Company, Westem Grain and Seed Company, and Faida Seeds. There are about 38 registered seed companies in Kenya, most of which produce seed for cereal crops, especially maize, wheat, barley, sorghum, and legumes (especially beans), and vegetables. Except for maize- which Kimenye (1999) says are mainly open-pollinated varieties (OPVs)--the comrnercial seed sector accounts for less than 5% ofthe seed sown in ASAL areas during the years with normal rainfall (personal comrnunication, District Crops Officer, Tharaka District). Very little certified seed of open-poll inated crops such as pigeonpeas, cowpeas, sorghum, millet, and green grams (which are usually grown by resource-poor farmers who mainly live in ASALs) is produced by private seed companies, and 95% of what is produced is exported directly and/or sold to NGOs for distribution locally or in foreign countries (Kimenye, 1999). The prívate seed companies do not produce seed of vegetatively propagated crops either. They are profit-driven and consider the seed of crops adaptable to ASAL areas not only expensive to produce and market, but also subject to unreliable demand. ln the informal seed delivery system, production, processing, marketing, and/or distribution of seed is done by unregistered farmer seed producers. This seed is variable in quality and is not produced under a certification scheme. Production and marketing are often localized and based on low-input technology. Key players in this system include NGOs, farmers, farmer groups, researchers, and comrnunity-based organizations. The informal system produces localland-races, improved OPVs, anda blend ofthe two. For most of the crops grown in ASALs, farmers obtain seed from local sources, especially their own saved seed, and social networks (relatíves, neighboring farmers, and grain traders in open-air markets). The majority of farmers rely on seed saved from their own harvests and continue recycling seed as long as the harvest is "adequate" and they are able to keep some for subsequent seasons. Local traders play a critica( role in rural communities by purchasing grain at harvest, storing it and later selling it back to the same fanners, either for food oras seed at planting time (Sperling, 2001 ). These traditional seed systems are critica! to the livelihoods of poor households in the supply of both food and seed. During emergencies, relief and seed given as gifts beco me an important source of acquiring seed (Audi 2000). This is best exemplified by a Kamba saying, "mbeu ndivatanawa," which, literally translated, means that "one cannot be denied planting seed." Seed bought from local markets also proves key (Sperling 2001 ' 2002). The informal sector accounts for over 90% of the seed sown in ASAL regions. Beca use it is based on rain-fed cropping systems, it is highly vulnerable to drought stress, resulting in severe shortages. Although producers in the informal sector ha ve limited access to breeders and basic seed of improved varieties, the local system has potential for sustainabili ty partly because it is derived from traditional systems and has Iimited demand for extemal inputs. Seed relief approaches: An overview Seed relief is a relatively new development in Kenya. lt began in 1992 as an effort to supply seeds to communities faced with food and acute seed shortages following drought. No record or report is available for an assessment of the seed situation in Kenya, but seed distribution has always followed food di stribution in the majority of locations. A number of factors have been considered in identifying geographicallocations and potential beneficiaries for seed, usually provided by Ministry of Agricul ture staff and including the following: Addre,,sing Seed Security in Disaster RespoT!se: Linking Relicf with Development 48 1 M. Makokha et al. • the prevailing food/seed insecurity in drought-prone areas • the actual nwnber of households that are affected by food/seed insecurity • the existing crop and farming systems in the targeted areas, including the crop planting density per population and cropping seasons (long- and short-rain seasons) • suitable crop species and varieties, based on agro-ecological conditions and existing crop and farming systems • the land area to be planted to different crops • the total amount of appropriate seed in terms of quantity/quality required for the affected areas, and existing capacity for packaging and distributing the seed • the potential sources of seed and their availabili ty among the licensed merchants, approved stockists, and small seed enterpri ses • weather forecasts and advice on suitable crops for the anticipated amount and distri bution of precipitation During droughts, governmental and nongovemmental organizations have responded not only with food aid, but also with "a package" that includes seed and, in sorne cases, tools for land preparation and other crop-husbandry operations. lt has been anticipated that the seed distributed to farmers would serve as a boost in restoring their capacity to produce crops and seed for subsequent seasons. Tn the l990s, most of this seed aid followed a centralized tendering and distribution system to the affected areas, with little participation ofthe target groups. However, with the introduction ofthe World Food Program's (WFP) community-based food distribution system in 2000, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) started shifting their seed distribution policy towards strengthening community-based systems and promoting the use of seed of locally avai lable and adapted crop species. Two approaches, direct seed distribution (DSD) and seed vouchers and fairs (SV &F), ha ve been used to distribute emergency seed in eastem Kenya. Many organizations (both NGOs and government agencies) have followed and continue to foll ow the DSD approach. In this approach, the organizations request seed quotations from registered seed companies. Once the companies respond, the quotations are assessed, based on the unit cost and the abi li ty ofthe company to supply the types of crop, varieties, and amounts required. Successful bidders transport the seeds to the district headquarters in the affected area, where it is received by the implementing agency for storage, awaiting delivery to the divisions and finally to locations where the seed is distributed to the beneficiaries. Officials from the Ministry of Agriculture and Office of the President ha ve been used to distribute seed to beneficiaries. Where NGOs are involved, ground staff supervise the distribution. CRS and its local partners used the SV &F approach to distribute seed to needy households in Kenya for the first time during the short rains of 2000 and 2001. This approach involves special markets (fairs) organized for farmers and local traders with surplus grain to be sold as seed. Seed stockists and companies are also invited to bring certified seed to the fairs. Seed-needy farmers are identified and issued vouchers of given monetary value, which they exchange for seed of the crops, varieties, and amounts of their choice, depending on the monetary val u e of the seed vouchers. When the fa ir is o ver, seed sellers redeem the vouchers for cash. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development 49 Comparison o{ Seed Vouchers & F airs and Direct Seed Distribution Comparison of DSD and SV &F systems: Basic features The overall aim of emergency seed distribution is to contribute to food and livelihood security by ensuring that fanners, especially the vulnerable ones, have access to adequate seed and planting materials. An effective emergency seed distribution system should therefore ensure that a large number of seed-needy households are reached. The basic features ( operational processes) of emergency seed distribution involve geographical and beneficiary targeting, identification ofseed sources, procurement, transportation to distribution points, setting up the distribution procedures, and communicating extension infonnation. Descriptive features Table 2 compares the operational features (processes) of the DSD and SV &F approaches. Most important to note is the fact that SV &F in vol ves and empowers the community in all the stages, thus building their capacity. As opposed to DSD, where farmers have no option but to accept the seed brought to them, SV &F empowers the community to identify seed-needy households, choose the crop, variety, and amount of seed to plant, bring seed to be exchanged, and even participate in seed quality inspection and price setting. With DSD, the community is involved only at the receiving end- they receive the seeds that are distributed. The process of seed sourcing, acquisition, transportatíon, and distribution is done by the govemment and NGOs. Comparison of operations ln Kenya, emergency seed distribution is mainly associated with drought whose effect is gradual in both geographical and population coverage. It usua lly starts from the most drought prone moving to the lesser drought prone districts as drought persists across seasons. Geographical coverage Between 1992 and 2002, Kenya suffered through three major drought periods (1992- 1993, 1996-1997, 2000- 2002), in which food and seed were distributed to the affected regions and population. During these major drought periods, o ver 42 districts benefitted from seed distribution in Kenya. In the droughts of 1992- 93 and 1996-97, the govemment and other development organizations used the DSD approach to distribute seeds to seed-needy households. In 1992- 93, seed was distributed to 32 districts, and between 1996 and 1997, it was distributed in 41 districts. In the period between 2000 and 2002, both the DSD and SV &F approaches were u sed to distribute seed in 42 districts in the country, out of which, the DSD approach was used in 34 and both DSD and SV &F in eight districts, mainly in eastem Kenya. Data available from implementing organizations reveal that SV &F has only been implemented in three years in nine districts in Kenya. However, OSO has been implemented for o ver 1 O years in all the 42 districts where seed distribution has taken place. The NGOs and the Ministry of Agriculture stafftend to agree that as long as seeds are available with seed companies and transport logistics are in place, the DSD approach is easily replicable and can cover a wider geographical area within a short time period compared to the SV &F approach. This is mainly beca use DSD is implemented through govemment and other development agency structures that already exist and which are easily mobilized for seed distribution. However, seeds and transport are usually not in place in the quantities needed at the required time. Although more of the targeted districts can be reached through DSD, the distribution of seed from the districts to the divisions, locations, and households is usually delayed beyond the necessary planting period. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Reliefwith Development 50 1 ---- M. Makokha el al. The nature of the SV &F approach, which involves targeting the most affected locations or divisions within a district, may limít it to smaller geographical coverage. However, with time and more capacity building in the implementing institutions, SV&F may be a better approach since it targets the neediest locations. Table 2. Comparison of Operational Features of DSD and SV &F oso ¡ SV&F Targeting of regions and locations Done at regional leve! based on drought. Little effort is made to identify the most affected divisions and locations ------- At district leve! targeting is based on food insecurity and occurrence of drought. Divisions and locations are selected based on rainfall data and crop performance in the current or preceding season Targeting of beneficiaries Targeting depends on the distributing agency. Some NGOs do their targeting according to criteria set by officials within their grassroots networks. ALRMP at times offers blanket distribution mainty to satisfy potitica\ interests, though, theoretically, frontline extension officers are supposed to target needy households Community sets criteria through sub-village committees to identify and rank seed-needy households --- - ---- Seed sources Seed companies, and at times small-seed enterprises such as irrigation schemes and community seed butking units -------- Farmers, local market traders, research institutions, community seed bulking groups, small- and large-scale seed companies ------- Seed procurement Requires a tendering process, or direct agreement with small seed enterprises 1 No tendering process required . Seed vendors bring grains and certified seed to the seed fai r si te Seed transportation to distribution points --------- Transportation has to be arranged by the implementing agency and seed companies or small seed enterprises for long distances Transportation arranged by the seed suppliers l (vendors) Seed distribution Done by chiefs, assistant chiefs, extension agents and grassroots network of implementing NGOs Beneficiaries are issued vouchers, which they exchange for seed Oecision on amount received by each beneficiary ------- - ----- - ---- - - Centrally decided by extension and administration officials. Depends on the number of beneficiaries coming for seed, or households targeted by grassroots networks, relative to available seed Made by each beneficiary, depending on the voucher value Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Reliefwith Development . 51 1 Comparison ofSeed Vouchers & Fairs and Direct Seed Distribution B eneficiaries targeted and r e ached The number of beneficiaries targeted and those receiving seeds through DSD and SV &F in eastem Kenya are presented in table 3. For the three drought periods, the number of bene ficiari es reached through DSD in the affected districts of eas tem Kenya exceeded the targets by between 15% to 23%. In 2000-2002, the distribution through both OSO and SV &F also exceeded the targets by 23%, indicating similarity in both approaches. The fewer number of benefician es targeted and reached by SV &F was determined by the project design and limited by project funds. However, if more funds could be made available for SV&F, more benefic iaries could be reached. Tahle 3 . Scale of Operation of Seed Distrihution in Terms of Districts Covered, Number of Beneficiaries and Quantitie s of Seed Distrihuted during the Three Major Drought Periods in Eastern Kenya No. of beneficiarias Value of Drought Quantity of seed Percent period and Number of seed distributed achievem'nt approach districts Targeted Achieved distributed (Mi Ilion (targeted/ u sed covered (M tons) shillings) achieved) 1992-93 10 79,050 90,907 1,741 157 115 (DSD) 1996-97 12 66,750 80,100 979 81 120 (DSD) 2000-2002 9 95,682 117,369 499 64 123 (DSD) 2000-2002 8 33,800 41 ,583 1,020 23 123 (SV&F) Oiscussions with those who implemented DSD and SV &F (Ministry of Agriculture and NGO staft) revealed that when OSO approach is used, even households that were not seed deficient received seed; SV &F is more efficient in targeting seed-needy households. Types of crops/varie ties distrihuted DSD relies on the crop varieties and quantities of seed available with seed companies. These are mainly improved crop varieties, which are released for cultivation in specified regions. For most ofthe dryland areas ofKenya, only a few crop varieties have been released for cultivation (Omanga, 2002) . This limits the number ofsuitable crops/varieties that are distributed to fam1ers through DSD. Nevertheless, maize, sorghum, beans, and cowpeas are the main crops that seed companies supply for emergency seed distribution. Discussions with Ministry of Agriculture crop officers in the various districts revealed that the most common maize varieties supplied for distribution in eastern Kenya during drought emergencies were DLC, KCB, H5 11 , H5 12, and H5 13. However, it is not uncommon to find that maize for high-potential areas, such as H5 12, H513, H61 4, and H6 14, have also been included in the supplies (Mohamed, 200 1). Two varieties of sorghum, Seredo and Serena, are the most common, while, in beans, the seed companies usually supply mwatimania and rosecoco. Addressing Seed Security in Disnster Response: Unking Relief with Development 52 1 M. Makokha el al. For drought-tolerant crop species like millet, cowpeas, green grams, pigeonpeas, and Dolichos beans, where few varieties have been released by research, the seed companies have been able to supply seeds but with no variety tag or )abe!. In most cases, it is only the name of the crop that is written on the package. This indica tes that some of the seed for these crops could be not certifíed but was purchased by seed companies from local markets. A sample of crops, varieties, and quantities supplied and distributed to benefíciaries through DSD are presented in table 4 for Makueni District, which is representative ofthe other districts. The crops and varieties/cultívars available during SV &F is representative ofthe cropping system ofthe area. In most SV &F distributions, various crops grown by farmers in the regían were avaiJable (table 5). These included maize, sorghum, millet, beans, cowpeas, green grams, pigeonpeas, Dol ichos beans, and chickpeas. Other crops that were brought to sorne ofthe seed fairs included cassava, sweet potatoes, and cotton. For each ofthese crops, farmers, traders, and seed companies brought completely differentiated varieties and cultivars. More crops and different crop varieties were brought for sale to farrners at SV &F events, compared to the number of crops and varieties that seed companies supplied through DSD. Quantities of seed given in each approach For DSD, the amount of seed supplied during the three drought periods largely depended on the availabi lity ofseed through seed companies, the price ofthe seed, and the availability offunds. Between 1992 and 2002, over 3219 tons ofseed worth 302 million shillings were supplied and di stributed by the govemment and NGOs in eastem Kenya using the DSD approach. During the drought period of 2000 and 2002, CRS and its partners distributed about 1020 tons ofseed worth 23 million shillings using the SV &F approach in eastem Kenya . A total of 51 SV &F events were conducted. At these events, 2169 seed vendors (farmers, traders, and seed companies) brought over 2500 tons of seed and sold 1020 tons to voucher ho lders (table 6). Despite the fact that beans and maize are not the best-adapted crops for the drought-prone areas of eastem Kenya, they sti ll comprised the highest proportion of seed distributed by both DSD and SV &F. This is mainly due to taste preferences and suggests that a greater effort is needed in promoting drought-tolerant crop varieties through on-farm trials and demonstrations. Quantities of seed given to each household Generally, most of the stakeholders who are involved in emergency seed di stribution rely on technical backstopping from Ministry of Agriculture staffto provide estima tes ofthe amount ofseed to be given to each household. This is based on the average area of land per household and prevailing agroclimatic conditions. For most districts in ASAL eastem Kenya, the average land holding is between two and seven hectares. The seed budget per household is about 1 Okg of maize, 1 Okg ofbeans, 5kg of sorghum or millet, and another 5kg of cowpeas, pigeonpeas, or green grams, according to d istrict crops officers. The amount of seed that each househo1d got through govemment channels, in practice, depended on the number of members of each household who present at the dí stribution point. In most cases, the benefíciaries received between 3kg and 1 Okg of seed of various crop varieties (according to district crops offícers). However, when NGOs were involved, the quantities received by each household ranged from 8kg to 25kg (table 7). Seed distributed through govemment channels went to everyone who carne to the distribution point, but the NGOs were more targeted, giving seed to the already identified seed-needy households only. Through SV&F, the average amount of seed received by each benefíciary was 28kg. Addressing Seed Securily in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development . 53 1 Comparison uf Seed Vouchers & Fairs and Direct Seed Distribution Table 4. Summary of Diversity of Crops, Varieties, and Quantities D elivered and Agencies lnvolved in the DSD System in Makueni Dish·ict Year/Donor/ Sea son 1995, Drought Recovery Program (DRP), LR 1995, GAA/KFFHC, LR 1996, DRP, LR 1996, WVK, GAA, DANIDA, >Z 2000, WVK,GAA, &MAP 2001, DRP, LR 2001 , FAO/AMREF , LR No. of beneficiaries reached No Records No Records No Records No Records No Records No Records Crop type and quantities supplied (tons) Varieties of each crop and quantities supplied (tons) ----~- Maize (63.0) Sorghum (5.0)/ Millet {5.0) Legumes (18.0) Maize (30.0) Sorghum (9.0) Beans (7.0) Maize (120.0) Legumes (90.0) Sorghum (5.0) Maize (48.8) Legumes {52.0} Sorghum (35.6) Cotton (19.2) Maize (15.1) Sorghum (13.5} Cotton (24.4} Legumes (22.8) Maize (36.0) Sorghum (24.0) Legumes (6.0) Sorghum (13.0) Millet (13.0) Legumes (52.0} ·---- --- KCB, DLC1 , and H511 (assorted) Serena and seredo 5.0 (assorted); Bulrush and finger millets 5.0 (assorted) Beans (15.0), (mwitamania and rosecoco, assorted); Cowpeas (3.0) (M66 and kenkunde, assorted) KCB (30.0) Seredo (9.0) Mwitamania (7.0) DLC1 , KCB, and H511 (120.0, assorted) GLP2, GLP92, GLP1004, kenkunde (90.0) Seredo (5.0) Maize (48.8) Beans, cowpeas, green grams (52.0) Sorghum (35.6, assorted) Cotton (19.2, assorted) Maize {15.1, assorted) Sorghum (13.5, assorted) Cotton (24.4, assorted) Beans, cowpeas, green grams, pigeonpeas, soybeans (22.8, assorted) KCB (36.0) Seredo (7.0), serena (1 7.0) Mwitemania (4.0 ), kenkunde (2.0) Sorghum (13.0, assorted) Millet (13.0, assorted) Cowpeas (13.0), green grams (13.0), beans (26.0) Source: District Agriculture Office Mak ueni (2003). Note: LR == long rains. For other acronyms, see the list at the end of the chapter. Table 5. Comparison of Varietal Composition of Seed Distl"ibuted through DSD and SV&F Number of Varieties Supplied/Available Crops DSD SV&F Maize 7 5 Sorghum 4 6 Millet 2 4 Beans 6 8 Cowpeas 4 7 Pigeonpeas 4 Green grams 1 3 Chickpeas 2 Dolicho beans 4 Total 25 43 Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking ReLief with Development 54 1 M . .llakukha el al. Table 6 . Cr op s and Quantities (in MT) Distributed in Drought-Mfected Districts of Eastern Kenya tht·ougb the SV &F Appt·oach , 2000-2002 Crop 2000 2001 2002 Maize 19.2 261.0 30.5 Sorghum 5.4 104.4 10.1 Millet 3.5 87.0 7.9 Beans 28.5 294.1 18.6 Cowpeas 3.4 69.6 8.5 Green grams 2.6 27.4 6.3 Pigeonpeas 1.5 22.2 3.6 Dolicho beans 0.3 3.5 0.5 Chickpeas 0.2 0.8 0.0 Total 64.6 870.0 86.0 Tahle 7 . Quantities of Seed (kg) Received b y Each Household through NGO Ch a1mels Using DSD , 2000 Quantity of seed received by each household by crop Sorghum/ Cowpeas/ NGO Maize millet Beans greengrams Pigeonpeas Total Red Cross 3 2 2 1 8 GAA 5 10 5 5 25 Catholic Diocese 5 2 5 4 16 DAN IDA 10 5 15 ADRA 5 2 5 7 19 DSD versus SV&F: Process and product An analysis of process and product compares the two approaches in emergency seed distribution in the context of logi stics and timeliness, quantit ies supplied and del ivered, capacity building, and process of seed acquis ition. It also addresses spin-offs such as choice leeway, pricing, income redistribution, and gender composition ofkey players. In the product analys is, we addressed the appropriateness oftypes of crops and varieties distributed, adaptability ofthe seed to local conditions, quality of the seed- viabili ty, purity-and the composition of the seed in tenns of crop species and varieti es. Logistics and timeliness For any emergency seed distribution, logistics have to be put into place to ensure a timely supply ofseed to needy households befare the onset ofthe rains. The two systems ofemergency seed distribution (DSD and SV&F) differ markedly in terms of the logistics involved, which begin from the identiftcation of drought-affected areas through to the procurement and distribution of seed to the targeted benefic iaries Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relie.f Lcith Dl'l'<'lopment 55 Comparison o[ eed Vouchers & Fairs and Direct Seed Distribution (table 8). The OSO involves a lengthy time consuming tendering process. lt also entails that the seeds have to be transported to the affected districts and locations. This is time consuming and more often the seed reaches the beneficiaries long after the onset of rains. For example, during the seed distribution of 2000 October short rains, most ofthe districts reported receiving seeds two weeks after the onset ofrains and sorne more than one month la ter (Mohamed, , 200 l ). In SV&F, most ofthe seed distributed comes from the affected areas. lt only requires mobilization and sensitization of farmers, traders, seed stockists, and seed companies to take seed to selected seed fair sites that are closer to beneficiaries. The mobilizati on may take about two weeks. In fact, discussions with agriculture officials and farmers revealed that through SY &F, farmers received seed in time to plant before or at the onset of the rains in 2000 and 200 l. This is further supported by Mohamed's (200 1) evaluation findings. Secondary b enefits Apart fro m the seed-needy farmers who are the purported beneficiaries of both systems of emergency seed distribution, other stakeholders also benefit. Table 9 gives a summary of various categories of beneficiaries in each system and the nature of benefits. Under the S V &F approach, the farming cornmunities benefitted twice: once from seed received and also from money received by local seed vendors, which was injected into the local economy. On the other hand, under OSO, the farming cornmun ities only benefitted from receiving seed. The funds used to purchase the seed went to the seed companies. The active role played by the farming communities under SY &F helps enhance the sustainabili ty ofthe local seed market system because local seed vendors and farmers play a key role in the actual exchange ofvouchers for seed. Quantities of eed received by each household In SY &F, the amounts of seed the voucher holders received depended on the prices ofthe grain (seed) in the seed fa ir. With the voucher value of700 shillings given to farmers during the seed fairs in 2001, most of the beneficiaries used 250 to purchase maíze, 250 to purchase beans, 1 00 to purchase sorghum and millet, and 100 for other grain legumes (table 1 0). Atan average price of 16, 38, 26, and 35 shillings per kilo of maize, beans, sorghum/mi ll et, and other legumes, respective1y, the beneficiaries took home an average of30kg of grain to be planted as seed. Only 8kg of certified commercial seed could be purchased for 700 shillings. In the OSO approach, the amount of seed received by households was decided by the implementing agency or the Ministry of Agricu lture. In most districts, each household was to receive about 1 Okg of maize, 5kg ofsorghum, 5kg ofbeans, and 2kg ofeither cowpeas, green grams, or pigeonpeas- a total of 22kg. However, the amount of seed finally received by the househo lds depended on what was supplied to the 1ocation or division and the number of househo1ds ata distribution point. Ouring 2000 and 2001 , most farmers receiving seed through DSO, took home an average 3kg to 1 Okg of seed to plan t. Table 11 gi ves a summary ofthe seed distributed in each district, the targeted farmers, and the estimated seed per household under the two systems. The average amount of seed supplied under the SV &F system was 28kg. T he highest amount of.seed was received in Tha,raka Oistrict, with each beneficiary receiving about 36kg of assorted seeds, whi1e the lowest amount was received in Kitui, where each beneficiary received 21 kg of assorted seed. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster l?espunse: Linking Relief with De11elopmenl ~~- ---- ---------- --~~ ----- M. Makokha el al. Table 8. Comparison of Logistics and Timeliness of DSD and SV &F Systems of Seed Distribution oso SV&F ldentification of Sea le and Scope of Disaster • Elaborate system that starts with frontline extension staff, village-level provincial administration, district-level officials, to national Office of the Presiden! (based ALRMP) and NGO head offices For !he case of seed from the government in Kenya, the system is time consuming because of bureaucratic red tape-hence not capable of quick response to an emergency. For the case of NGOs, they are more focused on certain target areas and have less red tape-hence capable of quick response • Existing information used to determine areas that deserve intervention • Combination of existing information and sub-village committees used to target beneficiaries • Focused on specific disaster-affected areas-hence easy to react in time with appropriate intervention Procurement and Distribution to Districts Procurement achieved through an elaborate tendering system that involves decisions and goodwill of a number of stakeholders, such as members of Office of the Presiden!, Treasury officials, and Ministry of Agriculture officials for seed from the government, and top-level management of NGOs for seed distributed through NGOs or their grassroots collaborators Availability of adequate and adaptable varieties of given crop species subject to stocking policies of major seed companies or small seed enterprises whose operations are independent of needs of Office of the Presiden!, Ministry of Agriculture, or NGOs Transportation from source to target areas involves contracting transporters and loaders. with associated cost implications • Too many independent players involved-hence not capable of quick response to emergency situation High proportion of seed supplied comes from within the disaster area Benefitting communities double as suppl iers of some of the seed-hence limited transport and packaging logistics Majority of the players in the exchange process are local • Minimal time required to sensitize the suppliers and organize potential beneficiaries to meet in a central place lnherent ability to support quick response to disaster because of few independent and spatially distributed players in decision making Distribution to Target Beneficiarias, Monitoring and Evaluation Budget for distribution normally allocated to provincial No physical transportation by an independent administration yet Ministry of Agriculture officials are transporter requi red to reach targeted beneficiaries supposed to distribute seed to targeted beneficiaries. No officials of provincial administration nor extension Individual NGOs involved in seed distribution organize staff required to supervise distribution their grassroots network for actual distribution to No elaborate packaging and storage facility required at targeted beneficiaries grassroots/village level Most ALRMP lorries in the districts are in disrepair and no specific funds are allocated for hiring lorries from prívate transporters to carry seed to target locations Some new districts lack adequate storage facilities for large quantities of seed sourced and distributed by the government. Most NGOs also lack storage facilities in target locations • Adequate time and properly planned logistics required to have the seed reach the beneficiaries-hence not capable of quick response to emergency \ . ~ - • Literally no time spent on distribution to target communities, as each beneficiary gets hislher share to carry home • Decentralized system with ta rgeting on smaller scale-hence more accurate and easier to monitor and evaluate • Both buyers and sellers benefit-hence ensures targeting without creating confl ict with in the community . -· lnformation contained in vouchers allows implementation to be tracked, forming the basis for monitoring and evaluation - ---- U.\ l. A- or ,. rr N y Addressing Seed Securily in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Developmenl 57 1 Comparison of Seed Vouchers & Fairs and Direct Secd Distribution Table 9. Comparison of Benefits Accruing to Various Stakeholders mtder DSD and SV &F Systems of Seed Supply oso SV&F Benefits to Farmers Primary beneficiaries and the main recipients of the distributed seed Primary beneficiaries of the seed purchased through the system: they comprise the majority of suppliers of seed and thus redeem vouchers for cash Benefits to Seed Vendors Benefits only in situations where NGOs purchase locally bulked seed for distribution to farmers Secondary beneficiarias from profits earned when they sell their grains as seed during the fairs Benefits to Seed Companies Main secondary beneficiaries: they supply Secondary beneficiaries: they supply part of most of the seed distributed through DSD certified seed purchased during the fairs Benefits to Local Seed Stockists Secondary beneficiaries: normally benefit when NGOs choose to purchase seed locally Secondary beneficiaries: they supply part of certified seed purchased during the fairs Benefits to Community in General Benefit from agricultura! outputs from the seed and, hence, food security; increased crop diversity occasioned by new species; small seed enterprises/community seed bulking agents sell part of their "seed" as emergency grade seed --- lnject cash into local economy (70% remains in the community); capacity building in terms of issues relating to seed quality; capacity building in terms of seed bulking and seed exchange systems; contributes to sustainability of the local seed market system Table 10. Arnow1t of Seed That Each Bt>neficiary Took Home Seed Fairs Commercial seed Household Average Amount Amount that Crop seed budget Unit price of seed purchased Unit price could have been (Ksh) (Ksh/kg) (~ (Ksh/kg) purchased (kg) Maize 250 16 15.6 100 2.5 Beans 250 38 6,6 80 3.2 Sorghum/millet 100 28 3.8 70 1.4 Other Legumes __ 100 35 2.9 100 1.0 Totals 700 30.0 8.0 - - -- -- -- Acúlrrssing Seetl Secttrity in /Jisaster l?esponse: Linking Reliif with Dc11elopment s_!_j_ -- M. Makokha et al. Table 11. Estimated Seed Distributed per Household under DSD and SV &F, 2000 oso SV&F Amount of Amount of Seed Seed per Seed Oistricts No. of Oistributed Household No. of Oistributed Seed per Beneficiaries {kg) (kg) Beneficiarias {kg) Household Tharaka 6,125 45,642 7.50 4,600 164,000 35.61 Mbeere 8,307 49,900 6.00 4600 93,000 20.22 Macha kas 41,100 1,014,100 24.00 4600 150,000 32.60 Makueni 7,700 129,492 16.80 4600 146,000 31.74 Kitui 13,530 50,150 3.70 4600 98,000 21.30 Mwingi 40,607 312,814 7.70 3278 86,000 26.24 Average 10.95 27.9 For each of the dryland crops, there are a number of varieties/cultivars that fanners can easily differentiate by local names and preferred characteristics. Indeed, different Iocall y adapted crops and crop varieties, which are not available in the formal seed sector but are important to food security in drought-prone areas, were brought for sale to the fairs. This helps develop an understanding of the biodiversity in crops and varieties and fanners' preferences for the various crops in each location. The seed fairs provided an opportunity for local seed vendors and seed-needy fanners to interact. lt also provided an opportunity to gather infonnation on the kinds of crops and varieties available for sale and fanners' preferences. In this way, the SV&F system strengthens the operation of local seed systems rather than undermining it. The promotion of seed-quality issues related to seed preservation, selection, and management of good-quality seed during sensitization meetings and fairs, as well as the involvement of local vendors and fanners under the SV &F scheme, considerably enhances the local seed supply system. Conversely, under the DSD scheme, all seed is purchased elsewhere and brought in for distribution in target Iocalities. The well-organized publicity and involvement of a considerable number of vendors, fanners, and commercial seed companies associated with SV &F make it possible to access a wider range of crops and varieties (see table 5). For example, during the implementation of the "Emergency Provísion of Seeds to Drought Affected Farming Households" project in Kenyan ASALs, sorne 43 varieties ofnine crops were bought at seed fairs, compared to only 27 varieties for seven crops provided through DSD. In the long tenn, the repeated provision of relief seed associated with DSD could unintentionally increase fanners' vulnerabili ty by promoting false expectations, contributing to dependency on free assistance, and disrupting local seed markets (F AO, 2002b ). In this context, SV &F is less "hannful" as it enhances the local seed supply. Seventy percent ofthose who bring their own seed under SV &F are from the local communities, which ensures that a larger proportion ofthe funds committed to relief seed remains in the benefitting communities. For instance, of the US$ 276,000 spent on vouchers in the six districts under srudy in 2001 , approximately US$ 193,200 remained in the benefitting communities. Flexibility The SV&F approach presents a " leve! playing field" upon which the commercial seed sector (seed companies and stockists) and the fanner seed system (fanners and market traders) can compete. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Rcliefwith Development . 59 1 ---~ Comparison of Seed Vouchers & Fairs and Direct Seed Distribution However, the playing field can be easily tilted in favor ofthe commercial sector iffarmers are lectured on the superiority of commercial seed of improved varieties. lt can also be tilted towards the farmer system by encouraging voucher holders to buy locally so asto prevent the proceeds from the sale Jeaving the community. The SV &F methodology provides beneficiaries a choice of crops, varieties, and seed quality. It is an open process in which commercial seed companies, stockists (input supply shopkeepers), market grain traders, and small farmers can all participate. With competent, experienced, and proactive management, SV &F can provide farm fami lies with a choice between farmer and formal seed, as well as small quantities of seed of new varieties. Beneficiary access to information concet•ning quality of the supplied seed Interviews with representative farmers (F AO, 2002a) and officials of the Ministry of Agriculture (district crop officers) revealed that farmers have more leeway accessing information regarding adaptation to local environments and seed quality in SV &F, compared to OSO. This is mainly dueto the fact that in SV &F, farmers ha ve the freedom to choose the crop, variety, and amount of seed they want, within the constraint of the value of their vouchers. They al so have the freedom to choose what to bu y from a number of suppliers, who range from local stockists, seed companies, seed vendors, and fellow farmers. This way, they ha ve control over the quality of the seed that they take home. Under SV &F, farmers are al so in a position to choose the seed or combination of seeds that they prefer. The majority (over 50%) ofthose displaying seed for sale are fellow farmers and the benefíciaries are able to rate the quality oftheir seed based on experience because they live in the same community. On the other hand, under the DSD system, farmers are compelled to contend with what is provided to them, as they do not play any role in deciding either what is to be purchased or the crop mix in terms ofwhat is provided to them. Contribution to biodiversity Interviews with various stakeholders (farmers and extension staft) revealed that both the OSO and SV &F systems of emergency seed distribution enhance biodiversity through the introduction of new varieties and, even at times, crop species. The DSO system brings in certifíed seed, sorne of which is totally new to the target areas and, thus, enhances diversity of the crop species in such areas . SV &F involves participation of seed companies and other seed merchants who introduce new crop species and varieties in target areas. For instance, Westem Kenya Seed Company was able to display and sell new varieties of pigeonpeas, beans, millet, sorghum, and maize during the seed fairs in 2001 , which is an indication that farmers in the region actuall y seek seed of new varieties. Ability of supply to satisfy the estimated demand Comparison ofthe two systems in terms ofability to satisfy the estimated demand revealed that the OSD system under ALRMP has rarely supplied the districts with the requested amounts. Using Machakos as an example (table 12), it can be seen that the amount of seed supplied for the much-needed varieties of maize, beans, cowpeas, and sorghum was far below the quantities ordered. On the other hand, the supply under SV&F is such that all vouchers are exchanged for seed and no farrner goes home with unused vouchers. Addressing Seed Securily in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development . 60 1 M. Makokha el al. Table 12. Quantities of Emergency Seed Ordered and What Was Actually Received for the See d from ALRMP, Machakos Distric t , 1997 CropNariety Quantity Ordered (kg) Quantity Received (kg) Maize H511 38,800 20,000 Maize H512 Nil 12.000 K ale 20 5 Onions 30 100 Tomatoes 40 180 Green grams 19,200 793 Maize (KCB) 317,400 115,000 Beans 304,600 2,000 Sorghum 4000 Nil Cowpeas 37,160 2,080 DSD versus SV&F: Financial analysis In a rder to implement emergency seed distribution, funds are required to meet the costs of purchase, transportation, and distribution. Depending on the approach used to distribute seed, these costs vary with the types of seed distributed and the distances between the di stribution locations and the district and seed company headquarters. At the NGO leve!, it was diffícult to get information on the amount and value of seed purchased and distributed. However, sorne data were avai lable from FAO Kenya, which coordinated seed distributions during the droughts of 2000 and 200 l . Based on the available data, we used two methods to compare the cost implicatíons ofDSD and SV &F: • information on the number of targeted beneficiaries and total project costs that was available for 2000 and 200 l from the F AO Kenya office, wh ich provided the overall costs involved in di stributing seed to each benefitting household under each of the two schemes. • the estimated costs of seed procurement, transportation, handling, and faci li tation, which addressed the cost effectiveness of each ofthe two schemes (adapted from a study on "Compara ti ve Financia! Analysis ofthe Seed Vouchers and Fairs Scheme," FAO, 2002b). Overall costs Table 13 compares the average cost and estimated amount of seed per beneficiary, and the estimated unit cost of seed for the DSD and SV &F distributions conducted in eastem Kenya during 2000 and 200 l. Only the cost of purchasing seed was included in this analysis since it was difficult to get other costs related to transportation and faci litation for DSD. The average cost of distributing seed to each beneficiary through DSD (545 Ksh) was almost identical to that ofSV &F (560 Ksh) in 2000, but less by 102 Ksh for the 2001 distribution. However, the amount of seed received by each household was far less in the DSD distribution: 4 .3kg through DSD in 2000, compared to 12.2kg in 2000 and 28. 7kg in 2001 through SV &F. The estimated unit cost of 128.2 Ksh/kg ofseed for DSD in 2000 was considerable more than the cost ofa kilo ofseed distributed through SV&F: almost three times more for 2000 and six times more for 200 l. Addressing Seed Securily in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development . 61 1 Cumparison ofSeed Vouchers & Fairs and Direct Seed Distribution Table 13. Aualysis of Costs of Seed Distributed Using DSD and SV&F in Eastern Kenya in 2000 and 2001 oso SV&F ltem Year 2000 Year2000 Year 2001 Amount of seed distributed (MT) 499 98 870 Estimated value of seed distributed (million Ksh.) 64 4 .5 19.6 Number of beneficiaries 117,369 8,027 30,270 Average cost per beneficiary (Ksh) 545 560 647 Estimated amount of seed per beneficiary (kg) 4 .3 12.2 28.7 __Étimated cost per kilo of seed (Ksh) 128.4 45.9 22 .5 Source: FAO (2002b). Considering the cost of seed, the DSD system is more expensive to implement than SV &F. The cost of the certified seed distributed in OSO is approximately s ix times more expensive than the local grain that domina tes the seed exchanged in SV &F schemes. Cost effectiveness The relative cost-effectiveness the two schemes is presented in table 14, as adapted from FAO (2002b). Due to lack of data on all emergency seed dis tribution operations, the analysis was conducted on the basis of final reports and financia! statements from AMREF, the implementing agency of DSD in Makueni District, and CRS, the implementing agency of SV &F in Mbeere, Tharaka, and Embu. Both schemes were implemented under the "Emergency Provision of Seeds to Orought-Affected Farming Households" project (OSRO/KEN/001 /SWE) funded by OFID through FAO. The CRS financia! budget and preliminary results for implementation of the "Emergency Seeds Distribution by Voucher System for the ' Long' Rains in Eastem Kenya" project (OSRO/KEN/101/UK) were also used. The maja r costs involved in implementing OSO included procurement ofseed, transportation, handling, and facil itation. There were al so expenditures to cover the costs of procurement missions. In contrast, the costs of seed provision through the SV &F seed fairs in volved facilitation and the value of the vouchers. In table 14, a summary of the cost comparison is given, revealing that the combined costs of facilitation and transportation per benefíciary (and therefore the total costs per benefíciary) are lower for SV &F than for DSO (US$ 1.0 and US$ 2.3 for SV &F projects OSRO/KEN/00 1/SWE and OSRO/KEN/ 10 1 /UK, respectively, compared to US$ 3.3 under DSD). The total cost of US$ 13.8 per household for OSO is e ven more expensive when one compares the amount of seed that each household rcceived . lt is evident in table 14 that the average price of seed was lower for SV &F in both 2000 and 2001 , compared to the price for OSO. However, the average cost for SV&F in 2000 was tvvice that ofSV&F in 200 l . This was attributed mainly to a change in market grain prices betvveen 2000 and 200 l. The grain prices were higher in 2000 due to grain shortages and high demand. Addresúng Seed Sr'curity in Disaster Response: U nking Heliefwith lJn ;elopmenl 62 1 M. Makuklw el al. --------------------------------------------------------------------~~~ Table 14. Summary of Financia! Costs fot· DSD and SV &F Project Project Unit OSRO/KEN/001/SWEa OSRO/KEN/101/UKe Description oso SV&F SV&F lmplementing NGO AMREF CRS CRS Number of benefitting households No. 6.217 8,027 30,278 (hh) Quantity of seed distributed Kg 74,604 64,678 956,324 Costs of seed acquisition US$ 65,262 42,103 243,589 Costs of seed facil itation US$ 12,108 8,282 69,800 Costs of seed transportation US$ 8,530 o o Costs of seed transportation US$ 20,638 8,282 69,800 &facilitation Total costs< US$ 85,900 50,385 313,389 Costs of seed per hhd US$ 10.5 5.2 8 .0 Average quantity of seed per hh Kg 12.0 8.0 31.5 Average price of seed US$/Kg 0.9 0.6 0.3 Cost of seed facilitation per hh US$ 1.9 1.0 2.3 Cost of transportation and US$ 3.3 1.0 2 .3 facilitation per hh Total costs per benefitting hh US$ 13.8 6.2 10.3 Cost of seed facilitation as % of % 19% 19% 28% seed value Cost of seed facilitation as % of % 14% 16% 22% total costs Cost of seed facilitation and % 32% 19% 28% transportation as % of seed value Cost of seed facil itation and % 24% 16% 22% transportation as % of total costs a. "Emergency Provision ofSeed to Drought-Affccted Farming Households in Kenya," actual numbers. b. "Emergency Seed Distribution by Voucher System for the ' Long· ra ins in Eastem Kenya," est ima tcd numbers. c. F AO monitoring and evaluation costs are excluded. d . The SV &F seed package under OSRO/KEN/ 1 O 1/UK project does not include the cost of promotional seeds. Lessons learned, reflections, and next steps forward Lessons leam ed Although direct seed distribution is based on the assumption that after a drought disaster, farm ing communities do not have enough seed, the experience with seed vouchers and fairs in eastern Kenya shows that despite the intermittent droughts that lead to repeated acute stress, the main constraint is one of access to seed as opposed to local seed availabili ty. This is ev idenced in the fact that during SV&F activi ties, over 70% of the seed supplied was by local seed vendors and/or farmers w ho double as suppliers of"seed" during such fairs. This implics that thc local seed system is capable ofproviding the required seed even in situations of acute stress. Lack of access, which might be a result of widespread poverty, is the most likely exacerbating factor for the seed-related problems observed under conditions of acute stress. Addressing Seed SecurÍ(l in Disaster Response: Linking Relief 1cith Developm('n/ 63 1 Comparison of Seed Vouchers & Fairs and Direct Seed Distribution In the nonnal planting season before any prolonged drought, fanners in drought-prone areas prefer planting landraces from their own sources and/or open-air markets (Audi, 2001 ). This implies that there is a built-in tendency for communities in ASALs to keep their own seed for planting or for sale to others through open-air markets, a factor that further supports the theory that during acute seed problems, the required seed is available in the communities but not accessible to all . The normal supply of seed for distribution through OSO has been come from govenunental or commercial sectors. This has led toa narrow range of crops and varieties available to beneficiaries. The commercial seed sector produces mainly for the reliable markets in medium- to high-potential agroecological zones, which means that they are not likely to ha ve adequate stocks of species or varieties adapted for ASAL districts. A shift towards empowering local bulking and availability of crops and varieties that are appropriate to local conditions could facilitate the procurement of seed for emergency seed di stributions, if only the donors and relief agencies could be convinced to be more flexible in their seed-sourcing policies. There are many cases where locally produced "emergency-grade seed" has been sourced and distributed. For instance, fanners in the Yala Oivision, Siaya Oistrict in Kenya (in collaboration with KARI, CIMMYT, and KEPHIS, and with financia! support from the Rockefeller Foundation) are currently bulking and selling unpacked and unbranded "semi-certified seed" among themselves in a cluster of 20 fanner groups. The same arrangement co uld be replicated in the ASAL districts of eastern Kenya. The fact that interventions have been needed each time there has been prolonged drought in eastem Kenya means that intennittent interventions have not resulted in establi shing a more resilient seed system that could sustaín itself through períods of acute stress without externa! intervention. There is therefore a need for a deeper understanding of the impact of relief seed on the rehabilitation of the seed system and promotion of system stabili ty. At present, seed fairs are only used as a means of enabling seed-needy fanners to access seed for the crop or variety of their choice in desired quantities, subject to the constraints of the value of the seed vouchers. However, the SV &F approach holds the poten tia! for stimulating local seed enterprises because it empowers even the small-scale sellers to participate. The approach could be modified to facilitate seed fairs on a regular basis, where those with vouchers and those willing to buy with cash could be brought together. Thís would help exploit the inherent empowennent and economic support of the approach, resulting in a more resilient and stable seed system in the drought-prone ASAL districts. Rejlections and recommended way forward The use of OSO and SV &F in emergency seed di stribution in eastern Kenya reveals that both approaches have strengths and weaknesses. OSO has been in ex istence longer and is therefore more familiar to donors, relief agencies, and govemment departments-both at top levels and grassroots. This means that it is easy to access funds from donors for OSO and to implement it on a wider scale. Also, the seed distributed through OSO is obtained mainly from commercial seed companies, so it is of known quali ty. An analysis ofthe cost effectiveness ofthe two approaches reveals relatively lower facilitation costs associated with SV &F compared to OSO. Further more, the OSD approach al so suffers the weakness of being implemented from the top down, with little room for participation by players in the local seed system. This has the potential ofundennining local seed system and its stability. The reliance of OSO on seed from commercial seed sources means that it might fa il at times to get species and varietíes suítable to the target areas. The inherent bureaucratic red tape in procurement and di stribution al so has a negative impact on the timeliness of delivery and targeting of actual seed-needy households. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: {,ínking Reliefwith Development 64 1 Providing seeds through SV &F has the potential of enhancing the local seed system by giving the farmers the opportunity to choose seeds of the crops and varieties they want, which can save for following seasons; contributing to the development of social capital by recognizing the dignity of the beneficiaries and empowering them to choose seed of their preferred crops and varieties; us ing and supporting local crop diversity; linking to development through their capacity to choose, competitive seed markets, and development of agro-enterprises; enhancing local seed marketing systems by reinforcing existing market mechanisms and reducing externa! dependence; and strengthening the local cash economy because it provides financia! injections into the communities. The inherent weaknesses in SV &F include the inability to ascertain seed quality; its lack offamiliarity to most donors, relief agencies, and beneficiaries; and the risk associated with moving large amounts of cash. The study team is of the opinion that there are inherent strengths in both DSD and SV &F that could be built on to enhance the capacity ofthe interventions not only to bring the local seed systems back to their feet but to rehabilitare, stabilize, and sustain the systems. This study recommends that the program designs in emergency seed distribution should always include capacity building at all levels, which provides the recipients with the required ski lls and experiences necessary to maintain the stability and sustainability of the local seed system. SV &F opera tes on the premise that the seed is available in the communities and it is only access to that seed that crea tes a problem in a situation of acute stress. To ensure the sustainabihty of SV &F, small-scale production of open-pollinated varieties for sale as "seed" needs to be enhanced and strengthened in order to facilitate jump-starting small-seed enterprises, as well as intluencing policy on the production and sale of "emergency-grade seed." More resources are currently being used under the DSD scheme, compared to SV &F. DSD also has a wider geographical reach than SV&F. However, comparative analysis ofthe two schemes reveals sorne inherent weaknesses in DSD, particularly with regard to targeting, timeliness, and lack of support for local seed systems. This study propases that the key stakeholders in the implementation of the two schemes should work collaborati vely with a view to incorporating the positive attributes of both for enhanced targeting, timeliness, and stabi lity of local seed markets. Activities for backstopping and institutionalization of small -seed enterprises in the production of standard or "emergency-grade seed" should be encouraged and supported. The govemment, through ALRMP, has shown its willingness to purchase and supply such seed (for example, the purchase of sorghum in Turkana). Stakeholders and other policymakers should exploit the precedent set by ALRMP and start lobbying for legalization of purchase and distribution of such seed by a l! relief organization during emergencies occasioned by droughts. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Reliefwith De:velopmenl 65 1 '--- -- Comparison of Seed Vouchers & F airs and Direct Seed Distribution Acronyms ADRA AMREF ALRMP ASAL CDTF CRS DAN IDA DRP DSD FAO GAA GoK GTZ KARI KCB KEPHIS KFFHC LR MAP- MoA&RD OPV SIDA - SR SV&F WVK Adventists Relief Agency African Medica! Research Foundation Arid Lands Resources Management Programme arid and semiarid land Community Development Trust Fund Catholic Relief Serví ces Danish Intemational Development Agency drought recovery program direct seed distribution Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations German Agro Action Govemment of Kenya German Technical Cooperation Kenya Agricultura! Research Institute Katumani Composite B Kenya Plant Health Jnspectorate Services Kenya Freedom from Hunger Council long rains Makueni Agricultura! Project Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development open-pollinated varieties Swedish lntemational Development Agency short rains seed vouchers & fairs World Vision Kenya Addressing Seed Securily in Disaster Response: Linking Relitf with Dm;elopment . 66 1 M. Makokha et al. References AMREF. 200 l . Emergency provision of seeds to drought-affected farming households. Project OSRO/K.EN/00 1/SWE. AMREF final report and financia! statement. Nairobi: African Medica! Research Foundation. Audi , P. 200 l. OFDA seed fairs and seed and tools: Systems of emergency seed distribution. Mbeere and Tharaka Districts, Eastern Kenya. ICRISAT Report. Nairobi: Intematio nal C rops Research lnstitute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. CRS, ICRlSAT, and ODI. 2002. Seed vouchers andfairs: A manualfor seed-based agricultura/ recovery after disaster in Africa. Nairobi: Catholic Relief Services. Avai lable on-line at http://www. foodaid.org/Tzehay/crs8199 .pdf ( accessed September 2004 ). FAO. 200 l. Emergency seed distribution by voucher system for the "long" rains in eastern Kenya . Project OSRO/K.EN/1 O 1/UK. Second Progress Report, December 200 l. Nairobi : Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. F AO. 2002a. Rapid evaluation of emergency seed distribution in eastern Kenya during !he short rains of200 1. Nairobi: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. F AO. 2002b. Comparative financia/ analysis ofthe seed vouchers and fairs scheme. Nairobi : Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. GoK. 1997-200 l . District deve/opment plans: Thirteen districts of eastern Kenya Nairobi: Ministry of Planning and National Development. Kimenye, L. N. 1999. Commercial Provision of non-hybrid seed in K en ya. In Linking seed producers and consumers: Diagnosing constraints in institutiona/ performance. Bulawayo, Zimbabwe: lntemational Crops Research lnstitute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. Mohamed , B.A. 200 l . Monitoring and eva/uation report on 2000 short rains season seed distribution. A joint Exercise by FAO, MOA&RD, R&R, ALRMP (OOP). Nairobi: Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Omanga, P.A. 2002. Seed fairs in Kenya: Experiences from CRS Kenya. A paper presented at the Workshop on Strengthening Emergency Seed Support in Kenya, Garden Hotel, Machakos, Kenya, 12- 14 June 2002. Remington, T., J. Maroko, S. Walsh, P. Omanga, andE. Charles. 2002. Getting offthe seed-and-tools treadmill wi th CRS seed vouchers and fair s. Disasters 26(4):316-328. Republic of Kenya (GoK). 1995. Proposed seed industry po/icy. Task force report prepared by Ministry of Agticulture and Marketing, Ministry ofTechnical Training, Research and Technology, and Kenya Agricultura! Research lnstitute. Nairobi : Ministry of Agriculture. Republic ofKenya (GoK). 2000. Seed Distribution Estimates. Nairobi: Ministry of Agriculture, Food Crops Di vis ion. J' Sperling, L. 200 l . Emergency seed a id in K en ya: A case study of lessons learned. Occasional Publications Series, No. 34. Kampala: lntemational Center for Tropical Agriculture. ; Sperling, L. 2002. Emergency seed a id in Kenya: Sorne case study insights on lessons leamed during the 1990s. Disasters 26(4):329- 342. '\ 1 ' Sperling, L. and D. Cooper. 2003. Understanding seed systems and strengthening seed security. Paper presented in a stakeholder ' s workshop on "Effect ive and Sustainable Seed Relief," Rome, 26-28 May 2003 . Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization ofthe United Nations. World Vision Kenya. 2003 . Market survey for crops and livestock in Morulem and Lokubae irriga/ion schemes of Lokori Division, Turkana District. Nairobi: World V ision Kenya. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development 67 1 ~ The U se of Informal Seed Producer Groups for Diffusing Root-Rot Resistant V arieties during Periods of Acote Stress) Reuben Otsyula, Gideon Rachier, Nashon Ambitsi, Roselyn Juma, Christine Ndiya, Robin Buruchara, Louise Sperling1 Ahstract / This case focuses on key aspects ofthe spread ofroot-rot- resistant bean germplasm in westem Kenya. It evaluates the provision of new varieties as an emergency response, as well as the varied seed channels used for reaching farmers in crisis. The case started from a premise that informal seed producer groups played an importan! role in moving new varieties. This could not be veri fied . Whether the groups produced seed or grain proved secondary to the observation that they moved only limited quantities of beans. The study developed a secondary focu s on local market channels, as this conduit proved to be a nexus for moving larger quantities of the resistant varieties for food, seed, or both. Analyses of a broad range of local markets showed the resistant varieties to be available throughout the region, and in \arge quantities. Quality of seed was also examined. If markets are used as a significan! diffusion channel, what are the implications in tenns of seed purity, gennination, and health? Two separate collections and laboratory analyses showed that seed from local markets in westem Kenya, including that routinely produced by farmers, is good in terms of purity, germination, and overall seed health. Finally, the study shows that to move new varieties, seed production models need to be carefully evaluated. At least as importan! as quality is the socioeconomic organization of production: who produces, at what scale, for whom, and with what strategies for distributing or marketing. Seed production models have to be (a) sustainable and (b) affordable and (e) must have an explicit impact-oriented outreach focus. Introduction Background Agriculture forms the core livelíhood in western Kenya. Maize is the main staple food, with the predominant farming system being the maize-bean intercrop. Bananas, vegetables (both exotic and l. R. O tsyula, G. Rachier, N. Ambits i, R. Juma, C. Ndiya are from the Kenya Agricultura! Research lnstitute (KARl), Kakamega Station, westem Kenya. R.Buruchara and L. Sperli ng are with the Center for lntemational Tropical Agricu lture (CIAT). Addressing Seed Securily in Disaster Response: Linking Reú:ef with De·velopnwnt 69 1 --~- The Use o/ Informal Seed Producer Groups local), cassava, sweet potatoes, sorghum, and finger millet are also widely sown, and there are a few cash crops: tea, coffee, snap beans, and sugar cane. Westem Kenya produces 12% of the total bean production in Kenya, although cultivation is largely concentrated on small plots and among small-scale farmers. Crop production has been constrained by low soil fertil ity anda build-up of pests and diseases. This is mostly dueto continuous cultivation, with very little use of fertilizer, soil amendments, or chemicals (for pest/disease control). Starting around 1989, bean production (and particularly yields) started to drop dramatically in westem Kenya. About 10% of farmers gave up bean production altogether in the more severely affected areas (Addend et al., 2004: 1 0). One ofthe causes ofthe decline was soon identified as bean root-rot, a complex of fungal pathogens which often emerges in depleted, intensively used soi ls. A great deal has been written about the response ofresearch institutions and development col laborators alike to the "bean root-rot crisis." Among the more notable partnerships has been the collaboration ofthe Kenyan Agricultura! Research Institute (KARI), The Intemational Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIA T), and the Organic Matter Management Network (OMMN). Within a fairly short period, this group jointly diagnosed the root-rot problem and tested severa! options for pathogen control, both on-station and with farming communities. One ofthese options, the sowing ofbean varieties resistant to root-rot, subsequently achieved widespread adoption. A forma l survey in 2001 showed 35%- 80% of farmers using the resi stant bush-bean gennplasm in the two districts in question, Kakamega and Yihiga (figure 1) (Addend et al., 2004). This case study focuses on key aspects of the spread of the root-rot resistant bean germplasm in the context of the overall OFDA-funded project. More generically, it examines the provision of new varieties asan emergency response and analyzes the varied seed channels for reaching farmers affected by stress. In particular, this case study was spurred by the observation that informal seed groups in areas in western Kenya Kakamega and Yihiga Districts) that had been devastated by root-rot seemed to be diffusing the resistant varieties widely and quickly. The starting point of analysis was to understand how these informal seed groups functioned and how effective they were in a stress period such as the Kenyan one, where there was severe pathogen infection . The investigations were subsequently expanded to look at the role oflocal markets as well as the fonnal seed supply, asking how well each channel was reaching affected farmers and assessing the quality of the product on offer. Diagnosis of the stress and initial responses The stress While the build-up of root-rot is a gradual problem, its manifestations on-farn1 were perceived by farmers as rather abrupt. This may be beca use a certain pathogen threshold has to be reached befare there is a marked drop in production. Starting about 1989- 1990, farmers and extensionists alike started to perceive this drop as dramatic. In participatory rural appraisal exercises (KARl, 1997), fanners vividly described the yellowing (and then death) of plants just weeks after first emergence. Declining soil fertility, which aggravates the severity and enhances the manifestation of bean root-rot, was also increasingly evident at this time: subsidies of fertilizers for maize had just been withdrawn and many farmers who had regularly used fertilizer with maize (in a routine maize/bean intercrop) had to do without. A survey carried out in 200 1 reported that bean root-rot did reach calamitous proportions in the 1990s, with 76% and 80% of the farmers in Kakamega and Yihiga, respectively, reporting clear experience w ith and destruction ofthe bean crop dueto bean root-rot (Addend et al. , 2004). Note that Addressing Seed Security Úl Oisasler Response: Linking Reliefwith Deoelopment . 70 1 ·' N t Figure l. Location of study ar·eas in Kenya R. Ots ula el al. Kakamega/Vihlga District farmers did not necessarily understand the speciftc causes (e.g., witchcraft was sometimes postu lated as the agent), but they had leamed to recognize the symptoms of root-rot. Diagnostic surveys followed- formal and informal (KARJ, 1999; Nderitu et al. , 1997; Nekesa et al., 1998)- along with an arra y of on-station trials and laboratory tests (Otysula et al. , 1998). The complex of fungal pathogens causing the root-rot was eventually isolated into its varied forms: Fusarium solani fsp phaseo/i, Rhizoctonia sola ni, Sce/erotium rolfsii, and Pythium spp (Bu ruchara et al., 200 1 ). These diagnoses were made by varied actors, using both qual itative and quantitative methods, and moving in time toward greater scientifíc ri gor. lt is not easy to characterize this type of stress within the larger set of emergency scenarios. The root-rot epidemic probab ly straddles the acute/chronic stress divide. The bui ld-up of soil pathogens and subsequent rot, while technically a gradual process, mani fested itself on-farm and, as perceived by the farmer, as a dramatic, acute decline in production . Many varieties in use at the time, including the most popular, GLP2, simply no longer produced yields. Howcver, the causes of the rot and decline in yields ha ve been shown to be ftrml y systemic. Poverty, leading tono use of inputs or land rotation, meant that farmers had chronic production problems, which could be lessened by variety/seed inputs that, alone, could not solve the problem. This case also straddles diagnostic categories in terms of a seed-security analysis, which theoretically distinguishes between seed-related problems of avail abili ty, access, and qua lity (Remington et al., Addressing Sel'd Security in Disaster RPsponse: /, inkirrg Reliif with /Jer•elopment 71 1 The Use o/ Informal Seed Producer Groups 2002). The complete dropping of bean cultivation by sorne farmers suggcsts the degree to which seed simply was not available locally (that is, nothing was available that would grow). Sorne fanners did buy a local variety from northem Tanzania (around Lake Victoria), ipunda, fro m the market. Thi s variety had sorne roo t-rot tolerance, so a limited amount of seed was accessible- if farmers had the funds. The fact that this bean did subsequently produce indicates that the issue of varietal quality could be sol ved, by sorne. However, since many local fanners dropped beans altogether, rather than sowing the Tanzanian option, the problem (lack of availability? access? quality?) is not clear-cut. In sum, this case study contains elcments of acute and chronic stress, in which all constraints of a seed security framework might be brought forward as concerns: problems with availability, access, and aspects of seed, such as varietal quaJity. Mitigating options The districts of Kakamega and Vi higa are typical of regions affected by root- rot: fann sizes are small, (2.6 ha in Ka kamega and 2.0 ha in Vihiga), population dens ities high (404 persons/km2 in Kakamega and 938 in Vihiga [GOK data reported in Addend et al. , 2004]), and crop rotation is v irtual! y ni l. Farmers generally pl ant beans in both ofthe two seasons: March to July (the long rains) and August to November (short rains). Beans are their main source of protein. When it was recognized that there was a problem, researchers and development personnel mobilized relatively quickly (in research tenns) to identify options for helping fanners control and mitigate the root-rot stress. From 1990 to 1995, experiments were undertaken on three bas ic thrusts. The first concentrated on improving soil fcrt ility (to counteract soil pathogens and enhance plant tolerance). Experiments were conducted with green manures, mulching, inorganic fertilizer, and ridging. All proved somewhat effective. The second thrust focused on enhanc ing existing seed, e ither coating the seed itself (employing local varieties) or using certified seed of already released materials. e ither of these had marked results. The third thrust, the promotion of varieties resistant to root-rot has been the most effective and most w ide ly adopted. Kenyan researchers screened hundreds of bean lines locally and found no resistance (Otsyula et al., 1998). However, they had an advantage in that as promising varieties had already been identified through regional breeding programs and in the pathology nurseries of ncighbori ng countries where root-rot pressure had come earlier and with great severity. From among these varieties (orig inating from the Great Lakes region), researchers and fanners selected severa! promis ing lines, among them KK8, KK1 5, and K.K22 (KK standing for K.ARI Kakamega). These eventually emerged as both resistant to the root-rot and acceptable to users in the western Kenyan region. They di ffer in seed color, maturity, and yield poten ti a l (see annex 1 ), but a ll ha ve been widely adopted, largely due to a single factor: their resistance to the root-rot stress. Focus of this case study This case study seeks to understand the opportunities and constraints of us ing varied diffusion channels to spread new varieties. The study started with a focus on one particular conduit, the informal (farmer) seed producer groups, as these were among the least understood ofthe diffusion channels in the region of interest and because initial observations suggested some potential impact. Seed production among small fanners in East and Central Africa, in general, is becoming a popular implementation option (especially during post-disaster recovery periods), so it bears closer scrutiny. Addressing Seed Sccurity in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Dem•Lopment 72 1 R. Ots ula el al. Practically, the study seeks to gain insight into how these K.K varieties actually spread. As ofmid-2004, they still have not been formally released. This means that, in theory, these varieties cannot be increased or sold by govemment agents or in certified seed stores (commonly know as stockists in Kenya). Certified bean seed has never been in strong demand in such formal channels because farmers find the cost high and feel they can control the seed quality sufficiently themselves. (Certified bean seed con tributes about 1% of the total bean crop sown in Kenya.) However, farmers usually need an initial infusion of genetic materials to spur the broader diffusion process. In this case, without fonnal release, a first infusion was not available. Case-study methods Fieldwork for this study was primarily carried out in the districts of Kakamega and Vihiga in westem Kenya. Select market surveys were also carried out in these districts, as well as in Mumias-Butere. Four basic methods were used for gaining insight into the general agricultura\ context and conducting specific seed system analyses. Literature review Documents, mostly in refereed joumals and gray literature (annual and progress report publications), were reviewed to give a background of l 0-year trends. The themes pursued included (a) agriculture in the westem Kenya region in general, (b) research and experimentation results in on-station and on-farm trials, (e) diagnostics on farming systems (including participatory rural appraisals (PRAs), and (d) adoption surveys of bean varieties in relation to root-rot. lnterviews lnterviews were carried out among different types of seed suppliers and seed cl ients. These included groups of seed producers trained by KARI or OMMN (N=6), as well as individual seed producers (N=20), sorne ofwhom stated that they had received outside training. Those buying seed from these seed producers, seed buyers (N=30) were followed up in the chain. A third majar group, those in the more formal sector, were al so interviewed (N=8) to record their views on types of seed and seed sources. This formal-sector group included extension personnel, prívate seed company managers, and representatives from farmer cooperatives. All interviews used semi-structured questionnaires and elicited qualitative and quantitative insights. Market surveys Surveys were carried out in eight regional markets in the s ix-week period prior to sowing time (from the end of January to mid-March). All bean sellers (N=202) were visited and their products inventoried, with 30% (N=6 1) directly interviewed. The purpose was to understand the profiles and sources of seed being sold and differences in beans for sowing versus eating. Market analysis also aimed to assess the overall availability of the resistant KARI varieties in public fora. Seed quality analysis Finally, formal analyses for seed quality were carried out in two separare research laboratories to compare standards among varietal materials (KK8, KK 15, and KK22) and among seed from a variety of sources (seed produced by trained farmers versus untrained farmers versus KARI seed versus seed procured on the open market) . Samples were tested for purity, germination, and seed health, including Addressing Seed Sewrity in Disaster Response: U nking Reliefwith Development 73 The Use of Informal Seed Producer Groups both seed-bome pathogens (relating to disease, per se) and saprophytes (relati ng largely to infection introduced in post-harvcst hand ling, which subsequently affects rates of germination). Annex 2 describes in sorne detail the laboratory analyses can·ied out at KARI /Kakamega (Kcnya) a nd CIA T/Kawanda (Uganda). Research strategy In brief, the overall aim of the research strategy was to trace the main channels by which new varieties (and seed) might be accessed (markets, individual seed producers, groups of seed producers, etc.) and to compare and contrast their effectiveness a long varied criteria. Seed quality is one ofthese criteria. It was added because quality is often perceived as an obstacle to allowing development or emergency aid groups to use more local channels. Survey imdings Market analysis The market analysis gives an overview of the extent of diffu sion of the root- rot- resistant KARl varieties. lt bears emphasizing again that these varieties have yet to be fonna lly released and, in theory, are not available from any of the formal channels with which research might normally interact (i.e., govemment stockists, extension agents, or prívate seed companies). The KARI station itself has produced li mited quantities of these materials for the public, between about IOOkg and 300kg per season, since 1995 and at least through 2003 (KARI-Kakamega, Seed Un it, communication). The eight markets surveyed represent an area of about 90 kilometers (55 miles) in radius. Each was visited for a si ngle day, chosen because it was the principal selling day for that particular market- but with no other bias. As stated in the methods section, for all those selling beans, the products on sale were inventoried . Table 1 shows that across these markets, 43% to 77% ofall bean sellers had some ofthe resistant KARI varieties on sale. In six of the markets, all three varieties were found, and in the other two, KK 15 and KK22 were avai lable. The findings are unexpected; in such a short period ( 1998- 2003), an impressive network of market sellers has been moving improved varieties, resistant to root-rot. Market analysis was also done on the full range of beans on o ffer among a subset of sellers (N=6 l ) eh osen randomly from the whole group. Within this subset, inventaries wcre made of all the bean baskets on di sp lay, separating beans according to whether they were (a) research generated (improved) or " local" and (b) root-rot tolerant or not. It is important to note that somc ''local" varieties (non-research generated) do show some tolerance to root-rot (see annex 1 ). Addressing Seed Serurit,l' in D~wster Response: Linking Relief 1áth /Jrrelopment 74 1 R. Ots ula et al. Tahle l. Market Sm·veys, Wester·n Kenya Region: Focus on KARI-Generated Root-Rot- Resistant Bean s, January-March 2003 # Sellers % Sellers Total with RR with RR Date of bean resistant Resistant Varieties at # Sellers Market survey sellers varieties varieties Market interviewed Ka ka mega 25/1/03 51 38 74.5 KK8, 15, 22 6 Mudete 30/1/03 8 5 62.5 KK8, 15,22 8 Luanda 30/1/03 40 20 50 KK15, 22 8 Se re m 8/2/03 23 11 43.5 KK8, 15, 22 8 M bale 712103 13 10 76.9 KK8, 15, 22 7 Lubao 20/2/03 24 16 66.7 KK8, 15, 22 8 Shinyalu 22/2/03 14 9 64.3 KK8, 15, 22 8 Butere 17/3/03 29 15 51 .7 KK15, 22 8 Total 202 124 61 .4 61 Table 2 shows the profile of beans for this market subset (with proportions expressed in terms of "baskets," rather than volume or weight). During this sowing period, January to March, relatively egua! sets of beans that were root-rot tolerant and those that were not were on offer. As traders explained, "There are beans for food and beans for seed-and customers know the difference- and they need both." Tahle 2. Full Set of Beans on Offer among 61 Sellers in Eight Markets, Western Kenya, 2003 Category of beans - - --- lmproved , root-rot tolerant lmproved, not root-rot tolerant Local, root-rot tolerant Local, not root-rot tolerant ------ % of baskets on display (N=211) - - ----- 33 26 13 26 lnterviews with individual sellers indicated the degree to which varieties res istant to root-rot are particularly valued for sowing. Their preference was also reflected in the price analysis, with resistant material sometimes fetching up to 20% to 35% more than the nonresistant material at peak planting time. Traders were quick to remark, however, that so me of the local varieties are sti ll considered among the tastiest and that post-sowing, the prices of root-rot materi als tend to drop quickly. In severa! markets, sellers commented that KK.l 5, though black and traditionally not preferred, remains a highly demanded item as it appears to be early maturing and fast cooking, and homemakers can easily remove the black coat for food preparation. Addressing SPed Security in Disasler Response: Linking Reliefn·it!t /Jp¡•elopment 75 1 The Use of Informal Seed Producer Groups Where did the market sellers obtain their stocks?. Interviews with traders and sellers showed that the sources were varied and, most of all , dispersed. No single source provided all the varieties on sale; rather, they were sourced from farmers in the countryside, middlemen, and even other market sellers. No market seller specifically mentioned specialized groups of seed producers as a so urce. Seed-producergroups Rural groups of seed producers were originally postulated to be an important means of diffusing these new varieties in the countryside. Five such groups were identified, all having been facilitated by sorne outside agency and having received sorne training related to seed production techniques. Table 3 summarizes the size and composition of the groups, when they started, and the breadth of activities in which they were engaged. lt is important to note that these groups might be considered to be "informal" seed producers: seed was just one of severa! enterprises they pursued, and they had received seed production training only once. Table 3. Informal Farmer Groups lnvolved in Seed Production: Selected Sample from W estern Kenya, 2003 Starting Starting Current Group Affiliated with date members members Activities Ebusoli AHI 1999 25 46 Horticulture (36 women, 10 men) Shihíngo FARMESAIFAO 1998 40 18 Maize vegetables, (8 women, 10 men) chickens Chavakalí RPK 2000 25 18 Soil conservatíon, (including men) (all women) poultry, vegetable productíon Lunyu FARMESA/FAO 1998 44 Composting (36 women, 8 men) vegetable farming Esiekuti OMNN 1995 21 17 Bee-keeping (9 women, 8 men) Note: AHI = African Highland Initiative; FFS = Farmer Field School: FAO-supported Project; FARMESA = Farmer Research Management in East and Southem A frica; OMMN = Organic Matter Management Network; RPK = Resource Projects Kenya. As Table 3 shows, all groups started between 1995 and 2000, with between 25 and 50 members, and all but one seem to be in membership decline. All are also engaged in multiple activities in addition to seed production to give them income and greater sustainability. Tnterestingly, all groups clearly stated that they embarked on bean seed production because the new varieties became available and because, due to the big disease problem, there was a strong demand for them. So, they started producing seed beca use of a varietal opportunity, not beca use there was a demand for clean seed or because seed quantities overall were low. In terms of organization for seed production, the actual joint ( or group) activities seem few. Most of the production is still done on an individual basis on farmers' home plots, although one group experimented wíth renting land together and, at the time of research, were waiting to see harvest results. In terms of seed, group activities seem limited to pooling for purposes of sale. In general, however, members each seem to dec ide their price alone and dispose ofthe beans (seed or food) as they wish. Addressing Seed Sewrity in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Developmenl 76 1 R. Otsvula et al. In group interviews, farmers described in detail how the resistant beans were being produced. All groups had received sorne seed-related training (two of them having been instructed by KARI scientists), yet, across the five sites, farrners described no special treatment between grain and seed in the field. As severa! ofthe groups had also been instructed in "better agricultura! practices," they were starting to add manure and to plant beans in rows. After harvest, sorne used ashes or actellic to coat the beans. When sorting for their own use, farrners picked out the healthier beans at sowing time; such sorting was also sometimes done with beans destined for sale. Their recounting of distribution specifics gave further insight into how these groups function. All stated that at the beginning, the new beans they sold brought higher prices than those available Jocally, but no Longer ("at the beginning, 100 Kenyan shillings (Kshs) per kilo; now, maybe 30 Kshs/kg"). Among their constant buyers ha ve been the schools, who use thi s "seed" as food for their pupi ls, and hotels, who serve bean meals on a continua! basis. None of the groups has done any financia! analysis of their operations, although most of the farrners sense they are making money individually. Farmers variously described how bean production helped them to pay school fees (about 2000 Kshs/year) and buy school unif01ms, fertilizer, chickens, a bull, health care, and other necessities. The issue of scale of sales is pursued below, under "individual seed producers," because it was easier to get quantitati ve data on bean dis tribution when farrners were interviewed one by one. In short, supply was neither sustained, nor very large: those who sold the largest quantities moved beans destined for consumption- and sold to schools and hotels. Sorne also sold the beans they did not immediately need for their own use. The conclusions to be drawn from speaking with the seed-producer groups are the fo llowing: they function little in terrns of direct collaboration, the beans they produce can be cons idered equally as grain or seed, and the amounts delivered tend to be modest. Financially, it seems clear that the groups themselves perceive that bean production (whether for seed or food ) results in profits, but alone, such production cannot give them a stable income-a vari ety of additional income-generating activities is required. Individual seed producers The case study identified indi vidual seed producers through local word ofmouth. All 20 individual seed producers interviewed were local farrners, integrated within the rural countryside. All had also devoted themselves to "special bean production" when the new KK varieties arrived on the scene. Like the seed producers associated with groups, these individuals saw a niche or a new demand because of the build-up of bean disease. About 40% of the individuals had further been in volved in the production of seed for other crops, including maize, local beans, cowpeas, and local vegetables. When asked if any special qualities made them seed producers, 75% said no, but the other 25% indicated two strengths: their other seed experience and, especially, the fact that they had larger p lots and, in a few cases, more fertile land. The analysis ofthe individual seed producers' profiles adds insight to the inforrnation on those who are associated with groups (who also seem to work primarily as individuals). Individual producers saw the demand for a new variety, not for seed, per se. Sixty per cent indicated that their production methods in the field were exactly the same for bean seed and food. The other 40% indicated that they did separate varieties when planting for seed, and 5% used fertilizer and planted in rows. The main treatment specifically for seed was applied post-harvest, when farrners sorted out the inert material along with the physically damaged and immature beans, and when they dusted the beans with ash or actell ic. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Unking Relief with Deoelopment . 77 1 The Use oflnfonnal Seed Producer Groups The individual producers indicated that, at the beginning, the price for the new beans was higher than that oflocal varieties, but this was no longer true (five to six years later) as the new varieties had become more conunon. They were also not always clear whether their buyers were acquiring beans for seed or for food (and the use did not seem to make any difference to them because they did not demanda price differential). ln terms of the quantities distributed, the figures were highly variable. Taking the long rains of 2002 as an example, 20% did not distribute at all , and the four farmers (again 20%) who distributed most- an impressive 195kg, on average- sold the beans entirely for food to schools and hotels. On average, those who distributed or sold beans that were "possibly used for seed" sold about 20kg per season either to other farrners or rniddlemen . Assuming optimistically that half of this is planted, each seed producer provided 1 O kg of KK material s per season. Ninety percent of the individual producers perceived this production to be profitable, again using mi testones of purchase ( e.g., paying school fees or purchasing livestock). They al so indicated that the demand for beans is always there: "Even when the new varieties are known, there is the demand for food." In terms of seed, per se, severa) of the producers anticipated an ongoing set of customers: "When a farrner buys from another fanner, slhe knows what is being received- and can count on that quality. Also they may have seen it in the field. " Sorne further observed that traders mix GLP585 and KK22 (both small red-seeded types), whereas fanner producers don't. In sum, it is not clear that the individual seed producers were specificall y producing seed, or whether they even considered their goal as selling seed, rather than food. lt appears that only limited quantities of beans are moved as seed, per se. Having said this, the individual producers, like those associated with groups, saw their bean transactions as profitable and aimed to continue producing and sellíng. Seed-buyer analysis The research agenda subsequently followed the chain to those who actually bought seed from the well-identified seed producers. Thirty farrners , a ll ofwhom were traced through specific producer links, were interviewed on-farrn to assess the importance of the root-rot- resistant varieties in tenns of their total bean sown, and to assess their satisfaction with the purchased seed product. Varieties In sorne respects, the seed buyers interviewed (N=30), seemed to have made radical changes in their bean production over the previous ti ve years. Ninety-three present (28 out of 30) were sowing only the resistant KK varieties, having completely dropped local types because of their poor performance. This step could be quite risky for such farmers, putting all their beans in one basket, so to speak. Seed sourcing ln other ways, however, these farrners seemed typical of small-scale holders. Their modest holdings meant that they sowed, on average, limited amounts ofseed: 7.25kg during the short rains of2003, with a range of0- 22kg). Further, as table 4 shows, they tended to source their seed (nearly completely) from their own home-saved stocks: 88% ofthe quantity sown ca me from home stocks, with five farrners using solely home stocks. The farrners all commented that although they had at one time purchased the seed of the new variety from the seed producer (buying small initial quantities of 0.05kg to 1 kg), they had not purchased it again (and had no intention of doing so). These farrners simply re-sowed what they themselves harvested, again and again. Addressing Seed Securi/y in Disasler ReJponsr: Línking Relitif"wilh /Jevelopment 78 R. Otsyula el al. Tahle 4. Sources of Seed Plante d in the Shor·t Rains, 2003, b y Those Who Had Bought New Varieties Resistant lo Root-Rot ft·om Specialist Producers (N=30) So urce Amount in kilograms Percentage Home saved 191.5 88.0 Local market 4.0 1.8 Stockist 0.0 o Relativesfneighbors 22.0 10.1 Others 0.0 o Seed qualíty Most buyers assessed the quality of seed received from seed producers as "good" (better than average). However, most also felt that it was not particularly different from the seed they themselves routinely produced (table 5). Tahle 5. Buyers' Assessments of Quality of Seed Received from Specialist Pt·oducer·s, Compared to Seed They Routinely Produced Themselves (N=30 ) How would you assess the quality of seed obtaíned from the specialíst producer, overa/1? Good Average Poor How would you compare the quality of the seed purchased in relatíon to that you usual/y produce? S ame Better Worse % of responses 86.6 13.4 o 56.6 40.0 3.4 Finally, each of the one-time buyers was able to li st severa! sources where she could obtain these resistan! varieties again, if needed. Getting a future supply s imply was not perceived as a problem. Formal-sector analysis Diverse representatives from the formal sector were also interviewed, for two majar reasons: the resistant varieties were not released and, hence, this sector was not offi cially responding to the stress. Second, varieties were being moved through uncertified channels and uncertified seed has a varied reputation within formal-sector circles. The formal seed sector (and forma l research sector, in general) is often contrasted to fanning communities in terms of types knowledge- and viewpoints--on offer. Formal-sector personnel (seed and otherwise) are in charge of giving expert advice and steering communities to options. It is of interest to examine how fom1al-sector personnel perccive the rot Addressing Secd Sec~trih · in /J isa.,t f'r Res¡>ume: Linking Relief táth Det'elopm(' ll l 79 1 The Use o.f Informal Seed Producer Croups problem, the varieties on offer, and the seed channels though which the varieties could presently be accessed. Eight professionals from different formal -sector institutions and levels were interviewed: Four worked direct ly with certified seed: representatives from the Kenya Seed Company, the National Cereal Board, L'Agrotech (a prívate company), and the Kenya Farmers' Association (KFA). The other four give advice to farmers on a regular basis: district extension officers (DEOs) or the district agricul tura! and lives lock extension officer (DALEO). There were sorne commonalities in the eight sets ofresponses: all knew ofthe root-rot problems in their zones of action. All but one also knew about the root-rot- resistant varieties being tested by KARl and also that they had not been released (the exception was the Cereal Board representa ti ve who dealt only in maize). The differences emerged when discussing whether farmers themselves produce seed of resistan! varicties for sale, and when evaluating its quality . As tabl e 6 shows, two specialists from the fom1al sector (seed-production company representatives) felt that farmers should not be producing seed for sale, and that what they were producing was not of good quality: " It is grain." "Seed production practices are not followed: there is no isolation and no separating of off-types." The representative from the KF A, which al so se lis inputs to fanners, fc lt otherwise, and asserted that he himself, on his own plot, sowed bean seed from the market. Table 6. Formal-Sector Views on Farmer Production of Resistanl Seed Representatives from --- Kenya Seed Company National Cereal Board L'Agrotech (private company) Kenya Farmers' Association DEO DALE O DALE O DEO Should farmers produce seed for sale? No N/A No. lt is grain, not seed Yes (but there is no demand) Y es Y es Yes, as a stopgap Y es What is the quality of farmer seed? Quality not good N/ A Not good Good Good Good seed: the problem is that varieties are sometimes mixed High, when sorne supervision Good, but should be monitored Jn contrast, all four extension agents expressed the need for farmers in the region to have the resistan! varieties quickly. They knew the varieties were not released but stressed that this was a bureaucratic issue and that they needed to focus on raising productivity- and quickJy. All agents supported farmer production , either as a continua! process ora stop gap measure (to be bolstered by outside monitoring). The extens ion agents further gave insights into the positi ve and negative attributes of forma l versus fanner channels- and how farmers in their zones perceived both. Agents emphasized that formal channels may also not be within geographic reach of farmers. Such channels supply a few varieties Addres.1ing Seed Security in /Ji.saster l?e.1ponse: Linking Relief with Dewlopment -ªº_l R. Ots ula et al. (GLP2, GLP24, GLP585 , GLP1004, GLPX92) but fanners like many others in addition to these. Most fundamentally, the agents reported that fanners perceived the seed from the formal sector as not genninating well (it is not handled well post-harvest). As assets of farmer-produced seed, the extension agents offered the following insights: fanners in the countryside can provide good channels of distribution because seed can be given as a gift to friends and relatives, exchange is possible (seed for grain), and the channel is physically nearer to fanners. In tenns of quality, all considered fanner seed as viable. However, they stressed that sorne fanners are known for producing better seed than others. The only real caution for the resistant varieties was that fanners might mix resistant and susceptible varieties (KK22 and GLP585). It is interesting to note that this is the same complaint fanner seed producers made against traders. So, in general, the seed-sector companies did not value farmer seed, except for the representative from the Kenya Fanners' Association (a nationwide body) who said he sows it himself. The extension agents generally felt it was "okay" in tenns of health, but wamed about mixing. However, they al so saw great advantages of using local channels in tenns of distributing a range of varieties, making seed available financially, and easing the logistics of distribution. Seed quality analysis As "quality of seed" seems to be a pivota) point for implementers deciding what kinds of production and diffusion channels to support, in the final step, laboratory analyses were carried out to assess key aspects ofthe quality (purity, gennination rate, and seed health) ofseed procured from a variety ofsources. Seed from four sources was compared and contrasted: seed produced for KARl (the fonnal sector), purchased from the market (local traders), produced by fanners trained in seed production, and produced by untrained fanners. Two separate batches of seed were collected and analyzed at two different laboratories, one in Kenya (KARl-Kakamega) and one in Uganda (CIAT/Kawanda). See annex TI for more methodological detail. Laboratory analysis, KARI-Kakamega The tests carried out at KARl-Kakamega were conducted on 36 samples of beans (encompassing the three KK varieties from four sources). Key results appear below (see annex II for detailed methodology). Purity The mean purity percentage of seeds tested was 97 .5%. There was no significant di fference (p > .05) in bean purity between the three varieties (KK8, 15, and 22), but there was a significant difference (p S: .05) between local market samples and KARJ samples (figure 2). Having said this, all groups produced seed with purity above 95%--quite acceptab1e levels, even for commercial producers. Germination The mean percentage gennination of seeds tested was 71 .6%, with a maximum gennination of98% from KK 15 and a mínimum of 34% for the same variety. Figure 3 shows the seed germination percentage from seed samples collected from the four groups. There was no significant difference in gennination in bean samples among the four groups (nor, in another analysis, between the three varieties). As the recommended mínimum lirillt of gennination is 70% (Aggrawal, 1994), on average, the germination rate ofthe seeds was good, both for seed produced fonnally and otherwise. In this analysis from KARl-Kakamega, the higher mean gennination ofseeds from the local market can be attributed to the long exposures in the sun during selling. When sell ing beans, sellers put them on traditional trays or Addressing Seed Serurity in Disaster Response: Linkíng Reliefwith Development 81 1 The Use o[ ln[ormal Seed Producer Groups 101 ~ 100 ~ >. -·~ 99 j Cl. , 98 Cll Cll (/) 97 96 Trained Non-trained farmers Local market Group KARI Figure 2. Purity (%) in samples of bean seed from diffe r ent groups -~ o -e: o :;::: "' e: E .... Q) (!) 76 74 72 70 68 66 Trained Non-trained farmers Group Local market KARI Figure 3. Percent germination in b ean seed samples from different groups sacks in the open. Such sun-dried seed is less prone to infection by storage pathogens, which attack seeds stored under high moisture levels, that reduce viability and ability to germinate. The relatively low gem1ination rates ofthe KART-produced seed are noteworthy. Seed health Seed health in the KARI analyses gave the most unexpected results, with infcction rates running from O (from a KK8 and KK22 sample) to 24.0% (rrom a KK8 seed sample sourced from KARI), with a mean seed infection of 9.24%. Figure 4 illustrates the proportion of infected seeds infection in the bean samples collected from the four groups in the study. (Note that in this first ana lys is, disease counts did not separa te pathogens and saprophytes, per se.) Addressíng Seed Seruríty in Disaster Response: Linl.:ing Relitifwith Dr'll<'lopment 82 1 ~~- 16 ~ 14 ~ e: 12 o .. u 10 Q) -e: 't:J 8 Q) Q) (/) 6 4 2 Trained Non-trained farmers Local market Group R. Otsyula el al. KARI Figure 4. Percent saprophyte/pathoge n infection in bean seed samples ft·om different groups There was a significant difference (p :5: .05) between the infection rate in KARI seed samples and those of the trained farmers, in particular, with the formal sector having higher rates of infection. (Another analysis showing no significant difference between the varieties themselves.) Seeds were especially affected by storage-related pathogens, such as Penicil/ium spp. The high mean rate seed infection in the KARl samples was thought to be the result of one set of seeds that had very poor gennination and were al so highly infected. This was attributed to inadequate drying, which encourages storage problems ( and saprophytes). In addition to the large quanti ty ofseed harvested by KARI, drying is difficult because it is usually done using sunlight only. The area has a great deal ofrain, and there fore drying can only be done for a few hours. Laboratory analysis, CIA T/NARO-Kawanda (Uganda) The observed high rates ofinfection in the KARl bean samples spurred a re-collection ofbean seed and re-analysis of germination qualities and seed health. This second analysis was done at the laboratory of ClATfNARO (National Agricultura\ Research Organization) in Kawanda, Uganda. There, laboratory facilities allowed analysis to distinguish between seed-bome di sease, per se (i.e., true pa thogens), and infections caused primarily by post-harvest handling (manifest by saprophytes). Salienl insights are abbreviated below. Again, refer to annex IJ for more detail. Germination The analysis showed that seed from the market had a lower germination rate than seed from other sources, but it was still within an acceptable mean of 73.3%. Fanners remarked that they can raise thi s level by sorting market seed (a procedure, which, unfortunately, the researchers failed to orchestrate prior to analysis). There was also wide variation in gennination between different marke t samples and KK 15: 17% to 84%. Overall , there was no s ignificant difference in mean values between the other sources (figure 5). Seed health Pathogens: A wide range of pathogens associated with bean seed were identified in the more focused CIAT-Kawanda study: Fusarium solani (whi ch causes root-rot), Colletotrichum lindemuthianum (anthracnose), Phoma exigua (ascochyta blight), and Macrophomina phaseolina (ashy stem blight). Addressing Seed Security in Disusll'r Response: Linking Relief with Del'clopment ---- ~ 83 1 The Use of Informal Seed Producer Groups 90 85 -~ 80 e:: .2 ~ e:: .E .. 75 Q) (!) 70 60 local Market Trained Farmers Untrained Farmers Seed Source KARJ Figure 5 . Percent germination of seed from different sow·ees Others identified included Fusarium oxysporum and Rhizoctonia solani. which are soi l-bome pathogens. However, the mean level ofseed infection for different pathogens from a ll sources was low. The highest mean value (5.2%) was observed with Phoma exigua on KK8 (table 7). Tahle 7 . Mean Percentage lufectiou by Major Seed-Bm·ne Pathogens and Saprophytes of Different Varieties Collected fr·om Different Sources % Seed infection, by seed-borne pathogen % Seed infection, by seed-borne saprophyte Fusarium Phoma Aspergillus Penicillium Rhizopus Cladosporium Source• Variety sola ni exigua spp spp spp spp KK15 0.86 1.1 46.4 30.3 18 2.0 KK8 1.4 11.5 13 0.7 7.8 KK22 2 3.1 6.1 10.1 o 2.3 2 KK15 0.25 2.8 10.5 4.9 o 8.1 KK8 0.8 3.2 6.6 3.8 6.7 13.4 KK22 2.8 1.3 5.3 3.2 o 6.8 3 KK15 0.08 1.2 6.9 4.3 0.3 8.4 KK8 1.2 0.5 4.2 13 2.5 12.9 KK22 0.2 3.6 4.3 7.7 0.2 13.1 4 KK15 0.83 6 7.8 o 9.8 KK8 0.1 5.2 10.5 8.4 8 12.8 KK22 1.3 19.4 15.4 o 3.4 *1 = Market; 2 = untrained fanners; 3 trained fanners; 4 = KARJ Kakamega Station. Addressing Seed Sccttrit_y in Disaster Response: Linking Reliefwith Development 84 1 ----- R. Otsvula el. al. Saprophytes: The major saprophytic fungi observed were Aspergillus, Penicillium, Rhizopus, and Cladosporium spp. Market seed fared less well than it did in the KARI-Kakamega analysis, but still showed generally low infection levels. The high leve! of saprophytic infection in certain samples from the market may have been due to poor post-harvest handling or storage. Poor storage conditions, seed not well dried, or attack by insects (mainly bruchids) may lead to high levels of secondary infection by saprophytes. Although saprophytes do not cause di seases on crops, they do lower germination rates (see figure 5). Seed from trained farmers al so fa red less well in that there was no significant di fference in infection rates between trained and untrained producers. Again, overall , the seed looked healthy. Seed quality: Overa/1 rejlections 8oth sets ofanalysis showed that a ll four sources delivered seed that can be considered "acceptable," not only by farmers' standards, but also by extensioni st and even intemational standards (such as those of Quality Declared Seed of FAO). one ofthe bean seed sampled reached the levels of certified seed for germination and health , not even that produced by KARI. However, farmers, extensioni sts, and most ofthe formal-sector representatives interviewed did not sense that certified seed was needed. Farmers can obtain very good-quality seed from local channels- at a fraction of the price of certi fied seed . Summary and conclusions The aim ofthe study was to examine channels for diffusing seed in a period of cris is. We started from a premise that informa l groups of seed producers played an important role in moving new varieties. This could not be verified. Whether the groups produced seed or grain proved secondary to the observation that they moved only limited quantities of beans. Thi s raises the issue of whether a focused group of small rural producers, with smalllandholdings, can be expected to produce the "excess" needed to move new varieties quickly in a crisis. The study then developed a secondary focus on local market channels, as this conduit had proveo to be a nexus for moving a larger quantity of the root-rot- resistant varieties for food, seed, or both. Traders' sources for obtaining local varieties were varied , including purchasing directly from farmers in the countryside and from other small traders, and even self-production. Analysis of a broad range of local markets showed the resistant varieties to be on easy offer throughout the region, and in large quantity. The quality of the seed then carne to the forefront as a defining issue. lf one is to use markets as a significant diffusion channel, what are the implications in terms of seed purity, germination, and health? ls the product on offer supporting livelihoods in crisis? Two separate collections and laboratory analyses gave firm results that the seed in local markets in westem Kenya, including that which farmers routinely produce in the countryside, is good in terms of purity, germination, and overall seed hea lth . In terms ofthe wider issues, the study showed that an injection ofnew varieties can make a difference to the stability ofthe farming system. Farmers did shi ft the profile of varieties sown (many dropping local varieties altogether), and wide price differentials among bean types at sowing time provided strong evidence that farmers place a high value on varieties that wi ll grow in the context of root-rot stress. Addressing Secd Sccurity in Disaster Response: l.inking Relief with Derelopment 85 1 '----- The Use of Informal Seed Producer Groups However, the study also suggests that one seed channel is not necessarily as effective as another for moving new varieties, although both may be locally based. Large numbers of farmers do not seem to ha ve been reached through the intervention of training for seed producer groups. The evidence is al so mixed on whether these groups produced higher quality seed than those who had not been trained. The unexpected prevalence of the root-rot- resistant varieties in the local markets raises the question of building on channels farmers routinely use-in emergencies and otherwise (assuming these channe ls can function in stress periods) . Traders, like fanners, recognized the value ofthe KK varieties relatively quickly and scooped them up from a wide array of farmcr suppliers in the countryside. Suppliers were not initial ly concentrated, but the number grew through ti me. Nom1a l farmers (at al! levels- large, medium, and small), who had not been trained, seem to have supplied the core ofthe available seed. So building on local channels in a period of stress can pay off. The work al so shows that to move new varieties, seed production models need to be carefully evaluated beyond their technical dimensions (e.g., beyond the quality of seed). At least as important as quality is the socioeco nomic organization of production : who produces, at what sea le, for whom, and with what strategies for distributing or marketing the seed. Seed production models have to be built that are (a) sustainable, (b) affordable, and (e) which have an explicit impact-oriented outreach focus. References Aggrawal, P.K. 1994. Principies ofSeed Technology. New Delhi : Publications and lnformation Division ofthe lndian Council of Agricultura! Research. Buruchara, R., F. Opio, R. Otsyula. J. Mukalazi, G . Tusiime, J. Carder, and G. Mahuku. 200 1. Development of integrated management ofbean root rots in East and Central A fri ca: Past, present and future. Paper presented at the Pabra Millcnnium Synthesis Workshop, 28 May-2 June 2001. Arusha, Tanzania. 1ST A. 1999. International rules for seed testing 1999. Seed Sciencc and Technology Supplement. Bassersdorf, Switzerland: lnternational Seed Testing Association . KARI. 1997. Regional Research Centre-Kakamega. /997 Annual Report. Kakamega, Kenya: Kenya Agricultura( Research [nstitute (KARI). KARI. 1999. Regional Research Centre-Kakamega, 1997 Annual Report. Kakamega, Kcnya: Kenya Agricultura( Research Institute (KARl). Nderitu, J.H. R.M. Otsyula, and B. Meso 1997. Fanners/extensionists/researchers discussions on bean root rot and bean stem maggot problems and solutions in Vihiga and Kakamega Districts, Westcrn Kenya. Kakamega, Kenya: AHE-CIAT. Unpublished manuscript. Nekesa, 0., J.J-L. dcritu, and R. Otsyula. 1998. Bean research in wcstcrn Kcnya: Lessons and experiences. In Proceedings ofthe 2"d Biennial Crop Protection Conference held at NARI. Nairobi, September 16- 17, 1998. airobi: Kenya Agricultura( Research lnstitute (KAR I). Odendo, M. , S. David, R. Otsyula and R. Buruchara. 2004. The impacts of improved bean I'Grieties in Western Kenya. CJA T Occasional Publication Series. Nairobi: lntemational Center for Tropical Agriculture. (/11 press) Otsyula, R.M., S.I. Ajanga, R.A. Buruchara, and C.S. Wortmann. 1998. Development ofan integrated bean root rot control strategy for westem Kenya. African Crop Science Joumal 6( 1 ):6 1-ó7 . Remington, T., J. Maroko, S. Walsh, P. Omanga, andE. Charles. 2002. Getting offthe seed and tools treadmill with CRS seed vouchers and fairs. Disaster. The Joumal of Disaster Swdies, Policy and Management 26(4):302- 315. Addressing Seed Securily in Disaster Response: Unkiug Reliefwith Detl(•lo{lment 86 1 --~- R. Otswda el al. Annex l. Bean varieties generally found in western Kenya region Variety GLP 2 (U pala) (Lwakhakha) GLP 585 Red haricot Wairimu GLP 24 GLP X92 Punda (Okwoto) Alulu (Rosecoco) Mugasa Rosebella Shiyigwa Nylon KK 22 KK 15 KK8 lmproved/local lmproved (relea sed) lmproved \(released) lmproved (released) lmproved (re\eased) Local from Tanzania (around Lake Victoria Local Local (yellow type) Local Local lmproved lmproved lmproved Reaction to bean root-rot Very susceptible Susceptible Susceptible Toleran! Toleran! Susceptible Susceptible Susceptible Susceptible Resistan! Resistan! Resistan! Characteristics Commercially grown High yielding Large seeded, preferred by farmers Rosecoco type Commercially grown Small seeded Red haricot type (preferred) High yielding lndeterminate (grows over maize and farmers do not \ike this) Commercially grown Canadian Wonder type 1 High yielding Commercially grown Pinto type 3 High yielding Early maturing Grayish Small seeded (type 1) Late maturing Moderate yields Preferred by farmers {laste) Yellow type Early maturing Small seeded (type 1) Rosecoco type: black mosaic Large seed Medium maturity Preferred by farmers (laste) Rosecoco-type Large seeded Medium maturity Red haricot type Small seeded Late maturing High yielding (deliberately mixed sometimes with red haricot) Black Large seeded Early maturing High yielding Medium seeded Rosecoco type High yielding Sometimes mixed with GLP 2 (accidental) Addressing Seed Security in {)isasln Rcspome: l.inkin[< Relief Láth De¡·elupmenl 87 1 The Use oflnformal Seed Producer Croups Annex 2. Analysis of bean seed quality KARI/Kakamega analyses At the KARI seed-quality laboratory in Kakamega, Kenya, parameters of purity (analytical and inert matter), gennination rate, and general rates of pathogen infection (seed health) were examined. For the first set of laboratory analyses, 34 seed samples ofbean varieties KK8 ( 1 0), KK 15 ( 13 ), and KK22 ( JI ) were obtained from individual seed producers, both trained and untrained, and six local markets in Vihiga, Kakamega, and Mumia Butere Districts (the six being serem, luanda, mbale, shinyalu, Kakamega municipal , and butere). The majority of the seed samples were from the harvest of the previous season (short rains 2002), whi le a few samples were from the long rains harvest. Laboratory analysis of the seed was done at KARI-Kakamega on blind samples (samples were submitted for analysis without identification). Purity test The purity test was to first determine the percentage composition by weight ofthe samples. The working samples were separated into three component parts: pure seed, inert matter, and other crop seeds, which included varieties of beans other than the one that was being tested. The percentage of each part was detennined by weight. The second objective was to identify various species of seeds, including the species being tested and other seeds found in the samples, such as weeds and other crops. Germination test The objective of the germination test was to determine the maximum gennination capacity of the seed samples. In this test, sand was used as the substrate. The working samples were made up of 100 seeds and divided into five replicates of 25 seeds each. The seed samples were kept at room temperature (20° to 25°C. The first count of germination for crotalaria was after seven days, and the second count was after 14 days. The gennination test involved taking the percentage by number of hard seeds, non-germinated seeds, abnonnal seeds, germinating capacity, and pure germination capacity, which is obtained through the calculation of (P * Gil 00), where P = purity and G = percent germination capacity (1ST A, 1999). Seed h ealth test The seed health tests were done to determine the state of health of the seed samples. lnstead of a full sample of 400 seeds, only 100 seeds were used to test seed health. This is because samples collected from fanners were relatively small and therefore would not be enough for the usual working sample of 400 seeds. The samples were divided into four replicares of25 seeds each. Blotters, which were used as substrates, were soaked in water and placed on petri dishes. Seeds were not subjected to any pre-treatment; they were directly plated on blotters and then incubated in 12 hours ultra-violet light alternating with 12 hours of darkness for seven days. After seven days of incubation, the seeds were exarnined for the presence or symptoms of disease organisms. The incubated seeds were then examined thoroughly under a stereo-microscope for growth of di fferent types of fungi and bacteria, but not all of the fungal and bacteria( diseases were identified. Data collected from purity, germination, and seed health tests were analyzed using ANOV A to determine any differences between the varieties. The means ofthe purity. germination and health results were also analyzed and compared with the standards for bean seed, as given by Kenya Plant Health lnspectorate Services (KEPH IS). Addressing Sel'd Securitv in Disaster Response: Lirzking Reliefu·ith /Jn ·elopment 88 1 CIAT- Kawanda-Uganda analysis Seecl Source and coUection R. Otsvula el al. For the second set of analyses, 59 seed samples were collected, and fanners and bean-seed traders were interviewed. Only those whose seed samples were collected were interviewed. The min imum number of samples required for each variety in each group was five. Col/ection sources Local markets: Seed collectors went to local markets, identified the bean varieties, and then purchased them if the traders were willing to sell. Trained farmers: Fanners who had been previous ly trained by KARl staff on bean-seed production were individually visited and asked if they had the required varieties and if they were w illing to sell samples to the collectors. A few had all three; others had only one or two of the desired variet ies in sufficient amounts. Collection from untrained farmers: Fanners who had not been fonnally trained by KA.R l staff were also visited individually and asked for samples ofthe required bean varieties. The bean collectors found sorne individual fanners who had all three varieties, while others had one or two. Collection from KARI-Kakamega: Collection was made from two seasons' planting of the bean variety KK8. Germinatiou test The germination test was done using the ro ll paper-towel method on 200 seeds per sample. Ten days later, samples were evaluated for germination and were categorized as normal or abnormal seedlings, rotten, or fresh ungenninated seed. Seed health test Seed-bome in fection was detennined using the standard blotter method. Two hundred seeds per sample were incubated at 20°C for seven days in petri dishes containing moist filter papers. Seeds were then examined under a stereo-microscope for funga l growth, and identification was made on the basis of fungal characteristics. Addressing SPed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development 89 ------~-- - ----~ --- ' .• ·~ The Case of Cassava Brown Streal~ Disease in Coastal Are as of N orthern Mozambique¿; Leif Tore Trredal Trygve Berg Abstract This study presents the case of a disease on a vegetatively propagated crop: cassava. During the 1990s, fanners in northem Mozambique became aware of problems with root rot on cassava, a d isease later identified as cassava brown streak disease (C8SD). In the District of Memba in the Province of Nampula, where this study was undertaken, C8SD was disastrous for both the livelihoods and the seed securi ty of the people depending on agriculture. The dominance of cassava in the production system made farming comrnunities particularly vulnerable. ln addition , genetic unifonnity and reliance on varieties very susceptible to the disease made cassava production even more precarious. Fanners were unable to obtain either appropriate cassava planting material or sufficient amounts of seed for alterna ti ve crops, such as sorghum and maize. The onset ofthe crisis was slow, starting in the ' 90s and developing into an acure situation of food insecurity by the autumn of 2002, by which t ime the si tuation was considered critica! and there seemed to be a need for externa! action. Two separare operations were launched in November-December 2002: one by Save the Children USA (SCIUSA) and one by the Provincial Govemment of Nampula (PDA). 8oth aimed at giving fanners altemative and tolerant varieties ofcassava or altemative crops as a supplement to the cassava. SC/USA based their intervention on assessments of the impact of C8SD both on the cassava and on the livelihoods of the people, while the PDA assumed seed insecurity on the basis of livelihood measurements only. 8oth are working in collaboration with a wider national and regional scientific network aimed at solving the problem of C8SD in southem and eastem A frica. The case shows how the fonnal scientific sector can be essential in the process of identify ing resistan! and tolerant planting material when coping with a disease in vegetatively propagated crops. As, at thi s point, only tolerant varieties have been identified, the case also indicares the importance of d iffus ing knowledge about the disease and effective cultural practices to ensure clean planting material-along with the new plants themselves. The govemment strategy of distributing cuttings on credit does not seem feasible because of the low quantity and (very likely) low quality of retumed material. Supporting local seed systems to produce adequate cassava planting material (i.e. , quantity and quality) might be a stratcgic focus for futurc institutional support. lntroduction When di sasters ha ve affected farming areas, rehabilita tion is commonly constrained by a lack of seeds. But a id agencies often fail to address seed issues appropriate ly in relief operations, which can slow down and complicare recovery. Many agencies clearly need education on how to ana lyze the prob lem ofseeds Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Reliefwith Developmmt 91 1 The Case o[ Cassava Brown Streak Disease in Coastal Areas o[ Northern Mozambique and how to con tribute to restoration of seed supply systems. For that purpose, the review of cases is a necessary leaming process. The case of a crisis caused by a virus disease in cassava, the most important subsistence crop in coastal areas of East Africa, represents one kind of disaster for which relevant authorities and aid agencies must be prepared. This case study compares the relief and rehabilitation strategies of two different agencies-Save the Children USA (SC!USA) and the District Directorate of Agriculture (ODA) in the Memba Distric t of northern Mozambique (figure 1)-in responding to an outbreak of cassava brown streak disease (CBSD) in cassava, the staple crop in the area. SCF DAP Pro&ram Taraet Districts FY02-FY06 Source: SCIUSA Nampula. kllometers Nacala Nacala-a- Velha Figure l. Nampula Province, Mozamhique, indicating the six district s where the SC/USA DAP2 program is rw1 The outbreak ofCBSD in northem Mozambique started in the 1990s, affecting only a few cassava plants at first. But in a few years, rotted roots were observed over a wide area. The disease had been building up year by year until it finally devastated whole fi elds. Farmers lost both the food harvest and their reproductive materials. Since the disease occurred over a wide area, many affected fanners had nowhere to go for new planting materíals: accessibfe cuttings were also likely to be in fected . Methodology Fieldwork for this report included one vis it immediately befare planting time in December 2002, when the crisis was assessed. Varíous group interviews were conducted with farmers in Memba Dístrict and with representatives from the SCIUSA and DDA. Another field visit in July 2003 allowed for study of the interventions and their impact. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Df'velopment 92 1 L. T. Trc~dal and T. Berg In July 21- 31, 2003, data were collected using semi-structured interviews with both farmers in the impacted area and representati ves of SC/USA and di fferent levels of the govemment. Yarious reports and documents of relevance to the operations were consu\ted. ln addition to co\lecting infonnation on the experiences of both the implementers and benefi ciaries, the main goal of the fi eldwork was to get infonnation on the background, scale, and impact of the operations. Infonnation was also gathered in semi-structured interviews with individual farmers in communities that had received assistance from SC!USA, in communities that had received assistance from DDA, and in communities that had not received any seed assistance, although it was difftcult to find communities that had not received any assistance at all. Interviews were carried out in one community (Chipene) where no distributions had taken place, but it appeared that thi s community was not affected by any production crisis in the year 2002 season. CBSD is nota problem in all of Memba; north of Mazua (see figure 2), the disease is not considered a problem. Communities in Memba that were visited and that are referred to in the text were Mekuta, Chopite, Chipene, Yamene, and Muipia (figure 2). During interviews with individual fanners, other members of the family or neighbors often also participated. Thus, sorne ofthe interviews took the form of group interviews, which sometimes enriched the information but other times limited the value of the interview. Guides were developed for interviews with the implementers (SC!USA and the govemment), but those interviews were generally carried out as informal conversations and discussions. Limilations of the data The difficulty finding communities that had not received assistance from any relief operations does not mean that such communities were nonex istent; the district is large, and we were only able to visit communities a long the roads. The di stribution of seeds and cassava sticks depended on road transport, so it might not have adequately reached the more remate areas--communities that may be the same ones we were unable to visit. Thus, our sample may not be representative ofthe overall impact ofthe disaster or the sea le and impact of the relief operations. The context of the crisis F arming system Fanners in Memba practice bush fallow in various rotations but usuall y with fairly short fallow, commonly two years-a system that people said had not changed during the ir time. There is enough unoccupied bush land for fanners to take as much landas they can manage for cultivation, which is done by hoe only. They bum the bush during the dry season. Family members work together or separately, according to traditional gender roles. The primary crop is cassava. In addition, the farmers grow maize, sorghum, and sorne pearl millet. Grain legumes are grown mostly in small amounts and include groundnuts, cowpeas, pigeon peas, beans, green grams, and bambara groundnuts ( Voand=eia subterranea), of which, cowpeas are probably the most important. Mixed cropping is common with these crops. Other crops include sweet potatoes, bananas, and ata few places, rainfed lowland rice. A little cotton is also grown in the north ofthe di strict. People do not invest money in production s ince it is primarily for subsistence. Sources of income are from the sa le of surplus cassava, maize, groundnuts, and cashew nuts. However, the cashew trees are Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Develupment 93 1 ---- The Case of Cassam BrotNI Streak Disease in Coastal Areas of/\'orthern !11ozambique o SA VE THE CHILDRENIUS lntcgnted Food Security Program Activity Loca!ions N oc ala -a-Velba BDd MembaDistricts M OZAMBIQUE MARCH 2000 LEOEND -" ............ IFSP I'ROORAIII ACTIVITIES ~ SCFc...ploiOd~ / s:F RD.dt (• ,_, uxompltttd) ® JPSPA~~twxnr.11t1 ~a o 5 Agnlhn4N~~t.oc.l.oM udlor N'lllblbae EzteanllJto ~l.octJcw IFSPC.hrw"M->- Sdf foa 0...... s-at ~litO. ud '~s..d.Mllh~a SCALE (lo1o) 10 15 20 25 Source: SC!USA Nampula. C ANAL DE MOC AM BIOUE Figure 2. Memba and Nacala-a-Velba Districts (fieldwork for this study took place near Chipene and Muipia lo the west of the district capital of Me mba) Aclclressing Seed Securily in Disaster Rcspoi!Se: Linking Relit'f with Devclopml'lll 94 1 L. T. Trredal and T. Berg poorly maintained and produce little. Those living near the sea also fish, and for them, fi shing is the main so urce of money. There is no integration of crop and livestock production, and 1 ivestock seem to be quite insignificant in the farming and food system. Only a few farmers keep goats and poultry. Food security The people say that this system nom1a ll y produces suffi cient quantities of food for their subsistence needs. This was the case even during the exhausti ve civil war from the late 1970s to the Rome Peace Accord in 1992: "During the war we were disturbed, but we had enough to eat." Unfavorable weather, such as droughts and cyclones, sometimes causes loca l problems, but when the cassava d iscase struck, the district experienced its first widespread hunger crisis. The farming system has not experienced any major transition in recent history. There has been some tumover ofvarieties and introduction ofnew crops, but technology--cultivation by burning, the use of hoes and pangas, and no use of inputs- has not changed. In such subsistence economies, therc is little surplus capacity to meet major calam ities. Seed supply and genetic resources Note that we use the word seed here in a broad sen se, covering any means of reproduction of crop plants. Thus, using cuttings for reproducti on of cassava and sweet pota toes has been íncluded in th is description of the sced supply system. Cassava In the past, cassava stems were abundantly ava ilabl c for making cuttings. Traditionally, farmers saved c uttings from their own fields, but if they lacked planting materials, they could ask anybody and they would get them for free. Cassava cuttings had no price. However, that system co llapsed with the cassava disease. At present, sources ofnew, clean planting materials are so far away that farmers in the affected areas cannot get them on their own. At the time ofthe CBSD outbreak, many farmers were growing only a s ingle cassava variety . As in many other parts of Africa, there has been some tumover in varieties over time. New ones havc been intro- duced and old ones discarded, often beca use of damage caused by pests or diseases (Tresh et al. , 1994 ). The current dominan! variety in Memba was introduced (together w ith other assistance) after 11 Apri l 1994, when the area was devastated by a cyc lone. Beca use of the circumstances of its introduction, peo- ple called the variety calamidade (calamity), although that name might also have been attached to other varieties associated with severe crises, such as cyclones in the l 980s. Some suspect that thc variety re- ferred toas calamidade is the one that brought the virus into the area. But initially it was found to y ield well and most farmers stopped growing other varieties, wh ich meant that there was an extreme degree of genetic unifom1ity in locally grown cassava when the disease later started to bui ld up. Ca/amidade appears to be very susceptible to thc disease. When farmers were asked if any of the previously grown varieties could have resisted the disease, one group said that they had other varieties when the d isease came and that all ofthem were equally affected. However, when farmers were asked to name cassava varieties that had been grown before the introduction of calamidade, they mentioned 1 1 different named varieties, some of which were still bei ng grown when SC/USA surveyed the area for varieties to screen for disease tolerance. Farmers in many communities knew these varieties and some expressed regret that they had been lost. Farmers in this reg ion have traditionally cultivated both bitter and sweet varieties of cassava, a lthough Addressing Serd Sccurit' ¡, /)isaster Response: Linking Reliefwith /Jevelopmertt 95 1 The Case uf CassaL'a Bru1m Streak Dt~~ease in Coastal Areas of 'orthem illozambique curren ti y, bitter varieties ( like mulapa) seem to domínate the farming system. Most farmers claimed that the bitter varieties yield better than the sweet ones, while others claimed that the sweet cassava have other advantages that the bitter ones lack. The sweet variety can also be eaten raw, whereas the bitter one is preferred for cooki ng. In sorne places people said that they never grew more than one variety ata time. When a new introduc- tion carne and did better, the older variety was discarded. Others said that they grew severa! varieties ata time and had them in separate fields. One fanner group sa id they had a few varieties until recently but that the disease had devastated all ofthem. Such stories suggest that virus diseases could have been around for a long time. lfviral infections build up year by year, new introductions from unaffected areas would naturally appear more vigorous than infected materials grown locally. If that is the case, they have replaced varieties instead of getting disease-free cuttings of existing varieties. The tragedy is that farmers switched to the new introductions befare these varieties were suffi ciently exposed to the virus to assess their degree of disease tolerance. Seed c•·ops Befare the cassava crisis, maize was only grown to a limited extent. There used to be many local varieties, but few are left now (e.g., kanyangulu and calamidade). To help farmers expand maize production , the commercial varieties matuba and manica have been distributed in recent years. The only local sorghum variety mentioned was lannla, but all farmers havc sorne sorghum. Relative to maize, sorghum is more reliablc on the local soils and under the uncertain ra infall pattem ofrecent years. However, birds are considered a serious problem with sorghum. Various local varieties of pearl millet, cowpeas, and bambara groundnuts (both black and white) are cultivated. There are also severa! named varieties of sweet potatoes. The seed crops are nonnally maintained through on-farm seed saving. Grains intended for seed are selected and stored separately from food grains by the women, who have the main responsibili ty for thi s process. They decide on how much ofthe harvest should be kept for food and how much should be kept as seed for the next season. The interviewed fanners said that some people do not separate seeds and food but keep it all together and plant w hatever is left in the granary at planting time. However, the separa te storage of seed is considered the norm. While food grains are vulnerable to insect damage during storage, fanne rs said they were able to maintai n their seeds well. They described a number of storage and protection methods, some traditional and sorne learned from govemment and SC/USA extensionists: ( 1) keeping unshelled/unthreshed cobs/panicles/pods on the roof, (2) tying the seed in grass bundles and keeping it on the roof, (3) ty ing it in grass bundles and suspending it in trees, (4) storing it in celeiros (granaries), or (5) sticking it under the cei ling near the cooking area so that it is exposed to smoke. Threshed seeds may also be kept in sealed bottles or pots, in which case some protective agent, such as ash, sand, cooking oil, hot pepper, or leaves from a certain wild plant, is mixed with the seeds. Hot pepper can be added whole or dried and pounded. Leaves from the wild plant can be pounded and mixed in or burned and added as ash. In nonnal times, most farmers are able to save all the seeds they need for the next planting. They do not keep reserves for replanting because one planting is considered to be enough. [f sorne farmers do not have seeds, they can go to othcr fanners and offer work for seeds. They then have to help with the hard Addressing Seed ecurity in Disasler Respon~e: Linking Relief with /Jeve/opment -- __.___!_6 L. T. Trcedal and T. Berg work of hoeing the land to prepare it for seeding, but they would get the seeds they need as payment. That was the traditional "safety valve" that ensured access to seeds for everybody. Considering that cassava used to occupy most of the land and therefore only small amounts of seeds were needed, it seems likely that this system provided reasonable seed security for a11 befare the demise of the cassava. In inland Nampula, however, where farmers depend less on cassava (see liTA, 2003 , indicating approximately 50% ofthe land in Nampula was planted to cassava in the 1997/98 season) and more on seed crops, farmers save twice the normally required amounts of seed. In Memba, selling and buying seed is very limited. A significant market for seed has not developed and certified seed from the commercial sector is not available in the district. However, local shop owners in Memba have started buying grain seed from farmers at harvest time and selling it back at p lanting time. Un like commercial seed companies, the shopkeepers deal with local seeds only-mostly sorghum, maize, groundnuts, sesame, and green grams. They "rescue" small quantities of local seed from being consumed, but currently, this isjust a few sacks, far from a solution to the district's seed problem. Even when farmers are desperate for seed, they may not have the money to buy it. One shopkeeper said that few farmers are able to buy, and those who do, can only afford small amounts, lkg to 2kg. Sorne visitors from outside the are a bu y larger quantities. Thus, so me of the traded seeds were exported from Memba during a time of critica\ seed shortage. The nature of the crisis This was a crisis of slow onset. According to Hillocks (2003), the disease was described in Tanzania as early as the 1930s. When it spread to Mozambique is uncertain, but many farmers blame the introduction and wide distribution of susceptible varieties that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. The first local report ofthe disease was in 1998. ln 2002, the impact ofthe disease had reached a leve\ that threatened people's livelihoods in a number of coastal districts. The problem went beyond known coping mechanisms; there was no experience with that sort of crisis, and little was known about sources of disease-resistant cassava material. Communities faced a major challenge in identifying and multiplying disease-tolerant cassava. Because of cassava' s dominant positton in the cropping system, it was difficult for farmers to compensate with other crops. On the contrary, the food shortage caused by the cassava disease made ít difficult for farmers to save enough seed. By the planting season ofDecember 2002, when the first field visit too k place, households in the district were facing shot1ages of cash and seeds in addition to the lack of cassava cuttings. Food stores were running dry and many fami lies depended on bush food for their subsistence. Since everybody had the same problem, there was nowhere to go to get seeds. In the group interviews, only one farmer group said they knew about a place where seeds could be obtained. But that place was far away, and the owner would only give seeds after having seen that his own fields had germinated and been successfu lly established. By autunm 2002, the situation seemed to be acute for the livelihood security ofmany househo\ds. lfnot dealt with in a proper way, it was feared that the situation would cause widespread chronic food and seed insecurity. The need for a response was apparent. However, the total population in Memba di strict at that time was almost l l 0,000, ofwhich 95% were living on fanns (figures provided by District Agricultura) Office). That makes a farm population of s lightly more than 100,000. With an average family size of Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development . 97 1 ---~ --'- -- The Case o/ Cassava Brown Streak Disease in Coastal Areas of Northern Mozarnbique around five persons, the number ofhouseholds would be approximately 20,000. So identi fying tolerant varieties and multiplying them to meet the needs of all the farmers in the area would be a major undertaking. Even with the disease only seriously affecting the southem part of the district, the total requirement amounts to 50 mil! ion cuttings if we calculate 10,000 farms in need of assistance, and if each ofthem plants half a hectare of cassava and uses 10,000 cuttings per hectare. In addition, there were similar needs in other affected districts . Since cassava cuttings do not constitute a regularly traded commodity, al l ofthis would have to be produced and distributed in a separate operation organized as a response to this particular crisis. Seed interventions As mentioned above, the situation at the 2002 planting season was considered critica! in severa! coastal districts in the Nampula Province, and development actors decided to distribute planting materials, including cassava s tems and seeds of cereals and Iegumes. In M emba District, SC/USA Mozambique and the District Directorate of Agriculture (ODA) were involved. The seed operations carried by SC/USA and ODA are described in terms of ( 1) the diagnosis made by the implementers about the food and seed situation in the area befare the distributions, (2) the actual process ofimplementing the distributions in the communities, and (3) experiences with the di stributions from both the implementers' and the farmers' points ofview. Diagnosis of the situation Both SC/USA and the ODA based their interventions on qualitative and quantitative assessments and assumptions about the food and seed security in the area. SC/USA diagnosis A "strange phenomenon" affecting cassava in N acata-a-Velha and Memba Districts was reported in 1998 (Noticias, Maputo, 13 October 1998). In 1999, a farmer contacted SC/USA asking for pesticides to use against the root decay on cassava, symptoms that were later identified as cassava brown streak disease. However, farmers recounted that they had observed the symptoms for the first time in 1994. According to the SC/USA assessment, the disease multiplied by eight- to tenfold per year through the use of cuttings taken from infected plants. lt reached a disastrous leve! during the first SC/USA development activity program (DAP) in the period 1996- 200 l . This USAID-funded program was operational in Nacala-a-Velha and Memba. Its main goal to strengthen food security and nutrition among farmers in those two districts. Since C BSD was identified as a huge problem for farmers in these districts during this period, the disease was given a central position in the DAP2 proposal (SC/USA, 2002a). As early as 1999, SC/USA Mozambique had started small-scale multiplication of cassava to find resistant varieties. Two fonnal assessments of the disease's impact on the production system were carried out: first, leaf symptoms were assessed in 2000. That involved 19 extension workers, each investigating at random 20 plants per farm, and covering 391 farms in six districts. Second, an investigation ofroot symptoms took place in 2002, which showed that the disease affected 75%-85% ofthe plants in the area.ln addition, a baseline survey was carried among fanners in early August 2002, mainly focusing on food availability, access, and utilization. In this survey, 587 households were interviewed (about 2.3% of the estimated number of households in the program area) (SC/USA, 2002b ). The investigators concluded that there was low availabili ty of appropriate cassava material in the area and that there was therefore a need to Addres.1i11g Seed Securit_r in Disastf'r Response: /,inking Relief uúh Development . 98 1 L. T. Tra!dal and T. Berg identify and di stribute res istant varie ties of cassava. Furthermore, in DAP2, SCIUSA identi fíed a need to make farmers less reliant on bitter cassava. ODA diagnosis Parallel to the SC/USA operations, in December 2002, the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture (PDA) also organized distributions of cassava sticks and seeds in coastal areas of Nampula, including the District of Memba. This operation was based on reports that had come in from govemmenta l fíe ld technicians in 2002 on food securi ty problems and problems with too high a consumption of bitter cassava (which can cause death from dietary cyanogen exposure). In this context, the provincial Technical Secretary on Food Security and Nutrition (SETSA N), a govemmental group in Nampula, made a crop assessment survey, w here farmers were asked questions on access to food, amounts of food in storage, availabili ty offood in markets ( including prices), altem ative sources ofincome, general local li velihood strategies in stress situations, and movements of people caused by the famine and reasons for their move (which was asked of community leaders). The report described the food security situation as critica! , particular! y in N acata-a-Velha and Memba (SETSAN, 2002). Recommendations were divided into two categories: long- and short-term interventions. Among the short-tem1 interventions, distribution of seeds was considered as an appropriate measure to help fa nners cope with the critica( s ituation. To encourage self-re liance, the govemment prefers measures that stimulate production rather than distributing free food, so food aid was not considered an altemative. For the long-term di versification of the agricul tura( sector, the introduction ofaltemative crops adapted to local soil and water regimes was proposed (SETSAN, 2002). lmplementing the operations The diagnosis made by the SC/USA and the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture (PDA) in amput a resulted in two separate seed operations in December 2002. In the fo llowing more details on the main goals of these operations, their scale and scope, and the processes of selecting beneficiaries are presented. SC/USA distributions Objectives Seed distributions by SC/USA are part of the second USA ID-funded development activity program (DAP2) with the overall objective of improving ' ' household farming systems and food consumption by introducing sustainable technologies and nutrition prac ti ces" (SCIUSA, 2002a: 1 ). An expressed goa l of the program, which is being run during the period 2002- 2006, is to eradicate the current threat o f CBSD by having disseminated disease-resistant cassava material to 50,000 househo lds by the end of the DAP period in 2006 (SC/USA, 2002a). In addition, SC/ USA aims to diversify the agricultura( production system by presenting other, more nutritious and marketable, crops as altematives for the farmers. ldentification of material for distribution As mentioned above, SC/USA Mozambique had startcd small-scale experimental multiplication of cassava in Memba and Nacala-a-Velha Districts to find resistant varieties shortly after the disease was identified in 1999. As part of DAP2, four more di stricts (Nacala, Mossuril, Ilha de Moyambique, and Mogincual) were included in the program . In each of the s ix districts, primary multiplication fields (PMF), ranging between one and two hectares in size, were established under the clase supervision of an SC agronomist for multiplication of cassava sticks. In Memba the average PMF is 1.37 ha (SC/USA, 2003a). Acúlressing Seed SPmrity in /Jisaster Response: Linking Reliefwith Dez·elopm ent 99 1 The Case o[Cassava Brown Streak Discase in Coastal Areas of!Yorthern 11/ozambique Cassava materia ls being multiplied include both local varieties and materials that are provided through the South A frican Rootcrops Research Network (SARRNET) and liT A networks. Res istance to CBSD is tested, a nd four varieties (nikwalta, m 'povatakwa, chigoma mafia, and nachinya) are under multiplication. The fírst two are of local origin, and the last two are from the Province ofCabo Delgado north ofNampula. These are al l sweet varieties except for m 'povatakwa. They have been identifíed as tolerant, implying that they show only leaf symptoms. The roots are not affected and can be used as food. Infected Jea ves still ha ve value as food and can be used for making the traditionallocal sauces, which are prepared from stamped cassava leaves, often mixed with different kinds oflegumes, such as groundnuts, bambara groundnuts, etc. ldentiflcatiorz of beneficiaries In December 2002, cassava sticks of the nikwaha variety were distributed to fanners for further multipl ication in secondary multiplication fields (SMFs). Nikwaha was chosen because it was considered tolerant and, at the time, was the one most readily available. The di stributed material was from both SC/USA's PMFs and material collected from Namina, Nampula Province. Within each community , three to four groups of 15- 20 fanners were established under the supervision of SC/USA 's local extension workers, and each group was given a plot for the cultivation of the distributed cassava sticks. Each fam1er received 20 sticks of cassava (in !-meter lengths), which in tu m , were cut into four pieces of25 cm, giving each fanner approximately 100 cuttings. The leftovers after the cultivation of the SMF were for farmers' own prívate fields. In the interviews, fanners said that they had between fíve and seven one-meter sticks left after the SMF cultivation. Distributions in Memba included 10,400 sticks from SC/USA 's primary multiplication fields in December 2002 and another 14,500 sticks from SARRNET in February 2003 (SC/USA, 2003b). Facilitated by SC/USA 's extension workers, meetings with fanners were held in each community befare the distributions. The famers who received the sticks volunteered for the project. They got no monetary compensation but had the rights to the produce ofthe SMF after harvest without any further obligation. This supplied both roots and lea ves for eating and disease-tolerant planting material for the next season. The only condi tion was that fanners had to participa te in SC/USA ' s training programs, where they were trained in identifying CBSD symptoms, crop lining and spacing, and mixing of crops in the fíeld. In addition, fanners had to form groups to cultivate the SMFs. The groups were responsible for cleaning the fields, harvesting the produce, and weighing and distributing the produce among themselves after harvest (which was not yet finished at the time of the field visit in July 2003). According to SC/USA records, the total number offanners trained in the groups in the program area was 5236. In Memba, 1 108 fanners were participating in the program (SC/USA, 2003a). ODA distrihutions Objectives As a response to the critica! food security situation in the coastal area of ampula, the Provincial Directorate of Nampu la established a three-year project, running from 2002 to 2005. The overall objective is to increase agricultura! production and improve toad security by diversifying agriculture in the area. The project has been implemented in the districts of Memba, Nacala-a-Velha, Mossuril, Mogincual, Erati, Nacaroa, Nacala Porto, and Ilha de Moc;ambique. One important element ofthe project is to replace some ofthe bitter cassava with sweet varieties, as well as replacing sorne of the cassava production with altemative, more nutritious, short-cycled crops (Furede, 2002), which are adapted to local soil and water regimes (SETSAN, 2002). Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Unking Reliif túth Det,.efopment 100 1 L. T. Trredal Clnd T. Berg A further objective, which has influenced who the beneticiaries of the project would be, has been to promote cultivation of the most ferti le land. ldentification of material for distribution In November 2002 , based on the knowledge of CBSD tolerance accumulated by SC/USA, l iT A, SARRNET, and INIA, the nikwaha variety of cassava was provided from the District ofRibaue; most of the other seeds were improved varieties of mil let, maize, sorghum, cowpeas, and groundnuts from SEMOC, the Mozambican seed company. The exception was millet, which was of local origin. While most of the seeds were sourced from the commercial sector, most of them were known and had been cultivated befare by many farmers in the area (interview with the Provincial D irector of Agriculture in Nampula, E.M. Furede, 3 1 July 2003). The intention has been to provide 1000 cassava sticks, 3 kg of maize, 1.5 kg of sorghum, and 3 kg of cowpeas to each family (table 1 ); however, it was di fficult to veri fy the actual amounts distributed, particularly the number of cassava sticks. Amounts of millet and sorghum are not mentioned in the project description. The project has an ultima te goal of reaching 3000 families (households) during the three-year project period (Furede, 2002). Tahle l. Seed Distrihution in Memha by DDA: Amounts Distrihuted in December· 2002 and Returned by End of July 2 003 Amounts distributed Amounts returned by Crops distributed in December 2002 end July 2003 Varieties distributed Maize 7911 kg 5486 kg (69.3%) Manica, matuba,* kalahari Sorghum 4000 kg 237 kg (0.6%) Macia Cowpeas 8799 kg 958.5 kg (1.1%) Brown mix Millet 1564 kg 570.5 kg (36.5%) Local variety Groundnuts 345 kg 249.5 kg (72.3%) Natal comum Note: The amounts indicated here as having been retum ed are percentages ofthe amounts distributed. Since farmers were expected to retum twice as m u eh as they received. their repayment oftheir commitment is even less than indicated here. * Matuba was the variety distributed in Memba. Because ofits short growth cycle, it does not need a lot ofrain to grow well and was considered the best-adapted variety for the sandy soils in Memba. Identification of beneficiaries It has been di fficul t to get c lear in formation on the exact process by which beneficiaries were selected in this distribution. In the project description, farmers were to be selected, on the one hand, on the basis of interest, experience, and responsibility and, on the other hand, on the location of their farms (Furede, 2002). lt appears that in most places, farmers were selected from govemment lists and provided with a bag containing a certain amount ofseeds of different kinds. In other places (as in Yamene), only farmers who were members offarmers' associations were provided seeds. The farmers were given the seeds on the condi tion that after harvest they retum 200% of the amount of seeds they received. T he intention of this was to establish a seed bank that could províde farmers with seeds each planting season. ldeally, in this way the ODA cou\d reach more farmers in their seed di stributions at the time of the next planting sea son. Addressing Seed Security in Di.sastN Response: l.inking Relief u·ith Den!lopment 101 1 Thc Case ofCassam Brvu•n Streak /J iscase in Cvastal Areas ofAorthern Mozambíque In Memba, fanners with the best soils were favored in the distributions. This was part o f a govemment stratcgy to get the farmers with the poorest soil to abandon their land and movc their production to other fi e lds with more favorable conditions (interview with District Director of Agriculture in Memba, Aiupa Abudo, 22 July 2003 ). There is litt le social stratification in the area, so no other criteria were applied to the selection of bene fic iaries. Evaluation of the operations and problem s faced Agricultura( development in thc Mcmba arca is constrained by an un favorable environment, particular! y poor soils and unprcdictable rainfall. The dry, sandy soils are extremely dependent on good rains to produce well, and a shortage of rain can scrious ly affect farm production and farm livelihoods. The distribution of cassava sticks and seeds by SCIUSA aimed at decreasing the fanners' vulnerability to stress situations, whcreas the concurrent ODA operation aimed at both decrcasing farmers' vulnerability and rclicving the situation of acutc food insccurity. At the time of thc study, nei thcr the SC/USA nor the ODA had yet madc any fonnal cvaluations or reports regarding the degree of success or fa ilure o f their seed distribution operations. Since thc distributed cassava had not bccn harvested at the time o fthe fie ldwork (July 2003), it was too earl y to assess success or failure. Still , it was possible to get an impression of the operations by talking with representativcs from both SC/USA and ODA and by talking to fanners in the different communities. Sorne importan! experienccs from the operations, both in tenns ofthe perspectives and parameters of the implementers andas seen by the targeted fanners, are presented below. Thc SC/ USA oper·ntion A major problem faced in the SC/USA DAP has been to find C BSD-resistant cassava material, which was fo rmulated as a goal in the DA P2 Proposal (SC/USA, 2002a). No resistant or immunc varieties have been found and, according to thc SC/ USA Assistant Agronomi st, it is not likely that any resistant varieties witl be found within the program period (2002- 2006). However, sorne varieties that are only slight ly affected by the disease are considered to be tolerant and have been selected for multiplication and distribution. lt is hoped that the currently identified tolerant varieties (nikwaha. m 'povatahva, chigoma mafia, and nachinyay a) wi ll be sufficient to overcome the crisis. Lack o.f diversity Prob lems encountcrcd during the search for tolerant varietics have includcd genetic crosion , whcrc many traditional vari eties ha ve been discarded and have di sappeared from the arca, leaving the cropping system with a narrow genetic base. lt was al so difficult to get fanners to sharc infonnation on disease to l- erance. In the hope of being provided w ith assets from the project staff, fanners ha ve been reluctant to say that they still ha ve good or to lerant varicties of cassava. For fanncrs to share this infonnation with the SC/ USA. a relationship o f trust and close collaboration between extens ion workcrs and fanners is necessary. There may also be a problem ofknowledge: linking thc leaf symptoms to thc root rot may not be obvious to the fanners; thcy keep planting stems from infcsted plants, thereby multiply ing the problcm. E ven though only a few varietics o f cassava domínate the farming system in Memba, quite a few o fthe old varieties still cxist and are c ultivated by the fanners. In an SC/ USA survcy in 2002, 6900 cassava plants were investi gated on 345 fanns in the six program districts, and sorne of the less common !Ir/dressing ScNl Securit_\ in /Ji.msln RPsponse: Linking Rclicfu·ilh n crl'iupmenl 102 1 L. T. Tro:da / and T. Ber varieties, such as Garcia, vinte, nacamula, namahava and nassuruma, showed low levels of infection (SCIUSA, 2003 b). Al! ofthese have been included in on-fann trials with the farmer training groups. Stealing cassava There ha ve been reports from fanners of problems with theft of cassava from the PM Fs. At night, other fanners (or fanners from within the groups) visit the plots and steal cassava. lt is c laimed that this happens because fam1ers are desperate for food. However, other fam1ers disagreed wi th this view, claiming that there has been a change in people's mentali ty: In the old days people could trust each other. People were also hungry at that time, but they would never steal from the fields. (Eiderly farmer in Mecuta) Still , the scale of this problem is unclear, andas stated by SC/USA 's Agronomist, Steve McSween: "The tolerant distributed cassava material is still out there amongst the farmers." Nevertheless, due to problems with theft of the distributed sweet cassava, it is reasonable to question the feas ibility of distributing sweet vari eties of cassava. lt was the fanners who adopted and developed a preference for the bitter varieties, in the first place, possibly beca use theft of sweet cassava had been a problem in the past. A study by Chiwona-Karltun in Malawi showed that social factors were the main reasons for farmers preferring bitter cassava: the need for processing roots before consumption confers protection from theft and vennin (Chiwona-Karltun, 2003). lt is important for indigenous knowledge and preferences to be leamed and utilized in order to accelerate the process of transferring agricultura! production technologies. In the process of figh ting cassava mosaic virus in Uganda, in order to secure prolonged and sustainable cultivation, the farmers identified resistant genotypes before they were released (Otim-Nape et al., 1994). This has not happened in the present situatíon. Fanners in Memba have been invo lved to a very limited degree in the process of identifying and selecting preferred tolerant varieties of cassava. Logistics The di stribution process was constrained by a number of problems: sorne communities cannot be reached by road, it was not possible to reach all the benefíciaries by the best planting time, and unfavorable weather condi tions were also mentioned as a constra int. The rain carne as expected in January and February but stopped early in March. Furthermore, a cyclone made cultivation difficult for sorne fanners. In the whole program area, 6162 households were reached by the SC/USA cassava distributions (SC/USA, 2003b) . The ultimate goal of reaching 50,000 households by the end ofthe program period in 2006 is still far away. The SCIUSA Assistant Agronomist is worried that at the program's current pace, it w ill be difficult to reach that goal. However, calculat ing the 2003 nurseries covering more than 25 hectares with 10,000 plants per hectare and each plant producing lO cuttings, 2.5 mi Ilion cuttings can be produced. That would be enough for lOO cuttings to each of25,000 households. Adding the customary free exchange of cassava cuttings makes it likely that di stributed vari eties will diffuse through the region once the fanners have enough for their own needs. The DDA operation So far there has been no fonnal evaluation ofthe DDA distributions. The only ava ilable indicator oftheir degree of success is the amount of seeds paid back by the fam1ers (table 1 ). lt appears that the distributed sorghum has not perfonned well, probably due to late distributions and lack of rain late in the cropping season, whi le the di stributed maize and gro undnuts seem to have done better. Still , there are reasons to Addressing Seed Security in Disaster R,.sponse: Linking Reliefll"ith Dt'velopme!ll The Case oJCassava Brown Streak Disease in Coastal Areas ofNorthern Mozambique belíeve that many fam1ers ha ve not yet paíd back the agreed amounts in spite of good production. As one farmer said, "1 ha ve not yet paid back the amounts of seeds demanded by the govemment beca use no one from the government has been here asking for them." Here, the government faces a logistical problem in that neither the government nor the farmers have the means to transport the seeds to the seed bank. The govemment distributed seeds on credit to avoid fanners getting used to receiving suppot1 for free. However, the farmers who benefitted from the govemment distributions generally (and not surprisingly) were not pleased by having to pay back twice the amount that they had received: It does not make sen se that we ha veto pay back the seeds. 1fl had kept the seeds, 1 would ha ve distributed the seeds to persons in other areas, but now this is impossible. (Farmer in Chupite) Timing ofthe distributions The local authorities relied on central funding for the seed distributions, which may ha ve contributed to late distributions in some of the communities. The seeds and the instructions were given by the provincial ministry in Nampula, and the framework given for the operations was perceived by the ODA in Memba as a limitation: The operation was emergency assistance, and that should not be a governrnent task . ... We [the DDA] did what was possible within the framework given by the Govemment ... . The main problem that we faced in the distributions was reaching all the people. In addition, seeds were not enough, and some of them arrived too late, and did therefore not perform well in the fíe ld s. (Aiupa A budo, District Director of Agriculture in Memba) Logistics Reaching people was another problem. In the end, the ODA was assisted with transportation of the seeds within the district by SC/USA. The problem of late distribution was most pronounced in the case of sorghum, which was hampered by a short (but heavy) rainy season. In addition, there were not enough seeds for all the cornmunities to receive the whole package: The govemment told us that 200 people should clear their land because we were about to receive seeds for planting. ln the end they only brought cowpeas in small amounts, only 50 kg (2.5 kg to each of 20 people). T here are still 180 people here waiting for their seeds. (Farmer in Muipia) Discussion Se ed security Seed security can be defined as a situation where farmers ha ve or can access enough seeds of desired species and preferred varieties, of good quali ty, in time to fully exploit the potential of their farms. The cassava disease disrupted the en tire farming and seed supply system in Memba in a way that undermined seed securi ty, as defined by all of these criteria. The failure o f cassava affected not only the food supply. There is a shortage both at individual farms and generally in the cornmunity, and when there is Jack of food, people cannot save en ough seed. Seed security accompanied the food insecurity. Addrrssing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief wilh Development . 104 1 ---- L. T. Tr<.edal and T. Berg In Memba there were many farmers who had not saved enough seeds or, in the case of cassava, lacked disease-free cuttings. There were no other farmers to go to for seeds and they could not buy sufftcient quantities. Thus, there is strong evidence that in thi s situation externa! assistance was needed. The slow-onset slow-recovery nature of the crisis A plant disease that does not kili its host and is transmitted through vegetative planting materials would tend to increase from year to year, eventually resulting in total infection of susceptible varieties. Tf the disease causes serious yield loss and resistant varieties are not available, a crisis situation will gradually develop. lt may take time, maybe years, until farmers and authorities see the danger. This kind of situation could al so occur in other vegetatively propagated subsistence crops such as potatoes, bananas, sweet potatoes, and yams. We are therefore díscussing not only a specific incident of cassava on the coast of East A frica, but a general problem that could affect subsistence farmers in many parts of the world. The case of a disease in cassava also shows the difficulties and long-term nature of recovery. The problems include the search for resistant altematives and the practica! task of multiplication and distribution of disease-free planting materials. That cannot be done in a one-season operation. Recovery takes time, and severa! years must be allowed for the restoration of affected cropping systems. Relief operatíons wíth short-term budgets are therefore inadequate as a response to such crises. Vulnerability and lack of alternatives Agricultura! history provides many cases of catastrophic outbreaks of plant diseases. From history we know ofthe late blight in potatoes in Ireland in the 1840s and the demise ofthe Gros Michel banana in the 1960s. In most cases, the outbreak has been preceded by genetic uniformity. Vegetatively propagated species are particularly vulnerable because the growing of one or a few favored varieties results in an extreme degree of uniformity. In the case of bananas, the industry has continued with the same degree of uniformity, based on a single new clone (Cavendish). There are other examples of cassava diseases in Africa, cassava mosaic virus (CMV) being the most striking. The situation of CMV in Uganda is very similar to the one we find in Memba: widespread cultivation of a few popular but very susceptible varieties of cassava was identified as one exp lanation for the sudden upsurge of the disease in Uganda (Thresh et al. , 1994). The pandemic had its greatest impact in areas with limited genetic diversity, where the main varieties were vulnerable to infection. In contrast, areas of high diversity experienced a marked shift in the relative importance of different varieties (Otim-Nape and Thresh, 1998). As in these examples, in Memba the cassava disease could spread unhindered in areas with on ly or mostly susceptible plants in the fi elds. According to farmers' experiences, a switch from growing severa! varieties to only one variety took place at many fanns in the years preced ing the disaster. Most likely this happened because the virus was a lready there making new, "clean," introductions appear more vigorous than the old varieties. This points to a need to organize the supply and maintenance of virus-free planting materials. Examples from other parts ofthe world show that low cost in vitro propagation of cassava is possible. In northem Cauca, Colombia, an NGO (FIDAR) together with CIA T have carried through a collaborative plan, involving the establishment of a tissue-culture laboratory and training of farn1ers. By using low-cost altematives, the tissue-culture laboratory was set up for 20 times less than the cost of a conventional laboratory (Restrepo et al. , 2000). In order to speed up the propagation of disease-tolerant Addressing S eed SPcurity in Disaster Response: Linking Re/ief with Developmenl . 1051 Tite Case o{ Cassava Brown Streak Disease in Coastal Areas o{ Northern Mozambique cassava varieties, this example may also be relevant for development actors working with the problems of CBSD in Nampula. The soils of the most severely affected areas of coastal Mozambíque are un favorable for typical seed crops and make it hard for farmers to mitigate the problem by switching to other species. This added to their vulnerability befare the crisis and made a quick recovery after the crisis vcry difficult. Lack of knowledge about the virus Cassava brown streak disease has been litt le studied and only superfic ially describcd in the avai lable li terature. The disease is spread through infccted planting materials, but there must also be a mechanism whereby plants grown from e lean cuttings become infected in the field. A booklet about cassava diseases issued by liT A (Msikita et a l. , 2000) says that the virus is "believed to be spread from plant to plant by insects." But the lack of exact knowledge how the disease is spread, the la e k of systematic screening of germpl asm for disease tolerance, and the nonexistence ofbreeding programs with a focus on the disease was a poor starting point for agencies that too k up this challenge when the problem first beca me known. This situation is repeated every time a disease or pest appears for the first time in an area. Preparedness in the form of capacity to quíckly start research on new diseases or pests and to integrate the search for resistance in plant breeding programs is needed but generally inadequate or nonexistent for many importan! subsistence crops in tropical countries. In such situations, local authorities and development agencies need to link with profcssional experts for coll aboration. The experts are needed for technical support and they, in tum, need the local projects for surveys and testing of materia ls. In this case, SC/USA has established links to the national research center in Mozambique (IN lA), to the regional network (SARRNET), and the lntem ational lnstitute of Tropical Agriculture (liT A). In addition, they ha ve networked with organizatíons and projects that work w ith cassava in other affected coastal areas in East Aft·ica. Having to develop solutions in that way, however, explains why the recovery has been slow and must be accepted as a long-term undertaking. The shortcomings of local knowledge and traditional coping rnechanisms Seed crops that are managed through on-farm seed selection may maintain so me degree of resistance to old diseases and quickly build up resistance to new diseases. In cassava, however, each variety is a clone and not amenable to such selection. On the contrary, farmers' local management tends to erode the existing base for selection when serious diseases start appearing in their varieties. In the Memba case, reliance on one crop andfew varieties madefarmers vulnerable to CBSD. The.fact that the stap/e was a vegeta ti ve/y propagated crop with poorly developed informal systems (integration in markets, etc.) made the .system even more vulnerable. In this case, solutions require access to new germplasm, a capacity for testing and multiplication--or the technology to generate and maintain disease-free planting materials. Al! of this is outside the reac h and beyond the capacity oflocal farming communities. Avoiding d ependency and encouraging self-reliance As a matter of policy, both the government and SCIUSA have self-reliance as a main objective and therefore want to avoid free handouts. In the case of the government, this means no food distribution, and seed distribution on credit. For SC/USA, it means collaboration with farmer groups in multiplying Addressing Seed S ecurity in Disaster Response: Li11king Relief witit /Jel'elopmenl L. T. Trredal and T. Berg and making tolerant cassava varieties available in affected areas. Since the implementers ha ve identified only varieties of cassava that are toleran! to CBSD (not resistan!), some kind ofknowledge transmission (of disease and cultural practices to ensure clean planting material) has to go with the material as part ofthe distribution process. The local people are clearly going through extreme! y hard times but seem to be able to survive by their own means. In both the SCIUSA and DDA operations, the fanners' own capacities and preferences have been addressed toa limited degree. For example, the di stribution of the nikv.·aha variety was not based on farmers' preferences, but because ofits disease tolcrance and availability; it is still an open question whether the fanners in the end wi 11 adopt this new sweet variety. Fanners' preferences are more complex than just disease tolerance; other sociocultural factors, such as taste, cooking qualities, and protcction from theft, are important. Thus, there is no guarantee that fanners will adopt the nihvaha variety. The govemment gives out seeds on credit and demands repayment in kind in order to establish a seed bank for redistributíon in coming years. This requires organization and an infrastructure for administrat ion of such a credit scheme, for recovery of seed loans, and for storage and redistribution of the seeds. The ODA does not appear to have the capacity and resources to manage all of that. The wisdom of combining credit recovery and extension services may also be questioned, and the interest is rather high: retum of twice the amount ofborrowed seed after one cropping season. The requirement of repayment by weight does not encourage rhe retum of high-quality grain as seed. Thus, "seeds on credit " does not seem to be a viable scheme because o.fthe low quantity and (vet)' likely) low quality o.f the returned material. Traditionally , seed security ís ensured by mechanisms ofredi stribution ofseeds and cuttings within the communi ty. Those mechanisms are only marginally commercialized and based on free gifts, in the case of cassava, and seeds for work, in the case of seed crops. This mechanism broke down w ith the cassava crisis. Post-disaster recovery should ideally restore on-fam1 production and household food securi ty, genetic resources, and the seed supply system with the traditional mechanisms of distribution and exchange within the communi ty. But it is too early to assess whether the recovery w ill bring back the old mechanisms of seed exchange. A local seed trade is emerging and may, over the long term, replace the old ways of acquiring seeds for those who do not have enough. Operational issues: the question of cooperation and trust Because of the nature of this crisis, ad hoc operations cannot sol ve the problem. Only projects with a long-term presence and long-tem1 commitment can deal with the difficulties of finding and implementing so lutions. A long-term presence is also necessary to bui ld rc lat ions of tn1st in arder to mobilize communities for active involvement. The way SCIUSA operatcs in collaboration w ith local and regional scientifíc networks seems in thi s caseto be a relevant model. Acknowledgements This study is pa11 of a CIAT, CRS, and Ca re Norway project on post-d isaster seed rehabilitation, fu nded by USAID and the Norwegian Mini stry ofForeign Affairs. Care Mozambique, through its main o ffice in Maputo and provincial office in Nampula, facilitated fí e ldwork prior to the planting season in December 2002, inc luding comparati ve studies of an unaffected inland district supported by Care and an affected coastal district supported by Save the C hil dren USA. Care's field director in Nampula, Ti m Russell , and Addressing Srwl Srrurir-, in fJisaster Respnnse: Linking Relie/Il'it!t Derelo¡urmtl . 1071 The Case of Cassava Brown Streal.: Disease in Coastal Areas of!Vorthern Mozambique SC!USA's Agronomist in Nacala, Steve McSween, are thanked for generous support and valuable discussions. A second field visit in July 2003 targeted only areas that had received seed assistance during the December 2002 planting season. Save the Children USA, amputa, together with fíeld offíce staff in Nacala Porto, facilitated and supported that second fi eld visit in all practica! ways. The SC!USA Program Manager, Richard Dixon, helped in organizing the work and supported it with transport, accommodation, and fíeldwork assistancc from the SC/USA staff. The SC!USA Assistant Agronomist, Chande Ossufe, was of particular help during the fíeldwork in a ll practica! ways, as well as in terms of sharing infonnation and translating information from the farmers. During the last days in Memba, the SC!USA Food Securir:y Adviser in Nacala-a- Velha, Agy Armando Erminio, also assis ted in the fieldwork. We also thank Steve McSween, who just after retuming from his summer vacation spent time discussing important issues and impressions from the fie ldwork; the SC/USA Extension Supervisor, Dos Santos, who assisted in both fi eldwork periods in terms of guiding and selecting communities to be investigated ; and the District Director of Agriculture in Memba, Aiupa Abudo, who provided us with essential infonnation about the government activities in the district and who also indicated communities to be investigated. We are also grateful to the people ofMemba, who in all possíb!e ways showed interest and patience with our (sometimes) tiring questions. Acronyms CBSD CIAT CMY DAP ODA liTA INIA PDA PMF SARRNET SMF SC/USA SETSAN cassava brown streak diseasc lntemational Center for Tropical Agriculture cassava mosaic virus deve lopment activity program District Directorate of Agriculture Intemational Institute of Tropical Agriculture National Agricultura! Research lnstitute Provincial Directorate of Agriculture primary multiplication fteld South African Rootcrops Research etwork secondary multiplication field Savc the Children USA Tcchnical Secretaria! for Food Security and Nutrition Addresúng Seed Sl'l'urity in Disasler Response: Linking Reliefwilh Det•elopmenl 1081 f-. T. TrO'dal and T. Berg References Chiwona-Karltun, L. 2003. A reason to be bitter: Sutdies on cassava c/assificationfrom the.farmers ' perspective. PhD Thesis. Uppsala, Sweden: Department of Medica! Science, Uppsala University. Furede, E.M. 2002. Projecto de miltiplicac;iio de eslacas de mandioca e de sementes agrícolas. Nampula, Mozambique: Direc~iio Provincial da Agricultura e Desenvolvimento Rural de ampula, Servir;os Provinciais da Agricultura. Hi llocks, R.J. 2003. Research protocols for CBSD. An unpublished note. Draft Fcbruary 2003. liTA. 2003. Terminal report ofthe INIA-1/TA/SA RRNET bifaleral project, Mo:::ambique,for Marc·lr 2001 - March 2003 onthe acceleraled multiplication and distribution ofhealthy planting materials o.fthe best yielding ¡•arielies of cassava and sweetpotato in Mozambique: A drought and jlood mitigation activil)•. Maputo, Mozambique: United States Agency for Intem ational Developmcnt and Intcm ational lnstitute of Tropical Agriculture, on behalfofthe Steering Committee o fthe Southern African Root Crops Research Network. Msikita, W., B. James. E. Nnodu, J. Legg, K. Wydra, and F. Ogbc. 2000. Disease control in cassava.farms. IPM Field Guide for Extension workers. Croydon, UK: lntemat ional lnstitute ofTropical Agriculture. Otim-Nape, G. W., A. Bua, and Y. Baguma. 1994. Accelcrating the trans fer of improved production technologics: Controlling A frican cassava mosaic virus di sea se epidemics in Uganda. A.frican Crop Science Jo urna/ 2(4):479-495. Otim- a pe, G. W. and J.M. Thresh. 1998. The curren! pandemic of cassava mosaic virus disease in Uganda. In The epidemiology ofplant diseases, edited by D. Gareth Jones. Dordrecht, etherlands: Kluwcr Publishers. Restrepo, J.M ., G. J. Ospina, C. Hemandez, R. Escobar, J. Thome, and W. Roca. 2000. ldentifj•ing information: Participatory development o.f low-cosl simplified rus tic tissue culture.for cassava. Cali , Colombia: Fundación para la Investigación y e l Desarrollo Agrícola. SETSA . 2002. Relatório sobre um diagnóstico da situac;iio de seguranr;a alimentar nos distritos de Memba, Nacala-a- Ve/ha, Nacala Porto. Mossuril, flha de Mor;ambique e Mogincual. Nampula, Mozambique: Govemo da Província de Nampula, Scrctariado Técnico de Seguranr;a Alimentar e Nutric;:ao. SCIUSA. 2002a. DAP propasa/ (FY2002-FY2006). Nampula, Mpzambique: Savc the Children USA . SC/USA. 2002b. Baseline survey report: Coastal region integrated food security program, Nampu/a Province. Mo:::ambique. Nampula, Mozambique: Save the Children USA. SCIUSA. 2003a. Save the Children DAP Quarter(¡· Report. Aprilto June 2003. Nampula, Mozambique: Savc the Chi ldren USA. SCIUSA. 2003b. Save the Children DAP quarter(r report, January to March 2003. ampula, Mozambique: Save the Children USA. Thrcsh, J.M., G.W. Otim-Nape, and D. L. Jennings. 1994. Exploiting resistance to African cassava mosaic virus. Aspects o.f Applied Biology 39:5 1- 60. Arúlressing Seed Security in Dis aster Response: Linking Reliejll•ith Det·elopmenl - 1091 /; Relief Seed Assistance in Ethiopia 1¡ Paula Bramel, Sigrid Nagoda, J on Magnar Ha u gen, Dereje Adugna, Taye Dejene, Tesfaye Bekele, Lei f Tore Tn-edal1 Ahstract For more than 30 years, the intemational communi ty has been assisting Ethiopia in recovering from recurring disasters. A continua! need for emergency agricultura! assistance as a response 10 droughts, conflict, and famine has led many to queslion lhe effecliveness and sustainability of the current interventions and to search for altemative approaches. This paper describes the approaches used for agricultura! recovery in Ethiopia, including problem diagnosis, design and implementation of interventions, and evaluation. Furthermore, lessons from one specific case, based on fieldwork in East and West Hararghe, are presented to assess the need for and appropriateness of the approach u sed. The study reports results from a review of assessment and evaluation reports, literature reviews, interviews with key informants, and questionnaires given to farmers and govemment officials in East and West Hararghe. The crop production system in East and West Hararghe is very di verse with very limiled use of inputs. Fanners' seed security is based on domestic supply and availability of assets to access the market. Productivity is inherently low and the droughl of the last two years has reduced supplies of own saved seed. Access to seed in the market is limiled due lo lack of cash or olher asse1s. However, even in drought, the supply of seeds from the market has been adequate to meet the demands from both farmers and the relief seed system. In East and West Hararghe, between 75o/o-79% ofthe households surveyed had received seed assislance in the previous three years. Direct seed distribution is the standard agricultura! emergency o r recovery response to repeated crop failures in Ethiopia. The use of seed aid has been institutionalized wi th the formation of a "relief seed system" with clearly deftned ro les and procedures that define how seed needs are identified and how seed is distributed. Farmers have a need for assistance in a rder 10 recover from very complex, chronic emergencies but the continua( application ofthe standard response has not always met this need. lmproved approaches for diagnosing seed needs and taking lessons from past experiences are needed, and there is a need to explore new approaches that ensure that local strengths and opportunities are employed. A need to look beyond the short-term perspective of relief operations and focus resources on long-tenn developmenl is urgent. lntroduction For more than 30 years, the intemational community has been assisting Ethiopia in recovering from recurring disasters. A continua! need for emergency seed assistance as a response to droughts, conflict, and famine has led many to question the effectiveness and sustainability ofthe current inte rventions and to search for altemative approaches. l . Pauta Bramel is a consultan!; Sigrid Nagoda is with Caritas Norway; Jon Magnar Haugen and Leif Torc Trredal are consultants for CARE Norway, Dereje Adugna, Taye Dejene, and Tesfaye Bekele are with CARE Ethiopia. Addressing Seed Securit_y in Disoster Response: Linking Reliif with Dcrelopmenl . 111 1 ReliefSeed Assistance in Ethiopia The main objective of this case study is twofold . First, it aims to describe the approaches used for seed re lief in Ethiopia. This will include issues of diagnosing the problem and designing, implementing, and evaluating interventions. Changes in the seed re lief approach over time have also been reviewed. Second, lessons from one speci fic case, based on fieldwork in East and West Hararghe, are presented to assess the need for and appropriateness of the seed re lief approach used. Food security and disasters in Ethiopia Ethi opia has a long history of drought and famine (EM-DAT, no date). Droughts that resulted in maja r fam ines occurred in the years 1972-74, 1976- 1978 1983-84, 1987, 1989/91, 1993/94 , 1997, and 1999/2003. In eight ofthe past 15 years, the number a ffected from drought ranged between 5- 14 million people. In two of those years, 2000 and 2003, the number ofpeople affected exceeded 1 O mi Ilion. Except for 1985/86, 1988, and 1995/96, the need for disaster response has been constant since the 1983/84 drought. Poverty is both a cause and an effect ofthe Ethiopian disasters. In appeals for emergency assistance, the various famines that ha ve occurred since 1 996 are all blamed on a combination of a drought emergency and poverty. On the other hand, the chronic vulnerabili ty of the Ethiopian rural population is seen as the effect of repetitive crop failures that have gradually deprived farrners of their assets. Dercon (2002) found that communities affected by the 1983/84 drought had barely recovered to pre-drought levels by 1994/95. Poor conunun ities have repeatedly had to adopt survival mechanisms that deplete their long-term strategies and assets. Droughts have caused the less poor to become poor, and the poor to beco me destitute. The lack of productive assets and savings, a long with small plots of land and a weak and poorly educated work force means that people are very vulnerable to shocks. A World Bank Country Study (World Bank, 1998) suggests that the share ofa household's income spent on food is a key indicator ofpoverty. In Ethiopia, this averages 75%. 8oth on-fann production, markets, and gifts/loans/wages from friends and relatives contribute to household diets . More than half(53 %) of the food consumption is obtained through purchases in local markets. A survey by Dercon (2002) found that most households rely on the market for food during certain times of the year, even for crops cul tivated on their own land. On average, households reported that they have no homegrown food in stock during about 1 O weeks per year. Agricultural policies Dercon (2002) analyzed the impact of the política! and economic reforms in Ethi opia from a feudal system, through a communist-in spired contro lled economy, toa market-based economy (supported by the lnternational Monetary Fund and the World Bank). He studied changes from 1989 to 1994/95 in households that were affected by the 1984/85 drought. The study concluded that the reforrns had not been universally pro-poor. The nearly 50% o f households that had good rains, good land, and access to infrastructure contributed to more than 80% of the overal l estimated reduction in the poverty gap. The poorest households stayed poor and had a lower growth rate. In the mid-1990s, the Ethiopian govemment adopted an initiati ve for agricultura! development ca lled "agricultura! development led industrialization." Through nationwide promotion and dissemination of agricultura! extension packages, this approach contributed to increased food production. Many fanners were able to produce a surplus that could be marketed. However, since markets are underdeveloped, the high supply resulted in very low cereal prices, especially for mai ze, sorghum, and wheat. Wholesale prices for mai ze in Nekempt plummeted by 75% from August 1999 to July 2002 as the number of plots that participated in the extension package program in East W ellega Zone increased from 600 in 1995 to Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Rcspunsl·: Linking Relief with Development 1121 P. Bram.el et al. 133,017 in 200 1 (Raymakers and Sewaonet, 2002). This has led, in tum, to an inabi lity of farmers to repay loans for the extension packages. The loan repayment has forced farmers to sell parts of their assets, household items, livestock, or oxen (Raymakers and Sewaonet, 2002). Guinand (2002) concluded that "many cash crop and surplus-producing farmers ... say they are better off not using the so-called govemment agricultura! ex tension package that is not helping them any more." The use offarm inputs has been s ignificantly reduced, and the productivity achievements ofthe late 1990s have been reversed (EC/ LFSU and WFP, 2002). Seed sales from the formal sector (including the ESE, the Pioneer Company, and farmer-based secondary seed multiplication units) fell from 35,000 metric tons (Mt) in 200 l to 20,000 Mt in 2002. For 2002, an F AO/WFP assessment concluded that about 97 % of the seed used was local. F ood and seed assistance Development economist Amartya Sen 's analysis of the 1972 Ethiopian fam ine led to his Nobel prize-winning theory of entitlement (Sen, 1981 ). The entitlement approach switches the focus from a problem of food availabili ty, addressed through food di stributions, to one offood entitlement, addressed through poverty reduction and market reform. Emergency reliefin Ethiopia has not proved able to adopt Sen's new paradigm. The Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC, 2002a) indicated that, in terms ofrelieffood aid, the food intlow to regularly mitigate fam ine has expanded progressively by over 600,000 Mt per year in the period from 1994 to 1999. Paradoxically, these imports have co incided with an increase in domestic cereal production but very low cereal prices to farmers. Programs for food aid are repeated every season (Raisin, 200 1 ), and due to constraints of time or other factors, evaluations of the long-tenn impact of assistance on food security are rarely undertaken. This hampers the possibi lity offinding a way offthe treadmi ll. However, seed assistance has been widely adopted, with the intent of reestablishing production, and thereby ensuring food security in the long run. The predominant approach for seed assistance, direct seed distribution, is generally based on the assumption that most households in a food insecure area are also seed insecure, i.e., that they do not have sufficient seed of their own or sufficient capacity to acqu ire seed locally ( Longley et al. , 2002). However, repeated provision of seeds in vulnerable areas might disrupt traditional household strategies for managing and accessing seed. Seed markets (both formal and informal) may also be disrupted. ln effect, local systems and capacities for coping wi th harvest fa ilures may be undermined, which may prolong the need for ''emergency" assistance. A pproaches that are employed to diagnose local seed stress and guide interventions are often s implistic. Assessments oflocal seed securi ty are seldom carried out before interventions are planned or implemented. Differences across households are seldom explored, and it is often assumed that all crops are equally affected . Remington et al. (2002) presents a framework for assessing seed security and diagnosing seed systems. This framework describes three parameters of seed securi ty: avai lability, access, and quali ty. Availability is re lated to seed supply. A sufficient quantity of the seed of desirable crops must be found within reasonable proximity to people and in time for critica! sowing periods. To benefit fro m available seed, people must have access to it, which means they must have adequate resources to secure seed through purchase or barter. And last, seed must be of appropriate quality, that is, it must be for desirable varieties and of acceptable standards (seed health, physiological characteristics, and varietal integrity). Seed di stributions generally contribute to seed avai lability by creating an artificial supply ofseed within a limited period oftime. However, questions may be raised at this approach, as seed is hardly ever totally Arldressing Seerl ecurity in Disas1er Respon.w·: U,king Relief rcith /Jerelopment Relief Seed Assistance in Ethiopia unavailable. Certain areas may provide surplus production, or seed ofaltemative crops may be available. For instance, recent food aid imports to Ethiopia have coincided with high cereal production in certain areas ofthe country (Guinand, 2002). The problem may be more one ofaccess or quality: seed may not be accessed because it is beyond the purchasing powcr of the impoverished, shock-susceptible population. A ltematively, farmers may be forced to use seed of inferior qua li ty. However, Remington et al. (2002) concluded that, "In summary, the preceden ce for the determination of food unavai labili ty, the complexity of diagnosing a lack of seed access, and the challenge of addressing access all contribute to the avoidance of the access determination." Methodology The case study consisted of three main sources of evidence. A review was made of all relevant reports that are available publicly on ReliefWeb, reports given during interviews, literature searches carried out in the UN Emergency Unit of Ethiopia (UN-EUE) library, and reports from F AO and NGOs. lnterviews were conducted in Addis Ababa in September 2002 with 20 key informants representing four government agencies (the Ethiopian Agriculture Research Organization [EARO], Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission [DPPC], National AgriculnJral Input Agency [NAJA], and Agricultura! Input Service Corporation), three of the largest donors (USAID, Government of Norway, and EURO -AlD), two UN agencies (UN-EUE and F AO), two disaster-assessment agencies (European Commission!Local Food Securi ty Unit [EU-LFSU] and Food Early Warning System-Network [FEWS-NET]), fíve NGOs (including the Christian ReliefDevelopment Agency [CRDA], the umbrella agency for most of the local NGOs in Ethiopia), one parastatal (Ethiopian Seed Enterprise [ESE], and one prívate trader involved in seed procurement (ODA Share Company). The focus of the interviews was knowledge of the farming systems in general, the formal and farmers' seed systems, the impact of the disaster on agriculture and seed systems, experiences with emergency and recovery responses, and experience with seed based interventions in emergencies or for development. Different types of data were collccted in fíeldwork in nine woredas (di stricts) in the specifíc target area, East and West Hararghe, in Aprii-June 2003. Surveys were done with fanners while interviews were conducted with grain traders and govemment offí cials. Thc farmer survey involvcd between 30 and 2 16 households per agroecological zone in each woreda. Nineteen grain traders were interviewed. Woreda administrative offícials were interviewed in every woreda except Mieso. One woreda agricultura! development offícer (ADO) was interviewed in each of the nine woredas. Officials of peasant associations were also interviewed in each ofthe nine woredas, for a total of66 officials in 60 villages. Seed aid in Ethiopia A review ofrecent seed reliefprojects in Ethiopia reveals that disasters are al! blamed on a combination of a drought emergency and chronic vulnerability. Over the years, direct seed distribution has become a typical response to these seed stress situations. In 1999 an appeal was made for food and seed distributions because of" the poor 1998 meher [main and long rain y season] and 1999 belg [short rain y sea son) harvest as well as increasing vulnerability from previous years" (UNDP-EUE, 1999). The appeal was justifíed further because "many farmers have consumed or lost their grain seeds and have been forced to sell agricultura! tools and oxen to buy grain." In 2000, an appeal was made for food and nonfood assistance due to repeated poor rains and the fail ure of the 1999 belg and the poor meher (UNDP-EUE, 2000) . Another appeal in 200 1 stated that the Addressing Seed Security in nisas/Pr R esponw': Lin.king Relief 1áth lJel·elopment P. Brame/ el al. objective ofthe project was to "save lives and to support the recovery process by protecting and building productive assets." Furthermore, it was stated that "an essential component of the approach will be ... the provision of seeds and tools for the upcoming belg cropping season" (UN/OC HA, 200 1 ). A new appeal in 2002 requested more than $ 15 mi Ilion for the provision oflocal and improved seed for the belg season in response of a fai lure of the previous belg rains and the poor meher (DPPC, 2002b,c). The appeal gave the following description of the situation: "Seed stocks are required in many crop-growing areas for the coming planting season. Seed ava ilability in 2003 will be critica) dueto the poor production perfom1ance in 2002. The seeds ha ve hi ghly shrivcled and are of poor quality for pl anting. Therefore, time! y supply is cri tica ) to avoid intlated needs for the remainder of 2003 ." Additional appeals were made in March (DPPC, 2003a) and June (OPPC, 2003b) of2003. Most appeals reviewed since 1996 relate the farmers' vulnerabilities to the famine in 1983/84. In the Govemment of Ethiopia 's appeal for 2003. the disaster was described as the res idua l effect of con ecutive years of drought and poverty. The food insecurity is described as chronic in nature w ith the exception of particular crisis periods that may produce more acute and transitory food insecurity. The appeal concludes that poverty is the underlying cause of chronic food insecurity dueto a lack of assets and endowments, low or variable rainfa ll , high population density, and low natural resource endowments. This is despite overall good harvests in 1995/96, 1998, and the meher of 2001, and increased cereal production in the surplus growing areas of the country from 1996 to 200 l . In Ethiopia, repetitive seed aid in the form of direct seed distribution has been institutiona lized to such an extent as to see the formation of a relief seed system, which is driven with funds from intemational donors and focused on seed procurement and production. Apmt from the funders, thc system is composed of organizations or individuals who produce seed ( or grain), institutions that procure seed. institutions that distribute the seed, and fin ally the beneficiary househo lds that rece ive the seed as assistance. The system is regu lated by the OPPC nationally, and by the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau (DPPB) regionall y, while the ationa l Seed lndustry Agency (NS IA) monitors seed quality and procurement. DPPC and OPPB are govemment agencies. The DPPC has three mandates: prevention/mitígation, preparedness, and immediate response. Food aid is classified as emergency response, whereas seed a id is considered a mechanism for preparedness or rehabilitation. Other national agencies in volved in the relief seed system are the Ethiopian Seed Enterprise (ESE), the Biodiversity lnstitute, Ministry of Agriculture, Ethiopian Agricultura! Research Organization (EARO), and the uni versities. The donors include intemational organizations, the European Union (EU), USA ID/OFDA, DFlD fro m the UK, and other official Northern agenc ies. Funds are provided directly or through F AÜ. Additional fundin g comes from prívate funds to NGOs. Donors may be involved at a number of di fferen t levels, funding assessments, serving as members of the assessment teams, or responding as key informants for the assessment. The food and non-food assessments are generally done with DPPC as the lead agency, while WFP and FAO, UN-EUE, the donors, the NGOs, the Ministry of Agriculture, the DPPB, regionallzonallworeda staff, and fam1ers participare as appropriate. Irrespecti ve of the assessment team, the assessments are generally based on the same sources ofinformation (see below). The institutions that solicit fu nds and procure the seed include the Govemment ofEthiopia, FAO, EU RONAJD, CRDA, and intem ational NGOs. The institutions that undertakc the distributions include intemational and local NGOs, thc Ministry of Agriculture, DPPB, and development agents in the affected peasant associations. Zonal and woreda committees participare in seed needs assessments, and work with affected farmers to identify the particular crops/varieties and quantities of seed needed. Often they mayal so participare in seed procurement through organizing local tender. In general , the woreda committee works with local Addressing Seed S<"curity in Disa ·ter Ne.f a·ith Derelopment . 121 1 Rclief 'eed Assistance in f:thiopia Highland 2003 Highland before 2003 Midland 2003 Midland before 2003 Lowland 2003 Lowland before 2003 -- 1 1 1 1 1 1 ~~-'i 1 •;..: __ - ~ 1 • ':;. .-¿;~;_:;., 1 - -.o 1 -1 '"i·:•: "'-· 1 1 ,..~..,~P. ·-1 1 -~'t 1 1 "";:.: . 1 1 1 1 --- 1 ¡ -·--,- 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 l 1 1 1 1 • 1 l 1 T 1 l l - 1 1 1 T l 1 l 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% OOnly own •only soc ial nctworks O ünly local market DOnly SC('d assistancc •Multiple chan ncls Figure 2. Proportion of households that ohtain seed from onJy own saved seed , only seed from social networks, ortly seed from the local marke t, ortly seed from seed assistance, o•· seed from multiple charmels, before 2003 and in 2003 for the thref' agro-ecological zones The main seed channel used to meet household seed needs for maize was own savcd seed both before 2003 and in 2003; however, the use of this channel dccl ined in 2003, espec ially in the lowlands and mid lands. This reduced use of own saved seed was compensated by an increased demand for seed from the local market and from seed assistance. The social nctwork only contributed a small proportion ofthe total seed needs for maize. Own saved sccd contributed 6 1%-76% of the total seed needs for sorghum, but in 2003 this was reduced, especially in the lowlands and midlands. For sorghum, the social network contributed more than seed assistance, especially in the lowlands and midlands. The importancc of own saved seed beforc 2003 was lcss for wheat compared to maize or sorghum, especially in the lowlands where households only used this source for 27% of their secd needs. In 2003, the contribution of this seed source increased or stayed very s imi lar. Both the local market and seed assistance accounted for one-fourth to one-thi rd of total seed needs. In 2003, there was a reduced demand for secd from the local market, espec ia lly in the highlands. In the lowlands there was an increased use of seed assistance for 2003. For te_¡; own saved seed was used for about one-third of the total seed needs befare 2003 in all three zones. The local market and seed assistance combined accounted for more of the total seed needs than own saved seed. In the lowlands and highl ands, there was a reduced use of own saved seed in 2003, while the contribution ofthe local market increased. In thc midlands, houscholds planned to use more of their own saved seed and secd from local networks in 2003. For haricot bcans, own saved seed and the local market were the main seed sources used before 2003. In 2003, there was a reduced use of own savcd seed anda large increase in secd needs to be met from the local market. There was no change in the use o f seed assistance. Generally, the households surveyed met a high proportion oftheir seed needs with thcir own saved seed and the market. The impact ofthe drought of2002 increased the proportion ofhouseholds who used only 4ddr~·.súng Seed SecurÍh in f)isa.isas/er Response: Linking Reliefwilh Del•elupm('JJ/ 1 A Review of Seed Security Strategies Malawi M. AJexander R. Phiri Rowland Chirwa Jon Magnar Haugen 1 Ahstract • m The liberalization of Malawi 's economy and the remo val of agricultura! and food subsidies ha ve hadan adverse impact on agricultura! production costs, productivity, household economy, and food security. This situation has been exacerbated by droughts and fl oods, which have altemated in most parts ofthe country, sometimes causing acute stress in isolated areas. In response to such crises and long-term poverty, the Govemment of Malawi, donors, and NGOs have distributed food aid, followed by agricultura! inputs to rebuild agricultura! productivity. A study was carried out in central Malawi to assess strategies designed to mitigare the impact of disasters or of poverty on seed security among smallho!der farmers. E ven during one ofthe worst disasters, local seed systems were shown to be resilient, and farm-saved seed remained the major source. In the absence of real assessments, relief seed implementers seemed to jump by default from Direct Seed Distribution (DSD) during the acute phase to Community-Based Multiplication Schemes (CBMS) thereafter- as the interventions are known and rela tively simple. Farmers' views suggest that relief seed interventions have enhanced the number of crops or variet ies at the household leve!, and farmers ha ve preferred NGO to govemment seed interventions mainly beca use the latter distributed only small seed packages and d id not involve farmers in the choice of crops or varieties. However it is not clear if the relief a id or if the agricultura! inputs packages more generally (focused on maize) have managed to lessen the need for repeated emergency assistance. Chronic a id itsel f maybe be undermining local system-but this remains to be clari fied further. Introduction Malawi is a small, landlocked Sub-Saharan Afri can country covering about 1 18,000 krn2 with a population of about 11 million people. The country's economic base sti ll largely depends on the agricultura) sector, which contributes about 35% to the gross domestic product (GDP) and employs about 80% of the population. The agri cultura) sector is divided into smallholder and estate subsectors. Traditionally, the estate sector has mainly focused on the production of export crops, such as tobacco, tea, sugar, and coffee, while the smallholder sector has been the main producer of food crops (maize, 1. M. Alexander R. Phiri is a Lecturer in Agricultura) Economics, Bunda College of Agriculture; Rowland Chirwa is a Bean Breeder and SADC-CIAT Regional Network Coordinator; Jon Magnar Haugen is a consultan! for Care-Nof\\-·ay. Addressirzg Seed Semrit_y in DisCL~ter Response: Linking Relú'f with Development . 1351 A Revie1c of Seed Securily Stralegies in Malawi rice, cassava, sweet potatoes, grain legumes) and lower-value cash crops, such as cotton. This study focuses on the smallholder fanners. Afterenjoying food self-sufficiency for a long time between the 1970s and early 1990s, Malawi suffered a severe dro ught in 1992, leading to a disastrous food shortage. In response to this, the government, a long with donor agencies and NGOs, provided food re lief, followed by seed relief. Similar re lief was provided in response to the food crisis in 2001 /02, and again in 2002/03. Access to appropriate seed is an important precondition for food production. lt is often assumed that seed insecuri ty is directly linked to food insecurity. In Malawi, this kind of perception was fi rst proved invalid after the 1992 drought disaster. For all interventions in response to the disasters mentioned above, the hypotheses were that farmers had run out offood, and that therefore they had consumed their seed stocks. However, to the contrary, even in arcas that had been worst hi t by drought, fa nners were able to plant their maize crop with the first rains, well before the seed reliefwas delivered in sorne areas, where delivery was delayed (Musopole, personal comm unicati on, 2003). Similar resul ts in Sudan were rcported by Jones et al. , (2003). Fanners' seed systems continued to meet the crop and variety needs of farmers, even fo llowing the 1998 famine in that country. Seed securi ty is dependent not onl y on seed being physically avai lable, but also on the abil ity of individual households to access the seed. In addition, the seed must be of appropriate quali ty (physiological/physical and genetic ). Often, farmers' access to seed of improved varieties is considered to be crucial to food security. At the policy leve!, it is argued that farmers' access to improved varieties (that is, varieties developed through formal plant breeding) will lead to increased food production and improved food securi ty. However, very little attention has been given to whether these correspond toa farmer's own preferences . This case study was initiated to assess the various strategies that have been implemented during the past two to three years in an attempt to mitigatc the negative impacts of natural disasters and deprivation on sced securi ty among smallho lder fanners in Malawi . Backgrotmd of the project This case study feeds into a larger project studying seed systems under stress. lt will contribute to the ovcrall aim o f gathering knowledge about how fanners secure seed in ti mes o f stress, and providing institutions with infonnation on assisting fanning communities in ways that promete, rather than undennine, sced security. This report describes the seed systems that fanners in Ma lawi use and how they ha ve functioned under the stresses that have occurred during recent years. Jt also evaluates the impact of the seed interventions that have been undertaken in response to these stresses and how such interventions have affected farmers' seed systems in Malawi, assessing whether these operations were necessary and appropriate. Based on institutions' own perceptions regarding fanners' needs and the appropriateness of past interventions, the text analyzes the institutions' abili ty to apply lessons from past act ivities to their planning and programming process. The case study contributed to the project in a number ways. Through meetings and in fonnal exchanges, stakeholders have been infonned of and inc luded in the project with the hope that this will influence future practices and approaches concerning seed securi ty, to ensure that future interventions support and/or increase farmers' resilience. Addressing Seed Securil,r in Disa.ster Respunse: Unking Relief with Development . 1361 M.A.R. Phiri, R. Chirwa, ancl). M. Haugen Methodology Literature review and stakeholders' meetings The project started with a comprehensive literature search on recent "seed and tools" initiatives that ha ve been implemented through various organizations. This review was guided by a review outline developed by the study team. Checklists were also developed for consultations with key organizations and donors and for a selected number of comrnunities where sorne ofthe NGOs are operating. The focus was mainly on the most popular seed interventions, through the Starter Pack lnitiative (SPI) and the Targeted Input Program (TIP), the Agricultura! Productivity Investment Program (APIP), and NGO initiati ves. Severa! NGOs that operate emergency programs, including Care Malawi , Catholic Relief Services (CRS) through the Catholic Development Commission of Malawi (CADECOM), Save the Children, Plan Malawi, Concem Universal, and World Vision Malawi were consulted. Subsequently, a stakeholders' meeting was organized to which these key organizations were invited. After the stakeholders' meeting, sorne comrnunities where the NGOs operated were selected for a field study with a focus on the impact of seed initiatives. Field study: Survey and focus-group discussions Although severa! NGOs were in volved in the pre-scoping phase of this case study , the field study was undertaken in six sites in five districts where five different NGOs were operating seed intervention initiatives. These were Concern Universal (Dedza), Action Aid (Salima), Care Malawi (Dowa and Lilongwe-Chilaza), CADECOM (Lilongwe-Mitundu), and World Vision Malawi (Mchinji ). All study si tes were in central Malawi, in areas within or close to Lilongwe for ease of logistics. AII six si tes had also been subject to govemment seed intervention programs, SPls, and TTPs. Field work was comprised of focus-group discussions that were conducted us ing checklists, and individual interviews that were conducted using structured questionnaires with approximately 40 questions, which were re latively the same questions as those in the focus-group checklist. The aim of using a questionnaire was to quantify the qualitative infonnation collected from the focus groups and then to compare the two sets of infonnation. Only comrnunities that were involved in NGO-driven seed-related operations were included in this study. Most NGOs in Malawi operate within the framework of a traditiona l authority. Hence, thi s was the entry point into each of the communities. Within a traditional authority, a cluster of villages was selected with the help of one group village headman. Each si te had at least five focus-group discussions with over 30 people in attendance in each group. A total of 30 focus groups were conducted. The individual interviews were conducted in the same areas. Individual s were selected usmg a multi-stage purposive and random sampling technique. From a cluster of villages, four to five villages were sampled (generally the same as those used for the focus groups) and households were then randomly se\ected. A total of 35 villages were selected for such interviews, with a target of nine individual households in each village. However, only 3 1 1 individual household interviews were achieved. These were distributed as follows: Dedza (5 1), Dowa (49), Lilongwe-Chilaza (50), Li longwe-Mitundu (58), Mchinji (53), and Salima (50). Addressing Seed Securit)· in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Development . 1371 A Review of Seed Security Strategies in Malawi Results Population and farming overview Social and demograpbic characte ristics Interview results revealed more than 40% illiteracy in the households studied. This corresponds with the national illi teracy leve! (NSO, 2000). The highest illiteracy rate was reported in Salima, where 52% of the household heads had not been to school. Such levels of illiteracy ha ve negative implications for the uptake of new teclmologies and the overall understanding of development issues. Overall, the main occupation of the majori ty of the household members across study sites was agriculture. The highest proportion (63%) ofthose engaged in agricul ture was reported in Salima and the lowest (34%) in Mchinji. These results confirm that agriculture is the main occupation ofthe majority of people in the rural areas ofMalawi. Size of farm landholdings More fanners in Mchinji (94%) reported to have large landholdings, more than 1 ha, followed by Li longwe Chilaza (66.0%), Salima with 56%, and Dedza (33%). For households with an average size of six people (which is a conservative figure for Malawi), such small landholdings cannot produce enough to meet the food requi rements for a ll members of the household from one harvest to the next. Cropping systems The majority of the rural households are smallholder farmers who re ly on a single harvest in a year for their livelihoods. These farmers grow various crops such as maize, cassava, rice, sweet potatoes, millet, sorghum, white pota toes, groundnuts, beans, and soybeans (table 1 ). lntercropping is widespread. Results from this study indicated that such crops as soybeans, white potaroes, and cassava were limited to relatively few farmers across the study sites, compared to maize, groundnuts, tobacco, beans, and sweet pota toes, which are trad itiona l crops in most of the study si tes . Traditionall y the majority ofpeople in Malawi, as in many countries in southern Africa, rely on maize for food securi ty. ln all the survey sites, almost all respondents (92%), produced maize mostly for food, compared to only 8% who sold part of it to eam some cash income. It has been estimated at the national leve! that maize occupies about 70% of the culti vated land within the smallholder subsector in any growing season (Phiri et al. , 2003). As a result, food security in Malawi is defined in relation to maize, which was confirmed by this study. Although most households had limited landholdings, on average 0.49 ha of that was planted to maize. The land all ocated to other crops, and their sowing dens ity, is difficult to quantify because they are generally intercropped with maize. Generally, their densities are much lower than they would be when mono-cropped. Cassava, white pota toes, and soybeans ha ve only recently been introduced to the area as a result of crop diversification efforts. Cassava, for example, has been promoted for food security in most parts of the country following persistent droughts. Nevertheless, interviews with farmcrs revealed that the inclus ion of cassava has been slow, partly due to lack of access to cassava pl anti ng materials. The farmers in the study si tes reported various constraints. Sorne of the cross-cutting ones, captured through the focus-group discussions, were ( 1) declining soil fertil ity, (2) lack of fertilizer, (3) lack of markets for agricultura! produce, (4) pests and diseases, and (5) seed-related problems. The last is explored further in the fo llowing section. Addrt>ssing ScNL SPcurily in Disasler Response: Linking Relief with Dcvelopment 1381 M .A.R. Phiri, R. Chirwa, and ]. M. Haugen Tahle l. Summary of Demographic and Farm Overview Survey Survey Characteristic (N=311) Characteristic (N=311) Occupation Landholdings Agricultura 48% Less than 0.4ha 6% Formal employment 1% 0.4ha to 0.7ha 19% Petty trade <1% 0.7ha to 0.9ha 15% Hired labor (ganyu) <1% More than 0.9ha 59% Cropping systems Cassava 5% Groundnuts 68% (16) (210) White potatoes 10% Tobacco 33% (32) (104) Soybeans 21% Beans 30% (66) (93) Maize 90% Sweet potatoes 29% (281) (91) Seed stress in Malawian cropping systems Farmers ' perceptions of seed-related problems Within the survey and focus-group discussions, fanners described their seed-related problems for different crops in varied ways. In general these included the following: • lack of cash to bu y seed • lack of markets that sell seed • inability to store seed because of hunger • inadequate seed or no seed at all • poor germination of relief seed • seed eroded by tloods • delays in sourcing seed • low harvest leading to seed insecurity • poorly timed distribution of relief seed • use of poor seed • cost of seed The most frequently mentioned seed-related problems were lack of cash to buy seed and poor gennination. Fanners in the foc us groups mentioned poor gem1ination of fann-saved seed, mainly of maize, beans, and groundnuts. This contrasts with findings from studies carried out in the Great Lakes Region, where fanners had no major concems with gennination offann-saved bean seed (Sperling et al., 1995). The question is whether poor gennination offann-saved seed is caused by poor genetic quality or poor physiological quality. However, there is reason to believe that poor storage facilities, combined Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Develupment ' 1391 A Review of Seed ecurity Strategies in Malawi with possible weevil damage ovcr the long period that seed must be stored because crops are only cu ltivated in one season, contributes to the inferior qual ity. The problem of poor seed quality was not only related to farm-saved sccd. In Lilongwe Chilaza and many other study sites, farmers received hybrid maize seed for the winter season (when farmers grow crops under residual moisture or irrigation). This was part ofthe govemment's Targeted Input Program (TIP), aimed at farmers in certai n localíties who had lost their rainy season crop in floods. Fanners complaíned that the hybrid maize seed th ey received failed to set cobs, and they did not harvest anything. They claimed that the hybrid was not adapted to the winter growing conditions. Description of stress: Acute and chronic Seed stress can be categorized as two types: acute or chronic. According to Sperling (2003), acute seed insecurity is brought on by distinct, short-duration events that afien affect a broad range of the population. People can be short of seed beca use of a failure to planta single season, loss of a harvest, or loss of seed stocks in storage. On the other hand, chronic seed insecurity is generally associated with poverty or resource deprivation. People who are marginalized may have problems saving seed or accessing seed through purchase or barter. Such seed insecurity is independent of an acute stress or disaster, although it may be exacerbated by it. These two types of stress can both be rccognizcd in Malawi: • Droughts and floods that have altemated in various regions ofthe country have temporarily caused Jow supplies of seed. • Poverty, coupled with high seed prices resulting from removal of subsidies on agricultura! inputs, has negatively affected access to seed on a continua! basis. Disasters like droughts and tloods usually occur in isolated pockets, causing acute food and seed stress in a localized area. However, in recent years, floods and drought have been frequent and, at times, have covered wide geographical areas, resulting in prolonged food and seed stress and the loss of people's resources. In such circumstances, the problem changes from acute to chronic food and seed stress. The chronic nature of this stress is illustrated by the fact that most households are not self-sufficient in maize from onc harvest to the next. Usually, during the last three months befare the harvest (February-April), the majority (approximately 75%) of the househo lds are without their own maize supplies (Levy, 2003). Sorne of them are forced to buy from the market at relatively high prices, or exchange labor for food, but many cope with inadequate food supplies. E ven those who buy or work for food most likely do not get supplies adequate to meet FAO daily intake standards. In the past few years, such disasters and stresses to the livelihoods of smallholder farmers in Malawi have resulted in more than 60% of all rural households being food insecure every year (Levy, 2003) . Dueto high levels ofpoverty, the majority of them are unable to compensate through the market, \eaving many food and seed insecure. Seed systems and seed security Almekinders and Louwaars ( 1999) categorize seed systems as formal and farmer. In the formal seed system, specialized breeders, seed producers, certifiers, and marketing agents supply seed through an organized chain. On the other hand, farmer seed systems are defined as systems in which seed selection, production, and exchange are integrated into crop production and the socioeconomic processes of farming communities. Addressing Seed ecuril) in Disaster Response: Línking Relief with !Jevelopment 1401 M.A.R. Phiri, R. Chinva, and}. M. Haugen In the past few years, various authors have mentioned the value of seed in the fanning system. Out of all the inputs used in agriculture, Morris ( 1998) identified seed to be one that is most limiting to crop productivity. Tripp (2000) said that under normal circumstances, most farmers are able to save or use seed from a previous harvest. He identified four situations where there is an incentive or need to access seed from other sources. These are emergencies, poverty, need for quality seed, and need for new varieties. Each of these situations leads to different types of seed demands, which can be satisfied by different responses. The concept of seed security depends on three principie elements: availability, access, and quality (Sperling, 2003). Availabi/ity is related to seed supply: a sufficient quantity of seed of desirable crops must be found within reasonable proximity to people and in time for critica! sowing periods. To benefit from available seed, people must have access to it, which means they must have adequate resources to secure the seed through purchase or barter, or indeed, domestic storage. Last, seed must be of appropriate quality, that is, it must be of desirable varieties and of acceptable standards (health, physiological characteristics, and varietal integrity). The following text summarizes informatíon on seed systems among Malawian farmers and how they secure their seed. The information has been col lected through direct di scussions with participating NGOs, extracts from the literature, and fanners ' opinions expressed in the focus groups and individual interviews. Channels of seed acquisition: Overview This study showed that most of the smallholder farmers in Malawi depend largely on the farmer seed system for such crops as maize, groundnuts, beans, soybeans, sweet potatoes, and white potatoes. The farmer seed system includes such means of seed acquisition as fann-saved from previous production, purchases from local markets, exchange of labor for seed, and donations from friends or relatives. Phiri et al. (2003) reported similar results in a study on fanners ' use of improved maize seed in the SADC region. They found that up to 70% of the smallholders in Malawi stí ll used the farmer seed system for maize, where the main seed source was fann-saved, which was recycled each season. The remaining 30% of the smallholder fanners acquired maize seed through the formal system, which is about 20% hybrid and 10% open-pol linated varieties. The formal system is limited beca use farmers' income or other resources are not adequate for purchasing seed from organízed retail outlets or agro-dealers. The inability offanners to access seed from the formal system has been exacerbated by the higher prices resulting from removal of state subsidies on agricultura! inputs. Adding to this, most seed dealers in the formal system are located in urban or semi-urban areas, making the di stances to the nearest distribution point prohibitively far. Thus, farmers tend to recycle their own local maize varieties or grain harvested from a hybrid maize crop. Although group discussions with farmers revealed that they doubted the quali ty of recycled maize seed, the farmer seed system continues to domínate the acqui sition ofmaize seed among smallho lder fanners in the study si tes. The situation for other crops is different in the sense that the formal seed system is less developed for such crops. Very limited quantities of certified seed for groundnuts, beans, soybeans, etc. , is made available through seed multiplication groups or farmers' associations. The few farmers who access such seed usually do so through loan schemes or NGO activities. Otherwise, the majority of farmers rely on the farmer seed system for these crops. Addressing SPed SecurÍl)' in Disa.•ler Response: Linking Reliefwith Dn·efopmcnt .. 141 1 A Reviet¡; of Seed Security Strategies in Malawi Channels of seed acquisition: Good versus bad years The major source of seed for maize and other crops is farm-saved from previous crops. Other means include cash purchases, loans, exchanges of seed for work, relief seed, and gifts from relatives. During the last few years, relief seed has beco me one ofthe important means of acquiring seed, particularly after the food crisis in 200 1/02. Figures 1-4 highlight the trends in seed acquisition in the study area. The focus in these graphs is primarily on the differences in trends between a normal year (2000/0 1, representing the general situation with chronic seed stress) and a year of disaster (200 1/02, representing acute seed stress). These graphs capture two crops: maize (figures 1 and 2) and beans (figures 3 and 4). The pattems shown for beans are reasonably representa ti ve of similar crops like soybeans and groundnuts. Since many fam1ers acquired seed in a variety of ways, the percentages add to more than 100%. 100 [] Farm saved -o VI • Boughtwith cash ... ..... Q) e: E 50 Q) OThru loan (,) ... ... ni Cllu.. O Worked for s eed c. o • Free seed prog 2000/2001 llil Relatives Figure l . Means of maize seed acquisition during a normal year (2000/2001) (n=3ll) 100 DFarm saved -o ~ • Bought with cash ..... e: Q) 50 Q) e DThru loan ~ 1'0 Q) u. O Worked for seed c.. o 2001/2002 • Free seed prog EJ Relatives Figure 2. Means of maize seed ac(¡uisition during a stress year (2001/2002) (n==3ll) Addressing Seed Securit.\ in Disaster Respume: Linking Relú:f with Dn r.lopmnrt :li.:1.R. Phiri. R. Chinw. and }. M. Haugen 40 - 30 O Farm saved o 1/l - ... • Bought with cash e: C1l C1l E 20 (.) ... OThru loan ... nl C1l u. a.. 10 OWorked for seed o • Free seed prog 2000/2001 ORelatives Figure 3. Mean s of bean secd acquisition dm·ing a normal year (2000/200 1) (n == 311) 40 - 30 OFarm saved o VI - .... e: Q,) • Bought w/ cash Q,) E 20 (.) .... OThru loan .... IV Q,) LL 10 Q. o O Worked for seed 2001/2002 • Free seed prog ORelatives Figure 4 . Means of bean seed acquisition during a stress year (2001!2002) (n==311) For both maize and beans, farm-saved seed from own production remains the major means of acquiring seed for normal seasons (figures 1 and 3) as well as seasons ofseed stress (figures 2 and 4). Although the interviews with farmers did not clearly separate purchased seed by source (formal or loca) markets), it is only maize seed that could be obtained from both types of markets. Beans and other grain crops are almost nonex istent in the formal market and can only be obtained as grain in the local market, planted as seed for the next crop. Seed acquired in exchange for labor has also become an important means for the needy to obtain seed on a routine bas is. These are people who are prepared to work and prefer to get paid in kind (with seed) rather than with cash. There is also some indication that there was an increase in the proportion of farmers who acquired maize and bean seed through relief programs during the seed stress season. Thi s means that although farmers savcd sorne seed (and also used local channels to acqu ire seed off-farm), during disaster years such as 200 1/02, secd rclief interventions might ha ve supplemented or Addressing SeNl Security in VisciSter Response: Linking Relilopmr>nt . 1531 A ReviPw of Seed Security Strategies in Malawi Ideally, different seed problems should call for different seed interventions. Among the specter of acute or chronic stress conditions and problems of access to or quality of seed, there are various options for responses (Sperling 2002). While OSO would be appropriate whenever there is a fai lure in the seed supply- where seed is unavailable- it may not be the most appropriate response when there are access problems. Even though most NGOs have a sense that OSO and CSM may fu lfill different objectives and play a role in different circumstances, they generally have a narrow sense of the differences between stresses. This limited knowledge may con tribute to the low repertoire of approaches that organizations employ. However, NGOs seem keen to leam from experience, as indicated by the adjustments that have been made to the standard approaches over time. In the cases ofTIP and S PI , seed distributions were used as a development tool to jump-start agricultura! production, a nd not to resolve an emergency situation. In these programs, the implicit goal seems to be one ofsubstituting the farmer seed system and traditional varieties with the formal system and improved varieties. There is reason to question the sustainability of such approaches. SPI was meant to be one- off, to jump-start agricul tura! growth by showing farmers that good seed and fertili zer could make a difference in food security at the household leve!. However, the program has been recycled severa! times (also in the form of TlP), without any convincing long-term impact. Agricultura! productivity did increase in the short tem1, but no sustained increase in production can be detected. Farmers complaincd about the approach, and the blanket distributions made it difficult for the approaches to target specitic seed problems. It is worth noting that the various seed interventions described in this study ha ve different impacts on the resilience of the farmer seed system. The govemment seed interventions (SPVTIP) have al l included hybrid maize, which cannot be recycled. However, farmers seem to acknowledge the yield advantage of hybrids compared to local cultivars or open-pollinated varieties. The NGO seed initiatives (OSO and CSM), on the other hand, have focused on improved seeds of open-pollinated maize, self-pollinated legumes (groundnuts, beans, and soybeans), and vegetatively propagated crops (white potatoes, sweet potatoes, and cassava), wh ich potentially add crop diversity at the household leve!. By creating artificial access to inputs, there is a danger that seed interventions may actually undermine the local systems and tradit ions for securing seed-systems that households may be dependent upon in the absence of externa! assistance. On the other hand, subsidies and interventions may already have significantly altered the local seed and livelihood systems in Malawi, creating a situation of dependency on such assistance. Having said thi s, the study showed that even during disaster years, farm-saved is the largest component o f all means of sced acquisi tion. And clearly, farmers ha ve coping mechanisms, even under what policymakers might perceive as the worst scenario. Conclusions and recommendations The following factors are critica! for the success of seed re lief interventions, such as OSO: • timeliness • amount • appropriateness • targeting Addrcssing Seed Security in Disa.~ter Response: Unking Rrlit'f with Oerelupmt'nl 1541 ----------------~----------'-·1_1.'--'A_. R.:._. Ph iri. R. Chinm, and } . M. 1/augen A diagnosis of the impacts of disasters on seed systems is important to cnsure that interventions are justitied and to guide their design and implementation so that they meet the actual needs of fanners. Diagnoses must be sensitive to difference acros crops and across, as well as between, households and communities. Local involvement is importan! for both diagnosing the problem and implemcnting any intervention. Whil e disasters may cause severe stress to loca l communities, local systems for securing sced often show remarkable resilience. Rather than intcrvening in the fie ld of sccd, it may often be more worthwhile spending efforts to relieve other strcsses. When the need for seed interventions is established, GOs seem to jump to DSD and CSM by default because they are logistically simple. Depending on the type of seed problem, othcr options, such as SY&F, might be more appropriate to meeting fanners' needs. Seed insecurity and, especial ly, chronic seed insecurity should not be viewed merely a seed problems but, rather, within a livelihood context. Appropriate seeds are often available even in emergencies, but fanners cannot access them because their resources are insufficient. Rathcr than looking at seed as an isolated issue and thereby coming up with seed-based interventions, non-seed approaches may be more appropriate to alleviate such general strcsses. lt may be rel evan! to view thc use ofboth DSD and CSM in this light. Rather than seed, as in the case o f DSD, farmcrs should be provided with general resources with which they can access local seed or meet othcr priorities. Rather than cstablishing new networks, as in the case of CSM, maybe efficient networks for seed production and cxchange already cx ist, the problem being that livelihood stress lcavcs no potential for accessing thcm. In Malawi, two sets ofhighl y subsidized systems (ADMARC and SPI , both targeted on the supply s ide) may have distorted both commercial systems and farmers' own management of the seed supply. This may have undennined local systems and resulted in a high dependency on extemal subsid ies, which, agai n, may be one reason it is difficu lt to find an ex it strategy from recurrent seed intcrventions. Addressing Se('d Serurit1 in Disasll•r Responsr•: Linking RP/ie.fU'ith /),.,,.fopment A Review of Seed Securit r Strategies in Malawi Acronyms AOMARC APIP CA O ECO M CIAT CRS CSM OOPRR OFID oso ELOP FAO GOP ICRISAT JITA NGO SAOC SACA SARRNET SV&F SPI TIP UK WFP Agricultura! Oevelopment and Marketing Corporation Agricultura! Productivity Investment Programme Catholic Oevelopment Commission of Malawi Centro lntemational de Agricultura Tropical Catholic Relief Services community seed multiplication Oepartment of Oisaster Preparedness, Relief and Rchabilitation Oepartment for lntemational Oevelopment, UK direct seed del ivery Evangelical Lutheran Development Programme Food and Agriculture Organization ofthe United Nations gross domestic product lntemational Center for Research in the Semi-Arid Tropics Intemational lnstitute for Tropical Agriculture nongovemmental organization Southcm African Oevelopment Community Smallholder Agriculture Credit Administration Southem African Roots and Tubcrs Research Network seed vouchers and fairs Starter Pack lnitiative Targeted Input Program United Kingdom World Food Program References Almekinders, C. and N. Louwaars. 1999. Farmers · seed production: New approaches and practices. London: In tem1ediate Technology Publications Ltd. Blackie, M., T. Benson, A. Conroy, R. Gilbert, G. Kanyama-Phiri , J.D.K. Kumwenda, C. Mann, S.K. Mughogho and A. Phiri. 1998. Malawi soilfertility issues and options. Rockefeller Foundation Oiscussion Paper. A Study Commissioned by the Malawi Ministry ofFinance, Lilongwe. CRS. 2003 . Agricultura/ recovery through seed assistance to seed vulnerable households in Malawi. Final Project Report. Lilongwe: Catholic Relief Services. Jones, R.B., P. Brame!, C. Longley, and T. Remington. 2003 . The need to look beyond the production and provision of relief seed: experiences from Southem Sudan. Disasters (26)4:302- 315. Levy, S. 2003. Starter packs and hunger crises: A briefing for policymakers on food security in Malawi. London: Overseas Oevelopment Institute. Available on-line (accessed January 2005): http://www.reliefweb. inú library/documents/2003/odi-mal-30sep.pdf. Levy, S. and C. Barahona. 200 l . 2000-01 TIP main report of the monitoring & evaluation programme in Malawi. September 200 l . Longley, C., J. Coulter, and R. Thompson. 1999. Maiawi rural livelihoods starter pack scheme, 1998-9: Evaluation report. London: Overseas Development Institute. Addressing Seed Security in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with /Jeulupment . 1561 M.A.R. Phiri, R. Chinua, and}. M. Haugen Morrís, M. 1998. Maize seed industries in developing countries. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Ng'ong' ola, D.H., R.N. Kachule, and P.H. Kabambe. 2003. Agricultural output market reforrns: The case ofmaize marketing in Malawi. In Integrated micro-credits, micro-enterprises and market reforms in s ubsistence economy: Experiencesfrom Malawi, edited by E. Adbi-Khal il. BEESCI Series Editíon. Lilongwe: BEESCI. NSO. 2000. 1998 Malawi population and housing census report ofjinal resu/ts. Zamba, Malawi: National Statistical Office of Malawi. Available on-line (accessed November 2004 ): http://www.nso.malawi.net/. Phiri, M.A.R. 2000. Seed distribution in the 1990s in Malawi: Linking seed producers to consumers. London: Overseas Development Institute. Phiri, M.A.R and S. D. Ngulube. 2003. A comparalive analysis ofthe marketing of cassava and sweet patato in Southern A(rica: The case Of Mala wi. Ibadan, Nigería: Intemational Institute of Tropical Agriculture. Phiri, M.A.R., M. Mekuria, and M. Banziger. 2003. Assessment of sm allholder farmers' utilisation of improved maize seed in the SADC region: A study of Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Mexico , DF: Intemational Maize and Wheat Improvement Center. (In press) Smale, M. and P.W. Heisey. 1997. Maize technology and productivity in Malawi. In Africa 's emerging maize revolution, edited by D. Byerlee and C.K. Eicher. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Smale, M. and A. Phiri . 1998. Institutional change and discontinuities in.farmers use o.f hybrid and maize seed and fertilizer in Malawi: Findings From the 1996197 CIMMYTIMOALD survey. Economics Working Paper 98-01, Mexico, DF: Intemational Maize and Wheat Improvement Center. 'y Sperling, L. 2002. Emergency seed aid in Kenya: Sorne case study insights on lessons learned during the 1990s. Disasters (26)4:329-342. Sperling, L. (2003): Conceptual notes presented ata seed relief discussion meeting, Nairobi, October 2003. ~Sperling, L. , U. Scheidegger, and R. Buruchara. 1995. Enhancing smallfarm seed systems: Principies derived.from bean research in the Great Lakes Region. Network on Bean Research in A frica, Occasional Publications Series No. 15. Kampala: International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIA T). Tripp, R. 200 l . Seed provision and agricultura/ development. London: Overseas Development Institute. Tripp, R. 2000. Strategies .for seed system development in Sub-Saharan A frica: A study ofKenya, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe. ICRISAT Working Paper Series 2. Bulawayo, Zimbabwe : Intemational Crops Research lnstitute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. Tripp, R. and D. Rohrbach. 200 l. Policies for African seed enterprise development. Food Policy 26(2): 147- 161. Addressing Seed Security in Disasler Response: Linking Relíefwith Dereloprnent 1¡ Relief Seed Assistance in Zimbabwe Paula J. Brame l Tom Remington 1 Ahstract Zimbabwe has been a recipient of food or seed a id since the 1990/91 drought, consídered one of the worst in 100 years. At present, as in the past, interventions aimed at agricultura! rehabilitation and recovery have focused on di rect seed distribution ( "seeds and tools"). While these interventions are being modified to better address the needs of farmers recovering from disaster, they are still based upon the premise that the emergency has resulted in a loss of seed and other assets, and there is a need to supply them. This study of relief seed interventions in Zimbabwe addresses a number of issues: (1) the effectiveness of the past agricultura! recovery response to disasters, (2) knowledge of farmers' seed systems, (3) changes in seed systems as influenced by relief seed distributions, and ( 4) the cause of thc continua! need for seed ass istance. The survey reported here found that thc seed requirements for households were less than those generally recommended by the technical guidelines used in macro-leve! seed assessments, especially for legume crops. Households obtain most of their seed from own saved seed and the local market for all crops but maize. For maize, seed obtained from the formal sector is most importan!. Seed security for households in the survey was dependen! on availabili ty of own saved sced and access to seed channels outside the home. Maize appears to be the exception for the use of various seed channels, especially in relation to the formal sector seed. Thus, seed needs assessments that focus on maize ha ve a bias towards seed demands from the formal sector. The Zimbabwe seed industry is one of the largest in A frica and is a major supplier of relief seed in the region. Much ofthis seed is produced by smallholder farmers and also distributed to smallholder farmers for emergency rel ief programs, often by the same GOs in the same areas. While this increase in seed supply and the enhanced links to the fonnal sector has increased the supply of seed to the relief market and increased the value ofthe relief seed market to Zimbabwe seed companies. it has not increased the supply of local seed or enhanced access to local seed for rural smallholder farmers. There is a cri tica! need for alternative responses that will strengthen the local seed system and its links to the fonnal sector, with increased emphasis on seed enterprise development at the local level. lntroduction Z imbabwe has a history of recurrent droughts. In the last 20 yea rs, significan! d roughts occurred in 1982/83 (700,000 people affected), 199 1/92 ( 4.6 mi Ilion people affected), 1994/95 (5 mil! ion people affected), and 200 1/02 ( 6. 1 m i Ilion people affected). This frequent loss of food production, and the subsequent need for recovery, has reduced househo ld assets , increased vulne rabil ity and stressed coping mechanisms. Recurren! droughts ha ve a lso contributed to a rapid decl ine in the economic status of the l . Pauta Brame) is a consul tant; Tom Remington is with Catho lic Relief Services. Addressing Seecl Securil_r in Disasler Respor~~e: Linking Reliefwith Deuelopmenl . 1591 Relief Seed Assistance in Zimbabwe country. A study done by the World Bank (Aiwang, Milis, and Taruvinga, 2002) on the changes in poverty in Zimbabwe in the 1990s and its causes found that the percentage of people living in extreme poverty increased from 26% in 1990 to 35% in 1995. This increased poverty was closely tied to economic restructuring and the poor performance ofthe economy. There is evidence that ownership of physical assets has been slow to recover from the impact of the drought of 1991192. In addition, the country faced a political crisis in the late 1990s which severely affected the competitiveness of the economy (lntemational Crisis Group. 2002). The política! crisis also severely affected the policy environment that is necessary for the alleviation of poverty and the facilitation of rapid recovery from drought. Al l ofthese have contributed to the cutTent chronic complex emergency in Zimbabwe. Since the end of 2001 , FEWS NET, FAO/WFP, IFRC, UN-RRU, and other organizations have conducted numerous assessments ofthe current emergency food situation in the Southem A frica region. These assessments have confirmed an increas ing food crisis in the region due to a combination of factors, including ( 1) drought and un usual rainfall pattems, (2) poor harvests from previous years, (3) reliance on a single staple crop (maize), (4) a continuous decline in economic conditions, and (5) detrimental government policies. Government policies and regulations, such as food price controls, a monopoly on maize marketing by the Grain Marketing Board, and the high duty on small grains, inhibit access to food in general. The government's fast-track land reform policy has severely curtailed commercial cereal production, contributing toa decline in grain reserves. The emergency food situation is exacerbated by the fact that considerable portions of the population in the country are particular! y vulnerable beca use of high levels of chronic malnutrition and HIV 1 AIDS. (Zimbabwe has one of the highest HIV/AIDS rates in the region, at 25.1% of the population). Zimbabwe has been a recipient of food and seed a id sin ce the 1990/91 drought-considered one of the worst in 100 years. Donors, GOs, and the govemment ha ve used many approaches to assist farmers in recovering from the immediate emergency and to rehabilitare the agricultura! sector. While these individual effot1s may ha ve alleviated the short-tetm needs, non e of them ha ve resulted in longer term improvements that would ha ve mitigated the impact of the current drought and economic crisis, which once again threatens the lives and li velihoods of Zimbabwe. At present, as in the past, agricultura! rehabilitation and recovery interventions have focused on the distribution of "seeds and tools." This response has become the standard progranuned response after initiation of food a id (also see discussion in IFPRI , 2002). D escription of case study Direct secd d istributions (seeds & tool s) are being modified to better address the needs of farmers recovering from di saster. However, they are still based upon the premise that the emergency has resulted in a loss of key assets and, s in ce these are not avai lable, there is a need to s imply supply them. This study of the relief seed approach in Zimbabwe will address a number of research questions: • How do donors, relief agencies, govemment agencies, and farmers respond to the need for agricultura! recovery from disasters? • What are the attitudes towards and knowledge of farmers' seed systems? • How has the formal seed system changed, influenced by the development of a relief seed approach? • If a direct seed distribution is an intervention to assist agricultura! systems in recovering from a drought or other disaster, then why is there always another request for seed assistance? 4cúlu-.uing Seed S N'LLrit.l in Disa.sif'r H.esponse: Linking Relú'f tt"ith Development P.). Brame! and T. Remington The evidence collected included a review of key documents, especially those by Mheen-Siuijer ( 1996) and Gwarazimba (2002a,b ), and key informant interviews with the SADC Regional Seed Security Network, SADC/GTZ, F AO Emergency Unit for Zimbabwe, LEAD, ZACH, Agricultura! Seed and Services/Nhimbe Seed Ltd., Mayfly Trading, ZFU-Binga, Hwange District AREX office in Binga, KMTC in Binga, UN-RRU, EURONAID, CIMMYT, ICRISAT, FEWS NET, SCF-UK, CRS, World Vision, and Plan Intemational. Questionnaires were administered to farmers, market traders, and govemment officials in the Binga and Nyaminyami Districts with SCF-UK and in six districts with CRS-Zimbabwe and CTDT. Seed aid in Zimhahwe Seed assistance has been a response to disasters since independence in 1982. The Govemment of Zimbabwe and other donors have routinely assisted fanners in recovering from the civil war, droughts, floods, and other disasters that ha ve hadan impact on crop production. These distributions ha ve included seed, tools, implements, livestock, and fertilizers. Direct assistance has become an annual response in many areas of Zimbabwe. The approach has been refined over the years with more and more emphasis on improved assessment and targeting. The current relief seed approach for Zimbabwe is shown in box l . A description ofthe regional relief approach can be found in a review available from the SADC Seed Security Network (Gwarazimba, 2002a). Seed aid donors include intemational organizations, such as UNDP-RRU and F AO and bilateral donors, including USAID/OFDA, DFID, CIDA, EU, Norway, Sweden, Netherlands, and others. Additional support comes from NGOs and Zimbabwe govemment funds through the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). Assessments are currently done by four groups in Zimbabwe, who use many of the same sources of information. Seed distribution projects are developed by F AO, NGOs, and the Government of Zimbabwe and implemented by intemational, national, and local NGOs, AREX, and the GMB. Seed is procured from the formal sector (national and regional seed houses, seed companies, and agro-dealers) and from grain traders. This year, for the first time, seed was sourced directly from farmers. Seed procured for relief seed distributions has been produced by commercial farmers, both large scale and small, by seed multiplication projects, and by contract fanners. Seed needs assessments A number of analyses ha ve been carried out on the emergency situation in Zimbabwe, its root causes, and the complex nature of the crisis (Christian Aid, 2002; IFPRJ , 2002; IFRC, 2002; OXFAM, 2002; WFP, 2002). A quantitative analysis of the food crisis has been done by FEWS NET (2002), which included an assessment of the crop and livestock situation at a district leve!. Separate analyses were presented on the status of production and access to food by four groups: communal areas, resettlement areas, farm workers, and urban areas. This analysis looked in depth at the status of reserves and at food availabili ty for the 2002/03 consumption year. It took into account a wide variety of foodstuffs and looked at access from income-generating options, such as cash crops and livestock. It did not look at input needs, such as seed or ferti lizers, for the 2002/03 production year. The F AO/WFP (2002) crop assessment mission u sed key informant interviews, field vtstts, remote-sensing data on rainfall and vegetati ve índices, and interim assessment reports produced by other organizations. They also used secondary data to confirm a ll their field results and come up with estimates of the population affected and seed needs. T hese are mainly based on estimates of crop and Addressing Seed S ecurity in Disaster Response: Linking Relief with Dcvelopment . 161 1 -----~- Relief Seed Assistance in Zimbabwe Seed Relief Approach in Zimbabwe Donors: Government of Zimbabwe, FAO, EU, RRU, DFID, USAID/OFDA, Norway, CIDA, other Bilateral donors lnternational NGO, Government of Zimbabwe lmplemented by international, national and local NGOs, AREX and GMB Seed procured from seed houses, private seed companies, agro-dealers, procurement agencies, grain traders and farmers Seed produced by commercial farmers, small scale farmers in communal areas, seed multiplication programs of NGOs and IARCs, contracted small scale farmers, vegetable seed imports from South Africa and Europe. Foundation seed Produced by Government and IARCs livestock production, vulnerabi li ty, food availabili ty, and market prices, compared to previous years and 1991 /92, as the worst drought year. No specific assessment of seed needs has been done, but the seed requirement is predícted based on crop status and food availability. This same methodo logy was used in 2002/03 and 2003/04 (F AO/WFP, 2003). The Zimbabwe Natíonal Yulnerabílity Assessment Committee (ZimVAC, 2002a,b, 2003) also does seed needs assessments, based on the status of maize seed available and sales from the formal sector. They also use estímates of area to be planted to mínor crops such as mí llet, cotton, groundnuts, and maize. They estímate the percentage offarmers who planto plant the crop and assume a constant value for total area planted by each farmer to get a percentage of the area to be planted to each crop, which is then used to estímate seed requírements for each crop. The total seed needs are then based on the percentage of households with no seed to plant from retaíned seed. They then looks at input supply versus seed needs in the formal sector. The 2003/ 04 ZímYAC household survey asked a number of questions on availabil ity and access to agricultura! inputs (box 2). There are three questions on seed availability and access for main cereal crops and cash crops. While the questions were asked, the analysis presented in their report does not refer to the responses to these questions. Addrr!ssing Seed Security in Disa.ster l?esponse: Unking l?elíef with Development 1621 ______________________________ _;,_P-.::}:..;..· _:::_Bramel and T. Remington Box 2. ZimVAC questions on seed 125. Did you have enough seeds for your main cereal crop in the last 12 months? No, yes , N/A 126. lf not, what was the reason? could not afford to purchase was not available in the market both of the above other 127. What was the main source for the seed that you used? (one answer only) from last harvest/retained seed/carry over purchased provided by NGO provided by government gifts/remittances other 128. Did you have enough seed for your main cash crop? No, yes, N/A 129. lf not what as the reason? could not afford to purchase was not available in the market both of the above other In add ition, FOSENET, a national GO comprising a food security network of 25 organizations that cover all the districts of Zimbabwe, con sol ida tes the monthly monitoring reports from individual NGOs and reports these results three to four times ayear. They report on the status of seed distributions, crop status, and seed needs for the next season ba ed upon observat ions in the ft eld. Mpofu (2002) described a macro-leve! approach to assessi ng seed needs in southern African countries affected by the floods in 1999/2000. The procedure estimates the total affected area and population in need of assistance. The crop need and crop calendar are al so considered in the estima tes of need . In this assessment, a questionnaire was sent to country focal points, seed companies, and seed projects. A mi ssion was also sent to each of the affected countries to tal k to government officials, NGOs, donors, and secd companies. Finally, there was a revicw of relevant background inforrnation. Thc crop seed needs were calculated as the total area to be planted times the governn1ent recommended seeding rate for each crop. The total cost ofthe seed needed was thc seed needs times the number ofhouseholds affected times the transport cost. The seed availabil ity was deterrn ined from the supply avai lable from the prívate or public sector in each country. Thus, the assessment was able to recommend where seed was available for distribution. This is a macro-leve! analysis that looked at theoretical need versus actual suppl y. It did not look at actual demand. One assessment, done by CRS/CTDT for their planned seed voucher and fa ir distribution in 2002/03, did focus on seed needs in both the farmer and formal seed sectors (Takavarasha, Vudzijena, and Madondo, 2002). They used focus-group discussions and key informant interviews with AREX, CTDT. RDC, DA, and farmers. To determine the need for seed, they asked about cropping pattem s, most importan! crops grown, preferred varieties, and quantities required by crop/variety. To detem1ine the local seed supply, Addressing Seed Securily in Disas/er fing Seed Securit_r in Disastcr l?esponse: Linking Relief u-ith Dl'l'l'lopmenl ' 1671 Relief Seed Assistance in Zimbabwe NW5tt>rmal 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 1!1 O'lly own • O'lly gJt D O'lly local market D O'lly tOJ • O'lly GMBFetailers m Multiple sources Figure 2. Proportion of households utilizing one seed source or multiple seed sources for maize under normal seasons and in 2003/04, for NR3 (high-potential) and NR4/5 (semiarid) areas exclusively on own saved seed for finger millet and source the majority oftheir seed for groundnuts (63%), beans (58%), bambara nuts (68%), and pumpkins (84%) from their own stock. In the semiarid areas, a1most half of all farmers rely exclusively on own saved seed for groundnuts ( 49%), sorghum (42%), and pearl millet (49%). The drought disaster resulted in reduced availabilíty and reliance on own seed. This reduction was compensated by greater reliance on multiple sources, including NGOs and the local market. For example, in the high-potential areas, seed sourced from NGOs and the govemment increased from 0% to 9% for finger millet and from 0% to 13% for bambara nuts. In the semiarid areas, it increased from 8% to 13% for sorghum and from 5% to 12% for pearl millet. Groundnut seed sourced from the local market increased from 10% to 14% in the high-potential areas and from 10% to 17% in the semiarid areas. In cowpeas, the use of own saved seed increased with the drought, and the use of seed from NGOs and the govemment decreased. This is because cowpeas were given as seed assistance in 2002/03 by SCF-UK, which may have contributed toan increased household seed supply and reduced demand for outside seed. One other strategy used by households to respond to the loss of own saved seed or reduced access to seed outside the home is to switch toa different crop. Generally, there were very few households who planned to change their crop mix from normal after the two years of drought. Thus, the shift to alternative seed channels was a strategy used more frequently to respond to the drought than changing crops. Seed couservation The ability to produce one's own seed is critica! to household seed security. However, to benefit from this retained seed, the producer must also be able to use seed-saving practices that maintain varietal integrity and seed quality. Households were asked about their seed selection and conservation practices at present and in the past. Significant changes could indicate increased seed insecurity. Surveyed households described a number oftraditional methods used to conserve seed.ln the high-potential areas, 88% of househo1ds used chemical seed treatments, a practice that had not changed in the previous five years. Although only 22% of farmers in the semiaríd areas used chemícal seed treatment, 16% used traditíonal treatments like tobacco, goat dung, ash, and shrub leaves. Addrcssing Seed Securit1· in Disasta Response: Unking Reheftt·ith Drvelopmenl --- . 1681 P.}. Bramel a nd T. Remington Table 2. Use of Seed Sources by Households in NR3 (High-Potentíal) and NR4 /5 (Semiarid) for Finger Millet , Sorghwn, P earl Millet , Groundnuts, Beans, Cowpeas, Bamhara Nuts, and Pumpkins, Normally and in 2003 NR3 NR4/5 Seed Channels Normal 2003104 Normal 2003104 Finger millet Sorghum Only own 96.9% 88.2% 41 .7% 31 .1% Only gift 0.0% 0.0% 9.4% 6.8% Only local market 3.1% 2.9% 5.0% 6.8% Only NGOfgovernment 0.0% 8.8% 7.9% 12.8% Multiple sources 0.0% 0.0% 36.0% 42.6% Groundnuts Pearl millet Onlyown 63.4% 62.0% 48.6% 19.8% Only gift 2.8% 2.8% 9.5% 2.5% Only local market 9.9% 14.1% 0.0% 3.7% Only NGOfgovernment 7.0% 7.0% 5.4% 12.3% Multiple sources 16.9% 14.1 % 36.5% 61.7% Beans Groundnuts Only own 57.7% 46.2% 49.0% 38.9% Only gift 0.0% 0.0% 4.1% 5.6% Only local market 19.2% 11.5% 10.2% 16.7% Only NGOfgovernment 15.4% 15.4% 8.2% 9.3% Multiple sources 7.7% 26.9% 28.6% 29.6% Bambara Cowpeas Only own 67.7% 60.0% 37.9% 44.4% Only gift 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 3.7% Only local market 22.6% 16.7% 10.3% 11.1 % Only NGOfgovernment 0.0% 13.3% 31 .0% 18.5% Multiple sources 9.7% 10.0% 17.2% 22.2% Pumpkins Onlyown 84.2% 64.7% Only gift 10.5% 11 .8% Only local market 0.0% 17.6% Only NGO/government 0.0% 0.0% Multiple sources 5.3% 5.9% Addressing Seed Security in D~saster Response: Linking Relief with Development l