[Type here] [Type here] Assessment of the structure and operation dynamics for two scaling pathways: the Agricultural Cooperatives and Modern Agricultural Cooperatives in Cambodia December 2025 Acknowledgments This work was undertaken as part of the Promoting Climate Resilient Landscapes in the Tonle Sap (PCRL) Project and the CGIAR Scaling for Impact (S4I) program. We gratefully acknowledge the support and funding provided by the CGIAR Trust Fund, and the Global Environment Facility. We extend our sincere appreciation to our partners, stakeholders, and collaborators whose expertise, insights, and commitment have contributed significantly to shaping this work. Their contributions have been instrumental in advancing CGIAR’s ambition to scale proven innovations across food, land, and water systems, fostering impact that is inclusive, sustainable, and transformative. We also recognize the continued support and collaboration of national and regional partners, whose engagement ensures that the solutions developed are responsive to local needs, strengthen innovation systems, and contribute to building more resilient agrifood systems. To learn more about CGIAR Scaling for Impact (S4I) program, please contact: scaling@cgiar.org Scaling for Impact (S4I) is a CGIAR program (2025–2030) that tests, refines, and scales innovations in food, land, and water systems. It works to align those innovations with stakeholder needs to achieve transformative impact. Website: https://www.cgiar.org/cgiar-research-porfolio-2025-2030/scaling-for-impact/ About CGIAR Scaling for Impact (S4I) program CGIAR is a global research partnership for a food secure future. Visit https://www.cgiar.org/research/cgiar-portfolio to learn more about the initiatives in the CGIAR research portfolio. About CGIAR Citation: Zander, S, Pen N, Then, R., Flor R. 2026. Assessment of the structure and operation dynamics for two scaling pathways: the Agricultural Cooperatives and Modern Agricultural Cooperatives. Contents 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 1 2. Study methodology ........................................................................................................ 2 3. Results ........................................................................................................................... 4 4. Implications for scaling in the two pathways .............................................................. 22 5. References ................................................................................................................... 24 1. Introduction Smallholder farmers in Cambodia experience a variety of challenges, such as information inefficiencies, limited access to credit, and constraints related to land or labour (Ofori et al., 2019). These are on top of their production-related challenges such as pests, diseases, and soil infertility (Chuon et al., 2023; Theng et al., 2014). They face insufficient financial resources for investment and business expansion, as these often require high-interest rates and cumbersome procedures (Chhinh et al., 2023; Chuon et al., 2023). On top of this, they often struggle with poor market access, insufficient infrastructure such as irrigation and rural roads, and low levels of public investment in agriculture (Theng et al., 2014). Middlemen often have significant control over agricultural product volumes and prices, which limits farmers' bargaining power (Chhinh et al., 2023; Theng et al., 2014). To overcome these common agricultural challenges, farmers are supported through agricultural cooperatives (ACs) as mechanisms for the government and other entities to reach farmers (Nou, 2006). They were introduced as a self-help method at the micro-level for farmers to increase their productivity, and at the macro-level to increase food security (Chhinh et al., 2022). The core values of these ACs are democracy, equity, self-help, solidarity, responsibility, and equality (Nou, 2006). At first, during the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, the term of agricultural cooperative (AC) was associated with forced collective labour (Nou, 2006). This contrasts with the inherent principles of the concept of cooperatives, as these fundamentally include voluntary membership and democracy (Nou, 2006). ACs possess diverse functions, sizes, origins, and resources, and they are often locally established, small, mono-functional, and often unregistered (Nou, 2006). On top of this, most of these are still in an early stage of development. Their aim is to enable rural people to solve their problems through collective action, by obtaining better prices for products and inputs, gaining security for product-selling, reducing costs, and accessing technical support (Nou, 2006). Yet, these cooperatives face significant challenges such as inadequate financial structures, poor infrastructure, no experienced managers and leaders, and difficulties in accessing services (Nou, 2006). In recent years, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) has invested in the extension program on Modern Agricultural Cooperatives (MACs) (Chea 2025). In this concept, the cooperative focus is on business orientation where the lead or CEO makes business-driven decisions, and the members collectively sell through contracts enabled by the CEO. It also entails coordinated production decisions, some credit for inputs and services, as well as technical support and facilitation by the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF). The idea is that innovations taken up collectively, the de-risking provided by the MAFF insurance support and bulk selling will generate the profits needed by farmers. From Scaling for Impact perspective, this offers an opportunity to observe the AC and MAC as different scaling pathways supported by a different business model. In collaboration with the General Directorate of Agriculture (GDA), specific innovations are being introduced in both models to try and observe the ways in which these innovations are spread and taken up in both AC and MAC. The training is a starting point in bringing out the innovation package in both pathways. The sessions included mechanized direct seeding, alongside the suitable agronomic practices, nutrient management and pest management. It also covered crop diversification, including mungbean, sweet potato, and the rice–fish systems. This study, linked to an MSc thesis, is an evaluation of the process and the context for scaling the innovation package within the two pathways. This research is aimed at understanding the structure, features and functioning of ACs compared to mACs. Specific attention is being paid to how these two pathways consider gender inclusion and the target impacts on food security outcomes. 2. Study methodology Policy review A policy review was done on how these AC and mAC are defined at the level of the MAFF, as well as the type of coordination and support provided to these as legal entities. This provides the hypothetical or design view of the structure and function of AC and mAC as collectives that reach and coordinate farmers. Through this review, we examine the governmental policies and documents provided by the MAFF and the PDAFF. We also look into the member lists and business plans provided by the AC and mAC to look into the membership and structure of the organizations. The Law is the base of every AC and mAC (Cambodia, 2013); however, new documents and policies provide insights on the differences in set up, structure, and governance of mACs compared to the older AC. A semi-structured in-depth qualitative interviews and participatory observations were then implemented on one AC and one mAC in Kampong Thom, Cambodia. Participatory observations were held within two training sessions of the ACs and mACs to gain insights on the working methods and dynamics of spreading information and guidance for production practices. Participatory observations provide ethnographic data essential for understanding how informal rules influence human interactions, such as shared norms and power dynamics (Wijers, 2019). Next to this, to gain a deeper understanding of the differences in structure, benefits and services, the inclusivity of gender and outcome implications, semi- structured in-depth qualitative interviews with the leaders and farmers of the AC and mAC, and with PDAFF were carried out. Study design and sampling strategy For the case studies, one AC and mAC in the province of Kampong Thom was selected because of the indication from MAFF that there were functional mAC as well as established ACs in the province. The design of selecting these cases was to enable an in-depth comparative analysis, where farmers may be in similar production ecosystems but the AC and mAC operate differently. Within the selected AC and mAC, farmers and leaders were recruited through snowball sampling method for semi-structured interviews.Documents provided by the MAFF show that the AC had 68 members, of which 50 are female. The interviews covered roughly 20% of the total membership. For both the AC and the mAC, the aim is to interview around the same amount of male and females to ensure an adequate gender representation. The exact number of participants may vary, depending on the data saturation. Based on the list, the selected mAC had 212 members, of which 10 are females. It had a board of directors (BoD) which was composed of of 9 members, of which 1 female. It also had a Supervisory Committee with 5 members, of which 1 female. For the AC, only the list of member names of the new structure was available, which existed out of 17 people, of which 6 women. Then, for the mAC the official member list showed the mAC existed out of 212 members, of which 10 are females. Ethical considerations This research adhered to several ethical guidelines. First, an informed consent form was provided and explained to all participants in advance of their participation in the interviews, to ensure their understanding of the nature and implications of these research methods. All participants were informed that they are eligible to withdraw or refuse to participate at any point in the process. Next to this, confidentiality and privacy are ensured in sharing of the data. 3. Results Agricultural cooperatives and modern AC in numbers In 2025, there are in total 1,245 registered ACs in the country, with a total of 173,388 members, of which 108,698 women. Also, there are in total 25 registered mACs with a total of 3,278 members, of which 765 women (MAFF 2025). Also, there are in total 173 people on the BoD, of which 44 women. In total, 99 people are on the Supervisory Committee, of which 26 are women. For Kampong Thom specifically, there 80 registered ACs with a total of 12,545 members, of which 8,473 females. There are 5 registered mACs with a total of 795 members, of which 173 females. Formation, structure and functions of ACs The Law on Agricultural Cooperative (RGC, 2013) defines agricultural cooperatives as “a private legal entity and agricultural-based economic enterprise which is voluntarily established by natural entities with their joint investment, joint ownership and joint democratic management" (RGC, 2013, p. 2). The law states the overarching purpose of these cooperatives as “to improve agricultural production capacity, agro-industry, agri-business, or services related to agricultural production aimed at enhancing economic, social and cultural status of members” (RGC, 2013, p. 2). There are several basic principles that underpin this definition. First, the cooperatives should be voluntary and have an open membership, thus should be accessible to all who can use their services and accept responsibilities without discrimination (RGC, 2013). Second, all members should all participate in policy-setting and decision making and have equal rights for voting (RGC, 2013). Third, all members should democratically control and contribute equally to the cooperative’s capital, with surpluses allocated for development, member benefits, or community activities (RGC, 2013). Fourth, independence and autonomy, as the cooperatives as self-help organizations controlled by their members and therefore should maintain democratic control even when engaging with external partners or sources of capital (RGC, 2013). Fifth, there should be provision of training and education for members, managers, representatives, and employees, to ensure they can contribute to the development, and to inform the public about the benefits and nature of cooperation (RGC, Cambodia, 2013). Sixth, there should be cooperation with other agricultural cooperatives through local, regional, national, and international structures to strengthen the cooperative movement (RGC, 2013). Lastly, they should work with member-approved policies to ensure the sustainable development of their communities (RGC, 2013). Then, the Law explains the difference levels of governance and policy- and decision making. First, the Policy Board for Agricultural Cooperatives, established and chaired by the MAFF, is responsible for creating the national strategy concerning agricultural cooperatives, and then proposing it to the Royal Government for approval (Cambodia, 2013). It also monitors and evaluates the implementation of the strategic and action plans and policies, and also strengthens the cooperations between ACs, the private sector, or other parties or institutions (Cambodia, 2013). Then, the MAFF is designated as the competent institutions to “promote and support the establishment, operation, and development of agricultural cooperatives” (Cambodia, 2013, p. 3). This institution should, among others, hold an oversight of the database and bookkeeping on ACs, providing training services or programs, assess economic situations, providing market information, evaluate the functioning and operations of ACs (Cambodia, 2013). With this, sub-national authorities such as provinces, municipalities and districts are required to assist in facilitating AC establishment, disseminating information, certifying registration applications, and cooperating with the municipal/provincial agricultural departments (Cambodia, 2013). Then, within the AC itself, the highest decision-making body that makes decisions on the functioning and formation of ACs, is the General Meeting (GM). Here, all members have one vote, regardless of subscribed shares, and a quorum of at least 2/3 is needed for decision making (RGC, 2013). Next to this, the Board of Directors (BoD), elected by the GM, is responsible for managing and leading the AC, including organizing meetings, financial management, managing assets, and submitting budgets and reports (RGC, 2013). The Chairman of the Board is appointed as the representative of this AC. Also, an Executive Director may be selected by the BoD to help assisting with business operations (RGC, 2013). Then, the Supervisory Committee is the permanent internal monitoring body, and is responsible for monitoring the activities of the Executive Director and Board of Director, which is done to ensure accountability (RGC, 2013). Furthermore, ACs may voluntarily set up a Union of Agricultural Cooperatives to mobilize capacity and expand their business (RGC, 2013). This can be done on a national, regional, and local level, and this Union must be registered for official recognition (RGC, 2013). Lastly, the Cambodian Agricultural Cooperative Alliance, of which all ACs automatically become members and is established by the General Meeting of representatives from ACs and Unions of ACs, is the supreme organ of ACs (RGC, 2013). This organ represents ACs, provides, training and technical advice, protects AC member’s rights, facilitates relationships with partners, government, and the private sector, and cooperates with the ministries on national policies (RGC, 2013). In 2024, the AC had undergone a structural change, which changed the set-up of the board and membership. The old structure used to have 70 members, of which 65 women, and the new structure is told to have 17 new members of which 6 women. The old AC also focused on animal feed, while the new structure mostly focused on rice production. The interviewees indicated that when the AC was established in 2015/2016, it was promoted by the former AC chief and the village chief. They invited the villagers to a meeting to announce and inform about the establishment. Next to this, the old AC chief engaged in personal door-to-door meetings, and after this the villagers talked to other villagers about the AC as well. This announcement and information regarding the AC had only happened once since the establishment. All interviewees stated that everyone who had some land could join the AC, and the membership is completely free. Two people, including one leader, specified that a requirement was having at least 0.5 hectare of land. For the old structure three interviewees indicated that there you could involve in shareholding and get some sort of interest rate. One other interviewee also indicated that you needed to have a share, to be able to get a loan. Eleven farmers indicated that the main motivation of joining the AC was to opportunity to borrow a loan. Five times other reasons for joining were mentioned, such as access to more general benefits and services, such as the possibility to get rice or crops variety, or some technical assistance or machinery. One farmer joined to receive an interest rate through shareholding, and another farmer simply joined because other villagers did. Eight of the interviewees reported not knowing why non-members decided not to join the AC. However, other interviewees indicated these reasons could be not coming to the establishment announcement meeting, the absence of an announcement meeting for the new AC structure, not having any land to farm, and the preference to managing their farming activities by themselves. Furthermore, one farmer mentioned that the confidence in the AC was damaged because some members used to take loans but did not repay those. The AC elected its board members through voting, and every AC member had one vote. The election had only happened twice since the establishment of the AC: one time for the old structure and one time for the new. Interviewees indicated that that at first, they selected 13 possible candidates. Then every member could vote for one, and the results depended on the majority. Interviewees all indicated they voted based on who had ability, talent, occupation, capacity, education, success, potential, skills, and is active. Everyone made their own decision, based on individual choices and preferences. The voting led to 7 successful leaders However, 2 of these dropped out because they did not want the position, so currently there were 5 management members. The interviewed leaders of the AC indicated that the AC engaged with a variety of external organizations, including the NGOs Helen Killer and SIEC, the commune agricultural officer, the MAFF (which provides technical training and guidelines for specific species suitable per zone or location), and the Provincial Department of Agriculture (PDAFF), which was available for assisting with problems. However, past year there seemed to be less involvement than the years before, and only five of the farmers indicated the involvement of the commune agricultural officer and two of them about involvement of the PDAFF. According to the leaders, IRRI supplies seeds, fertilizer, and technical assistance universally, regardless of AC membership status, and CGIAR provides demonstration training to the leaders of the AC. Next to this, the interviewed farmers often reported not having a clear idea about any NGOs being involved, and none of the leader nor the farmers knew about any involvement from the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives. Lastly, six the farmers responded about a fertilizer of rice mill company selling from or to them. Regarding the communication within the AC, this was mostly with of by the chief. Almost all members indicated this happened in person or by phone call. There also was a Telegram group, but not all members used this. They also reported a wide range of differences in the frequency of meetings with the AC, ranging from twice a month to once a year. Formation and functions of mACs The modern AC is a relatively new program, backed by policies but not yet enacted as law. The Sixth Priority Policy Program on Promoting Modern Agricultural Communities (MAFF, 2023) aimed to implement mACs “to transform Cambodia's smallholder based agricultural sector to a robust agricultural economic enterprise with high integration, economies of scale and competitive capacity for both quantity and quality” (MAFF, 2023, p. 2). Broader aims to reach this goal include increasing competitiveness within the agricultural value chain of Cambodia, improving the livelihoods of its farmers, ensuring food security, and transforming Cambodia into a higher middle-income country by 2030. In the documents provided by the MAFF and PDAFF, it is explained that the term “community” was used instead of “cooperative”, as a cooperative was based upon the Law. MACs were implemented to overcome challenges conventional ACs were facing, such as a lack of ownership in leadership and management, high production costs, inability to respond to market demand, climate change risks, and being small-scale and isolated (MAFF, 2023). There is limited documentation of how the mACs are expected to function as the program is still dynamically assessing how this could work. Interviews with Provincial and MAFF implementers show how mACs operate through several key conditions, including borrowing credit as joint capital for agricultural production, purchasing inputs, including variety, fertilizers and pesticides, together as a community, jointly using agricultural techniques, selling through contract farming, dividing the profit according to the amount of member’s production, and paying a contribution of 5% of the gross income for community development and administrative expenses. The PDAFF guidance document also highlighted the successful implementation of mACs within Cambodia. More farmers had shown interest in joining agricultural cooperatives, and members had received technical and capital support from the MAFF, quality inputs for lower prices than the retail market, and loans with lower interest rates. The mAC in the case study was completely new, and had not been converted from an existing conventional AC. The establishment had begun with the MAFF creating the policy and set up and then introduced the concept to the local community to arrange the members. The establishment and information regarding the mAC had been disseminated through local meetings with villagers. Interviewees indicated that the PDAFF and commune officers had helped with introducing the mAC. The current mAC chief also seemed to play a big role in spreading information about the mAC, by actively spreading the word and gathering people to join. Some interviewees learned about the mAC through social media, where the MAFF had posted information about the mAC, and information also seemed to be widely spread from farmer to farmer. The interviewees mentioned the following criteria for joining. The membership fee was stated to be 50,000 riels per year. There was no minimum required land size, and members do not need to own any land, as many members also rent land from others. Membership required having a national Cambodian identity card. All members must follow the guidelines and rules of the mAC policy, including adhering to certain land preparation norms, buying and applying the mAC variety, fertilizer and pesticides, and selling their production back to the mAC. These guidelines were aligned with certain EU policies for specific pesticides. The MAFF regularly visited the fields to check the adherence, and when the guidelines were not followed the mAC will not buy back the members production. The most frequently mentioned reasons for joining the mAC were the availability of a loan and a low price and advice on variety, fertilizers and pesticides, and the stability of the market price. Next to this, multiple interviewees mentioned the mAC is specifically beneficial for farmers who lack capital, as the payment is done after the harvest, and the ability to talk to people and intervene with problems. The most common reason other farmers decided not the join the mAC was told to be the desire to wait and first see if the mAC will be successful. Other reasons entailed not clearly knowing about the mAC policy yet, having a small farm that is only for consumption, and people’s preference to manage their pesticides and fertilizers without any strict guidelines. The board of the mAC was selected through an election and voting process, coordinated by the MAFF. The official establishment and election of the mAC was mentioned to all have happened on the same day. On this day, first 15 possible board candidates were selected based on volunteers who stepped up, and then the voting took place. Following the MAFF policy, the majority vote for the top 9 candidates formed the board, with the number of votes determining the position hierarchy within the board. All interviewees stated the voting decision was completely individual, and based upon who they thought had good ability, education, talent, patience, leading ability and/or capacity. The chief mentioned herself that she initially did not wish nor thought she was going to be the leader, but she wanted to help the mAC succeed. Both the chief and the members indicated that she possessed convenient storage space and location. The mACs had several partner institutions to secure financial and market support. Four banks had provided credit and loans to mACs, and currently two companies held a contract for buying the rice from the mAC, and one company that provided credit guarantee services. The process of how mACs are funded through a guaranteed loan process is shown in Fig. 1. Fig.1. Guaranteed loan process for modern agricultural cooperatives Source: https://www.cgcc.com.kh/en/modern-agricultural-cooperative-guarantee- scheme-mags/ Differences between AC and mAC establishment and registration procedure There appeared to be a few key differences between the official establishment of an AC and a mAC. Firstly, for ACs, the registration was handled by the Municipal/Provincial Departments of Agricultural, Forestry and Fisheries (PDAFF) (Minister of Agriculture, 2018), while for mACs this process was overseen by the Department of Agricultural Cooperative Promotion (DACP) (MAFF, 2023). Secondly, it was reported that prior to setting up a mAC, there should be a study done to investigate possible challenges, the market demand, the minimal economy of scale, the initial investment capital, and the amount of potential agricultural production (Minister of Agriculture, 2018; MAFF, 2023). Lastly, for mACs an extra official establishment step was added, in which the DACP was required to coordinate with the BoD in recruiting/employing the full management of the mAC and thus cannot be done solely by the mAC members themselves (MAFF, 2023). Differences between AC and mAC in management and production process For both ACs and mACs the management structure is led by the BoD and the Supervisory Committee (Cambodia, 2013; MAFF, 2023). Additionally, mACs was stated to have a CEO and management team with good experience and professional expertise, existing out of an accountant, a qualified and professional executive, a farm manager, and other technical staff based on the needs, and a possible advisory team that had expertise of agriculture and other relevant support skills (MAFF, 2023). In this sense, the management of the mAC is targeted towards more entrepreneurial venture. All management members of the AC were doing their work completely voluntary and for free, and the leaders usually met two or three times a week, typically in response to a problem or challenge that was arising. All management members said they had separate responsibilities, but when a problem or challenge arises, they worked on it together. The chief was responsible for the final decision making but was supported by the other board members. The chief reported to have limited knowledge regarding arranging the structural set up, roles and responsibilities, and it was hoping an NGO, and a commune officer was going to help with this. The Board of Directions (BoD) was responsible for the technical aspects of agriculture within the AC, such as giving technical advice on variety production, dry rice, and explaining techniques to the farmers, including how to use fertilizers or pesticides. With this, they often observed if the farmers followed technical guidelines. Due to the new structure, the eventual number of members for the BoD was still unsure yet. The Inspection team had a variety of responsibilities, such as checking land location and preparation, ensuring weed clearance, and monitoring the use of the appropriate variety, fertilizer, pesticide, water application, and pest control. The interviewed members of the Inspection team also indicated that in the future there would be both an internal and external Inspection Team. Furthermore, the Finance team existed out of one member, that had a background in managing financial statements, including income, expenses and profit. However, due to the new structure, no specific tasks or responsibilities had been assigned yet. The interviewees indicated there also was supposed to be a Deputy Chief, which would be the firth management member. Two interviewees also mentioned they were members of the AC that were specialized in specific areas of agricultural production and stepped up in helping the management in their activities. One of these members was a teacher of agriculture and he worked together with the BoD to help with guidance in the agricultural field. The other member was an expert in vegetable planting and helped with management tasks regarding this expertise. He also worked together with an NGO, to help and guide AC farmers. While there is some coordination of production and sale expected from the ACs, it is still largely operated as individual ventures of members who make their production decisions. The policy described that a key difference between ACs and mACs was that mACs had high professional management and required farmers to engage in joint production, after which the farmer received their share of the mACs profits based upon their size of land or crop production, and additional income in the form of waged labour by working for the mAC and the revenue from a flat fee from rental (MAFF, 2023). Another key difference is that conventional ACs firstly produce their goods and then attempt to find a market after harvesting, while MACs always first find the market, and then determine the demand and produce the product. Sometimes conventional ACs do engage in contract farming, but often neither the farmer nor the buyer respects the contract terms, while MACs always strictly adhere to the guidelines and policy for contract farming. Another difference is that conventional ACs do not receive any budget or loans from the government to support their operation, while MACs do get this financial support. For both conventional ACs and MACs, the PDAFF and MAFF play a significant role in supporting them. However, conventional ACs primarily work and function separately and individually from the government but can reach out in case they need help, while for MACs the government is strongly intertwined from the beginning. Here, the PDAFF and MAFF coordinate the election event, formulate the business plan in accordance with the Board of Directors, and continue to offer managing and technical guidance to the board and all the members. The Board of Directors operates autonomously and is not told what to do, but the PDAFF and MAFF regularly step up and provide advice. The mAC was managerially divided into two parts, each led by a deputy chief. The Board of Directors consisted out of 9 people: the chief, two deputy chiefs, and six members. There also was an inspection team, which existed out of five people including one chief. All members of the board and the inspection team did the work on voluntary basis. The mAC was newly set up, and because of this, specific roles and responsibilities were not yet divided, but the management indicated this would be done in the near future. Currently, the chief mentioned she was responsible for calculating and managing all the finances, including the members’ expenses such using mAC or other member machinery, loans with interest rates, expenses on variety, fertilizer and pesticides, the profits from the rice sales, and then the final amount the members received after the harvest. In the future, she mentioned the mAC will establish a finance team for this role. The board also worked together with the MAFF to arrange the business plan and the contract farming, and to sign the contract agreement both parties had to be present. Next to this, the board was responsible for helping members resolve problems, and they facilitated contact with the MAFF technical team. In general, the board was responsible for most of the work, but they consulted the Inspection team when guidance or help was needed. The Inspection team was required to double-check all mAC documents and reports, such as membership lists, or reports on variety, fertilizers and pesticides. Overall, management board was told to be equally divided and often done together in meetings. These meetings were told to be held often, but the frequency usually depended on the current workload or problems. The people present at those meetings varied, from meetings with the MAFF, to meetings with the whole board, to smaller meetings, and the things discussed often included technical issues or information, or management set up. Business plan review Within the current AC structure, there is no business plan yet, but the leaders thought they would establish one within next six months, as this is one life cycle of the rice variety. While the teams had been defined, the specific task division for the different management positions was still absent. The old structure was organized based on farming groups that specialized in specific areas, such as duck feed and chicken feed. Each group had 10 to 15 members each. A review of the mAC business plan was done. In this plan, first a geographical context description of Kampong Thom province was given. Statistical data was provided for Baray Commune (12 villages, 2,825 families, 548 female heads of household) and Treal Commune (22 villages, 5,327 families, 658 female heads of household), and the hectares dedicated to rice cultivation. The plan also identified possible challenges, such as high production costs, market problems, and technical problems. The document then identified the purpose and missions of mACs, and the exact date of establishment, and the responsibilities and tasks of the BoD, Oversight Committee, and the CEO and a supporting team with expertise. Furthermore, it entailed a variety of detailed plans and strategies. The Rice Production Action plan explains the specific phases of rice production, and the dates the members need to do carry out certain activities. The Financial Plan entails a profit-loss table with insights in former expenses and profit. The plan also explained the way profit is distributed, which is calculated based on the amount production costs (for members who use services from the mAC) and operating costs (such as staff salaries and administrative costs). Thus, the profit was the revenue based on the rice production after harvesting minus the production and operating costs. The Marketing Strategy entails a SWOT analysis and a Sales Strategy to reach goals such as creating a fixed price contract with a purchasing party and having immediate payment upon delivery. Lastly, a risk management plan was made that considered contractual safeguards such as fixed price guarantee and quality insurance, weather risk protection such as creating irrigation systems and conducting climate research, and financial risks. External engagement A few external actors were involved in the mAC. The MAFF was heavily involved with the establishment of the mAC by creating the initial structure, business plan, loan arrangement, and contract farming. After this, the MAFF remained a large factor by coordinating with the bank, providing a technical team to guide farmers in their production, arranging training sessions, and helping the management to solve problems. Especially the PDAFF, under the MAFF, assisted with making those arrangements and supervision. The agricultural commune officer was mentioned to also help with production problems, to inspect the fields and give farming advice, and to sometimes join meetings as well, as they were responsible for all the farmers in the commune. Next to this, the bank provided the loan, fertilizer and pesticide companies provided necessary inputs, and the rice mill company was involved in the contract farming and buying from the farmers. There was no NGO involved in the mAC yet, but board members indicated that contact with an NGO had been made regarding potential future collaboration. Concerning the Union of Agricultural Cooperatives, none of the board members were aware about this possible stakeholder. Most of the interviewees indicated that the management was doing a good or acceptable job, with some members articulating that the fact that was newly set up. However, a few concerns were raised about inadequate management, because the board could not completely implement their own guidelines and was creating some confusion with miscommunication, and because board members also had their own jobs and might lack sufficient time to manage. Two mentions were made about the fact that there is no CEO yet. Benefits and services in AC and mAC 1. Credit The old structure of the AC allowed members to borrow a loan, stated by eight respondents. Five farmers stated that loans are currently unavailable. The most mentioned benefit was getting free rice variety. However, there were different stories about how often and the amount, ranging from yearly, to only once, and from 25 kg to 100kg per household, to mentions about it being dependent on land size, and mentions about it being the same for everyone. A few interviewees also mentioned the provision of some free fertilizer, while other said you must pay for it, and a few mentioned the provision of some variety for crops/vegetables. Two respondents also indicated not receiving any of those benefits, because of a lack of necessary labour, and another one reported the variety not being on time for usage. For the mACs, the leaders and members were very consistent in their reports about the benefits and services. mAC members were able to get a loan, which they needed to pay back after harvesting with an interest rate. Thus, credit is made available every growing season of rice, which is approximately six months. The loan limit was depending on their land size, which a certain maximum amount available per hectare. The chief managed the calculation and repayment to the bank. Interviewees indicated they used this loan to hire people for working on their land, to rent land, to hire machinery, or to use the water pump station. Overall, most of the members reported getting the loan. This is largely backed by the broader policy with a guarantee scheme as shown in Figure 1. The government coordinated access to financing for the mACs. These loans are secured with a guarantee to the bank, thereby de-risking both borrower and lender. 2. Services and inputs The provision of inputs and machinery was inconsistently observed to be present in ACs. Some services like the seeders, dryers and postharvest facilities, and harvesting machines were sometimes told to be free, while other times payment was required (e.g., for fuel). The AC leader acknowledged that for the new structure of the AC, they did not yet possess equipment or machines. Then, regarding the crop management, most farmers looked after their crops themselves. However, the old management used to help by checking the fields. The mAC provided the specific variety, fertilizer and pesticides following the mAC guidelines. They provided it for a lower price than outside the mAC, and the members had to pay back after the harvesting as well. Also here, the quantity was based upon the land size. Some members maintained their own storage, and others rented storage space outside the mAC, sometimes with rent and sometimes for free. Most storage arrangements were made by the farmers themselves, but some members sought help from the mAC. The mAC chief had a storage place at her house, but not all members seemed aware of this or use it. Leaders stated that the mAC currently did not have a warehouse, but members could rent external warehouses for free. For machinery, there were told to be multiple options. Some farmers, particularly those with large land sizes, had their own machinery. mAC members could also rent their machinery to other members, for which the board handled the rental payment, by including this in the post-harvest profit calculation. Other members rented their machinery from farmers outside the mAC and arranged this independently. The mAC also sometimes helped with arranging machinery rental outside the mAC, when the machinery rental options within the mAC were limited. 3. Technical assistance, support from extension agents Regarding the trainings given through the AC, there were also different stories. Some mentioned everyone was invited to every training, while some were unsure, and others mentioned only leaders were invited. However, the leaders themselves mentioned there was a “Training of Trainers” (TOT), in which the leaders and specialized members went to the trainings that were given by the MAFF, and then they would spread the learned lessons to the rest of the farmers. Trainings were told to cover technical subjects, such as variety selection, the usage of fertilizers, harvesting methods, and crop management. The number of times the trainings that the leaders than provided to the members took place, was also reported inconsistently, as there were mentions ranging from one time so far, till three times a year. There were a few that mentioned that the leaders came and checked sometimes to see how the farming was going and gave tips and guidelines, but others also said they had to look after these things themselves. The new structure leaders themselves did mention they plan to do spread the information they learned in the trainings. The mAC assisted their members with field management, pest control, and ensuring that specific techniques are used. If members encountered a problem, such as an insect outbreak, they could contact the board, and they helped them to get in touch with the MAFF technical team, which was completely free. The technical team helped by calling, sending photos through Telegram, or when needed the team came directly to the field. The frequency of this inspection or guidance depended on the problem. Next to this, the agricultural commune officer also visited the fields for inspection and offering assistance. The MAFF organised trainings and workshops for the mAC and other mACs/ACs. These training sessions often focused on technical matters. Some trainings were told to be exclusive to the board, for which they rotated attendance. There were also regular trainings for which all members were invited, but often farmers decline participation because they are busy with their farming activities. However, members that did go to the trainings often spread the information to those who could not attend, by discussing it on the field or one-to-one, and the chief also organized meetings for all the members to share the information that was given in those training sessions. Next to this, it was also mentioned that the agricultural commune officer provided information sessions regarding agricultural production, and those were also open to non-mAC members. Observably, the training that was implemented by the GDA reached both AC and mAC. There was no difference in participation. However, the step down training to the other members remain to be observed as it happened too close to the data collection for the case studies. 4. Collection, storage and selling produce Half of the interviewees from ACs mentioned dry rice storages or warehouses being available to them. Some of them said this was free, and some of them saying they had to pay, while other interviewees were unsure about these things, while leaders mentioned storage was available. AC members predominantly sold their rice production individually to middlemen (12 mentions). Some interviewees said that the AC used to negotiate the market price, while other said it still does, and others said the AC did, and still not helped at all. Five farmers felt as if they had no choice in deciding about their selling price. The AC chief stated that the benefit the AC provided regarding market access was promoting the best varieties and techniques, enabling members to achieve a better price due to better and homogenous quality. He also noted that currently, there was no contract farming, but to facilitate contract farming in the future, he expressed a desire for more villagers to join the AC, as this would allow for better tracking village demand and supply. Overall, he mentioned that for any potential contract farming, the rice must be homogeneous to avoid a lower price. The mAC provided the inputs, and after harvest, members had to sell back their production to the mAC. The mAC then calculated the total costs and subtracted these from the profit before paying back the members the remainder. The contract farming agreement provided a stable price for all members, and this price was always determined before harvesting. One interviewee mentioned for future plans all members were supposed to contribute 5% of their income to the mAC for operating and development services, but other interviewees seemed to be unaware of this. For the price, different quality levels came with different prices, with a better price for a better quality, which was also outlined in the contract farming. If a member did not follow the mAC guidelines, the mAC will not purchase back their production. The price on the mAC contract was reported to be the best price for that specific variety. The buyer/contract farming company collected the rice either at the household or at a collecting point/warehouse. If needed, the mAC sometimes helped organise the collection point. Pick up was free, but farmers had to pay for the bags they used to put the rice in. The production amount was calculated by the buyer at the collection point, paid, and then given to the chief. In some cases, the farmers collaborate to gather a full car truck of rice, which is required for the pick-up. Interviewees indicated they could sell any quantity they wished, and most interviewees felt as if the price was good or reasonable. There were two mentions of the price being too high compared to the production costs. The interviewees indicated that members cannot benefit from the mACs services without doing anything, as rewards are based on the amount of individual production. Therefore, the results are dependent on the technique and land size of the farmer. There was one mention about some member benefitting without contributing, but this interviewee believed the management would address this in the future. Social inclusion and gender in AC and mAC In terms of role division on both the household and AC level, everyone mentioned men primarily worked and engaged in the farming, while women were generally housewives, often handling small tasks such as a small shop or planning vegetables. The men were also told to be the main decision-makers within the households. Four of the interviewees were widows, and because of this managed and decided for their farms on their own. Women were mostly seen as the AC representative within the household, and thus attended AC meetings and trainings, because their husband were busy with the farming. Men did sometimes go to trainings that focused on specific techniques. Additionally, one farmer noted the challenge of women attending meetings, but men failed to then follow information provided by the women. Almost all interviewees reported a belief in women being able to be a leader, only most of them reported it is depending on the individual ability. Remarks such as ‘there is no problem on gender’, ‘some women here have high education’, ‘the Finance Team is female’, and ‘men also struggle sometimes’ were made. However, one leader noted that men tended to have "higher intentions than women" to become a leader. Furthermore, some women in which they had ‘initial confidence’ became less active over time. All interviewed farmers consistently reported that men and women benefitted equally from the services and benefits provided by the AC. In mACs the household task division was similar as in the ACs, where the men were the head of the family, primarily made the decisions, and conducted the work related to rice cultivation and other businesses. Some men had additional employment alongside the farming. Women were typically housewife, and some engaged in small jobs, such as selling food at the market, or helping at the fields. In one household, the wife was employed as a government worker. In almost all households, the man served as the mAC representative. The main reason given for this was those men being mostly engaged in the farming. In one of the households, the women reported herself as the representative; she also assisted her husband with the farming and emphasized the equality between men and women in the mAC. Interviewees gave a variety of insights regarding the gendered differences in leadership. A few members emphasized that the chief is female, while others emphasized the lack of equality in the board election, as there was only one woman among the 15 candidates. The education level or capacity of women was sometimes perceived as not high enough. Another interviewee explained that because men predominantly handled the farming and mostly engaged in the mAC, most members present at the election were solely male, which resulted in mostly male candidates and almost no women leaders. Outcome implications for AC and mAC members The majority of respondents from ACs reported that their food production had improved due to AC membership. Eight farmers also reported having a better income. However, four farmers stated that production had not improved, and two reported no improvement in income. Regarding dealing with climate shocks such as droughts and floods, six interviewees reported that the AC provided some variety to replant for free, two mentioned it also gave some money, and someone talked about helping within pumping and irrigation, although for this payment was required. The biggest challenge at the farm level reported by farmers within the AC was the high or unstable market price. Other farm challenges include high seasonal expenses, distance from irrigation, insect/rat infestations, and insufficient financial resources. At the whole AC level, the most pressing challenge was also the high market price. Other significant issues included the AC’s inability to manage finances due to members failing to repay loans, conflicts of interest (AC providing selling support for some members but not others), and members not going to meetings. There was a wide variety of desired improvements reported by the interviewees. These included establishing contract farming, having rice storage, obtaining machinery for members, and securing a good market price. One respondent suggested that better management, unity, education, and leadership would improve the AC. A more forward-looking view was expressed by one farmer who stated that confidence was currently low, but they anticipated improvement once the AC transitions into a mAC. On the other hand, there were varied experiences from farmers in mACs. The degree to which the mAC helped dealing with climate shocks was varying among the interviewees. Some interviewees mentioned the mAC had their own irrigation and pump station, and that there was a machine available to dig and drain the water, but you need to pay for those after harvest. Some mentioned the mAC looks for ways to solve problems related to climate, while others mentioned the mAC does not know how to fix these issues either, especially as the water canal was currently closed for development by the government. One interviewee stated the mAC did help with his problems concerning droughts, as his payment could be moved to the next payment round, and another interviewee mentioned that some members got flooded because disregarded the mACs advice to wait to start cultivation, so for this case the mAC could not help as it was their own fault. Two members did not know whether the mAC could help in dealing with climate shocks, as they did not contact the mAC to ask for advice. The most common challenges reported were the scarcity of the water supply, as about half of the interviewees experienced trouble with this, but this could be explained by the government closing the canal for construction. Other challenges included managing rats and pests, difficulties accessing their farm due to bad roads, droughts, and concerns about the contract farming price in the future, as it kept decreasing, and still was unknown for the next round. Interviewees explained that it was difficult to find acceptable contract farming for everyone, because of the involvement of so many actors. For some the price of the contract farming was too low compared to the production costs, and one interviewee indicated that while the mAC variety price is the highest for that specific variety, a higher price was available for a different variety outside the mAC. Lastly, others mentioned that it was hard to get a homogenous variety, as the mAC variety differed from what they previously used. Desired improvements included having good water management to spread the water from the big canal to the small canals, for all farmers. For this it was mentioned that both the government and mAC should help with this. There were a few interviewees that wanted a higher price for their production, especially as the production costs were high as well. Other price related improvements were securing the contract farming for the next round, getting the variety that was able to get a higher market price, and addressing the non-homogeneous variety issues that led to lower prices. One farmer wanted the installation of electric power to all farms, another one mentioned fixing the miscommunication issue, and two mentioned the need for a CEO. Four interviewees stated that the mAC was doing good and no improvements were necessary. Overall, almost all interviewees mentioned that their food production and income was better than before they were a mAC member. One of the leaders reported that more than 90% of all the food produced within the mAC was for selling, so the mAC could be very influential. However, a few emphasized the negative effect of natural disasters and their production. 4. Implications for scaling in the two pathways The Royal Government of Cambodia through the laws and programs for farmer collectives has made a clear demarcation between ACs and modern ACs. The structure and formation of both are different, targeting democratically managed collectives for one and vertically-linked enterprises for the other. In terms of numbers, the ACs are more pervasive across the country, while there are only a limited number of mACs at the moment. Both AC and mAC target a form of collectivization, which enable outreach to farmers. The decision-making however is different between both in that as a whole enterprise, the mAC members are limited from making individual farming decisions. Diversifying towards a crop that is not planned within the mAC, for example, would not be of use to an mAC member because there would be no support for it. Thus, production decisions are coordinated. The group sale of produce is observed as an advantage, and is thus seen as a benefit of the mAC, compared to the AC. In terms of the policy around guarantee schemes, this also provides an insurance to the group that de-risks their production decision. Both AC and mAC have ways to enable technical assistance and extension. There was not much observed differences as far as formal training is done, as well as connections to external sources of knowledge. Nonetheless, as a new program that is being developed and largely supported by the Ministry, there is substantial external support being provided to the mAC. A crucial difference is the investment of the mAC leadership in the crop management and issues arising therein as they are the ones coordinating the contracts with buyers. Thus there was observed to be more interactions that support decisions in dealing with crop management concerns. For services and inputs, the mAC clearly outperformed the AC in terms of provision of these services to their members. This also has to do with the capital being enabled through the policy and guarantee scheme. There was also more technical oversight in that the leaders had responsibility towards the contracts made. There was also more external support from government technicians. Lastly, the operation of the mAC is supported by a clear business plan, which is reviewed by the banks and is largely insured by the government. Through this, a risk mitigation is provided, and the mAC is able to take business decisions towards aligning the crop production practices (crop choice, variety or seeds, inputs, services). These enable the farmers to access the technologies which are recommended through the knowledge extension outreach and is supported by the mAC leadership. With these structure, support, and de-risking mechanisms, there is observably higher chance for supporting the scaling of an innovation for rice production within the mAC compared to a conventional AC. There is however a time factor that determines how sustained support from policy and the guarantee scheme can continue to enable the mAC operations. 5. References Akter, S., Rutsaert, P., Luis, J., Htwe, N. M., San, S. S., Raharjo, B., & Pustika, A. (2017). Women’s empowerment and gender equity in agriculture: A different perspective from Southeast Asia. Food policy, 69, 270-279. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2017.05.003 Alkire, S., Meinzen-Dick, R., Peterman, A., Quisumbing, A., Seymour, G., & Vaz, A. (2013). The women’s empowerment in agriculture index. World development, 52, 71-91. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.06.007 Baksh-Soodeen, R., & Harcourt, W. (2015). The Oxford handbook of transnational feminist movements. Oxford University Press. Beban, A., Martignoni, J. B., Hak, S., Le, H., Kongmanila, D., & Nguyen, D. T. (2024). Thematic Study: Towards gender-equitable land policy and lawmaking in the Mekong Region. https://www.mrlg.org/wp- content/uploads/2024/03/Thematic-Study_February-2024.pdf Cambodia, R. G. o. (2013). Law on Agricultural Cooperative (Unofficial Translation). In: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Cambodia, R. G. o. (2022). National Agricultural Development Policy 2022-2030. https://data.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/km/dataset/20f68541-bb64- 4192-90b8-c575de630992/resource/0d749c0b-69c2-459a-a1fd- 46877704b033/download/national_agricultural_development_policy_en_ _09.09.2022.pdf.pdf Chhinh, N., Rath, S., Nguophan, P., & Thou, P. (2023). Promoting Agricultural Cooperative for Livelihood Development among Smallholder Farmers in Cambodia. Insight: Cambodia Journal of Basic and Applied Research, 5(2), 79-85. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.61945/cjbar.2023.5.2.08 Chhinh, N., Sok, S., Sou, V., & Nguonphan, P. (2022). Local engagement in the agricultural cooperatives (ACs) operation in Cambodia. Sustainability, 14(24), 16515. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.3390/su142416515 Chuon, S., Umali, D. J. A., Or, T., Gonsalves, J., Nabuuma, D., Pham, H., Duong, T., & Huynh Thi, T. (2023). Nutrition-and gender-sensitive agri- food systems in the Mekong Delta, Cambodia: A case study of three interventions. https://cgspace.cgiar.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/aafb5297-f2f7-466b- 9948-0494d340acaf/content Culas, R. J., & Tek, K. (2016). Food security in Cambodia: Trends and policy objectives. International Journal of Development Issues, 15(3), 306-327. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1108/IJDI-06-2016-0033 Francisco, R. A. (2010). Collective action theory and empirical evidence. Springer Science & Business Media. Hua, H. H., Nguyen, M. A., & Ngo, T. T. T. (2024). Collective and individual adaptation of rice farmers to climatic variability in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta. Cogent Social Sciences, 10(1), 2390181. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2024.2390181 Huot, S. (2020). Gender and leadership of agricultural cooperatives: The case of Cambodia. https://etda.libraries.psu.edu/files/final_submissions/21340 Huot, S., Jensen, L., Bates, R., & Ader, D. (2023). Barriers of Women in Acquiring Leadership Positions in Agricultural Cooperatives: The Case of Cambodia☆. Rural Sociology, 88(3), 708-730. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/ruso.12490 Kabeer, N. (1999). Resources, agency, achievements: Reflections on the measurement of women's empowerment. Development and change, 30(3), 435-464. https://doi-org.ezproxy.library.wur.nl/10.1111/1467- 7660.00125 Kunzekweguta, M., Pigeon, M.-A., Micheels, E., Henry, C., & Nosworthy, M. G. (2025). Understanding the role of co-operatives in enhancing food security in East Africa. Food Security, 1-17. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-025-01582-0 Lamb, V., Schoenberger, L., Middleton, C., & Un, B. (2019). Gendered eviction, protest and recovery: a feminist political ecology engagement with land grabbing in rural Cambodia. In Gender and Generation in Southeast Asian Agrarian Transformations (pp. 113-132). Routledge. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2017.1311868 Maestre-Matos, M., Lombana-Coy, J., Mesías, F. J., & Elghannam, A. (2021). Institutional Factors That Affect Inclusive Businesses: The Case of Banana Cooperatives in the Magdalena Region (Colombia). International Journal of Rural Management, 17(1_suppl), 69S-96S. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/0973005221991603 McCarthy, N., & Kilic, T. (2015). The nexus between gender, collective action for public goods and agriculture: evidence from Malawi. Agricultural Economics, 46(3), 375-402. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/agec.12170 Minister of Agriculture, F. a. F. (2018). Prakas on the guideline for the establishment and registration of agricultural cooperatives. https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/cam219297.pdf Ministry of Agriculture, F. a. F. (2023). The 5th and 6th priority policy program of the royal government of the 7th legislature of the national assembly. https://data.opendevelopmentcambodia.net/library_record/the-5th-and- 6th-priority-policy-program-of-the-royal-government-of-the-7th- legislature-of-the-natio Ngo, L. N., & Tran, T. Q. (2024). Gender equity in key agricultural policy documents in Cambodia and Vietnam from 2001 to 2021. Social Sciences & Humanities Open, 9, 100830. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssaho.2024.100830 North, D. C. (1992). Institutions and economic theory. The american economist, 36(1), 3-6. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/0569434516630194 Nou, K. (2006). Emerging structures of agricultural cooperatives in Cambodia. Cambodia Dev. Rev, 10, 9-12. https://www.cdri.org.kh/storage/pdf/cdr06- 1e-3_1617856035.pdf Ofori, E., Sampson, G. S., & Vipham, J. (2019). The effects of agricultural cooperatives on smallholder livelihoods and agricultural performance in Cambodia. Natural Resources Forum, Ostrom, E. (2010). Analyzing collective action. Agricultural Economics, 41, 155- 166. Quisumbing, A., Cole, S., Elias, M., Faas, S., Galiè, A., Malapit, H., Meinzen- Dick, R., Myers, E., Seymour, G., & Twyman, J. (2023). Measuring women’s empowerment in agriculture: Innovations and evidence. Global Food Security, 38, 100707. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2023.100707 Rocheleau, D., Thomas-Slayter, B., & Wangari, E. (2013). Feminist political ecology: Global issues and local experience. Routledge. Singh, S., Mohan, A., Saran, A., Puskur, R., Mishra, A., Etale, L., Cole, S. M., Masset, E., Waddington, H. S., & MacDonald, H. (2022). PROTOCOL: Gender transformative approaches in agriculture for women's empowerment: A systematic review. Campbell Systematic Reviews, 18(3), e1265. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1265 Theng, V., Keo, S., Nou, K., Sum, S., & Khiev, P. (2014). Impact of farmer organisations on food security: The case of rural Cambodia. CDRI Lucknow, India. https://cdri.org.kh/storage/pdf/wp95e_1617793094.pdf Tran, T. T., Nguyen, T. T., Ashton, E. C., & Aka, S. M. (2025). Support Needs of Agrarian Women to Build Household Livelihood Resilience: A Case Study of the Mekong River Delta, Vietnam. Climate, 13(8), 163. https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3104&co ntext=dissertations Wijers, G. D. (2019). Inequality regimes in Indonesian dairy cooperatives: understanding institutional barriers to gender equality. Agriculture and Human Values, 36(2), 167-181. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1007/s10460-018-09908-9 With Partners