Digital Sequence Information (DSI) data governance practices to support benefit-sharing and science NOTICE: For the purposes of this brief, “data governance” refers to the formal and informal rules and guidelines that govern the generation, sharing, publication, access, and use of DSI. This brief is written by researchers to support policymakers understand current practices and frictions related to placing DSI in the public sphere. The brief is intended to address a limited set of DSI governance issues potentially relevant to the much broader set of issues necessary to develop the DSI multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism. 1 POLICY BRIEF 1. The status quo is more open than FAIR or CARE. The multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism can maximize benefits for providers of genetic resources from which DSI was generated while supporting scientific data interoperability. This is possible by maintaining the data governance policies and practices that ensure DSI access in the International Nucleotide Sequence Database Collaboration (INSDC) remains open: anonymous, free of charge, and unrestricted.¹ ⁴ These properties are more open than the FAIR and CARE principles, and they can enhance the quality of scientific outputs and international collaboration, which are benefits on their own. By improving both the quality and quantity of these benefits, we can encourage equitable benefit-sharing. 2. Use existing infrastructure for monitoring benefits generated. Benefit-sharing proposals that would require large structural changes to the DSI database landscape, such as requiring new payments for cloud services or universal registration requirements for all DSI users, would be ineffective, inconsistent with open access, and generate more costs than benefits. Using existing DSI scientific infrastructures for monitoring non-monetary benefits such as publications, or data on patents, can maximize open access while increasing benefits. 3. Easy to comply, hard to avoid. Benefit-sharing proposals that fragment DSI use conditions—such as those requiring licenses for individual DSI records in public databases—would be hard to comply with and easy to avoid. In contrast, global approaches like universal terms of use would be easy to comply with and hard to avoid. The first approach reduces benefits by negatively disrupting the current DSI governance system and would create an economic marketplace where some DSI are more economically attractive than others. Meanwhile, the latter approach increases benefits by continuing to allow the best scientific outputs and capturing benefits from all DSI. 4. DSI of IPLC origin. The multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism would benefit from an updated metadata field in DSI public databases to indicate whether the associated genetic resources have IPLC provenance, permissions and/or protocols, when this information is available. The IPLC provenance data can also be useful for fund allocation. Key takeaways: Débora S. Raposo1 2, Pablo Orozco2, Ann McCartney3, Jens Freitag4, Mathieu Rouard5, Barbara Ebert1, Amber H. Scholz2 , - Introduction Status quo: How is DSI governed today? DSI databases: Hundreds of millions of DSI are housed in public databases managed by academic institutions, government agencies, or international consortia. The INSDC is the core source of public Nucleotide Sequence Data.* As such, its governance practices for DSI set the bar for the status quo because of its sheer use.⁷ The INSDC’s practices, such as their approach to open access, are largely influenced by historical events⁸ ⁹ and are currently led by - orldwide.¹⁰ A further >50 large DSI databases under the umbrella of the Global Biodata Coalition,¹¹ listed as core biodata resources, as well as thousands of smaller downstream databases collaboratively have developed a culture of open DSI over several decades. the INSDC International Advisory Committee, for the use of scientists w Scientific funders, journals, and other organizations: Public research funders and journal editors define rules for publicly funded DSI (paid for by a research grant) or DSI that needs to be publicly validated (i.e. associated with a publication) with strong mandates for open DSI. Scientific organizations, for example, the Genomics Standards Consortium,¹² also play a role in establishing guidelines and best practices for how DSI should be stored, formatted and exchanged. In addition, research institutes can have their own rules on how to use, store, and publish DSI produced with institutional funding. National regulations: Individual countries might have their own legal, administrative and policy measures governing access and utilization of genetic resources. They may regulate under Mutually Agreed Terms the outcomes of the utilization of genetic resources including DSI.¹³ National and regional governments also set open access requirements and place conditions on funding towards maximum openness.² International agreements: International agreements on Access and Benefit-Sharing (ABS) that regulate genetic resources have indirect implications for the creation, collection and sharing of DSI.¹³ There is no single international agreement or global governing body specifically responsible for DSI. Agreements such as the CBD, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Pandemic Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework and its draft Pandemic Agreement 2 Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) are developing a multilateral mechanism including a global fund for benefit-sharing from the use of digital sequence information (DSI) on genetic resources. Key issues for the multilateral mechanism still need to be agreed upon, like DSI access and use, triggers for the mechanism, tensions between the current “open” paradigm¹ of DSI in public databases and the FAIR and CARE principles, DSI provenance information, and the role of indicators and monitoring tools.⁵ Future decisions for the mechanism could significantly impact the various formal and informal DSI governance rules and practices in the databases, scientific funders, journals, and other organizations, as well as national regulations. The DSI governance landscape consists of overlapping rules, practices, policies, national regulations and international agreements set by data repositories, scientific organizations, national and regional governments, and international bodies. WHAT THIS BRIEF WILL DO: 1. Identify the status quo of the various formal and informal DSI governance around the globe. 2. Describe different types of DSI "users". 3. Discuss tensions between Parties, stakeholders, and rightsholders that have implications for DSI governance. 4. Make recommendations from an academic scientific perspective on the possible changes to the status quo of DSI governance. * At the time of writing, the INSDC is composed of three repositories: the DNA Data Bank of Japan (DDBJ), the European Nucleotide Archive (ENA), and the Genbank at the U.S. National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI). This could change based on the recent INSDC announcement welcoming new members. https://www.insdc.org/news/insdc-publishes-guidance-for-prospective-new-members/ (WHO CA+), and the recently adopted Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) under the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) are all grappling, in parallel, with how to address benefit-sharing from the use of DSI. In all these agreements, many measures that could directly or indirectly impact the governance of DSI within the scope of their specific mandate are still to be determined. Status quo: Who are the DSI users? • Group 1 - Web page users: Individuals who interact and download DSI directly via a website interface, where DSI is displayed in a human-readable format. • Group 2 - Power users and bulk downloads: Computers used by high-throughput users to download large datasets from databases in a semi-automated format via Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), File Transfer Protocol (FTP) or other related technological tools and protocols. • Group 3 - Interconnected databases: Other databases that download the data, store it, and then redistribute it through their own websites and databases via their own Groups 1-2. 3 There are different ways to access and use DSI. In developing the multilateral mechanism, Parties will need to consider whether current DSI working practices and research are impacted and whether any impacts meet the criteria in Decision 15/9 Para. 9e-i.¹⁴ Academia and industry are both part of all the groups above. The breakdown of "who, what, when and why" of DSI use is unknown and currently unmeasurable. Tensions in negotiations At the heart of efforts to enable benefit-sharing from DSI, tensions and concerns have emerged. Many proposals that would require changes to the status quo of DSI governance fundamentally stem from an attempt to address and resolve these tensions: 1. Open access to DSI versus obligatory monetary benefit-sharing: One major issue is balancing the need for open access to DSI in public databases while also ensuring that monetary benefits generated from its use can be captured and shared. The concern is reflected in discussions regarding possible triggers for benefit-sharing at different points of the DSI data lifecycle. Because DSI is distributed via technological infrastructures such as scientific databases, it is understandable that these infrastructures themselves might be considered to directly capture monetary benefits. However, any major DSI infrastructure changes would also have impacts on a range of stakeholders and generation of non-monetary benefits (see Recommendations 1 and 2). 2. Open access versus exertion of sovereign rights and control: For some Parties, stakeholders and rightsholders, there is a strong drive to ensure that a benefit-sharing system makes clear who has used which DSI. Users of genetic resources, after all, must obtain prior informed consent under mutually agreed terms. Thus, for DSI there is a desire to also control and know who has used what. Ideas such as universal registration of users or improving the monitoring of data throughout its lifecycle have surfaced during negotiations to increase this control. In Recommendations 2 and 3, we examine how different approaches might support the desire for control without overhauling DSI practices of public databases.¹⁵ 3. Stakeholders and rightsholders who feel that the system overlooks their needs: Some stakeholders from low- and middle- income countries (LMICs) and Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs) have been marginalized or left behind in the scientific and innovation systems. They seek proper recognition for their contributions and traditional knowledge and emphasize the importance of data citation and acknowledgment of IPLC territories as the origin of genetic resources giving rise to DSI.¹⁶ To address these concerns, options to identify the provenance and protocols associated with DSI or other datasets, new metadata requirements, adding terms of use, or requiring data citation might be considered (see Recommendations 3 and 4). Solutions that require large structural changes: Benefit-sharing solutions that require (a) payments for cloud services or (b) universal registration of all DSI users could not be carried out in a manner that complies with decision 15/9. The main reason these two solutions are neither feasible nor practical is that both would require registrations to access DSI. It would mean registering the three different types of users, regardless if they are web page users (group 1), power users and bulk downloads (group 2), or entire databases (group 3). This would be significantly challenging for several reasons: Recommendations from a scientific perspective on possible changes to the status quo of DSI governance The tensions outlined above have varied implications for DSI governance. How the solutions are operationalized may imply different governance measures to be tweaked, changed, or completely overhauled. These dynamics underscore the complexity of creating a multilateral mechanism that is equitable and effective for all involved. We must identify opportunities for DSI data governance that maximize benefits for providers of genetic resources while also ensuring interoperability and access to DSI for its generators and users. By improving both the quality and quantity of benefits, we can encourage equitable benefit-sharing. Four DSI governance-focused recommendations will enable benefit-sharing while still ensuring the criteria in decision 15/9 are fulfilled. 4 RECOMMENDATION 1: Keep current DSI governance practices which are more Open than FAIR or CARE principles Open DSI in INSDC is FAIR (Findable, Accessible, Interoperable, and Reusable), but goes even further. Open access means anonymous, free, machine-readable, and unrestricted re-use.³ This openness is crucial for scientific discoveries as scientists often use millions of sequences to find useful ones for their research purposes. FAIR ensures context information through metadata quality, format readability, and data integration, while Open access facilitates the broadest comparison with the entire global corpus of data, which generates the biggest collective benefits. Although Open and FAIR are complementary, FAIR can be more restrictive if the data creator wishes. The CARE (Collective Benefit, Authority to Control, Responsibility, Ethics) principles complement the FAIR principles by ensuring roles for Indigenous Peoples and other marginalized communities in decision-making, protecting access to data as dictated by these communities, minimizing harms, and maximizing benefits.¹⁷ However, this can conflict with international recommendations for Open Science that call for data to be kept as a digital public good (open, free and in the public domain),¹⁸ especially if specific DSI data cannot be made public. Such data may need to be handled in specialized databases,¹⁹ and this can be required in MAT when accessing genetic resources.¹³ Scientific policies for open data governance can, however, complement the FAIR and CARE principles by acknowledging the provenance and protocols of data from IPLCs (see Recommendation 4), and maximizing benefits through interoperability, capacity development, scientific collaborations, and new discoveries. Decision 15/9 ensures open access to foster scientific advancements in fields like biology, medicine, agriculture, and environmental sciences, benefiting the genetic resources providers as much as for DSI users and the entire society. RECOMMENDATION 2: Avoid large structural changes to DSI databases and instead use existing infrastructure • Legal and data privacy issues: concerns about whether database managers will need to act as gatekeepers, potentially sharing personal information with legal authorities. Currently, database managers do not have the legal authority to do this, and even when users voluntarily register, their data is not shared with third parties. In addition, data and privacy protection principles in countries and regions are not uniform. Existing global services and database options in less restrictive regions would not have the ability to build equivalent systems. • Technical issues and engineering costs: Many FTP transactions are automated, with computers programmed to download large 5 datasets regularly (e.g., monthly downloads of the entire INSDC). Requiring registration for automated downloads is technically more complex which would incur in significant costs. • Reduced interoperability among the chains of data resources: If registration is required for the INSDC, all downstream databases (potentially numbering in the thousands) would also need to implement registration for their users. This creates a domino effect, requiring the entire ecosystem to shift to a registration model. The databases would need to extend their registration systems to cover interactions with an additional 2,700 databases, making data less interoperable and, again, creating technical issues and raising engineering costs. • Blocking scientific creativity where it is most needed: Innovations and new services developed in universities often become widely available or integrated into existing databases. Especially in the global south, where computer science enables global scientific participation and the development of locally adapted services. Blocking this form of scientific creativity would hinder progress where it is needed the most. Solutions that use existing infrastructure: On the other hand, solutions that make the most of existing infrastructure, such as using the current DSI architecture for reporting on publications and patent data, would be easier to implement in a way that allows open access and maximizes benefits. In addition, this approach would not require databases to change their core function or tax them with duties beyond their means. The use of publications and patent data has been called on by parties such as Brazil during the formal and informal negotiations. • Regarding publications: submissions of sequence data are required by journals as a condition of publication and rely on the use of unique identifier(s) (called accession numbers [ANs]) generated by a member of the INSDC.²⁰ Most funding agencies also require that DSI generated during the project is made freely available. This information can be collected in an automated way to generate non-monetary benefits reports. • Regarding patents: DSI necessary to ensure reproducibility of the invention is submitted to patent offices around the world. The publicly available DSI resulting from these submissions could also be used for reporting purposes.²¹ Currently, a database of DSI products does not exist. It is not easy to determine if and what DSI is used in a specific product but going back to the patent could indicate some information. In order to assure the success of these solutions, the reporting responsibilities should be placed on institutions that already collects data and not the users. RECOMMENDATION 3: Data governance policies should be easy to comply with, hard to avoid Data governance policies for benefit-sharing that fragment DSI by using conditions like licenses for individual DSI records would be hard to comply with and easy to avoid. On the other hand, global approaches, such as universal terms of use would be easier to comply with and hard to avoid. The level of compliance will directly affect the benefits, either reducing or increasing them. An assessment of two examples can provide clarity on how: A licensing solution is hard to comply with and easy to avoid: If individual licenses were to be attached to individual DSI records (sequence entries) with some requiring benefit-sharing and others allowing for free and unrestricted use, this would create an economic marketplace with some DSI more economically attractive than others. While comparisons have been made to the use of creative commons licenses, which all allow for open use and re-use, it is unclear whether licenses that require monetary benefit- sharing would actually be taken up in the public DSI database ecosystem. In biological research, many scientists either work with thousands of sequences daily or with individual sequences that need prior analysis of larger datasets, making it difficult to comply with variable conditions and requirements. Additionally, the INSDC does not attach licenses to sequence records. For instance, when downloading data from INSDC, all metadata can be retained and included in the downstream databases. However, downloading licenses associated with DSI is technically much more complicated, cost-intensive and presents legal uncertainty. The most problematic aspect of a licensing solution is that it would be easy to avoid benefit-sharing obligations. To avoid potential legal issues, users might sidestep these restrictions by (a) filtering out the sequences which contain restrictive conditions of use and (b) using similar sequences from other sources (jurisdiction shopping). Therefore, restricting the use of DSI, regardless of the modality, could have the opposite of the intended * DSI-based publication data could support Para. 21 of CBD/WGDSI/2/2. An example of existing infrastructure is the WiLDSI Data portal . * https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/40d7/2520/515ea38668444a547836a474/wgdsi-02-02-en.pdf https://apex.ipk-gatersleben.de/apex/wildsi/r/wildsi/home 6 effect of the benefit-sharing mechanism, ultimately reducing the benefits generated. A “Terms of Use” solution is easy to comply with and hard to avoid: Global approaches that are easy to comply with and hard to avoid guarantee the functionality of the system and will increase benefits. An example of this would be a notification to users of public databases of the multilateral mechanism. This notification would treat the entire global DSI dataset with the same conditions. It would preserve free and unrestricted access to DSI in public databases, maintain interoperability and machine readability of data and would not fragment DSI within databases. This option could decouple access from benefit- sharing obligations by setting the monetary benefit- sharing trigger at the point of commercialization of the use of DSI. The terms of use would notify database users that obligations to share benefits would arise when DSI is used to develop a product or generate revenue, avoiding the need of databases to track and trace DSI for benefit-sharing purposes. A “global terms of use” solution would also guarantee users of DSI from public databases legal certainty for their use of DSI and compliance with the benefit- sharing obligations. RECOMMENDATION 4: A metadata field to identify DSI of IPLC origin. geolocation of where the genetic resources were sourced from, and could be used, in theory, to indicate IPLC provenance.²³ However, in order to foster respect, recognition and transparency, public databases could work towards establishing updated metadata fields to indicate whether genetic resources that gave rise to DSI come from IPLC provenance, and labels²⁴ which could be associated with the genetic resources. A metadata field for “IPLC origin” could not readily be used for benefit-sharing but it would allow users to voluntarily engage and build relationships while also contributing to the respect and acknowledgement of IPLCs values and realities. Acknowledgements We express our sincere gratitude to the stakeholders and rightsholders who participated in the interviews on data governance, conducted in the period from Apr-Jun 2024 as part of the research for the FAR-DSI project. We thank the members of the DSI Scientific Network who joined the Working Group Data Governance (Alejandra Sierra, Andrew Hufton, Carolina Dos Santos Ribeiro, Davide Faggionato, Eizadora Yu, Gabrielle Rinck, Guilherme Oliveira, Halima Benbouza, Hanzhi Yu, Irma Klünker, Martine Hossaert, Masanori Arita, Martha Cepeda, Rachel Ogidan, and Sarah Hearne) and the sounding board of the FAR-DSI project for their discussions and contributions to the brief. The project is supported by the German Federal Agency for Nature Conservation (BfN) with funds from the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection (BMUV). Affiliations ¹ GFBio - German Federation for Biological Data e.V.; draposo@gfbio.org ² Leibniz Institute DSMZ - German Collection of Microorganisms and Cell Cultures GmbH. ³ Genomics Institute, University of California ⁴ Leibniz Institute of Plant Genetics and Crop Plant Research (IPK) ⁵ Alliance of Bioversity International and the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) * Currently, there is no specific field in public databases to indicate if genetic resources are sourced from IPLC lands, territories or waters. In terms of provenance of genetic resources, only a small subset of DSI in databases have any geographical origin information currently available.²² The INSDC began requiring geographical and temporal provenance information for newly submitted nucleotide sequences in March 2023. However, protein and metabolite databases almost completely lack geographical origin information. We recommend these databases follow the lead of the INSDC to expand provenance information. Some public databases have additional free text fields that can be used to indicate a higher level of * See similar proposal in Para. 13c of CBD/WGDSI/2/2 mailto:draposo@gfbio.org https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/40d7/2520/515ea38668444a547836a474/wgdsi-02-02-en.pdf 7 Literature Cited ¹ Open Definition 2.1 - Defining Open in Open Data, Open Content and Open Knowledge. Accessible at https://opendefinition.org/ od/2.1/en/ ² Sara, Hufton, Sett, and Scholz. (2022). Open access: a technical assessment for the debate on benefit-sharing and digital sequence information. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/ zenodo.5849643 ³ Sara, Hufton, and Scholz. (2022). Compatible or Incompatible? DSI, Open Access, and Benefit-Sharing. SocArXiv Papers. https:// doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/nw8g9 ⁴ Jaspar and Brown. (2022) What Should We Mean by ‘Open Access’? Book Chapter from Access and Benefit Sharing of Genetic Resources, Information and Traditional Knowledge, 1st Edition, London. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003301998 ⁵ CBD/WGDSI/1/3* (2023). Report of the Ad Hoc Open- ended Working Group on Benefit-sharing from the Use of Digital Sequence Information on Genetic Resources on its first meeting. Accessible at https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/8531/ d3e3/739fe0f4c5931b46dab505f3/wgdsi-01-03-en.pdf ⁶ Rohden, Huang, Dröge, and Scholz. (2020). Combined study on digital sequence information in public and private databases and traceability. Accessible at https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/1f8f/ d793/57cb114ca40cb6468f479584/dsi-ahteg-2020-01-04-en. pdf ⁷ INSDC clarification to CBD about DSI open access policy. Accessible at https://www.cbd.int/abs/DSI-views/2019/INSDC- DSI.pdf ⁸ The Bermuda principles (1996). Accessible at https:// dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/7715 ⁹ The Fort Lauderdale Agreement (2003). Accessible at https:// www.sanger.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/fortlauderdalereport. pdf ¹⁰ Response from INSDC to CBD call for views and information on DSI on Genetic Resources. Accessible at https://www.cbd. int/abs/dsi-views/2019/insdc-dsi.pdf ¹¹ Global Biodata Coalition: https://globalbiodata.org/ ¹² Genomic Standards Consortium: https://www.gensc.org/ ¹³ CBD/DSI/AHTEG/2020/1/5 (2020). Fact-finding study on how domestic measures address benefit-sharing arising from commercial and non-commercial use of digital sequence information on genetic resources and address the use of digital sequence information on genetic resources for research and development. Accessible at https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/428d/0 17b/1b0c60b47af50c81a1a34d52/dsi-ahteg-2020-01-05-en.pdf ¹⁴ CBD/COP/DEC/15/9 (2022). Digital sequence information on genetic resources. Accessible at https://www.cbd.int/doc/ decisions/cop-15/cop-15-dec-09-en.pdf ¹⁵ Paragraphs 37, 55, 57 of CBD/WGDSI/1/L.2 (2023). Possible elements of a multilateral mechanism for benefit-sharing from the use of digital sequence information on genetic resources, including a global fund. Accessible at https://www.cbd.int/ doc/c/b3c5/e301/e4cdc9663fb0001e5196ef8e/wgdsi-01-l-02- en.pdf ¹⁶ Paragraphs 19, 58 of CBD/WGDSI/1/L.2 (2023). Possible elements of a multilateral mechanism for benefit-sharing from the use of digital sequence information on genetic resources, including a global fund. Accessible at https://www.cbd.int/ doc/c/b3c5/e301/e4cdc9663fb0001e5196ef8e/wgdsi-01-l-02- en.pdf ¹⁷ Carrol et al. (2020). The CARE Principles for Indigenous Data Governance, Data Science Journal. https://doi.org/10.5334/ dsj-2020-043 ¹⁸ UNESCO (2021). UNESCO Recommendation on Open Science. Accessible at https://en.unesco.org/science-sustainable-future/ open-science/recommendation ¹⁹ Systematics Collections Data: https://scd.landcareresearch. co.nz/ ²⁰ Scholz et al. (2021). Myth-busting the provider-user relationship for digital sequence information, GigaScience (10). https://doi.org/10.1093/gigascience/giab085 ²¹ WIPO Standard ST.26: https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/ www/standards/en/pdf/03-26-01.pdf ²² Raposo, Cepeda, Ebert, and Scholz. (2023). Challenges and opportunities of geographical origin information in DSI benefit- sharing: a global analysis from the academic sector. Zenodo. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10050454 ²³ Example of entry at ENA with reference to a IPLC territory (Navajo Nation). Accessible at https://www.ebi.ac.uk/ena/ browser/view/MT070996 ²⁴ Traditional Knowledge (TK) and Biocultural (BC) Labels: https://localcontexts.org/labels/about-the-labels/ https://opendefinition.org/od/2.1/en/ https://opendefinition.org/od/2.1/en/ https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5849643 https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5849643 https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/nw8g9 https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/nw8g9 https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003301998 https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/8531/d3e3/739fe0f4c5931b46dab505f3/wgdsi-01-03-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/8531/d3e3/739fe0f4c5931b46dab505f3/wgdsi-01-03-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/1f8f/d793/57cb114ca40cb6468f479584/dsi-ahteg-2020-01-04-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/1f8f/d793/57cb114ca40cb6468f479584/dsi-ahteg-2020-01-04-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/1f8f/d793/57cb114ca40cb6468f479584/dsi-ahteg-2020-01-04-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/abs/DSI-views/2019/INSDC-DSI.pdf https://www.cbd.int/abs/DSI-views/2019/INSDC-DSI.pdf https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/7715 https://dukespace.lib.duke.edu/dspace/handle/10161/7715 https://www.sanger.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/fortlauderdalereport.pdf https://www.sanger.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/fortlauderdalereport.pdf https://www.sanger.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/fortlauderdalereport.pdf https://www.cbd.int/abs/dsi-views/2019/insdc-dsi.pdf https://www.cbd.int/abs/dsi-views/2019/insdc-dsi.pdf https://globalbiodata.org/ https://www.gensc.org/ https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/428d/017b/1b0c60b47af50c81a1a34d52/dsi-ahteg-2020-01-05-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/428d/017b/1b0c60b47af50c81a1a34d52/dsi-ahteg-2020-01-05-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-15/cop-15-dec-09-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-15/cop-15-dec-09-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/b3c5/e301/e4cdc9663fb0001e5196ef8e/wgdsi-01-l-02-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/b3c5/e301/e4cdc9663fb0001e5196ef8e/wgdsi-01-l-02-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/b3c5/e301/e4cdc9663fb0001e5196ef8e/wgdsi-01-l-02-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/b3c5/e301/e4cdc9663fb0001e5196ef8e/wgdsi-01-l-02-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/b3c5/e301/e4cdc9663fb0001e5196ef8e/wgdsi-01-l-02-en.pdf https://www.cbd.int/doc/c/b3c5/e301/e4cdc9663fb0001e5196ef8e/wgdsi-01-l-02-en.pdf https://doi.org/10.5334/dsj-2020-043 https://doi.org/10.5334/dsj-2020-043 https://en.unesco.org/science-sustainable-future/open-science/recommendation https://en.unesco.org/science-sustainable-future/open-science/recommendation https://scd.landcareresearch.co.nz/ https://scd.landcareresearch.co.nz/ https://doi.org/10.1093/gigascience/giab085 https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-26-01.pdf https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/standards/en/pdf/03-26-01.pdf https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.10050454 https://www.ebi.ac.uk/ena/browser/view/MT070996 https://www.ebi.ac.uk/ena/browser/view/MT070996 https://localcontexts.org/labels/about-the-labels/ Digital Sequence Information (DSI) data governance practices to support benefit-sharing and science Key takeaways Introduction Status quo: How is DSI governed today? Status quo: Who are the DSI users? Tensions in negotiations Recommendations from a scientific perspective on the possible changes to the status quo of DSI governance RECOMMENDATION 1: Keep current DSI governance practices which are more Open than FAIR or CARE principles RECOMMENDATION 2: Avoid large structural changes to DSI databases and instead use existinginfrastructure RECOMMENDATION 3: Data governance policies should be easy to comply with, hard to avoid RECOMMENDATION 4: A metadata field to identify DSI of IPLC origin. Acknowledgements Affiliations Literature Cited