IFPRI

MYANMAR

STRATEGY SUPPORT PROGRAM | WORKING PAPER 32 MARCH 2023

An Overview of Migration in Myanmar: Findings from the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey

USAID FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

FEED THE FUTURE The U.S. Government's Global Hunger & Food Security Initiative

LIFT Livelihoods and Food Security Fund

managed by UNOPS

CONTENTS

TABLES

FIGURES

ABSTRACT

This paper provides evidence on the extent and characteristics of migration in Myanmar between December 2021 and June 2022. We use data from three rounds of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, to analyze migration patterns in Myanmar. The data highlights a complex situation, where there is both new migration, that is driven by conflict, and more traditional migration, that is driven by a search for better employment both within Myanmar and abroad. We find that approximately 3.6 million individuals or 6.5 percent of the population of Myanmar moved over the 6-month study period. Between December 2021 and June 2022 fleeing direct conflict was the primary driver of migration for as many as 604 thousand individuals. During the same period, approximately 2 million individuals moved in search of a job for themselves or a family member. Finally, Chin, Yangon, and Rakhine had the highest rates of migration.

1. INTRODUCTION

In 2017, an estimated 25 percent of Myanmar's population were internal migrants, while 5 percent were international migrants (World Bank 2017). In 2019, Myanmar had one of the highest net migration rates in the Southeast Asian region, higher than that of Philippines, Laos, and Thailand, but lower than that of Singapore and Cambodia (ibid). At the same time, Myanmar also had one of the highest rates of internally displaced persons due to conflict and violence (IOM, 2022). The pandemic had an immediate impact on the Myanmar economy as well as on migration. Border closures between countries and states/regions and lockdown measures reduced internal migration and out-migration while at the same time large numbers of migrants decided to return home (World Bank 2020). During this time, the net migration rate[1] by population fell from -1.89 percent in 2019 to -0.65 percent in 2022, below that of the Philippines, Laos, and Malaysia (United Nations Population Division 2022).

In February 2021, in the midst of the pandemic, the military took over in a coup and Myanmar fell into a political crisis. After the coup, security conditions declined rapidly, adding to the already deteriorating economic situation. As a result, welfare for many people in Myanmar declined. The global crisis triggered to a large extent by the war in Ukraine in February 2022, led to a further deterioration of living conditions in Myanmar as food, fuel and fertilizer prices increased rapidly. This triple crisis -- pandemic, political, economic – likely has spurred massive migration. However, the extent and characteristics of this migration is largely unknown. UNHCR (2023) estimates that between February 2021 and December 2022 1.14 million people in Myanmar were displaced internally as a result of conflict. We add to these estimates, by exploring overall migration, including migration driven by a search for employment, marriage, or family reasons.

More specifically, this report investigates household and individual migration in Myanmar between January 2020 and August 2022. We use data from the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS) for this analysis. MHWS is a panel survey, conducted every quarter since December 2021. This paper relies on the first three rounds: round 1 (R1) was conducted from December 2021 to February 2022, round 2 (R2) from April to June 2022, and round 3 (R3) from July to August 2022 (MAPSA, 2022a). The rounds have 12,100, 12,142, and 12,128 observations, respectively. MHWS was implemented when mobility was restricted due to COVID-19 and insecurity and was therefore conducted by phone.

First, this report provides a descriptive account of households who have migrated within Myanmar between January 2020 and June 2022. Household migration refers to a whole household that has moved during this time period. Since R3 began in the beginning of July 2022, we only have partial estimates for July and August 2022. Therefore, we end our analysis period in June 2022. Since we do not survey households outside of Myanmar, we only capture household that have migrated internally.

Second, this report explores the characteristics of migrants who have left their households between December 2021 and August 2022. These individual migrants, as we refer to them, could have migrated either internally or abroad. For our analysis of individual migrants, we rely on panel households that participated in at least two rounds of the survey.

Third, combining these two types of migrants, we estimated the number of individuals that have migrated between December 2021 and June 2022. Finally, we use regression analysis to explore the drivers of household and household member migration.

[1] Net migration is defined as the difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants per 1000 population. Net migration rate on the other hand is expressed as the contribution of migration to the overall population change.

This paper is organized as follows: Section two provides a background on migration in Myanmar. Section three describes the data and methodology. Section four explores migration trends at the township level. Section five documents household migration within Myanmar. Section six gives an overview of migrants that have left their households within the MHWS panel. Section seven estimates the extent of migration between December 2021 and June 2022. Section eight explores characteristics associated with migrating. Section nine concludes.

2. BACKGROUND

An internal migrant is defined as someone who is born in Myanmar and has changed their usual place of residence within Myanmar at least once in their lifetime (CSO, UNDP, WB, 2020). An international migrant is someone from Myanmar living in a country other than the one in which they were born (UN DESA 2022). The Myanmar Housing and Population Census recorded that in 2014, 19.6 percent of the total population of Myanmar were internal migrants and nearly 2 million Myanmar nationals (5.1 percent of the total population) were international migrants[2] (2014 Myanmar Housing and Population Census). At that time, 40.8 percent of internal migrants moved for marriage and family, 34.3 percent moved for employment, and 0.7 percent moved because of local conflict (Department of Population 2015). Further, during the same period, Thailand, Malaysia, and China were the most popular destinations for international migrants and together were home to 90 percent of the international migrant population (2014 Myanmar Housing and Population Census).

According to the World Bank, in 2017, nearly 18 percent of the population were considered internal migrants, roughly similar to the level in 2014 (CSO, UNDP, WB 2020). Further, in 2017, an estimated 2.95 million Myanmar citizens were living abroad, which is equivalent to 5.5 percent of Myanmar's population at that time, representing an increase from the previous period (World Bank 2017). While in 2015, conflict seemed to rank low as a driver of internal migration, at the end of 2020 Myanmar was among the top 20 countries with the largest population of internally displaced persons due to conflict and violence (IOM, 2022). Further, in 2020, Myanmar ranked 19th on the top 20 list of origins of international migrants (IOM, 2022). Not all of Myanmar's international migration during the period was to find employment as there was also a huge exodus of Rohingya refugees from Rakhine state (UNICEF 2023).[3] As a result, in 2020, Myanmar was also among one of the five countries with the highest rates of refugees, along with Afghanistan, the Syrian Arab Republic, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (IBID).

These migration patterns changed with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Mass gatherings were banned on February 28th, 2020 (Traill et al. 2020) (Figure 1). On March 29, 2020, the Myanmar Ministry of Health and Sports issued a statement restricting all foreign travelers from entering the country (Figure 1). They temporarily suspended issuing all types of visas for entry, as well as incoming flights. To stop international travel via land borders, Myanmar shut down border checkpoints with China, India, Thailand, and Laos (Ministry of Health and Sports 2020).

Before these orders came into effect and following the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Myanmar, tens of thousands of migrant workers returned home from Thailand during the week of March 22, 2020, through both official and unofficial border crossings (ILO 2020). This unexpected mass influx of migrant workers was fueled by concerns of the COVID-19 situation worsening, unemployment, and expected job losses. Further, many migrants wanted to cross the border before the Thai emergency decree was enforced.

[2] Movement of people involving a change of country of usual residence (CENSUS Atlas Myanmar).

[3] This paper does not capture information on whole households that have moved abroad but only on individual migrants who have moved abroad. Therefore, the Rohingya crisis is not addressed in the paper. Please refer to Rosenbach et al. (2018) for further analysis of this issue.

In April 2020, partial lockdowns were enforced among some townships in Yangon (Traill et al. 2020). At the same time, Thailand, Malaysia, and China, where most of Myanmar's international migrants live, closed their borders to foreigners (ILO 2020). Between March 22nd and June 15th, 2020, an estimated 99,058 Myanmar migrants returned from Thailand, and 36,280 migrants returned from China (ibid). This is equivalent to approximately five percent of the estimated number of migrants living abroad in 2017.

Due to a second wave of COVID-19 in August 2020, stay-at-home orders were put back in place in certain locations (ILO 2020). In September 2020, Myanmar issued another country-wide stay-at-home order that required all companies and workplaces to adopt work-from-home practices other than essential services. This resulted in immense job loss for internal migrants. For example, in the garment sector, which employs mainly internal migrants, only the export factories were allowed to operate. As a result, ninety-five percent of garment factory workers reported losing their jobs (ILO 2021).

In February 2021, in response to the coup, conflict escalated across the country, forcing some households and individuals to flee. At the same time, borders between countries were still closed. Although Thailand began making plans to open its borders to migrant workers in November 2021, the military government failed to put in place an MOU with the Thai government to permit legal migration (Reuters 2021). Even when legal migration resumed, due to complex bureaucratic processes and long waits at the border, many migrants left through unofficial channels. Those that were caught faced deportation with fines up to 50,000 baht ($1,443) and a 2-year ban from being eligible for a Thai worker permit (Frontier Myanmar 2022). Malaysia did not begin accepting migrant workers until October 21, 2022, but even this initial opening was only targeted for migrant workers employed in palm oil plantations and rubber glove manufacturing (Reuters 2021).

Conflict also fueled international and internal migration. Between February 2021 and December 2022, around 49,600 individuals from Myanmar took refuge in neighboring countries (UNCHR 2023). During the same period, 1.14 million Myanmar people became internally displaced persons (IDPs) (UNCHR 2023). The majority of IDPs were from Sagaing, Magway, Kayin, Kayah and southern Shan. Having likely lost their livelihoods after the displacement, these families were vulnerable to using negative coping mechanisms such as reducing food consumption, relying on savings, borrowing, and selling assets (OCHA 2022). Due to destruction of civilian properties, including homes, churches, monasteries, and schools, as well as heightened security risks and explosion risks, this displacement may be prolonged or permanent (ibid).

Figure 1. Timeline of COVID-19 related regulations in Myanmar and its neighbors

Source: Traill et al. 2020; ILO 2020; ILO 2021; Reuters 2021

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The analysis presented in this paper relies on data from the first three rounds of MHWS. The first round was collected through a phone survey between December 2021 and February 2022, the second round between April and June 2022, and the third round between July and August 2022. Each round has around 12,100 respondents. The survey is nationally representative at the rural/urban and state/region levels (MAPSA 2022b).

In our report we focus on two types of households. We first explore households that have moved in Myanmar between January 2020 and June 2022, which we refer to as mid-2022. These households include any household that either recalled their move date or moved between survey rounds. Second, we explore migration of individuals greater than 15 years of age who have left their household between survey rounds. We only have this information from R1, R2, and R3 panel households that participated in the survey in two or three rounds. We analyze household migrants and individual migrants separately because our data is for different time periods and different indicators.

We employ exploratory regression analysis to obtain a better understanding of which households are more likely to migrate and which households are more likely to have members migrate. To do so we use a random effects panel Probit model to estimate the impact of conflict, household characteristics, and location on whether a household migrates and sends a migrant. Conflict is measured by a township-level indicator for violent shocks based on secondary information from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) dataset (ACLED, 2022). The indicator is the number of battles in the three-month period prior to the interview month of the household.

It is important to note key issues in the data collection that likely impacts our estimates of internal household migration. It is likely that our estimates of the total number of individuals that have moved with their households within Myanmar is too low because many households who would have moved did not participate in the survey after the first or second round. For example, attrition households were more likely to be asset poor and were less likely to own an improved house, be connected to the government electricity grid, and own agricultural land all of which we found to be associated with household migration (Appendix Table 1). Further, at the regional level, attrition households were more likely to live in Kayah, Kayin, Sagaing, Tanintharyi, Mon, and Rakhine, all areas that are heavily affected by conflict.

Another issue with our survey is that because of the difficulty in sampling conflict as well as the issue of attrition, it is likely that we under sample IDPs. We estimate that 320,666 individuals moved with their households primarily because of conflict between February 2021 and June 2022. However, this number is much lower than the 758,500 IDPs estimated by UNHCR over the same time period. Further, the under sampling of IDPs increases across rounds. Between February 2021 and November 2021, we estimate that 153,940 individuals migrated due to conflict, this is 58 percent of the number of IDPS estimated by UNHCR over the same period (267,500). Between December 2021 and June 2022, our results indicate that 166,726 individuals moved due to conflict, which is 34 percent of the 491,00 IDPs estimated by UNHCR during the same period.

A couple of different issues may account for these missing IDPs. First, we have missing information on the reason for migration for 87 households in our sample who have moved since 2020.[4] These households may have moved due to conflict. Another issue may be that households are primarily moving because of conflict but are reporting a different reason for their own safety. Third, MHWS is likely under sampling households that have moved due to conflict. Only 89 households in our sample are living in IDP camps. This reflects the difficulty of surveying IDPs who may be hard to reach over the phone. Of the households that have moved due to conflict since December 2021, 14 dropped out of our sample, while only 2 households that moved due to conflict were added to the sample in R3. Further, while 4 households living in IDP camps left the sample, no new households in IDP camps were added to the sample in R3. So, while, the number of households who moved due to conflict should be increasing, it is actually decreasing due to sampling issues. We further address this issue in section 5 when we estimate migration from conflict.

It is also important to note key differences in the R2 and R3 questionnaire that impacts our estimates of individual migrants (see Appendix B and Appendix C). In R1 we did not collect household roster information. Therefore, in R2, in order to ask for changes in household composition, we went by age group and gender and asked if anyone left the household. The sample was divided into four age groups, 0-4 years, 5-14 years, 15-64 years, and 65 years and older. For each age-group we asked if there were fewer household members in this age range, and if yes, to multi-select why they left. If there were multiple migrants within the same age-group and gender, we do not capture them separately in the survey. We only know that there was at least one household member who left. This means that we are likely underestimating migration.

In R2 we started to collect household roster information. Therefore, in R3 we could use the household roster to identify which members left. As a result, in R3 we know how many members left and who left. However, because of issues with our unique individual identifier, we lost 140 observations that we could not match with the roster. Further, we asked households to specify if they mainly lived in the same household with the same people, or if they left and joined another household, or if many of the previous HH members left their household. For the last two options, these households were meant to fill out a new household roster, but 540 did not. Therefore, all we

[4] This is 270,114 individuals for whom we do not know why they moved.

know is that these households had at least one migrant, which is certainly an underestimate. As a result, we expect the number of household members leaving in both R2 and R3 to be underestimated.

4. PERCEPTIONS ON MIGRATION IN THE COMMUNITY

The movement of households and individuals has increased in Myanmar since the coup. One indicator of this movement is the large number of households reporting a departure or influx of residents. In our survey, households were asked if in the last three months they witnessed a large departure of residents and/or a large influx of migrants in their communities. Between September 2021 and August 2022, 14.5 percent of panel households reported a large departure of residents in their communities. Sixteen percent of panel households also reported a large influx of migrants in their communities. Looking at the pooled sample by round, the number of households reporting a large departure of residents in their community increased from 6.1 percent in R1 to 7.3 percent in R3. Households reporting a large influx of migrants also increased across rounds, from 6.1 percent in R1 to 7.4 percent in R3.

There was enormous heterogeneity in the movement of households across states/regions. In Kayah and Chin, 56.5 and 31.5 percent of households reported a departure of residents on average in a three-month period (Figure 2). If one considers panel households only, over the nine-month period, 79.3 percent of households in Kayah and 49.6 percent of households in Chin reported a large departure of residents. Looking at the pooled sample by round, fewer households witnessed a large departure of residents in Chin State in R3. In Sagaing, Tanintharyi, and Rakhine, however, more residents were departing. Figure 3 compares out-migration and in-migration at the township level from September 2021 to August 2022. Several townships in Chin and Kayah are dark blue suggesting that more than 80 percent of households reported out-migration and in-migration in those townships. Further, across Sagaing and Shan there are several townships with more than 60 percent of respondents witnessing out-migration. In Appendix A, we provide figures by round accompanied by a list of townships with more than 50 percent of households reporting out/in migration. A large departure of residents is positively correlated with the 3-month ACLED indicator for number of violent events, as well as our self-reported indicators for feeling insecure in the community and having a low level of social trust in the community.

Figure 2. Percent of households reporting departure and influx of migrants in communities, by state and MHWS round (top large departure, bottom large influx)

(a) Large departure of residents from the community



(b) Large influx of migrants in the community



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Figure 3. Percent of respondents reporting migration in their communities, at the township level (left large influx, right large departure)



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

5. INTERNAL MIGRATION OF HOUSEHOLDS

Migration can take place in many forms. While individual members can migrate alone for employment, education, or security related reasons, it is also common to see whole households move for the same reasons. In this section, we focus on the households that have moved internally as an entire household. It is important to note, that in our survey we cannot capture households who have left the country.

Of the pooled MHWS sample, 60.3 percent of households resided in the same township since the birth of the respondent, with striking differences between rural (70.1 percent) and urban (35.5 percent) households (Figure 4). Sixteen percent of households moved between 1954 and 2009. Another 8.5 percent of households moved between 2010 and 2015 while 7.6 percent moved between 2016 and 2019. Finally, 7.3 percent of households moved over the period January 2020 to June 2022, representing around 3.79 million people. During this period, 4.3 percent of rural households and 15.0 percent of urban households moved to a different township. In this two-and-a-half-year period, which included some COVID-19 lockdowns, roughly the same number of households moved as in the previous four years. For the households that moved in 2020 and after, we collected detailed information on why they moved and where they moved.

Figure 4. Percent of households migrating by date of departure, by rural/urban location of origin



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Since January 2020, the number of households that are moving appears to be increasing. Figure 5 shows the number of households who have moved since January 2020 and the percent of the sample that has moved each month between January 2020 and June 2022. In 2020 and 2021 migration decreased when COVID-19 lockdown measures were in place. Fewer households moved between August 2020 and November 2020 when stringent lockdown measures were first introduced. Household migration picked up again, thereafter, with the easing of these measures. Following a third wave of COVID-19, lockdowns were re-introduced in June 2021. As a result, migration decreased again in June, July, and August 2021 (Figure 2). Since February 2022, household migration appears to be increasing steadily. In June 2022, an estimated 64,662 households migrated, which is the largest number of households by month in the period.

Figure 5. Number of households who have moved internally, January 2020- June 2022



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Most of the household migration between January 2020 and mid-2022 was either urban-to-urban or rural-to-rural (Figure 6). Forty percent of households moved from one urban area to another. Thirty-one percent of that urban-to-urban migration was to Yangon; 69 percent to other cities. Further, 35 percent of respondents moved from one rural location to another. Fourteen percent of households moved from rural to urban areas and 12 percent of households moved from urban to rural areas. In Figure 6, we disaggregate these pooled averages by year. Rural-to-rural migration appears to have increased, from 22 percent in 2020 to 31.5 percent in 2021 and 2022. Further, the share of households migrating from urban to rural areas, which was high during the COVID-19 pandemic, dropped to 2 percent in 2022.

Figure 6. Percent of households who have moved between rural and urban areas, January 2020- June 2022



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Most households moved within their states/regions over the period 2020 to 2022. Figure 7 depicts movement within and between states/regions. The figure presents the origin of the household on the x-axis and the destination of the household on the y-axis. Inside the squares is the percent of migrant households travelling from each origin to each destination out of the total population of the origin state. Any migration flow greater than one percent of the state/region population is included in the figure, with the redness deepening as the migration flow increases. The states/regions that had the most households move compared to their population were Kayah (25 percent of households), Chin (20 percent of households), and Yangon (14 percent of households).

Most households moved within the same state/region. This appears to be different from the previous period, where internal migrants moved across states/regions (62 percent) rather than within a region (38 percent) (ILO 2015). From the figure it is evident that for those who moved across regions, Yangon is the largest destination for migrant households, accounting for all the significant migration flows from Bago, Magway, Rakhine, Shan, and Ayeyarwady. This is consistent with previous migration flows (ILO 2015). The figure depicts the wide range of migration flows from Kayah and Chin states. In Kayah, households moved significantly inside the state as well as to Bago, Mandalay, and Shan. In Chin, households moved to Sagaing, Magway, Mandalay, and Yangon. Another important household migration flow is movement from Mon to Kayin.

Figure 7. Myanmar migration flows of entire households moving internally, January 2020-June 2022



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.
Note:

Fifty-eight percent of households stated they moved between January 2020 and mid-2022 for employment (Figure 8). Other reasons that households moved include marriage (10.9 percent of households), to give support to their families (7.4 percent of households) and to get support from their families (5.7 percent of households). Nine percent of households moved for other reasons including moving back to their hometown, avoiding high or unaffordable rental prices, moving closer to a road or market, or because of illness/COVID-19.

Nearly 10 percent of households moved because of conflict. We see an increase of migration over time driven by conflict, from 4.5 percent in 2020, to 11.2 percent in 2021 and 2022. This is 72,842 households (363,837 individuals) who have moved because of conflict since January 2020. If we add the difference between our estimate of IDPs and UNHCR's estimate of IDPs (437,834 IDPs) to our sample, conflict becomes the principal cause for 27 percent of household migration, whereas employment accounts for 45 percent of migration (Appendix Figure 7). This highlights that employment was still the most important driver for household internal migration between January 2020 and June 2022.

Figure 8. Main driver for internal household migration, January 2020 to June 2022



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Seventy percent of households who moved from rural-to-urban areas was for employment (Appendix Table 2). While households who moved from rural-to-rural, urban-to-urban, or urban-to-rural areas also moved mainly for employment, around half of these households moved for non-employment reasons. Fifteen percent of urban-to-urban migrant households moved for other reasons including high housing or rental prices. Eighteen percent of rural-to-rural migrant households moved because of marriage, while 14.3 percent moved to avoid conflict. Further, 13.6 percent of urban-to-rural migrant households moved for marriage and 11.2 percent moved to avoid conflict. More households moving from rural-to-rural areas or urban-to-rural areas moved because of conflict than household moving between urban areas or from rural to urban areas.

At the regional level, while in most states/regions by far the most important reason households moved was for employment, there were two notable exceptions. In Chin, 54 percent of households who moved internally, moved because of conflict, and in Kayah, 82 percent of households who moved internally, moved because of conflict (Figure 9). Conflict was also a significant driver of households moving in Sagaing, Magway, and Shan. In Yangon, many households moved for other reasons including to study and to find cheaper rent. Most households that moved expect to stay more than six months (42.4 percent) or permanently (31.0). Though some households plan to stay one month or less (2.0 percent), some will stay between one and six months (13.9 percent) and some did not know (10.7 percent).

Figure 9. Main driver of household internal migration January 2020 to June 2022, by state/region



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

In our survey we asked households to list all the hardships and benefits they experienced after the move. We did not get responses from 84 households or 10.0 percent of households that moved since 2020. Further, 24.7 percent of households who moved listed neither hardships nor benefits while 21.3 percent of households who moved listed both hardships and benefits. Forty-two percent of households said they experienced hardships after the move while 52.3 percent of households said they experienced some benefits after moving (Figure 10).

First, 32.2 percent of households had less work/income after the move compared to 29.4 percent of households that had more work/income. Further, more households had less access to food markets and services including doctors and banks after their move, than households who improved their access to these services. On the other hand, while 13.3 percent of households faced worse housing conditions including no electricity, bad weather and/or scarcity of water after their move, 17.8 percent of households improved their housing conditions by moving. Further, while 6.6 percent of households who moved experienced less physical security after their move, 16.6 percent had better physical security after their move. Finally, some households also faced other difficulties including higher rent, higher debt because they borrowed money to move, having few goods when they arrived, and not feeling a sense of belonging in their new community.

This highlights the dual nature of internal household migration in Myanmar and its impact on household welfare. While 34.8 percent of households that moved because of employment experienced at least one hardship after their move, 69.7 percent of households that moved because of conflict/insecurity experienced at least one hardship after their move. At the same time, less than half of migrant households who moved because of employment (48.8 percent) had more work/income after the move. Households who moved because of marriage had the lowest percentage of households reporting more work/income after their move (11.0 percent) and the lowest percentage of households reporting at least one benefit after migration (19.4 percent).

Figure 10. Hardships and benefits that households faced after their move, January 2020 to June 2022



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

6. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MIGRATION OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS

While sometimes entire households moved, more often, household members left their households. In our survey, we capture information on household members who left their households between December 2021 and August 2022. These migrants are members who left during the three months, or less, between each survey round. Table 1 shows the percent of panel households who had a member who migrated between survey rounds. Overall, between December 2021 and August 2022, 17.0 percent of panel households had a member leave their household. On average these households with migrants had 1.4 members leave. This represents an estimated 1,857,651 members older than 15 who have left their households between December 2021 and August 2022. There was no statistical difference between the percent of households with migrants in rural and urban areas.[5]

Table 1. Individual migrants from panel households, December 2021- August 2022

	Panel National	Panel Rural	Panel Urban	R2	R3	National (pooled)
Households with migrants (%)	17.0	17.1	16.9	14.3	10.0	11.9
Panel households	11,438	7,853	3,585	7,786	9,630	17,416
All households	15216	10587	4629	12,142	12,128	36,370

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

[5] Significantly fewer members left between R2 and R3 than between R2 and R1. But there were fewer months between R2 and R3 than R2 and R1. R2 ended in June and R3 began in July, while R1 ended in February and R2 commenced in April. Therefore, we shy away from analysis over time and for the rest of our analysis we focus on the panel and pooled samples.

Looking at the panel sample, there is significant variation in the percentage of households who had members leave by state/region. Further, there is a heterogeneity between states, in whether members left from rural or urban areas. In Chin 24.6 percent of households had a member leave between December 2021 and August 2022; in Rakhine, Kachin, and Kayah, it was 22 percent; in Kayin, 21 percent; while in Mon, Tanintharyi and Shan this was 20 percent (Figure 11). While in most states/region member migration was predominately rural, in Rakhine, 24.7 percent of urban households had a member leave and in Shan, 25.7 percent of urban households had a member leave.

Figure 11. Percent of panel MHWS households with a migrant, December 2021-August 2022



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Many households had more than one member leave. Between December 2021 and August 2022 panel households sending migrants had on average 1.4 household members leave. While Bago was the state with the fewest migrant sending households, among the households that did send a migrant, they sent 1.5 on average. Households in Sagaing, Kachin, Chin, and Kayah also had more members leave than the national average. In Kayah, households had 1.5 members leave. Using these approximated numbers of household members leaving, we estimate the number of members 15 years and older that have left their households between December 2021 and August 2022 by state/region (Figure 12). The figure also includes the percentage of individuals who have left each state/region.

Overall, Yangon had by far the most members leaving their households, 316 thousand migrants, followed by Mandalay and Ayeyawady, 225 and 223 thousand migrants, respectively. As a percentage of the state/region population Kachin had the largest number of household members leave; 4.6 percent of the residents in Kachin left the state between December 2021 and August 2022. In Rakhine and Kayah, 4.0 and 3.8 percent respectively of residents left the state over the same period. While Chin had the greatest number of migrant sending households, as a percentage of the population, Chin lost 3.1 percent of residents. This is because Chin has the largest average household size, 5.4, compared to the average household size of 4.3 members.[6]

[6] The extent of migration out of Chin and other states/region is not fully captured in our survey. First, in some cases, the respondent left their former household for a new household. For these cases, which account for 2.9 percent of households, we do not know the extent of member migration out of their original household. Second, 1.5 percent of households reported that many of their previous household members left their households for another household. For these households we do not know how many members left. In 6.7 percent of

Figure 12. Number of individual migrants between December 2021-August 2022 by state/region



Note: We estimate that between 1,304,878 members 15 and older in rural areas and 552,774 members in urban areas have left their households.

In R3 we collected more detailed information on the characteristics of these migrants. Table 2 presents the households members who left by type of migrant, percent female, age, and relationship to the head of household. Overall, 41.9 percent of household members who left between R2 and R3 left to work elsewhere in Myanmar. This is approximately 364,000 people who left between April 2022 and August 2022 to work elsewhere in Myanmar. Another 10.7 percent, or 88 thousand residents left to work abroad between April 2022 and August 2022. Eighteen percent of migrants left because of marriage or divorce. Another 12.3 percent of migrants left their household to go to school elsewhere. Finally, 17.1 percent of migrants left for other reasons, including fleeing or for safety. Unfortunately, all these "other" reasons were not specified in the questionnaire. There were some rural/urban differences between types of migrants leaving households. In rural areas, more households had a member leaving both to work elsewhere in Myanmar and to work abroad. Further, more rural households also had members leave to go to school elsewhere. Finally, urban households were more likely to have members leave for other reasons, including safety.

There were not large differences in gender by type of migrant. Overall, 52 percent of migrants were female. Forty-nine percent of migrants working elsewhere in Myanmar were women and 44.6 percent of migrants working abroad were women, indicating that men migrate relatively more abroad. Migrants who moved for marriage were equally men and women. More women moved elsewhere for other reasons, 59.8 percent of migrants. The average age of the migrants was 28.2 years. Migrants were most likely the son or daughter of the head, 61.3 percent of migrants. Though in urban areas, only 44.2 percent of migrants were the son or daughter of the head, which is significantly less than in rural areas. Other types of migrants including parents, brothers/sister, and other relatives also migrated more frequently in urban areas.

households in Chin, the respondent left their former household for a new household (Appendix Table 3). Further, 5.1 percent of households in Chin had many of their previous household members leave.

Table 2. Characteristics of migrants, April 2022- August 2022 R3 MHWS

	National	Rural	Urban
	Percent of migrants		
Lives elsewhere in Myanmar for work	41.9	43.7*	36.0
Lives abroad for work	10.7	12.8***	4.2
Lives elsewhere after marriage/divorce	17.9	17.1	20.6
Lives elsewhere for school	12.4	13.6**	8.3
Lives elsewhere for other reasons, including safety	17.1	12.9***	30.9
All migrants	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Percent Female		
Lives elsewhere in Myanmar for work	49.0	47.6	54.7
Lives abroad for work	44.6	45.6***	33.3
Lives elsewhere after marriage/divorce	52.2	51.2	54.7
Lives elsewhere for school	58.5	58.3	59.4
Lives elsewhere for other reasons, including safety	59.8*	57.1	64.2
All migrants	52.0	50.6	56.8
	Average age		
Lives elsewhere in Myanmar for work	27.4	26.4****	31.6
Lives abroad for work	27.8	27.7	29.6
Lives elsewhere after marriage/divorce	28.8	27.5*	32.0
Lives elsewhere for school	19.6***	19.3	21.3
Lives elsewhere for other reasons, including safety	37.2***	37.6	36.7
All migrants	28.2	27.1	31.9
	Percent by relation to head		
Head	9.2	8.4	11.7
Spouse of head	4.0	2.9**	7.5
Son/daughter	61.3	66.4***	44.2
Son-in-law/daughter-in-law	5.8	6.1	4.9
Grandchild	3.9	4.1	3.3
Parent/parent-in-law	4.0	2.9**	7.7
Brother/sister	4.9	3.7**	8.8
Other relative	6.4	5.3**	10.1
Observations	1043	772	271

Note: Asterisks show significance at p-values * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Asterisks on rural show significance difference between rural and urban areas.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Insecurity appears to be an important driver of household member migration. Significantly more households with a migrant had members assaulted or temporarily or permanently detained than households without a migrant. Significantly more households with a migrant, 1.6 percent, had an asset destroyed or appropriated (Table 3). Further, 1.4 percent of households with a migrant had to pay bribes or payments compared to 0.7 percent of households without a migrant. More urban households with a migrant had their assets destroyed/appropriated and/or were forced to give bribers or payments compared to urban households without a migrant. While feelings of insecurity did not impact migration overall and in urban areas, more rural households with a migrant felt insecure compared to those without a migrant. Finally, households with a migrant had a lower level of social trust in their community compared to households without a migrant, this was true both among rural and urban communities.

Table 3. Percent of insecurity among households with and without members leaving, December 2021 – August 2022

	Household has a migrant			Non-migrant household		
	National	Rural	Urban	National	Rural	Urban
Assault/detention	0.6**	0.5	0.8	0.2	0.2	0.2
Destruction/appropriation of assets	1.6*	1.2	2.5*	0.9	0.8	1.2
Theft/robbery	3.8	2.4	7.0	3.7	2.9	5.7
Bribery/forced payments	1.4**	1.0	2.4*	0.7	0.6	0.9
Feels insecure	22.4	21.6*	24.5	20.7	19.3	24.1
Low levels of social trust	24.4***	21.2*	32.1**	21.1	18.9	26.3

Note: Asterisks show significance at p-values * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Asterisks on national, rural, and urban show significance differences between migrant and non-migrant households within these regions.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

7. ESTIMATE OF MIGRATION FROM DECEMBER 2021 TO JUNE 2022

In Figure 13 and Figure 14 we bring together our estimates of the number of individuals who have migrated with their households and our estimates of individuals who have left their households. We estimate that between December 2021 and June 2022, 1,749,647 individuals migrated with their households while 1,814,382 individuals left their households. As a result, around 3,564,028 individuals moved between December 2021 and June 2022, which is roughly 6.5 percent of the Myanmar population. Figure 13 presents the total number of migrants in thousands by their state/region or origin, while Figure 14, presents those numbers as a percent of the origin state/region population. As a percentage of the state/region population Chin had the greatest migration rate with 11.6 percent of individuals migrating either within the state or leaving the state. This was followed by Yangon where 10.9 percent of individuals moved during the six-month period. Finally, Rakhine, Kayah, and Shan also had higher than average migration rates, with 7.5, 7.4, and 7.3 percent of the population either moving within or away from the state. This highlights the tremendous vulnerability of the Myanmar population right now as individuals search for a safer and more economically viable communities to live in.

Figure 13. Number of migrants that have moved between December 2021 and June 2022 (in thousands)



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Figure 14. Percent of migrants that have moved between December 2021 and June 2022



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

8. ASSOCIATES OF MIGRATION AMONG MIGRANT AND MIGRANT SENDING HOUSEHOLDS

In this section, we use regression analysis to explore how shocks, household characteristics, and geographic locations are associated with migration in the short-term. We start by analyzing the drivers of sending migrants between survey rounds amongst panel households. Table 4 presents the marginal effects from random effects panel Probit regressions of shocks, household characteristics, and locations on the probability of having a migrant. Column (1) presents our base regression, while column (2) includes lagged dummies for whether the household was food insecure, income poor, and had income from remittances.

Conflict is an important driver of household member migration. The number of battles within a township that occurred during the three months prior to the interview is associated with the number of households sending migrants. On the other hand, experiencing a climate shock appears to have no impact on sending migrants in the short-term. Compared to households who earn most of their income from their own-farm, families who earn most of their income from a non-farm enterprise are less likely to have a migrant. This is also the case for households who earn most of their income from non-farm wages and farm wages. Receiving income from non-farm wages and farm wages decreases the probability of sending a migrant by 2.8 and 2.9 percentage points, respectively. In terms of incentives to migrate, a higher average unskilled agricultural wage within the community is associated with less migration.

In terms of household composition, the probability of sending a migrant decreases by 4.4 percentage points if the household has only female members in the previous period. Further, the probability of sending a migrant decreases by 3.3 percentage points if the household has young children. Having more household members, on the other hand, increases the probability of sending a migrant. Households who have moved more recently are also more likely to send a migrant.

Finally, location has an important impact on whether a household sends a migrant. Compared to households in Bago, households in Kachin, Kayin, Chin, Tanintharyi, Mon, Rakhine, Yangon and Shan have a higher probability of sending a migrant. Households in Rakhine have the highest probability of sending a migrant. They are 6.3 percentage points more likely to send a migrant than households in Bago, ceteris paribus.

In column (2) we explore the association between income, remittances, and household member migration. Receiving remittances in the previous period is associated with member migration in the current period. This may be because households who already have a migrant have a network to send another migrant. Or this may be because households who received more remittances in the previous period have more money in the current period, making it easier for them to send a migrant. However, we can see that on the contrary, households who were under the poverty line in the previous period are more likely to send migrants. This suggests that income poor, better-connected households are more likely to send migrants.

Table 4. Marginal effects of shocks, household characteristics, and location on having a migrant

	(1)	(2)
Number of battles (3 months)	0.001***	0.001***
Climate shock	-0.002	-0.001
Non-farm income vs own farm	-0.022***	-0.016**
Farm/non-farm salary vs own farm	-0.01	-0.004
Non-farm wage vs own farm	-0.033***	-0.026***
Farm wage vs own farm	-0.030***	-0.025**
Male unskilled construction wage	-0.002	-0.002
Male unskilled agriculture wage	-0.003**	-0.003*
L. women only household	-0.044***	-0.044***
Child <5yr old in HH	-0.033***	-0.031***
HH size	0.007***	0.005***
HH head has limited education	0	-0.002
Respondent is female	-0.001	-0.004
Asset rich (7-10 assets)	-0.007	-0.003
Asset poor (0-3 assets)	0.003	0.002
Year the household moved to current home	0.001***	0.001***
R2 vs R3	0.048***	0.046***
Rural vs urban	0.009	0.008
Kachin vs Bago	0.048***	0.043**
Kayah vs Bago	-0.003	-0.024
Kayin vs Bago	0.031*	0.02
Chin vs Bago	0.050*	0.044
Sagaing vs Bago	0.004	-0.002
Tanintharyi vs Bago	0.033*	0.02
Magway vs Bago	0.014	0.006
Mandalay vs Bago	0.017	0.008
Mon vs Bago	0.029*	0.02
Rakhine vs Bago	0.063***	0.059***
Yangon vs Bago	0.033***	0.028**
Shan vs Bago	0.034***	0.032***
Ayeyarwady vs Bago	0.002	-0.002
Nay Pyi Taw vs Bago	0.004	-0.002
L. Food insecurity (poor, borderline food consumption or hunger)		-0.014*
L.HH is poor: daily per ae income<total pl		0.028***

L. Remittances in the past 3 months		0.047***
No. of Obs.	16839	16170

Note: Asterisks show significance at p-values * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. L. refers to the lag of the variable from the previous round. The number of observations decreases in column (2) because we do not have AE to calculate income poverty for all households.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

We also explore the characteristics associated with households who migrate as an entire household. For this analysis, households who have moved did so during the survey recall period from September 2021 to August 2022. We use a panel probit random effects regression to look at the impact of shocks, household characteristics, and location on whether the household moved. Table 5 presents the marginal effects from our base regression in column (1). In column (2) we add controls for asset class. In column (3) we add lags for whether the household is food insecure, income poor, and receives remittances. In column (4) we add lags for the ownership status of the dwelling. In column (5) we add lags for the material of the house.

The number of battles within the township that occurred during the three months prior to the interview is also associated with households migrating. Interestingly, while farm and non-farm wage earning households were less likely to send migrants, they are more likely to migrate with their whole households. Having income from non-farm salaried work is also associated with household migration. Further, a high unskilled male construction wage in the community is associated with less household migration.

While larger households are less likely to migrate, households that are all women, or households with young children are more likely to migrate. On the other hand, households with less educated heads are less likely to migrate. Compared to R1, R2 and R3 is associated with higher household migration, indicating an increasing trend of household migration in the country. By location, rural households are less likely to migrate. However, as we saw in the descriptives, this is driven by urban migration within the same city. Compared to Bago, our base model shows that Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Chin, Mandalay, Rakhine, Yangon, and Shan are associated with greater migration.

Column (2) presents the association between asset ownership and migration. Compared to households owning 4 to 6 assets, asset rich households who own 6 to 10 assets are 2.3 percentage points more likely to migrate. Further, asset poor households who own 0 to 3 assets are 1.2 percentage points less likely to migrate. Households with low or borderline food consumption in the previous period are more likely to migrate (column 3). On the other hand, lagged income poverty is not associated with household migration. At the same time, households who received remittances in the previous period are more likely to migrate. This highlights an important difference between households who are sending migrants and households who are migrating. Unlike migrating households, sending individual migrants is not associated with asset classes, but it is associated with income poverty.

In column (4) we add lags for whether the family's house was rented, in an IDP camp, or was provided for free compared to owned. Renting a house in the previous period increases the likelihood of moving by 7.2 percentage points, living in an IDP camp increases the likelihood of moving by 9.8 percentage points, and living in a free dwelling increases the likelihood of moving by 5.5 percentage points. Further, the material of the house is also associated with migration (column 5). Compared to improved/semi-improved houses, families who live in bamboo houses or huts are more likely to migrate. Finally, it should be noted, that in these two specifications, the only regional dummies that remain significant are Rakhine, Yangon, and Shan, suggesting that these regions are associated with higher migration among all house and household ownership types.

Table 5. Marginal effects of shocks, household characteristics, and location on households migrating

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Number of battles (3 months)	0.001***	0.001***	0.001**	0.001***	0.001***
Climate shock	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002
Non-farm income vs own farm	0.005	0.007**	0.010*	0.006	0.007
Farm/non-farm salary vs own farm	0.026***	0.027***	0.040***	0.031***	0.036***
Non-farm wage vs own farm	0.016***	0.014***	0.024***	0.017***	0.018***
Farm wage vs own farm	0.011***	0.007*	0.018**	0.014*	0.012
Male unskilled construction wage	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.002*	-0.002*	-0.002
Male unskilled agriculture wage	0.001	0.001	0.00	0.00	0.00
Women only household	0.009**	0.008*	0.01	0.015*	0.014**
Child <5yr old in HH	0.014***	0.013***	0.020***	0.015***	0.016***
HH size	-0.008***	-0.008***	-0.013***	-0.010***	-0.011***
HH head has limited education	-0.012***	-0.017***	-0.015***	-0.019***	-0.017***
Respondent is female	-0.002	-0.003	0.001	0.001	0.00
R2 vs R1	0.037***	0.036***	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.019***
R3 vs R1	0.051***	0.050***			
Rural vs urban	-0.021***	-0.028***	-0.029***	-0.013**	-0.025***
Kachin vs Bago	0.031***	0.028***	0.033**	0.023	0.029**
Kayah vs Bago	0.050***	0.048***	0.025	0.022	0.030*
Kayin vs Bago	0.025***	0.023**	0.027*	0.017	0.025
Chin vs Bago	0.037***	0.029***	0.023	0.015	0.021
Sagaing vs Bago	0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.008	-0.007
Tanintharyi vs Bago	0.014	0.011	0.028*	0.016	0.024
Magway vs Bago	0.003	0.001	-0.005	-0.01	-0.009
Mandalay vs Bago	0.019***	0.020***	0.016	0.011	0.015
Mon vs Bago	0.016*	0.016*	0.019	0.018	0.016
Rakhine vs Bago	0.029***	0.022***	0.028**	0.027**	0.027*
Yangon vs Bago	0.033***	0.033***	0.036***	0.025**	0.034***
Shan vs Bago	0.024***	0.023***	0.025**	0.019*	0.024**
Ayeyarwady vs Bago	0.01	0.004	0.003	-0.002	-0.001
Nay Pyi Taw vs Bago	0.016	0.016	0.014	0.005	0.012
Asset rich (7-10 assets)		-0.023***			
Asset poor (0-3 assets)		0.012***			
L. Food insecurity (poor, borderline food consumption or hunger)			0.008*		
L. HH is poor: daily per ae income<total pl			0.00		
L. Remittances in the past 3 months			0.011***		
L. Dwelling is rented				0.072***	
L. IDP camp /temporary shelter				0.098***	
L. Dwelling is free				0.055***	

L. Bamboo house					0.016***
L. Hut					0.041***
No. of Obs.	36369	36369	16183	16852	16852

Note: Asterisks show significance at p-values * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. L. refers to the lag of the variable from the previous round. The number of observations decreases in column (3) decreases because we do not have AE to calculate income poverty for all households.
Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

9. CONCLUSION

Migration is an important phenomenon in Myanmar, with both household members and entire households moving within and outside of the country. Between January 2020 and mid-2022, 7.3 percent of households in our sample moved. In February 2022, household migration began increasing. This was driven in part by an increase in rural-to-rural migration from 22 percent in 2020 to 31.5 percent in 2021/2022. When we account for the under sampling of IDPS, employment was still the largest driver of internal household migration over the sample period. At the same time, conflict was the largest driver of internal household migration in Chin and Kayah states.

Between December 2021 and August 2022, 17.0 percent of households had a member 15 years or older leave their household. Member migration was the highest in Chin, Rakhine, Kachin, and Kayah. Overall, 41.9 percent of household members who left between R2 and R3 left to work elsewhere in Myanmar and 10.7 percent left to work aboard.

Combining households and members migrating and limiting our sample period to December 2021 to June 2022, we estimate that 1.7 million individuals migrated with their households and 1.8 million individuals left their households. This is an estimated 3.5 million migrants over the 6-month period. Kayah and Chin states had the largest number of households move while Chin and Rakhine states had the largest share of households with a member migrating. While conflict was an important driver of migration, the economy was still the largest driver of migration accounting for approximately, 54.9 percent of migration or 1.96 million individuals migrating in search of a better job.

Regression analysis demonstrates that conflict and poverty are drivers of household migration. Increased conflict, fewer assets, lower food consumption, and non-ownership of a dwelling were all associated with increased household migration. Conflict and income poverty were important divers of member migration as well, with households experiencing conflict and those that were under the poverty line in the previous period associated with more members migrating. While farm households were more likely to send migrants, wage households were more likely to migrate as a household. Finally, while controlling for income poverty and asset poverty, Rakhine, Yangon, and Shan were the region's most likely to send a migrant and have a household migrate.

While migration can lead to increased income through remittances, migration can also result in household disruption and for households that are forced to migrate it can lead to increased vulnerability. Slightly more households had less work/income after the move than more work/income, and this is also the case for access to food markets and services including doctors and banks. Further, we find no association of household migration with lower income poverty or improved food security.

For individuals that have left their households and are sending remittances, there is a positive association between remittances and several household welfare outcomes (MAPSA 2023). But individual migration also comes at a cost. Migrants, especially those that are unofficial, are often vulnerable. They may experience higher competition for jobs, exploitative working conditions, and lower pay. Women are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence when they migrate (OCHA 2020). Given that 52 percent of migrants were female including 49 percent of migrants working elsewhere

in Myanmar and 44.6 percent of migrants working abroad, this is a significant issue. Finally, the pandemic not only highlighted the precarious nature of migrants' working conditions, but also the danger of relying too heavily on income from migrants to meet household needs.

More research is needed to understand the short-term impact of migration on welfare. Specifically, it will be critical to understand how migration driven by conflict compared to migration driven by employment impacts the vulnerability of households across Myanmar. Further, for household members leaving their household, more research is needed on whether this migration is chosen or forced, documented or undocumented, and safe or unsafe. Given the attractiveness of migration because of its potential to improve household welfare, understanding these factors is key to prescribing policies to help reduce the high risks associated with migration. Finally, understanding the drivers, risks, and consequences associated with female migration will be critical for ensuring a safe environment for women.

REFERENCES

ACLED (2022). ACLED data. Accessed at ACLED | Bringing Clarity to Crisis (acleddata.com)

Akee, Randall, and Devesh Kapur. *Myanmar Remittances*. Final Report, International Growth Center, Oct. 2017. S-53405-MYA-1

Bangkok Post. "Migrant Infections Spike Prompts Foreign Labor Halt." Bangkok Post. www.bangkokpost.com, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/1908790/migrant-infections-spike-prompts-foreign-labour-halt. Accessed 7 Mar. 2023.

Belton, Ben, and Mateusz Filipski. "Rural Transformation in Central Myanmar: By How Much, and for Whom?" *Journal of Rural Studies*, vol. 67, Apr. 2019, pp. 166–76. *DOI.org (Crossref)*, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2019.02.012.

Chanayuth. "Myanmar Junta Announces Nationwide Lockdown Next Week as COVID-19 Surges." *The Irrawaddy*, 15 July 2021, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-announces-nationwide-lockdown-next-week-as-covid-19-surges.html.

Central Statistical Organization (CSO), UNDP and WB (2020) "Myanmar Living Conditions Survey 2017: Socio-economic Report", Nay Pyi Taw and Yangon, Myanmar: Ministry of Planning, Finance and Industry, UNDP and WB.

Filipski, Mateusz J.; Belton, Ben; Hein, Aung; Zu, A Myint; Htoo, Kyan; Win, Myat Thida; Thu, Eaindra Theint Theint; and Htun, Khun Moe. 2021. Myanmar migration in a time of transformation: 2011-2020. Myanmar SSP Working Paper 8. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.134313

Gupta, Shagun. "Leveraging Migration for Development: A Review of Literature on Patterns and Movements in Myanmar." *Migration in Myanmar: Perspectives from Current Research*, Dec. 2016.

Internal labour migration in Myanmar: building an evidence-base on patterns in migration, human trafficking and forced labour; International Labour Organization, ILO Liaison Officer for Myanmar. - Yangon: ILO, 2015 x, 106 p.

International Labour Organization Liaison Office In Myanmar. *COVID-19: Impact on Migrant Workers and Country Response in Myanmar*. International Labour Organization, June 2020.

International Labour Organization Liaison Office In Myanmar. *The impact of COVID-19 in Myanmar: a study of income loss of workers in the garment sector*. International Labour Organization. 2021.

International Labour Organization Liaison Office In Myanmar. *The Impact of COVID-19 on Myanmar's Garment Sector*. International Labour Organization. 2021.

Kyaw, Thu. "Thailand Bans Entry to Foreigners, Prepares Emergency Measures Against Coronavirus." The Irrawaddy, 26 Mar. 2020, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/asia/thailand-bans-entry-foreigners-prepares-emergency-measures-coronavirus.html.

McAuliffe, M. and A. Triandafyllidou (eds.), 2021. World Migration Report 2022. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva.

MAPSA (2022a). Vulnerability and Welfare: Findings from the third round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (July and August 2022). Washington, DC. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

MAPSA (2022b). Phone surveillance, from scratch: Novel sample design features of the nationally representative Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS). Myanmar SSP Working Paper 16. Washington, DC. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

MAPSA (2022c). Welfare and Vulnerability: Findings from the first round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey. Washington, DC. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

MAPSA (2023). An Overview of Remittances in Myanmar; Findings from the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey. Washington, DC. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

Menozzi, Clare. 2022. Why safe, orderly and regular migration matters for sustainable development. UN DESA Policy Brief 146. New York. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

Myanmar Humanitarian Update. No. 24, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Dec. 2022.

Myanmar Humanitarian Update. No. 26, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Feb. 2023.

Pattison, Corey, et al. "A Country on the Move: Migration Networks and Risk Management in Two Regions of Myanmar." Migration in Myanmar: Perspectives from Current Research, Dec. 2016, pp. 45–75.

Paudel, Susan; Filipski, Mateusz J.; and Minten, Bart. 2022. Income diversification and the rural non-farm economy. Myanmar SSP Working Paper 27. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.136458

"'Stay at Home': COVID-19 and Rising Domestic Violence in Myanmar's Informal Urban Settlements." New Mandala, 22 June 2020, https://www.newmandala.org/stay-at-home-covid-19-and-rising-domestic-violence-in-myanmars-informal-urban-settlements/.

Remittances Of Myanmar Citizens Abroad Tops $6 Billion Within 8 Years - Global New Light Of Myanmar. 7 Sept. 2022, https://www.gnlm.com.mm/remittances-of-myanmar-citizens-abroad-tops-6-billion-within-8-years/.

Reuters. “Thailand Plans to Reopen Borders to Foreign Workers amid Shortage.” Reuters, 9 Nov. 2021. www.reuters.com, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thailand-plans-reopen-borders-foreign-workers-amid-shortage-2021-11-09/.

Reuters. “Malaysia Lifts Migrant Worker Ban, to Reopen Holiday Island to Foreigners.” Reuters, 22 Oct. 2021. www.reuters.com, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/malaysia-lifts-migrant-worker-ban-reopen-holiday-island-foreigners-2021-10-22/.

Rosenbach, Gracie; Tiburcio, Ernesto; Filipski, Mateusz J.; Dorosh, Paul A.; and Sen, Binayak. 2018. Economic activities of forcibly displaced populations: An analysis of enterprises in Southern Bangladesh. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1763. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). http://ebrary.ifpri.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15738coll2/id/132870

Traill, Ashwini Deshpande, Khaing Thandar Hnin, and Tom. “Myanmar’s Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Brookings, 1 Dec. 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2020/12/01/myanmars-response-to-the-covid-19-pandemic/

UNdata | Record View | Net Migration Rate (per 1,000 Population). http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=migration&d=PopDiv&f=variableID%3a85. Accessed 23 Dec.2022.

UNICEF (2020). Myanmar’s fight against stigma during the COVID-19 outbreak. Myanmar. UNICEF. https://www.unicef.org/myanmar/stories/myanmars-fight-against-stigma-during-covid-19-outbreak

World Bank (2017). Migration and Remittances Data. Bilateral Data Worksheets. http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data

World Bank (2023). Myanmar Economic Monitor: Navigating Uncertainty. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.

World Food Programme (2018). Calculation and use of the food consumption score in food security analysis. WFP VAM. Rome.

APPENDIX

Table A.1. Differences between attrition and non-attrition households

	Attrition household	Remained in sample
Household Food Consumption Score	57.75	57.17
Improved water according to WHO/JMP (%)	78	79
Improved house: semi-pucca, bungalow/brick,apartment/condomium (%)	29	32
Asset poor (0-3 assets) (%)	36	32
HH is poor: daily per ae income<total pl (%)	50	49
Total agricultural land owned in Acres (%)	34	48
Government/national grid (%)	63	66
How many working mobile phones are owned in total by members of your house	2.31	2.36
Climatic shock (%)	11	12
HH affected by temporary or permanent detention of household members in the past (%)	0	0
Destruction/appropriation of assets (%)	1	1
Theft/robbery (%)	4	4
Bribery/forced payments (%)	1	1
Feels insecure (%)	18	20
Low levels of social trust (%)	20	20
Increase in crime (%)	8	8
Violence (%)	6	7
Kachin (%)	2	3
Kayah (%)	1	1
Kayin (%)	4	3
Chin (%)	1	1
Sagaing (%)	11	9
Tanintharyi (%)	3	2
Bago (%)	11	10
Magway (%)	7	8
Mandalay (%)	11	13
Mon (%)	4	3
Rakhine (%)	7	5
Yangon (%)	14	16
Shan (%)	10	9
Ayeyawady (%)	12	14
Nay Pyi Taw (%)	2	2

Table A.2. Reasons for household migration, by movement path

	Rural to urban	Urban to urban	Rural to rural	Urban to rural
Employment	69.9	55.2	52.8	60.6
Marriage	7.6	7.5	17.8	13.6
Avoid conflict / improve physical security	8.3	5.9	14.3	11.3
To give support to family	4.4	9.7	5.7	9.6
To get support from family	4.6	7.4	4.5	5.5
Education opportunities	6.2	3.2	4.0	1.4
Other	2.9	15.4	5.3	8.2

Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Table A.3. Percent of households who had a household head leave or had many members leave by state/region

	National		Rural		Urban	
	respondent left (%)	many household members left (%)	respondent left (%)	many household members left (%)	respondent left (%)	many household members left (%)
Kachin	2.7	2.5	3.1	3.3	1.8	0.7
Kayah	3.4	3.6	4.7	1.6	0.8	7.8
Kayin	1.5	2.3	1.8	1.5	0.4	5.0
Chin	6.7	5.1	8.8	6.3	1.0	1.7
Sagaing	1.7	1.1	1.8	1.0	1.4	1.3
Tanintharyi	2.6	2.2	2.3	2.9	3.5	0.0
Bago	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.5	3.2	2.0
Magway	1.6	1.5	1.3	1.5	3.9	1.3
Mandalay	3.0	1.4	2.1	1.3	5.2	1.7
Mon	3.9	1.5	3.1	1.9	5.9	0.6
Rakhine	2.8	0.0	1.5	0.0	9.5	0.0
Yangon	4.8	2.0	4.8	1.9	4.7	2.0
Shan	3.4	1.7	1.5	1.0	7.6	3.2
Ayeyawady	2.5	1.1	2.0	0.9	5.3	2.0
Nay Pyi Taw	2.9	1.7	1.8	1.5	6.3	2.2

Figure A.1. MHWS Round 1: Influx of migrants



Note: Townships denoted as “x” refers to townships not surveyed during this round of MHWS survey. Townships with 50% and or more influx of migrants are Demoso (Kayah), Hpruso (Kayah), Shadaw (Kayah), Mese (Kayah), Paletwa (Chin), Laukkaing (Shan).

Figure A.2. MHWS Round 2: Influx of migrants



Note: Townships denoted as “x” refers to townships not surveyed during this round of MHWS survey. Townships with 50% and or more influx of migrants are Demoso (Kayah) and Hpruso (Kayah), Shadaw (Kayah), Kanpalet (Chin), Thantlang (Chin), Paletwa (Chin), and Chaung-U (Sagaing), Mongkaing (Shan), Tanintharyi (Tanintharyi).

Figure A.3. MHWS Round 3: Influx of migrants



Note: Townships denoted as “x” refers to townships not surveyed during this round of MHWS survey. Townships with 50% and or more influx of migrants are Demoso (Kayah), Shadaw (Kayah), Kyainseikgyi (Kayin), Paletwa (Chin), Mongkaing (Shan), Mongton (Shan), Khin-U (Sagaing), Kani (Sagaing), Chaung-U (Sagaing) and Pinlebu (Sagaing), Tanintharyi (Tanintharyi).

Figure A.4. MHWS Round 1: Departure of migrants



Note: Townships denoted as “x” refers to townships not surveyed during this round of MHWS sur-vey. Townships with 50% and or more influx of migrants are Demoso (Kayah), Hpruso (Kayah), and Pekon (Shan).

Figure A.5. MHWS Round 2: Departure of migrants



Note: Townships denoted as “x” refers to townships not surveyed during this round of MHWS sur-vey. Townships with 50% and or more influx of migrants are Loikaw (Kayah), Demoso (Kayah), Hpruso (Kayah), Shadaw (Kayah), Kanpalet (Chin), Paletwa (Chin), Pinlebu (Sagaing), Mongkaing (Shan), Tanintharyi (Tanintharyi).

Figure A.6. MHWS Round 3: Departure of migrants



Note: Townships denoted as “x” refers to townships not surveyed during this round of MHWS sur-vey. Townships with 50% and or more influx of migrants are Demoso (Kayah), Kanpalet (Chin), Kani (Sagaing), Kyaukkyi (Bago), Pekon (Shan), Mongton (Shan)and Namhsan (Shan).

Figure A.7. Reasons for household migration at the pooled national level



Source: Author's calculations based on MHWS data.

Appendix B. Household Composition Questionnaire from MHWS Round 2 Survey

Module C: Household composition

Now we would like to know about your household. This includes all people, including children, who live or have lived recently in the same dwelling and recognize one adult male or female household member as the head of the household. When they are together, they share food from a common source, and contribute to and/or share in a common resource pool.

Could you please tell me how many household members live with you? Please include yourself as first person in the list, then household head (if not yourself), then others.

[enumerators should get a more elaborate definition during training and in the enumerator manual, which can be used in case respondents express doubts on whom to include. For household head or any other household member, if s/he is migrating, then we do not count the person as a household member. Informally, enumerator can record names of main hh members, but not in CATI. Respondents don't need to mention the names, or they can use a short name or nickname if they prefer that.]

C1_person id	*C2_gender* 1 = Male 2 = Female	*C3_age* In years *[enumerator, if not 100% sure, please choose reasonable approximation]*	*C4_relation to household head* 1 = head 2 = spouse of head 3 = son/daughter 4 = son-in-law / daughter-in-law 5 = grandchild / great grand child 6 = parent / parent-in-law 7 = brother or sister 10 = other relative 11= domestic worker 12 = not related	*C5* Can [NAME] read and write a simple sentence in any language? CAPI: only ask # hh members >14
1 RESPONDENT				
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
Etc				

Confirm: # hh members = ____

C.08 What is your marital status? CAPI: do not ask if spouse of household head **Confirm if B.02a==1 or ask new if B.02a==2**	1 = single 2 = married 3 = widowed 4 = divorced/separated

Below if B.02a==1 and 2

C.10 Do you still live in the same household with mostly the same household members as when we interviewed you or another household member three months ago?	1 = yes 2 = no, respondent left former household for new household) 3 = no, many of previous hh members left (to another household or other)

	If no (option 2 or 3) >>>> skip to Module D.

Appendix C. Household Composition Questionnaire from MHWS Round 3 Survey

Module C: Household composition

Now we would like to know about your household. This includes all people, including children, who live or have lived recently in the same dwelling and recognize one adult male or female household member as the head of the household. When they are together, they share food from a common source, and contribute to and/or share in a common resource pool.

C.10 Do you still live in the same household with mostly the same household members as when we interviewed you or another household member three months ago? **Skip if new respondents (B.02a==3 and B.02b==3)**	1 = yes 2 = no, respondent left former household for new household) 3 = no, many of previous hh members left (to another household or other) **If no (option 2 or 3) >>>> go to hh roster.**
C.11 If yes (mostly same hh members), formerly we noted there are <preload xx> adults and <preload xx> children in your household. Did anyone leave or join the household? *Multi-select.* **Only if C.10==1**	1 = yes, some left 2 = yes, some joined 3 = no, still the same
C.11_1 If left, who left? *Show former hh roster information of each and select who left.*	
C.11_2 For each person who left, please indicate the primary reason:	1 = passed away 2 = go to boarding school / living elsewhere for school 3 = live elsewhere in Myanmar for work 4 = lives abroad for work 5 = lives elsewhere for safety reasons 6 = marriage / goes to live with spouse 6 = lives with other household (for other reasons than above) 9999 = other (specify)
C.12_xx If joined: add these persons to hh roster and fill in the necessary info	
C.12_6 For each person who joined, please indicate why:	1 = birth 2 = marriage / live with spouse 3= return from school / educational purposes 4 = return from migration in Myanmar 5 = return from migration abroad 9999 = other (specify)

Roster is asked if B.02a==3 (if not interviewed three months ago), or if respondent indicates major changes in hh composition (C.10==2 or C.10==3)

Could you please tell me how many household members live with you? Please include yourself as first person in the list, then household head (if not yourself), then others.

[*enumerators should get a more elaborate definition during training and in the enumerator manual, which can be used in case respondents express doubts on whom to include.*

For household head or any other household member, if s/he is migrating, then we do not count the person as a household member.

Informally, enumerator can record names of main hh members, but <u>not</u> in CATI. Respondents don't need to mention the names, or they can use a short name or nickname if they prefer that. *]*

C1_person id	*C1_interviewee* 1 = interviewee . = household member	*C2_gender* 1 = Male 2 = Female	*C3_age* In years *[enumerator, if not 100% sure, please choose reasonable approximation]*	*C4_relation to household head* 1 = head 2 = spouse of head 3 = son/daughter 4 = son-in-law / daughter-in-law 5 = grandchild / great grand child 6 = parent / parent-in-law 7 = brother or sister 10 = other relative 11= domestic worker 12 = not related	*C5* Can [NAME] read and write a simple sentence in any language? CAPI: only ask # hh members >14
1 RESPONDENT					
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
Etc					

Confirm: # hh members = ____

C.08 What is your marital status? CAPI: do not ask if spouse of household head **Skip if B.02a==1 and B.02b==1**	1 = single 2 = married 3 = widowed 4 = divorced/separated

ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

This work was undertaken as part of the Myanmar Agricultural Policy Support Activity (MAPSA) led by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in partnership with Michigan State University (MSU). Funding support for this study was provided by the CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets (PIM), the United States Agency of International Development (USAID), and the Livelihoods and Food Security Fund (LIFT). This Policy Note has not gone through IFPRI's standard peer-review procedure. The opinions expressed here belong to the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of IFPRI, MSU, USAID, LIFT, or CGIAR.

INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
1201 Eye St, NW | Washington, DC 20005 USA
T. +1-202-862-5600 | F. +1-202-862-5606
ifpri@cgiar.org
www.ifpri.org | www.ifpri.info

IFPRI-MYANMAR
IFPRI-Myanmar@cgiar.org
www.myanmar.ifpri.info

The Myanmar Strategy Support Program (Myanmar SSP) is led by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in partnership with Michigan State University (MSU). Funding support for Myanmar SSP is provided by the CGIAR Research Program on Policies, Institutions, and Markets; the Livelihoods and Food Security Fund (LIFT); and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). This publication has been prepared as an output of Myanmar SSP. It has not been independently peer reviewed. Any opinions expressed here belong to the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of IFPRI, MSU, LIFT, USAID, or CGIAR.