2013 

 

 

Understanding Mesqa and Marwa 
Water Management Practices in IIP 
areas of the Nile Delta 

 

Siraj Dutta 
 

Final Report 

Water and salt management in the Nile Delta: Report No. 3 



2 

 

  



3 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Understanding Mesqa and 
Marwa Water Management 

Practices in IIP areas of the Nile 
Delta 

 

 

 

Siraj Dutta 

 

 
 

With the collaboration of Samir Salama, François Molle, Edwin Rap and 
Waleed Hassan 

 
  



4 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Abstract 

 

Based on primary research in the Nile Delta, this report evaluates the impact of the irrigation 
improvement projects, and also analyses the factors that shape the water management practices of 
farmers. It demonstrates that irrigation management practices are shaped by informal 
organisational and institutional arrangements of farmers which primarily evolve from socio-political 
structural relations. The boundaries of water management arrangements are not rigid and often 
overlap, and are influenced by the socio-culturally embedded institutions. It further demonstrates 
that coping mechanisms of farmers like direct pumping from the canal or reusing drainage water 
are major factors that shape the equity of water distribution and the efficiency of water use at the 
lowest levels of the irrigation system. Based on the observations, the report offers a set of 
recommendations that might improve the adaptability and impact of the improvement projects. 
  



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Table of Contents 

List of Abbreviations and Illustrations 6 

1. Chapter I – Introduction 8 

1.1. Introduction 8 

1.2. Traditional Irrigation System 9 

1.3. Irrigation Reform 10 

1.4. Study Area and Methodology 12 

2. Chapter II - Basic Observations 14 

2.1. Ownership Pattern 17 

2.2. Project Planning and Implementation 18 

2.3. Technical Constraints 20 

2.4. Water Allocation in BC 21 

3. Chapter III - B4 and B7: Basic Characteristics 27 

3.1. Pump Station Trajectory 28 

3.2. Crop Pattern 31 

3.3. WUA Composition 33 

3.4. Role of WUA 35 

3.4.1. Financial Management 36 

3.4.2. Conflict Resolution 37 

3.4.3. Maintenance 38 

3.4.4. Day-to-day Management 40 

4. Chapter IV - Water Management Arrangements 42 

4.4. Irrigation Schedule 43 

4.5. Informal Organisational Arrangements 46 

4.6. Coping Mechanism 49 

4.7. Response against Varying Levels of Water Supply 56 

4.8. Preference for Conflict Avoidance 58 

4.9. Equity of Water Distribution 59 

4.10. Impact of the Improvement Package 60 

5. Chapter V – Discussion and Conclusion 61 

Appendix  64 

Bibliography 71 



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List of Abbreviations and Illustrations 

Glossary and List of Abbreviations 

ICARDA International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas 

ARC Agricultural Research Center 

NWRC National Water Research Center 
IIP Irrigation Improvement Project 

IIIMP Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project 
PIM Participatory Irrigation Management 

IMT Irrigation Management Transfer 

WUA Water User Association 

CPR Common Property Resource 
BC Branch Canal 

IP Individual Pump 
Feddan Unit of land (0.42 hectares) 

Sakia Persian Water Wheel 

Mesqa Tertiary Canal 

Marwa Quaternary Canal 

Tatweer Development – Used to refer to irrigation development projects 

Islah Land reform 

Milk Owners 

 

List of Illustrations 

Chapter Title Page 

Chapter I 
Figure 1.1 Irrigation System in Egypt 8 
Figure 1.2 Research Site 12 

Chapter II 

Table 2.1 Basic Details of Collective Pump Stations 14 
Figure 2.2 Vats constructed by farmers 22 
Chart 2.3 Measured discharge in Branch Canal 

 

23 

Figure 2.4 Farmer trying to collect water in BC 24 
Figure 2.5 Absolute scarcity in BC 24 

Figure 2.6 Completely dry rice field 24 

Figure 2.7 Affected crop 24 

Figure 2.8 BC Water not adequate for IP intake 24 
Figure 2.9 BC Water not adequate for PS intake 24 

Figure 2.10 Water level at different times during rice cultivation 26 
Figure 2.11 Rubbish in various areas of BC 28 

Figure 2.12 Lather produced by pumping directly from BC 28 

Chapter III 

Figure 3.1 Spatial location of B4 and B7 30 
Figure 3.2 Layout of Mesqa B7 32 
Figure 3.3 Layout of Mesqa B4 33 

Figure 3.4 Crop pattern at B7 36 



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Figure 3.5 Crop pattern at B4 36 
Figure 3.6 Well-maintained field drain 46 

Figure 3.7 Well-maintained field marwa 46 
Figure 3.8 Hydrant with pin system 46 

Figure 3.9 Hydrant with cap system 46 

Figure 3.10 Stone used to close the pin cap 46 
Figure 3.11 Polythene bag and wood used to close cap 46 

Chapter IV 

Figure 4.1 Water Management Arrangements 49 
Figure 4.2 Hydrants kept partially open 56 

Figure 4.3 Direct Pumping from BC 59 

Figure 4.4 Direct Pumping from the Drain 59 

Figure 4.5 IP connected to marwa end 59 
Figure 4.6 IPs connected to air-vent of marwa 59 

Figure 4.7 Direct Pumping from sub-BC at B7 59 
Figure 4.8 String of IPs set beside B7 PS 59 
Figure 4.9 El-Hodad Drain 60 
Figure 4.10 El-Nashar Drain 60 

Figure 4.11 Direct Pumping from field-level drain 62 
Figure 4.12 Direct pumping from sub-surface lateral collector 62 
Figure 4.13 Diesel pump connected, at B6 65 
Figure 4.14 Diesel pump set up, at A1 65 
Figure 4.15 Relationship between water availability and collective 

participation 
66 

 

List of Appendix 

Appendix Title Page 
Appendix 1 1.1 List of interviews quoted in the paper 

 

77 

Appendix 2 
2.1 Location of W10 in Meet Yazid Command Area 79 

2.2 Location of Masharqa Branch Canal in Meet Yazid 
Command Area 

80 
2.3 Location of Meet Yazid Command Area in the Nile Delta 81 

Appendix 3 3.1 Matrix ranking of all the mesqas in Masharqa canal 

 

82 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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1 Introduction 

1.1 Context 

The economy of Egypt is primarily agrarian with 58% of the population engaged directly in 
agriculture. Irrigated agriculture utilises 86% of Egypt’s annual share of 55.5 milliard cubic metres 
from the river Nile (El-Nahrawy, 2011). The Nile Delta covers an agricultural area of 2.5 million ha 
(app), which contains a dense network of canals that transfer water from the Nile to nearly two 
million farmers. Large-scale development and land reclamation projects and the demand of water 
in various economic sectors have increased the pressure on the available water resources for 
agriculture (Hamza and Mason, 2005). A significant amount of water is diverted to industrial and 
municipal use and for the development of the reclaimed lands. It is expected that the pressure will 
further increase in the future. Rising operations and management costs coupled with the need to 
improve efficiency of irrigation system led to the introduction of irrigation reforms in the form of 
infrastructure improvement and more user participation in management (Aziz, 1994). In the last 
two decades, various irrigation reforms projects have been initiated by the government as part of 
the Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) action plan made by the Ministry of Water 
Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) with the objective of improving water use efficiency, equity of 
water distribution and for saving water (MWRI, 2005). The Egyptian case is a typical example of the 
dominant global paradigm of irrigation reform process. The reforms have been shaped by the 
neoliberal paradigm and driven mainly by the lack of adequate government funds for irrigation 
operations and maintenance, increasing rate of degradation of infrastructure and need for better 
accountability (Turral, 1995; Svendsen et al., 2000; Ghazouani et al., 2012).  

The irrigation reform process of the Egyptian government has been supported by many major 
donors like the World Bank, USAID etc and they have funded projects like the Irrigation 
Improvement Project (IIP) and Integrated Irrigation Improvement and Management Project (IIIMP) 
for technical and institutional reform at various levels of the irrigation system. IIP/IIIMP’s central 
objective was to introduce collective pumps at the tertiary level (mesqa), in place of individual 
pumping by farmers, and distribution by a pressurised piped network, sometime extended to the 
plot level. IIIMP is, in theory, planned to be gradually implemented across Egypt.  

This report evaluates the impact of the projects on the water management arrangements of 
farmers at the lowest level, and also explores how farmers have adapted the technical changes. It 
must be added that the organisational and institutional arrangements of farmers that shape water 
management practices, and the impact of the irrigation improvements on these arrangements are 
still largely unexplored. Based on primary research in W101 area in the Nile Delta, this report aims 
to unpack the organisational and institutional arrangements of farmers which shape water 
management practices.  

The field work and the report are part of the research project ‘Management of water and salinity in 
the Nile Delta: A cross-scale integrated analysis of efficiency and equity issues’ led by the research 
organisation International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Egypt. The project is financed by 

                                                        
1
 W10 is a pilot area in Kafr El-Sheikh Governorate, which comprises 6,000 feddans in the downstream tail-end area of the Meet 

Yazid command canal, as shown in Appendix 2.  The second phase IIP package and on-farm improvements have been 

implemented in this area. 



9 

 

the Australian Center for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) and is a cooperation between 
international (IWMI, ICARDA) and national research institutions (ARC, NWRC).   

One of the major limitations of the study is the insufficient analysis of the impact of gender 
relations on organisational arrangements. As both the researchers were men, it was not possible to 
interact with women due to the cultural boundaries of the rural Egyptian society. Hence, the study 
is constrained by its male bias in respondents’ selection.  

The report is divided in five chapters. Chapter I contains the description of the irrigation system and 
the improvement projects, along with the research details. The basic observations in the Masharqa 
branch canal (BC) are explained in Chapter II, whereas the next chapter explains the characteristics 
of two pump stations. Chapter IV contains a detailed discussion of the water management 
arrangements. The discussion drawing on the evidence is presented in the next chapter, which also 
concludes the report along with a set of recommendations. 

1.2 Traditional irrigation system 

History of large-scale artificial irrigation in Egypt goes back to the Ptolemaic period (300-1 BC) when 
the sakia was introduced, and history of modern-day irrigation can be traced back to the 
construction of the High Aswan Dam in the 1960s which was followed by the foundation of the 
current delivery system (Manning, 2012). The delivery system is four-tiered with main canal, branch 
canals (BC), tertiary canals (mesqa) and the quaternary canals (marwa) as shown in the figure 1.1. 
Main canals run on a continuous basis, while the distribution at the branch level is done on a 
rotational basis. The mesqas and marwas are considered as private channels, owned and managed 
by the farmers.  

Figure 1.1: Irrigation System in Egypt 

 

Source:  Kotb and Boissevain (2012) 

The government is responsible for water management and operations and maintenance till the 
branch canal level, while the water distribution and operations and management at the tertiary and 



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quaternary level are the responsibilities of the farmers (Allam, 2004). The marwas cover 1-5 
hectares comprising 5-20 farmers, while mesqas cover 5-40 hectares and 25-100 farmers. Studies 
like Radwan (1998) etc have pointed out that even though water allocation in the main canal is 
supposed to be done on the basis of cropping pattern under the canals, it is actually done on the 
basis of need of the branch canals as assessed by the department, due to the scope of error in the 
earlier system. The objective is to maintain the canal level to a predetermined height. Similarly the 
flow in the branch canals is controlled by maintaining a certain level of water rather than a precise 
amount based on the demand of farmers or the crop pattern.  

The mesqas are earthen ditches lower than the branch canal and get water based on the rotation 
system in the branch canal. A BC supplies a number of mesqas, based on a rotation schedule which 
is loosely based on the rotation system which divides the water of the main canal in various BCs. 
The mesqas are made lower than the marwas, and farmers have to lift water from the mesqa to 
their marwa using individual pumps. Before the use of pumps became widespread, water 
distribution at the mesqa was based on the sakias which lifted water from the branch canal to the 
mesqas, to be shared on a rotational basis.  The sakias also defined the lifting points on the branch 
canal, for the farmers of each mesqa (Hopkins, 1999). 

An important part of the irrigation system is the drainage network that covers the entire Nile Delta 
and releases about 12 BCM/year of drainage water to the sea (Allam et al., 2005). The network 
consists of a web of laterals and collector drains, which collect the local run-off and surplus water 
after irrigation and convey it to the open drainage canals. It is primarily used to control the water 
table and salinity of the soil. The reuse of drainage water is a common practice in the delta region 
and the tail-enders use both drainage water and fresh canal water for irrigating their crops 
(Moustafa, 2004). It is also mixed with fresh water at secondary and main canal levels, through 
pumping stations established by the ministry.   

1.3 Irrigation reform 

The major projects for irrigation reform have been IIP and IIIMP. The primary objective of IIP is to 
improve irrigation water use efficiency and agricultural productivity. The improvements planned 
under the package are: 

 Infrastructure improvement at the branch and secondary canal levels. 

 Conversion of rotation system of water distribution at branch canal level to continuous flow. 

 Mesqa technical improvements: 

 Replacing mesqa ditches with pipes or brick-lined channels 

 Single lifting point at the head of a mesqa, in the form of a collective pumping 
station. 

 Organisation of farmers in water user associations (WUA) for irrigation management at 
mesqa level. 

The plans were to make the water supply continuous and demand-driven through collective 
pumping and therefore reducing the over-irrigation believed to be generated by the uncertainty in 
supply. The individual lifting points were replaced by a single collective pumping point for the same 
reason. WUAs have been formed at the mesqa level for operations and maintenance of the 



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improved mesqas and collective pump stations, improving water delivery and water use efficiency, 
and conflict resolution (MWRI, 1998). 

 IIIMP was launched to build on the experience of IIP and to extend the improvements to the 
marwa and farm-levels. One of the major components of the IIIMP package is the on-farm 
improvements which include the following: 

 Replacing marwa ditches with a pressurised pipe and valve system, based on the length of 
the marwa ditches and the consent of the farmers. 

 Land levelling of the plots.  

 Promoting water management techniques like irrigation scheduling etc. 

 Organising farmers of a quaternary canals in Marwa Committees (MCs). 

 The aim of replacing the earthen ditches was to increase the distribution efficiency. The project is 
expected to improve the conveyance efficiency and farm-level efficiency. A major focus of the 
project is on the management of the drainage system. The project is driven by the need to reduce 
the reuse of drainage water at the local level, which would be followed by an increase in the official 
reuse of drainage water at the secondary and main canal levels (World Bank, 2010). The technical 
component also includes improvements in the drainage system at the farm level and branch canal 
level. The institutional component of the project includes organising farmers in WUAs and branch 
canal water user associations (BCWUAs).  

In tune with the principles of irrigation management transfer (IMT), the farmers are expected to 
repay a part of the capital costs of mesqa improvements over a 20-year period. They are also 
expected to repay the total costs of marwa improvements over a similar period.  

Review of Evaluation Studies 

The projects aimed to improve both the efficiency (water saving of 10% to 30%) and the equity of 
water distribution. Increasing the participation of water users in the operations and management at 
various levels of the irrigation system is expected to help in improving the equity and efficiency. 
Most of the studies (El-Agha et al., 2011; Kotb and Boissevein, 2012; MWRI, 1998) have evaluated 
the projects in terms of the narrow objectives of equity, efficiency and productivity. Some studies 
have also evaluated the impact of organising farmers in WUAs. This section attempts to review the 
existing literature and studies on the impact of the socio-technical package. 

As mentioned earlier, a major objective of the package was the conversion to continuous supply at 
the branch canal level. But most of the studies have pointed out the failure to introduce continuous 
flow operations. Simas et al. (2009) have evaluated the marwa improvements based on preliminary 
observations in the W10 area, and they have argued that the package has resulted in the 
improvement of conveyance efficiency, irrigation time and on-farm irrigation efficiency.  They have 
also documented an increase in crop yield, water productivity etc. Most of the studies like Kheira 
(2009) point towards reduction in operating costs and time required for irrigating each feddan. The 
shift from diesel pumps to collective electric pumps (either through the IIIMP project or by the 
farmer themselves) has reduced the operating costs. At the same time, irrigation time available per 
feddan has increased, due to the continuous operation of the pumps for 20 hours/day. Similarly, 
increase in supply adequacy, irrigation efficiency and subsequent water saving have also been 
documented. A qualitative study (Gouda, 2009) was conducted by GTZ in the W10 area in 2010 to 



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understand the socio-technical impacts of the experimental marwa improvements. The study 
suggests that there has been improvement in the efficiency and equity of water distribution, and 
there have also been social benefits like reduction in conflict and more participation of women in 
irrigation etc.  

Even though most of the studies point towards the benefits of the projects in terms of equitable 
water distribution, water use efficiency etc, none of them have evaluated how the water 
management practices are shaped at the lowest levels and how the socio-technical improvements 
affect social arrangements and the water distribution. This study aims to fill that gap. 

1.4 Study area and methodology 

The study is based on the mesqas in the Masharqa canal, which covers three villages, Masharqa, 
Knaive and Sawaiya from the head to tail respectively.  The Masharqa canal is one of the branch 
canals of the Meet Yazid canal in the W10 area.  The Meet Yazid canal is 63km long, and serves 60 
branch canals, covering a command area located in two Governorates, El-Gharbeya and Kafr El-
Sheikh. It gets water from the Bahr-Shebin carrier canal which is primarily fed by the Delta barrage.  
As the pilot area is at the tail-end of the main canal, it faces periods of water shortage during peak 
summer season.  

Masharqa canal has 18 electric pump stations (A1-A6 and B1-B12) along a length of 4.2kms, as 
shown in figure 1.2. The pump stations were constructed at the head of each major mesqa. It 
branches off Meet Yazid at km59.50, and meets the Nashart drain at the end, as shown in figure 
2.1. A sub-branch of the Masharqa branch canal, Sidi Salem BC branches off after the pump station 
B12. The Nashart drain which was originally a canal, is made artificially higher through the 
operation of the gates constructed in the drain downstream in Sidi Salem, and hence a major part 
of the water in the canal is drain water, that is allowed to flow by gravity from the Nashart drain.  



13 

 

Figure 1.2: Research Site 

 

It also must be mentioned that even though, with two exceptions of the sub-BCs,  the original 
mesqas have been filled in, the main pipe system of each pump station is still referred to as mesqa, 
and the words mesqa and pump station have been used interchangeably in the paper.  

Farmers in the mesqas B4, B6, B9 on the left bank, together with farmers of A1, A4, A5 and A6 on 
the right bank have access to the local secondary drains El-Hodad and El-Nashar respectively that 
border the command area on both sides, as shown in figure 1.2.  

The basic aim of the research was to evaluate the socio-technical package with regard to water 
management practices and the arrangements of farmers around the marwa and mesqa 
improvements. A case study approach, involving various research tools including direct observation, 
semi-structured interviews, and unstructured interviews, has been taken to understand the micro-
arrangements. Case studies are useful in doing an in-depth analysis of a social phenomenon or 
practice within its real life context (Yin, 2009). A major component of the field work was to observe 
the daily irrigation practices of farmers along the canal and the mesqas and marwas. The field work 
was done in three phases as explained below. The survey period (May-July) corresponded to the 
highest water demand in the year offering opportunities to study social interactions and coping 
mechanisms of farmers. 



14 

 

The first part of the field work involved a survey of all the 18 pump station (PS) command areas in 
this canal to understand the historical trajectories of their use and operations, and it was primarily 
based on semi-structured interviews with 40 farmers. The participants were selected on the basis of 
their positions along the mesqa. The information was used to create a profile of each pump station.  

The second phase involved an in-depth analysis of the water management practices and 
organisational arrangements of farmers in two mesqas B4 and B7, selected on the basis of a matrix 
scoring of the pump stations profiles done by the researchers. Factors like, WUA management, 
practice of direct pumping from drainage and branch canal, conflict among farmers etc were 
considered for the matrix ranking. The matrix score card is attached in Appendix 3. The second 
phase involved observing the flow of water along the mesqas and marwas, and the various micro-
interactions around it, and then unstructured interviews with the farmers based on the 
observations. In a third phase, it was attempted to zoom out and look at similarities and 
dissimilarities in other mesqas based on the observations in B4 and B7. 

It must be added that the names of the respondents who have been quoted in this paper have been 
changed. The list of interviews is provided in Appendix 1. 

 

2 Basic observations 

This chapter describes the basic characteristics of the pump stations, and also explains the local 
socio-economic context. 

The IIP package (tatweer) was implemented 5-6 years ago, whereas the marwa improvements were 
implemented three years back. Tatweer was initially refused by many farmers of the Masharqa 
area, but the construction company went ahead with the implementation. Many respondents 
claimed that they were forced to accept the package. It also emerged from the survey that there 
was confusion among the farmers regarding the financial aspect of the project. As mentioned 
earlier, the land owners have to repay a part of the loan in annual instalments which is added to 
their regular taxes. The land owners have to pay it irrespective of whether the pump station is 
working or not, and of whether they use it or not. But many respondents stated that they were told 
that the project was a grant from the government and external agencies, and they were not aware 
that they would have to pay for the improvements.  

Table 2.1: Basic Details of Collective Pump Stations 



15 

 

 

A major objective of the package was institutional improvements in the form of WUAs and MCs.  
WUAs comprising five members were formed at each pump stations during the project 
implementation. The members were primarily selected by the engineer or by some influential 
farmers of the pump station. The five members comprise the president, secretary, treasurer and 
two other water users. Each pump station was received by some of the WUA members of that area. 
Some reports like Gouda (2009) have also mentioned that marwa farmers were organised in MCs, 
in this area. But the survey could not find any evidence of formal MCs; rather it was observed that 
the farmers had informal water distribution arrangements at the marwa level which will be 
discussed in Chapter IV.  In this report, institutions and organisations promoted by the projects are 
considered as formal, while socially and culturally embedded institutional and organisational 
arrangements are considered as informal. 

One of the primary objectives of the package was the conversion of the rotation system of water 
distribution to a continuous flow system. But it was observed that the flow in the BC was not 
continuous and was based on a rotation schedule controlled by the irrigation engineer, as it used to 
be in the past. Since the canal was also supplied from the Nashart drain at its tail end, the resulting 
regime of double water supply was quite irregular. Predictably, the middle stretch of the BC 
(between B4 and A5) faced varying degrees of water deficit.  

A two-week period of water deficit in the BC was observed during the field work. It coincided with 
the peak irrigation season of rice transplantation. It was also observed that the pump stations 
stopped working, if the water in the BC reduced below a certain level because of the high level of 
the intakes of the pump stations. Only some pump stations at end namely A1, A2, A3, B1, B2 were 
operational throughout the period with the exception of two days, thanks to the availability of drain 



16 

 

water. It can be seen from the table 2.1 that the characteristics of the pump stations are not 
homogenous. A major observation during the survey was that two pump stations (B8 and B9) were 
lying unused since their installation. It was also observed that water users of two of the pump 
stations (B6 and A5) which had stopped working due to some technical issue, had refused to get 
them fixed. Three major reasons were observed: 

Pumps or electric wires stolen: Pump station B9 is not working since the beginning, as the pumps 
were stolen immediately after installation. It must be added that there was initial disagreement 
amongst the farmers about receiving the pump station from the implementing agency. 

Conflict among farmers: Pump stations B4, B5, B6, B7 and A5 had stopped working after a fire in 
the electric supply. The transformer and the wires had burnt in the fire. All the farmers of that area 
collected money to get a new transformer. But water users of B6 and A5 refused to get the electric 
wires installed for their stations. B6 is lying unused since then. While at A5, farmers eventually 
installed electric wires, but the pump station has not been working since the last three years as 
farmers refused to get the PS repaired after some technical snag developed in the PS. 

Initial disagreement: At B8, there was a disagreement among the farmers of that area about 
accepting the pump station from the implementing agency, and it lies unused since then. It was also 
mentioned by some farmers that the motors were eventually stolen.  

These issues will be discussed at length later in the report.  

A primary objective of the package was to replace the practice of individual pumping with collective 
pumping.  

Before the implementation of the project, the farmers used to lift water directly from the BC or the 
mesqas using individual diesel pumps. The lifting points of the farmers were fixed, based on their 
mesqas and marwas. These individual lifting points were replaced with a single lifting point at the 
head of the mesqa with the aim to control over irrigation. An irrigation schedule has been designed 
each pump station for collective pumping. The collective water division is based on the irrigation 
schedule, and every unit area of land (feddan) gets a fixed duration of water supply. It can be drawn 
from the table that the practice of direct pumping from the BC and the drainage is still very 
common, and the practice is more common in the middle stretch of the BC. Also, the practice of 
drainage water reuse is a major coping strategy of the farmers against irregular supply in the BC. It 
also emerged from the survey that some farmers have opted out of the collective pumping system 
at some of the pump stations in the middle part of the BC like A4, B7 etc.  Many reasons like conflict 
among water users, lack of adequate water from the CPS etc emerged from the field work that are 
analysed in detail later on. It was found during the survey that the water management practices and 
pump operations were influenced by the land ownership pattern which was then explored in the 
next stages of the research. It is discussed at length in the next section. 

The marwa improvements included filling in the marwas and replacing them with a pipe-and-valve 
system, and land levelling. It was observed, however, that in most of the mesqas, the marwas have 
been kept open by the farmers even after shifting to the pipe and valve system. Multiple studies 
(Gouda, 2009; Simas et al, 2009) have documented that replacing marwa ditches with pipes has led 
to land savings and a subsequent increase in cultivable land. Our observations raise serious 
questions on the claims about land saving. Two reasons were pointed out by the respondents: 



17 

 

 Farmers prefer to keep the marwa ditches open so that they can be used if the pipe and 
valve system stops working for some reason. 

 Traditionally marwas also represented the demarcation between plots and roads or 
between adjacent plots. Farmers have an apprehension that filling up the marwas adjacent 
to the roads by owners of land adjacent to those marwas might slowly lead to an 
encroachment of the road by those owners. And that would lead to conflicts. So, farmers 
prefer to leave the marwa open to avoid any conflict over land encroachment. But it is not 
the same for marwas between plots. Many farmers prefer to keep those marwas open to 
keep a clear demarcation between plots. 

It was also pointed out by most of the respondents that replacing the marwa ditches with pipes had 
helped in saving water during irrigation. Other positive impacts of the package like reduction in 
irrigation time and cost were also pointed out. All the respondents further stated that the 
distribution of water had become equitable after the implementation of the project as all the plots 
along the mesqa got the same amount of water in a given duration. The impacts of the package are 
discussed in details in Chapter IV. 

2.1 Ownership pattern 

The agricultural arrangements and the land ownership pattern influence the water management 
practices and the operations. The agricultural arrangements are built around the land-people 
relationship. Even though there are not many landless farmers in the villages, there are large 
numbers of marginal farmers and sharecropping is a common practice in the villages. It is important 
to discuss the history of land tenancy in Egypt to understand the current arrangements. 

The Agrarian Reform Laws of 1952 gave land rights equivalent to ownership rights to the tenants 
over the land they used to cultivate. As part of the islah (land reform) initiated by the government 
under the leadership of Abdul Nasser, many areas were nationalised and distributed to the landless 
and the existing tenants were granted perpetual tenancy contract renewal (Saad, 1999). Around 
350 feddans of land owned by a Greek businessman in the study area (comprising the three villages) 
were also distributed amongst its tenants and labourers. This land comprises major parts of the 
area between the pump stations B4 and B7. Initially, the islah area was served by a large-scale 
central pump managed by the government, while the milk (owner) areas were served by sakias. But 
with the advent of small diesel pumps, the sakias and the islah pump were replaced by individual 
pumps and all farmers started using individual pumps.  

In the 80s-90s, the government changed the land tenure laws as part of the liberalisation policies. 
The land rent ceiling was eventually abolished and the owners got back the right to evict the 
tenants while the tenants were given an option to buy the land they were tilling or to get a minor 
compensation from the owner (Springborg, 1991). The islah farmers of this area also got the option 
to buy the land through instalment over a period of 15-20 years. Many islah farmers have become 
the owners of their lands by now while the others are still paying their annual instalment. The 
economic differences between the islah and milk farmers have reduced over the years. A rich and 
known figure in the society, Rahman, stated, ‘Initially, the islah farmers were poor. But now there is 
not much difference between the islah and milk farmers’ (Interview 9, 12th June 2013). But the 
structural and social differences still exist and can be understood from the fact that they used 
different mesqas for irrigation or lifted water from different points along the branch canal, before 
the implementation of the projects.  



18 

 

People who own large areas of land often rent it out to small farmers for sharecropping. Two types 
of sharecropping arrangements were observed, 1) one-fourth rule – the tenant rents the land for a 
year, and has to give three-fourth of the yield to the owner at the end of the season, while every 
input is provided by the owner, and 2) money rule – the tenant rents the land for a year for a fixed 
amount of money and the owner is not responsible for any input and does not get any part of yield 
from the tenant. The tenants are dependent on the owners for the irrigation arrangements, in the 
first system. The owners pay the operations and maintenance charges for the pump station, and 
also arrange for individual pumps for direct pumping. The second system of sharecropping based on 
money, is more popular among the land owners. Musa, who rented land in the B8 mesqa for 
cultivating rice, said, ‘The rent system in this area is based on money rather than one-fourth rule, as 
the owners feel that tenants don’t work hard enough in the latter system’ (Interview 50, 27th June 
2013).  

The areas under B8 and B9 are owned by a few large land owning families who have rented the land 
to other farmers. It emerged from the study that the land owners do not have any interest in the 
operations and maintenance of the pump stations, and the pump stations have been lying unused. 
The issue was clearly stated by a couple of farmers, who had rented land in the B8 area, ‘this pump 
station (B8) has not been working since the beginning, and the pumps have also been stolen. None 
of the farmers agreed to receive the PS at the beginning. This area (both B8 and B9) is owned by 
rich farmers and has been rented out to other famers like us. So the owners don’t care about 
tatweer. And they have not tried to get things fixed.’ (Interview 51, 27th June 2013). It was further 
observed at other pump stations like B7, A4 etc that the tenants had little say in the operations and 
management of the collective pump stations, and were not part of any kind of decision-making 
regarding the operations. The tenants just follow the set of rules of the pump station. The impact of 
land ownership on collective pumping operations is discussed in the next chapter. 

A3 and B11 present interesting cases of participatory water management.  The command area of 60 
feddans and 20 feddans under A3 and B11 respectively are owned by one family each. Even though 
a major objective of the project was to increase the participation of farmers in the operations 
through WUAs, these pump stations are serving only a couple of rich families. Hence, the rationale 
of collective pumping does not apply here, and the only difference for these families has been the 
conversion from diesel pumps to electric pumps.  

2.2 Project planning and implementation 

The layout and command area of the PS were decided by the engineers of the project without 
consulting the farmers, and the implementation was done by a contractor. The farmers did not 
have the choice to accept or reject the project. The evidence as discussed below also points 
towards the lack of adequate consultation with farmers regarding the layout and design of the 
project. 

The engineers obtained the land ownership data from the local village cooperative and designed 
the layout and the command areas of the pump stations based on their plans. After completion of 
the project, the respective PS and the associated water distribution systems were handed over to a 
group of farmers which was selected by the engineer in consultation with some large landowning 
farmers, or in some cases by the engineer only. Those farmers comprised the WUA. It also emerged 
that many farmers did not want the improvements, and were not comfortable with paying for the 
improvements. 



19 

 

Two major issues were raised by the respondents regarding the pump station layout: 

 Large command area: Some pump stations like B4, A3, A4, A5 etc have large command 
areas in the range of 60-90 feddans. It was pointed out by the farmers of these pump 
stations that large areas make operations difficult and lead to more conflicts. 

 Lack of consultation: Farmers were not adequately consulted during the design of the 
layout. The layout and command area under the pump stations were decided by the project 
engineers. Before the project implementation, all the mesqas had specific lifting points on 
the BC. Many such mesqas were clubbed together and brought under one pump station, 
without consulting the farmers. A farmer of B8 stated the significance clearly, ‘Farmers of 
this area used to irrigate from the sub-BC (the one connecting the BC and the PS B9) earlier. 
So the farmers of B10 did not want them to become a part of the B10 area, as we did not 
take water from that part of the BC in front of B10 area earlier.’ (Interview 52, 27th June 
2013). It was observed that at some pump stations like B4, B2 etc, the clubbing of various 
marwas and lifting points under one collective pump station had been accepted by the 
farmers, whereas it was one of the major issues at some pump stations like A4, B7 etc. The 
trajectories of B4 and B7, discussed in the next chapter, explain the issue in details. 

It emerged from the survey that some of the pump stations were officially received by signing an 
official paper, by a group of farmers with the consent of other farmers of that area, while a few 
were received by individual farmers or a limited group of farmers without the participation of other 
water users of that area. Pump stations like B8, B9 etc were received by individuals, whereas B4, A1 
etc were received by a group of farmers. It was observed that there were distinct differences in the 
management of these pump stations. Pump stations which were received by a limited group of 
farmers or individuals were managed poorly compared to other pump stations. A farmer of A4 
explained the reason of poor management in his own words, ‘Here many farmers were not ready to 
accept the PS at the beginning. So it was used by only a few farmers who received it. Eventually 
other farmers who were initially not ready to accept tatweer also wanted to become a part of the 
PS, and this led to conflict. Farmers have not collectively decided anything here. This leads to 
conflict and misunderstanding.’ (Interview 34, 17th June 2013). In most of the pump stations, the 
process was dominated by the rich and large landowning farmers. Sarfaraz, a farmer of A4 and also 
a WUA member, explained it clearly, ‘During the implementation, some land-owning farmers used 
to hobnob with the engineers. After completion, the engineer got the PS received by one of those 
farmers’ (Interview 43, 22nd June 2013). A similar situation was observed at B7 where a rich farmer 
had received the pump station from the implementation agency. 

On the other hand, pump stations like B4 were received by a group of farmers. As the operator of 
B4 aptly commented on the non-working status of B9 while comparing it with B4, ‘That pump 
station was received by only one person who was asked by the engineer to do so. And that led to a 
lot of conflicts’ (Interview 40, 20th June 2013). A similar thought was echoed by a farmer of A4 who 
compared his CPS with B4, ‘At B4, farmers collectively received the PS and collectively decided the 
rotation system. But here, many farmers were not ready to accept the PS at the beginning. So it was 
used by only a few farmers who received it. Farmers have not collectively decided anything here. 
This leads to conflict and misunderstanding.’ (Interview 34, 17th June 2013). 



20 

 

It can be drawn from the evidence that the farmers were not adequately consulted during the 
layout design and implementation. Also, the present-day operations are affected by the process of 
getting the pump station received by the farmers. 

2.3 Technical constraints 

The IIP package was implemented with some changes in the W10 area. The pump capacities have 
been reduced to increase the working hours of the pumps. Two types of pumps with the following 
technical specification have been used in this area: 

Type HP 
Capacity 
(L/S) 

Main Head 
(M) RPM 

Big 7.5 40 6-7.1 1450 

Small 5.5 20 6-7.1 1450 

 

 As shown in table 2.1, smaller mesqas have two motors comprising one big and one small in terms 
of pump capacity, while the larger ones have three motors comprising one big and two small ones. 
The motors pump water from the BC to water towers constructed adjacent to the pump stations. 
And water is released to the mesqa from the water tower. In large mesqas, the pump stations are 
used for 20-22 hours every day during summer, whereas they are used on a demand basis in winter. 
And in smaller mesqas, the pump stations are used for 15-16 hours every day. The pumps were 
expected to run for 16 hours, as per the design of the project. At the same time, the limited pump 
capacity results in a lack of adequate pressure at the tail end of long mesqas. The impact of limited 
pump capacity is discussed in Chapter IV. There are some more technical constraints related to 
infrastructure and design like electricity cut, large command area etc which affect the water 
management practices and operations, as explained below:  

 Electricity cut or pumps not working – One of the major technical constraints is the regular 
electricity cut. Farmers miss their irrigation turn and prefer to use their individual pumps 
rather than waiting for their next turn. When Mehmoud, a farmer of B4, was asked why he 
was using the individual pump (IP), he said, ‘It was my turn to irrigate last night at around 9 
pm, but there was a power cut and I missed my turn. So, I am using my IP to irrigate from 
the drainage now’ (Interview 25, 12th June 2013). 

 Water availability in the BC – It was observed that the pumps stopped working if the water 
in the BC dropped below a certain level. It is a major factor in the middle stretch of the BC, 
which has been discussed in details later in the report. 

Some specific instances of technical errors were also observed. The position of the first valve and 
outlet at the pump station A4 is an example of technical error and the lack of adequate consultation 
with the farmers during the implementation. The outlet has not been used since it was installed. It 
has been designed to supply water to a small vat which further connects to the marwa of the first 
part of the command area. Figure 3.4 shows examples of a vat. It was pointed out by the farmers of 
that marwa that the vat was constructed at a lower level than the marwa and water through the 
vat cannot flow along the marwa. Also, the small size of the vat results in overflow and irregular 
flow to the marwa. The farmers were not consulted before deciding the position of the valve. They 
wanted the outlet to be constructed at the head of the marwa, as they knew that the area was 



21 

 

higher. The outlet has not been used even once, and all the farmers in part one use their individual 
pumps to irrigate their plots.  

Figure 2.2: Vats constructed by farmers 

 

The impact of the technical constraints on the water management practices and operations of the 
pump station is discussed in Chapter IV. 

2.4 Water allocation in BC 

During the field work, it was observed that the water distribution in the Masharqa canal was still 
based on a rotational system controlled by the water control gate at the head of the canal, as 
opposed to the planned continuous flow. The gate is operated by the bahaar (gate-keeper) on 
instructions of the muhandis (engineer). The theoretical schedule in the Masharqa canal is four days 
on and four days off in summer and four days on and eight days off in winter. All the branch canals 
have a theoretical fixed schedule during which they get water from the main Meet Yazid Canal. It 
was further observed that the water control gate was not operated as per the schedule and the 
allocation is done on the basis of the need or water level in BC assessed by the engineer, and/or on 
the basis of the complaints received from the farmers. As per one of the engineers of the local 
irrigation department, the control gate is kept open for as long as the water does not reach the end 
of the BC. In Masharqa, the gate is kept open until the water from Meet Yazid reaches the 1.5km 
mark, while the water from Nashart drain reaches up to the 2km mark. The downstream control 
gate in Nashart is also closed at times to increase the water level and the drain water eventually 
crosses the 2km mark.  The level of water is therefore better at the head and the end of the branch 
canal, because of their proximities to the Meet Yazid canal and the Nashart drain respectively. Eight 
pump stations (A4, A5, and B4-B9) in the middle stretch of the canal face varying degrees of 
periodic water deficit, due to irregular supply from the Meet Yazid canal. Overall, it can be seen 
from the following chart that during summer, Masharqa canal receives more water from the drain 
than from the main canal itself. 

Average measured discharges downstream El-Masharqa head regulator and at its tail end (from 
Nashart drain) during summer 2012 



22 

 

Chart 2.3: Measured discharge in Branch Canal 

 

It must be mentioned here that the situation is different in winter. All the respondents stated that 
the availability of fresh water in the BC was more regular in winter, and the farmers did not face 
fresh water deficit. During the field work, a period of water deficit was observed when the water 
from Meet Yazid was not released in the BC for around ten days. The situation can be understood 
from the figures (2.3 – 2.8) which show the level of water in the canal and the impact on crops. 
Farmers were seen trying to collect some water in the canal by manual desilting. Also, many 
farmers were spending their whole time near the pump waiting for some water to collect. The 
water was eventually released after complaints and mass protests like blocking roads etc from the 
farmers of this area. When one of the department engineers was asked about this period of water 
scarcity, he blamed it on the lack of adequate water in Meet Yazid and its consequences at the end 
of the canal system. He further added that 15 branch canals had to be supplied with water in that 
region, and the allocation was done on the basis of need assessed by the engineer rather than a 
strict rotation schedule. It must be added here that most of the respondents claimed that the water 
situation in the canal was better before the implementation of the IIP project.  

 

Figure 2.4: Farmer trying to collect water in BC                    Figure 2.5: Absolute scarcity in BC 

 

Figure 2.6: Completely dry rice field                                      Figure 2.7: Affected crop 

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

1-
M

ay

1-
Ju

n
1-

Ju
l

1-
Aug

1-
Sep

A
v
e
ra

g
e
 m

e
a
s
u

e
d

 d
is

c
h

a
rg

e
 (

m
3
/s

e
c
)

From the head From the drain



23 

 

 

Figure 2.8: BC Water not adequate for IP intake         Figure 2.9: BC Water not adequate for PS intake 

 

In most of the large-scale public irrigation systems in the world, farmers have to depend on 
whatever amount of water is supplied to them (Molle, 2009). Similarly, farmers do not have 
effective control over the supply of water in the branch canals in the Egyptian irrigation system.  It 
has been pointed out by appraisal reports and studies (World Bank, 2005; Kotb and Boissevain, 
2012) that there is scope for saving water by using water more efficiently at the farm level. But 
direct observation along the marwas during the field work threw some interesting insights into the 
claim. The optimum range of water depth required for rice cultivation is 5-10cm (WMRI, 1996). It 
was observed that farmers preferred to keep 8-10cm of water standing in the rice fields which is in 
the range of the recommended water depth. Some farmers along the local drain claimed that they 
had to irrigate their land more frequently as the water in the field drained out faster than other 
plots further away from the drain. 

It was also observed that there were dry periods as well, when the farmers kept the water level in 
the rice fields intentionally low. The alternate wet-and-dry cycle is followed by many farmers for 
optimum growth of the crop. The standing water level can be seen from the figure 2.3 of four 
different plots. As discussed in the earlier sections, the practice of reusing drainage water is quite 
common which increases the efficiency of water usage. The observations raise serious questions 
about the claim that farmers over-irrigate and waste water. It also must be mentioned that there 
were some instances of over-irrigation as well. One of the instances is explained in box 2.1. 

Box 2.1: Over-irrigation - A4 

A couple of women are sitting beside their IP which is working.  One of the women is irrigating her 
rice field (head-middle region, part of valve 2) with the IP since 7:30 in the morning. She tells us that 
her turn from the PS will come tomorrow, and her rice field needs irrigation today. So she is using 
her IP. 



24 

 

We check her field and the adjacent field. There is around 5cms water standing in her field (1.5 
hours irrigation since morning), while the adjacent field is sufficiently moist to survive for a couple 
of days without irrigation. We ask her if her field was in a similar state in the morning. 

She says that the field was in the similar state. And then adds that rice will die if she doesn’t irrigate 
today. When pointed out that the adjacent field can survive easily for couple of more days, she says 
“Since the PS was not working for a long time, I am not sure if it will work continuously. It might 
stop working again. So I am using my IP to irrigate.” 

Source – Field Notes (28th June 2013). 

 

It can be drawn from the example that over irrigation is chiefly driven by the unpredictable nature 
of supply. The farmers are still dependent on the irrigation department for assessing their need and 
allocating water in the BC. The transfer of the irrigation management at the branch canal and higher 
levels to the water users has been nominal as there has not been any major change in the 
ownership and management pattern. As mentioned earlier, the marwas and mesqas are privately 
owned by farmers, whereas higher level canals are owned and managed by the government. Even 
after the implementation of the reform projects, this ownership pattern has not changed. The 
branch canals and higher levels of the system are still managed by the government. BCWUAs have 
been formed at the branch canal level for devolution of O&M of the canals to the farmers, but the 
domain of BCWUAs is still very limited as discussed in the next section. Ghazouani et al. (2012) 
evaluate the reform projects in the NEN region, and suggest that the major focus of the 
government and the irrigation department has been on transferring the O&M costs to the farmers, 
rather than transferring the management of the system. 

Figure 2.10: Water level at different times during rice cultivation. 

 

 

BCWUA 



25 

 

The Branch Canal WUA (BCWUA) was formed after the implementation of the project, in 2011, and 
its primary responsibilities include keeping the BC clean, liaising with government officials, resolve 
issues of farmers related to BC etc. The association is formed of members from most of the pump 
stations. It has a small office which is housed in a room in the house of the president. Some of the 
respected men hold a grudge against the BCWUA as they feel that their authority was not 
recognised during the formation of the association. The president of B4 mentioned that the 
engineer got the pump station received by a common man (president of BCWUA) and did not 
consult respected men like him. He also added that the BCWUA president was trying to become a 
big man now. (Interview 41, 20th June 2013). It must be mentioned here that the BCWUA president 
is a teacher in the local school, and is a known face amongst the farmers now. An interesting 
observation was the relationship between the Irrigation Advisory Service (IAS) officials and the 
BCWUA president. IAS has been formed as part of the reform process primarily for the capacity 
building of the new institutions.  The officials interact with the president the most, compared to 
other members of the BCWUA.  He is considered the most important person among the community 
members, by the IAS officials. The officials also portrayed the Masharqa BCWUA as the model 
association, in front of the research team. But any role of the BCWUA in the operations and 
maintenance of the BC was not observed during the period of the field work. The BCWUA does not 
have any role in the water allocation in the BC. Even though the allocation is based on need 
assessment or demand of the farmers, the BCWUA does not have any role in need assessment or 
advocating the demand to the department.  

It also must be added that the operations and maintenance responsibilities have not been 
adequately devolved from the irrigation department to the BCWUA. The President of the BCWU4A 
stated quite explicitly, ‘The government wants the farmers to take up all the financial and 
maintenance responsibilities. It is not good. Government formed the BCWUA to solve the problems 
of the farmers. But the government does not want the burden of farmers and has passed it on to 
the BCWUA.’ (Interview 28, 12th June 2013). He also added that the BCWUA should be given 
decision-making powers, while the financial management should rest with the government. The 
situation was well summarised by an engineer of the district irrigation department when he said, 
‘The associations were formed three years back. But only three out of the 15 in this district are 
operational. There isn’t any role clarity. Also, the government has not given them any money to 
start maintaining the BC’ (Interview 57, 4th July 2013). The financial, maintenance and water 
rotation responsibilities still lie with the government. It was observed that the role of BCWUA was 
limited, with minimal visibility among the farmers. The awareness about the BCWUA among the 
farmers is also low. 

An interesting example of the role and effectiveness of the BCWUA is the maintenance of the 
branch canal. It was observed that the practice of throwing local rubbish and sewage waste in the 
BC was common in both Masharqa and Sawaiya villages. Figure 2.10 shows the sewage floating in 
the BC. The quality of water in the BC can be understood from figure 2.11 which shows the lather 
produced in the water. Farmers, who were pumping from the BC, expressed their unhappiness and 
helplessness over the quality of water in the BC. Most of the respondents complained that the poor 
quality of the water had an impact on their health and liver diseases were quite common among 
the villagers. A farmer of B2 clearly pointed it out when he said, ‘Water is available all through the 
year, as the pump station is near the end of the canal (and near the drain). The only problem is the 
quality of the water. It leads to health issues like liver problems.’ (Interview 4, 22nd May 2013). It 
was further observed that the local waste of the village was regularly thrown in the BC. One of the 



26 

 

main reasons that emerged was the lack of a sewage and local waste management in the village. 
The village sewage and waste management is the responsibility of another department of the 
government, and needs to be analysed as a separate issue. Even though the maintenance of the 
branch canal is supposed to be the responsibility of the BCWUA, the president expressed his 
helplessness in ensuring that villagers did not throw the rubbish into the BC, due to lack of any 
other sewage management system.  

Figure 2.11: Rubbish in various areas of BC                      

 

Figure 2.12: Lather produced by pumping directly from BC              

 

An instance of the involvement of the BCWUA president in the maintenance of the BC was observed 
when the canal had to be desilted.  As mentioned earlier, there was acute water shortage during a 
period of two weeks. It was decided by the farmers of the middle-end part of the BC to get that part 
desilted. The responsibility of maintenance of the BC lies with the irrigation department, and it has 
to be cleaned twice or thrice a year, according to needs. Even though the BC had been cleaned a 
month back, a part of it (1.5km from the end) was being cleaned again to improve the water level in 
the BC. The president of the BCWUA stated that he had requested the irrigation department for the 
out-of-turn cleaning (Interview 54, 28th June 2013). The department paid for the cleaning machine, 
while the farmers had to pay baksheesh to the machine operator. It was observed that most of the 
water users of the middle-end part were present near their pump stations to ensure proper 
desilting in front of their mesqas.   

Capacity building of these organisations was also part of the reform process, and it is discussed in 
the next section. 

Capacity Building of Institutions 



27 

 

Interviews with the WUA and BCWUA members suggested a serious lack of adequate capacity 
building of the institutions. None of the WUA members reported attending any training 
programmes. Also, only the BCWUA president is called for trainings and meetings a couple of times 
in a year, but other members have not attended any training. The BCWUA president stated the 
situation clearly, ‘BCWUA gets two trainings per year at Kafr-el Sheikh. Sometimes all members go 
for the training, but most of the times, only I attend the trainings. The WUAs have not received any 
training till now. And no one has even talked about it till now.’ (Interview 28, 12th June 2013). It 
must be added that this contradicts the claim made by some IAS officials who hold the view that the 
organisations have received adequate number of trainings. The president of B4 WUA also echoed 
the president’s claim, ‘The WUA has not received any training since the beginning, except a hands-
on demonstration of the pump station.’ (Interview 29, 13th June 2013). The operators of most of the 
pump stations mentioned that they had not received any training on how to use the pump station 
except a demonstration at the beginning.  

The contradiction between the facts stated by the farmers and the IAS respectively raise questions 
on the functioning of the IAS, and needs to be explored more to understand the issues in details.  

3 B4 and B7: Basic Characteristics 

Both B4 and B7 pump stations are part of the middle stretch of the BC. Figure below shows the 
spatial location of the pump stations and their command areas. The local drain can be accessed by 
the farmers of B4, whereas it is not accessible for the B7 farmers. This chapter discusses the various 
characteristics of B4 and B7 in details. It also cites examples from other pump stations to draw a 
pattern in the Masharqa canal. 

The basic characteristics of the pump stations are explained in the following table.  

 

The pumps are operated as per the irrigation schedule. As mentioned earlier, the pump station is 
operational for 20-22 hours of the day. The farmers have set the following operating schedule for 
the pumps: 

 At B4, the high capacity pump is operated for 12 hours, and then the combination of the 
two smaller ones is operated for the next 12 hours. 

 At B7, the pumps are operated alternately or together, depending on the irrigation 
schedule. If the valves at the tail end have to be supplied, then the high capacity pump is 



28 

 

operated or both the pumps are operated. But it was observed that the smaller pump was 
out of order for most part of the study period. 

The effect of the long operating hours on the wear-and-tear of the motors could not be quantified 
or explored.  

Figure 3.1: Spatial location of B4 and B7 

 

3.1 Pump station trajectory 

As discussed in the earlier chapter, the area between B4 and B7 comprises both islah and milk land. 
But the pump station trajectory explains the structural differences between islah and milk farmers, 
and also the result of lack of adequate consultation with the farmers. 

 The command area of B7 is divided in four parts as shown in figure 3.2. Two parts belong to milk 
farmers while the last two belong to islah farmers. Before the implementation of the project, the 
islah farmers used to get water from the islah pump or from the mesqa on their side of the land. 
And the owners used to get water from the branch canal. Both the areas were clubbed together by 
the project and brought under the same pump station which was built at the same point of the 
branch canal from which the milk farmers used to draw water. This decision was not supported by 
the milk farmers, as they did not want the islah farmers to take water from their side of the branch 
canal. It is one of the major reasons of the conflict over water management in B7. Abdullah, a milk 
farmer of B7 explained the structural difference clearly when he said, ‘the islah farmers are poor 
and depend on others for their basic needs like land, food etc. They take whatever you throw at 
them’ (Interview 32, 15th June 2013). Even though the islah farmers gradually became the owners of 



29 

 

the lands by buying it from the government, but they were still considered socially inferior to the 
milk farmers.  

Figure 3.2: Layout of Mesqa B7 

  

It can be seen from the figure that a small area (6 fed app.) at the end of the milk area of B7 has not 
been added to the pump station. The area belongs to one farmer and is part of the PS B9. Before 
the project, this area was irrigated from the sub-BC which was used by the farmers of the adjacent 
B9 area. From the discussion with the farmers of that PS, it emerged that the owner of that area 
wanted to become a part of B7, but the area was not included by the engineer.  

Similarly, the command area of B4, as shown in figure 3.3, contains both islah and non-islah land. 
But the pump station followed a different trajectory than B4. V1-V2 is a milk area, while V3-V8 
comprises islah farmers and V9-V13 is again a milk area. The area V1-V13 was originally served by a 
sub BC which extended all the way from B5 to V13. As part of the project, the sub-BC was only kept 
till B6 while the rest of it was filled in, and it was planned to include the V3-V8 area in B6, while B4 
was supposed to cover the area V1-V2 and the area under B3. Islah farmers of V3-V8 did not want 
to become a part of B6. The reason was explained by a prominent islah farmer, ‘The farmers of this 
area did not want to be clubbed together with the farmers of B6 as they were from a different 
village (Masharqa) and this would lead to conflicts’ (Interview 20, 6th June 2013). Also, they wanted 
to take water from the BC rather than the sub-BC. The islah farmers talked to the milk farmers of 
V1-V2 who agreed to include the islah and milk area under one pump station.  Some 
representatives of the farmers submitted an application along with a hand-drawn map of proposed 
area at the irrigation department and met the Director for stating their case. Eventually, the design 
was changed and the area was added to B4. At the same time, the milk farmers of V9-V13 also 
wanted to become a part of B4, and that area was also added to B4 after consent from the other 
farmers. The farmers of V3-V13 used to draw water from the sub-BC which supplies B6. But it was 
filled-in during the project implementation. A milk farmer of V9 explained, ‘There wasn’t any 



30 

 

problem. The islah farmers did not mind the milk farmers joining the PS. And we did not have any 
option as the sub-BC was filled in, and the only way-out was to become a part of B4. We had to pay 
600 EP more for the pipes and valves needed for extending the connection.’ (Interview 24, 8th June 
2013). It can be drawn from this case that the command area of B4 was the result of a negotiation 
among the islah and milk farmers, and also between the farmers and the engineer. A major 
difference between B4 and B7 is the role played by the president who is a respected man of the 
village, in the negotiations. Also, the milk and islah farmers of B4 wanted to come under the same 
pump station, whereas the milk and islah farmers of B7 wanted to opt out of the same pump 
station. It also must be pointed out that the milk and islah farmers along V3-V13 at B4 used to 
withdraw water from the same sub-BC which was eventually filled in, whereas the milk and islah 
farmers of B7 had different points for withdrawing water from the BC. 

Figure 3.3: Layout of Mesqa B4 

 

A special mention must be made of how the PS B11 was established to understand the interaction 
between the water users and the project implementation department. The pump station covers an 
area of 20 feddans that belongs to one rich family. During the discussion with the owner of the 
area, he mentioned, ‘It is his special PS and no one else uses it. So there isn’t any water issue’. He 
further added, ‘When tatweer was being implemented I told the engineers that I would accept it 
only if I get an individual PS for my lands’ (Interview 9, 26th May 2013). It also emerged from the 
discussion that neighbouring farmers also wanted to become a part of the pump station, but he 



31 

 

convinced the engineers not to include other farmers’ area under that pump station. This example 
shows how local power structures in the form of a dominating rich family influenced the 
implementation of the project. 

It can be drawn from the evidence that the farmers of B7 were not adequately consulted during the 
planning and design phase. It also shows a lack of understanding of the local water management 
practices and organisational arrangements. Even though different marwas and parts have been 
brought under the same pump station, the earlier organisational arrangement around lifting points 
on the BC has been reproduced in the improved systems. On the other hand, B4 presents a case 
where the traditional arrangement has not been reproduced and farmers of different parts are 
successfully using the collective pump station. The layout of B4 is the result of participation of 
farmers in the designing and planning process, and has primarily been decided by the farmers.  

Farm Hydrant Layout 

It has emerged from the discussions that the participation of farmers in deciding the layout of the 
plot-level hydrants was high and the positions of hydrants in the plots were decided by the farmers 
themselves. Some farmers of both B4 and B7 also got extra hydrants installed after paying for them. 
At B7, a rich farmer who owns 5 feddans of land got a main valve and hydrant installed just for his 
area. A farmer of B7 explained the process, ‘If a farmer wanted more valves, he could get them by 
paying extra. Also, the farmers did the manual work during the installation of the pipes and valves, 
and a farmer could ask the farmers (who were doing the installation) to fix an extra valve (by paying 
more). The engineer did not object to that.’ (Interview 37, 19th June 2013). It was observed that the 
number of hydrants were more than the plot level divisions in some of the marwas, as discussed in 
the box below. 

Box 3.1: Hydrant layout – B4 

There are ten hydrants under V3, while there are eight plots. It was observed that one of the paddy 
fields had two hydrants. One of the farmers of that marwa explained the reason, ‘Originally eight 
valves were installed on this marwa. But the farmer of this plot added the extra valves later, as the 
land changed hands and the new owner preferred more valves. The average plot size is around 12-
16 kerat in this area, so the number of hydrants is also large’ (Interview 22, 06th June) 

It was also observed that the farmers preferred separate hydrants for each part under the marwa, 
rather than one for each feddan. Hamid, a farmer of B4, explained the reason, ‘Each part needs a 
separate hydrant. Otherwise it might lead to conflict. If a rice farmer and cotton farmer share a 
hydrant, then it will lead to conflict.’ (Interview 21, 06th June 2013).  At the same time, some 
farmers also refused to install more than one hydrant. The command area of four feddans under 
V12 belongs to one family, who got just one hydrant installed for the whole area, and refused to 
install more because of the cost. 

3.2 Crop pattern 

Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show that rice dominates the crop pattern in both B4 and B7. Cotton is the 
second most popular crop in this region. The preference for rice is driven by profitability and urge 
for food sufficiency. Most of the farmers mentioned that rice was more profitable than cotton in 
terms of investment costs. At the same time, some farmers specifically pointed out that their first 
priority was to grow food for the family. The crop pattern is decided by the village cooperative 
which divides the total area into rice, cotton and dry crops areas. The crop pattern is not farmer 



32 

 

specific, but it is area specific. A farmer who has two plots in two different areas might have to grow 
two different crops based on the pattern of the area. The farmers are expected to follow the 
pattern. Also, the rice farmers can shift to dry crops but the other way round is not allowed and 
fines might be imposed. But some farmers shift from dry crops to rice, though it is not a major shift. 
The president of BCWUA clearly stated, ‘There hasn’t been any major change in the area of rice 
cultivation in the last two years’ (Interview26, 12th June 2013). The irregular nature of fresh water 
supply in the BC is not reflected in the crop pattern. There has not been any major shift to dry 
crops. One of the major reasons is the practice of supply augmentation as discussed later in Chapter 
IV.  

 

Figure 3.4: Crop pattern at B7 

 

The crop pattern at B4 does give some interesting insights. In the area V1-V2, only four out of 17 
plots have been planted with rice, and the rest are cotton and berseem. But on the other hand, 
most of the area under V3-V13 has been planted with rice. As Mohammad whose land is part of V1, 
explained, ‘The farmers on the other side of the road (the road that was created by filling in the 
sub-BC between V3-V13 and runs parallel to the mesqa) plant more rice as they have more water 
because of the proximity from the drain. Farmers individually decide the crop they want to plant. 
But the government doesn’t allow everyone to plant rice’ (Interview 13, 1st June 2013). The broad 
crop pattern is decided by the government every year, as explained an official of the village 
cooperative when he said, ‘The crop pattern is decided by the cooperative. The area is divided into 
three parts (rice, cotton, maize) and the sequence changes every year. The crop pattern has been 
there from the beginning for the islah farmers. So even after it was stopped by the government, 
they still planted according to the crop pattern.’ (Interview 27, 12th June 2013). It was observed that 
most of the farmers still mentioned the government crop pattern as a broad rule which governed 
their crop decision. It was also observed that crop decision of a family was not only influenced by 



33 

 

the accessibility of adequate water, but also by other factors like crop pattern, crops cultivated last 
year etc. The example of Kalam in the box below clearly explains this. 

 

Figure 3.5: Crop pattern at B4 

Box 3.2: Crop preference 

Kalam owns land in both the B4 and B5 command areas. At B4, his plot is near the drainage where 
he planted berseem, whereas he planted rice in the B5 area. Even though he had access to 
adequate water at B4, he planted berseem there as he had been planting rice on that land for the 
last two years. 

Source: Field Notes (2nd July 2013) 

The example also points towards the rotation system of crop planning, in which the history of crops 
cultivated in the last couple of seasons influences the choice of crop in the present season. Farmers 
often keep a land fallow for a season in between two major crops. 

3.3 WUA composition 

During the project implementation phase, four or five farmers were selected on the basis of their 
socio-economic position to comprise the WUA. The selection was primarily done by the agency 
engineer, but some large land-owning farmers were also involved in the process.  

Rural Egyptian society is patriarchal, and the interaction among villagers is heavily influenced by 
family ties and bonds. Based on the socio-economic status, education, and exposure etc, certain 
men in the society are regarded as wise and kind, and are respected by everyone in the village. 
Most of these men are also large land owners. When asked about the criteria for becoming a WUA 



34 

 

member, all the respondents of B4 and B7 said that the WUA member should be rich with a large 
area, and should be a known and respected figure of the society. A person with a large area would 
have more ownership towards the operations of the pump station. Also, a rich person can help to 
tide over any emergency financial requirement. 

The local social and power relations are often reproduced in the WUA (Narain, 2003).  The 
composition of the B4 and B7 WUAs suggests the structural reproduction (Giddens, 1984) of the 
traditional socio-political division between islah and milk farmers. B4 WUA has five members while 
B7 has four members. Even though the islah farmers constitute a major part of the area under both 
B4 and B7, the WUAs do not have any islah farmer as the member.  

Mehmoud, who owns land in B4 mesqa, stated, ‘Milk farmers are richer and more learned. And 
they also want to be at the centre of power. So they are the members of the WUA. They can also 
talk to the engineers or other external officials’ (Interview 25, 12th June 2013). B7 WUA has two 
large landowners of the mesqa as members. A similar thought was echoed by Abdullah, who is a 
large farmer of B7, when he said, ‘Islah farmers did not want to become members of the WUA as 
they knew that they were not part of this area originally and they would not be selected’ (Interview 
32, 15th May 2013). It clearly shows the dominance of milk farmers over the islah farmers in the 
WUA composition.  

The absence of women members in the WUA also suggests reproduction of the structural exclusion 
(Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen, 1998) of women in irrigation. In a focus group discussion with 
women, the participants stated forcefully that they could not become members of the WUA as a 
woman’s position was fixed in the society and they were not supposed to cross the boundary. There 
were a few men present at the meeting, and they agreed with the women. 

Organisations for common property resource management like the WUAs should build on existing 
local organisations (Uphoff, 1986; Cernea and Meinzen-Dick, 1993). Some of the WUAs have 
assimilated the existing conflict resolution institutions. There are some traditional conflict 
resolution institutions in the Egyptian rural society. Villagers refer to some specific men who are 
considered wise and kind, for advice and conflict resolution. The villages also have a traditional 
system of conflict resolution called the Adal al Arab. It is an informal committee comprising the 
respected men of the village and has five or seven members. The villages also have a mayor, Omda 
and the secretary of the mayor, Sheikh al Balad, who play a role in conflict resolution at times. 
Before the WUAs were formed, the farmers referred to these men or the committee for conflict 
resolution or for seeking advice regarding irrigation. But now some of them are members of the 
WUA. The B4 WUA shows the assimilation of the traditional institutions in the formal structure. The 
president of the B4 WUA is a member of the social committee Adal Arab and has been traditionally 
consulted for conflict resolution. He is consulted by the farmers in his capacity as both the president 
of the WUA and the member of the social committee. It must be added that his father was also a 
respected man of the society who was consulted for conflict resolution. It also must be mentioned 
that a similar assimilation was not observed in B7 WUA. The impact of the assimilation on the 
conflict resolution mechanism is discussed in later section 3.4.2. 

It is evident from the composition of the WUAs that the local power, social and gender structure 
have been reproduced in the formal organisational arrangements promoted for water 
management. New institutions like president, treasurer etc which have been created by the project, 
have further strengthened the existing power structures as only rich and large landowning men 



35 

 

have been selected for those positions. But any new power and social structure created by these 
new institutions in the community was not observed. Further exploration is required to analyse this. 

3.4 Role of WUAs 

The WUA board comprises president, secretary, treasurer and two other members. A point must be 
made here regarding the perception of WUA among the water users. Even though WUA is 
technically the association of all the water users, the water users do not consider themselves part 
of the WUA and perceive it as an association of only the selected members. 

An interesting observation was the dominance of some individuals over the operations and 
management of the collective pumping system, at some of the pump stations. The impact of 
dominance of an individual over operations and management can be drawn from B7 where the 
WUA functioning and the pump station operations are totally controlled by the president. It was 
observed that the president also abused his dominant position in various ways as explained in the 
following sections on the role of the WUA. The operator of B7 stated it as a matter of fact, ‘The 
President received the pump station after project completion and so he also acts as the treasurer’ 
(Interview 58, 5th July 2013). The president is a large landowner who also has a cattle business. On 
the other hand, it was seen that the various responsibilities were distributed among different 
members of the WUA at B4 where the responsibilities of the three positions lie with three farmers.  

It was observed that WUAs were primarily involved only in collection of money from the farmers for 
operations and maintenance like charging pre-paid electricity card, pump maintenance etc. In 
addition to that, some members like the President are consulted for conflict resolution. As 
mentioned earlier, WUAs were formed to ensure collective pumping and to maintain the irrigation 
schedule, along with other O&M activities. But the observations and the discussions with the 
farmers suggested limited role of WUA in water management in the mesqa. It is discussed in details 
in Chapter IV. 

Most of the respondents pointed out the following responsibilities of farmers associated with the 
WUA or the WUA members: 

 

Activity Actor and Role 

Operations and water 
management 

Operator 

Financial management The treasurer is involved in collecting money for the O&M. 

Conflict resolution The President or other members of the WUA are consulted for conflict 
resolution. 

Maintenance The mesqa and marwa maintenance activities are the responsibilities of 
individual farmers while the pump station maintenance is the 
responsibility of the operator. 



36 

 

It was observed that the responsibilities are dependent on individual farmers or WUA member, 
rather than the WUA as an organisation. It must be mentioned here that formal WUA meetings 
were not observed during the period of field work. The respondents unanimously agreed to this 
observation and said that formal meetings were not held. It was further observed that the mode of 
communication among the WUA members, or between the users and members or between the 
operator and WUA members was informal, and part of daily conversations rather than any formal 
mode of interaction. 

The activities are discussed in details in the following sections. 

1.1.1. Financial management 

One of the objectives of the irrigation reform was to increase the participation of farmers in 
operations and management of the improved infrastructure. As mentioned earlier, the farmers 
have to repay a part of the infrastructure cost in the form of an annual instalment payment. The 
farmers also have to pay for the electricity charges, along with other operation and maintenance 
costs. The major costs involved are: 

 Electricity charge 

 Operator’s salary 

 Maintenance cost 

One of the major responsibilities of the WUA is the financial management of the pump stations. The 
treasurer has the responsibility of managing the finances. It was stated by all the respondents of B4 
that the treasurer collected the money for O&M and got the electricity pre-paid card for pump 
operations. The treasurer keeps the money as the WUAs do not have any bank account. Some other 
farmers are also involved in collecting the O&M charges from the water users. One of the farmers 
of each marwa has been given the responsibility by other farmers to collect the money, and give it 
to the treasurer.  This process was mainly observed at B4, but some other pump stations like A1 and 
A4 also had a similar system. Sometimes, one of the rich farmers also chips in with the required sum 
for the O&M, while the money is collected from all the water users.  The water users have to pay a 
certain amount for all the costs mentioned above. At B4, the users have to pay 60 EPs/season while 
at B7, the fee is around 35-45 EPs/season. The difference in the amount is due to the difference in 
the number of motors (and the electricity cost) for B4 and B7 respectively. The fee might change in 
different seasons according to the electricity charges. It must be added that the operators are paid 
150-200 EP/month. The electricity pre-paid card is recharged once for a season, and it is also done 
by the treasurer. All the respondents of B4 were aware of the role of the treasurer, and it was 
observed that the process of money collection was well established among the water users. 

At B7, the process was not as well established as B4 and the president acted as the treasurer. 
Farmers give money to the President or the operator when they are asked for it. Some farmers of 
B7 also raised questions on the financial management by the president. Some of the islah farmers 
complained that they were asked to pay more when they wanted to become a part of the pump 
station a year ago. And one of the major reasons which triggered decision of the islah farmers was 
the acute shortage of fuel for individual pump last year. An islah farmer of part V4 who wanted to 
rejoin the pump station, explained, ‘I wanted to become a part of the pump station and was asked 
by the president to pay 2 EPs/kerat and was also told to get at least 2-3 farmers from his marwa as 



37 

 

it was not possible to give water to only one farmer of the valve. The normal charge is 1 EP/kerat.’ 
(Interview 60, 5th July 2013). The thought was also echoed by Doaa who was an islah farmer and 
owned land in V3, and was asked to pay 4EP/kerat by the President when she wanted to become a 
part of the pump station (Interview 44, 23rd June 2013). As mentioned earlier, the milk farmers did 
not want the islah farmers to join the pump station during the implementation. 

The following example below shows that the process of getting the electric card recharged is not 
well established at B7, and the president is not proactive towards the financial management 
responsibilities. 

Box 3.3: Electricity card recharge management – B7 

On 5th July, it was observed that the PS had stopped working, and the reason was that the low 
balance of the pre-paid electricity card. The operator said he could not understand it earlier as he 
could not read the counter in the electric meter, as he could not read English. The water users were 
not sure about the initial recharge amount of the electric card, as it was done by the President. The 
operator added that the card was recharged once before the beginning of the season and it was 
supposed to suffice for one season.  

Source – Field notes (5th July, 2013). 

 

It can be drawn from the evidence of B4 and B7 that a major difference is the well defined role of 
the treasurer along with an established process of money collection at B4 as compared to that at 
B7.  

1.1.2. Conflict resolution 

There was a visible difference in the levels of conflict between B4 and B7 farmers. It was found that 
40% of the initial water users had opted out of the collective pump station at B7 citing conflicts as 
the primary reason. The reasons of the conflicts are analysed in Chapter IV. B4 presents a different 
example where none of the farmers have opted out of the collective pumping system. A major 
reason is the difference in the conflict resolution mechanism at B4 and B7. 

It was observed that the conflict resolution mechanism consisted of the following layers: 

 Operator 

 WUA President 

 Respected men of community 

 Family/Neighbourhood ties 

Life in rural Egypt revolves around family and neighbourhood ties. One of the major conflict 
resolution mechanisms is the relationship between the farmers based on their family or 
neighbourhood ties. All the farmers of a specific area are related to each other through some 
extended family ties or live in the same neighbourhood. Hence, in minor conflicts, family members 
or neighbouring farmers try to mediate and resolve the conflict. The operator of B7 explained the 
process, ‘People call a man from the nearby village for conflict resolution. The Omda is also 
consulted.  But after tatweer, people try to resolve the conflicts through the WUA first and then go 



38 

 

the respected man or the police station’ (Interview 30, 14th June 2013). The president of the 
BCWUA also clearly stated, ‘If a conflict happens now, the farmers consult the WUA first. If it can’t 
resolve the conflict, then farmers consult the responsible men. Those men talk to both the parties 
and try to resolve the issue. The conflicts have reduced a lot since tatweer because of the rotation 
rules and the total system’ (Interview 28, 12th June 2013). It was observed that most of the on-field 
conflicts were resolved with the help of the operator or other neighbouring farmers. The president 
of the WUA or the respected men of the village are consulted only if the operator and neighbouring 
farmers cannot resolve the conflict.  Also, multiple conflict resolution mechanisms can be at work at 
the same time, which is explained by the example below. 

Box 3.4: Conflict – A4 

The pump station had stopped working during the middle of the field work because of a conflict 
among the farmers. One of the farmers had opened his hydrant out of turn, during another farmer’s 
(Sarfaraz) irrigation turn. He had not sought permission from Sarfaraz. When Sarfaraz got to know 
about this, he turned the pump stations off, locked the room and kept the key with himself. It must 
be added that Sarfaraz is also a WUA member. The farmers were trying to resolve the conflict by 
getting all the water users together and talking it out. As added by one of them, ‘We plan to get all 
the farmers together and then make the guilty farmers swear over the Holy Quran that they would 
respect the rotation system.’ (Interview 36, 17th June 2013).  Eventually, the farmers talked to each 
other and Sarfaraz gave the key to the operator to start the pump station. The pump station was 
inoperable for eight days. 

This example shows that multiple conflict resolution mechanisms can be at work at the same time. 
As mentioned earlier, the president of the B4 WUA has been traditionally consulted for conflict 
resolution. His traditional and socially acceptable role has ensured a strong conflict resolution 
mechanism at the WUA level.  On the other hand, it was observed that the conflict resolution 
mechanism at the WUA level at B7 was not well established and the president or the operator did 
not actively participate in conflict resolution.  

1.1.3. maintenance 

It was observed at both B4 and B7 that specific individuals or members of WUA were involved in the 
maintenance of the collective pumping system. Maintenance activities at the mesqa and marwa 
levels were observed in the following activities: 

 Cleaning of mesqa, marwa and field-level drain - The marwas and drains have to be cleaned 
periodically and the weeds have to be removed. It was observed that farmers clean the part 
of the marwa or drain which corresponds to their fields. It is the individual responsibility of 
the farmers. Water users of both B4 and B7 were often seen cleaning their marwas or the 
drain. It was also observed at other pump stations. Sarfaraz stated, “Farmers clean the 
marwa in front of their own fields. Once or twice a year, farmers do it together and 
sometimes they don’t.” (Interview, 22nd June 2013). Any attempt by the WUA to facilitate 
the cleaning of the marwas or to advocate the need for the same was not observed at any 
of the mesqas under the Masharqa canal. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 shows a well-maintained 
marwa and drain. 

 Maintenance of pipe and valve system - It was observed that many valves and farm 
hydrants were partially broken in most of the pump stations. Most of the respondents said 



39 

 

that the valves were not repaired as it was expensive to do so. Even though the hydrants are 
individual properties, the maintenance of the hydrants is often regarded as a collective 
activity.  It can be drawn clearly from an instance of A4 where most of the valves are 
broken. When Munif, a farmer of A4 was asked why water users did not get the valves 
repaired, he explained, “The valves need to be fixed, and I have asked all the farmers (part 
of that marwa) to contribute 10 EP each, but they just keep saying that they would 
contribute and they don’t.” (Interview 61, 5th July 2013). Most of the valves at both B4 and 
B7 are partially broken, but the wear and tear of hydrants at B7 is more than those of B4. 
Even though most of the respondents stated their unhappiness and helplessness over the 
situation, none of them seemed keen enough to get the hydrants repaired. It also must be 
noted that a broken hydrant helps a farmer in getting some water out of turn. The farm 
level hydrants installed as part of the project have a pin-system for opening and closing, as 
seen in figure 3.9. It was pointed out by some of the respondents that the wear-and-tear 
was high for the pin system and it led to water leakage. Figures 3.11 and 3.12 shows how 
farmers use local innovative solutions to control the leakage. Some farmers at other pump 
stations like A3, A4 etc have converted their own pin-system hydrants to a cap system, as 
seen in figure 3.10.   

 Maintenance of collective pump station – The operator is responsible for the maintenance 
of the pump station. Local mechanics are called for fixing any issue in the collective pumps. 
It was observed that the operator of B4 was more proactive in getting the pump fixed, than 
the operator of B7. An informal flow of information between the operator and the president 
regarding the maintenance of the pump station was also observed at both B4 and B7. In 
most of the cases, the operator always informs the president if the pumps develop any snag 
or need to be repaired. It was further observed that the operators gave the key only to 
trusted neighbour or family member, in case of their absence during irrigation schedule.  

The example of B8 and B9 must be mentioned here to understand the impact of heterogeneity of 
the community on collective maintenance. As discussed earlier, the area under these pump stations 
is mostly cultivated by sharecroppers based on the rent system. The owners do not feel the need to 
get the pump stations fixed, whereas the tenants also don’t have the urge as they don’t own the 
land. The lack of collective maintenance is directly linked to difference between the water users and 
the owners. 

An instance of collective maintenance, discussed in box 3.4, was also observed which pointed 
towards the relationship between the scale of the maintenance activity and the collective 
participation of the farmers.  

Box 3.4: Collective maintenance of sub-BC 

A sub-BC of the Masharqa canal supplies water to the area under B6. Some farmers of B7 also draw 
water from the sub-BC. An instance was observed when the farmers of the area under B6 and B7 
who used the sub-BC got together to get the canal cleaned. It was also driven by the long period of 
water shortage in the Masharqa canal. The sub-BC had not been cleaned for the last two years.  The 
farmers had asked the islah cooperative to send a machine for cleaning, and the cost of the 
machine would be added to the farmers’ accounts at the cooperative which they could pay at the 
end of the season. All the users of the sub-BC were present during the cleaning. It also must be 
mentioned that any prominent role of WUA of B6 and B7 or the BCWUA was not observed during 



40 

 

the whole exercise. It also emerged that the farmers always asked the coop to arrange for the 
machine, as they could pay for the machine in instalments to the coop. 

The evidence suggests that the all the maintenance activities except the pump maintenance are 
performed by individual farmers. There are also instances when the farmers do not keep their 
marwa and drain clean, but that depends on the farmers. Any specific involvement of WUA in 
collective maintenance of the pipe and valve system or the pump station was not observed.  

  Figure 3.6: Well-maintained field drain                              Figure 3.7: Well-maintained field marwa 

        

  Figure 3.8: Hydrant with pin system                                       Figure 3.9: Hydrant with cap system 

           

  Figure 3.10: Stone used to close the pin cap                            Figure 3.11: Polythene bag and wood 
used to close cap 

           

1.1.4. Day-to-day management 

A primary objective of this study was to understand the day-to-day management of the collective 
pumping system. There was a visible difference between the management at B4 and B7 as 
discussed below.  



41 

 

Around 25 farmers have opted out of the collective pump station B7, whereas none of the water 
users have opted out at B4.  All the 25 water users comprise islah farmers, with the exception of 
one milk farmer under V1. Also, it was observed that it was easier for milk farmers than the islah 
farmers to opt out and join back in the next season. It must be added here that the process of 
opting out is not well defined at any of the pump station, and farmers who want to opt out just 
inform their neighbours and the operator. A farmer who has opted out of the CPS A4, explained the 
process in simple words, ‘I just informed my fellow farmer Mahsub who is also a WUA member that 
I would be opting out, and then stopped using the CPS.’ (Interview 3, 19th May 2013). The president 
of B7 WUA also explained the process, ‘A farmer doesn’t have to inform the WUA if he wants to opt 
out of tatweer. He just stops paying the electricity money.’ (Interview 31, 14th June 2013). Other 
water users do not try to stop those farmers from opting out, which is somehow understandable 
because the pump capacity will now be distributed over a smaller area. It must be added that land-
owners who have opted out of tatweer still have to pay the annual instalment for tatweer charges.  

As discussed earlier, the WUA members of B4 do not participate in the regular operations and 
maintenance activities. On the other hand, the president of B7 tries to dominate over the 
operations and management activities. It also must be added that the boundary separating the 
roles of the president, treasurer etc is not well drawn at most of the pump stations. Instances of 
discrepancies in management by various actors were also observed. Some specific examples are 
explained in the box below. 

Box 3.5: Irrigation management – B7 

Farmer Ali (valve 3) comes to meet the operator. He wants to irrigate his land today. The operator 
tells Ali that he let him irrigate out of turn last time, but he can’t allow that today. But after 
sometime he informs Ali that he can irrigate at the end of the day. 

Source – Field notes (21/06/2013) 

Fiscal management - A4 

During the field work, it was observed that the operator of A4 had stopped working. He explained 
the reason, ‘I was not paid regularly and that’s why I had stopped working. I have not been paid 
since the electric counter was fixed 6 months back’. Water users of that pump station agreed to 
this, and also added, ‘The operator is a kind man and he worked without a salary for a long time.’ 
(Interview 35, 17th June 2013). He got back to his work after being requested by the water users, 
and on the promise that he would be paid soon. 

 

The first example clearly shows that the operator sometimes lets water users irrigate out of turn, 
which might lead to conflict later, while the second example points towards the organisational 
ineffectiveness of the WUA at A4. 

It also emerged that at some of the pump stations l