MYANMAR

IFPRI

STRATEGY SUPPORT PROGRAM | WORKING PAPER 74 JANUARY 2026

Community and Household Shocks and Coping Strategies

Findings from the Ninth Round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (April – October 2025)

Joanna van Asselt and Zin Wai Aung

Livelihoods and Food Security Fund

LIFT

UKaid

European Union

Australian Aid

Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC

Canada

New Zealand Foreign Affairs & Trade Aid Programme

Norway

managed by UNOPS

CONTENTS

Abstract iv

1. Introduction 1

2. Shocks 1
   - 2.1. Security Shocks 1
   - 2.2. Climatic Shocks 5
   - 2.3. Service Sector Shocks 5
   - 2.4. Economic Shocks 10

3. Coping and Indebtedness 10

4. Conclusion 15

References 17

Appendix 18

TABLES

Table 1. Percentage of households negatively impacted by economic shocks, July–December 2024 and April–October 2025 10

Table 2. Percent of households reducing expenses to cope with lack of money 11

Table A.1. Percentage of households experiencing community and household insecurity in the past three months, by state/region 18

Table A.2. Percentage of urban households experiencing community and household insecurity in the past three months, by state/region 18

Table A.3. Percentage of rural households experiencing of community and household insecurity in the past three months, by state/region 19

Table A.4. Percentage of households experiencing of lawlessness in the past three months, by state/region 19

Table A.5. Percentage of farm households experiencing climatic shocks in the past three months, by state/region 20

Table A.6. Percentage of households experiencing negative economic shocks in the past three months, by state/region 20

Table A.7. Percentage of urban households experiencing negative economic shocks in the past three months, by state/region 21

Table A.8. Percentage of rural households experiencing negative economic shocks in the past three months, by state/region 21

Table A.9. Percentage of households employing coping strategies in the past 30 days, by state/region 22

Table A.10. Percent of households reducing food expenditures as a coping strategy, by rounds 22

Table A.11. Percent of loans by credit sources, by state/region 23

Table A.12. Percent of loans by use, by state/region 23

FIGURES

Figure 1. Percentage of households who felt insecure in their community in July–December 2024 (left) and April–October 2025 (right) 2
Figure 2. Percentage of households reporting different risks in their community over the past three months for urban and rural households, April–October 2025 3
Figure 3. Percentage of households who experience drug use (top left), gambling (top right), limited mobility (bottom left) and risk of conscription (bottom right) in their communities4
Figure 4. Percentage of farming households experiencing climatic shocks over the past three months, June–November 2023, July–December 2024 and April–October 2025 5
Figure 5. Number of days with one hour power cuts, July–October 2025 6
Figure 6. Number of hours in the past 24 hours without electricity, July–October 2025 6
Figure 7. Percentage of households accessing the internet (top) and barriers to internet access (bottom), June–October 2025 7
Figure 8. Access to medical services in the past month, June–October 2025.....8
Figure 9. Percentage of households with all children aged 5–14 enrolled in school, by state/region, June–November 2023, July– December 2024 and April–October 2025 (top) and by level of reported security (bottom) 9
Figure 10. Percentage of households who have savings as cash or gold, by state/region, July–October 2025.....12
Figure 11. Percent of households reporting a large influx/outflux of migrants 13
Figure 12. Percentage of households who have loans, Q4 2023-2025 13
Figure 13. Percent of loans by source and location, July – October 2025.....14
Figure 14. Percent of loans by use and location, July – October 2025.....15

ABSTRACT

The ninth round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS), a nationally and regionally representative phone survey, was conducted between July and October 2025. This round follows eight previous rounds carried out since December 2021 and reflects conditions during April – October 2025. This report presents updated evidence on the conflict, climatic, service, and economic shocks households face and the coping strategies they adopt.

In April–October 2025, insecurity and lawlessness intensified across Myanmar. About 21 percent of households reported feeling insecure, an increase from late 2024, with rural insecurity exceeding urban levels for the first time. Trust deteriorated sharply, with 25 percent reporting low community trust. Lawlessness remained widespread: 16 percent reported gambling, 16 percent petty crime, and 13 percent drug use. Urban areas were disproportionately affected by petty crime, bribery, and mobility constraints, while perceived conscription risk rose markedly, exceeding 40 percent in some regions.

Climatic shocks continued to compound conflict-related stressors. About 19 percent of farm households reported being negatively affected by at least one climatic shock between April and October 2025. Flooding was the dominant shock, affecting 13 percent of households nationally, with particularly high exposure in Kayin, Shan, Bago, and Magway. Irregular rainfall and strong winds were less prevalent but remained locally significant, especially in Chin and Mon, reinforcing spatial disparities in vulnerability.

Service disruptions were severe and persistent. Around 71 percent of households accessed electricity from the national grid, yet 70 percent of those experienced daily daytime power cuts throughout the week prior to the survey. Average outages exceeded 17 hours per day in Chin and 13 hours in Rakhine. Thirty percent of households reported being negatively affected by power cuts. Internet access remained constrained, with 39 percent lacking regular access and 13 percent reporting no access at all, primarily due to service shutdowns. Medical access was uneven, with over 30 percent of households in Kayah, Rakhine, and Chin unable to access needed services in the prior month.

Economic pressures remained high despite modest improvements. About 37 percent of households reported being negatively affected by high food prices, similar to 2023 levels but slightly lower than late 2024. Price shocks were highly uneven, exceeding 50 percent in conflict-affected regions. Fuel price shocks affected 33 percent of households, declining from late 2024 as prices stabilized, though impacts remained severe in conflict-affected regions.

Households continued to cope by reducing expenditures. Reductions in non-food spending were more common than cuts to food consumption across all regions. Conflict-affected states recorded the highest shares of households reducing both food and non-food expenditures, often exceeding 40 percent. While fewer households reported cutting back on staples and vegetables, most continued to reduce consumption of meat and fish, reflecting persistent affordability constraints for animal-source foods.

Financial buffers remained extremely limited. Fewer than one in five households reported holding any cash savings. Borrowing was widespread, particularly among wage-earning households, with over half reporting outstanding debt. More than 50 percent of loans were sourced from friends and relatives, reflecting the near collapse of formal credit. Debt was primarily used for food, health, and basic needs, with a growing share allocated to medical expenses.

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper provides an overview of the shocks faced by households and communities across Myanmar, drawing on data from the ninth round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (MHWS). The MHWS is a national, regional, and urban/rural representative phone survey that uses a novel sampling strategy and household and population weights to ensure representativeness (Lambrecht et al. 2023). The ninth round was conducted from 14 July 2025 to 5 November 2025, with most indicators reported for April – October 2025. Indicators are compared to those from the eighth round (July – December 2024) and the sixth round (June – November 2023) to assess changes over one- and two-year periods.

The recall period for Round 9 began right after the powerful 7.7-magnitude earthquake struck central Myanmar on March 28, 2025, causing catastrophic damage to infrastructure and civilian life. The earthquake occurred amidst a backdrop of escalating conflict and displacement in multiple regions, including the Northwest, Southeast, and Rakhine State. As of November 2025, displacement nationwide reached approximately 3.6 million people, the highest level observed to date (OCHA 2025). Nearly 1.7 million of those affected were concentrated in the Northwest, Rakhine, and the Southeast.

Conflict-related disruptions to communication infrastructure posed significant challenges during Round 9, particularly in Kachin, Chin, Rakhine, Shan, and Kayah, where disconnected or unstable phone networks limited the ability to reach some households. As a result, coverage in the most heavily conflict-affected and inaccessible areas remains constrained. At the same time, the survey continues to capture information from conflict-affected regions where access was feasible, particularly in urban and peri-urban areas. In this round, the samples for Rakhine and Kachin are not fully representative at the state level, with 61 and 81 observations respectively, largely concentrated in Sittwe and Myitkyina. The Kayah sample consists of urban and peri-urban households in Loikaw and is therefore representative of urban Kayah. These data provide partial but informative evidence on household conditions in conflict-affected settings, while recognizing that impacts in the most inaccessible areas are likely understated.

In this paper, we provide an update on security, climatic, health, service, and economic shocks that Myanmar households face. We also present an overview of coping strategies they rely on to combat these shocks, including reducing food expenditure, spending savings, migration, and borrowing. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the shocks that have negatively affected Myanmar's people, including security, climatic, service, and economic shocks. Section 3 provides an overview of coping behaviors and Section 4 concludes.

2. SHOCKS

2.1. Security Shocks

In April–October 2025, 21 percent of households in Myanmar felt that their community was very or somewhat insecure. There was a significant increase in insecurity compared to the second half of 2024. This was the first round where more rural households reported feeling insecure compared to urban households. Trust also deteriorated significantly from 19 percent of the sample reporting low levels of trust in their community at the end of 2024 to 25 percent in mid-2025. More urban households reported lower levels of trust, and higher levels of violence compared to rural households. The four states/regions where households felt the most insecure during this period were Rakhine (43 percent of households), Kayah (41 percent), and Chin (34 percent) (Figure 1). Sagaing remained the fourth most insecure region, with 34 percent of households reporting insecurity. Table

A.1, Table A.2, and Table A.3 present state/region results at the national, urban, and rural levels, respectively.

Figure 1. Percentage of households who felt insecure in their community in July–December 2024 (left) and April–October 2025 (right)





Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data.

Lawlessness remains widespread across Myanmar. In April-October 2025, 16 percent of households reported a lot or some gambling in their community, 16 percent of households reported a high risk of burglary, theft, or robbery in their community, and 13 percent of households reported drug use in their community.[1] These issues were more prominent in urban areas than rural areas (Figure 2). Petty crime was particularly prevalent in urban areas, where 25 percent of urban households reported a risk of being robbed. Another major concern was that 14 percent of respondents felt it was dangerous to move around and carry out everyday tasks during this period. This increased compared with the end of 2024. Further, 12 percent of urban and 9 percent of rural households reported that it was common to pay bribes to authorities. This increased in urban communities compared with the end of 2024. This rise is likely linked to the conscription law, as this bribe mechanism to avoid forced conscription has become widespread. Finally, 3 percent

[1] Households were asked "how do you feel about the situation of gambling in your community. In your community is there 1. Yes, a lot of gambling; 2. Yes, some gambling; 3. No, not much gambling; 4. No, no gambling at all; 8. prefer not to answer; 9. Do not know. The question format is then repeated for other indicators including violence, petty crime, drug use, limited mobility, risk of kidnapping, and bribes.

of respondents reported a risk of kidnapping in their community. This has increased compared with the end of 2023 and the end of 2024.

Figure 2. Percentage of households reporting different risks in their community over the past three months for urban and rural households, April–October 2025



Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data.

Conscription trends continue to differ markedly from patterns of insecurity and lawlessness. Households in Ayeyarwady (56 percent), Nay Pyi Taw (44 percent), and Bago (44 percent) reported the highest perceived risk of young adults being forced to join an armed group or the military under conscription laws (Figure 3). Further, about 42 and 41 percent of households in Mandalay and Shan reported similar concerns. The share of households reporting a risk of conscription rose significantly in Chin, Mon, Mandalay and Yangon.

Figure 3. Percentage of households who experience drug use (top left), gambling (top right), limited mobility (bottom left) and risk of conscription (bottom right) in their communities



Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data.

2.2. Climatic Shocks

In April–October 2025, 19 percent of farm households reported being negatively impacted by at least one climatic shock. The recall period primarily covers the wet season, including the monsoon and the onset of the post-monsoon period. This time of year is typically marked by heavy rainfall, with the monsoon beginning in late May and continuing through June. The recall period followed the earthquake that hit Myanmar on March 28, therefore, this shock is not included in climatic shocks, though of course the lasting effects are captured in the data. Flooding was the most common shock in mid-2025, reported by 13 percent of households. Other climatic shocks were less prevalent and included irregular rainfall or temperature (3 percent) and strong winds (2 percent). (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Percentage of farming households experiencing climatic shocks over the past three months, June–November 2023, July–December 2024 and April–October 2025



Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data.

Flooding was a major issue for farm households in Kayin (23 percent) and Shan (21 percent). (Table A.5). Further, about 14 percent of farm households in Bago and Magway were affected by floods. At the same time, about 5 percent of households in Sagaing, Shan, and Nay Pyi Taw reported experiencing irregular rainfall or temperature. Finally, intense winds were a significant shock in Chin and Mon, negatively affecting 5 percent and 4 percent of households, respectively.

2.3. Service Sector Shocks

In mid-2025, 71 percent of households accessed electricity from the national grid. Among those households connected to the national or border-country grid, 70 percent experienced a power cut of at least one hour from 8:00 am to 8:00 pm on all seven days prior to the interview (Figure 5). Power outages were most widespread in Rakhine (with 100 percent of the households surveyed reporting a power outage in all seven days), Ayeyarwady (85 percent), Sagaing, and Mon (about 79 percent each). In Kayah, on the other hand, 56 percent of respondents reported no daily daytime power cuts. Nay Pyi Taw and Tanintharyi followed with 39 and 20 percent, respectively. It should be noted that 76 percent of residents of Yangon reported power cuts in all seven days prior to the survey, with the average duration of the power-cut lasting for seven hours.

Figure 5. Number of days with one hour power cuts, July–October 2025



Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

When we consider the past 24 hours, respondents in Chin reported the longest average duration without electricity at 17.4 hours, followed by Rakhine (13.4 hours) and Sagaing (9.5 hours) (Figure 6). Nay Pyi Taw and urban Kayah appear to be the only regions largely spared by major power cuts, with Nay Pyi Taw averaging just 3 hours of outages per day, followed by Kayah (about 4 hours). It is also important to note that these figures exclude entire townships that we could not reach due to electricity blackouts.[2] Therefore, it is likely that access to electricity is much worse than presented here. Thirty percent of households reported that they were negatively affected by power outages, with urban residents particularly impacted (37 percent) (Table 1). The highest shares of negatively affected households were reported in Yangon, Sagaing, Kachin, and Mandalay (Table A.6, Table A.7, and Table A.8).

Figure 6. Number of hours in the past 24 hours without electricity, July–October 2025



Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

[2] Thantlang and Paletwa in Chin, ten townships in Kachin, five townships in Kayah, eight townships in Rakhine and Sagaing, and 12 townships in Shan. There were other townships where we also did not have any responses, but this has been consistent across rounds and is due to low population size rather than connectivity issues.

Between June and October 2025, 39 percent of households did not have access to the internet regularly. As with power access, this figure excludes households we could not reach due to electricity or phone connectivity issues, which are likely closely tied to internet access. During this period, 13 percent of households could not access the internet at all in the month prior to the survey (Figure 7). Within our sample, there was an improvement in the number of households who could use the internet anytime, which increased from 40 percent at the end of 2024 to 49 percent in mid-2025. This is due to the combination of an increase in access to the internet among urban users and a larger urban sample in our survey. Similar to urban-rural differences, there were huge regional differences in accessing the internet. Rakhine (97 percent), Chin (71 percent) and urban Kayah (68 percent) had the highest shares of households reporting no access to the internet in the month prior to the survey. In Rakhine, only 2 percent of respondents could access the internet anytime they wanted to.

The primary reason for limited internet access was service disruptions, as reported by 70 percent of households. These disruptions result from service shutdowns by the operators due to military suppression and infrastructure damage caused by conflict. This has been the main cause of limited internet access since August 2022. Internet service disruptions were the primary reason for the lack of internet in Rakhine (96 percent), Kachin (84 percent), and Sagaing (81 percent). Households also reported cost-related barriers to using the internet, including high internet fees (5 percent), and limited budgets (12 percent).

Figure 7. Percentage of households accessing the internet (top) and barriers to internet access (bottom), June–October 2025





Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data.

Among the 28 percent of households who needed medical services, 2 percent could not access medical services at all, and 12 percent could only access medical services once or twice, in the month prior to the survey. While overall access appeared to be adequate in June–October 2025, access in some states/regions remained limited. In urban Kayah (40 percent), Rakhine (35 percent), and Chin (31 percent), more than 30 percent of households could not access medical services in the month prior to the survey. Further, in Kachin and Sagaing, 24 and 19 percent of households, respectively, could not access medical services or could only access them once or twice in the last month (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Access to medical services in the past month, June–October 2025



Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

School enrollment (including public, private, and international schools) improved substantially, reaching 91 percent of children aged 5 to 14 in April–October 2025, the highest

percentage across all rounds. Enrollment levels were significantly higher in urban areas compared to rural areas in July–December 2024 and in April–October 2025.

School enrollment increased significantly in Shan, Mon and Mandalay between the end of 2024 and mid-2025 (Figure 9). On the other hand, enrollment declined sharply in Sagaing, which now has the lowest enrollment rate in the sample, with only 66 percent of households reporting their child was enrolled in school. When considering enrollment based on households' perceived security, we see that 76 percent of households who felt very insecure have their children enrolled in school, compared to 93 percent among households who felt very secure.

Some children were not in school because they were working. About three percent of households reported a child under fifteen who worked at least one hour a week in the three months prior to the interview. In this round, we see that children in both rural and urban areas were nearly equally engaged in paid work. In Chin, Nay Pyi Taw and Sagaing, 8, 5 and 5 percent of children worked for wages for at least one hour per week in the three months leading up to the survey round. The number of reported children working for pay decreased significantly in Magway, Mandalay, and Sagaing in mid-2025 compared to the end of 2024.

Figure 9. Percentage of households with all children aged 5–14 enrolled in school, by state/region, June–November 2023, July– December 2024 and April–October 2025 (top) and by level of reported security (bottom)





Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

2.4. Economic Shocks

Between April and October 2025, 37 percent of households reported being negatively impacted by higher food prices, a significant decrease from 39 percent in the second half of 2024, but not significantly different from the second half of 2023 (Table 1). But the percentage of households reporting high food price shocks differed tremendously by region. In Ayeyarwady, Nay Pyi Taw, Bago, and Magway, less than 35 percent of households in each state/region, respectively, reported high food price shocks. In Chin, urban Kayah, and Rakhine, more than 50 percent of households reported food price shocks. Further, a significantly larger share of households reported food price shocks in urban areas, compared with rural areas.

Table 1. Percentage of households negatively impacted by economic shocks, July–December 2024 and April–October 2025

	July–Dec 24	April–Oct 25	July–Dec 24 vs April–Oct 25	Rural April–Oct 25	Urban April–Oct 25	Rural vs Urban April–Oct 25
Higher food prices	38.6	36.8	**	34.0	42.5	***
Higher fuel prices	38.0	33.2	***	32.1	35.5	***
Loss of employ-ment	25.0	22.4	***	22.3	22.6	
Exchange rate fluctuation	18.9	12.8	***	11.5	15.5	***
Loss of electricity	28.8	29.9		26.4	37.1	***
Unable to assess money in a bank account	4.4	3.1	***	2.1	4.9	***
Observations	12,058	11,865		7,570	4,488	

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data.
Note: Asterisks show significance at p-values * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

In mid-2025, the share of households negatively affected by high fuel prices decreased significantly to 33 percent, from 38 percent at the end of 2024. However, a larger share of households reported this issue compared to the second half of 2023. While fuel prices jumped considerably between Q1 and Q2 of 2022, they stabilized at a higher level through Q4 2023. However, prices rose again by 44 percent between Q4 2023 and Q2 2024, followed by an additional 7 percent increase between Q2 and Q4 of 2024, further straining household budgets (van Asselt & Aung, 2025). In mid-2025 fuel prices finally decreased, returning to similar levels as at the end of 2023. At the same time, fuel prices remained high in conflict-affected states/regions. More than 50 percent of households were negatively affected by fuel price shocks in Rakhine, urban Kayah, and Kachin (Table A.6).

Twenty-two percent of households reported being negatively impacted by a loss of employment in April–October 2025, which was lower than the level in July-December 2024 (Table 1). However, the impact was considerably severe in urban Kayah, where 51 percent of households reported a loss of employment between April–October 2025, while in Chin and Rakhine, 43 and 40 percent of households reported a loss of employment.

3. COPING AND INDEBTEDNESS

Shocks can be particularly damaging to household well-being when households either cannot deploy a coping mechanism to maintain their living standard or are forced to use strategies that result in a permanent loss of assets, income, or safety (van Asselt et al., 2026). Compared with the end of 2023 and mid-2024, the number of households reporting a reduction in their non-food expenditure has declined significantly. While nearly fifty percent of households reported reducing their non-food expenditure between August-November 2023, in June to October 2025 this fell to 39 percent of households. Similarly, the share of households reducing their food expenditures fell from 41 percent in late 2023 to 35 percent in mid-2025. Use of both of these strategies was more prevalent in urban areas compared with rural areas.

Table 2. Percent of households reducing expenses to cope with lack of money

	National	National	National	Rural	Urban
	Aug–Nov 23	Mar–Jun 24	Jun–Oct 25	Jun–Oct 25	Jun–Oct 25
Reduced non-food expense	46.1***	40.3**	38.6	37.3***	41.2
Reduced food expense	41.1***	34.9	35.4	34.3***	37.5
Reduced expenses on health	28.9***	23.3	24.2	24.1	24.4

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data.
Note: T-tests show significant differences between Round 9 vs Round 7, and Round 9 vs Round 6. Asterisks show significance at p-values * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

At the same time, there is substantial heterogeneity across states in the share of households reporting reductions in expenditures, with markedly larger expenditure reductions observed in conflict-affected areas relative to non-conflict regions. **In Rakhine State, for example, 55 percent of households—predominantly in Sittwe—report having reduced food expenditures, compared to only 28 percent of households in Nay Pyi Taw, a difference of approximately 28 percentage points** (Table A.9). More broadly, in Rakhine, Kayah, Chin, Kachin, Tanintharyi, Sagaing, and Shan States, over 40 percent of households continue to report reductions in both food and non-food expenditures. These figures likely understate the true extent of coping, as the data exclude households without access to mobile phones, who are plausibly among the most vulnerable. Although trends across survey rounds indicate a general decline in the overall proportion of households reducing expenditures, the disparity between relatively better-off regions and poorer, conflict-affected regions remains pronounced and persistent.

Among households reporting reductions in food expenditures, follow-up questions elicited information on the specific food groups for which spending was reduced. **The results indicate that, relative to 2023 and 2024, a similar—and in most cases substantial—share of households continued to reduce expenditures on animal-source foods, particularly meat and fish** (Table A.10). This pattern is consistent with observed price dynamics, as animal-source food prices increased between July and October, with especially pronounced increases for fish. In contrast, there is a notable decline in the proportion of households reporting reductions in expenditures on rice and other staple foods, as well as on vegetables. This shift suggests a relative improvement in households' purchasing power for staples during this period, even as affordability constraints for higher-cost, nutrient-dense animal-source foods persist.

While reducing food and non-food expenditure has been a crucial coping mechanism, between Q4 2021 and Q4 2023, the most common coping mechanism reported was spending savings (van Asselt et al., 2026). **As a result, by Q4 2025, only 16 percent of households reported having any savings, either in cash or in the bank, which is significantly lower compared to Q4 2024 (20 percent)** (Figure 10). In Kayah, only 6 percent of households reported having any savings. Around 41 percent of households held savings in the form of gold, but this was lowest in Chin (16 percent), followed by Kayah (22 percent). These figures suggest that across Myanmar, and particularly in Chin and Kayah, households lack liquid assets to cope with shocks.

Figure 10. Percentage of households who have savings as cash or gold, by state/region, July–October 2025



Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

Migration emerges as an important coping strategy, as illustrated by Figure 11, which presents trends in reported population movements for urban and rural areas. The figure shows the share of households reporting a large influx of new residents compared with the share reporting a large departure of residents in their communities. In both settings, a larger proportion of households report an influx rather than an outflow of residents, with a gap of approximately 7 percentage points in urban areas and 4 percentage points in rural areas. However, the interpretation of these patterns differs markedly by context. In urban areas, the influx of migrants is consistently higher than in rural areas, particularly in 2024 and 2025, and the gap between reported influx and departure is substantially larger, reaching 8 percentage points in late 2024 and 7 percentage points in mid-2025. **Given that the urban sample remains broadly representative—including continued coverage of urban areas in conflict-affected states such as Kachin, Rakhine, and Kayah—this pattern is consistent with population growth in urban centers driven by inward migration**. In contrast, the rural results likely understate outward migration, as the rural sample excludes the most severely conflict-affected areas where large-scale departures have occurred, particularly from Round 8 onward (July – December 2024). As a result, the observed rural gap should not be interpreted as evidence of rural population growth; rather, if highly conflict-affected rural areas were included, the share of households reporting departures would plausibly exceed those reporting an influx.

Figure 11. Percent of households reporting a large influx/outflux of migrants



Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data.

Borrowing is another widely used coping strategy among households in Myanmar. While debt remains widespread, its patterns and implications vary by location. Nationally, rural households still carry more debt than their urban counterparts, but the gap has narrowed over time. These patterns vary significantly across regions. The highest household debt levels are observed in Ayeyarwady, Magway, Bago, Kayah and Kachin, where roughly 47 – 49 percent of households are in debt. Further, both rural and urban debt have declined slightly (Figure 12). However, aggregate debt levels provide limited insight into the severity or function of indebtedness. Debt can be productive when used to invest in agriculture or small enterprises, but it can also indicate distress when borrowed at high interest rates simply to cover food or health expenses. Alarmingly, a large share of household borrowing appears to fall into this latter, more precarious category.

Figure 12. Percentage of households who have loans, Q4 2023-2025



Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data.

Most debt in Myanmar originates from informal sources. Nationally, 56 percent of loans come from friends and relatives, followed by 20 percent from moneylenders, 11 percent from government departments, 9 percent from microfinance institutions (MFIs), and 9 percent from shops and traders (Figure 13). While more urban households received loans from relatives and friends, reflecting their social networks, larger rural households accessed loans from shops/traders and the government departments, which were mainly used for agricultural investment. In Ayeyarwady and Bago, relatively higher shares of households,17 and 19 percent. respectively, borrow from the government, and 11 and 8 percent access loans through MFIs (Table A.11). In contrast, in Kayah, households rely far more heavily on social networks, with 82.8 percent of debt coming from relatives and friends.

Figure 13. Percent of loans by source and location, July – October 2025



Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data.

The situation is particularly stark in Rakhine and Chin. In Rakhine, nearly all debt is sourced from friends and relatives, with virtually no access to formal credit systems or government loans. A similar pattern emerges in Chin, where 81 percent of debt is from friends and relatives, and an additional 8 percent is borrowed from moneylenders. Tanintharyi has the highest reliance on moneylenders in the country, with 31 percent of households reporting use. These figures underscore the absence of formal financial infrastructure in some of the poorest and most vulnerable regions.

Looking at how debt is used provides further insight into household vulnerability. Borrowing money to buy food is still the most common use of debt nationwide, particularly in urban areas, where 44 percent of loans went to purchase food (Figure 14). This was also the most important use of debt in Rakhine (66 percent), Kachin (53 percent), Kayah (45 percent) and Kayin (43 percent). Health expenditures are another major reason for borrowing, accounting for 31 percent nationally and again with a much higher use in urban areas compared with rural areas. Further, more households in Tanintharyi, Rakhine, and Chin used their debt for health expenditures. At the same time, debt used for productive purposes like farming is also still present, especially in rural areas and in Shan, Ayeyarwady, Sagaing, and Bago, where it accounts for over one-third of borrowing. Debt is also used for non-agricultural businesses, especially in urban areas.

Figure 14. Percent of loans by use and location, July – October 2025



Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data.

Patterns of debt usage also vary widely by source. Government loans are almost entirely directed toward agriculture, with 88 percent used for farming. Loans from MFIs are most commonly used for agriculture (30 percent) and for non-agricultural business (31 percent). Loans from shops and traders are primarily used for food (53 percent), but notable shares also support agricultural (31 percent) and non-farm business activities (13 percent). Loans from relatives and friends are more diversely allocated: 38 percent go to food, 36 percent to health, 21 percent to farming, and 13 percent to non-farm businesses. In contrast, moneylenders' loans are overwhelmingly used to meet urgent needs, with 45 percent spent on food and 40 percent on health, reflecting the role of high-cost debt in emergency situations. Overall, while borrowing remains a critical coping mechanism for many households, the data suggest that debt in Myanmar is too often a tool for survival rather than a pathway to recovery or growth.

4. CONCLUSION

Between April and October 2025, household-level evidence from Myanmar indicates renewed insecurity and continued deterioration in living conditions, driven by intensifying conflict-related risks and persistent structural constraints. Insecurity has increased across nearly all states and regions, with particularly high levels persisting in Kayah, Chin, and Sagaing, underscoring the continued salience of conflict-related risks. Lawlessness remains widespread and has not improved since the end of 2024, with limited mobility, bribery, and petty crime posing especially acute challenges in urban areas. At the same time, the risk of conscription has risen further in 2025, with pronounced increases reported in Ayeyarwady, Nay Pyi Taw, Bago, and major urban centers, carrying serious implications for household livelihoods and productivity. Structural constraints continue to compound these pressures: access to electricity has further deteriorated, with long daily power cuts reported across most regions, and access to required medical assistance has declined, particularly in Kayah, Rakhine, Chin, Kachin, and Sagaing.

Households continue to rely on a narrow and increasingly constrained set of coping strategies. Reductions in food and non-food expenditures remain widespread, especially in conflict-affected states, and substantial disparities persist between better-off and more vulnerable regions. While fewer households report reducing staple and vegetable consumption, suggesting some improvement in purchasing power for basic foods, most households continue to cut back on animal-sourced foods, consistent with rising meat and fish prices during this period. Migration remains a central response to shocks, with a larger share of urban households reporting an influx rather than departure of residents, likely reflecting urban population growth due to internal migration. Borrowing has become an essential survival strategy, particularly among wage-earning households, with debt increasingly sourced from friends and relatives rather than formal institutions and used primarily to meet food, health, and farm-related expenses. Notably, the use of debt for health expenditures has increased since late 2024, pointing to rising medical costs even as food affordability shows modest improvement.

Taken together, these findings suggest that while some short-term pressures on staple food consumption may have eased, households in Myanmar in mid-2025 remain highly vulnerable, with limited buffers, growing reliance on informal coping mechanisms, and continued exposure to conflict, governance failures, and service disruptions.

REFERENCES

Lambrecht I, van Asselt J, Headey D, Minten B, Meza P, Sabai M, et al. (2023) Can phone surveys be representative in low- and middle-income countries? An application to Myanmar. PLoS ONE 18(12): e0296292. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0296292

OCHA (2025). Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 50, 17 November 2025. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/myanmar/ocha-myanmar-humanitarian-update-no50-17-november-2025

van Asselt, J and Aung, Z.W. 2025. Community and household shocks and coping strategies: Findings from the eighth round of the Myanmar Household Welfare Survey (July – December 2024). Myanmar SSP Working Paper 66. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Van Asset, J, Steinhübel-Rasheed, L, Aung, Z.W, Goeb, J, and Kham Synt, N.L. (2026) Climate, conflict, and the coping capacity of farm households in Myanmar. Journal of Rural Studies, 121:103909.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2025.103909.

APPENDIX

Table A.1. Percentage of households experiencing community and household insecurity in the past three months, by state/region

	Kachin	Kayah	Kayin	Chin	Sagaing	Tanintharyi	Bago	Magway	Mandalay	Mon	Rakhine	Yangon	Shan	Ayeyarwady	Nay Pyi Taw
Community															
Feels insecure	23.6	40.9	24.8	34.4	34.1	26.4	17.2	20.9	22.0	18.4	43.1	17.1	19.3	12.0	11.5
Low levels of social trust	20.9	39.9	22.6	26.5	27.9	31.1	19.6	21.1	22.0	17.5	56.4	28.0	25.6	24.9	19.5
Violence	22.0	12.9	9.2	6.2	10.5	10.1	4.5	7.4	8.1	7.0	12.3	6.5	7.0	3.0	3.5
Number of observations	81	97	323	130	1213	321	1269	1058	1612	487	61	1917	1340	1643	313

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

Table A.2. Percentage of urban households experiencing community and household insecurity in the past three months, by state/region

	Kachin	Kayah	Kayin	Chin	Sagaing	Tanintharyi	Bago	Magway	Mandalay	Mon	Rakhine	Yangon	Shan	Ayeyarwady	Nay Pyi Taw
Community															
Feels insecure	22.9	30.3	23.2	37.2	29.9	29.3	16.4	15.1	20.9	14.9	45.8	19.3	14.7	7.7	16.4
Low levels of social trust	20.2	31.2	24.0	24.0	30.3	30.5	21.1	22.6	23.1	15.1	46.4	30.6	21.7	25.3	20.7
Violence	24.7	14.7	13.5	10.2	9.2	11.3	6.9	5.1	8.6	7.8	22.2	7.8	8.3	6.0	1.7
Number of observations	51	38	158	53	374	115	353	151	602	217	45	1376	623	241	91

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

Table A.3. Percentage of rural households experiencing of community and household insecurity in the past three months, by state/region

	Kachin	Kayah	Kayin	Chin	Sagaing	Tanintharyi	Bago	Magway	Mandalay	Mon	Rakhine	Yangon	Shan	Ayeyarwady	Nay Pyi Taw
Community															
Feels insecure	25.2	52.2	25.4	32.2	35.1	25.0	17.4	22.1	22.5	20.1	40.2	12.2	21.4	12.8	9.6
Low levels of social trust	22.5	49.1	22.0	28.5	27.2	31.4	19.2	20.8	21.4	18.7	68.1	22.3	27.4	24.8	19.0
Violence	15.1	11.1	7.6	3.1	10.9	9.5	3.9	7.9	7.8	6.6	2.1	3.6	6.4	2.5	4.2
Number of observations	30	24	218	79	973	251	982	895	1036	349	21	595	970	1408	213

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

Table A.4. Percentage of households experiencing of lawlessness in the past three months, by state/region

	Kachin	Kayah	Kayin	Chin	Sagaing	Tanintharyi	Bago	Magway	Mandalay	Mon	Rakhine	Yangon	Shan	Ayeyarwady	Nay Pyi Taw
Drug use	42.0	16.9	22.6	14.3	5.6	26.4	6.6	5.1	8.2	23.1	24.9	15.2	24.3	7.3	4.2
Gambling	32.4	17.7	21.5	5.4	14.9	18.5	13.0	12.7	14.8	23.2	20.3	18.9	16.9	15.0	15.3
Risk of kidnapping	7.8	4.3	3.8	0.5	3.9	3.5	4.4	5.7	4.1	3.4	4.0	3.0	2.9	0.7	1.4
Petty crime	35.8	19.6	19.0	27.0	12.4	16.6	10.0	8.4	17.2	21.5	39.8	22.7	15.7	9.0	8.0
Limited mobility	23.6	20.0	10.5	18.6	21.1	20.7	12.8	18.1	18.1	14.7	18.5	12.3	9.4	6.5	6.7
Bribes	17.8	6.9	6.0	7.7	6.7	12.7	12.2	9.6	8.6	11.6	10.9	11.9	8.8	13.5	5.4
Conscription	20.2	25.2	22.7	35.7	17.9	32.0	43.9	38.7	41.6	26.7	25.4	40.1	41.1	55.9	44.4
Number of observations	81	97	323	130	1213	321	1269	1058	1612	487	61	1917	1340	1643	313

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

Table A.5. Percentage of farm households experiencing climatic shocks in the past three months, by state/region

	Kachin	Kayah	Kayin	Chin	Sagaing	Tanintharyi	Bago	Magway	Mandalay	Mon	Rakhine	Yangon	Shan	Ayeyarwady	Nay Pyi Taw
Negatively affected by any natural or climatic shock	14.9	27.0	24.1	19.6	16.8	7.1	18.2	16.3	22.9	14.6	54.0	8.9	25.7	12.2	30.6
Drought	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.6	0.9	1.5	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.6	0.0
Flood	12.9	27.0	23.0	12.9	10.4	4.2	13.9	13.7	8.8	11.1	54.0	6.3	20.7	9.0	8.2
Irregular rainfall or temperature	2.0	0.0	1.4	2.0	5.0	1.2	2.8	3.7	2.7	1.3	0.0	1.7	4.7	2.7	4.5
Strong wind	0.0	0.0	2.6	5.4	2.7	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.8	3.9	0.0	2.1	1.3	2.9	0.0
Number of observations	20	15	106	72	759	122	630	626	611	164	11	252	877	858	109

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

Table A.6. Percentage of households experiencing negative economic shocks in the past three months, by state/region

	Kachin	Kayah	Kayin	Chin	Sagaing	Tanintharyi	Bago	Magway	Mandalay	Mon	Rakhine	Yangon	Shan	Ayeyarwady	Nay Pyi Taw
Higher food prices	43.1	62.7	40.7	51.2	39.4	43.8	32.1	33.4	37.5	35.1	59.1	38.3	35.7	29.9	31.1
Higher fuel prices	50.3	64.7	40.2	48.9	42.6	41.9	26.6	30.0	33.3	30.3	56.3	27.0	36.5	26.2	27.9
Loss of employment	23.2	50.5	24.3	42.6	26.0	24.5	18.3	21.6	22.4	23.4	40.1	17.3	25.2	19.6	17.4
Exchange rate fluctuation	19.7	27.8	13.4	29.2	13.8	16.5	10.8	10.8	13.0	13.9	10.5	13.2	14.6	9.3	10.4
Loss of electricity	33.3	14.6	31.8	31.3	34.7	28.1	29.9	23.9	33.1	30.0	28.5	39.2	30.1	18.2	23.1
Unable to assess money in bank account	2.7	3.5	3.0	20.8	3.0	1.3	1.9	1.4	3.0	3.2	14.1	3.4	2.9	1.5	3.5
Number of observations	81	97	323	130	1213	321	1269	1058	1612	487	61	1917	1340	1643	313

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

Table A.7. Percentage of urban households experiencing negative economic shocks in the past three months, by state/region

	Kachin	Kayah	Kayin	Chin	Sagaing	Tanintharyi	Bago	Magway	Mandalay	Mon	Rakhine	Yangon	Shan	Ayeyarwady	Nay Pyi Taw
Higher food prices	45.0	65.4	37.8	53.2	38.9	47.3	39.3	52.1	43.1	34.2	70.2	40.1	38.7	38.9	38.4
Higher fuel prices	52.4	55.3	35.0	48.9	38.6	44.0	31.3	40.1	38.0	33.8	66.1	27.4	37.5	27.7	37.6
Loss of employment	22.5	58.1	27.3	28.2	24.1	18.4	17.4	24.7	27.0	23.0	36.2	16.6	23.5	26.7	21.9
Exchange rate fluctuation	21.8	28.9	16.1	29.1	14.3	20.8	11.2	16.0	15.4	12.8	16.0	14.4	15.0	14.6	19.8
Loss of electricity	36.9	21.1	32.9	47.9	40.3	33.1	37.2	31.7	38.2	30.3	33.4	42.1	29.2	36.5	29.0
Unable to assess money in bank account	3.8	4.5	3.6	28.1	5.3	0.0	3.4	1.9	4.1	4.2	25.5	4.3	4.0	0.9	1.5
Number of observations	51	73	105	51	240	70	287	163	576	138	40	1322	370	235	100

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

Table A.8. Percentage of rural households experiencing negative economic shocks in the past three months, by state/region

	Kachin	Kayah	Kayin	Chin	Sagaing	Tanintharyi	Bago	Magway	Mandalay	Mon	Rakhine	Yangon	Shan	Ayeyarwady	Nay Pyi Taw
Higher food prices	38.2	59.8	41.7	49.5	39.5	42.1	30.4	29.6	34.8	35.5	47.5	34.5	34.4	28.2	28.4
Higher fuel prices	44.9	74.7	42.1	48.9	43.6	40.8	25.5	27.9	31.0	28.6	46.0	26.2	36.0	25.9	24.2
Loss of employment	25.0	42.4	23.2	54.3	26.5	27.5	18.6	20.9	20.1	23.6	44.1	18.7	26.0	18.3	15.7
Exchange rate fluctuation	14.5	26.5	12.4	29.3	13.6	14.3	10.7	9.8	11.8	14.4	4.8	10.5	14.5	8.3	6.8
Loss of electricity	24.2	7.7	31.4	17.7	33.4	25.6	28.1	22.3	30.7	29.9	23.3	32.9	30.6	14.7	20.9
Unable to assess money in bank account	0.0	2.3	2.7	14.9	2.4	1.9	1.6	1.3	2.4	2.7	2.1	1.5	2.4	1.6	4.3
Number of observations	30	24	218	79	973	251	982	895	1036	349	21	595	970	1408	213

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

Table A.9. Percentage of households employing coping strategies in the past 30 days, by state/region

	Kachin	Kayah	Kayin	Chin	Sagaing	Tanintharyi	Bago	Magway	Mandalay	Mon	Rakhine	Yangon	Shan	Ayeyarwady	Nay Pyi Taw
Higher food prices	44.6	57.6	34.6	49.8	44.0	42.3	34.5	37.0	36.6	38.3	62.1	38.3	39.8	34.3	29.3
Higher fuel prices	44.2	56.7	38.6	44.1	39.9	42.6	30.8	33.3	33.3	36.6	55.4	34.3	35.7	31.4	27.6
Loss of employment	33.8	35.9	22.2	41.7	26.7	26.5	20.8	22.0	23.0	21.0	43.5	23.1	25.9	21.9	19.3
Number of observations	81	97	323	130	1213	321	1269	1058	1612	487	61	1917	1340	1643	313

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

Table A.10. Percent of households reducing food expenditures as a coping strategy, by rounds

	June–Nov 23	Jan–June 24	April–Oct 25	Rural April–Oct 25	Urban April–Oct 25
Food Group					
Staple grains, roots and tubers	46.9	36.8	29.2	26.3	34.7
Beans and nuts	42.3	31.4	30.5	30.5	30.6
Vegetables	27.1	25.6	19.0	16.9	22.9
Fruits	36.6	31.0	30.0	27.1	35.3
Meat	87.2	87.1	89.2	90.5	86.7
Eggs	59.4	48.1	40.5	41.9	37.8
Fish	79.8	73.3	76.3	76.8	75.4
Dairy	50.6	38.6	44.1	42.5	47.0
Sugary products	60.7	50.9	58.0	56.6	60.5
Oils, fats and butter	84.0	64.6	58.5	58.6	58.2
Condiments	66.7	50.7	39.7	40.4	38.4
Restaurant meals, takeaway meals	64.7	54.5	64.9	62.9	68.6
Number of observations	5268	4672	4377	2920	1457

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data.

Table A.11. Percent of loans by credit sources, by state/region

	Kachin	Kayah	Kayin	Chin	Sagaing	Tanintharyi	Bago	Magway	Mandalay	Mon	Rakhine	Yangon	Shan	Ayeyarwady	Nay Pyi Taw
Bank	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	2.7	0.9	3.0	1.9	0.0	1.7	2.0	0.6	1.6
MFI	5.1	1.2	6.3	2.7	2.6	7.6	7.9	11.2	9.4	8.1	0.0	8.4	13.3	10.6	19.4
Moneylender	9.9	16.8	15.2	7.8	23.5	30.9	18.1	20.4	21.7	17.1	2.3	23.7	10.3	22.6	10.8
shops/traders	14.2	0.9	12.9	2.6	9.5	8.1	11.5	6.5	7.9	7.7	5.5	3.8	15.3	6.6	13.0
NGOs	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.3	1.0	0.5	0.7
Relatives and friends	61.6	82.8	58.5	81.3	62.1	51.8	47.5	53.6	53.8	65.7	92.2	61.1	50.7	49.2	43.7
Other	2.7	0.0	4.9	4.9	1.8	1.5	3.1	3.1	2.1	1.5	0.0	1.9	0.9	2.0	1.1
Government department	9.4	0.0	2.8	1.0	4.7	5.7	18.6	15.4	9.5	6.8	0.0	3.0	17.9	17.1	18.2
Number of observations	81	97	323	130	1213	321	1269	1058	1612	487	61	1917	1340	1643	313

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

Table A.12. Percent of loans by use, by state/region

	Kachin	Kayah	Kayin	Chin	Sagaing	Tanintharyi	Bago	Magway	Mandalay	Mon	Rakhine	Yangon	Shan	Ayeyarwady	Nay Pyi Taw
To purchase food	52.7	44.5	43.4	39.5	41.4	39.2	35.0	40.6	38.5	37.2	65.5	38.3	26.5	32.7	41.5
To pay for health expenditures	36.9	34.1	33.8	39.3	33.8	47.0	30.3	34.4	27.5	36.3	40.3	37.2	18.0	30.0	22.6
To pay for education expenditures	22.8	18.6	6.7	28.0	6.1	14.2	8.3	8.5	11.0	10.4	13.3	12.9	9.2	9.4	15.4
To pay for farm expenditures	6.7	35.1	18.4	7.1	37.9	13.7	36.7	35.2	25.5	16.5	0.9	8.4	51.5	40.1	26.4
To repay loan	0.0	0.0	2.9	0.0	1.3	1.9	1.6	2.5	2.6	2.6	0.0	2.3	1.6	1.0	3.7
To pay for marriage/funerals/ceremonies	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.0	2.1	2.9	2.6	2.5	1.6	2.3	16.5	2.0	1.5	2.2	4.8
To pay for migration of household	2.8	8.7	1.1	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.9	0.5	3.0	1.4	2.3	0.4	1.0
To pay for migration of a household mem	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.8	0.3	0.7	1.0	0.4	1.2	3.0	1.0	0.8	0.5	0.5
Donations	0.0	0.0	1.2	0.0	1.5	3.7	2.2	3.0	1.9	2.4	19.5	0.8	0.4	1.5	1.0
Non- agricultural business	15.5	2.2	17.8	13.0	11.2	15.7	11.7	10.0	14.9	21.6	12.9	20.6	10.5	16.8	14.7
Other	13.6	4.9	7.8	2.8	3.4	11.2	9.1	7.2	8.4	9.5	0.0	11.9	6.2	3.8	7.5
Number of observations	81	97	323	130	1213	321	1269	1058	1612	487	61	1917	1340	1643	313

Sources: Authors' calculations based on MHWS data. Note: Rakhine, Kachin and Kayah are not representative estimates.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Joanna van Asselt is a Research Fellow at the International Food Policy Research Institute, based in Sri Lanka. **Zin Wai Aung** is a Research Analyst at the International Food Policy Research Institute, based in Thailand.

ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

This work was undertaken as part of the Myanmar Agrifood System and Food Security Monitoring project led by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). Funding support for this study was provided by the Livelihoods and Food Security Fund (LIFT) and LAMP. This publication has not gone through IFPRI's standard peer-review procedure. The opinions expressed here belong to the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of IFPRI, LIFT, LAMP, or CGIAR.

INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

1201 Eye St, NW | Washington, DC 20005 USA
T. +1-202-862-5600 | F. +1-202-862-5606
ifpri@cgiar.org
www.ifpri.org | www.ifpri.info

IFPRI-MYANMAR

IFPRI-Myanmar@cgiar.org
www.myanmar.ifpri.info

Funding support for the Myanmar Strategy Support Program is provided by the Australian Government and the Livelihoods and Food Security Fund (LIFT).