IFPRI Discussion Paper 01329

March 2014

Aid Effectiveness

How Is the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative Doing?

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INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

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ABSTRACT

This paper uses case studies of Bangladesh, Ghana, Rwanda, and Senegal to assess the degree to which the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI) has been implemented within the framework of managing for development results (MfDR) and to evaluate progress in various outcomes, including economic governance, agricultural growth, poverty, and food and nutrition security (FNS). The MfDR approach has gained widespread support in obtaining results, including reforming the ways in which development aid is delivered and managed. This reform has led to recent development cooperation that emphasizes alignment of aid to recipient countries' own national development strategies and priorities.

This paper combines narratives, based on information collected from expert opinion surveys, and trends analysis of quantitative data, based on publicly available data and information, to address four research questions:

- What does a country-owned agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security (ARD&FNS) strategy entail?
- To what extent are governments and their development partners providing financial and nonfinancial efforts toward these country-owned ARD&FNS strategies?
- How are these efforts being managed to achieve development results?
- To what extent are development results being achieved—that is, are outcome indicators trending in the expected directions toward stated targets?

Results are presented first at the global level to set the context of development aid and then for the country case studies, comparing the situation prior to the 2009 AFSI and the situation afterward. Overall conclusions for the contribution of AFSI to observed changes are drawn, followed by suggestions for further studies.

Keywords: aid effectiveness, agriculture, rural development, L'Aquila Food Security Initiative

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Funding support for this study was provided by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH. Thanks to the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative Sub-Working Group on Managing for Development Results and Results Reporting for their consultations, guidance, and comments at various stages of study. Special thanks to all the state and nonstate stakeholders (government officials, donors, researchers, service providers, civil society and farmer organizations, and so on) in Bangladesh, Ghana, Rwanda, and Senegal who participated in the surveys and provided invaluable information for the analyses leading to this report. Thanks to my colleagues, Michael Johnson and Tsitsi Makombe, and in-country consultants, Mohammad Jahangir Alam, John Kalisa, and Abdoulaye Seck, for preparing the country case studies that this report draws on.

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAA	Accra Agenda for Action
AFF	agriculture, forestry, and fisheries
ASWG	agriculture sector working groups
AFSI	L'Aquila Food Security Initiative
ARD	agriculture and rural development
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
DP	developing partner
FASDEP II	food and agricultural sector development plan
FNS	food and nutrition security
GAFSP	Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme
IA	impact assessment
JSR	joint sector review
MfDR	managing for development results
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MINAGRI	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources
NAIP	national agricultural investment plan
ODA	official development assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD CRS	OECD Creditor Reporting System
PDAE	Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness
PSTA	Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture

1. INTRODUCTION

Aid effectiveness, or the degree to which development aid works, continues to be a subject of significant disagreement among politicians, economists, and development specialists in both donor and recipient countries. However, there seems to be general agreement that development aid is necessary, as all developed countries, as well as several developing countries, provide some form of development aid.[1] Therefore, the debate on aid has recently shifted to how to manage aid for development results. This seemingly new discourse—popularized by the endorsement of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's (OECD's) 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PDAE) by leaders of countries from around the world—has its origins in preceding meetings by country leaders, including the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, the first roundtable on managing for development results (MfDR) in Washington, DC in 2002, and the 2003 High-Level Forum on Harmonization in Rome.

Basically, these meetings and consequent declarations and agreements seeded a series of others,[2] with country leaders from around the world looking to reform how development aid is delivered and managed in order to achieve such results as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). During the global food price crises of 2007 and 2008 (whose symptoms and effects still linger), the number of people suffering from food insecurity worldwide surpassed the one billion mark (Worldometers 2013). These crises raised the urgency of aid effectiveness and the stakes involved. In 2009, for example, the governments and international and regional organizations that convened in L'Aquila, Italy, agreed to mobilize US$20 billion from 2009 to 2012 for investments in agriculture and rural development (ARD) to hasten achievement of food and nutrition security (FNS). This agreement is popularly known as the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (AFSI). In 2011 alone, total official development assistance (ODA) by all donors amounted to US$161 billion, of which nearly a tenth was spent on ARD&FNS (OECD 2013).

In an effort to increase aid effectiveness, a fundamental principle that is articulated in recent development cooperation is alignment of aid to recipient countries' own national development strategies and priorities. Given common knowledge that aid has a positive impact on growth and development outcomes, conditional on a good institutional and policy environment (see, for example, Akramov 2012), the country-ownership principle does not only provide motive for donors to increase aid but also has the potential to make aid effective to the extent that the principle is implemented. The rationale is that aligning aid to a country's priorities can help solve the principal–agent (or double asymmetry) problem associated with development cooperation.

The first asymmetry derives from the principal (in this case, a donor) and the agent (in this case, a recipient country's government) having divergent interests, preferences, or priorities. These divergent interests arise from various sources, including differences in ideology, models of how things work, beliefs about how things should be done, and political imperatives. In a typical cooperative agreement, the donor contracts with the government to implement a project to realize some development objective, such as poverty reduction or increased food security. The donor agrees or pledges to provide some financial and nonfinancial assistance, and the government, in exchange, agrees or pledges to undertake some policy and institutional reforms that are consistent with the donor's interests.[3] At the project's implementation, however, the donor can never completely assess the government's performance associated with any outcome because of lack of information on the part of the donor to attribute the outcome (which the donor

[1] *Development aid* (*also called development cooperation, development assistance, technical assistance, international aid, overseas aid, official development assistance*, or *foreign aid*) is financial and nonfinancial aid given by governments and other agencies to support the economic, environmental, social, and political development of developing countries.

[2] Other meetings and resulting cooperative agreements include the second and third roundtables on MfDR in Marrakech in 2004 and in Hanoi in 2007, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008, and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation in 2011.

[3] In the United States, for example, development assistance serves as a component of national security strategy and a tool to promote US commercial interests and American values (Tarnoff and Lawson 2011). Whereas the United Kingdom, for example, identifies poverty as a moral obligation for providing aid, inherent interests in avoiding negative spillovers from developing countries due to, for example, conflict, mass migration, climate change, and so on, have been mentioned. Recent debate has focused on procuring goods and services from UK suppliers.

observes) to the government's effort (which the donor does not observe)— the second asymmetry. As such, the government has an incentive to act differently or to pursue its own interest (moral hazard), which may lead to undesirable outcomes. Because donors want to maximize the expected returns to their investment,[4] they can be expected to shift aid away from projects where the asymmetry is large (even if those projects have large potential benefits to society) toward projects where the asymmetry is small (even if those projects have relatively little potential benefits to society).

By aligning aid with the recipient country's priorities (meaning that the donor funds and the recipient government implements a project that is consistent with a country-owned strategy), donors can convince their home constituencies (that is, taxpayers) that their money is being spent effectively and efficiently, and they can then advocate for more aid. But now, donors do not have to worry about their inability to observe the government's effort—there is little incentive for the government to act differently, because the government's effort to do so is enforceable within the process of implementing the country-owned strategy in terms of the government being accountable to its citizens. Of course, all of this depends on the fundamental assumption that the country-owned strategy (including the priorities and programs and the required resources to implement those priorities and programs) is indeed viable and jointly owned by the government and the society at large, as envisaged, for example, under the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP).

There is concern that the country-owned principle can quickly become a buzzword that is mostly used to legitimize donors' own interests and investments in areas that are aligned to local priorities, without authenticating the country-owned strategy. In addition, donors may shirk their responsibility in monitoring the government's effort and performance. Governments may also use the country-owned principle and processes to obtain external funds to finance their own political agendas outside of national interests.

Using AFSI as an example of development assistance under the new model of managing aid for development results, this paper's aim is to assess the substance of country ownership in policy and program implementation in different countries and the extent to which it may be crowding in development assistance and leading to greater and better-distributed outcomes. In particular, we use four case study countries—Bangladesh, Ghana, Rwanda, and Senegal—to assess the degree to which the L'Aquila commitments have been achieved within the MfDR framework and contributed to progress in development results associated with economic governance, agricultural growth, poverty, and FNS. Because of the short time since AFSI was announced (in 2009), this paper makes no attempt to make any attribution in changes in the outcome indicators analyzed to AFSI; actually, it is virtually impossible to do so. Rather, the idea is to see how the governments and development partners in the four case study countries are managing AFSI and other development aid for results in the agricultural and food security sectors vis-à-vis the PDAE principles and the AAA, which AFSI upholds. The study addresses four basic questions:

- What does a country-owned ARD and ARD&FNS strategy entail?
- To what extent are governments and their development partners providing financial and nonfinancial efforts toward these country-owned ARD&FNS strategies?
- How are these efforts being managed to achieve development results?
- To what extent are development results being achieved—that is, are outcome indicators trending in the expected directions toward stated targets?

The next section begins by looking at what AFSI is about, in terms of unpacking the L'Aquila Joint Statement on Food Security, to set the context of development assistance under the new model of managing aid for development results. This is followed by a brief review of the MfDR concept and the conceptual framework and methodology used to address the objectives of the study. Then the sources of data, analysis, and results are presented. Conclusions and implications for improving aid effectiveness, as well as for further study, are drawn.

[4] See footnote 3, on sample of donor interests.

2. THE L'AQUILA FOOD SECURITY INITIATIVE AND MANAGING FOR DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

The 2009 L'Aquila Joint Statement on Food Security articulates the desired development results (increased FNS, reduced poverty and hunger, increased trade flows, and so on) and the commitments (including US$20 billion over 2009–12, investments in ARD, support to country-owned strategies, and so on) needed to achieve the results (see Figure 2.1 for details).

Figure 2.1 L'Aquila Food Security Initiative results, commitments, and principles of managing for development results



Source: Authors' illustration based on OECD (2005, 2008, 2009) and G8 Italy (2009).
Notes: CAADP = Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme; MfDR = managing for development results; PDAE = Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness; AAA = Accra Agenda for Action. It is recognized that achieving both the commitments and the results will depend on several country-specific (such as good governance) and global-level (such as financial crisis) factors. However, most important is that the efforts are managed for development results in consistency with the PDAE and AAA principles.

The MfDR concept is a management approach that involves using performance information at all stages of the development process to make better and more effective decisions and to steer development efforts toward clearly defined goals (AfCoP 2012). Having its origins in the establishment of the MDGs, MfDR encompasses five areas: (1) setting desired results and agreeing on targets and strategies, (2) allocating available resources to activities that will contribute to the achievement of the results, (3) monitoring and evaluating progress to assess whether results are being achieved, (4) reporting on performance, and (5) learning from the experience and providing feedback to improve decisionmaking (OECD 2008). These five areas combine to ensure that managers are using evidence to make decisions and that development stakeholders are able to keep track of progress.

The MfDR approach has gained widespread support in obtaining results on the development agenda, especially in the face of tight budgets and increasing public pressure to demonstrate results and that resources are being used efficiently and effectively. To help move the MfDR agenda forward, the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, which was created in 2003 by OECD to establish an international development cooperation framework, organized four roundtables on MfDR: the first in 2002 in Washington, DC; then in 2004 in Marrakech; in 2007 in Hanoi; and in 2008 in Accra. These roundtables brought together representatives from developing countries and development agencies to review MfDR efforts and to define required actions to enhance adoption of MfDR approaches. The first roundtable, for example, focused on the actions needed to build demand for results-based approaches and building capacity for such approaches, whereas the one in Accra focused on sharing experiences in implementing the Paris declaration (MfDR 2013). Although managing for results is one of the five specific thematic areas of the PDAE (in addition to ownership, alignment, harmonization, and mutual accountability), it goes beyond aid management to address the entire development process and how resources can be effectively allocated to achieve desired results.

Therefore, the stated commitments of the AFSI are rooted in the MfDR framework, and, as such, they embrace the aid effectiveness agenda that has been articulated at various high-level forums. At the recent high-level forum in Busan, however, delegates noted that whereas implementation of many of the principles underpinning PDAE and AAA have contributed to higher-quality and more transparent and effective development cooperation, progress in implementation has been uneven and neither fast nor far reaching enough (HLF-4 2011).

Answering the questions posed in the introduction will help provide needed evidence on progress made. The next section presents the methodology used to address the objectives of the study—that is, to assess the extent to which AFSI commitments have been achieved within the MfDR framework and has contributed to progress in development results.

3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, METHODOLOGY, AND DATA SOURCES

The methodology used to address the four research questions raised in the introduction combines narratives based primarily on information collected from expert opinion surveys and trend analyses of quantitative data based primarily on publicly available data and information. A list of the indicators analyzed, data sources, and the expert opinion survey instruments are presented in Appendix A. This section presents each of the four questions, as well as the methodology and data used in addressing them.

What Does a Country-Owned ARD and ARD&FNS Strategy Entail?

Here, we use descriptive statistics based on results of the OECD surveys on countries' compliance with the PDAE principles (OECD 2011), as well as narratives based on the expert opinion surveys that we carried out in the four study countries in September 2012. These surveys focused on the indicators associated with country ownership. The PDAE principle and indicator on country ownership—which is defined as a country having a national development strategy that has clear strategic priorities linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and that is reflected in annual budgets—does not explicitly consider the underlying process by which the national development strategy has been developed. In particular, issues of inclusive stakeholder participation and use of credible evidence in setting policy and investment priorities are not addressed at all. Because these issues are especially important for mutual accountability, which in turn is a critical component of the MfDR process for ensuring high effectiveness of aid, we expanded on the issue of country ownership in the expert opinion surveys (Table A.1, item 2a; Appendix B, part 2) to complement what is already available from the OECD surveys. Therefore, in addition to describing how the value of the ownership indicator measured in the OECD survey has changed over time, we try to assess different stakeholders' leadership, participation, and sense of ownership of the national ARD&FNS strategy. To get a full perspective of all the issues covered in the expert opinion survey, the instrument was administered to stakeholders categorized into three groups: AFSI donors, government officials, and nonstate actors (including non-AFSI donors).

To What Extent Are Governments and Their Development Partners Providing Financial and Nonfinancial Efforts toward These Country-Owned ARD&FNS Strategies?

This question is addressed through a trend analysis of aid and government expenditures on ARD&FNS, considering two time periods—one prior to the 2009 AFSI and the other one after that. ODA data from the OECD Creditor Reporting System (CRS) database are used to analyze the effort of donors, and public expenditure data are used to analyze the effort of government. A fundamental issue is how to define ARD&FNS, which we define by distinguishing three nested aggregates, starting with agriculture and then adding on indicators that capture rural development and FNS (Box 3.1). Based on the data, we assess whether there is a change (and, if so, by how much) in the amount of incremental ODA or government spending on ARD&FNS after AFSI was announced relative to the period prior to the announcement. An illustration of the analysis is shown in Figure 3.1. First, observations up to 2009 (representing the actual base period or the situation before AFSI) are projected forward (based on estimated annual average growth rate of the observed values up to 2009) to provide a business-as-usual scenario against which to compare the situation with AFSI after 2009 (that is, to compare actual and projected values).

Box 3.1 Measuring agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security (ARD&FNS)

Official Development Assistance for ARD&FNS

We follow the approach taken by the Global Donor Platform for Rural Development (GDPRD 2011) to capture different elements of agriculture, rural development, and food and nutrition security by distinguishing three nested aggregates based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Creditor Reporting System (OECD CRS) purpose codes: (1) agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (AFF); (2) AFF and three others on rural development, food security programs, and emergency food aid (AFF+); and (3) AFF+ and additional purpose codes, which capture a host of supporting sectors, including financial policy administration and management, trade facilitation, general budget support, and road transport among others (labeled AFF++).

Government Spending on ARD&FNS

Unlike the data on *official development assistance*, the available public expenditure data could not be (dis)aggregated according to the above three measures of ARD&FNS. Here, the analysis is based on public expenditure for the agriculture sector—that is, AFF—and are obtained from several national sources.

Source: Author's compilation.

The incremental financial (and nonfinancial) effort due to AFSI can then be estimated as the difference between the two lines in Figure 3.1 (that is, between the business-as-usual scenario and the actual case with AFSI), and the amount can be given as a total value or an annual average amount over the relevant years. These amounts can also be expressed in percentage change terms (over the base amounts). In the illustration of the analysis (Figure 3.1), the incremental effort is positive. However, it is also possible for it to be zero or negative, such as when the line representing the actual case with AFSI is on or below the line representing the business-as-usual scenario, respectively. When the change is zero, for example, aid after 2009 can be interpreted as reallocating or relabeling existing and already-planned effort for ARD&FNS. However, a zero or insignificant incremental effort could also reflect the lag between commitments, disbursements, and actual expenditures in the target countries. The analysis is carried out in real value terms (that is, constant prices) in order to remove the influence of inflation and other intertemporal factors.

Figure 3.1 Illustrative analysis of incremental effort due to AFSI



Source: Authors' illustration based on fictional numbers.
Note: AFSI = L'Aquila Food Security Initiative.

The main underlying assumption of this method is that the predictors of ODA or government spending on ARD&FNS remain the same as in the base period. Because we do not estimate these relationships, we cannot judge the direction of bias associated with violation of this assumption, which cannot also be tested. However, we generate greater confidence in the estimates by using lower and higher annual average growth rates than the estimated rates in doing the projections. This will give a lower- and upper-bound estimate of the incremental effort due to AFSI, wherein the lower-bound estimate will be associated with using a higher annual average growth rate for the "without AFSI business-as-usual scenario" and a lower annual average growth rate for the "with AFSI projected scenario." In addition, the upper-bound estimate will be associated with using a lower annual average growth rate for the "without AFSI business-as-usual scenario" and a higher annual average growth rate for the "with AFSI projected scenario."

Note that the L'Aquila pledge is only part of overall ODA for ARD&FNS, and many donors' support for ARD&FNS goes well beyond the AFSI pledge. Because it is generally not possible to distinguish AFSI-specific ODA from other ODA for ARD&FNS, as is discussed later, the results of the analysis only show that something different has happened since 2009 to the extent that any observed change in ODA for ARD&FNS is significant. The same is true for the analysis on government spending.

The literature on aid effectiveness suggests that the main impact pathway of aid is that it leads to public spending (Doucouliagos and Paldam 2008, 2009). However, because it is not possible to disaggregate public spending on agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (AFF) (Box 3.1) into ODA and domestic sources, we are unable to assess any direct crowding-in or crowding-out effects of incremental effort in ODA for AFF on own-government spending on AFF.[5] However, we can use correlation coefficients between ODA for AFF and total public spending on AFF to make an indirect assessment. In this case, a positive correlation coefficient would imply crowding in, and a zero or negative correlation coefficient would imply crowding out or substitution.

How Are the Efforts toward ARD&FNS Being Managed to Achieve Development Results?

Here too, we use descriptive statistics based on results of the OECD surveys on countries' compliance with the PDAE principles (OECD 2011), as well as narratives based on the expert opinion surveys, focusing on the indicators associated with alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability (Table A.1, items 2b–2e). Because the OECD survey data are related to overall development cooperation, we tried to focus the expert opinion survey on the value addition of AFSI and on lessons and challenges in implementing existing ARD&FNS strategies (Appendix B, parts 1, 3, and 4). In particular, we try to answer the following secondary questions:

- How is AFSI linked with this broader ARD&FNS strategy, and how is this understood in the country?
- How are the resources for AFSI (and ARD&FNS, in general) being channeled to the recipient countries? Is it via budget support or to particular public institutions or via nonstate agencies and nongovernmental organizations?
- How does AFSI add value to existing capacities for policy dialogue and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) that can help accelerate or ensure achievement of results?
- What lessons and emerging challenges is the country facing in implementing a comprehensive ARD&FNS plan?

[5] Government spending on ARD&FNS that is financed from its own (domestic) sources is also an indicator of country ownership (item 2a in Table A.1).

To What Extent Are Development Results Being Achieved—That Is, Are Outcome Indicators Trending in the Expected Directions toward Stated Targets?

Here, we analyze trends of the indicators on intermediate development results (Table A.1, items 4 and 5) and ultimate development results (Table A.1, items 6 and 7). Unlike the ODA data, most of the available data on these indicators are only up to 2009; therefore, it does not reliably allow analysis of the two time periods. Therefore, we look at general trends to assess progress against stated targets, such as halving poverty and hunger by 2015 compared with the levels achieved in 1992. Reasons for the observed trends are based on literature review and the expert opinion surveys (Table A.2, part 5).

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Before presenting the findings based on the country case studies, we first provide a brief overview of trends in overall ODA to all sectors and then to ARD&FNS at the global level, followed by looking specifically at AFSI donors in terms of tracking the L'Aquila pledge.

Global Trends in ODA

ODA to All Developing Countries

In 2011, total ODA (for all bilateral and multilateral donors) disbursed for all purposes stood at about US$161 billion (in 2011 constant prices), which, compared with the amount in 2001, is up by about 64 percent in real terms (Figure 4.1). From 2001 to 2011, the amounts committed and the amounts disbursed increased at the same rate of about 5 percent on average per year, with the amounts disbursed averaging about 87 percent of the amounts committed. However, since 2008, the amounts committed have declined gradually, whereas the amounts disbursed have continued to rise, leading to an improvement in the performance of disbursements as a share of commitments, which stood at 94 percent in 2011 and is the highest ever for the periods considered. The period between 2005 and 2007—that is, the years immediately leading to the global food price crisis—also saw a decline in both commitments and disbursements. In general, the rate of growth in the total amounts disbursed was higher during the periods prior to the AFSI (6.3 percent per year on average in 2000–2009) compared with the periods after (2.6 percent per year on average in 2009–2011).

Figure 4.1 Total ODA commitments and disbursements to all developing countries



Source: Authors' calculation based on OECD (2013).
Note: ODA = official development assistance.

Looking at the distribution of ODA across different regions of the world, Africa and Asia were the leading recipients of ODA, attracting 36 percent and 31 percent of the total ODA on average per year, respectively (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 Distribution of total ODA disbursements to different regions



Source: Authors' calculation based on OECD (2013).
Note: ODA =

ODA for ARD&FNS to All Developing Countries

Regarding how much of the total ODA is allocated to ARD&FNS, Figure 4.3 shows that the average share for developing countries as a whole declined from about 9 percent in 2003 and reached a low point of 5.3 percent in 2006. It then rose rapidly to around 10 percent from 2008 onward. The trend is similar for Africa as a whole, though the shares, which currently stand at about 12 percent, are higher. Again, the period immediately leading to the global food price crisis is when the shares of ODA for ARD&FNS were also at their lowest.

Figure 4.3 Percentage of total ODA disbursements for ARD&FNS



Source: Authors' calculation based on OECD (2013).
Note: ODA = official development assistance; ARD&FNS = agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security.

Using the approach laid out in Section 3 to estimate incremental ODA for ARD&FNS starting in 2009 (when AFSI came into force), ODA for ARD&FNS disbursed to all developing countries taken together was lower by US$0.7 billion (or 4.4 percent) on average per year compared to what has been achieved in the past (Table 4.1). There is a shortfall for Africa as well, though it is relatively larger at US$1.2 billion (or 13.7 percent) on average per year.

Table 4.1 Estimated incremental ODA disbursements for ARD&FNS, annual average 2009–2011

	Actual disbursements (constant 2011 US$ billions)		Annual average growth rate (%)		Estimated baseline disbursements (constant 2011 US$ billions)*	Difference between estimated and actual (2009–2011)	
Recipient	2002–2008	2009–2011	2002–2008	2008–2011	2009–2011	US$ billions	%
All developing countries	10.2	15.2	5.4	1.7	15.9	–0.7	–4.4
Africa	4.7	7.4	8.4	–1.2	8.6	–1.2	–13.7

Source: Authors' calculations based on OECD (2013).
Notes: ODA = official development assistance; ARD&FNS = agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security. * Estimated baseline disbursement is based on projected 2009–2011 values using 2002–2008 annual average growth rate.

Looking at the distribution of ODA for ARD&FNS to the different components (to agriculture, rural development, food security programs, and emergency food aid), we find that for all developing countries taken together, the bulk is allocated to agriculture (50 percent), followed by emergency food aid (24 percent), food security programs (16 percent), and rural development (11 percent) over the 2002–2011 period. As Figure 4.4 shows, the shares allocated to ARD were higher in the periods following the food price crisis (2009–2011) compared with the period before the crisis (2002–2008). The same trend is observed for Africa as a whole, though the shares allocated to emergency food aid are much higher (37 percent in 2002–2008 and 30 percent in 2009–2011), with agriculture receiving only 44 percent in 2009–2011 compared with 53 percent for all developing countries over the same periods.

Figure 4.4 Breakdown of ODA for ARD&FNS in all developing countries and Africa



Figure 4.4 Continued



Source: Authors' calculation based on OECD (2013).
Note: ODA = official development assistance; ARD&FNS = agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security; Rural dev't = Rural development.

AFSI Pledge, Commitments, and Disbursements to All Developing Countries

In this section, we look specifically at progress in meeting the AFSI pledge. This is only part of overall ODA for ARD&FNS, because 13 donors are involved with the initiative, and many of the AFSI donors' support for ARD&FNS goes well beyond the AFSI pledge.[6] However, it is not possible to distinguish AFSI-specific commitments and disbursements in the OECD CRS database. Therefore, we rely on self-reporting by the AFSI donors compiled in the G8 Camp David Accountability Report (G8 USA 2012). The results presented in Figure 4.5 show that of the total pledge of US$22.5 billion, 76 percent was committed, and only 52 percent had been disbursed at the time of the G8 meeting in 2012. Wide variation exists across the AFSI donors in terms of the amounts pledged and committed and in the performance of meeting the pledges and commitments. Looking at the size of the pledges or commitments, the European Union, the United States, and Japan are the top three leaders, with each pledging or committing more than US$3 billion. Looking at the amounts disbursed, however, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Germany are the top three leaders, with each within the range of US$1.5–US$2.2 billion. But looking at disbursements relative to commitments, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Canada are the top three, with 100 percent performance or more.

[6] The AFSI group of donors includes Australia, Canada, European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States.

Figure 4.5 Tracking the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative Pledge (AFSI), 2009–2012

7a: All AFSI donors



7b: Individual AFSI donors



Source: Authors' illustration based on G8 USA (2012) and OECD (2012).
Notes: No commitments were reported for the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

A follow-on question is the extent to which these amounts represent additional support to ARD&FNS. Different AFSI donors indicated different support (Figure 4.6). Australia and Spain, for example, indicated that all of their pledged ODA for ARD&FNS counts as their support under AFSI, whereas Canada, Italy, Russia, and the United States indicated it to be about half. The remaining AFSI donors indicated this to be 30 percent or less, with Sweden and the Netherlands indicating the least, at about 3 and 7 percent, respectively. To address the question further, we used the OECD CRS data to analyze the incremental amounts disbursed by AFSI donors for ARD&FNS relative to their past performance.[7] The results are shown in Table 4.2. In general, the results are consistent with the findings for all donors, as shown in Table 4.1. For all the AFSI donors taken together, ODA for ARD&FNS disbursed to all developing countries was lower by US$1.8 billion (or 14.7 percent) on average per year compared with trends observed for the past. As expected, performance varies across the different AFSI donors. Only Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom showed positive incremental ODA for ARD&FNS in 2009–2011. This finding is largely due to acceleration in ODA for ARD&FNS in 2009–

[7] This analysis does not include disbursements by AFSI donors via multilateral institutions because the CRS database does not have the data to do so. The Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) is one such multilateral facility set up at the request of the G20 to realize some of the L'Aquila commitments. Under the GAFSP facility, 18 countries have so far benefited for a total of US$663 million. Eleven of the countries that have benefited are in Africa, including two of the case study countries: Rwanda (US$50 million) and Senegal (US$40 million). Bangladesh, the other case study country, has also benefited in the amounts of US$50 million for the public sector and US$5 million for the private sector. Ghana applied on both occasions of the GAFSP call for proposals but was unsuccessful.

2011 compared to the situation in 2002–2008 for the same countries. Although the Netherlands has continuously cut back on ODA for ARD&FNS, the positive incremental value occurred because of a slowdown in the rate of reduction in recent years (–2.1 percent in 2009–2011) compared to the past (–8.1 percent in 2002–2008). In the other countries, the annual average growth rate in ODA for ARD&FNS in 2009–2011 was lower or negative compared to the rate in 2002–2008.

Figure 4.6 Additional pledge of ODA for ARD&FNS by AFSI donors



Source: Authors' illustration based on G8 USA (2012) and OECD (2012).
Notes: ODA = official development assistance; ARD&FNS = agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security; AFSI = L'Aquila Food Security Initiative. No commitments were reported for the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Table 4.2 Estimated incremental ODA disbursements for ARD&FNS by AFSI donors

	Actual disbursements (constant 2011 US$ millions)		Annual average growth rate (%)		Estimated baseline disbursements (constant 2011 US$ millions)*	Difference between estimated and actual (2009–2011)	
Donors	2002–2008	2009–2011	2002–2008	2008–2011	2009–2011	US$ millions	%
All AFSI donors	7,313	10,683	10.4	0.0	12,517	–1,834	–14.7
Australia	249	362	4.1	2.9	409	–47	–11.5
Canada	243	626	22.9	15.7	687	–61	–9.0
EU	877	1,641	55.8	–2.0	3,951	–2,310	–58.5
France	440	463	8.1	–7.6	700	–237	–33.9
Germany	483	706	4.3	15.2	588	118	20.0
Italy	72	91	9.6	–17.8	159	–68	–42.7
Japan	1,074	1,608	14.0	–3.8	2,155	–547	–25.4
Netherlands	234	184	-8.3	–2.1	167	17	10.2
Spain	216	600	18.8	–11.4	626	–26	–4.2
Sweden	164	159	7.5	–9.3	232	–74	–31.7
UK	365	609	1.6	22.0	426	183	43.0
USA	2,896	3,635	4.8	–2.4	4,085	–450	–11.0

Source: Authors' calculations based on OECD (2013).
Note: ODA = official development assistance; ARD&FNS = agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security; AFSI = L'Aquila Food Security Initiative. * Estimated baseline disbursement is based on projected 2009–2011 values using 2002–2008 annual average growth rate. The amounts do not include disbursements via multilateral institutions. Russia is not included in the CRS database.

Summary of Global Trends in ODA for ARD&FNS

In 2011, total ODA (for all bilateral and multilateral donors) disbursed for all purposes stood at about US$161 billion (in 2011 constant prices), with about 10 percent of it going to ARD&FNS. The bulk of ODA for ARD&FNS is allocated to agriculture (50 percent), followed by emergency food aid (24 percent), food security programs (16 percent), and rural development (11 percent). Africa and Asia are the leading recipients of ODA, attracting 36 percent and 31 percent of the total ODA on average per year, respectively. Looking at incremental values of ODA for ARD&FNS for the period following the L'Aquila initiative (2009–2011) compared to the period before (2002–2008), ODA for ARD&FNS disbursed by all donors to all developing countries taken together was lower by US$0.7 billion (or 4.4 percent) on average per year. For all the AFSI donors taken together, ODA for ARD&FNS disbursed to all developing countries was lower by US$1.8 billion (or 14.7 percent) on average per year. Performance varied across the different AFSI donors. Only Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom showed positive incremental ODA for ARD&FNS in 2009–2011, largely due to acceleration in ODA for ARD&FNS in 2009–2011 compared to the situation in 2002–2008.

Findings from the Country Case Studies

We now present findings from the four case study countries (Bangladesh, Ghana, Rwanda, and Senegal) to describe what the concept of country ownership entails in each country and to assess the extent to which AFSI commitments have been achieved within the framework of MfDR and contributed to progress in development results in the countries.[8]

Country Ownership of ARD&FNS Strategies

The main issue is what a country-owned ARD&FNS strategy entails. To determine this, we examine the process through which the strategy has been developed, considering inclusive stakeholder participation and use of credible evidence in setting policy and investment priorities.

In Bangladesh, broad consultations with donors, civil society organizations, farmers, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector in preparing country and sector investment plans seem to have given country ownership to them. However, in-country perspectives among some remain skeptical because they believe some reforms are being pushed from external sources, and the involvement of stakeholders outside the government of Bangladesh, especially nongovernmental organizations and private sector, has been limited during implementation. The move to develop parallel programs managed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the government (as in the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme [GAFSP]–funded programs), for example, may have underestimated the involvement of in-country stakeholders.

In Ghana, too, the processes in place for setting policy and investment priorities have definitely improved over previous ones, which has led to greater ownership and inclusiveness for its food and agricultural sector development plan (FASDEP II) and the medium-term agriculture sector investment plan through which food security is addressed. In Rwanda, the government, through the Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources (MINAGRI), has effectively led and owned the elaboration and implementation of the Strategic Plan for the Transformation of Agriculture (PSTA) II (2009–2012) and more recently the elaboration of PSTA III (2013–2016). Both PSTA II and PSTA III were formulated in a participatory manner involving consultations with various stakeholders at the central and local levels. However, participation of nonstate actors in the elaboration of both PSTA II and PSTA III and in the agriculture sector working group (ASWG) and joint sector reviews (JSRs) is said to be limited. In Senegal, until the CAADP–initiated national agricultural investment plan (NAIP) of 2010, the president was solely responsible for initiating the government's agricultural policies and programs, with little or no

[8] See Alam, Johnson, and Makombe (2013), Benin, Makombe, and Johnson (2013), Makombe (2013), and Benin, Makombe, and Seck (2013) for detailed country case studies on Bangladesh, Ghana, Rwanda, and Senegal, respectively.

consultation of the different actors. As such, the sector has been described as one without a comprehensive strategy for the different actors in the sector to rally behind.

The results from the expert opinion survey are consistent with the results from the survey on the PDAE conducted by OECD, which ranked Rwanda as the highest among the four countries for the country-ownership indicator, which is based on having a long-term, costed national development strategy linked to sectoral and subnational strategies. Ghana was next highest, with Bangladesh and Senegal receiving the lowest grades. Rwanda and Ghana have shown improvement over time (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Country ownership: Rank in having an operational development strategy

Country	2005	2007	2010
Bangladesh	C	C	C
Ghana	C	B	B
Rwanda	B	B	A
Senegal	C	C	C

Source: OECD (2011).

What is the relationship between these trends and AFSI? At the outset, from the expert interviews, it was clear that AFSI is not a buzzword that most people in the case study countries are familiar with. Knowledge of AFSI, including the linkage between AFSI and MfDR, is limited to donor agencies, where it has been internalized. The concept of MfDR, which AFSI upholds and which is reflected in the principles of the PDAE and later in the AAA, is already widely accepted by governments and donors as being ideal for ensuring aid effectiveness in the case study countries, even though actual implementation of this concept varies substantially across the countries. Governments and development partners (DPs) are continuously working on finding practical and mutually acceptable ways of implementing the concept. As such, AFSI and other initiatives have furthered any already-existing efforts for MfDR. However, because AFSI and these other initiatives reaffirm existing MfDR efforts without providing specifics on how they would do so, it is difficult to isolate how AFSI or the various initiatives have furthered these efforts. Therefore, it is potentially much easier to show the contribution of AFSI via any additional financial commitments and disbursements than the contribution of AFSI to implementation of MfDR practices and to achievement of results in the countries.

Financial and Nonfinancial Efforts toward ARD&FNS

To what extent are governments and their development partners providing financial and nonfinancial efforts toward country-owned ARD&FNS strategies?[9] Looking first at overall ODA for ARD&FNS disbursed to the study countries and using the approach laid out in Section 3 to estimate the overall incremental ODA for ARD&FNS starting in 2009 (when AFSI was implemented), ODA for ARD&FNS (AFF+) disbursed to the four case study countries together increased by 6.8 percent on average (Table 4.4, last column). Whereas disbursements went up moderately in Ghana and Senegal (17 and 11 percent, respectively) and slightly in Bangladesh (1.8 percent), it declined moderately in Rwanda (–11 percent).

[9] Donors' nonfinancial support is reflected largely through provision of technical assistance in the area of strategic analysis, policy advice, and monitoring and evaluation to governments to implement investment plans and development programs. We were unable to assess the incremental quantity of technical assistance provided (either in number of hours of experts' time or value of experts' time). However, because technical assistance is usually given in complement to financial contribution, the findings associated with analysis of the ODA disbursements and commitments generally apply to technical assistance.

Table 4.4 Estimated incremental ODA disbursements for ARD&FNS (AFF+) to the case study countries

	Actual disbursements (constant 2009 US$ millions)		Annual average growth rate (%)		Estimated baseline disbursements (constant 2009 US$ millions)*	Difference between estimated and actual (2009–2011)	
Country	2002–2008	2009–2011	2002–2008	2008–2011	2009–2011	US$ millions	%
Bangladesh	186	275	8.6	–6.9	270	5	1.8
Ghana	109	231	13.2	17.8	191	40	17.2
Rwanda	69	111	13.7	21.8	124	–12	–11.1
Senegal	89	108	1.5	12.2	95	12	11.2
All	454	725	9.2	6.2	676	49	6.8

Source: Authors' calculations based on OECD (2013).

Notes: ODA = official development assistance; ARD&FNS = agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security .AFF = agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. *Estimated baseline disbursement is based on projected 2009–2011 values using 2002–2008 annual average growth rate.

Given that disbursements lag commitments, it is instructive to also look at the incremental ODA commitments for AFF+ to assess the intention of DPs to provide support toward AFF+. Using the same methodology as above, we find that ODA commitments for ARD&FNS (AFF+) to the four case study countries together went down by 51 percent on average (Table 4.5, last column). In particular, commitments declined substantially in Ghana and Bangladesh, whereas Senegal and Rwanda attracted 57 and 29 percent more commitments than normal, respectively.

Table 4.5 Estimated incremental ODA commitments for ARD&FNS to the case study countries

	Actual commitments (constant 2011 US$ millions)		Annual average growth rate (%)		Estimated baseline commitments (constant 2011 US$ millions)*	Difference between estimated and actual (2009–2011)	
Country	2002–2008	2009–2011	2002–2008	2009–2011	2009–2011	US$ millions	%
Bangladesh	314	404	14.9	–10.9	588	–184	–45.4
Ghana	195	126	38.4	–41.8	852	–725	–574.4
Rwanda	81	147	5.7	15.1	104	43	29.5
Senegal	84	242	4.6	86.7	103	139	57.4
All	674	919	17.3	–5.4	1,389	–469	–51.1

Source: Authors' calculations based on OECD (2013).

Notes: ODA = official development assistance; ARD&FNS = agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security * Estimated baseline commitment is based on projected 2009–2011 values using 2002–2008 annual average growth rate.

As it turned out, quantifying the specific AFSI financial contribution for all AFSI donors in the four case study countries was not possible, because the OECD database does not indicate what is specific for AFSI and otherwise. In only a few instances were we able to make such an assessment. In the case of Canada and Ghana, for example, the two countries signed an agreement in support of Ghana's Growth and Poverty Reduction Support Program on January 19, 2009, for a total of CAD$280 million for 2009–2013, of which CAD$100 million was earmarked for support to FASDEP II.[10] This commitment was increased by CAD$10 million in November 2009 as part of Canada's commitment to AFSI (CESS Institute 2012). Thus, the CAD$10 million represents a 10 percent increase over the initial commitment. The GAFSP award to Rwanda in the amount of US$50 million is said to represent an additional funding

[10] The Canadian International Development Agency has been providing agriculture sector budget support in Ghana since 2004. The CAADP medium-term agriculture investment plan was not in place at the time of signing the agreement.

to the initial credit of US$34 million for scaling up of the government of Rwanda's land husbandry, water harvesting, and hillside irrigation program (World Bank 2011). However, this needs to be evaluated in light of all government projects in the agriculture sector to see whether it truly represents an additional amount over what it would have been without AFSI.

How have the governments in the four countries fared in supporting their own ARD&FNS strategies? As Table 4.6 shows, growth in public agriculture expenditures slowed in all four countries from 2009 onward compared to the periods before that. Overall, annual average growth in public agriculture expenditures was highest in Bangladesh, followed by Rwanda and then Senegal. Looking at the agriculture expenditures relative to total expenditures and then the size of the agriculture sector, the annual average shares in all four countries from 2009 onward were higher compared to the annual average shares in the periods before that. This suggests that despite the slump in growth in agricultural expenditures from 2009 onward, the growth experienced was still higher than the growth experienced in total expenditures and agriculture value-added. Senegal outperformed the other countries in terms of the shares.

Table 4.6 Annual average public agriculture expenditure, 2002–2010

	Real growth rate (%)		Share in total expenditure (%)		Share in agriculture value-added (%)	
Country	2002–2008	2009–2010	2002–2008	2009–2010	2002–2008	2009–2010
Bangladesh	28.57	14.81	5.04	9.07	2.90	6.51
Ghana	12.42	3.77	8.86	9.06	6.69	7.51
Rwanda	31.99	23.38	4.59	6.51	2.82	5.39
Senegal	18.14	4.94	11.24	13.90	17.55	22.47
All	21.42	11.02	6.68	9.48	4.47	7.59

Source: Authors' calculations based Benin and Yu (2013) and IFPRI (2013).

Because ODA is a substantial source of government expenditure, the government's ability to finance its ARD&FNS strategy also rests on donor commitments and disbursements for ARD&FNS, as reflected by the large correlation coefficients between ODA for ARD&FNS and public agriculture expenditures shown in Figure 4.7. The high positive correlation coefficients suggest that ODA for ARD&FNS and public agriculture expenditure crowd in each other and are complementary. They are strongest in Rwanda and Bangladesh (with a correlation coefficient of about 0.7 each), followed by Ghana (0.4), and then Senegal (0.3).

Figure 4.7 Correlation between donor disbursements for ARD&FNS and public agriculture expenditures, 2002–2010



Figure 4.8 Continued



Source: Authors' calculations based on OECD (2013), Benin and Yu (2013), and IFPRI (2013).
Notes: ODA = official development assistance; ARD&FNS = agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security; PPP = purchasing power parity. For all four countries together, 1 is based on aggregate of the country, whereas 2 is based on using the individual country observations as they are.

Managing for Development Results

How are the efforts in the countries toward ARD&FNS being managed to achieve development results? In all of the case study countries, there are efforts to reaffirm and ensure aid effectiveness. These efforts are reflected through various processes, mechanisms, and institutions, including having specific triggers in agreements between governments and donors, ASWGs, and JSRs. The exception is in Senegal, where these efforts are at rudimentary stages or are nonexistent. It is through these processes, mechanisms, and institutions that the MfDR principles play out in the planning and implementation of investment plans and development programs. (Table 5.1 summarizes these processes, mechanisms, and institutions.) Because the MfDR principles that AFSI embraces were already internalized in the implementation of the case study countries' ARD&FNS strategies prior to the L'Aquila initiative in 2009, AFSI's contribution to MfDR in these countries is assessed according to the extent to which it gave new impulses or furthered already-existing efforts for MfDR in the countries.

The experts interviewed as part of the study revealed that triggers for disbursement of funds included in the budget support agreements between governments and donors tended to be the most effective at ensuring MfDR. For example, although the ASWGs and JSRs have been useful, especially for information sharing, follow-up on recommended actions has been poor. Thus, although ASWGs and JSRs have been strong in pushing the MfDR principles, particularly from the donors that are active in these programs, those who also provide budget support tend to weigh in more in making demands on what is required of the government. As Table 4.7 shows, few AFSI donors provide general budget support in the study countries, except in Ghana, where 7 of the 13 AFSI donors do. In Bangladesh, the principal AFSI

donors are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Japan, channeling a significant amount of funds through country investment plans being managed by the government of Bangladesh. With regards to agriculture sector budget support, only three of the AFSI donors are involved in the case study countries: Canada in Ghana and the European Union and the United Kingdom in Rwanda.

Regarding the GAFSP facility at the global level, only five donors provide funding. With only three of the AFSI donors (Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom) engaging directly in the agriculture sector in only two case study countries (Ghana and Rwanda), it is difficult to see, in light of the overall reduced financial support, how the AFSI group donors together could have given new impulses or furthered already-existing efforts for MfDR in ARD&FNS.

In the case of Canada's agriculture sector budget in Ghana, the agreement with the government comes with 12 triggers that are in line with the MfDR principles, including targets to ensure that (1) the government's own support to the sector is maintained or increased, (2) there is greater predictability of assistance and budget performance, (3) intra- and inter-ministerial coordination and donor harmonization are enhanced, (4) there is greater accountability, and (5) there is a continuous increase in productivity (see CESS Institute [2012] for details). Similar triggers and objectives for disbursements of funds exist under the GAFSP facility in Rwanda, as well as with the European Union's agreement with Rwanda in its agriculture sector budget support. Where there is general budget support only, the effect of MfDR in ARD&FNS depends on the inclusion of triggers and targets relevant for ARD&FNS.

Table 4.7 AFSI donors supporting GAFSP and in-country ARD&FNS development

		Budget support							
		Bangladesh		Ghana		Rwanda		Senegal	
AFSI donor	GAFSP	GBS	ASBS	GBS	ASBS	GBS	ASBS	GBS	ASBS
Australia	✓								
Canada	✓			✓	✓				
EU				✓		✓	✓	✓	
France				✓					
Germany				✓		✓			
Italy									
Japan		✓		✓					
Netherlands		✓		✓		✓			
Russia									
Spain	✓								
Sweden									
UK	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓		
USA	✓	✓							

Source: Authors' compilation.

Notes: AFSI = L'Aquila Food Security Initiative; GAFSP = Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme ARD&FNS = agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security; GBS = general or national budget support, which includes multidonor budget support. ASBS = agriculture sector budget support. These both reflect bilateral support only. The Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, and World Bank provide the bulk of the GBS.

In the case of Rwanda's GAFSP, one of the early triggers was beefing up the implementation capacity in different areas, including financial management and procurement, which is consistent with the MfDR principles. This may have encouraged the additional financial support of US$8 million that has come from Canadian International Development Agency and of US$14 million from the US Agency for International Development in support of Rwanda's land husbandry, water harvesting, and hillside irrigation program. These amounts brought total commitments for the program to US$106 million, including the US$50 million from the GAFSP and the US$34 million from the International Development Association. This shows a specific case of how AFSI may have furthered already-existing efforts for MfDR in ARD&FNS.

Although triggers can be lauded as enforcing MfDR, having a large number of triggers, as the Canada–Ghana agreement shows in Table 4.8, could lead to inefficiencies in implementing the investment plan. Having a large number of triggers, which often is an indication of a lack of focus in the investment plan as well as a lack of focus of support being offered, may detract from regular government activities and could lead to suboptimal use of capacity. Indeed, a major cause of low budget support disbursement rates in other countries is having a large number of triggers that need to be fulfilled (Nkamleu, Tourino, and Edwin 2011). Another takeaway from Table 4.8 is that there are far more triggers for agriculture sector budget support than for other sectors. Is this because the agriculture sector is more complex? Nevertheless, it does mean that MfDR is less likely to be successful in the agriculture sector compared to others, to the extent that having a large number of triggers negatively affects full and timely implementation of the sector investment plans and development programs. This does not seem to be the case in the Canada–Ghana agriculture sector budget support, where there has been 100 percent disbursement rate (CESS Institute 2012).

Table 4.8 Selected cases of requirements for ODA disbursements

Institution	Country	Sector	Loan amount (millions)	Year of approval	# years in operation	# tranches	# triggers
ADB	Bangladesh	Energy	US$465.00	2005	3	2	1
ADB	Bangladesh	Health	US$70.00	2009	7	3	2
CIDA	Ghana	Agriculture	CAD110.00	2008	5	10	60
AfDB	Rwanda	Agriculture	US$35.35	2011	5	2	7
AfDB	Rwanda	Education	UA 15.00	2006	4	4	2
WB	Senegal	Energy	US$80.00	2008	2	2	11

Source: CESS Institute (2012).
Notes: ODA = official development assistance; ADB = Asian Development Bank; CIDA = Canadian International Development Agency; AfDB = African Development Bank; UA = unit of account; WB = World Bank.

Despite limited sector budget support, there seems to be a good indication of DPs contributing and aligning to country ARD&FNS strategies. In Ghana, for example, there is a high reflection of aid in the ministry of agriculture's budget, exceeding the PDAE target of 85 percent. Rwanda DPs have done reasonably well in aligning their efforts with PSTA II, with the ASWG playing a key role in helping to ensure alignment. This is similar to the case of Ghana. Although the situation in Senegal is described as one without an operational country-owned, comprehensive agriculture strategy, the bulk (about 60 percent) of the funding provided by the donors for implementing their own activities seems to be in line with the priorities of the *La Loi d'Orientation Agro Sylvo Pastorale*, the main policy framework for sector development in 2004.

On the issue of coordination and harmonization, questions have been raised about the limited use by DPs of country procurement systems, which continue to pose a dilemma in the absence of serious efforts to improve the government of Bangladesh's capacities to improve its public financial management systems. In Ghana, there is increasing use of program-based approaches for funding development activities, though not meeting the PDAE target of having two-thirds of aid provided through such mechanisms is evident. Donor coordination meetings and ASWG have contributed to increased information sharing, which is essential. As in Ghana, DPs in Rwanda are increasingly using MINAGRI's public financial management systems, though this largely remains limited to budget support and pooled/basket funds. Rwanda needs to work on reducing parallel project implementation units, as about 40 percent of ODA for AFF disbursements in 2010 were in the form of off-budget project-type interventions. Senegal's DPs are pushing for more coordination and harmonization of their aid activities, and they now have regular meetings for information sharing on their activities, as well as to decide on common positions between them and the government on important issues. As in the other countries, Senegal has a donor matrix of development activities that is regularly updated and shared.

Some mechanisms are in place in Bangladesh to potentially exercise mutual accountability because of a signed joint cooperative strategy between the government of Bangladesh and DPs through an ASWG-like body. Efforts to improve the country investment plan's M&E in Bangladesh are evident in the 2012 M&E report by the Food Planning and Monitoring Unit. The data systems in place and the capacities for M&E and analysis far exceed those typically seen in many African countries. In Ghana, the JSRs are paramount, with four JSRs occurring since it was institutionalized in 2008, which is consistent with the CAADP mutual accountability framework. In Rwanda, the JSR has been important for monitoring agriculture sector performance, as well as for its contribution to the national development targets and providing necessary feedback on how achievement of desired results can be improved through decisionmaking, planning, implementation, and reporting, all of which are important aspects of MfDR. Together, the ASWGs, sector-wide approach group, and JSRs have been noted as providing effective forums for aid coordination, alignment of DP support with sector priorities, and mutual accountability. Nonetheless, for MINAGRI to effectively manage for results, there is a need to urgently strengthen its M&E, statistics, and technical capacity, which are reported to be weak. In both Ghana and Rwanda, these platforms rely on a weak M&E system, and there are no such operational institutional bodies or platforms in Senegal, where the national agricultural M&E capacity is also weak and there has been no evaluation of any major public agricultural program. Although donors conduct evaluations of their programs, ongoing events in Senegal can be developed to the likes of Ghana and Rwanda. For example, the thematic working groups put in place during the development of the NAIP could be revived, which would be an equivalent of the ASWGs in Ghana and Rwanda. With the proposed technical committee of the NAIP in place, these two bodies could then work on implementing and institutionalizing a JSR.

Results and AFSI's Contribution to Their Achievement

To what extent are development results being achieved—that is, are outcome indicators trending in the expected directions toward stated targets? As the detailed country reports in Appendix B reveal, all of the case study countries have made significant achievements in several areas, despite the recent high global food price and financial crisis. For example, Bangladesh has produced more of its own food, with per capita agricultural production levels growing rapidly at an annual average rate of more than 3 percent. This increase has lessened import dependence. There has also been significant progress toward reduction of poverty, child malnutrition, and undernourishment. Ghana too has produced more of its own food, with per capita agricultural production levels growing rapidly at an annual average rate of 3.5 percent in 1990–2000, catching up and then overtaking the averages not only in Africa but also in the world. Ghana has experienced a substantial decline in the poverty rate since 1992 (either measured relative to the international or national poverty line) and has already achieved the first part of the MDGof halving its 1992 poverty level. Rwanda has seen steady agricultural growth, poverty reduction, and improved food security. Senegal has managed to keep inflation low and has made significant improvements in reducing overall poverty and hunger. However, more needs to be done in Senegal; as the pace of poverty reduction has declined in recent years, and the hunger situation is still regarded as being serious, whereas the prevalence of undernourishment remains relatively high, and child malnutrition has increased in recent times.

There is no doubt that ODA and MfDR efforts for ARD&FNS have made significant contributions to achievement of these results. ODA makes up a substantial share of the national budgets of the study countries, and government programs that these budgets are spent on, in addition to MfDR processes, mechanisms, and institutions, have contributed to achievement of the results. Regarding the government of Rwanda's land husbandry, water harvesting, and hillside irrigation program, for example, significant progress had been made in only the first half of the first year of the program, including achievement of 50 percent of the target proportion using improved farm methods (World Bank 2011). These early achievements have been instrumental in securing the additional GAFSP funding for scaling up the project. In Ghana, the government's program on fertilizer subsidy, mechanization, and block farms has contributed to improving agricultural production and productivity by providing farmers with low-cost

inputs or greater access to credit inputs and mechanization services (Benin et al. 2013). The fertilizer program, for example, started as a voucher system in 2008 and 2009; however, lessons learned of high overhead and administrative costs, diversion of fertilizers from intended target beneficiaries, and large amounts of time spent by the head office and district directors and the staff of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture in policing the distribution process led to its replacement with the waybill system (Ghana, MOFA 2010).

The experts interviewed also cited several programs that had contributed to increasing agricultural productivity, raising incomes, and reducing poverty in the case study countries. Of course, several other factors have also contributed to these results, including private-sector investments and other donor off-budget projects. In Bangladesh, for example, the Food Planning and Monitoring Unit (2012) report shows that committed focus and continuity in antipoverty policies by successive governments over the past 20 years have led to a sustained decline in poverty. However, gender-based food insecurity persists, with women earning substantially less than men. On the whole, real wages expressed in rice terms increased significantly, whereas food prices rose faster than other prices. As in Bangladesh, the gains in poverty reduction and the increase in FNS have not been the same in all parts of each case study country. In general, poverty and child malnutrition are higher in the rural areas. In addition, child malnutrition is higher among males than females.

Quantifying the contribution of AFSI to achievement of the results is impossible, because of the primarily short time span of the data and when AFSI came into force in 2009. However, because AFSI embraces MfDR, as reflected in the principles of PDAE and AAA, it can be expected to contribute to these positive trends into the future to the extent that it demonstrates added value to existing financial and nonfinancial ODA in implementing countries' ARD&FNS investment plans and programs within the MfDR framework. This is something that only the AFSI group of donors can show, particularly for the nonfinancial component and MfDR activities, given that the experts interviewed all acknowledged that AFSI was consistent with what was already in place.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Using Bangladesh, Ghana, Rwanda, and Senegal as case studies, this paper attempts to assess the degree to which the AFSI has been implemented within the MfDR framework and to evaluate progress in development results associated with economic governance, agricultural growth, poverty, and FNS. Having its origins in the establishment of the MDGs, the MfDR approach has gained widespread support in obtaining results on the development agenda at all levels (global, regional, and country). A critical part of the movement is reforming the ways in which development aid is delivered and managed in order to achieve results. In response, recent development cooperation emphasizes alignment of aid to recipient countries' own national development strategies and priorities, which is expected to provide motive for donors to increase aid and to make aid work. The rationale is that aligning aid to the country's priorities can help solve the principal–agent (or double asymmetry) problem that is associated with development cooperation.

The paper combines narratives, based primarily on information collected from expert opinion surveys, and trend analysis of quantitative data, based primarily on publicly available data and information, to address four research questions:

- What does a country-owned ARD and ARD&FNS strategy entail?
- To what extent are governments and their development partners providing financial and nonfinancial efforts toward these country-owned ARD&FNS strategies?
- How are these efforts being managed to achieve development results?
- To what extent are development results being achieved—that is, are outcome indicators trending in the expected directions toward stated targets?

What does a country-owned ARD&FNS strategy entail? In Bangladesh, broad consultations with various stakeholders in preparing country and sector investment plans seem to have given country ownership to them. However, some people are skeptical of reforms being pushed from external sources. The processes in place in Ghana for setting policy and investment priorities have definitely improved over previous ones, which has led to greater ownership and inclusiveness for its food and agriculture sector development and investment plans. In Rwanda, the government, through MINAGRI, has effectively led and owned the development and implementation of its strategic plan for the sector, which were formulated in a participatory manner involving consultations with various stakeholders at the central and local levels. The situation in Senegal is different: Until the CAADP–initiated national agricultural investment plan of 2010, the president was solely responsible for initiating the government's agricultural policies and programs, with little or no consultation of the different actors. These findings are consistent with the results from the survey on the PDAE conducted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which ranked Rwanda as the highest among the four countries for the country-ownership indicator. Ghana was next highest, with Bangladesh and Senegal receiving the lowest grades.

To what extent are governments and their development partners providing financial and nonfinancial efforts toward these country-owned ARD&FNS strategies? Incremental ODA for ARD&FNS disbursed to the four case study countries together after 2009 (when AFSI started), compared with the periods before then, increased by 6.8 percent on average. Whereas disbursements went up moderately in Ghana and Senegal (17 and 11 percent, respectively) and slightly in Bangladesh (1.8 percent), it declined moderately in Rwanda (–11 percent). On the part of the governments in the four countries, public agriculture expenditure increased fastest in Bangladesh, followed by Rwanda, and then Senegal and Ghana. However, the growth rates were higher in the periods before 2009 compared with the periods after that. Looking at the agriculture expenditures relative to total expenditures and the size of the agriculture sector, the shares were higher in the periods after 2009 compared with the periods before that. This suggests that despite the slump in growth in agricultural expenditures from 2009 onward, the growth experienced was still higher than the growth experienced in total expenditures and agriculture value-added. There is a high positive correlation between ODA for ARD&FNS and public agriculture

expenditure, suggesting that they crowd in each other and that they are complementary. The correlation is strongest in Rwanda and Bangladesh (with a correlation coefficient of about 0.7 each), followed by Ghana (0.4) and then Senegal (0.3).

How are these efforts being managed to achieve development results? Various processes and mechanisms are in place to ensure that planning and implementation of ARD&FNS strategies and programs are managed for development results. (Table 5.1 summarizes the main findings.) The major processes include triggers in agreements between governments and donors, donor coordination meetings, agricultural sector working groups, and joint sector reviews. Only in Senegal are these efforts at rudimentary stages. The main challenge faced with MfDR in the countries lies with institutional coordination, which is characterized by the ministry of agriculture's weak interagency coordination and human and institutional capacity. Donors have described the investment plan or framework for the agriculture sector as not being strategic enough. The supposed country-owned strategies have not attracted expected external resources—only 11 African countries (including Rwanda and Senegal) and Bangladesh, among seven others, have benefitted from the GAFSP. The expected move toward agriculture sector budget support has not also materialized. It is only in Ghana and Rwanda where this happens: Canada in Ghana and the European Union and the United Kingdom in Rwanda.

To what extent are development results being achieved—that is, are outcome indicators trending in the expected directions toward stated targets? All the case study countries have made significant achievements in several areas, including rapid food production and significant progress toward reduction of poverty, child malnutrition, and undernourishment. Progress seems relatively lower in Senegal, where the pace of poverty reduction has declined in recent years and the hunger situation is still regarded as being *serious*, while the prevalence of undernourishment remains relatively high.

Overall Contribution of AFSI

Although AFSI's specific contribution to MfDR in these countries was difficult to isolate, it can be expected to contribute to positive trends into the future to the extent that it demonstrates added-value to existing financial and nonfinancial ODA for implementing countries' ARD&FNS investment plans and programs. AFSI, as well as other initiatives taking on MfDR approaches, represents important initiatives in combating low agricultural productivity, chronic hunger, and pervasive undernutrition. Because these efforts target mid- to long-term changes, rather than relying on short-term interventions, it is important that they stay the course in providing (and documenting) additional financial and nonfinancial resources, while integrating those resources well with other existing or new development initiatives.

It is still early to assess the impact of AFSI, as the findings in this paper reflect, but laying a solid foundation, including providing resources for rigorous M&E studies, will be critical. Results of the voluntary reporting included in the appendix of the G8 Camp David report (G8 USA 2012) does not have enough information to carry out a comprehensive assessment of the value addition of AFSI. Actually, the results give an impression that in many cases, most donor activities are due to AFSI. Table 5.2 presents a reporting framework that can elicit information necessary for carrying out a comprehensive assessment of the impacts of AFSI. This table builds on the reporting framework for the G8 Camp David report, using the case of Canada's support to Ghana to fill in some of the information.

Table 5.1 Summary of key processes, mechanisms, and institutions for MfDR in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries and their effectiveness in achieving results

Country	Country ownership	Alignment	Coordination and harmonization	Monitoring and evaluation and mutual accountability
Bangladesh	Strong, but there are skeptics on the sources of agenda setting.	Moderate and increasing over time. There is no sector budget support (SBS).	Limited use of government or public financial management (PFM) systems. Efforts to improve capacity are being questioned.	Potential reflected in signed joint cooperative strategy between the government of Bangladesh and development partners (DPs). Regular food and nutrition security (FNS) monitoring and evaluation (M&E) reports.
Ghana	Strong, but late entry of some civil society organizations (CSOs).	Strong and increasing over time. There is SBS by two DPs.	Increasing use of program-based approaches (PBAs) and PFM system. DP coordination and agriculture sector working group (ASWG) meetings are key for information sharing.	Organized four joint sector reviews (JSRs), consistent with the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) mutual accountability framework (MAF). Weak M&E system, which is more for the ministry of food and agriculture (MOFA) than for the entire sector.
Rwanda	Strong, but limited participation of some CSOs.	Strong and increasing over time. There is SBS by two DPs.	Increasing use of PBAs and PFM system. DP coordination and ASWG meetings are key for information sharing.	Strong accountability platforms (including JSR consistent with the CAADP MAF). Also weak M&E, statistics, and technical capacity.
Senegal	Weak (solely presidential) until the CAADP process leading to development of the national agricultural investment plan (NAIP).	Increasing over time despite lack of comprehensive strategy. There is no SBS.	DPs and government pushing for more coordination and harmonization of aid activities.	No mutual accountability platforms. Donors conduct M&E. No evaluation of government programs. Development and implementation of the NAIP is likely to change the situation for the better.

Source: Authors' analysis based on expert opinion surveys.

Table 5.2 Suggested reporting framework to assess the contribution of AFSI to ARD&FNS in a specific country

		ODA (currency millions)												Objectives and results	MfDR			
		All ODA			ODA for ARD&FNS													
					Via sector budget support			Via general budget support			Via private-sector and nonpublic			Via multilaterals and other arrangements					
		Financial	Nonfinancial (such as TA)	Total	Financial	Nonfinancial (such as TA)	Total	Financial	Nonfinancial (such as TA,)	Total	Financial	Nonfinancial (such as TA,)	Total	Financial	Nonfinancial (such as TA,)	Total		Supporting country investment plans	Strategic coordination	Comprehensive approach	Leveraging multilaterals
																	Indicator 1.	Indicator 1.	Indicator 1.	Indicator 1.	Indicator 1.
Commitments and targets	Initial				100	1.8[c]		18[e]			13.9[g]										
																	Indicator 1.	Indicator 1.	Indicator 1.	Indicator 1.	Indicator 1.
	Incremental due to AFSI				10																
Disbursements and achievements to date	Initial				80[a]	1.4[d]		11.5[f]			11.2[h]						Description of achieve-ments	Description of achieve-ments	Description of achieve-ments	Description of achieve-ments	Description of achieve-ments
	Incremental due to AFSI				8[b]												Description of achieve-ments	Description of achieve-ments	Description of achieve-ments	Description of achieve-ments	Description of achieve-ments

Sources: Authors' illustration based on AFSI voluntary reporting framework (G8 USA 2012).

Notes: ODA = official development assistance; ARD&FNS = agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security; AFSI = L'Aquila Food Security Initiative. Information filled in is based on Canada's support to Ghana for 2009–2013. The data are from various sources, including G8 USA (2012), CESS Institute (2012), and Ghana's donor matrix of activities (see Appendix C). [a,b] Assumes five equal tranches and 100% disbursement rate. [c] Based on annual average budget for technical assistance (CAD4.9 million for 2002–2015). [e] Estimated by 10 percent (government's commitment to CAADP) of CAD180 million general support. [f] Estimated by 8 percent (average government spending on agriculture) of actual disbursement to ministry of finance for general budget support, assuming five equal tranches. [g] Based on annual average budget for capacity development (CAD7.25 million for 2007–2012) and support to innovative food security initiatives (CAD14.3 million for 2008–2016). [d,h] Assumes five equal tranches and 100 percent disbursement rate.

APPENDIX A: INDICATORS

Table A.1 AFSI-relevant macro-level and disaggregated indicators

	Quantitative information (indicator and definition)		Qualitative information	Sources of data		
Process, policy, or intervention	**Macro level**	**Disaggregation**		**Macro level**	**Disaggregation**	**Qualitative information**
AFSI commitments and disbursements						
1. Donor commitments and disbursements	1a. ODA disbursements: (1) total amount; (2) share of total commitments 1b. ODA disbursements for ARD as share of total ODA 1c. ODA disbursements for ARD as share of GDP	ODA disbursements for ARD by: (1) financial and nonfinancial; (2) on- and off-government budget support; (3) types—agriculture and rural health, education, infrastructure, safety nets, and so on	Narratives on: (1) alignment between donor in-country implementation and headquarter polices; (2) M&E or IA results of major donor development projects	OECD CRS database (1a, 1b, 1c), ReSAKSS aggregates (1b, 1c)	OECD CRS database (1, 2, 3)	In-country donor offices (1), country M&E or IA reports (2)
ARD policy and planning process						
2. MfDR process	2a. *Ownership*: Percentage of NAIP budget that is financed from country's own revenue sources	(1) Percentage of NAIP budget that is financed from different sources (government, private sector, donors, and so on), including financing gap	(1) Extent to which NAIP or national ARD strategy has clear strategic priorities that are linked to a medium-term expenditure framework and reflected in national annual budgets (2) Inclusiveness of state and nonstate actors (including rural farming communities and women) in CAADP processes and investment planning (3) Adoption of and stage in CAADP roundtable process and NAIP	Government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture (2a); country agricultural investment plan and policy documents (2a) ReSAKSS monitoring (2a)	Government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture (1); country agricultural investment plan and policy documents (1); CAADP country team (1), ReSAKSS monitoring (1)	Government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture (1, 2, 3); country agricultural investment plan and policy documents (1, 2, 3); CAADP country team (1, 2, 3), donor offices (1, 2, 3), ReSAKSS monitoring (3)

Table A.1 Continued

Process, policy, or intervention	Quantitative information (indicator and definition)		Qualitative information	Sources of data		
	Macro level	Disaggregation		Macro level	Disaggregation	Qualitative information
ARD policy and planning process (continued)						
2. MfDR process	2b. *Alignment*: (1) Percentage of total ODA for ARD given to the public sector that is reported on partners' national budgets; (2) Percentage of donors and ODA that use public financial management systems in partner countries	(1)	(1) Country's procurement and public financial management systems and extent to which they either adhere to broadly accepted good practices or have a reform program in place to achieve these (2) Provision of donor capacity-development support through coordinated programs consistent with partners' national development strategies (3) Predictability and timeliness of ODA vis-à-vis agreed schedules in annual or multiyear frameworks	OECD CRS database (2b-1 & 2); Government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture, and so on (2b-1 & 2)		Country assessments of public financial management systems (1); CAADP country team (2); donor offices (1, 2, 3), ReSAKSS monitoring (2); OECD CRS database (1, 2, 3)
	2c. *Harmonization*: (1) Percentage of total ODA provided via multilateral arrangements or as Program-based approaches; (2) Percentage of total bilateral ODA that is untied	Percentage of donors and ODA (including nontraditional donors like foundations) operating outside aid effectiveness framework	(1) Support to Joint assistance strategies and use of common funding mechanisms (2) Commissioning and use of shared analysis (such as joint field missions, diagnostic reviews) (3) Extent of intra- and intersectoral and ministerial harmonization in partner country	OECD CRS database (2c-1 & 2); government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture (2c-1 & 2), and so on	Government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture (1) donor offices (1)	OECD CRS database (2); country agricultural investment plan and policy documents (3); CAADP country team (2, 3); ReSAKSS monitoring (3); donor offices (1, 2);
	2d. *Mutual accountability*: (1) Frequency of JSR meetings held; (2) Participation rate against total membership of JSR	(1) Participation rate of different groups of state and nonstate actors versus total membership of JSR	(1) Mutual (state and nonstate actors) assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness and national ARD strategies (such as JSRs) (2) Adoption of the African Peer Review Mechanism (3) Perceptions by different groups of state and nonstate of the effectiveness and utility of JSRs	Government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture (1 & 2); CAADP country team (1 & 2); donor offices (1 & 2),	Government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture (1); CAADP country team (1); donor offices (1)	Government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture, and so on (1, 2); CAADP country team (1, 2); donor offices (1, 2)

Table A.1 Continued

Process, policy, or intervention	Quantitative information (indicator and definition)		Qualitative information	Sources of data		
	Macro level	**Disaggregation**		**Macro level**	**Disaggregation**	**Qualitative information**
ARD policy and planning process) (continued)						
2. MfDR process						
2e. *Results orientation*: (1) Share of total agriculture budget and expenditure allocated for M&E; (2) Proposal: Percentage of ODA given to capacity building in the ARD public sector	(1) Number of professionally trained M&E and IA experts employed by education attainment, gender, area of expertise, source of training—domestic or overseas, and so on; (2) Per capita expenditures on capacity training on M&E and impact assessment—domestic and overseas; (3) expenditure on conducting agricultural survey on basic indicators of sector performance (production volumes, commodity prices, and so on)	(1) Transparent and monitorable performance assessment frameworks to assess progress against national ARD strategies and targets (2) Resources and capacity to implement above frameworks and use assessment results in managing for results (3) Outcomes or impact of CAADP review, mutual learning, and dialogue processes	Government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture, and so on (1, 2); donor offices (2); OECD CRS database (2)	Country agricultural investment plan and M&E documents (1, 2); government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture, and so on (1, 2); CAADP country team (1, 2), donor offices (1, 2),	Country agricultural investment plan and M&E documents (1, 2); government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture, and so on (1, 2, 3); CAADP country team (1, 2, 3); donor offices (1, 2, 3); ReSAKSS monitoring (3)

Table A.1 Continued

Process, policy, or intervention	Quantitative information (indicator and definition)		Qualitative information	Sources of data		
	Macro level	Disaggregation		Macro level	Disaggregation	Qualitative information
Government spending						
3. Government budget sources and spending on ARD	3a. Government budget and expenditures, and (1) total amounts; (2) as share of GDP; (3) by source—grants vs. loans, bilateral versus. multilateral, and so on 3b. Government budget and expenditures on the agricultural sector as percentage of (1) total government expenditure; (2) agriculture GDP 3c. Government budget and expenditures on other individual sectors (rural health, education, safety nets, and so on) as percentage of total government expenditure 3d. Financing gap in NAIP	Share of total agriculture expenditure by: (1) Development and recurrent expenditure (2) Major types/functions—R&D, extension, farm support, irrigation, natural resource management, marketing infrastructure, and so on (3) Agricultural subsectors—crops, livestock, forestry, fishery (4) Subnational—region or province	Narrative on (1) Timing of ODA (grants, loans) and reporting requirements (2) Coordination of government agencies in ARD (3) Private-sector investments in ARD (excluding ODA above) (4) Spending on nutrition services (including ODA)	Government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture, rural development, and so on (3a, 3b, 3c, 3d); CAADP country team (3d); ReSAKSS aggregates (3b, 3d)	Government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture, rural development, and so on (1, 2, 3, 4)	Government offices—ministries of finance, agriculture, rural development and so on (1, 2, 3, 4); CAADP country team (2); OECD CRS database (1, 4)
Intermediate results						
4. Economic governance	4a. Macroeconomic management: (1) deficit to GDP; (2) revenue to GDP; (3) debt to GDP; (4) exchange rate; (5) inflation rate; (6) balance of payments; (7) real exchange rate; (8) general price index	Domestic and export-import parity prices for major (agricultural?) commodities	Narratives on M&E or IA results of policies and programs on economic governance	IMF Statistics (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8); government offices—statistical bureaus, national accounts (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8); ReSAKSS aggregates (1, 2, 5, 6, 8)	Government offices—statistical bureaus, national accounts	Country M&E or IA documents; government offices—statistical bureaus, national accounts
5. Agricultural performance	5a. Real (constant prices) AgGDP growth rate (percent) 5b. Value of total agricultural exports: (1) as percentage of AgGDP; (2) ratio to value of total agricultural imports	(1) Real agricultural growth by subsectors (crops, livestock, forestry, fishery) and major commodities (2) Productivity (output per unit input) of major commodities	Narratives on M&E or IA results of policies and programs on agricultural performance	Government offices—statistical bureaus, national accounts (5a, 5b); World Bank (5a); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (5b); ReSAKSS aggregates (5a, 5b)	Government offices—statistical bureaus, national accounts (1); FAO (1, 2); ReSAKSS aggregates (1, 2)	Country M&E or IA documents; government offices—statistical bureaus, national accounts

Table A.1 Continued

Process, policy, or intervention	Quantitative information (indicator and definition)		Qualitative information	Sources of data		
	Macro level	Disaggregation		Macro level	Disaggregation	Qualitative information
Results						
6. Poverty	6a. Poverty: incidence (P0), gap (P1), and squared gap (P2) 6b. Inequality: gini coefficient 6c. Income and consumption expenditure	Measures by: (1) rural/urban (2) gender (3) age and other available demographic characteristics (4) subnational—region/province, district	Narratives on M&E or IA results of policies and programs on poverty. capacity, frequency, quality of household expenditure (income) surveys	Government offices—statistical bureaus (6a, 6b); World Bank-LSMS/consumption-expenditure surveys (6a, 6b); ReSAKSS aggregates (6a)	Government offices—statistical bureaus (1, 2, 3, 4); World Bank-LSMS/consumption-expenditure surveys (1, 2, 3, 4)	Country M&E or IA documents; government offices—statistical bureaus, LSMS/consumption-expenditure surveys
7. Hunger and food and nutrition security	7a. Food availability: (1) per capita food production; (2) food production + the balance of food import and food export + food aid + food stock 7b. Food access: (1) food prices; (2) per capita food consumption 7c. Food utilization and nutrition: percent of (1) stunting, (2) wasting, and (3) underweight children under 5 years 7d. Hunger: GHI	Measures by: (1) different food commodities (2) rural/urban (3) gender (4) age and other available demographic characteristics (5) subnational—region/province, district	Narratives on M&E or IA results of policies and programs on hunger and food and nutrition security	Government offices—statistical bureaus (7a, 7b, 7c); DHS surveys, consumption-expenditure surveys (7a, 7b, 7c); IFPRI-GHI (7d); ReSAKSS aggregates (7c, 7d)	Government offices—statistical bureaus, DHS surveys, consumption-expenditure surveys	Country M&E or IA documents; government offices—statistical bureaus, DHS surveys, consumption-expenditure surveys

Sources: CAADP M&E Minimum Core Set of Indicators (Benin et al. 2010); GDPRD (2011).

Notes: AFSI = L'Aquila Food Security Initiative; ODA = official development assistance; M&E = monitoring and evaluation; OECD CRS = Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Creditor Reporting System; IA = impact assessment; ARD = agriculture and rural development; MfDR = managing for development results; NAIP = national agricultural investment plan; CAADP = Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme; JSR = joint sector review; IMF = International Monetary Fund; AgGDP = agricultural gross domestic product; LSMS = living standards measurement study; GHI = Global Hunger Index; DHS = demographic and health surveys.

APPENDIX B: EXPERT INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT

Overview

This instrument is intended to fill in any information gaps from reviewing publicly available data and documents for assessing progress of AFSI financial and nonfinancial commitments in terms of:

1. To what extent have the AFSI donors and partner countries been able to meet their AFSI commitments, consistent with implementation of the partner country's own ARD&FNS strategy?
2. Is there sufficient evidence that the implementation of AFSI, and the partner country's own ARD&FNS strategy, is being managed for results (that is, is it adhering to the AFSI and PDAE/AAA principles and MfDR framework)?
3. Without making any attribution, are there any changes in development outcomes that are moving in the direction of stated targets?

The series of questions or information sought after have been broken into five main parts:

- Part 1: Awareness and nature of AFSI
- Part 2: Country ownership and implementation of the ARD&FNS strategy
- Part 3: Alignment and harmonization
- Part 4: Managing for development results
- Part 5: Changes in development outcomes (results)

Basic Interview Information

Interviewer: _____
Interviewee: _____
Organization Affiliation: _____
Date of Interview: _____

Part 1: Awareness and Nature of AFSI

1. Are you aware of what AFSI-related principles/commitments are and what they stand for in your country? Yes or No (Please explain.)
2. How are these linked to your ARD&FNS strategy (such as timing and sequencing, consistency of their objectives, institutional responsibilities, and so on)?
3. In your opinion, what is the value-addition of AFSI-related principles/commitments (for example, to ARD&FNS goals and objectives, resources)?

Part 2: Country Ownership and Implementation of ARD&FNS Strategy

4. Who were the major players in developing the strategy? What were their key roles? How effective were they?
5. What was the level of political leadership or champions (such as president, ministers, permanent secretaries)?

6. To what extent were smallholder farmers, especially women, included in the process? How about in implementation?
7. Was the strategy informed by locally generated analysis? Who were the main authors? What was the source of funding?
8. How has the strategy been internalized (well understood and applied) by the main implementing agencies?
9. Do you agree that the strategy is locally owned?

1	2	3	4	5
Strongly disagree	Disagree some	Neither	Agree some	Strongly agree

10. Do you know what the main priorities of the strategy are?
11. How is the budget allocated to the different priorities? (Who decides? Who is consulted? Who has influence? Who validates? Who approves?)
12. What are the major challenges in implementing the strategy?

Part 3: Alignment and Harmonization

13. To what extent are donors aligning to the priorities of the strategy? How has this changed in the past five years? (Give examples.)
14. Is the alignment helping to improve the government's budget planning? How?
15. To what extent are donors using multilateral institutions or trust funds (harmonization)? How has this changed over the past five years?
16. To what extent are donors using joint missions or analytical work (coordination)?
17. Are there any examples of public-private partnerships supporting the ARD&FNS strategy (especially for research and development)?

Part 4: Managing for Results

18. What mechanisms are in place for review and mutual accountability (such as JSR, ASWG, others)?
19. Who are the participants? How often do they meet? How effective are they and why? Any challenges?

Group	Frequency of meetings (number per year)	Most active participating groups	Effectiveness (Explain.)	Major challenges

20. Regarding the monitoring and evaluation system for data collection, analysis and reporting: Who is responsible? What are the key products? How effective is the system in terms of availability, timeliness, and usefulness of the products? Are there major challenges (capacity)?

	Who is responsible?	What are the key products?	Effectiveness and challenges
Data collection			
Analysis and reporting			

Part 5: Changes in Development Outcomes (Results)

21. How do you feel the general well-being and food security situation in the country has changed in the past five years?

1	2	3	4	5
Worsened a lot	Worsened a little	Not changed	Improved a little	Improved a lot

Please explain (including how the impacts have been distributed across different groups of society, and so on):

22. Which polices and programs, in the past five years, do you think have had the largest impact on the following outcomes?

Outcome	**Polices or programs**	**Explanation**
a. Raising agricultural productivity		
b. Increasing household incomes		
c. Increasing food and nutrition security		
d. Reducing mass poverty		

APPENDIX C: CANADA'S AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOOD AND NUTRITION SECURITY SUPPORT TO GHANA

Table C.1 Canada's ARD&FNS support to Ghana

Developing partner (updated)	Title	Category	Main objectives	Components	Total budget	Currency	Type of funding grant = 0 loan = 1	Runtime
CIDA (Jan-12) CIDA 2	Food and Agriculture Sector Program (FASDEP)	Other	Implementation of the Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy	Sector Budget Support	110	CAD	0	2009–2013
CIDA (Jan-12) CIDA 4	Food Security Advisory Services	Capacity Building	Support to Government of Ghana's FASDEP	Technical Assistance	4.99	CAD	0	2002–2015
CIDA (Jan-12) CIDA 7	Ghana Environment Management Project	Natural Resource Management	To strengthen Ghanaian institutions and rural communities to enable them to reverse land degradation and desertification trends in three regions of northern Ghana	Capacity Development	7.25	CAD	0	2007–2012
CIDA (Jan-12) CIDA 8	Food Security and Environment Facility	Natural Resource Management	To deliver and disseminate innovative food security and sustainable agricultural programming in the three northern regions of Ghana.	Support to innovative food security initiatives	14.3	CAD	0	2008–2016

Source: Ghana's Donor Matrix.
Note: ARD&FNS = agricultural and rural development and food and nutrition security; CIDA = Canadian International Development Agency; CAD = Canadian dollars.

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