Independent Advisory and Evaluation Service

CGIAR

The Culture and Engagement Data Ecosystem at CGIAR: A Data Quality Assurance Case Study

John Kieti

January 2026

Correct citation: Kieti, J. 2026. The Culture and Engagement Data Ecosystem at CGIAR: A Data Quality Assurance Case Study. Rome: CGIAR Independent Advisory and Evaluation Service (IAES), Evaluation Function.

Cover image: C. de Bode/CGIAR (2018) - Hung Nguyen, ILRI food system specialist, visiting a government research facility

The Culture and Engagement Data Ecosystem at CGIAR: A Data Quality Assurance Case Study

John Kieti

January 2026

Contents

Executive Summary **1**

Introduction **2**

1 Background: The GDI/C&E Data Ecosystem **3**

2 Methodology **5**

3 Detailed Findings **6**

3.1 The "Human-Mediated" Hybrid System 6
3.2 Usability and Value Proposition Gaps 7
3.3 Reliability and Coherence: Multiple Truths and Metric Instability 8
3.4 A Broken Accountability Architecture 10
3.5 A Structurally Fragmented Ecosystem 11
3.6 The Central Governance Failure: A Stalled People Database 12

4 Conclusions **13**

5 Recommended Actions **14**

5.1 C&E-Level Actions 14
5.2 Governance-Level Actions 15

Annex 1. List of Documents Reviewed **16**

List of Tables

Table 1. Multiple truths on staff affiliation to science groups 9
Table 2. The Broken Chain of Centre-level Accountability Tools (EQ2) 11

Table of Acronyms

C&E	Culture and Engagement
DQA	Data Quality Assurance
GDI	Gender Equity, Diversity and Inclusion
IAES	Independent Advisory Evaluation Services
ISDC	Independent Science for Development Council
P&C	People and Culture
QA	Quality Assurance

Executive Summary

Aligned to the C&E/GDI review Terms of Reference, the Data Quality Assurance (DQA) case study examines the reliability, timeliness, coherence, and decision-usefulness of data systems supporting the GDI/C&E workstream. The DQA study provides a diagnostic assessment of the Culture & Engagement (C&E) data ecosystem within CGIAR.

Diagnostic - A Fragile, human-mediated Ecosystem: Since 2020, the C&E team has built a functional, system-wide data-collection mechanism across a fragmented landscape, successfully codifying a "Common Data Language" for workforce reporting. However, the current ecosystem is structurally brittle, relying on manual "human-mediated" processes that constrain scalability and analytic rigor.

- **Process & Timeliness:** Center focal points extract, re-map, and reconcile data using Centre ERPs and spreadsheets. Central reconciliation creates a 5-8-month lag, rendering the final annual dataset a "historical snapshot" rather than a timely, decision-useful tool
- **Value Proposition**: C&E dashboard usage is low because its "one-size-fits-all" model offers redundancy rather than value. The system does not deliver distinct analytics required by key users, such as Centers (comparative analytics and benchmarking), and Science Leads (linkage to programmatic performance).
- **Reliability and coherence:** The ecosystem produces “multiple truths.” Public and internal dashboards differ by 1,700+ staff due to the exclusion of temporary workers, contradicting official GDI definitions. Differences also exist between HR-centric headcount and programmatic assignment data, and technical bugs have resulted in incorrect aggregates.
- **A broken accountability architecture:** The GDI Matrix, the primary tool for center-level accountability, failed after one collection cycle in 2020. Its replacement—the C&E Progress Index—is substantially delayed and is yet to be adequately co-developed with centers and technical leads, thereby risking future accountability.
- **A structurally fragmented ecosystem:** Five parallel “people data” silos exist: workforce dashboards, engagement surveys, the new Progress Index, programmatic (Initiatives) dashboards, and mature center-level systems. Lack of integration is prone to contradictory reporting and duplication of effort.
- **A stalled People Database:** The intended solution for automation and real-time workforce data—The People Database—is stalled not for technical reasons but due to a governance vacuum: no system-wide data-sharing policy, no empowered business champion, and no resourcing for centers to participate. This blockage is a single point of strategic failure for the C&E data ecosystem and jeopardizes delivery of the 2025–2027 Action Plan.

Conclusions: The C&E team has built a functional system from a low baseline and provides high-value insights where possible. However, the current ecosystem is not fit for purpose for modern, timely, or scalable organizational management. Process, adoption, and governance bottlenecks collectively limit reliability and strategic usefulness. The root cause is the unresolved governance environment surrounding people data.

Recommended actions: The study proposes two categories of actions to help transition CGIAR from a human-mediated, fragmented ecosystem to an integrated, policy-backed, and analytically robust people-data environment.

- C&E-level measures to improve user engagement and consultation processes

- Governance-level measures to unblock the People Database, resolve contradictory definitions, integrate parallel systems, reconcile the HR/programmatic linkage debate, and define secure aggregate data-access mechanisms.

Introduction

This case study provides a diagnostic of the CGIAR Culture and Engagement (C&E) data ecosystem, as mandated by the joint review's Terms of Reference. Its objective is to assess the "data quality, reliability, and decision-usefulness" of the GDI/C&E monitoring and reporting systems. The findings presented here aim to provide sharpened, illustrated, and traceable evidence to ground the main review's system-wide conclusions. The findings also inform a set of recommendations to strengthen data and systems support for the CGIAR C&E workstream.

The review finds that the C&E team has successfully built a functional CGIAR system-wide data collection and reporting system from a low baseline. The team had to create a system from scratch (circa 2020) in a historically fragmented data landscape that lacked a pre-existing system-wide data architecture, "common data language," or standardized collection processes. From this starting point, the C&E team has demonstrated resilience and pragmatism. The quantitative data system underlying the C&E workforce dashboard successfully captures key GDI progress, including the 2024 female promotion rate (47%) being significantly higher than the workforce baseline (39%).

In parallel with the C&E workforce data stream, the C&E function, in collaboration with P&C, has established a key perception-based instrument: the Workforce Engagement Survey, which found that 85% of respondents recommended CGIAR as a good place to work in 2024. Furthermore, the C&E team has been a "positive force for change," proactively developing and refining the "common data language" (e.g., the BG Level Equivalent mappings), which was later adopted as a foundational prototype for the corporate-level **CGIAR People Database Concept Note**. Moreover, for a complex data lifecycle with no formal authority, the C&E team is consistently described by key informants as 'really respectful,' 'very collaborative,' and adept at managing the 'complicated balance' by learning from Centers rather than imposing solutions.

However, the C&E team's pragmatic data ecosystem is not a modern, integrated architecture. It is a collection of semi-manual processes and disparate data streams that has operational limits. It is unscalable and falls short of being "fit for purpose" as an operational management tool, as this case study will show. Evidence from the 2017 Gender Evaluation (Vol II) suggests these challenges are not new; that evaluation noted similar persistent gaps between established policies and actual managerial practice, as well as chronic deficits in monitoring mechanisms. The findings of this DQA suggest these historical, systemic challenges remain unresolved, adding urgency to the need for structural solutions. This includes ongoing C&E-supported efforts to create a common job classification system and competency framework to harmonize the disparate career structures across Centers.

The review's central finding is that systemic and institutional governance weaknesses hamper the C&E work stream's data ecosystem. These include systemic governance failures that have stalled the foundational CGIAR 360 People Database project. This blockage is not technical; it is a governance and policy vacuum, characterized by technical leads as a lack of Center participation (only 7 of 13) due to "*concerns with the lack of a system-wide data governance policy*"—a policy vacuum confirmed in corporate documents. This blockage places the 2025/2027 C&E Action Plan at critical strategic risk. The plan depends on this stalled database for its core analytics (Outcome 3), a dependency that technical leads describe as "*unrealistic*" until the systemic governance issues are resolved.

Furthermore, a gap exists between CGIAR's stated strategic vision for GDI/C&E and the operational reality of its data ecosystem.

The Vision: CGIAR's 2020 GDI Framework sets a clear and compelling vision. It links GDI to innovation and performance and is built on principles including "Accountability" (Principle 4) and "Progressing in Partnership" (Principle 5). The evidence-driven approach is reinforced in an interview with a senior leadership representative, who stated, "I can't... go to any board and... talk about culture... without having any data." The current data ecosystem, as documented in this case study, actively undermines these two core principles:

Accountability: The findings show that the "Broken Chain" of accountability tools (*Finding 4.4*) and a lagging co-development of the new C&E Index represent a systemic challenge to Accountability.

Partnership & Integration: The principle of "Progressing in Partnership" has stalled at an institutional level. The "Stalled People Database" (*Finding 4.6*)—the foundational project intended to unite all Centre data—is blocked not by technical issues, but by a systemic governance failure.

1 Background: The GDI/C&E Data Ecosystem

The C&E data ecosystem is a 'human-mediated' hybrid system comprising multiple, disconnected data streams, which rely on varying degrees of manual intervention. It is not a single, integrated platform but a collection of distinct components managed by the C&E team to monitor the organization's C&E Action Plans. The primary data streams are described below.

1. **The quantitative workforce data stream:** This data stream for workforce demographics, tracking staff, promotions, and separations. The collection process is a digitally assisted manual one:
    a. Centre focal points extract data from their local, decentralized Centre ERPs (e.g., OCS / Agresso Business World).
    b. Data focal points then manually combine this data with information from other sources (such as local Excel spreadsheets) to fill gaps of information not tracked in the ERPs, which could relate to consultants and temporary staff or fields such as dependents and education level information.
    c. Using Microsoft Excel, they manually map, validate, and translate their local fields into the standardized templates provided by the C&E team. This manual "translation" is required even for Centers with their own modern HRIS.
    d. The completed templates are uploaded to the formal "GDI Data Submission Platform," a secure online tool that includes automated data validation, email notifications, and a workflow for review and approval.
    e. This data then populates the C&E team's central Snowflake Data Warehouse and is visualized in Tableau and Power BI Dashboards.

This template-based approach is a compromise to manage the varying levels of technical maturity across Centers. KIIs revealed a wide spectrum:

- *High Maturity*: Some Centers, like the Alliance, have proactively "*worked with IT*" to "*automate a little bit*" and create custom reports in their ERP (Agresso) that map internal fields to the C&E template.
- *Medium Maturity*: Other Centers, like ICARDA, "*had to develop our system*" (OCS/ABW) to add fields requested by C&E that previously only existed in "*paperwork*." However, the process still requires manual cross-checking using VLOOKUP in Excel.
- *Low Maturity:* Smaller entities, like the System Management Office, rely on a fully manual "*copy and paste from our spreadsheet process*."

A notable design feature of this stream is the "common data language", a standardized schema created by the C&E team to enable system-wide comparisons. The C&E team proactively developed and maintains this language, which includes the "BG Level Equivalent" mappings (to standardize 15+ different Centre grading systems), the CGIAR Workforce Group (15 standardized categories), and the specific, required definitions for promotions, separation reasons, and organizational groups. This C&E-led work was later adopted as a "*foundational prototype*" for the corporate-level CGIAR 360 People Database project.

2. **The perception-based data stream (Workforce engagement surveys):** This data stream provides perception-based data on culture, leadership, and inclusion. It was planned as a core component of the GDI architecture from its inception, listed under "Measuring Success" in the 2020 GDI Framework and the GDI Kick-off Workshop Report. This stream has matured significantly since its inception:
    a. *Methodology*: The survey is administered by an external third-party vendor, WorkBuzz, to ensure all responses are "*completely confidential*" and anonymous. Center-level results are firewalled and can only be shared with external parties with the explicit permission of each Centre.
    b. *Evolution*: This data stream evolved from short "*pulse surveys*" in 2021 (7 questions) and 2022 (8 questions) into the "*first in-depth CGIAR-wide workforce engagement survey*" in 2023-2024. This was a more comprehensive tool, featuring 56 questions, co-designed with Centers, benchmarked against 18 peer organizations, and administered in 7 languages.
    c. *Data utility***:** In 2024, the survey gathered 5,612 responses (a 58% response rate) and identified key staff sentiments, such as a high overall engagement score (85%), alongside concerns about "*Wellbeing & Mental Health*".
    d. *Responsive design*: **I**n response to feedback that staff "*didn't see any action*" on key findings like "*burnout*", the 2025 survey was strategically redesigned to enhance accountability. KIIs confirmed staff "*discontent*" and "*fatigue*" due to the perception that past results were not acted upon. The 2025 survey instrument directly addresses this by adding new, specific accountability questions, such as (Q59) "*My Centre has taken action on the results of the last survey*" and (Q60) *"I am confident my Centre will take action on the results of this survey.*" This shifts the "*onus… on each of these centres to take this information and to talk with their staff about it.*"
3. **The C&E accountability system (Index):** This stream is the primary tool for tracking Center-level accountability against the 2025-2027 action plan, specifically Outcome 4: Accountability.
    a. *Replacing the GDI Matrix*: The new C&E Progress Index (formerly known as the GDI Index) is intended to replace the discontinued GDI Matrix. The original Matrix was deemed "*too complicated*" and "*burdensome*" by Centers, which led to its discontinuation.
    b. *Operationalization plan*: The new Index was scheduled for implementation in 2025. Consultations for co-developing the index were ongoing in November 2025.
    c. *Low-burden, hybrid design*: An intended key strategic feature is its "*low burden design,*" created specifically to solve the problems of the GDI Matrix. The C&E team states that "*The proposed Progress Index will be filled out by the C&E team… there will be little to no reporting burden for Centers*". It functions as a "*hybrid consolidator*" that the C&E team populates using two main sources:
        i. *Internal C&E Records*: Data is drawn from other streams managed by the C&E team, such as results from the Engagement Survey or internal logs of training participation and ERG enrolment.

ii. *Centre activity records*: Qualitative progress on specific Action Plan items (e.g., "Engaged in consultations for and endorsed Leadership competencies") is verified through "*Activity Reporting by Centers during 1:1 sync meetings*".

4. **The Research Initiatives people data stream:** This is a parallel, unreconciled data stream, not managed by the C&E function, originating from the legacy "Science Initiatives" era. It was created to provide visibility into the composition of initiative teams and to track programmatic GDI goals, such as a 40% female representation target set by GDI leadership. This data stream had its own separate, manual collection process. Initially, each of the 32 initiatives submitted a "*people plan*" in its own unique format (e.g., Word documents or non-standard Excel files). To standardize this, P&C, Finance, and the PCU collaborated in late 2022 to create a single, unified Excel template to avoid redundant data requests. This template was then collected twice per year, aligned with the "*planning and replanning cycle*".
   The data is visualized in a separate Power BI Dashboard titled the "CGIAR Research Initiatives: People Dashboard". This dashboard, launched in September 2023, presents program-centric metrics that are distinct from the C&E (HR) workforce data. Its key metrics include:
   a. *Individuals*: The unique headcount of staff working on initiatives (3,088 in the 2024 *visualization*)
   b. *Assignments*: *The total number of roles (4,308) is higher because one individual could hold assignments on multiple initiatives*
   c. *FTEs*: The "Full-Time Equivalent" time dedicated to those assignments (1,929)

The final data in this dashboard reflects the Q2 2024 reporting cycle. This stream represents residual institutional demand for program-centric people metrics that are not captured by the C&E function's HR-centric workforce dashboard.

2 Methodology

This DQA is a case study under GDI/C&E review, rather than a full-scale systems audit. Its scope is limited to the data platforms, collection processes, and reports managed by the C&E function for monitoring the GDI/C&E Action Plans. It assesses the fitness of this ecosystem to answer the review's Evaluation Questions, particularly EQ5, EQ6, EQ7, EQ8, EQ9, EQ10, and EQ11 (TORs). The methodology combined three triangulated approaches to ensure findings were robust and grounded:

a. **Document and literature review:** A review of over 30 documents. This included historical evaluations, strategic frameworks, reports to the System Council, strategic documents for the CGIAR360 platform and People Database, and written responses from the C&E team.

b. **Systems analysis and data reconciliation:** This included guided demonstrations of the data systems with the C&E team and a direct analysis and reconciliation of data from the public and internal-facing C&E dashboards, as well as the parallel "Science Initiatives" dashboards. A review of technical data-collection guides, the C&E Progress Index, and the Engagement Survey instruments supported this analysis.

c. **Confidential Key Informant Interviews (KIIs):** Findings were triangulated using evidence from 22+ KIIs. This provided a multi-perspective view, capturing the experiences of senior leaders, technical and systems specialists, and operational staff at both the System organization and Centre levels.

Limitation: This DQA is a single-point-in-time review based on a sample of selected entities. The review did not conduct a technical audit of the underlying database architecture (e.g., query logic), but instead focused on the system's outputs, processes, and their "fitness-for-purpose".

3 Detailed Findings

This section presents the case study's findings, organized into six thematic areas. The findings move from the operational process (4.1) and its consequences for users (4.2, 4.3) to the systemic architectural and governance failures (4.4, 4.5, 4.6) that comprise the root cause of operational challenges.

3.1 The "Human-Mediated" Hybrid System

This finding addresses EQ8 (Data controls and streamlined processes) and EQ10 (Roles and responsibilities).

Among the data streams in the C&E data ecosystem (section 2), this section on process focused on the quantitative workforce data stream. This is the most elaborate and functionally mature data stream created and managed by the C&E team. The other data streams are nascent (C&E progress index) or not under the C&E team's control (workforce engagement surveys and the research initiatives people data dashboard). The C&E quantitative workforce data stream has evolved into a mature system that regularly aggregates data across the CGIAR's federated entities and features a modern visualization dashboard. However, its data pipeline is brittle, human-mediated, and difficult to scale. It is a hybrid system that includes online submission tools and dashboards, but it has vulnerable processes with manual, high-friction, and error-prone steps.

The "Common Language"—a workaround for a systemic failure: Manual interventions are made necessary by a core systemic failure: the lack of a common job architecture across the CGIAR. As a key informant confirmed, each Center operates "*autonomously with different bands, job descriptions, and job titles.*" The C&E team's "*common data language*"—a standardized set of definitions (e.g., BG Level Equivalent, CGIAR Workforce Group) is a pragmatic workaround that supports comparison and aggregation of data across CGIAR entities where none existed, but it has operational limits. The evidence confirms that the data pipeline has many manual steps.

At each Centre (data supply): Data focal points at Alliance, ICARDA, ILRI, and SMO all confirmed that their C&E workforce data processes are not simple exports. They manually combine data from more than one data source—pulling mainly from their local ERP(s), then manually add data from other sources, including local Excel spreadsheets (e.g., for consultants, temporary staff, or staff on different legacy ERPs) to fill the C&E template. The complexity of this manual "translation" is evidenced in the data collection template, which requires data focal points to manually populate five separate columns (Hosted Personnel, Seconded Personnel, Hosted/Seconded Personnel PARENT Centre, Shared Working Arrangement, Centre Sharing Working Arrangement) just to reconcile organizational structures that an integrated system would automate.

Moreover, KIIs also confirm that this mapping is required even when Centers have their own modern, functional HRIS. One focal point noted, "We have our own HRIS… so we run the queries, then we… do a bit of VLOOKUPs, a bit of this and that, then we populate their template." This confirms the process is not one of simple data extraction but of manual translation. In the absence of a common job architecture across the CGIAR, Centers' data focal points manually "translate" their local job classifications into the standardized "BG Level Equivalent".

Centrally (data reconciliation): The C&E team manually checks the data. A focal point described the iterative process: "*[It] goes to [the C&E team], who check it, and send it back with errors to fix. Yes. We do it twice or three times, …*". This process is further complicated by the system's inability to handle staff transitions between reporting periods. For staff who joined and separated between data collections, the official workaround requires focal points to manually add these individuals to a file, then send a separate

email to specific C&E team members for manual reconciliation and exclusion from one report and inclusion in another.

Central approval bottleneck: The workforce dashboard's primary challenge, is not data transformation but the lengthy centralized reconciliation and approval process. The C&E team confirms that the annual workforce data collection process takes nearly 7 months, from a kickoff information session (December) to the final data sign-off (July), including 3 months for "*Centre review meetings, data changes… and final signoff.*" This central bottleneck is not a Centre limitation. Multiple data focal points indicated that they have the capacity and willingness to submit data more frequently ("Yes, of course. Why not?"), but the 5-month+ central reconciliation process makes a more frequent cadence impractical.

The consequence—an opaque, brittle system: The manual process is a direct result of an opaque system architecture. The GDI Data Collection FAQs (Dec 2024) instructs focal points to report hosted staff under their "HOST Centre". Then, as documented, the C&E team centrally performs "swaps" after submission to move staff to their Parent Centre. This makes independent reconciliation by a user "*literally… [a] nightmare*," as the raw data submitted by Centers is designed to differ from the final dashboard figures.

While the manual central reconciliation is a primary bottleneck, it is a systems failure, not a people failure. KIIs with data focal points and P&C leads attest to the C&E team's professionalism and portray a high degree of goodwill toward the team and its data systems efforts.

3.2 Usability and Value Proposition Gaps

This finding addresses EQ6 (Assurance for informed decision-making), EQ9 (Timeliness and decision-usefulness), and EQ5 (Integration with performance reporting).

The workforce dashboard systems deliver high, tangible value to Centers with a high need for data consolidation. Key informants at the Alliance, which has two fragmented ERPs, use the dashboard "very, very often" as the only consolidated, "official source" for their own Board of Trustees and donor reporting. Nonetheless, for board reporting by centers (typically twice a year) and donor reporting, which may require more frequent data updates than once a year, a year-end snapshot is not sufficient. Potential users across centers, including at the Alliance, consider the utility of the data in the workforce dashboard to be undermined by its annual update cadence.

A key stakeholder validated the GDI contribution to social inclusion in research, which they considered the "*least addressed impact area by CGIAR*". The C&E data system is the only organizational tool to monitor workforce diversity. This data is critical for ensuring diversity leads to better decision-making and building external credibility with marginalized groups.

Overall, the review observes low adoption of the workforce dashboard systems. Google Analytics for the public-facing dashboard showed only 650 users for the twelve months to October 2025. The internal dashboard for P&C professionals showed only 53 sessions, confirming low usage by the intended audience. The review finds the workforce dashboards' fitness-for-purpose undermined by a hierarchy of shortcomings as follows:

a. Core Problem - A Value Proposition Gap: A key reason for low user adoption is a fundamental value proposition failure, hence the need for recommended action 6.1.4. The written questionnaires confirm the C&E team's understanding that "*System-wide views are not necessarily of interest to Centers*" and "*Centers likely rely on their own internal dashboards*".

This value proposition gap is evidenced in the KII testimony:

- The system fails to serve Centers whose operational needs are already met. For users with a single, trusted internal system (like ICARDA), the dashboard is seen as a one-way, "reporting up" burden.

The timeliness gap undermines its value to such centers. One data focal point stated: "*To be honest, no… I have my own data. Why should I go to the dashboard? … I just upload and that's it.*" This low adoption sentiment is echoed at a management level. One Center P&C lead, while supportive of the C&E function, questioned any value added in more frequent reporting, indicating they do not currently use the central dashboards for their own management decisions.

b. An underlying Integration gap: The value proposition failure is a symptom of the "strategic integration deadlock" (Finding 4.5). The system is perceived as a "*reporting-up*" burden because it is not vertically integrated to efficiently draw from or feed into other corporate data streams (such as center ERPs). This necessitates the manual, untimely data collection process (Finding 4.1). The dashboards' "decision-usefulness" is also limited because they fail to incorporate critical aggregate metrics that are already collected (e.g., pay gaps). Data from the promotions and separations streams (such as overall promotion rates by gender or turnover rates) is not visualized on the public-facing dashboard. While this exclusion protects public-facing sensitivity, the current access restriction to a narrow circle of HR users via the internal dashboards effectively obscures these trends from the rest of the CGIAR workforce. The dashboard system is also not horizontally integrated with the programmatic data that operational and science leads value.

c. Aggravating factor - An untimely cadence: The core value proposition failure is compounded by the system's annual timeliness cadence, a direct symptom of the 5-month manual reconciliation and approval process (Finding 4.1). The annual-only reporting cadence falls short of being "fit for purpose" as an operational management tool, given the organization's turnover rate. C&E's internal dashboard reports 913 separations in the 2024 period, against a public workforce count of 8,790. This represents a 10.4% annual turnover rate, and the situation was not different in 2023, which registered 903 separations. About 1/10 of the workforce had changed between the publishing of the 2023 and 2024 workforce datasets. The annual cadence fails the "timeliness" test for quality of the workforce data stream, rendering it a "historical snapshot" rather than a live management tool.

d. Usability barriers: The dashboard system's value proposition is further impeded by "last-mile" failures. The C&E team's written questionnaires confirm that although dashboard users can download PDF and PPTs of visualizations seen, a lack of a CSV/analysable data download is a deliberate governance choice to protect PII. This policy forces users (including this review team) into error-prone manual transcription. It simultaneously obfuscates data reliability errors from users, such as the "241 vs. 248" discrepancy (see technical reliability bug in Finding 4.3), which was only discoverable through such manual validation. Data focal points expressed minor but indicative usability failures, such as uncommunicated changes to Excel template drop-down lists (e.g., "*errors because of a space*") which force them to hunt for the problem manually. The review also observed slowness challenges impacting the dashboard systems' usability, which the C&E team acknowledges and attributes to "*data transformations … required to accommodate the change management processes*".

3.3 Reliability and Coherence: Multiple Truths and Metric Instability

This finding addresses EQ2 (Coherence of results), EQ3 (Compliance with Frameworks), EQ8 (Data controls), and EQ9 (Reliability).

Beyond process and value proposition, the C&E data ecosystem faces challenges where specific datasets are structurally misaligned or exhibit metric instability.

Structural contradiction ("multiple truths"): The system suffers from known structural data discrepancies, creating "multiple truths" that require reconciliation, undermining user trust and transparency.

The Workforce definition breach: A discrepancy exists between the internal and public-facing dashboards. The Public Dashboard reports 8,790 total staff, while the Internal Dashboard used for C&E's analysis shows 10,528. A technical lead reported this 1,738-person gap as resulting from the exclusion of "Workforce Group 13" (Temporary Staff). This is not an error, but a documented design choice. A technical presentation to the review team explaining underlying "*number swaps*" shows the Alliance's "*INTERNAL Dashboard*" with 1,726 staff and its "*external dashboard*" with 1,544 staff, noting that the external dashboards "e*xcludes workforce group 13: Temporary Professional Contractors*". This is reinforced by the data collection guide, which instructs focal points that separations data for temporary personnel "need not be reported". This technical instruction contradicts the foundational GDI-Framework and all three subsequent Action Plans, which all define the "workforce" to include "*holders of short-term contracts, holders of job-contracts… and third-party contractors.*"

Staff affiliation to science groups: A second contradiction emerges when comparing HR-centric headcount data with programmatic assignment data. The C&E Public Dashboard reports staff affiliation based on their primary HR-assigned Group, e.g., Genetic Innovation (GI). This HR-based headcount is systematically different from the Science Initiatives People Dashboard, which counts individuals based on programmatic assignments —a discrepancy described by a technical lead as "a challenge to reconcile. Quantitatively (Table 1), a difference of 1,437 individuals (Public dashboard) or 2,648 people (Internal dashboard) would remain unaccounted for in the programmatic dashboard to a user without the benefit of understanding the dashboards' different data sources and processes.

Table 1. Multiple truths on staff affiliation to science groups

	Science Initiatives People Dashboard (Programmatic)			C&E Public	C&E Internal
Science Group	**Assignments**	**Individuals**	**FTE**	**Headcount**	**Headcount**
Genetic Innovation (GI)	1,435	1,315	851	2,105	2,554
Resilient Agrifood Systems (RAFS)	1,780	1,434	709	1,612	2,138
Systems Transformation (ST)	1,093	852	369	1,321	1,557
Total	4,308	3,601	1,929	5,038	6,249
Difference to reconcile against the total in the programmatic people dashboard				1,437	2,648

The C&E team attributes the differences to scope, explaining that the C&E dashboards include *"ALL research-related staff,"* such as those working on non-portfolio bilateral projects who are excluded from the initiative-focused dashboard. While the distinct scopes of the dashboards are valid, the lack of cross-referencing creates "multiple truths". These contradictions can be resolved not by restructuring the data, but by adding explanatory footnotes and visual cues to clarify the specific scope of each dashboard to the user.

*Technical reliability bugs***.** The dashboard contained reliability errors. This review identified a discrepancy between the aggregate totals displayed and the sum of the center figures when hovering over the dashboard's bar charts. For example, the aggregate count for "Senior - Research Management" (248) did not match the sum of the center-level data (241). The technical team acknowledged and fixed the discrepancy, attributing it to a "bug… [excluding] 'home-based' staff".

2. Metric instability ("incoherent Results"): Systemic instability in organizational definitions undermines longitudinal analysis of GDI results. Constant organizational restructuring means key cohorts, like "Executive Leadership," are not comparable year-on-year. For example, the C&E team reported this group reached

39% female representation but warned the figure would drop to 21% post-restructuring. This 18-point change reflects an external organizational shift, not a failure of GDI policy. This instability is confirmed in a presentation to the System Council, which shows the definition and total number for the "Executive Leadership" cohort changing in 2020, 2021, 2023, 2024, and 2025. Such instability, which is beyond the C&E team's control, makes an accurate, coherent comparison of results challenging. At the same time, the data that potentially solves this problem is already being collected. The C&E team's data collection template and raw data schema already capture both the unstable "CGIAR Workforce Group" (Metric 1) and the stable "BG Level Equivalent" (Metric 2). The C&E team's internal dashboard already visualizes this stable "CG Level" data, and the GDI Data Collection FAQs confirm that they use the "BG/CG level" to standardize the 15+ different Centre grading systems. This indicates that a stable, coherent "dual metric" analysis is a practical, low-cost solution.

Moreover, a stakeholder noted inconsistencies in reporting to the Systems Council, with metrics such as women in senior leadership "*omitted from year-to-year reports*", making it challenging to "*track change over time*" and assess performance reliably.

3.4 A Broken Accountability Architecture

This finding addresses EQ7 (Governance and accountability structures) and EQ2 (Coherence and evolution of the Action Plans). This theme consolidates findings on the tools and structures of accountability, revealing notable systemic breaks.

The "Broken Chain" of Accountability Tools: The GDI Matrix, the primary accountability tool for 2020-2024, according to the first two action plans, notably failed. KIIs confirm it was collected only once (2020), was "*too complicated*" and "*burdensome*", and was eventually "*asked to [be} bring… down from the web*". This failure is significant given that the tool was "*co-developed*" with the HR community in 2020. At one Centre, the one person trained on it left and "*no one… followed up on this*" —indicative of a broken, non-institutionalized process.

The consultation deficit (New C&E Index): This review finds that the GDI Matrix failure is at risk of being repeated. The 2025-25 action plan envisages that the C&E progress will be co-developed with stakeholders. The C&E team lists 6 centers consulted as of November 2025, ie CIP, IWMI, ICRISAT, WorldFish, IRRI and the System Organization. The review still observes a delay and a "consultation deficit" for the new C&E Progress Index. KIIs conducted in late October 2025 with P&C Leads and Data Focal points across Alliance, ICARDA, and ILRI, all stated they had "*No," "No, I didn't,*" or "I *haven't seen anything*" consultation on the new tool. This shows that the new accountability tool is at least four months behind its new schedule, setting aside that replacement of the GDI matrix has remained overdue. Systems technical leads also indicated they were unaware of the upcoming C&E progress index, meaning they were yet to be incorporated into index's co-development. The need for a center-level accountability tool was further expressed by a funding stakeholder who expected details in system council reporting on "*which centers are participating*" in the action plan and where "*stronger attention needs to go*" .

The C&E team's written responses explain that the new Index is a pivot intended to fix the old Matrix's flaws, specifically by having it "*filled out by the C&E team… there will be little to no reporting burden for Centers.*" While this addresses the "*burdensome*" complaint, the observed consultation deficit with the P&C community (the end users) and systems technical leads represents a stakeholder engagement challenge. It risks the new tool's perceived legitimacy and adoption.

Table 2. The Broken Chain of Centre-level Accountability Tools (EQ2)

Period	Accountability Tool	Status / Finding
2020-2022	GDI Matrix	Failed & discontinued.
2023-2024	Accountability Gap	Measurement black hole. No tool for Centre-level tool accountability was in place.
2025+	C&E Progress Index	At risk. With "consultation deficit", and backward compatibility not documented.

Balancing Context: It is critical to note that the C&E Index consultation process failure does not reflect the team's overall reputation. A senior P&C lead described the team as "really professional" and "very collaborative." Another P&C Lead stated that the team is "really respectful" and "adept at managing the 'complicated balance'" by learning from Centers rather than imposing on them.

3.5 A Structurally Fragmented Ecosystem

This finding addresses EQ5 (Integration with performance reporting) and EQ12 (Integrated assurance systems).

The data ecosystem is not only characterized by manual interventions and untimeliness; it is structurally fragmented. The governance failure (Finding 4.6) has created an environment in which multiple, parallel, and unreconciled "people data" systems have emerged, leading to "multiple truths" (Finding 4.3). This review documents five distinct silos:

Silo 1: The C&E workforce system (Tableau and Power BI): The primary HR headcount system, visualized in Tableau (internal) and Power BI (public) - its own two "sub-silos". It is fed by the manual data collection process (Finding 4.1) and produces the contradictory public (8,790 staff) and internal (10,528 staff) "truths" (Finding 4.3).

Silo 2: The engagement survey system (WorkBuzz): This is the primary system for perceptual data on culture and engagement. This data is collected and held by a confidential third-party vendor, "WorkBuzz," and its non-confidential aggregate-level data is not integrated with the workforce data

Silo 3: The C&E accountability system (Index): This is the new accountability tool. It is intended to be a separate, qualitative system, with data sourced from "Activity Reporting by Centers during 1:1 sync meetings" and "C&E Function & Eng Survey - Internally assessed". It is not integrated with the other data streams.

Silo 4: The Research Initiatives People Dashboard (Power BI): This is a parallel, unreconciled silo that also holds "people data" but is not connected to the C&E/HR workforce system. This system, which runs on Microsoft Power BI, uses entirely different metrics (e.g., "Individuals" (3,088), "Assignments" (4,308), and "FTE" (1,929) and is used for research portfolio management. The C&E team confirms this is a "different exercise" with "different data sources" from the HR-centric dashboard. While a legacy of the 2022-2024 Initiatives, it reflects residual institutional demand to integrate C&E data with programmatic results. Furthermore, the existence of this silo is driven by a clear institutional demand for integration (EQ5), as articulated in the current C&E Action Plan (AP-25), which aims to achieve "*Staff composition analytics on the Science Portfolio and Accelerators to build balanced leadership to positively impact people, performance, and management*".

Silo 5: Local Center-Level Frameworks and Systems: Finally, KIIs reveal that fragmentation also exists at the Center level. Multiple Centers maintain their own mature, local GDI frameworks, data systems, and dashboards that run in parallel to the central C&E system. When central frameworks are released,

these Centers 'align' them and 'borrow aspects' rather than adopting them wholesale, as their local systems are more trusted, timely, and operationally sound. For example, one P&C Lead noted their local system reports GDI data to its own board twice a year and to management monthly, exceeding the C&E system's annual cadence.

Furthermore, a technical lead felt that there should be no C&E data link to the performance and results management system (PRMS). They explained this is a deliberate structural choice, not a technical failure. Accountability for GDI/P&C is at the Center (hiring entity) level, whereas PRMS tracks Program (Initiative) level KPIs; integrating them would push accountability to the "wrong entry point", according to the technical lead. This operational hesitation (also shared by another key informant) stands in contrast to the CGIAR 360 strategy to integrate people data with programmatic results through "*A common data environment … to anchor analytics and AI for CGIAR*". The current C&E action plan links its success to leveraging the PDB for GDI monitoring for research & innovation delivery. Moreover, the C&E team states that, "*there is an argument to be made to investigate the possible impact of the composition of teams… on results*". As such, there is a fundamental strategic deadlock (EQ5) that only governance can resolve. This impasse also fuels the value proposition gap (Finding 4.2), as a missed linkage between C&E data and programmatic performance data limits the decision usefulness of the former.

3.6 The Central Governance Failure: A Stalled People Database

This finding addresses EQ7 (Governance structures), EQ10 (Roles and responsibilities), and EQ11 (Oversight and management responsibilities).

This is the overarching finding of the observed failures of the C&E data ecosystem—its manual processes (4.1), value proposition (4.2), contradictions (4.3), and fragmentation (4.5). The failures are symptoms of the stalled People Database (PDB) - the root cause, and a single point of failure for the entire C&E data strategy.

Systems specialists familiar with the database project were unanimous in their view that the PDB was the correct and only solution. The PDB was described as the "*dream*" and "*fundamentally transformative*", the key to solving the timeliness problem and providing a *"live picture*" of the workforce. The C&E team's formal response confirms this, stating, "*The solution to moving towards more current and relevant data is automation… the real-time People Database.*" The semi-automated workarounds (Finding 4.1) are therefore a direct, brittle consequence of this governance stall. Moreover, technical leads confirmed that the PDB's technical proof of concept was successfully completed, with nearly half of the Centers participating. The issue is not technical; it is a systemic governance, leadership, and resource challenge.

The People Database blockage:

No Policy (Legal/Policy Vacuum): The first barrier is the absence of a "*clear mandate specific to people data.*" The March 2024 Privacy Notice explicitly admits: "*Currently, the One CGIAR operational structure does not have in place a system-wide policy governing data sharing… between CGIAR legal entities.*" This vacuum was a known, escalated risk. A presentation to the Senior Leadership Team (Feb 2024) listed *"Finalize Data sharing policy"* as a key "Ask." The failure to ratify this policy leaves Centers exposed to undefined liability, causing them to default to non-participation. The C&E team proposes the solution: a mandate mirroring the "*Financial Framework Agreement*" (Clause 11), to legally override these liability concerns.

No Sponsorship (Structural Vacuum): Second, the project lost its business champion, leaving no "*champion that is empowered*" to drive it through governance. A technical lead stressed that institutionalizing the PDB requires solving issues of "*adoption, strategic approval, and organizational commitment*". The project is stalled due to a lack of buy-in. The C&E team confirms this, stating "*Only 7 out of 13 Centers shared data*," and the "missing element", is having a clear mandate from the GLT or System Council. KIIs also indicated that the GDI workstream's leadership lacks the authority to compel data sharing, and had to rely on "*soft power*" and

"*influence*". This is a known corporate risk, with the CGIAR 360 presentation listing "*Finalize Data sharing policy*" as a key "*Ask*" to senior leadership

The "Unfunded Burden" (Resource Failure): A third barrier is the lack of allocated resources. A Technical Lead indicated that non-participating Centers explicitly communicated they lacked the internal "data engineers" to build the required APIs and viewed the integration as an "unfunded burden" they refused to absorb. This is corroborated by the CGIAR 360 Digital Strategy, which identifies "Lack of Skills" and "Competing priorities/lack of capacity" as top implementation risks. This confirms that non-participation was not purely political; it included failure to resource the mandate, assuming Centers could simply "push" data when many lacked the budget and technical infrastructure to do so

Architectural aggravator: Furthermore, the technical architecture chosen for the PDB may have contributed to the stall. The PDB was designed with a copy-focused architecture, where a "snapshot or copy of the data" is moved from Centre systems to a central database. This design directly triggers the "liability" and "buy-in" fears among Centres. The centralized "copy" approach appears counterintuitive to the official, federated "Data Mesh" and "Data as a Service" (DaaS) architecture outlined in the corporate CGIAR 360 Digital Strategy, which, in theory, would leave data at the source.

A core strategic failure: The PDB blockage poses an immediate critical risk. The 2025-2027 Action Plan relies on this stalled database to achieve its analytical objectives in Outcome 3. It includes an activity to *"Gain an understanding of cross-Center and System Organization movement, tenure, and separation by leveraging the CGIAR 360 People Database."* A senior leader stated that the PDB is the "*foundational piece*" for all future P&C strategy, including talent management and succession planning. Because this database is non-functional, the C&E team is trapped in an unscalable, manually intermediated process (Finding 4.1). The C&E progress index under development also proposes an indicator: "Center agrees to share data via CGIAR 360 People Database to enable accurate and streamlined reporting and analysis." As a technical lead stated, this reliance on the PDB is "unrealistic" until the governance deadlock is broken. The failure to advance the PDB is, therefore, a systemic governance failure that compromises the C&E work stream's strategic mandate.

4 Conclusions

The C&E function has demonstrated significant resilience and success, building a functional—albeit human-mediated—system from a low baseline (circa 2020) in a fragmented data landscape. The team has successfully created a "common data language" (e.g., the BG-Level mappings), captured critical positive metrics (like the 47% female promotion rate), and provides a high-value, consolidated "official source" of data that some P&C leaders rely on for their own governance reporting. The C&E team is seen as "*really professional*" and "*very collaborative*" by key informants. A key product of the C&E data ecosystem is the 2024 Workforce Engagement Survey, a perception-based instrument that found that 85% of respondents recommended CGIAR as a good place to work.

However, this pragmatic, "human-mediated" system faces operational limits. It falls short of being fit for purpose as a modern, timely, or scalable management tool. The review finds four bottlenecks undermining the quality of the data coming from the C&E function's data ecosystem, namely process, data reliability, value proposition, and governance:

- **Process bottlenecks:** The system's foundational data-collection process is a "human-mediated" hybrid, reliant on brittle manual reconciliations (Finding 4.1). This process is the direct cause of its "not fit for purpose" annual timeliness cadence, which is inadequate in an organization with a 10.4% annual turnover rate (Finding 4.2).
- **Data bottlenecks:** The data is subject to integrity concerns. It is contradictory in some instances, as evidenced by the "Multiple Truths" (a 1,738-staff gap) stemming from a breach of the GDI Framework's own definitions (Finding 4.3). It exhibits instability, with incoherent longitudinal metrics (like the "Executive Leadership" cohort) that impede accurate analysis of progress (Finding 4.3).

- **Adoption & Accountability bottlenecks:** The system's usability is undermined by a core 'value proposition failure' that leads users with trusted local systems to see it as an irrelevant 'reporting-up' burden (Finding 4.2). This core value gap is aggravated by its untimeliness and functional barriers (Finding 4.2). Concurrently, the center-level accountability architecture suffers from a 'tooling deficit': the GDI Matrix failed, and its replacement (the C&E Progress Index) faces adoption risks with the lagging, phased consultation (Finding 4.4).
- **Governance bottlenecks:** The root cause of all these issues is a systemic governance failure. This failure has led to the emergence of a fragmented ecosystem of at least four "people data" silos (Finding 4.5). The entire system is now strategically blocked by the stalled People Database, which is not a technical problem but an institutional and policy one: the documented absence of a system-wide data-sharing and privacy policy (Finding 4.6). The AP-25 is now at critical risk, as its own success metrics (Outcome 3) are dependent on this stalled database.

The People Database blockage places the C&E 2025-27 Action Plan at critical strategic risk, as it depends on the stalled database. The recommended actions focus on resolving the data integrity and usability gaps (tactical) while addressing the central governance failure (strategic).

5 Recommended Actions

The recommended actions are categorized according to the target actor with the authority to implement them.

5.1 C&E-Level Actions

These are tactical and strategic actions the C&E team can implement to address the findings.

5.1.1 Implement a stable dual-metric system to solve the metric instability (addressing 4.3):

The C&E team should consider reporting key metrics (e.g., leadership representation) using two definitions in parallel: 1) The "unstable organizational definition" (e.g., "Executive Leadership"), and 2) The "stable, grade-based cohort" (e.g., "All staff at BG-11 and above").

Rationale: Corporate documents and confirm that the organizational cohorts are unstable. This is a practical, low-cost solution. The C&E team already collects both metrics and already uses the stable "BG Level Equivalent" as the key to harmonize data.

5.1.2 Pilot a bi-annual data collection cadence with a small group of willing Centers. (addressing 4.2)

Rationale: The C&E team confirms that the 5-month approval cycle is more often the timeliness bottleneck than the center's data submission capacity. A pilot with willing centers would address the timeliness failure, a key driver of low user adoption. This is a pragmatic interim step to test and validate the value proposition of a higher data aggregation frequency while the automated solution (the PDB) remains stalled.

5.1.3 Expedite, broaden and formalize the consultation for the new C&E Index (addressing 4.3)

Rationale: The "co-development" goal is yet to be actualized. The consultation needs to be expedited as key stakeholders (P&C Leads, Data Focal Points, and Technical leads) indicated they were not aware of the C&E index, nor did they anticipate its co-development activities as of late October 2025. This consultation is essential for user buy-in. The C&E team should expedite and broaden this consultation with formal communication to ensure the tool is co-developed and adopted, avoiding the failures of the GDI Matrix.

5.1.4 *Implement a user engagement & value demonstration plan to demonstrate the value of the dashboards back to Centre managers, data focal points, and other CGIAR users, focusing on their specific operational needs. (addressing 4.2)*

Rationale: This recommended action addresses the "Value Proposition Failure" (Finding 4.2). The C&E team confirms "*System-wide views are not necessarily of interest to Centers.*" Key informant sentiment proves this ("*I have my own data. Why should I go to the dashboard?*"), and the critically low usage of the internal dashboard for P&C professionals (just 53 sessions). The C&E team should proactively demonstrate how the CGIAR-wide data system solves specific, local problems for users (e.g., providing consolidated data for Centre board reporting, as it does for the Alliance).

5.2 Governance-Level Actions

These address systemic failures that the C&E team lacks the authority to address. They need to be elevated to senior corporate governance and other system-wide functions (e.g., Global Leadership Team, Legal, and D&D).

5.2.1 *Elevate the P&C/C&E dependency on the People Database from an operational issue to a corporate-level strategic risk requiring prioritized governance action. (Addressing 4.6)*

Suggested actions include: ratifying a system-wide data-sharing and privacy policy and appointing a business champion, while addressing the center's incentives and capacity to participate in the people database project.

Rationale: This addresses the root cause of the C&E ecosystem's operational challenges (Findings 4.1 and 4.2). The PDB is stalled not for technical reasons, but for a "l*ack of buy-in*" stemming from a documented governance and policy vacuum.

5.2.2 *Mandate C&E and P&C leadership to resolve structural data contradictions by either aligning the public dashboard with the GDI Framework or formally revising the "workforce" definition to justify exclusions. (addressing 4.3)*

Suggested actions would include: (a) align the public dashboard with the GDI Framework by including the 1,738 temporary staff, or (b) formally revise the definition of "workforce" in the foundational GDI Framework and action plans to justify the exclusion.

Rationale: The system's credibility is undermined by the "Multiple Truths" (Finding 4.3). The C&E team confirms that the 1,738-person gap between the public and internal dashboards is a "strategic Rationale" for excluding temporary staff. This is a direct breach of the foundational "workforce" definition, which is defined in all three Action Plans [AP-20, AP-23, AP-25] to include "*holders of short-term contracts... and third-party contractors.*" Governance should either align the dashboard with the Action Plans or formally revise the definition.

5.2.3 *Corporate governance and D&D should lead a mandated review to de-conflict and integrate the multiple parallel "people data" systems. (addressing 4.5)*

Rationale: Governance gaps (Finding 4.6) have allowed the ecosystem to "splinter," creating at least five "people data" silos (Finding 4.5). This has led to duplication of effort: C&E runs an HR-centric dashboard, a programmatic team runs a parallel "Initiatives" dashboard, and mature Centers run their own, more timely local systems. This fragmentation leads to "multiple truths" [Finding 4.3], which can be resolved through a formal, governance-led review.

5.2.4 *Elevate the C&E team's "common data language" from an informal prototype to a formally mandated, resourced corporate standard for semantic interoperability across all P&C data. (addressing 4.6)*

Rationale: The C&E team's "common data language" (e.g., "BG Level Equivalent") is a critical, proven asset. It is the reconciling template that patches the systemic lack of a "common job architecture". The March 2024 privacy notice confirms that the PDB project adopted this language as its foundational prototype. This proven asset should be formalized and resourced as the corporate standard for all P&C data to ensure the future PDB (and any interim system) is semantically interoperable.

5.2.5 *Corporate governance and D&D should lead a formal review to resolve the strategic disagreement on integrating C&E (HR) accountability data with programmatic performance (PRMS) data. (addressing EQ5)*

Rationale: The C&E team is caught in a strategic deadlock (Finding 4.5) that it does not have the authority to resolve. The C&E Action Plan and the CGIAR 360 strategy suggest linking C&E accountability and programmatic performance data. The C&E team acknowledges a need to "*investigate the possible impact of the composition of teams … on results*." This linkage between program performance and HR data is contested, with technical and programmatic leaders arguing it would be the "wrong entry point," as programs have "no influence" over "institutional" (Centre-level) hiring decisions. This is a governance disagreement (not a technical one) that should be elevated to senior leadership.

5.2.6 *Towards formally resolving the tension between data usability and confidentiality, the Global P&C Group, D&D, and Legal should define a secure data access mechanism for vetted users.*

A governance review is required to ratify a formal policy defining "Secure aggregate data" to eliminate PII risk and to develop a functional CSV/JSON export for anonymized data. **(addressing 4.2)**.

Rationale: This will empower users to validate data and detect hidden reliability bugs (such as the hover error), thereby preventing the current policy from hiding technical failures and forcing error-prone manual transcription. The C&E team's 'no data download' policy is a valid response to PII risks. However, this review's evidence (the "hover error" and the "error-prone manual transcription" proves that the current data protection policy introduces an alternative risk: it hides reliability failures and prevents essential quality assurance. Governance should find a balanced solution (e.g., a secure, aggregated, anonymized data export for vetted users).

Annex 1. List of Documents Reviewed

C&E Foundational & Strategic Documents

1. Framework for Gender, Diversity and Inclusion in CGIAR's Workplaces (Feb 2020)
2. Action Plan for GDI in CGIAR's Workplaces (2020-2021)
3. Action Plan for GDI in CGIAR's Workplaces (2023-2024)
4. Action Plan for Advancing Culture and Engagement (2025-2027)
5. Terms of Reference: Review of Culture and Engagement in CGIAR (Aug 2025)
6. GDI Kick-off Workshop Report (March 2020)
7. GDI Matrix Factsheet (August 2020)

Evaluations and Synthesis

8. Evaluation of Gender in CGIAR Research - Volume I (April 2017)
9. Evaluation of Gender in CGIAR at the Workplace - Volume II (April 2017)
10. Gender, Youth, Inclusion and Diversity Evidence Compendium (Sept 2022)

11. CGIAR GENDER Platform: Evaluation Report (July 2023)

Reports to System Council

9. GDI Two-Year Progress Report (Nov 2022)
10. Update on GDI in CGIAR's workplaces (Oct 2023)
11. Update on GDI in CGIAR's workplaces (June 2024)
12. Data-driven Insights from the GDI Function (Nov 2024)
13. Culture & Engagement Presentation and Infographic (May 2025)
14. GDI Impact Infographic 2024 (Annex 1 to SC22-12)

CGIAR360 & People Database (PDB) Documents

15. Privacy Notice - Compilation of CGIAR Personnel data (March 2024)
16. CGIAR People Database Concept Note (April 2024)
17. People Database Data Management Plan and Architecture (June 2024)
18. Update on the CGIAR 360 implementation (Feb 2024)
19. CGIAR360 Data Architecture Summary (March 2024)
20. CGIAR360 Digital Strategy & roadmap (Dec 2023)
21. CGIAR360 - DR02 - DaaS and Gov (Dec 2023)

Technical Guides & C&E Team Communications

GDI Workforce Data Collection Guide (Jan 2024)
GDI Data Collection FAQs (Dec 2024)
GDI number swaps explained (Dec 2024)
GDI Platform - User Guide (Dec 2024)
Cycle 1 - data and systems-related written Q&A with the C&E team (Oct 2025)
Cycle 2 - data and systems-related written Q&A with the C&E team (Nov 2025)
Draft GDI Progress Index Framework (Feb 2025)

Engagement Survey Documents

2024 results GDI - CGIAR Workforce Engagement Survey
2025 - Engagement Survey Questions (Complete)
2025 - Extract of GDI-Culture questions from Engagement Survey

Dashboards and data dumps

32. GDI Workforce public - dump (Dec 2024)
33. Overall Workforce (Internal Dashboard, Dec 2024)
34. Overall CLC - Promotions (2024)
35. Overall CLC - Separations (2024)
36. Overall - science initiatives people (Power BI Dashboard)
37. Overall Leadership - science initiatives people (Power BI Dashboard)
38. Google Analytics Report (10 Oct 2024 - 8 Oct 2025)

Independent Advisory and Evaluation Service
Alliance of Bioversity International and CIAT
Via di San Domenico, 1 00153 Rome, Italy
IAES@cgiar.org
https://iaes.cgiar.org/