

Policy coherence for water security in the Karamoja–Turkana Complex between Uganda and Kenya

Aligning institutions, incentives, and investments for a changing drylands region

Key messages

Water security in the KTC, along the upper Kenya–Uganda border (Fig. 1), is undermined not by hydrology alone but by incoherence across policies, institutions, and incentive systems — produced and sustained by power asymmetries and elite interests, not merely a structural problem (Nicol et al., 2025; Nicol, 2024). Sectoral priorities operate in silos; central and district mandates contradict one another; catchment planning downplays mobility and political economy; and formal governance fails to incorporate local authority and indigenous knowledge.

This brief identifies six Ugandan policy instruments whose mutual misalignment drives incoherence in the KTC: the National **Water for Production** investment policy; the **conditional-grant architecture** governing district water-sector financing; the **Mining Act 2022** and concession-licensing system; the **Land Act 1998** and its lack of a Karamoja-specific provision; the **Catchment Management Organization (CMO) frameworks** for the Lokok, Lokere, and Awoja catchments; and the **2019 Uganda–Kenya Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)** on reciprocal grazing.

Tracks 1 and 2 set out specific revisions to each, with named lead actors and timelines.

Incoherence is sustained by political economies in which water scarcity generates rents: tanker operators in Lodwar earn an estimated USD 4–7 million annually from artificial scarcity (REACH, 2021), politically connected drilling contractors capture county tender processes, and downstream irrigation schemes enclose former dry-season grazing reserves under elite ownership. This disrupts the social contract underpinning pastoral economies: when rivers dry, livestock losses trigger asset erosion and distress migration, straining kinship networks and destabilizing the customary mechanisms that have long mediated cross-border resource access.

Resilience requires greater coherence — aligning water, land, mobility, extractives, and decentralization policy; synchronizing district and catchment plans; embedding mobility and diplomacy into official systems; financing governance before infrastructure; and centring women and youth from the start — so water becomes a catalyst for stability rather than dispute in one of East Africa’s most complex dryland regions (Nicol et al., 2025; Thuo, 2025).

Acronyms and abbreviations

- ASAL: Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
- CEWARN: Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (IGAD)
- CMO: Catchment Management Organization
- CSO: Civil Society Organization
- EIA: Environmental Impact Assessment
- FY: fiscal year
- ICPAC: IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre
- ICPALD: IGAD Centre for Pastoral Areas and Livestock Development
- IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development
- KIDP: Karamoja Integrated Development Plan
- KTC: Karamoja–Turkana Complex
- MEMD: Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (Uganda)
- MLHUD: Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (Uganda)
- MoFPED: Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Uganda)
- MoLG: Ministry of Local Government (Uganda)
- MoU: Memorandum of Understanding
- MWE: Ministry of Water and Environment (Uganda)
- NEMA: National Environment Management Authority (Uganda)
- O&M: operation and maintenance
- OPM: Office of the Prime Minister (Uganda)
- ULGA: Uganda Local Governments Association
- UPDF: Uganda People's Defence Force
- WRA: Water Resources Authority (Kenya)
- WUC: Water User Committee

Introduction

The drylands of Karamoja in Uganda and neighboring Turkana in Kenya are being reshaped by climatic volatility, rapid population growth, accelerating mineral extraction, a widening cash economy, and major proposed infrastructure (Thuo, 2025; Nicol, 2024).

Water scarcity here operates as a cascade. Failed wells and dried springs trigger livestock losses, forcing distress sales that erode household capacity and compelling migration outside customary calendars, straining kinship-based reciprocity and weakening the traditional councils that once mediated cross-border access. By the time conflict erupts at a contested borehole, the social infrastructure for resolving it has already collapsed (Schilling et al., 2012; Opiyo et al., 2016). Policy that intervenes only at the conflict node — security deployments, peace dialogues — misses the upstream water-governance failure that started the cascade. This brief uses **policy coherence** as its analytical lens, distinguishing, after OECD (2019), three dimensions often conflated in policy debate but operating through different mechanisms:

- **Vertical coherence** — alignment between government levels, particularly between mandates and the resources needed to deliver them.
- **Horizontal coherence** — alignment across sectors (water, land, mining, agriculture, livestock, security, environment) and spatial units, so one sector's priorities do not undermine another's.
- **Social coherence** — alignment between formal institutions and the customary, gendered, and generational systems through which resources are actually accessed; the gap between systems designed on paper and systems lived in practice.

The KTC suffers acutely from all three, in mutually reinforcing ways.

The institutional and policy environment governing water and land remains a patchwork: fragmented, layered, and increasingly misaligned with the wider political economy (Le Sève, 2018; Nicol et al., 2025). Security in this scarce environment demands more than new boreholes or larger dams; it requires realigning policies, institutions, and incentives across sectors, government levels, borders, and social systems (Nicol et al., 2025; Nicol, 2024), without which new investment risks deepening the vulnerabilities it aims to reduce, or triggering new insecurity.

The brief is structured around **two advocacy tracks**: **Track 1**, Uganda-domestic revisions the government can advance unilaterally — to Water for Production policy, conditional-grant architecture, mining EIA process, the Land Act, and CMO frameworks — forming the primary asks; and **Track 2**, bilateral instruments requiring joint Uganda–Kenya action with IGAD facilitation, principally renewal of the 2019 MoU and joint monitoring and arbitration mechanisms. Turkana evidence is used both comparatively and, to ground Track 2, substantively; each recommendation is tagged accordingly.

Changing climate patterns compound these problems, concentrating people and livestock around remaining perennial sources and intensifying stress in low-rainfall years, against a governance landscape where responsibilities are unclear, incentives misaligned and institutions mismatched to dryland socio-ecology (Catley et al., 2021; Nicol et al., 2025) — as Longoromit Dam in Kaabong District illustrates. Climate finance, while theoretically expanding, remains practically inaccessible: between 2018 and 2022 Turkana County secured KES 47 million of roughly KES 2.1 billion available nationally¹ — 2.2%, despite hosting 8% of Kenya's ASAL population (Atela et al., 2020), with application processes and review criteria that systematically favor fixed-asset urban projects over mobile-population programming. Climate finance reform, not access, is the binding constraint.

1. Approximate exchange rate: USD 1 = KES 130 (July 2026). The KES 47 million and KES 2.1 billion figures are approximately USD 361,000 and USD 16 million, respectively.




Figure 1. Map of Uganda–Kenya border (Source: Wikimedia Commons).

Box 1. A note on method

The Longoromit case study (Figs 2 & 3) draws on IWMI field research in Kaabong District, 2023–late 2025, comprising site observations, interviews with officials and Water User Committee (WUC) members, and focus groups with women, elders, and youth, triangulated against earlier IWMI fieldwork in the Lokok, Lokere, and Awoja catchments (Nicol, 2024). All informants gave informed verbal consent and are anonymized.

The political economy of incoherence

Policy incoherence in the KTC unfolds across four interlocking dimensions — sectoral and spatial (both horizontal), vertical, and social — each undermining resilience and sustained by a political economy in which fragmentation distributes benefits to specific actors, not merely a coordination failure.

Sectoral and spatial incoherence (horizontal)

Sectoral incoherence is most visible. Uganda's National Water for Production policy privileges large infrastructure — dams meant to reduce mobility, support irrigation and underpin sedentarization (Nicol et al., 2025) — while district authorities struggle daily to keep small systems running: repairing hand pumps, sourcing spare parts, mediating disputes between domestic and livestock users (Le Sève, 2018; Nicol, 2024). Mining concessions under the 2022 Act, covering nearly a quarter of Karamoja, add pressure, since mining needs reliable water for washing and sorting minerals while communities fear contamination, competition, and rising dry-season costs (Nicol, 2024); water allocation policy has not kept pace, producing inconsistent incentives despite existing CMOs (Nicol et al., 2025).

Spatial incoherence undermines planning. Water governance is organized around catchments managed by the Lokok, Lokere, and Awoja CMOs (Nicol, 2024), yet hydrology alone does not define how water is accessed or contested (Nicol et al., 2025): pastoral mobility crosses catchments and borders, wildlife follows ecological gradients, mining overlays grazing areas, and patronage runs along district lines — realities that define a **problemshed**, a socio-political geography of water risk distinct from hydrological boundaries. Planning that ignores it addresses the wrong issues at the wrong scale (Nicol et al., 2025).

Vertical incoherence

Uganda's decentralized system mandates districts to manage water and sanitation, but finance tells a different story: over 90% of district water-sector funding flows through the conditional-grant system, earmarked and centrally controlled (Le Sève, 2018). Districts plan five-

year strategies but largely lack discretionary resources to deliver them, leaving them responsible for infrastructure they did not design and accountable without means to meet expectations (Le Sève, 2018; Nicol, 2024; Nicol et al., 2025). The disjuncture is acute for larger dams: formally owned by central government, socially “owned” by communities, yet left in management no-man's-land. At Longoromit, where neither monitoring nor maintenance occurred despite existing gauges, vertical incoherence turned a district asset into a community liability, compounded by inadequate data collection (Nicol, 2024; Nicol et al., 2025).

Social incoherence: gender, generations, and customary institutions

Formal institutions — WUCs, CMOs, district technical offices — operate alongside customary systems long regulating mobility and sharing (Catley et al., 2021; Feyissa, 2020), yet these are rarely acknowledged in formal planning (Nicol et al., 2025): systems designed on paper diverge from systems lived in practice, and traditional water governance is the binding framework, not a cultural supplement. Turkana *ekisil* rotation rules at communal wells (cattle morning, small stock midday, human collection evening) have sustained extraction within hydrological limits across at least five documented mega-droughts, yet none of 89 externally designed water projects surveyed in Turkana West incorporated them into operations and maintenance; 73% failed within three years (Mwangi & Ochieng, 2019; Haagsma & Moussa, 1993).

Three illustrations sharpen the point. First, *etamam* — the negotiated practice through which Turkana and Karimojong communities arrange temporary drought-time access to grazing and water — remains the operative system for cross-border access in much of the KTC (Feyissa, 2020; Stites et al., 2016). Field interviews in Kaabong and Moroto indicate most dry-season movements are still mediated through elder-led *etamam* negotiations, yet the practice appears nowhere in district plans, catchment plans or the 2019 MoU; where the state engages, it is through security deployments and disarmament campaigns that disrupt elder-led negotiation cycles.

Second, the gendered division of water labor sits sharply at odds with the gender composition of formal governance. Women and girls undertake most household

water collection — journeys of three to seven kilometers common in the dry season, far longer where boreholes fail — and report risks of gender-based violence en route, yet WUCs at Longoromit and most surveyed boreholes remain male-dominated, women typically treasurers rather than chairs: siting, repair, and fee decisions fall to those least exposed to the costs of failure (Catley et al., 2021; Nicol et al., 2025).

Third, generational incoherence is intensifying, as younger Karimojong and Turkana operate within cash economies shaped by mining and mobile money (Thujo, 2025), negotiating access in ways elder-led channels were not

designed to mediate. Where neither customary nor formal institutions represent youth, disputes drift toward the security apparatus by default, visible at Longoromit and in the Karenga–Kaabong corridor. Together these dynamics show why an incremental “include communities” approach is insufficient: coherence requires recognizing customary mobility institutions, gendered water labor and youth’s shifting authority as constitutive of water governance, not context around which to manage it.



Figure 2. 2018 Kaabong District project sign at Longoromit Dam, Kaabong, Uganda (Photo: Alan Nicol/IWMI).



Figure 3. Longoromit Dam, Kaabong, Uganda, in July 2024 (Photo: Alan Nicol/IWMI).

Incoherence across the border: what Turkana reveals about systemic failure

Evidence from Turkana County, across a border partly defined colonially along the Nile Basin watershed, reinforces and deepens Karamoja's coherence failures (Thuo, 2025; Stites et al., 2016). The border embeds centuries of reciprocal grazing: Turkana herders access Karamoja's highland pastures during extreme drought, while Karimojong communities reciprocally use Turkana's riverine resources in Uganda's dry seasons (Stites et al., 2016; Catley et al., 2021). Water insecurity on the Kenyan side is driven not by absolute scarcity but by misaligned governance and development models clashing with pastoral realities (Catley et al., 2021; Thuo, 2025). Karamoja and Turkana form a single socio-ecological problemshed, yet are governed as administratively separate, siloed territories (Nicol et al., 2025). Cross-border cooperation also faces institutional asymmetry: Turkana County, under Kenya's devolved system, holds direct mandate over water services and county climate funds, while Karamoja districts, under

Uganda's more centralized framework, must channel most decisions through Kampala. A Karamoja Cluster Water Compact must therefore engage at two levels — county-to-district and Nairobi-to-Kampala — or risk agreements Karamoja signatories lack authority to implement.

Turkana evidence draws principally on Thuo (2025), triangulated against related literature (Catley et al., 2021; Stites et al., 2016; Feyissa, 2020). Pastoral mobility remains the backbone of resilience: an estimated 150,000 Turkana herders regularly cross the border in response to rainfall variability, while Kaabong and Moroto sometimes host tens of thousands of cattle and Turkana in dry seasons (Thuo, 2025). These movements are frequently structured and negotiated rather than chaotic, yet policy on both sides continues treating mobility as something to control rather than govern (Nicol et al., 2025). The absence of a Karamoja-specific provision in the Land Act 1998 leaves a significant gap, since Karamoja's transhumant context requires a tailored approach to land ownership and use.

Catchment-based planning, though technically sound, fails to account for these lived patterns (Thuo, 2025;

Nicol et al., 2025). Despite decades of spending on boreholes, dams, and irrigation, water insecurity in Turkana remains stubbornly high, affecting over half of households year-round (Thuo, 2025). Schemes such as Turkwel have collapsed not from technical failure alone but because benefit-sharing was unclear and community engagement superficial (Thuo, 2025) — as in Karamoja, infrastructure has outpaced the institutions to manage it, and government has been unwilling or unable to respond to local feedback (Nicol, 2024; Nicol et al., 2025).

Elite capture, securitization, and the politics of water

Turkana and Karamoja evidence sharpens the political-economy analysis. Securitization around water infrastructure — including at Longoromit — undermines community authority and weakens accountability (Nicol et al., 2025; Thuo, 2025). Traditional dispute-resolution is formally recognized under Kenya's 2010 Constitution, yet poorly integrated into operational water governance, leaving customary institutions visible but powerless.

Development narratives privilege hardware over governance and negotiated access, even as artisanal mining, oil exploration and monetized livelihoods place new, unregulated demands on water (Thuo, 2025; Nicol, 2024), while governance frameworks remain locked in older rural service-delivery models. Elite capture compounds these pressures: Turkana analyses (Thuo, 2025) document how county-level politics, procurement, and patronage divert water investment from the most vulnerable, and similar dynamics appear in Karamoja, where decentralization has shifted authority without redistributing power, transparency or fiscal discretion — a power imbalance future programming on both sides should address.

How incoherence produces failure.

Incoherence's consequences manifest across Karamoja's water infrastructure. At Arachek Dam, extraction for road construction became entangled in local political competition, with irregular permitting and informal payments shaping outcomes — echoed recently at Longoromit²; at Kobebe Dam, conflicting expectations among herders, domestic users and wildlife authorities have intermittently sparked violence during drought (Nicol, 2024).

At Longoromit, the reservoir's near-failure to fill despite adequate rainfall reflected institutional as much as hydrological factors: no entity routinely monitored inflows, assessed leakage or enforced valve by-laws,

and communities disagreed on the causes of decline (Nicol, 2024; Nicol et al., 2025) — infrastructure built without coherent governance, maintained without clarity on rules, used without consensus on rights and responsibilities.

Smaller systems fail similarly: boreholes buckle under dry-season stress as livestock arrive after valley tanks dry out; herders move between hand pumps, leaving broken systems behind because repair responsibility is undefined; and WUCs struggle to collect contributions where water is seen as free (Le Sève, 2018; Nicol, 2024; Nicol et al., 2025). Climate change amplifies these pressures: across the KTC, infrastructure built in the name of resilience becomes a site of contestation and decay, breakdown occurring not at construction but at the interface between use, authority, and accountability — at Arachek, Kobebe, Longoromit and, in Kenya, Turkwel. Turkana shows parallel evidence: schemes abandoned as water levels drop, boreholes inoperable for lack of maintenance, water points captured by powerful actors during drought (Thuo, 2025) — a cycle of investment, governance vacuum and renewed vulnerability (Nicol et al., 2025; Thuo, 2025). Longoromit itself is more granular. Built in 2012 as a flagship “water for production” investment for livestock, domestic use, irrigation and, briefly, fisheries (Nicol, 2024), it once served communities on both sides of the border. Today it holds far less water than original capacity; governance faltered not chiefly from scarcity but an institutional vacuum of misaligned mandates and almost non-existent financing (Nicol, 2024; Nicol et al., 2025). Formally owned by MWE, it is used by pastoralists, road contractors, wildlife, and the UPDF, and is meant to be managed by a WUC — yet none of these actors has both the mandate and the means to govern it.

Towards greater coherence: specific policy asks

Policy coherence is a means, not an end: built on the wrong paradigm — sedentarization through irrigation, say — it can entrench the vulnerabilities it aims to address. This brief calls for coherence around climate-resilient water systems that sustain mobility and communal governance, rather than infrastructure-led sedentarization.

This section sets out revisions to the six Ugandan instruments identified in the key messages (Track 1) and the bilateral framework with Kenya (Track 2), each naming a lead institution, supporting actors and a timeline, for direct use in advocacy under the Third KIDP (2021/22–2025/26) architecture led by OPM.

2. Field report, Kaabong District, November 2025; Lucky Sarafina Nakiru.

Track 1 — Uganda-domestic policy revisions

Policy instrument	Specific ask	Lead and supporting decision-makers	Coherence dimension	Timeline
National Water for Production policy and investment criteria	Revise WfP investment criteria to require a formal Governance Readiness Assessment (mandate, O&M plan, monitoring, participation) before any new dam above a size threshold.	Lead: MWE (Water Resources Mgmt). Support: MoFPED; World Bank/AfDB/EU as financiers.	Vertical & horizontal	Short term (0–12 months); ongoing application
Conditional-grant architecture for the district water sector	Restructure the District Water and Sanitation Conditional Grant to include a ring-fenced minimum discretionary O&M floor (suggested at 20%) that districts can deploy locally, with simplified reporting.	Lead: MoFPED (Budget) and MoLG. Support: ULGA; Parliament's Committee on Local Government.	Vertical	Medium term (FY cycle); legislative anchoring 1–3 years
Mining Act 2022 and concession-licensing system	Require joint MEMD–MWE water-use and mobility assessments as a binding EIA component for new mining concessions, with district and CMO sign-off.	Lead: MEMD (Geological Survey and Mines) with MWE. Support: NEMA; district environment offices.	Horizontal (sectoral)	Short term (interim guideline); medium term (legislative amendment)
Land Act 1998 — absence of Karamoja-specific provision	Introduce a Karamoja-specific land governance instrument recognizing communal tenure and transhumance, protecting grazing reserves from commodification, and integrating customary institutions into formal land administration.	Lead: MLHUD (Land Administration). Support: Uganda Land Commission; civil society (LANDnet, KDF).	Horizontal (sectoral) & social	Medium to long term (1–5 years)
CMO frameworks for Lokok, Lokere, and Awoja	Mandate that Catchment Management Plans incorporate mobility corridors, mining overlays, and a problemshed annex, with annual joint planning forums and quotas for women, youth, and pastoralists on CMO sub-committees.	Lead: MWE (Water Resources Mgmt). Support: the nine Karamoja districts; Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development.	Horizontal (spatial) & social	Short term (planning forums); medium term (CMP revisions)
WUC governance and gender/youth representation	Issue a binding MWE directive setting quotas for women (≥40%), youth, and pastoralist representation on WUCs, resourced via district facilitation budgets; publish annual compliance data.	Lead: MWE with Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. Support: District Water Offices; CSOs.	Social	Short term (0–12 months)

Track 2 — Bilateral Uganda–Kenya policy revisions

Track 2 asks address the cross-border architecture no single government can revise unilaterally, for joint action by Uganda and Kenya with IGAD facilitation. Each maps to a lesson in Box 2.

Instrument or mechanism	Specific ask (mapped to Box 2 lesson)	Lead and supporting decision-makers	Timeline
2019 Uganda–Kenya MoU on reciprocal grazing	Review and renew the MoU with binding annexes: (i) a joint seasonal water-availability protocol; (ii) formal recognition of etamam-style elder negotiations; (iii) designated mobility corridors; and (iv) a joint dispute-arbitration mechanism with traditional councils [Lessons 1, 4 & 5].	Lead: Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Uganda/Kenya), with MWE/WRA. Support: IGAD/CEWARN; Karamoja district peace committees.	Short to medium term (renewal: 0–18 months; annexes 1–3 years)
KTC Policy Coherence Platform	Establish a standing KTC Policy Coherence Platform, convening district/county leaders, elder fora, women’s and youth reps, and technical agencies annually; mandate that investment decisions reference its outputs [Lesson 2].	Co-lead: MWE (Uganda) and Council of Governors (Kenya). Support: IGAD; IWMI; donors.	Medium term (1–2 years to establish; ongoing)
KTC Water and Mobility Outlook	Produce a twice-yearly Water and Mobility Outlook synthesizing climate, hydrological, and mobility data to inform low-regret pre-drought decisions [Lesson 5].	Lead: national meteorological authorities (Uganda, Kenya); ICPAC. Support: WRA, MWE, CMOs.	Short to medium term (pilot 0–12 months; institutionalize 1–3 years)
KTC Water Compact	Negotiate a binding KTC Water Compact (Uganda, Kenya, Turkana County) with shared monitoring for cross-border dams and arbitration through traditional councils [Lessons 3 & 4].	Lead: foreign-affairs ministries (UG/KE) with IGAD. Support: traditional councils; MWE, WRA.	Long term (3–7 years)
Cross-border digital and community-based monitoring	Deploy a shared digital and community-based monitoring system covering dam levels, borehole performance, grazing pressure, and water-quality indicators, with open data access to CMOs [Lesson 3 — transparency].	Lead: MWE/WRA. Support: WUCs, mobile-network partners.	Short to medium term

Box 2. Cross-border lessons mapped to specific asks

Lesson 1. Mobility is governance-critical, not residual. Sedentarizing pastoralists through infrastructure has repeatedly failed. *Ask: MoU annex on mobility and etamam recognition (row 1).*

Lesson 2. Catchments are necessary, but insufficient. Hydrological planning that ignores political economy misfires. *Ask: KTC Policy Coherence Platform (row 2); CMP revision (Track 1, row 5).*

Lesson 3. Elite capture is a systemic risk. Devolved systems can reproduce exclusion without transparency. *Ask: conditional-grant O&M floor (Track 1, row 2); digital monitoring (row 5).*

Lesson 4. Security actors shape water outcomes. Securitization undermines community governance. *Ask: KTC Water Compact (row 4); MoU arbitration (row 1).*

Lesson 5. Agreements fail without institutional anchoring. Resource-sharing stays fragile without mandates and joint monitoring. *Ask: MoU annexes and Water and Mobility Outlook (rows 1 and 3).*

Underlying principles

Four principles should guide implementation: finance governance before infrastructure, with no large water asset commissioned without a costed O&M plan; treat mobility as structural to dryland resilience; recognize customary institutions — elder-led negotiation, women’s water authority, youth participation — as constitutive of water governance, not peripheral to it; and match cross-border problems with cross-border instruments carrying binding annexes.

Unlocking opportunity through coherence

The KTC also offers a chance to pioneer new approaches to water governance. The KTC Policy Coherence Platform proposed would be the region's first dedicated mechanism for aligning water, land, mobility, and development policy, bringing together Ugandan district leaders, Turkana County authorities, elders' fora, women's and youth representatives, and technical agencies (Nicol, 2024), integrating climate outlooks and political-economy analysis to reduce duplication and support harmonized investment.

The Water and Mobility Outlook would equip districts and ministries to make low-regret decisions under uncertainty; the KTC Water Compact would underpin reciprocal access agreements with binding protocols and traditional-council arbitration; and digital and community-based monitoring would fill persistent data gaps on dam levels, borehole performance and water quality. Paired with clearer governance rules, these instruments could turn infrastructure provision into a more resilient anchor for development.

Conclusion

Karamoja and Turkana's water problems cannot be solved by engineering alone: they are governance problems, rooted in incoherence across policies, institutions, and social systems — vertical, horizontal, and social. The region's vulnerability is institutional as much as ecological, and so are its opportunities for transformation.

This brief has translated that diagnosis into named policy asks: revisions to Uganda's Water for Production investment criteria; restructuring of the conditional-grant architecture; binding inter-ministerial assessments under the Mining Act; a Karamoja-specific provision under the Land Act; revisions to the CMO frameworks; and renewal of the 2019 Uganda–Kenya MoU with operational annexes. Each names a lead institution and timeline; the brief functions as both analysis and engagement document. As the costs of incoherence rise, deliberate action and sustained collaboration across the Uganda–Kenya border can make the KTC a model for integrated, climate-resilient transboundary drylands governance.

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Audience and intended use

Primary audience: Government of Uganda decision-makers over water, land, mining, decentralization, and Karamoja development — the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE), the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM, lead coordinator under the Karamoja Integrated Development Plan, KIDP), the Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development (MLHUD), the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development (MEMD), the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG), the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED), and Parliament's Committee on Natural Resources. Secondary audience: Turkana County Government, the Government of Kenya (notably the Water Resources Authority (WRA) and the State Department for Northern Kenya), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and development partners financing water and resilience programs in the Karamoja–Turkana Complex (KTC). Intended use: to support named policy revisions in Uganda (Track 1) and a parallel cross-border track (Track 2); the asks are directly actionable by the addressees named in each row. A full list of acronyms and abbreviations follows below.

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