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Understanding the Framework for Intergovernmental Interactions in the Implementation of Nigeria's Agricultural Transformation Agenda

Prof. Aderibigbe S. Olomola

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACMTC	Agricultural Commodity Market and Trade Corporation
ACVCD	Agricultural Commodity Value Chain Development
ADP	Agricultural Development Project (state-level agricultural extension programs)
AETA	Agricultural Extension Transformation Agenda
AFAN	All Farmers Association of Nigeria
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
ATA	Agricultural Transformation Agenda
ATIC	Agricultural Transformation Implementation Council
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
FDAE	Federal Department of Agricultural Extension
FGD	Focus group discussion
FMARD	Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
GES	Growth Enhancement Support scheme
HLS	Helpline staff (for the GES scheme)
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFDC	International Fertilizer Development Center
LGA	Local Government Area
MANR	Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (state-level)
MARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (state-level)
MOA	Ministry of Agriculture (state-level)
NIRSAL	Nigerian Incentive-based Risk Sharing for Agricultural Lending scheme
OGSAIDA	Ogun State Agro-input Dealers Association
POS	point of sales (payment system used for some GES transactions)
RC	Redemption center
SCM	Supply chain manager
SCPZ	Staple Crop Processing Zone
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

ABSTRACT

This study focuses on intergovernmental interactions in Nigeria's Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA). ATA may not be able to achieve its desired objectives unless the intergovernmental and inter-agency interactions are well understood, coordinated, and integrated into the design and implementation of the various ATA programs, especially those that are still being developed. Unfortunately, the interactions among the three tiers of government in Nigeria is still not recognized by policy makers as a major issue in refining the design of the transformation process and reinforcing it. No tier of government acting alone in making decisions that affect all three tiers of government can create an environment that will be sufficiently enabling to ensure that farmers and other beneficiaries of ATA initiatives receive the maximum benefits obtainable. If the buy-in of a particular level of government is not properly and meaningfully secured, implementation of programs can be fraught with delays and avoidable costs. These may jeopardize the sustainability of ATA. This study seeks to:

1. Examine the various institutional reforms and initiatives under ATA,
2. Analyze the intergovernmental relationships in the design and implementation of ATA,
3. Assess ATA implementation performance and challenges at the federal and state levels, and
4. Proffer suggestions for improved intergovernmental collaboration and sustainability of the agricultural transformation agenda in Nigeria.

The study employed secondary data obtained from the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD) and four study states, Kebbi, Niger, Ogun, and Ebonyi, and primary data obtained from in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with government officials at federal, state and local government levels. Conceptually, this study is guided by the theory of collaborative governance.

The study finds that intergovernmental relationships in the design and implementation of ATA are manifest more in terms of cooperation rather than in terms of collaboration. The level of cooperation depends largely on the extent to which the population in the state depends on agriculture for their livelihoods, the calculation of political benefits of participation, and the fiscal capacity of the states involved. The intensity of intergovernmental interaction varies from one state to another on account of differing levels of understanding of roles in ATA implementation and deep-seated misgivings about the non-collective nature of the decisions leading to the assignment of stakeholders' roles. Nonetheless, with the extent of cooperation achieved, it has been possible to implement key components of ATA successfully due to a history of cooperation between the federal and state governments, effective leadership and coordination, institutional reforms, and the creditable roles of a technical facilitator and supply chain managers. The level of success achieved notwithstanding, there are a number of challenges to the sustainable implementation of ATA programs, including weak collaborative processes, which often result in delays in service delivery. To remedy the situation, there should be more effective and meaningful use of existing institutional arrangements for collective decision making where cross-tier partnerships are required. There is need to intensify the regulatory role of government to ensure improved quality of inputs. It is also important to depoliticize and de-bureaucratize the roll-out of ATA programs to avoid delays and to achieve better results.

Keywords: Collaborative governance, agricultural transformation, input subsidy, intergovernmental interactions

I. INTRODUCTION

The Transformation Agenda in Nigeria is a strategic framework developed by the administration of President Jonathan for the economic development of Nigeria. The agenda touches all critical areas of development and all sectors of the economy. The Agricultural Transformation Agenda (ATA) derives from the broad strategic Transformation Agenda framework, which itself is inspired by Nigeria's Vision 20: 2020 (NV20: 2020). NV20: 2020 seeks to place the country among the top 20 economies in the world with a minimum GDP of \$900 billion and a per capita income of no less than \$4000 per annum by the year 2020. Its intention for the agricultural sector is to transform agriculture into a sustainable profitable sector with an emphasis on increasing agricultural productivity and production for direct consumption and processing for the local market and exports. The specific objectives of the agricultural sector as envisioned in ATA blueprint document are to:

- Secure food and feed for the needs of the nation,
- Enhance generation of national and social wealth through greater exports and import substitution,
- Enhance capacity for value addition,
- Efficiently exploit and utilize available agricultural resources, and
- Enhance the development and dissemination of appropriate and efficient technologies.

These are to be achieved by focusing attention on five priority areas:

1. Commercial agriculture development aimed at developing major crops, livestock, and fisheries along their entire value chains,
2. Construction, completion, and rehabilitation of silos and warehousing for agricultural commodities,
3. Research and development, including equipping existing institutes for research in agricultural biotechnology,
4. Completion and rehabilitation of existing irrigation schemes and dams, and
5. Restructuring of agricultural commodity marketing companies as enunciated in the first implementation plan of 2010-2013.

The principles and views of the NV20: 2020 as well as the objectives and priorities of its first implementation plan were harmonized and embedded in ATA blueprint document. This was articulated in 2011 to coincide with the 2011-2015 tenure of President Jonathan. Under ATA, the country is witnessing a plethora of policy changes and initiatives, especially in the areas of deregulation of seed and fertilizer markets, marketing reforms, innovative mechanisms for agricultural financing, import substitution, and a framework for agricultural investment.

The appropriateness of ATA programmes and initiatives are incontrovertible. The success achieved so far during the short period of implementation has also been applauded by government and various other stakeholders. Of the aforementioned programs, however, the Growth Enhancement Support (GES) scheme and the development of value chains stand out in the extent to which implementation has been achieved and successes recorded. Nonetheless, experience shows that there is considerable room for improvement in refinement of strategies and elimination of bottlenecks. These stand in the way of the agricultural sector responding in tandem with the good intentions, efforts, and resources that are being mobilized in the transformation process. The GES scheme has been found to have made a positive contribution in bringing sanity to agricultural input markets, reducing corruption, and ensuring that inputs are delivered directly to intended beneficiaries. Since 2012, the GES scheme has made significant strides. However, some of its teething problems are not fully eliminated.

In spite of its relevance, some of the achievements under the GES scheme during its first year of implementation in 2012 are below expectations. For example, a recent assessment shows that an average turnout rate of 32 percent and an inputs redemption rate of 67 percent of farmers were recorded. Redemption implies that 67 percent of farmers who turned out at a redemption center were able to successfully redeem their fertilizers using the e-wallet system. A breakdown of the turnout rate across the geo-political zones shows below-average performance in a majority of the zones. With the exception of the North West zone, where the rate is above national average (50 percent); rates ranged from 21 percent in North East, 18 percent in North Central, six percent in South South, to only three percent in South East and South West. According to Adesina (2013), the low turnout rate reflects the current low adoption of inorganic fertilizer and improved seeds by small-holder farmers in Nigeria. The phenomenon could also be due to the limited resources farmers possess to purchase fertilizer or to a distrust of the government procurement system of the past where poor quality fertilizer and seeds were distributed.

The less than 100 percent redemption also reflects problems with the depth of the mobile networks used for the e-wallet system, the reliability of these networks at the time of inputs redemption by farmers, difficulties for some farmers with the e-wallet system, and an inadequate supply of inputs at redemption centers.

The challenges currently being faced by the GES scheme can be regarded as not unexpected in a reform program of its ambitious design and extensive coverage. It is the belief of government that once the challenges facing the implementation of the scheme are addressed, its contributions will exceed what has been achieved so far. Despite this optimism, ATA may not be able to generate impact in the medium to long term that will enable agriculture to perform close to its potential unless the inter-governmental and inter-agency interactions necessary for the implementation of the GES and for ATA as a whole are well understood, coordinated, and integrated into their design and implementation. This is the focus of this study.

ATA involves reforms in critical areas of the agricultural sector which touch on the livelihood of farmers and which involve multiple agencies and layers of government. In spite of successes being recorded, the transformation process requires reinforcement and refinement which will enable the impacts to have greater significance, be more widespread, and be more sustainable.

This study focuses on a critical aspect of the process – that of inter-governmental interactions – whose effects are often underestimated in seeking solutions to emerging challenges. Inadequate attention to the nature of the interactions among the three tiers of government in Nigeria is still not recognized by policy makers as a major issue. Yet, no tier of government acting alone in making decisions that affect all three tiers of government can create an environment that will be sufficiently enabling to ensure that farmers and other beneficiaries of the initiatives maximize their intended benefits. Moreover, not all programs under ATA have reached the same level of implementation as the GES scheme. Thus, some of the challenges facing the GES scheme can be avoided for other newer programs based on the findings of this study. Moreover, the measures currently in place to remedy the identified challenges in program implementation may ultimately be powerless in yielding significant improvements unless there is a parallel improvement in the governance of the process that reflects cooperation among the multiple layers of government involved.

What is more, the sustainability of ATA programs, including the GES, depends to a large extent on the political, financial, and administrative commitments of various tiers of governments. If the buy-in of a particular level of government is not properly and meaningfully secured in the design and implementation of a program component, any success will only be achieved (if at all) with considerable delays and costs; and this may ultimately jeopardize the sustainability of ATA. Therefore, the goal of this study is to examine the intergovernmental interactions under ATA within the context of Nigeria's multi-layered political structure. The specific objectives are four-fold.

1. Examine the various institutional reforms and initiatives under ATA,
2. Analyze the intergovernmental relationships in the design and implementation of ATA reforms and initiatives,
3. Assess ATA implementation performance and challenges at federal and state levels, and
4. Proffer suggestions for improved intergovernmental collaboration and sustainability of ATA in Nigeria.

I.2 Theoretical Framework

Agricultural transformation is the process by which individual farms shift from highly diversified, subsistence-oriented production towards more specialized production oriented towards the market. The process involves a greater reliance on input and output delivery systems and increased integration of agriculture with other sectors of the domestic and international economies. Agricultural transformation is a necessary part of the broader process of economic structural transformation in which an increased proportion of the output and employment in an economy are generated by sectors other than agriculture. Notably, the process shifts resources from the production of food and agricultural products to the production of secondary and tertiary products from agro-industries. These industries include agricultural input production and services, agricultural product processing, and the marketing of these products. It is in this sense that effective transformation of the agricultural sector can provide the scaffold upon which the industrialization of the economy can be configured. Essentially, the transformation of the sector should not only promote the industrial orientation of agriculture, but also serve as the basis for the industrialization of the economy as a whole. While a transformation agenda can be spearheaded by government, it takes the participation of various stakeholders for the inherent policies, programmes, and projects involved to be effectively implemented and the desired objective of agricultural transformation achieved.

As conceptualized by the Federal government, ATA is an expression of the various policies and strategies that have to be implemented to modernize the Nigerian agricultural sector and make it more business-oriented, investment-friendly, employment-generating, and wealth creating. Invariably, both public and private sector agencies and other non-state actors, including individual farmers, need to be accommodated within a framework of actors in order to make ATA a success. Within the public sector, all tiers of government – federal, state and local – have to be actively involved, since each tier has a constitutionally mandated responsibility for agricultural development. With varying styles and motivations of governance at each level of government, in the agricultural transformation process, a framework of collaboration among the levels of government must be deliberately engendered and cooperation forged between them and all non-state actors. This underscores the relevance of collaborative governance in the articulation of a framework for intergovernmental and inter-agency interactions under ATA.

THE THEORY OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

Collaborative governance is defined as a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets (Ansell and Gash, 2007). This definition stresses six important criteria:

1. Initiation of the arrangement by public agencies or institutions,
2. Participation of non-state actors,
3. Participants engage directly in decision making and are not merely “consulted” by public agencies,
4. The process is formally organized and participants meet collectively,
5. There is a forum which aims to make decisions by consensus (even if consensus may not be achieved in practice), and
6. The focus of collaboration is on public policy or public management.

One critical component of the term collaborative governance is “governance.” Conceptually, governance has increasingly been used in the public and voluntary sectors to refer to the oversight of executive power – it sets expectations for executive agents, sets parameters, grants decision rights and conditional authority, and monitors performance against targets. Governance is constituted by processes designed to meet a number of objectives and which are usually organized into a range of structural arrangements (Olomola et al., 2012). However, ‘governance’ in the modern sense tends to be associated with a system constituted by devolved bodies assuming a ‘bottom up’ range of responsibilities, while subject to ‘top down’ regulations, scrutiny, and oversight – a network in place of a single central controlling agent, but one that is accountable to its members (Storey et al, 2008).

According to Stoker (2004), however, governance also refers to the rules and forms that guide collective decision-making. An important component of this definition is that governance is not about one individual making a decision. Rather, governance concerns groups of individuals, organizations, or systems of organizations making decisions. Thus, Ansell and Gash (2007) point out that collaborative governance is a type of governance in which public and private actors work collectively in distinctive ways, using particular processes, to establish laws and rules for the provision of public goods. Their basic definition of collaborative governance also sets standards for the type of participation of non-state stakeholders. They posit that collaborative governance is never merely consultative; but implies two-way communication and influence between agencies and stakeholders and between stakeholders. Thus, consultative techniques, such as stakeholder surveys or focus groups, although possibly very useful for management purposes, are not collaborative in the sense implied here, because they do not permit two-way flows of communication or multilateral deliberation.

Collaborative governance focuses on public policies and issues. The focus on public issues distinguishes collaborative governance from other forms of consensus decision making, such as alternative dispute resolution or transformative mediation. In particular, collaborative governance should be distinguished from two alternative patterns of policy making, namely adversarialism and managerialism (Busenberg 1999; Futrell 2003; Williams and Matheny 1995).

In contrast to decisions made adversarially, collaborative governance is not a “winner-take-all” form of interest intermediation. In collaborative governance, stakeholders will often have an adversarial relationship to one another, but the goal is to

transform adversarial relationships into more cooperative ones. Whereas adversarial politics reveals that groups may engage in positive-sum bargaining and develop cooperative alliances, such cooperation is ad hoc, since adversarial politics does not explicitly seek to transform conflict into cooperation (Ansell and Gash, 2007).

With regard to managerialism, managerial public agencies make decisions unilaterally or through closed decision processes, typically relying on agency experts to make decisions (Futrell 2003; Williams and Matheny 1995). An important distinction between decisions made by managerial agencies and collaborative governance is that, whereas the former may take account of stakeholder perspectives in their decision making and may even go so far as to consult directly with stakeholders, collaborative governance requires that stakeholders be directly included in the decision-making process.

A MODEL OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE

With the above definition and a wide review of literature and meta-analytical study, Ansell and Gash have contributed to the development of a theory of collaborative governance. Their contingency propositions highlight conditions under which collaborative governance will be more or less effective as an approach to policy making and public management. These propositions are relevant to this study and will be subjected to empirical verification. Some of the propositions that will be adapted are highlighted in Table 1.1. Their model of collaborative governance consists of four broad variables—starting conditions, institutional design, leadership, and collaborative process. Each of these broad variables can be disaggregated into more fine-grained variables. Collaborative process variables are treated as the core of the model, with starting conditions, institutional design, and leadership variables represented as either critical contributions to or the context for the collaborative process. Starting conditions set the basic level of trust, conflict, and social capital that become resources or liabilities during collaboration. Institutional design sets the basic ground rules under which collaboration takes place, while leadership provides essential mediation and facilitation for the collaborative process. The collaborative process itself is considered to be highly iterative and nonlinear.

Table 1.1—Contingency theory of collaborative governance

Broad Variables	Propositions
Starting Conditions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Power & Resource Imbalances • Incentives to Participate • Prehistory of Antagonism or Cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If there are significant power or resource imbalances between stakeholders such that important stakeholders cannot participate in a meaningful way, then effective collaborative governance requires a commitment to a positive strategy of empowerment and representation of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders. • If alternative venues exist where stakeholders can pursue their goals unilaterally, then collaborative governance will only work if stakeholders perceive themselves to be highly interdependent. • If there is a prehistory of antagonism among stakeholders, then collaborative governance is unlikely to succeed unless (a) there is a high degree of interdependence among the stakeholders, or (b) positive steps are taken to remediate the low levels of trust and social capital among the stakeholders.
Facilitative Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Where conflict is high and trust is low, but power distribution is relatively equal and stakeholders have an incentive to participate, then collaborative governance can successfully proceed by relying on the services of an honest broker that the respective stakeholders accept and trust. Such an honest broker will also be able to develop trust during the collaborative process by remaining above the fray and by maintaining procedural integrity and transparency in the collaborative process. • Where power distribution is skewed or incentives to participate are weak or asymmetric, then collaborative governance is more likely to succeed if there is a strong “organic” leader who commands the respect and trust of the various stakeholders at the outset of the process. Organic leaders are leaders who emerge from within the community of stakeholders. The availability of such leaders is likely to be highly contingent upon local circumstances. An implication of this contingency is that effective collaboration may be seriously constrained by a lack of leadership.
Collaborative Process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If the prehistory is highly antagonistic, then policy makers or stakeholders should budget time for effective remedial trust building. If they cannot justify the necessary time and cost, then they should not embark on a collaborative strategy. • Even when collaborative governance is mandated, achieving buy-in is still an essential aspect of the collaborative process. • Collaborative governance strategies are particularly suited for situations that require ongoing cooperation.
Intermediate Outcome	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • If prior antagonism is high and a long-term commitment to trust building is necessary, then intermediate outcomes that produce small wins are particularly crucial. If under these circumstances stakeholders or policy makers cannot anticipate these small wins, then they probably should not embark on a collaborative path.

Source: Adapted from Ansell and Gash (2007)

I.3 Methodology

STUDY AREAS

The study focused on the federal, state and local government levels. The Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (FMARD) was the core entry point at the federal level, while states for the study were selected from four of the six geo-political zones. All six zones could not be covered due to resource constraints. On account of their prominence in terms of participation in ATA, the extent of commodity coverage in ATA value chains being developed, and research feasibility, the North West, North Central, South West, and South East geo-political zones were covered in the study. And on the basis of one or more of these criteria, the states studied were Kebbi, Niger, Ogun, and Ebonyi, respectively. Based on consultations with state government officials and using similar criteria, two local government areas (LGAs) were studied in each of the selected states (Table 1.2).

Table 1.2—Coverage of study at sub-national level

Zone	State	Local Government Areas
North West	Kebbi	Birnin-Kebbi; Jega
North Central	Niger	Agaie; Paiko
South West	Ogun	Odeda; Yewa North
South East	Ebonyi	Izzi; Ohaukwu

Source: Author's compilation

TYPES AND SOURCES OF DATA

Both secondary and primary data were used in the study. The former include published documents on the design, implementation, and achievements of ATA, as well as relevant grey literature and other bibliographical materials collected from FMARD and online. Primary data were collected through in-depth interviews (IDIs) of key informants associated with ATA at the three levels of government (Table 1.3). At the state and local government levels, focus group discussions (FGDs) involving relevant officials were also conducted. Both the IDIs and FGDs were conducted by the author. The nature of information obtained from the in-depth interviews and FGDs are highlighted in Table 1.4.

Table 1.3—Category of government officials interviewed

North West Zone Kebbi state	North Central Zone Niger state	South West Zone Ogun state	South East Zone Ebonyi state
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commissioner of Agriculture Permanent Secretary, MANR Director, FMARD State Office Director, Planning, Research and Statistics Department and 5 others (in FGD) Supply Chain Manager, Jetlink State GES Coordinator Programme Manager, Kebbi ADP State Project Officer, IFAD Director, Agriculture Department, Birnin-Kebbi LGA Director, Agriculture Department, Jega LGA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commissioner of Agriculture Permanent Secretary, MARD Director, FMARD State Office Director, Planning, Research and Statistics Department Supply Chain Manager, IFDC State GES Coordinator FMARD Zonal Director Director, Agriculture Department, Agaie LGA Director, Agriculture Department, Paikoro LGA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commissioner of Agriculture Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture Assistant Director, FMARD State Office Director, Planning, Research and Statistics Department and 5 others (in FGD) Supply Chain Manager, Ecalpemos State GES Coordinator Director, Agriculture Department, Odeda LGA Director, Agriculture Department, Yewa North LGA 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Permanent Secretary, MANR Director, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, Ebonyi ADP Director, FMARD State Office Deputy Director, FMARD State Office Supply Chain Manager, Jetlink State GES Coordinator and Programme Manager, Ebonyi ADP Director, Agriculture Department, Ohaukwu LGA Director, Agriculture Department, Izzi LGA

Source: Author's compilation

Table 1.4—Description of types of information required by level of government


Data Sources	Nature of Information Required
Federal government (FMARD)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) What strategies have been adopted and achievements recorded in respect of the following activities under ATA: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Facilitating and catalyzing the procurement and distribution of fertilizer, including identifying the suppliers. (ii) Regulating quality and quantity of inputs. (iii) Facilitating and stimulating local production of fertilizer. (iv) Ensuring adequate budget allocation. (v) Ensuring that national food security objectives are realized. (vi) Providing technical support regarding quantity and types of fertilizer suitable to various agro-ecological zones. b) Nature and scope of interactions with state governments. c) Nature and scope of interactions with local governments. d) Nature of conflicts and resolution mechanisms. e) Constraints on performance under ATA.
State governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) What strategies have been adopted and achievements recorded in respect of the following activities under ATA: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) Providing counterpart funding. (ii) Providing extension services. (iii) Providing support to Supply Chain Managers. (iv) Making fertilizer storage facilities available at LGA level. b) Nature and scope of interactions with federal government. c) Nature and scope of interactions with local governments. d) Nature of conflicts and resolution mechanisms. e) Contributions to the progress of ATA. f) Constraints on state performance under ATA.
Local Government Authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) Specific roles under ATA. b) Interactions with state under ATA. c) Interactions with federal government under ATA. d) Contributions to the progress of ATA. e) Constraints on local government performance under ATA.

Source: Author's compilation

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The framework adopted for this study is derived from the concept of collaborative governance propounded by Ansell and Gash, as highlighted earlier. The authors propose a model consisting of four broad variables – starting conditions, institutional design, collaborative process, and facilitative leadership. The format of the model is illustrated in Figure 1.1. All are quite relevant to understanding intergovernmental interactions under ATA. Each of these variables constitutes a prism through which collaborative governance can be examined in order to construct a framework for effective inter-governmental and inter-agency interactions for a robust programme design and successful implementation. The model will be modified as we move from the broad array of variables to more specific variables and issues that are consistent with the multi-layered governance structure in Nigeria, multi-party democracy, and constitutional definition of roles of each tier of government in agricultural development.

Figure 1.1—Analytical framework for collaborative governance



The collaborative process is the core issue to be unraveled. It depends on starting conditions, institutional design, and facilitative leadership all working together to produce the expected outcome. Dimensions of the context in which the analysis is conducted are listed in Table 1.5.

Table 1.5—Analytical context of collaborative governance under ATA

Elements of the Collaborative Process	Context
Starting Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Resource and power imbalances • Technical and executive capacity • Prehistory of cooperation or antagonism • Decision making framework or structures
Institutional Design	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear ground rules • Transparency • Reforms to improve efficiency
Facilitative Leadership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adequate management of the collaborative process • Maintaining technical credibility • Ensuring that the collaborative process is empowered to make credible and convincing decisions that are acceptable to all
Outcome	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Key performance indicators • Targets

Source: Author's compilation

The analysis is conducted qualitatively in line with the specified analytical framework. It is guided by the aforementioned theoretical propositions. These are adapted in executing the study and are subjected to empirical verification in order to achieve the study objectives.

2. INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND POLICY INITIATIVES UNDER THE AGRICULTURAL TRANSFORMATION AGENDA

The agricultural sector in Nigeria has witnessed considerable reforms since 2011 following the launching of the agricultural transformation agenda (ATA). The sector has an extensive array of institutions and policies in view of its multiple sub-sectors – crops, livestock, fishery, and forestry – and network of actors – input suppliers, producers, assemblers, marketers, processors, financiers, and consumers that are expected to witness dramatic changes and benefit under ATA. Moreover, the sector exemplifies the constitutionally-mandated responsibilities that are shared among the three levels of government in Nigeria. It is expected that cross-tier roles and responsibilities will also be affected under ATA, since the three tiers of government constitute important policy domains that often drive the development and implementation of agricultural policies, programmes, and projects. This section examines the reforms under ATA in order to understand the various components, motivations, administrative relevance, and roles of governmental and non-state actors.

2.1 Policy reforms under ATA

ATA covers key areas of agricultural development, such as input distribution, value chain development, product marketing, research, extension, and agricultural financing. Under ATA, agricultural input markets (for seed, fertilizer, agro-chemicals, farm implements and machineries, etc.) have been completely liberalized. Production, procurement and distribution of agricultural inputs have been left in the hands of private sector operators. Fertilizer subsidies has been increased from 25 to 50 percent. To ensure that farmers directly benefit from the subsidy and have unrestricted access to fertilizer, the federal government initiated the Growth Enhancement Support (GES) scheme through which the subsidy is channeled to small-scale farmers across the country.

The major role of government has now shifted to that of quality control and assurance in order to guarantee that products being sold to farmers meet required standards both in terms of quantity and quality. Quality control and regulation occurs at the points of import, production, distribution, and sale, particularly at the GES redemption points. To give legal backing to these processes, two bills on fertilizer quality control and regulation and on the GES scheme are before the National Assembly. The issue of quality control and regulation is to cover organic and inorganic fertilizers, micronutrients, and soil conditioners. The approved National Fertilizer Policy of 2006 now is being reviewed to include organic fertilizers.

The seed industry has witnessed considerable policy action with a view to modernizing it so that it is able to meet the production targets for various crops. Before the launch of ATA in 2011, the multiplication of foundation seed of all publicly-bred crop varieties has been the responsibility of the National Agricultural Seed Council, which organized a network of private outgrowers for this purpose. Under ATA, however, the goal is to promote private sector participation and encourage competitiveness. Thus, foundation seed production has been liberalized with the mandate research institutes allowed to produce and market their foundation seed under a registered seed unit. The private seed companies are also encouraged to produce foundation seed for their own use and to float a foundation seed production and marketing company. In this regard government has organized licensing agreements for genetic access and transfer of publicly-bred materials. These measures have started to yield positive results. For instance, the quantity of foundation seed produced has increased from 511 mt in 2010 to 9,043 mt in 2013, while the quantity of certified seed rose from 6,409 mt in 2010 to 198,274 mt in 2013. In addition, financing of the seed subsector has improved from 1.8 billion Naira in 2012 to 4.2 billion Naira in 2013; quite apart from the increase in employment generation arising from seasonal jobs created in seed production and handling (FMARD, 2014).

The ATA flagship programmes to address weaknesses in agricultural performance and policy deficiencies are GES, the Agricultural Commodity Value Chain Development (ACVCD) scheme, the Staple Crop Processing Zone (SCPZ) program, the Agricultural Commodity Market and Trade Corporations (ACMTC), the Agricultural Extension Transformation Agenda (AETA) and the Nigerian Incentive-based Risk Sharing System for Agricultural Lending (NIRSAL).

GES is a shift from the Fertilizer Market Stabilization Programme. It puts the resource-constrained farmers at the center of policy. The scheme delivers subsidized agricultural inputs to farmers through an electronic wallet. With unique voucher numbers that are delivered to their phones, farmers then redeem their input allocation from accredited agro dealers. It is expected that this scheme will improve agricultural input distribution and marketing. In addition, it should provide incentives to encourage actors along the fertilizer value chain to work together towards the common purpose of improving agricultural productivity, household food security, and incomes. The specific policy objectives of the GES scheme are to:

1. Target 5 million farmers annually for 4 years for the delivery of agricultural inputs on their mobile phones.

2. Provide direct support to farmers to enable them to procure agricultural inputs at affordable prices, at the right time, and at the right place.
3. Increase productivity of farmers across country through increased use of fertilizer—from 13kg/ha to 50kg/ha, and
4. Transform the role of government from direct procurement and distribution of fertilizer to a facilitator of procurement, regulator of fertilizer quality, and catalyst of active private sector participation in the fertilizer value chain.

Under ACVDC, the focus is on key commodities in each of the six geopolitical zones. The target commodities to be developed in the zones are: cotton, onion, tomato, cassava, rice, sorghum, livestock, and fisheries in North East; cotton, onion, tomato, cassava, rice, sorghum, livestock, and fisheries in North West; maize, rice, soybean, livestock, and fisheries in North Central; oil palm, cocoa, rice, cassava, livestock, and fisheries in South West; oil palm, cocoa, cassava, rice, livestock, and fisheries in South East; and oil palm, cocoa, cassava, rice, livestock, and fisheries in South South.

With regard to SCPZ, the main idea is to encourage private sector agribusinesses to set up processing plants in zones of high food production to process agricultural commodities into food products. The zones link clusters of farmers to food manufacturing plants. The locations of the zones depend on the comparative advantage of the zone to produce the identified commodity and state government's support. The role of the government is to put in place appropriate fiscal, investment, and infrastructure policies for the zones and to develop a code for agricultural investment. Such policies include tax breaks on imports of agricultural processing equipment, tax holidays for food processors that are located in these zones, and supportive infrastructure, especially complementary investments by the government in roads, logistics, storage facilities, and power. The Agricultural Investment Code has been developed by FMARD in partnership with the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Trade and Investment, and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN).

As regards AMTDC, government seeks to support the development of these private sector-driven marketing organizations in order to grow the agricultural sector. The elimination of marketing boards during the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme in the 1980s and 1990s without the introduction of alternative institutions has made market access for millions of Nigerian farmers very difficult (Olomola, 2007). To address this challenge, these marketing corporations are to coordinate the production and export of target commodities; attract investment into the sector for research and development, infrastructure, and processing; and stimulate the development of tailored financial services. These private sector-led, but government-enabled marketing institutions are to be owned by agricultural value chain actors and will empower farmers and other actors in the value chain to generate value.

Despite the fact that agricultural extension is central to the dissemination of new knowledge and demonstration of new skills in the sector, FMARD did not have an extension service function until 2012. Compliance with the Constitution limited FMARD's role in the provision of agricultural extension services. Instead, FMARD relied on states' extension service departments known as Agricultural Development Projects (ADP). The services provided by ADPs include establishing demonstration farms; identifying lead farmers; providing lead farmers with information about improved farming practices; facilitating access to improved technology and inputs, such as improved seed varieties, fertilizer, crop chemicals, machinery services; and helping lead farmers to train other farmers. Although concrete performance information is limited, it is apparent that FMARD is not satisfied with this relationship. Thus, FMARD launched AETA in 2011 under ATA. The Head of the Civil Service of the Federation approved an adjustment to the structure of FMARD in late 2012 to create a Federal Department of Agricultural Extension (FDAE).

NIRSAL is a mechanism that seeks to reduce the level of risk in the lending of credit to the agricultural sector. Developed in 2010 by the CBN in collaboration with the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), NIRSAL aims to break the "seeming jinx in Nigeria's agricultural lending and development." Specifically, NIRSAL aims to tackle bottlenecks that affect the financing of agricultural value chains. To do this, it seeks to secure increased processing of agricultural production, and, by so doing, launch an agricultural industrialization process that boosts economic earnings across entire agricultural value chains (Adesina, 2013).

2.2 Institutional reforms

The main institutional reforms under ATA are the restructuring of FMARD, establishment of the Agricultural Transformation Implementation Council (ATIC), and creation of advisory groups. To ensure that ATA is successfully implemented, government embarked on restructuring the FMARD, including deconcentration of staff. The restructuring led to the establishment of zonal and state offices. With the understanding that agriculture is undertaken at the state-level, rather than at the federal

capital, and to ensure an improved relationship between federal and state governments, six zonal offices and offices in the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) have been established. These offices are being manned by zonal and state directors appointed through a competitive hiring process by FMARD. This has enabled the ministry to relate with the states virtually on a daily basis and has made implementation and supervision of agricultural programs in the states more effective. Altogether, 2,818 staff of different cadres have been deployed under ATA institutional reforms to various states across the country.

ATIC was put in place as part of the administrative strategy for the implementation of ATA. It is chaired by the President and performs an oversight role over the entire ATA. FMARD, led by the Minister, serves as the coordinator for the Council. There are three major implementation groups in ATIC:

1. The Agricultural Investment Transformation Implementation Group brings together heads of key ministries, departments, and agencies to work together to create a conducive environment to grow private and public sector investment for the development of strategic agricultural commodity value chains. Members of the group include representatives from the Ministries of Finance, Power, Trade and Investment, Water, and Works, the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission, Nigerian Export Promotion Council, and the Nigerian Customs Service. The role of the group is to stimulate private sector investment in the agriculture sector through the development of a comprehensive agricultural investment framework; fiscal incentives; improved export competitiveness; and the promotion of investment opportunities.
2. The Agricultural Value Chain Transformation Implementation Group has the primary function of increasing agricultural productivity and links to markets. It is responsible for developing and implementing strategies to grow Nigerian agriculture along targeted agricultural commodity value chains. Its members consist of senior technical advisers on value chain and operational activities and development partners who provide guidance and oversight to align the activities of the group to the general strategy of their development organizations.
3. The NIRSAL Implementation Group executes the partnership between CBN and FMARD to provide incentives to the banking sector to expand their portfolio for improved agricultural financing under the NIRSAL scheme.

The other major institutional arrangement is the establishment of advisory groups to provide support for ATA. These include the Eminent Persons Group, the Economic Policy Working/Advisory Group, and the Agricultural Industry Advisory Group. The Eminent Persons Group provides advisory services to ATA. It has members from within and outside Nigeria, including Bill Gates, Kofi Annan, and the Presidents of IFAD and the African Development Bank. Group members have been advising the President on agriculture, raising investments to grow the sector, and ways of diversifying the economy. The Agricultural Industry Advisory Group represents the voice of the private sector. It consists of leaders in agricultural industries, including farmers, agricultural input suppliers and manufacturers, agricultural service providers, financial service providers, and agricultural processing and trading organizations.

2.3 Stakeholders identification and definition of roles and responsibilities

A major policy reform of ATA is the liberalization of input procurement and distribution. Fertilizer, being the most important input, occupies a central position in the strategic scheme through which inputs are to be delivered to the farmers through private sector distribution networks. In this connection, the different stakeholders are identified and their roles and responsibilities specified under the GES. As shown in Table 2.1, both state and non-state actors are identified as participants in the implementation of GES and are assigned responsibilities accordingly.

The involvement of this array of stakeholders is consistent with the philosophy of collaboration. However, acceptance of the responsibilities and understanding the way they should be discharged depends on joint decisions of stakeholders in each category of partnerships. Among the state actors, there seems to be a communication gap which undermines the understanding of the ground rules by state-level officials. In terms of funding of the fertilizer subsidy, there is acceptance of a payment modality by the federal and state governments in which the contribution of states will be deducted by the federal government at source within the federation account allocation framework. It is doubtful whether the administrative details concerning the implementation of input delivery are well understood at the state level, at least judging by the incessant frictions between FMARD officials and officials of some state governments.

Table 2.1—Roles and responsibilities of key actors in the fertilizer distribution system

STAKEHOLDER	ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY
Federal Ministry of Agriculture – Fertilizer Department, National Fertilizer Technical Committee, and National Programme for Agriculture and Food Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Facilitate and catalyze the procurement and distribution of fertilizer, including identifying suppliers. Regulate quality and quantity – in the future, to be migrated to barcode tracking and scanning. Facilitate and stimulate local production of fertilizer Ensure adequate budget allocation Ensure national food security objectives are realized Provide technical support regarding quantity and types of fertilizer suitable to the agro-ecological zones of the country
State governments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide counterpart funding Provide extension services Provide support to IFDC in identifying farmers Make available fertilizer storage facilities at LGA and village levels to participating fertilizer companies at concessionary rental rates
Cellulant mobile commerce service provider	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Design and build e-system for GES Integrate all other stakeholders into the e-system Provide the tools, reports required by every participant in the e-system Facilitate private sector entry and participation
IFDC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide sector expertise Coordinate timelines, timeframes and activity monitoring Build capacity of program actors to participate Monitor and evaluate accuracy of subsidy distribution and reach
Mobile network operators	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide channels and tariffs Ensure allocated bandwidth and network capacity is adequate
Financial institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide financial service extension to the grassroots through mobile and agency banking initiatives and support Provide credit to participants in the e-system
Suppliers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supply fertilizer Build channels and networks down to farmer level Develop and use tracking system (bar-coded stock)
Distributors, agrodealers, and retailers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Keep stock to farmer level
Farmers and farmer or community associations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Register into e-system and provide bio-data Provide groups along various lines (crops, ward, village, thrift etc.) Have access to SIM card and cell phone
Federal Ministry of Communication and Technology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide access to national SIM database Facilitate and ensure that mobile network operators open up their networks, allocate adequate bandwidth, and provide connectivity throughout Nigeria.
Central Bank of Nigeria, NIRSAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide lending window to fertilizer companies, dealers, farmers, etc. Catalyze investment in the sector through access to credit Single digit interest rates
Independent National Electoral Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provides access to voter database nationwide for validation purposes
National Population Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide access to population database for validation purposes
Federal Fertilizer Department (FFD) in collaboration with the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control and the Standards Organisation of Nigeria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Setting of fertilizer standards Regulate quality of fertilizers (points of imports, production plants, warehouses, dealer and retailer shops, and open markets. Inspection and sampling Issue of import permits Imposition of sanctions, penalties and prosecution
Donors that already support voucher schemes (USAID, AGRA)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consider possibilities for scaling-up existing resources Provide independent critique & assessment of program impact.

Source: FMARD, Abuja. 2011

Some non-state actors, such as the banking sector, also did not understand their roles at the beginning. However, with persistent efforts, communication, and interaction with the leadership of ATA, the situation improved. Among state actors, the lack of a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities persists, leading to delays in taking critical decisions relating to input delivery to farmers. Despite the advantages of the fertilizer procurement and distribution policy, untimely input delivery to target beneficiaries continues unabated. Whereas other stakeholders are easy to identify and relate to directly, the same

cannot be said about farmers. The subsidy strategy is targeting small-scale farmers. Usually size is defined by farm size, which is largely below three hectares. With this loose definition, anyone cultivating the commensurate farm size, whether the person is a tailor, professor, pupil, teacher, civil servant, or politician resident or non-resident in the place of registration, turns up to be registered as a farmer. This observation points to the fact that collective decision making at the design stage of ATA missed out key representatives of farmers who are in the best position to identify themselves and take decisions on their behalf.

Conspicuously absent from the list of stakeholders is the local government whose jurisdiction covers the grassroots and the rural domain in which agriculture is practiced. The non-recognition of local government in the design of the ATA overall and GES particularly is also inconsistent with the cross-tier responsibilities mandated by the constitution and expressed in various agricultural policy documents which are based on such constitutional mandates.

3. INTERGOVERNMENTAL AND STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS IN ATA'S DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

This section examines the extent of collaboration among the federal, state, and local governments in ATA design and implementation. The analysis is focused on the participatory nature of the design and the intergovernmental and inter-agency collaboration and interactions. The three tiers of government are bound by the constitution, which mandates their participation in agricultural development. According to the 1999 constitution (as amended), agriculture is on the current legislative list; implying that responsibilities for implementing and financing agricultural projects often are shared across the three tiers of government. In view of the overlapping nature of their roles, it is expected that progress in the discharge of their responsibilities will depend to some extent on collaboration between the three tiers of government.

Emphasis on collaboration in policy design is not misplaced. This is particularly important in Nigeria where resistance to policy reform is a common phenomenon. Resistance to policy reform is unavoidable if the stakeholders are not involved at the initial stage. Mobilizing stakeholders for collective action at the policy implementation stage is not easy if they are not involved at the design stage (Olomola, 2013). Collective decision making at the stage of policy design is required to avoid friction later at the implementation stage, especially in the context of democracy in Nigeria, where political differences between the ruling party at the center and at the state level can frustrate any policy initiative, no matter how well it has been designed. Moreover, in the Nigerian federation, budgets of the federating units are not subject to control by the federal government. Consequently, states often feel that they are not under any obligation to implement programmes designed at the center. Each time there is a major agricultural policy reform, states are likely to be a potential source of resistance to the reform, especially as they seek to avoid any undue encroachment on their budgets. In light of the foregoing, it is instructive to understand the collaborative process under ATA.

3.1 Analysis of Inter-Governmental Roles in ATA Design

The extent of collaboration was explored through in-depth interviews of top government functionaries with a view to understanding the nature of involvement of the three tiers of government, their contributions, and possible misgivings. As expected, concerns vary from one state to another. However, a common view was that ATA is a policy of the federal government. The view from Kebbi State is as follows.

“The state has no contribution to the design of ATA. We were not invited to partake. Maybe they thought they have enough people to do it. But this is not good enough, because some states specialize in the production of some commodities as a matter of priority and in different sectors – livestock, fishery may be emphasized by different states. These are areas where states contributions should have been useful.

“We were dragged into the programmes. The proponents bulldozed their ways into the states. Whether it is your way or not, they don't care to know; you have to comply. There is no time for you to think and articulate what is best for the progress of agriculture. We are passive participants. We are invited when the need arises mainly to get the policies implemented.

“Although the policies are good, (for instance private sector is to handle input procurement and distribution); but the state is not adequately sensitized. And if you are not an active decision maker in the process you cannot say much about ground rules and ways of ensuring transparency and effective communication.

“If we have been involved we would have stressed the importance of extension in the execution of some of the activities. In the state, extension is dead. If states were to be involved, there would have been adequate provisions for logistics for extension services”.

Other misgivings expressed by the states include the lack of clear definition of funding responsibilities and specific roles of the states (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1—Missing links in ATA’s collaborative process

State	Is the Design Collaborative?	Missing Link
Kebbi	No. We are not active participants. The proponents bulldozed their ways into the state.	Inadequate provision for extension logistics
Niger	No. States did not participate	
Ogun	Conceptualized by federal government. States were later coopted.	The quantity of fertilizer (2 bags) targeted for subsidy is grossly inadequate
Ebonyi	No. We are not involved. That is why we say it is ATA of the federal government.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Roles of state and of the agricultural research institutes should have been more appropriately defined. • The funding responsibility of the state was not clearly defined. • If we were part of the design, then it would have been preferable that what is happening at the federal, federal will chair; what is happening at state, state will chair; and what is happening at local level, local government will chair. Now the federal is taking the lead in the implementation of the program even at the state level. This should not normally happen if it is indeed a joint program.

Source: Author’s compilation from Field Survey, 2014.

3.2 Management of the Growth Enhancement Support scheme implementation process

The need to entrench an elaborate management system in the implementation of the GES scheme arose following the review of the implementation performance for 2012. A number of challenges were revealed, including

- delays in supplying inputs to RCs,
- questionable quality of inputs,
- poor inventory management by agrodealers, and
- banks’ requirement for an independent entity to give them more accurate figures on inventory and redemption so as to avoid diversion of funds by agrodealers.

It was the view of stakeholders that the use of supply chain management organizations could eliminate these problems. Thus, FMARD engaged three of them through a competitive bid process to participate in GES scheme implementation starting in 2013. Table 3.2 presents the supply chain managers (SCMs) and the states allocated to each of them. In the ensuing section the management activities of the SCMs and their interactions with other stakeholders in the input redemption process are examined.

Table 3.2—States covered by supply chain managers

Supply Chain Manager	States Covered
IFDC	Lagos, Anambra, Bauchi, Benue, Delta, Edo, FCT, Kaduna, Kano, Kwara, Niger, Ondo, Oyo, Sokoto, Taraba
Jetlink Nig. Ltd.	Adamawa, Cross River, Ebonyi, Ekiti, Imo, Kebbi, Osun, Plateau, Rivers, Yobe, Zamfara
Elcapemos Technologies Ltd.	Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Borno, Enugu, Gombe, Jigawa, Katsina, Kogi, Nasarawa, Ogun

Source: Information compiled from IFDC, Abuja

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF GROWTH ENHANCEMENT SUPPORT SCHEME STAKEHOLDERS

The stakeholders associated with the GES scheme are small-scale farmers, private sector input suppliers, agrodealers, FMARD headquarters, directors of FMARD offices in the states, MANR in the states, Cellulant, GES scheme coordinators in the states, and supply chain managers. With the exception of FMARD headquarters and Cellulant, all the other stakeholders have regular interactions in the course of implementing the GES scheme. The nature of their interactions is implicit in the roles and responsibilities assigned to them as shown in Table 3.3.

Although, not a participant in the decision making process, the helpline staff (HLS) play a critical role during the redemption exercise when farmers receive their inputs at the RCs. They attend to farmers directly at the RCs, identifying the farmer beneficiaries following the stipulated identification criteria, educating them on the redemption process, and assisting them to redeem their inputs. HLS record the redemption exercise at each RC and ensure that agrodealers supply inputs to the farmers. They also manage crowds and crises at the RCs. The SCM at the state capital is mandated by the head office to use a rigorous reporting system with proper record keeping and timely management of information. At the end of every working

day, the HLS sends a report to the supervisor indicating the number of farmers who redeemed inputs, as well as the quantity of inputs involved. Every Thursday, the supervisors collate all the records and forward them to the SCM at the state headquarters. The next day, SCM transmits the report to the headquarters of his company in Abuja.

Table 3.3—Roles and responsibilities of Growth Enhancement Support scheme stakeholders

Stakeholder	Role and Responsibility
Small-scale farmers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Registered in the 2012 or 2013 GES National Farmer Database; Travel to assigned GES redemption center with their ID card or mobile phone; Pay balance to the agro-dealer in order to obtain GES inputs at discounted prices.
Private sector input suppliers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Meet FMARD's "Supplier Selection Criteria" in order to participate as a registered, reputable company that provides high quality inputs; Develops distribution supply channels to redemption centers that have been allocated for GES; Ensure that sufficient quantity of inputs are supplied to the allocated redemption centers to meet the expected demand of farmers participating in GES.
Agrodealers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Meet FMARD's "Agro-dealer Selection Criteria" which are established to ensure that the private sector entities are willing and able to provide goods and services to farmers throughout the year; Ensure adequate storage and security at the redemption center or agro-dealer shop; Ensure sufficient staffing over normal working hours while GES is operational (Monday to Friday, 8 am to 5 pm).
FMARD	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Screen suppliers and confirm their eligibility according to the Supplier Selection Criteria; Screen agro-dealers and confirm their eligibility according to the Agro-dealer Selection Criteria; Organize National GES Technical Working Group to handle policy change and state-level issues; Provide timely updates to the state directors, with copy to the GES Coordinators and Supply Chain Managers, on implementation agreements from the GES Technical Group or the GES Working Group.
FMARD – State director	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chair state Technical Working Group, with SCM and GES Coordinator; Meet on a weekly basis with the GES Coordinator and the Cellulant representative; Approve new agro-dealers from approved list as part of the state Technical Working Group meeting; Review offline farmer redemption logs at the weekly state Technical Working Group meeting.
State MANR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Screen suppliers and confirm their eligibility according to the Supplier Selection Criteria; Screen agro-dealers and confirm their eligibility according to the Agro-dealer Selection Criteria.
State GES Coordinator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Attend weekly GES Technical Working Group meeting; Monitor GES redemption exercise; Approve new agro-dealers from approved list as part of the state Technical Working Group meeting; Assist and support sensitization and awareness creation;
Supply Chain Manager	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Screen, select, hire, train, and supervise the GES staff required to carry out SCM's field activities, including, but not limited to Helpline Staff, Zonal Supervisors and State Team leader Mapping of approved agro-dealers to redemption centers based on farmer density, accessibility, storage capacity, security, etc. Provide regular progress reports on both farmer enumeration and input redemption.
Cellulant	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Print farmer register and hand over to the SCM State Coordinator; Weekly update of redemption by RCs; State representative to oversee all technical network issues.

Source: IFDC, 2013

THE REDEMPTION PROCESS

At state level, the process of input redemption begins with the mapping of the RCs. Next is the preparation of the rollout template by the SCM in conjunction with the FMARD state office and the Ministry of Agriculture in the state. This clearly presents the redemption centers, agrodealers, LGA and wards, and the quantity of stock expected from each agrodealer and major suppliers providing inputs to the agrodealers. Detailed information about the agrodealers and helpline staff are provided as are the quantity and prices of the various fertilizer, seed, and agro-chemicals to be made available.

Upon finalizing the rollout template, SCM contact the agrodealers through text messages to let them know the RCs to which they have been assigned. Letters indicating the quantity of inputs to be supplied to the centers are then sent to them. Within two to three weeks, the agrodealers are expected to deliver inputs to the RCs. At the same time, the SCM mobilizes the HLS to verify that all the inputs delivered conform to the type, quantity, and quality specified. During this period, the SCM commences the activation of farmers. This involves sending text messages to farmers asking them to go to a particular RC and collect specified quantities of inputs. The RC is a warehouse (or store) where an agrodealer stores his products for sale to farmers. The messages are translated to local languages – Hausa, Ibo and Yoruba.

On arrival at the RC, the farmer will be screened by the HLS. The farmer has to show the text message, his identity card, voter's card, or national identity card. Four out of the 11 digits of a farmer's phone number are missed out on the register and the farmer should be able to call them out as part of the verification exercise. In the absence of these means of identification, the farmer is identified by the village head or chairman of his group. For farmers who do not receive a text message but appear at the RC and find their names on the register, the HLS will rely on the village head or group chairman for identification. In any case, the name of the farmer must correspond with the name in the farmers' register at the RC. Once the farmer is cleared, the HLS will assist him or her to redeem the inputs. This involves inserting the appropriate syntax that reflects the name of the fertilizer, other relevant inputs, and the particular crop involved as a text message, which is sent to Cellulant. In the case of the generic GES, the seed is rice and maize and the fertilizer is NPK and urea. When sent to the Cellulant portal, the message generates an immediate response recognizing and authorizing the farmer to collect the indicated inputs. The farmer is then directed to the agrodealer to pay for the inputs and collect them immediately. These transactions take place online with the use of the farmers' phones. In the case of farmers without cell phones, the agrodealers' phones are used for the redemption. In areas where there is no network coverage, the redemption is done using the point of sales (POS) payment system. The POS has all the required information about the farmer which the agrodealer can use for the redemption.

INTERACTIONS OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGER WITH OTHER STAKEHOLDERS

The SCM serves as the link between suppliers and agrodealers, on the one hand, and between farmers and agrodealers, on the other. At the state level, the management team consists of the SCM, an assistant, and helpline staff. The SCM ensures that inputs get to the agrodealers in time, so as to avoid delays and shortages during redemption, and that such inputs are of the specified quality.

Relationship between SCM and FMARD

In Ogun state, the SCM and FMARD state office worked together to ensure hitch-free distribution of inputs in the state. Their interactions began from the stakeholders' inception meeting where the date of launching the input distribution exercise was decided and continued to the redemption centers (RCs) where the farmers collected their inputs. GES stakeholders in Ogun state were the Ministry of Agriculture, Ogun State Agricultural Development Programme, representatives of the Ogun state chapter of the All Farmers Association of Nigeria (AFAN), the Chairman and Secretary of the local agro-dealers association, and directors of individual commodity value chain development programs that are to be rolled out under the ATA. Jointly they decided on the date of the rollout of the main GES scheme and the sequence of rollout of specialized GES scheme commodities. They conducted the mapping of agrodealers and redemption centers. This involved allocating the agrodealers into LGAs and determining the number of wards and RCs that were to be allocated to each for distributing inputs to farmers. The SCM and the FMARD state director organized training for the staff of FMARD office and the HLS to acquaint them with the redemption process. The FMARD state director usually assigned one staff member to each of the RCs for the purpose of coordinating, verifying and evaluating data regarding input redemption by farmers. In addition, 32 HLS were recruited to manage each of the RCs in 2013. This number increased to 35 in 2014.

In Kebbi State, the FMARD state office provided office space for the supply chain management team. It also facilitated the work of the SCM by offering logistic support, office equipment, and recruitment of helpline staff.

Relationship between SCM and state Ministries of Agriculture

The relationship between the SCM and the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in Ogun State can be described as cordial. To launch the GES, the SCM visited all the 20 LGAs of the state to solicit their support in listing all the wards for the mapping exercise. MOA worked with the SCM to identify appropriate locations of RCs that satisfy political and agroecological criteria. However, the MOA did not provide staff to work or supervise activities at the RCs; for both the generic and the more specialized, commodity-specific GES.

In Kebbi State, the SCM worked with the state MANR to sensitize farmers on the need to come out and redeem their inputs. MANR staff assisted in coordinating the farmers groups that participated in the various specialized GES rollouts.

In Ebonyi State, however, some rivalry exists between the FMARD state office and MANR. Top officials of the state felt that they have to lead the process, whereas the FMARD office in the state felt it should be the leader. During the mapping, the state officials wanted to allocate agro-dealers to the RCs, whereas that work is the responsibility of the SCM and the GES committee. The state insisted that GES committee should give them GES reports on weekly basis, and the committee

complied to in order to avoid friction. Moreover, despite the large number of registered farmers, the state insisted on its own quota of 60,000 farmers to receive inputs, claiming that, since the state is responsible for subsidy payment on equal basis with the federal government, the onus is on the state to limit the number of farmer-beneficiaries based on the state budget. This has contributed to the low rate of redemption recorded in Ebonyi state.

Relationship between SCM and input suppliers

There are two distinct groups of input suppliers – fertilizer suppliers and seed suppliers. The fertilizer suppliers in Ogun state were Springfield, Wacott, Elephant, Olam and Saro, while the seed suppliers were Springfield (rice and maize) and Savannah (rice). As a rule, the SCM must be informed before any supply is made and when the stock is to be replenished by agrodealers. However, some agrodealers ordered for more supplies even though their stock was still high. Moreover, often it was only after the supplies had been delivered that the agrodealers informed the SCM. According to the SCM:

“The implication is that we are not able to fulfill the requirement that we must have oversight on every input delivery to the RCs. In a situation where agrodealers just bring waybills to us, we are unable to authenticate the actual quantity delivered. Of course after much explanation one has no other choice than to collect the waybills. Thus, at the end, the number of farmers claimed to have redeemed inputs may not be the true number. There is the likelihood that the number reported by such agrodealers is more than the number of farmers who actually collected their inputs. This applies to virtually all suppliers, with the exception of just a few who always make their supplies known to us and the HLS. Sometimes, suppliers can claim that supplies arrived at an RC about 8 pm, at which time the SCM and HLS are not likely to be there. The waybill will then be presented to the HLS the following day”.

This occurrence is in spite of the fact that the SCM held meetings with suppliers to inform them of the redemption process and associated rules and to brief them on the progress being made with regard to the sale of their products at the RCs. The reason for the late arrival of trailers to deliver the products may not be unconnected to state laws which restrict the movement of trailers to particular periods (9 am to 12 noon and from 6 pm to 6 am the following day) in order to decongest traffic on the roads.

Relationship between SCM and agrodealers

The SCM and agrodealers often have series of meetings to keep them abreast of new developments and also resolve some redemption challenges. The agrodealers also invite the SCM to attend some of their meetings. In Ogun State, the relationship between the SCM and agrodealers is not very cordial. This arises mainly from the fact that the agrodealers have different educational background. Some of them are literate and they understand the redemption process while others are illiterate and they do not fully understand the procedures. They are of the opinion that the rules being applied come from the SCM rather than higher authorities. The agrodealers belong to an organization known as Ogun State Agro-input Dealers Association (OGSAIDA) which is a formidable force to be reckoned with in the state. According to the SCM:

“Some members of OGSAIDA always want things done according to their dictates. Their representatives attend the stakeholders’ meeting but those that are illiterate often feel that the rules are made by the SCM and as such he can be over-ruled or the rules can simply be sidetracked. The agrodealers want to collect the farmers’ register from SCM so that they can carry out redemption by themselves thus denying the HLS their rights and responsibilities. This is with the intention of manipulating the register before the arrival of the HLS at the RCs. They can then go ahead and use their own code to activate the platform and redeem on behalf of some farmers before the arrival of the HLS. If that is done, it becomes impossible for the HLS to do the necessary verification and ascertain the presence of farmers. If care is not taken to address the farmers’ preference in this regard, it can lead to a situation where “ghost farmers” will be allowed to redeem inputs under the GES scheme”.

In 2013, the agrodealers charged farmers N50/bag for bringing the inputs from the store to the collection point. The HLS used their cell phones to redeem for farmers who did not possess phones and collected 50 naira from each farmer as cost of the text message sent. Some HLS charged as high as 100 naira. This did not go down well with farmers. Thus, in 2014, SCM argued that their HLS should not be involved in using their cell phones to activate farmers’ records and redeem their

inputs. This implies that offline redemption should be done by agrodealers using their own cell phones. The agrodealers accepted the responsibility, but seized the opportunity to engage in all sorts of non-procedural redemption practices, such as redemption outside normal working hours and redemption for absentee farmers.

In Kebbi State, after the mapping of the RCs, the SCM ensured that each agrodealer was given a center to which to deliver his inputs. Each RC is to serve between 4,000 and 5,000 farmers. Usually the list of agrodealers that would operate in each state is sent by the fertilizer department of FMARD to the SCM.

Relationship between SCM and farmers

The list of farmers is usually sent to the SCM in each state. The number of farmers determines the number of RCs to be created. In Ogun State, the SCM usually invited farmers to stakeholders' meetings to prepare for the redemption process. Farmers' associations such as the Ogun state chapter of AFAN and the chairmen of commodity associations, such as those of rice farmers, cassava growers, vegetable planters, fish farmers, and piggery farmers, are always well represented. The farmers themselves often made telephone calls to the SCM to complain about various problems they faced during redemption. The problems included:

- Farmers inability to find their names on the register at the RCs,
- Agrodealers regarded as part of the reason for low rates of redemption the incomplete phone numbers which were used as a means of identification. According to them, if the phone numbers have been completely written out (instead of eliminating 4 of the digits as means of identification), they would have taken it upon themselves to call the farmers to come to the RCs and redeem their inputs.
- Cash flow problems, which prevent farmers from redeeming the inputs fully.

In some areas where farmers complained of an inability to pay for the two bags of fertilizer allotted to them, in spite of the 50 percent subsidy granted by the government, agrodealers often bought the inputs from such farmers. They preferred to sell the two bags or one of them in return for cash, which they badly needed at that time. Another reason why farmers often interacted with SCM is the issue of Cellulant erroneously sending text messages to non-crop farmers, such as poultry farmers and those keeping pigs, sheep, and goats, inviting them to go and redeem fertilizer and seeds. Some of them contacted the SCM for clarification and would decline the invitation, while others would go and collect the inputs and later resell them to other farmers and agrodealers. These loopholes were exploited by agrodealers in Ogun State to make money easily.

There is also the issue of agrodealer selection, which requires the joint participation of SCM, the FMARD state office, and the state MOA. In 2012 in Ogun state, 22 agrodealers were selected by MOA to take part in the GES scheme. In 2013, agrodealers selection involved MOA, OGSAIDA, and FMARD. Other areas of interaction between these agencies included the reconciliation of redemption records and ensuring that agrodealers fulfilled their repayment obligations to input suppliers in situations where the agrodealers procured the inputs on credit. In Ogun state, agrodealers purchased inputs from suppliers on a credit basis. Repayment of the amount involved is usually after farmers have redeemed their inputs. A simple procedure is followed. After the reconciliation of the quantity and value of inputs distributed, a request for payment is made by the agrodealers on behalf of the suppliers who supplied the input to them on credit (a form of trade credit) at the beginning of the redemption period. The federal government pays the 50 percent subsidy directly to the account of the creditor-suppliers after the agrodealers should have paid into the same account the 50 percent payment collected from the farmers. For the transactions to proceed smoothly, there is need for joint participation of the SCM, MOA and FMARD state office in reconciling the records of input supply to agrodealers and redemption at the RCs.

In Ebonyi State, the SCM encountered the following issues in their interaction with farmers during the redemption period. These problems accounted for the lower-than-expected rate of redemption in many centers.

- Some farmers received text messages from Cellulant, but their names were not in the register. In such cases the names of the farmers were compiled and sent to Jetlink with a copy to Cellulant. According to the SCM, "it was found that five persons can use one phone number for registration. In such cases, the five names would be omitted because it was not easy to identify the real owner of the phone number. ... During registration some people claimed they have 10 ha, 20 ha or 50 ha. However, the GES is for small-scale farmers, in which case the names of such farmers would be omitted in the final redemption list that was sent by Cellulant".
- In the case of some farmers, the identification numbers that came with their text messages were different from the ones that appeared in the farmers' register. Such farmers could not redeem inputs unless confirmation was received from Cellulant. Sometimes due to workload, there might be no response from Cellulant to the confirmation request.

- In other cases there were farmers whose names were omitted from the register and they did not also receive text messages. They would come to the RCs because they have farmers identification cards which they collected during their registration. For these farmers, their names were compiled with their identification numbers and sent to Cellulant for confirmation. Some were confirmed that their names were on the platform. However, some were not confirmed and they could not redeem inputs.

ANALYSIS OF ATA MANAGEMENT MECHANISMS

FMARD seeks to ensure result-oriented implementation of ATA components. Several of the management mechanisms that have been put in place are highlighted in Table 3.4. These mechanisms and what they bring to the collaboration process can be understood in four analytical contexts of (1) oversight and visibility, (2) maintaining technical credibility and capability, (3) empowering the implementation process, and (4) ensuring transparency. In this section, we analyze the management of the ATA implementation process at the federal and state levels to identify the administrative strategies, implementations procedures, and management mechanisms that are likely to enhance program performance.

ATA management mechanisms at federal level

The key management mechanisms and service delivery innovations associated with ATA implementation at federal level are presented in Table 3.4. The high level of visibility associated with ATA is associated with the location of the highest level of oversight at the Presidency and the establishment of the Eminent Persons Group, with membership drawn from within and outside Nigeria. Deliberate efforts have been made to strengthen ATA's implementation process by adopting appropriate strategies. These have contributed to the success of the GES scheme, especially in terms of maintaining the technical credibility of the scheme, empowering the implementation process, and ensuring transparency.

Table 3.4—ATA management mechanisms at the federal level

Context	Management Mechanisms
High-level oversight and visibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inauguration of the Agricultural Transformation Implementation Council (ATIC) • Introduction of ATA Eminent Persons Group
Maintaining technical credibility and capability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Private Sector Facilitator (Cellulant) • FMARD has a fertilizer department that certifies all the fertilizers being used under GES. Staff of the fertilizer department go to the factories of every fertilizer supply to take random samples in order to analyze them to ensure high quality and compliance with specifications. • The National Agricultural Seed Council certifies all seed being used. Their staff members in different states go to redemption centers to take samples of the seed supplied for viability tests and determination of variety. This is to verify whether the input supplied is seed or grain. If it is grain, the viability will be low. They check both the tag on each seed pack to determine whether it is authentic and the type of chemicals used to seed-dress the seed. • Subject matter specialists used by FMARD on each value chain are chosen according to the relevance of their qualification and disciplinary focus. • In 2012, The state director and assistant director for GES from each of the 36 states were sent for a one-week training on agricultural value chains and their development. UNDP sponsored the training. • In 2013, a one-week technical training on value chain development was organized by FMARD for all technical staff relevant to ATA.
Empowering the process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FMARD deconcentration • FMARD has 2 project vehicles for monitoring and supervision of the RCs and other official responsibilities. • All staff at different RCs are given financial incentives to encourage them and enhance their performance in supervising the redemption process..
Ensuring transparency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Introduction of Supply Chain Management • HLS help farmers in redeeming their inputs, but a representative of FMARD is there to witness. • During redemption, FMARD staff provide a weekly report to the state office. At the same time, HLS provide a report to the SCM. These reports are jointly reviewed and reconciled. If there is any discrepancy, a query will be raised by FMARD to the agrodealer and the HLS. So far there has been no cause to raise such a query. • Introduction of 'touch and pay' (TAP) technology

Source: Author's compilation based on 2014 Field Survey

Management mechanisms at the state level

The level of performance at state-level of ATA implementation management is much lower than at federal-level, judging by the lack of specific management mechanisms in some states to address the issues of visibility and oversight, technical credibility, process empowerment, and transparency. According to the design of ATA, the ATIC, which was established at the

federal level with the President as Chairman, was to be replicated at the state level to perform similar functions. As shown in Table 3.5, the council has not been inaugurated in three of the four states studied as of 2014. In Niger state, where it was inaugurated, it has not been functioning due to the low priority accorded to it by the state. Kebbi state has taken steps to maintain technical credibility in the implementation process, but there is no clear indication of what has been done to empower the process and ensure transparency. In Niger state, a lot has been done to empower the process, but there seems to be no clear-cut strategy to address the issues of technical credibility and transparency comparable to what is being done at federal level. In the case of Ebonyi state, a number of measures have been taken to maintain the technical credibility and to empower the implementation process within the limits of its budget, but there is no indication of any specific measure to strengthen the level of transparency. The lack of specific management innovations to strengthen the implementation process of the GES at state-level is most pronounced in Ogun state, where it has been difficult to pinpoint any measures taken to strengthen the technical credibility and to empower the process. However, the state places much emphasis on ensuring transparency, especially by refraining from interfering with the process of selecting agrodealers, which often is vulnerable to manipulation.

Table 3.5—ATA management mechanisms in studied states

State	Context	Management Mechanism
Kebbi	ATIC	Yet to be inaugurated
	Maintaining technical credibility	State provides technical staff for implementation of GES at MANR and redemption centers. It provides venue for training helpline staff. ADP staff involved in providing training for HLS.
	Empowering the process	No clear indication
	Ensuring transparency	No clear indication
Niger	ATIC	Inaugurated in 2013, but since not functional
	Maintaining technical credibility	No clear indication
	Empowering the process	In 2014, federal government provided forms, while state provided transportation and allowances for enumerators and supervisors involved in farmers' registration. In 2014, the state spent about ₦22.2 million on registration, bringing the number of registered farmers from 257,000 to 600,000 as of August 2014.
	Ensuring transparency	No clear indication
Ogun	ATIC	Yet to be inaugurated, as of December 2014
	Maintaining technical credibility	No clear indication
	Empowering the process	No clear indication
	Ensuring transparency	Input suppliers select suitable agro-dealers without state's interference
Ebonyi	ATIC	Yet to be inaugurated
	Maintaining technical credibility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Government organized training of staff and other agricultural professionals in modern agriculture, both locally and internationally. Farmers and management staff were sent to Japan, China, and Vietnam for training on modern rice farming. Modern tractors, harvesters, planters, broom sprayers were procured to add modern technical inputs for the implementation of projects
	Empowering the process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Formation of GES working group Government has established an Agricultural Commodity Market and Trade Corporation (ACMTC) to fast track practical implementation of agricultural initiatives in the state. The ACMTC bill was signed into law in December 2013, and it commenced operation in 2014.
	Ensuring transparency	No clear indication

Source: Author's compilation based on 2014 Field Survey

By and large, less attention has been devoted to the management of ATA implementation process at the state-level than at federal-level. There are no remarkable innovative approaches at the state-level to empower the process (with the exception of Niger state) and to ensure transparency. Generally, efforts are concentrated on maintaining the technical credibility of the implementation process, especially in Kebbi and Ebonyi states.

3.3 Interactions among various stakeholders in ATA implementation

The relationship among the various stakeholders is governed by established procedures, although decisions on the procedures may not have been jointly taken by the parties involved. Whereas the interaction between federal and state officials

may be rule-based, that between the state and local government can be described as episodic and not based on any joint collective decision making process. Here we present key elements of the interactions between FMARD and the state Ministries of Agriculture on the one hand, and between the state Ministries of Agriculture and the Department of Agriculture at local government level on the other.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FMARD AND STATE MINISTRIES OF AGRICULTURE

Table 3.6 describes aspects of the interactions between FMARD and the Ministries of Agriculture in four study states. GES implementation activities are time specific and require urgent decisions. This makes the FMARD state offices beehives of activity during farmer registration and input redemption periods. On the basis of the specified roles of the FMARD state office, there are frequent interactions between the state GES Director and the state Ministry of Agriculture. The intensity of interaction varies from one state to another. This is due largely to improper understanding of roles and deep-seated misgivings about the non-collective nature of the decisions leading to the assignment of the specified roles.

Table 3.6—Federal – state interactions under ATA

State	Relations With FMARD
Kebbi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The officer coordinating GES in the state is a staff member of the ADP. The newly created Federal Department of Extension relate with MANR in the development of extension services. Any input that FMARD has distributed to the state comes through the FMARD state office (e.g., The 25 motor cycles distributed to frontline extension staff of ADP, fishing gear distributed to fishermen, and sprayers distributed to farmers. Invitation to attend workshops, seminars or training courses passes through the governor's office to the staff of MANR. Whenever there is need for FMARD to contact farmers, the arrangement is between the FMARD state office and MANR.
Niger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Organize joint consultative meetings to review activities of the past season and plan for the upcoming season. Usually takes place twice a year. GES scheme weekly technical committee meeting. GES scheme roll out meetings for jointly mapping out RCs and placement of state and federal representatives as well as HLS and agrodealers in the RCs. Joint field supervision of input redemption. Joint participation in farmers registration. Federal government provides the template and upload the farmers register to the Cellulant platform. State government provides funds for the enumerators and supervisors and monitors the exercise. Joint pre-season training for farmers on production, use of chemicals, use of sprayers, processing, etc. Jointly conduct advocacy on print and electronic media on GES activities in the state. If FMARD state director is available, he attends the weekly management meeting of the state MARD.
Ogun	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Low interaction with regard to redemption activities. FMARD has representatives in each RC except one. State does not have representative in any of the RCs. FMARD liaises with OGADEP in compiling farmers list for different value chains, such as oil palm, cassava, cocoa, etc., which are later used for roll out. Both FMARD and MOA act as facilitators during pre-rollout stakeholders' meetings In the case of cassava value chain development, there is a committee set up comprising FMARD and MOA staff to liaise with the relevant communities in Ijebu-Igbo for the 6,000 ha of land needed for cassava cultivation. Through this joint effort, it was possible to secure 500 ha for the project.
Ebonyi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> State and federal government jointly carry out supervision of GES implementation.

Source: Author's compilation based on 2014 Field Survey

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE MINISTRIES OF AGRICULTURE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Local governments have departments of agriculture which undertake projects in their areas of on jurisdiction jointly with the state or on their own, depending on availability of funds. More often than not, funds are not available; thus the LGAs hardly implement projects of their own. Under ATA they are either invited to attend the symbolic flag off of the rollouts of GES programs or requested to provide staff to take part in farmers' registration, as highlighted in Table 3.7.

Table 3.7—State – local government interactions under ATA

State	Relations With LGAs
Kebbi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> From the beginning, local governments have been involved in the GES scheme, especially in the appointment of helpline staff, registration of agrodealers, and selection of redemption centers. LGAs were invited to participate in the flag off of the GES in 2012 at the secretariat of the Kalgo local government.
Niger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Directors of Agriculture in all LGAs supervise and assist with the logistics of movement of enumerators from village to village and provide accommodation for the enumerators and writing materials. AFAN chapters in LGAs mobilize the farmers through the district head, village head, ward head, and the Emirs.
Ogun	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> During farmers registration, Directors of Agriculture in all LGAs met regularly with FMARD and MOA officials regarding distribution and recovery of registration forms. Directors of agriculture in all LGA served as supervisors during registration and are paid the necessary allowance by FMARD for services rendered.
Ebonyi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> What the local government will provide in funding the input subsidy was not captured in the design of ATA. This is not good, because if the subsidy component of the cost of inputs is shared among the three tiers at 25 percent for federal, 15 percent for state, and 10 percent for local government, it will be less financially cumbersome for each tier of government to finance. There is no justification why the local government will not be part of the source of funding the GES scheme. So the 13 LGAs do not play any active role in ATA in Ebonyi state.

Author's compilation from 2014 Field Survey

In Niger state, the two LGAs included in the study have different perceptions and experiences with participation in GES implementation. In the case of Paiko LGA, the role of the Department of Agriculture is mainly to provide extension service to farmers with regard to the use of fertilizer and other inputs. The department does not implement any project due to lack of funds. It provides tractor hire services occasionally to farmers for ploughing and harrowing purposes. In the past, the department used to obtain chemicals from the state government for treating any disease outbreak among Fulani herdsmen. Paiko LGA was involved in farmers registration under the GES in 2012 and 2013. The LGA provided 15 members of staff of the Agriculture Department to take part as enumerators. They were supervised by the Director of Agriculture of the LGA. They were involved in registering farmers for dry season rice in 2013 as well as the registration of cattle herdsmen for the livestock GES. The local government is not involved in input redemption activities under the GES. According to the Director of the Agriculture Department, "when they started this year (2014), I went to one of the RCs located in our LGA to ask why we were not involved. I was told that they were not asked to involve us".

In the case of Lapai LGA there is no specific project being implemented solely by local government. It implements projects designed either by the state or federal government. Occasionally tractor hiring and extension services are rendered to farmers and women in the LGA. The women services are rendered by the Home Economic Department and are concerned with teaching women on how to process soybean into various food products. The Director of Agriculture explained that:

"In terms of participation in ATA, we were involved in farmers' registration twice in 2012 and once in 2013. Two members of staff were assigned to each of the 10 wards in the LGA. The Ministry of Local Government paid the allowances for the 20 staff that participated as enumerators. The Director of Agriculture served as supervisor together with one supervisor each provided by the state and federal governments. His involvement in the supervision exercise was in his capacity as the State Chairman of the National Council of Local Government Departments of Agriculture. We sent our staff to represent the LGA at the two RCs annually from 2012 to 2014 to serve as our eyes and to identify farmers who are to collect inputs. This is based on request from FMARD state office. The LGA was also involved in the distribution of livestock feeds to cattle herdsmen under the GES, just as we distributed fishing materials (boats, fishing nets, hooks etc.) to the fishermen."

The GES scheme committee directed that LGAs should deploy staff to supervise RCs in their areas. It is possible, however, that the information might not have been passed round to all LGAs. Many LGAs are not complying, possibly because there is no financial benefit attached to such participation. Many Directors of Agriculture were not informed about the commencement of redemption in the LGAs. They, therefore, were not encouraged and motivated to mobilize farmers and to monitor the redemption process. Only Directors who are curious go out to supervise. It is their belief that their involvement should not be out of curiosity; it should rather be mainstreamed.

In Ogun state, LGAs are not also involved in GES implementation beyond the level of registration. Even at this level there was considerable conflict of interest. During farmers' registration, the Directors of Agriculture at the LGAs served as

supervisors following the intervention of FMARD state office. The FMARD state director has to intervene to resolve the different opinions of the Ogun State Agricultural Development Programme and the Directors of Agriculture at the LGAs. The former believed that their extension staff were better placed to do the job, while the latter argued that farmers were always coming to their offices to obtain information about the latest agricultural technology and other programs of government due to the lack of extension agents in their communities. Thus, in view of the fact that they are already very familiar with the Agriculture Department, the staff of the Department will be in a better position to mobilize the farmers and encourage them to turn out for the input redemption exercise. According to the Director of Agriculture Department of Odeda LGA,

“When inputs are to be distributed to farmers the LGAs are not involved at all in the process.....we were made to understand that the redemption is between the service provider and farmers. Nonetheless, I always ask my Agricultural Superintendents to go and monitor redemption activities in the three RCs in Odeda LGAs. Whenever we hear news that roll-out is underway in respect of any commodity, we disseminate the information to the farmers through text messages and telephone calls. We (local government staff) have never been invited to any symbolic flag-off of any commodity rollout under the GES since its inception in 2012. Apart from our participation in the 2013 registration exercise, we have never been invited to any pre-rollout or other stakeholders’ meeting on ATA/GES scheme”.

The experience is not different in Yewa LGA. It was involved in farmers’ registration only in 2013. The LGA deployed and paid (₦20,000) for one additional enumerator, raising the number from two (provided by the state) to three enumerators per ward to ensure effective coverage of farmers during the exercise. According to the Director of Agriculture in the LGA, “on our own volition, we went to monitor the redemption exercise in in the three RCs in our LGA in 2013 and 2014”. The LGA also hired vehicles and motor cycles and paid for supervisors to go to the 11 wards to monitor the redemption exercise.

The non-involvement of the local government in agricultural projects with joint financing by more than one tier of government is not unprecedented. For instance, in the case of the Fadama irrigation projects, the LGAs were not members of the steering committees. According to the Director of Agriculture in Odeda LGA, “ in Fadama III for example, we only overheard that it has been extended”. He opined that whenever the coordination of jointly financed projects are being contemplated, local government officials should be part of the decision and should participate in the coordination. According to him “local government is just serving as a working tool in any agricultural project. All decisions would have been taken; only for instructions to be passed to the local government to go to the field and implement”, In Fadama III, there is a Desk Office at the LGA with two desk officers and four enumerators to carry out the assigned tasks. If Directors of Agriculture in the LGAs have been members of Steering Committee or seen and treated as stakeholders, it would have been possible for them to encourage, advise, or influence their local government chairmen to pay their counterpart funds for the implementation of the project on a regular basis.

The situation is different in Ebonyi state. Unlike other states, there seems to be some level of cooperation between the state and the LGAs in GES implementation. Both the FMARD state office and the MANR in the state involve the LGAs as stakeholders in GES scheme rollouts. FMARD contacts Directors of Agriculture at the LGAs through telephone calls and text messages for necessary actions during the input redemption exercise. Directors of Agriculture in the 13 LGAs in Ebonyi state served as supervisors during the 2013 farmers’ registration exercise in cooperation with the FMARD state office. According to the Director of Agriculture of Ohaukwu LGA, “we partner with the state. Whenever any program is being run....they will involve us. If there is improved seed to be distributed to the farmers, they will invite us to pick. The state director sent us text messages to come and collect our LGAs’ quota of the oil palm seedlings meant for the farmers. This year, there is a RC in my LGA and a letter was written by the Hon. Commissioner of Agriculture to us that we should supervise and maintain orderliness as redemption is going on.” The letter clearly spelt out the responsibilities of LGAs during the exercise as follows:

- Provide input storage facilities for agrodealers,
- Assist in ensuring that inputs are secured from theft,
- Ensure that there is orderliness and peace during input redemption. And
- Provide general monitoring and supervision of the GES implementation exercise within the period.

In Izzi LGA, the Director of Agriculture confirmed that they were involved in GES implementation since inception in 2012. The LGA provided a good working environment to GES staff during the redemption period, including the provision of warehouses for input storage, security, and lunch occasionally for states’ GES scheme assistants while on duty. The state

FMARD office requested that the LGA compile a list of potential oil palm GES scheme beneficiaries. In 2013, five names were submitted, while the number increased to 160 in 2014. Following the submission of the list, farmers were given oil palm seedlings and fertilizer, with each one of them paying a sum of ₦5,000.

In sum, the cooperation between the federal and state governments has been more visible than that between the state and local governments in the implementation of the GES scheme. The weak cooperation in respect of the local government is due to the fact that in designing ATA, the partnership was not inclusive of the local government and during its implementation the participation of LGAs is casual and episodic. The level of cooperation has also been influenced by the extent to which a state is agriculture-dependent and the priority accorded to the sector in the overall development of the state. States with larger population of farmers tend to be more cooperative and proactive in managing the GES implementation process than those with a smaller farming population.

There is also the political dimension of intergovernmental interactions. The visibility associated with ATA implementation is received with a pinch of salt in some states based on their estimation of the balance of the possible political benefits, which they assume is heavily skewed in favor of the federal government. Therefore, there is some level of hesitation in some states to give full cooperation to activities which in their opinion infringe upon their political authority and fiscal capacity, especially when there is no joint decision about such activities. Constitutional autonomy and budgetary considerations are also critical in understanding the level of cooperation demonstrated at the state level in ATA implementation. Irrespective of political differences and party affiliations, states seem to act in a way to ensure that their autonomy is protected and that they are in full control of their resources to meet the aspirations of the various claimants on their budgets. This tends to limit the extent to which they can tolerate disruptions to their budgetary allocations and legislative appropriations by surrendering to extra-jurisdictional expenditure mandates, such as the ATA.

These observations and results are supportive of the fact that collective decision making and the sequencing of the interactive phases matter in an intergovernmental collaborative process. Collaboration works better where it is built on joint interests in sharing the costs and benefits. It is apt to falter if the partnership is based on established through coercion, persuasion, and where the foundation lies on decision by key partners rather than persuasion. With collective decisionmaking, it should be possible to consider what each partner has at stake, what should be done to sustain the participation of each partner, and who exactly should do what in order to achieve the desired objectives. In the case of ATA, there is a joint interest in achieving the ultimate goal of food security and political support of farmers. There is also joint responsibility that is mandated by the constitution.

However, in view of political differences, economic interests, and the need to protect various jurisdictional fiscal interests in line with the principles of fiscal federalism in the Nigerian context, there should be cross-tier decision making responsibility. This should be shared in order to have sustained cooperation in the implementation of ATA. The lack of such collective decision making is apt to breed mistrust among partners. Ultimately, this will affect the level of performance in terms of process as well as expected output and outcomes. Intergovernmental collaboration will yield better results if, in addition to the cross-tier interests to share the benefits, there is also a similar interest and a joint decision to share the costs.

4. STRATEGIES, PERFORMANCE AND CHALLENGES OF ATA IMPLEMENTATION

This section examines the implementation strategies of ATA and its performance in terms of achievements and outputs. The factors influencing performance are highlighted and challenges identified. These details are presented at national level based on available data and at state level based on the experience of the four states included in the study.

4.1 ATA implementation strategies

The implementation of ATA involves the federal government partnering with state governments and the private sector to achieve the objectives of the key components, including the GES scheme, NIRSAL, AETA, SCPZ, ACVCD, and ACMTC. For instance, memorandums of understanding were signed between the federal government and state governments in respect of the specialized GES schemes, ACVCD, and AETA to spell out the responsibilities of each of the parties and the time to accomplish the desired objectives. Similar arrangements were worked out with the banking sector with regard to the financing of agrodealers by NIRSAL under the GES scheme. The GES scheme also had the wet season and dry season components. The latter was implemented in the northern zones where irrigation facilities exist for the production of grains.

Table 4.1—ATA components implemented in selected states

Year	Kebbi	Niger	Ogun	Ebonyi
2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GES wet season - arable crops 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GES generic - rice, maize 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GES generic - rice, maize GES specialized - cassava, cocoa 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GES generic - rice, maize
2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GES generic - rice, maize GES wet season - arable crops GES dry season - rice ACVCD AETA SCPZ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GES generic - rice, maize GES wet season - arable crops GES dry season - rice GES specialized – cassava, soybean GES artisanal fishery GES livestock - dairy, beef AETA SCPZ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GES generic - rice, maize GES specialized - cassava, cocoa, oil palm, cotton, piggery, aquaculture ACVCD AETA SCPZ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GES generic - rice, maize GES specialized - oil palm ACVCD AETA
2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GES generic - rice, maize GES wet season - arable crops ACVCD AETA SCPZ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GES generic - rice, maize GES wet season - arable crops GES dry season - rice GES specialized – cassava, soybean GES artisanal fishery GES livestock - dairy, beef AETA SCPZ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GES generic - rice, maize GES specialized - cassava, cocoa, oil palm, cotton, piggery GES aquaculture & capture fisheries AETA SCPZ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GES generic - rice, maize GES specialized - oil palm, poultry, and aquaculture ACVCD AETA

Source: Author's compilation using 2014 survey data.

The aspects of ATA in which the selected states were involved from 2012 to 2014 are shown in Table 4.1. Whereas all the states took part in the generic GES scheme involving the supply of subsidized inputs for rice and maize production since GES inception in 2012 and in AETA since its inception in 2013, different states started the implementation of other components at different periods. For instance, Niger and Kebbi states have been involved since 2013 in the dry season GES scheme to boost rice production. Niger state also has implemented the GES schemes relating to the livestock and fishery sub-sectors. The aquaculture GES scheme started in 2013 in Ogun state, while Ebonyi state commenced rollout in 2014. The latter did not commence the livestock-related GES scheme until 2014, whereas Niger and Ogun states started in 2014 and Kebbi state as of 2014 had yet to commence implementation.

Table 4.2 presents the various activities undertaken by the states in the implementation of the GES scheme. Each state is responsible for paying half of the 50 percent subsidy on fertilizer, while the federal government pays the other half of the subsidy. The farmer pays 50 percent of the full-market price of the inputs. Apart from this financial contribution, the states engage extension workers for registering and mobilizing the farmers to turn out in large numbers for the GES scheme.

Table 4.2—Implementation activities at the state level

State	Activities
Kebbi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State covered half of the cost of the 50 percent input subsidy under the GES scheme. • State identified LGAs with a comparative advantage in producing target crops and asked them to mobilize farmers to register. • State provided some storage facilities and security for the redemption centers. • State engaged extension workers to identify and register farmers.
Niger	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State covered half of the cost of the 50 percent input subsidy under the GES scheme. • In the livestock GES scheme, federal government was to 50 percent and farmers were to pay 50 percent of the cost. However, the government paid for the farmers. • For the fisheries GES scheme, federal government was to pay 25 percent, the state 25 percent, and farmers 50 percent. However, the state government paid for the farmers.
Ogun	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State covered half of the cost of the 50 percent input subsidy under the GES scheme • State took part in mobilizing farmers through radio jingles and town criers in rural areas. • State engaged extension workers to identify and register farmers.
Ebonyi	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State covered half of the cost of the 50 percent input subsidy under the GES scheme. • State engaged extension workers to identify and register farmers.

Source: Author's compilation based on 2014 field survey

4.2 General and state-level performance of ATA implementation

The various components of ATA have been implemented in some form since 2011; although achievements vary across the components based on the period of commencement, the initial conditions, priorities attached, and the extent of preliminary activities, including consensus building. However, with regard to the components that started in 2012, reasonable levels of achievement began to show up one year later. These components include the ACVCD, the GES scheme, SCPZ, ACMTC, and AETA. However, progress of certain components has been quite considerable, whereas others have made only gradual progress.

PERFORMANCE OF THE VALUE CHAINS

ATA activities in agricultural commodity value chain development began with the expansion of the seed industry to enable private sector producers invest in seed production and to meet the target quantity of improved seed required for production expansion in line with the objectives of the GES scheme. The activities embarked upon in respect of improved cassava planting materials and rice, maize, sorghum, soybean, and cotton seeds are shown in Table 4.3, while Tables 4.4 and 4.5 shows performance in terms of land area cultivated and output changes. In terms of performance, the target set for seed production was exceeded by 111, 140 and 345 percent in respect of sorghum, cassava, and rice, respectively, while production of other seeds increased substantially as well. In the case of maize the improved seed produced contributed to the production of about 7 million metric tons of maize as at the end of 2012. The area devoted to the cultivation of various crops and the output realized within a year of ATA implementation are shown in Table 4.4. Compared to the situation 10 years before, output growth assumed double digits for several crops, including as fruits and nuts (14.7 percent), cereals (232.2 percent), vegetables (37.7 percent) and roots and tubers (44 percent). The only exception is in respect of fiber crops for which there was a decline of about 25 percent (Table 4.5).

Table 4.3—Seed production performance

Crop	Activity	Performance
Rice	7,100 MT of improved seed for planting additional 117,000 ha produced	690,000 MT – 345% of target for 2012
Cassava	30 million stems improved planting material distributed to farmers nationwide used to cultivate 10,000 ha.	250,000 MT – 140% of target for HQCF in 2012
Sorghum	500 MT of four improved varieties procured as planned. 402 MT distributed to 25,000 registered farmers in eight states of NW and NE zones.	60,000 MT – 111% of target for 2012 for fortified foods
Maize	67,000 MT improved certified seed for planting on 3.5 million ha deployed to farmers nationwide	7 million MT increase in production
Soybean	18,000 MT second generation certified seed for GES capable of planting 360,000 ha deployed to farmers.	Certified seeds sufficient to plant 600,000 hectares produced
Cotton	Nine of the available 17 functional private ginneries have been repositioned and are organizing farmers for enhanced seed cotton output.	240,000 MT seed and 100,000 MT lint produced in 2012

Source: Adapted from Adesina 2013.

Table 4.4—Crop sub-sector performance in Nigeria, 2012

Crop	Value (\$ million)	Quantity (thousand MT)	Area harvested (thousand ha)
Yams	7,753	38,000	2,900
Cassava	5,641	54,000	3,850
Fruits	2,278	4,760	932
Vegetables	1,745	7,760	1,015
Rice, paddy	1,309	4,833	2,685
Groundnuts, with shell	1,309	3,070	2,420
Maize	1,048	9,410	5,200
Sorghum	991	6,900	5,500
Millet	851	5,000	3,800
Cashew nuts, with shell	732	836	366
Taro (cocoyam)	732	3,450	500
Okra	703	1,100	385
Cowpeas, dry	634	2,500	3,200
Plantains	578	2,800	456

Source: FAOSTAT 2014.

Table 4.5—Change in agricultural production in Nigeria, 2002-12

Subsector	2002	2012	% change	Subsector	2002	2012	% change
Crops (metric tons)				Fisheries (metric tons)			
Roots and tubers	69,459,000	100,000,000	44.0	Diadrom fish	187,242	312,009	66.6
Cereals	21,373,000	26,333,000	23.2	Demersal fish	114,823	146,918	28.0
Vegetables	8,673,803	11,940,600	37.7	Pelagic fish	112,283	142,837	27.2
Fruits and nuts	10,372,179	11,898,500	14.7	Crustaceans	35,711	31,976	-10.5
Oil crops	2,631,105	2,880,568	9.5	Marine fish, other	28,152	29,677	5.4
Pulses	2,404,789	2,560,000	6.5	Mollusks	2,426	4,842	99.6
Fiber crops	151,116	112,888	-25.3	Cephalopods	419	495	18.1
Livestock (metric tons)				Forestry (m³)			
Indigenous meat	1,168,366	1,491,163	27.6	Wood fuel	60,064,328	63,999,115	6.6
Eggs	450,000	640,000	42.2	Industrial roundwood	9,418,000	9,418,000	0.0
Milk	408,200	566,000	38.7	Sawn wood	2,000,000	2,002,000	0.1
Sheep and goat meat	372,207	469,075	26.0	Wood-based panels	95,000	97,000	2.1
Beef and buffalo meat	357,425	390,000	9.1	Wood pulp	23,000	23,000	0.0
Poultry meat	190,000	290,000	52.6	Paper and paperboard	19,000	19,000	0.0

Source: FAOSTAT 2014

The rice and cassava value chains in particular have witnessed a large increase in processing capacity in line with the prevailing import substitution policy and the use of high quality cassava flour as a 20 percent substitute for wheat flour in the production of bread. As at 2014, the aggregate rice milling capacity was 780,000 MT stemming from the growth of integrated rice mills from only one before ATA to 20 in 2014. By October 2014, government gave approval for the establishment of 10 additional integrated rice mills under a public-private partnership arrangement that will add 360,000 MT of import quality rice to the national supply and raise aggregate milling capacity to 1,120,000 MT (FMARD, 2014). However, realizing this level of capacity may not be easy because:

1. The integrated mills that are newly established are still facing teething problems of poor infrastructure and inadequate power supply.
2. Paddy is not easily accessible by some millers, because it exists in pockets around villages and across zones.
3. Farmers are still largely unorganized and that does not make for easy access to technologies, credit facilities and market; thus making the value chain to be still largely fragmented.
4. Farmers have poor access to extension services and market information and this adversely affects rice yield.
5. Production and transaction costs are still high at each stage of the value chain.

Under ATA, Nigeria maintains its position as the largest producer of cassava in the world with annual production of 34 million MT. As part of the efforts to develop the cassava value chain, government is developing the cassava industry through the promotion of production of drought-tolerant cassava varieties, facilitating the processing of cassava into high quality cassava flour that meets international standard, and encouraging the substitution of wheat flour with 20 percent cassava flour for bread production. These efforts, in conjunction with the marketing expansion opportunities of the SCPZs, have attracted global agricultural processing players, like Cargill, Unilever and Nestle, who are exploring the possibility of processing cassava into starch, sweeteners, and sorbitol (Grow Africa, 2013).

The progress being made in the development of the rice value chain is comparable with that of cassava. Recently, FMARD signed a memorandum of understanding with the Bank of Industry to establish 10 integrated rice mills across the country in addition to six integrated cassava processing mills. The agreement provides for a loan facility to the tune of ₦13.6 billion to be facilitated by the Federal government for investors to access the facility at 5 percent interest rate per annum. Loans under the agreement are payable within 10 years inclusive of a three year moratorium on payments. The government has no equity capital in the mills. The role of government is to facilitate access to finance to encourage the private sector to invest in the mills and run them as a totally private-sector driven operation. The rice mills are medium sized with a capacity for each of 36,000 metric tons. They are to be located in Kebbi, Zamfara, Kaduna, Kano, Benue, Kogi, Bayelsa, Bauchi, Ogun and Anambra states, while the six cassava flour mills are to be located in Ondo, Ogun, Abia, Delta, Cross River and Nasarawa states (Ajayi, 2014).

Table 4.6—Performance of livestock sub-sector value chains, 2013-14

Value chain	2013	2014
Pig	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3,600 pig farmers in four states registered for pig fattening, while 819 redeemed their GES inputs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 400 pig farmer registered in 8 states for genetic improvement. Training-of-Trainers workshop in modern pig production and health held for subject matter specialists and pig farmers.
Poultry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training of cassava farmers and processors on production of Feed Grade Cassava Grits (FGCG) for poultry feeds. Members in value chain and stakeholders in Poultry Association of Nigeria trained in operations of hatcheries, breeder farms, and feed mills. Supply of 100 day-old chicks, 5 bags of chick mash, 4 doses of Newcastle Disease Vaccine, and 2 doses of Coccidiostat and Vitalytea at 60% subsidy per farmer to 1,000 farmers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2,700 poultry farmers registered for 2014 input rollout Redemption of inputs in Kaduna, Kano, and Plateau states.
Beef	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identification and registration of 500 cow-calf Cattle farmers in four states for artificial insemination programme. Completed a diagnostic survey of beef industry to identify potentials and constraints in order to attract investors. Training of trainers for 35 small and medium enterprises and farmers on crop residue utilization Provision of fattening input to 520 farmers in 2013. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Selection of locations for cross breeding programs in four states for 2014 artificial insemination program. Registration of 800 farmers to benefit from GES scheme in 18 states. Inventory of input supplies, beef wholesale companies and abattoirs concluded.
Dairy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Intervention between private firm (WAMCO) and farmers to establish guaranteed farm gate price for raw milk in Oyo state. Training on dairy production and management to stakeholders such as farmer groups, inseminators, and extension agents. Provide quality parameters for supply of raw milk at milk collection centers to link farmers to artificial insemination and feeding supplementation in targeted states. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6,200 pastoralists and peri-urban farmers participated in GES scheme. 2,200 10-kg blocks of salt lick at N1400 each and 13,200 50-kg bags of commercial dairy feed at N3500 were distributed. All inputs were sold at 50 percent subsidy.
Leather	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leather value chain registered through the state Hides and Skins Associations 1,720 skin buyers in 6 states being supported with 10 bags of industrial salt each. Sensitization workshop on GES for leather field officers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Training of 50 skin buyers in 6 states on use of industrial salt in effective preservation of hides and skins. Capacity building for abattoir workers, flayers, traders and other stakeholders in the leather industry.
Sheep and Goat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Registration of 18,077 sheep and goat farmers and migration to Cellulant GES platform and databank. Nine major commercial feed millers were linked to 31 agrodealers to supply commercial ruminant feed to farmers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 15,245 farmers registered in 31 states 509 farmers and 24 state desk officers trained on utilization of crop residue resources as basal feeds for ruminants. Increased live weight and carcass weight within 60 days of fattening through commercial ruminant feeds being provided GES scheme beneficiaries.

Source: Adapted from FMARD, 2014

The livestock sub-sector also has demonstrated positive growth in output expansion between 2002 and 2012. With the exception of beef which grew at 9.1 percent, all the other products grew at double digits over the period. The growth was highest in the case of broilers (52.6 percent), followed by eggs (42.2 percent), milk (38.7 percent), and sheep and goat meat (26 percent) as shown in Table 4.5. The various activities and achievements in respect of piggery, poultry, beef, dairy, leather, and sheep and goats value chains are presented in Table 4.6.

Activities for agricultural commodities' value chains development have been extensive under ATA. They have been able to elicit considerable private sector participation in the various agricultural sub-sectors. The comprehensive coverage of the sub-sectors commenced in 2013 with a focus on soybean, ginger, groundnut, sorghum, sesame, oil palm, cotton, cashew, cocoa, poultry, sheep and goat, piggery, dairy, leather, beef, aquaculture, and artisanal fishery. Table 4.7 presents the key inputs distributed under the value chain development program and the associated redemption rates.

Table 4.7—Major inputs distributed and redemption rates for agricultural value chain development in Nigeria

Commodity or Enterprise	2013			2014		
	Redemption Rate (%)	Seeds distributed (mt)	Fertilizer distributed (mt)	Redemption Rate (%)	Seeds distributed (mt)	Fertilizer distributed (mt)
Crop						
Soybeans	73	834	1,744	60	769	2,758
Cassava	73	232,292	2,821			
Ginger				74	58	124
Groundnut ^(a)	52		172			
Sorghum	54	356	12,718	87	905	20,548
Sesame	77	470	87	83	248	497
Oil Palm	57	139,550	228	63	787,000	966
Cotton	50	2,779	6,177	88	2,096	10,824
Cashew				72	14	398
Cocoa ^(b)	6		624,799	57		
Livestock						
Poultry ^(c)	95	28,500	36	84	220,900	169
Sheep & Goat ^(d)	28		3,860	64		
Piggery ^(e)	24	679	121			
Dairy ^(f)	8	467	143			
Leather ^(g)	100		882			
Beef ^(h)	18	10,472	1,104	15	27	1
Aquaculture ⁽ⁱ⁾	88	3,681,500	553	86	2,359,000	361

^(a) SSP fertilizer was entered in column for fertilizer.

^(b) Total pesticides used in liters comprising of Teractive, Actara, Champ DP, Funguran, Ridomil Gold, Ultimax was entered in column for fertilizer.

^(c) Day old chicks and chicken feeds were entered in column for seeds and fertilizer. Chicken feeds are in metric tonnes.

^(d) Feeds was entered in column for fertilizer.

^(e) Disinfectants in liters was entered in column for seeds.

^(f) Dairy Feeds was entered in column for fertilizer.

^(g) Industrial Salt was entered in column for fertilizer.

^(h) Beef fattening concentrate feed and salt lick are entered in column for seeds and fertilizer respectively.

⁽ⁱ⁾ Juveniles and fish feeds are entered in columns for seeds and fertilizer respectively.

In 2013, the redemption rates in the crop sub-sector ranged from 6 percent for cocoa to 77 percent in the case of sesame. In 2014, the redemption rates increased considerably ranging from 57 percent for cocoa to 88 percent for cotton. With the exception of leather which recorded full redemption in 2013, the redemption rates are generally lower in the livestock sub-sector than for the crop sub-sectors. The redemption rate for poultry, which stood at 95 percent in 2013, declined to 84 percent in 2014. In the case of beef, the redemption rate which was only 18 percent in 2013. This fell to 15 percent in 2014. The fishery sub-sector witnessed remarkable activities in aquaculture compared with artisanal fishery. Fish farmers responded to the incentives in 2013 with the redemption rate being as high as 88 percent. The activities continued in 2014; although there was a slight drop in the redemption rate to 86 percent.

PERFORMANCE OF THE STAPLE CROP PROCESSING ZONES

SCPZ is the key pillar of ATA in which the government seeks to identify major clusters of agricultural enterprises that will be delineated as specific zones for agricultural processing and industrialization. The SCPZs are designed to boost import substitution, improve the competitiveness of Nigeria's agricultural sector, and establish appropriate linkages between the agricultural and industrial sectors as a basis for Nigeria's industrial development. FMARD is to implement the SCPZ program in partnership with state governments; other federal ministries, departments, and agencies; development partners; and the private sector with a focus on key commodities, such as rice, sorghum, cassava, fisheries, horticulture, livestock, and oil palm. The production clusters for these commodities have been evaluated by the federal government based on factors such as existing clusters of agro industrial activities, competitiveness, business environment, and implementation support by the state governments. The evaluation has led to the selection of 14 sites to be developed as model SCPZs (Table 4.8).

Table 4.8—Location of Staple Crops Processing Zones

Location	State	Crop
Adani-Omor	Enugu/Anambra	Cassava
Agbadu	Kogi	Cassava
Ambursa	Kebbi/Sokoto	Rice
Badeggi	Niger	Rice
Edebiri	Bayelsa	Fisheries
Gassol	Taraba	Rice
Kadawa	Kano	Rice, Tomato, Sorghum
Metu Ereyun	Lagos	Fisheries
Makurdi	Benue	Citrus
Oban	Cross River	Pineapple
Okorolo	Rivers	Fisheries
Ososa	Ogun	Cassava
Shao	Kwara	Cassava

Source: Adapted from Adesina, (2013)

PERFORMANCE OF THE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITY MARKET AND TRADE CORPORATIONS

Whereas the government has made significant progress in implementing the other ATA pillars, only gradual progress is being made with regard to the transformation of the marketing system. Yet, unless marketing challenges are meaningfully addressed, the gains made under ATA will be difficult to sustain. At the inception of ATA, government emphasized the need to establish new market corporations to perform several functions which complement efforts geared towards the development of agricultural commodity value chains and proper functioning of the SCPZs. In this regard, ACMTCs are to be established for roots and tubers, cocoa, cotton, grains, horticulture, livestock, and fisheries. Specifically, the corporations are to:

1. Coordinate commodity value chains to ensure that farmers are able to secure profitable markets for their commodities and through such trade to improve farm incomes.
2. Organize farmers into production clusters for each of the commodity value chains and link them to processors.
3. Put in place institutional arrangements to expand the access of farmers in the value chain to agricultural extension services and improved production methods (seeds, fertilizers, irrigation, and mechanization) to rapidly raise the productivity of farms.
4. Establish a decentralized modern price discovery system to ensure the flow of reliable, quality, and timely market information across agricultural value chains, using mobile phones and other mass price transmission systems.
5. Coordinate with the Abuja Security and Exchange Commission in order to put in place a functional agricultural commodity exchange platform to improve marketing and pricing of agricultural produce.
6. Establish, manage, and promote private sector investments in commodity processing and value addition through commercial ventures.
7. Ensure price stabilization through a mix of public and private sector instruments, including public interventions to mop up surpluses, to support strategic grain reserves, to link farmers to buyers, to enable market hedging, and to facilitate export financing for farmers to export their surpluses.

8. Develop the needed market infrastructure – warehouses, silos, cold storage, etc. – and transfer their operation to the private sector under lease arrangements to reduce post-harvest and marketing losses and improve food safety.
9. Put in place grade and standards for the commodities to facilitate trade.
10. Facilitate the establishment and functioning of Staple Crop Processing Zones.

Currently, the ACMTCs are still at the development stage. They are being designed by experts in consultation with stakeholders associated with the various commodities along the value chains. Although work has reached an advanced stage, all of the corporations did not come on stream in 2014. Four of the corporations – cocoa, cotton, roots and tubers, and grains – were fully operational by end-2014, while the remaining three – horticulture, livestock, and fisheries – would follow soon after that.

PERFORMANCE OF AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION TRANSFORMATION AGENDA

The Agricultural Extension Transformation Agenda (AETA) is being implemented in 25 states. The states signed agreements with the federal government to perform specific roles and responsibilities. About 1,215 motorcycles have been acquired and distributed to the states for use by extension agents. Also 5,000 knapsack sprayers have been distributed to be used for training young agriculturists as crop protection service providers. A number of capacity building activities have been carried out. These include pre-season in-service trainings, workshops, technical and steering committee workshops, and specialized trainings for targeted value chains. Over 4,800 farmers and processors and 840 extension agents of various cadres were trained in 2012.

The states are expecting better performance from AETA. The views express in one of the case study states is that AETA should support the revival of some extension functions which were previously supported over two decades ago jointly by the World Bank, federal government, and the state. Since World Bank financing came to an end, extension has been relegated to the background in many states in terms of funding. According to a top official of the Agricultural Development Programme,

The state has only been able to pay staff salary and allowances. Many extension programmes such as the continuous research and extension linkages, monthly technical review meetings, and fortnightly training at field level came to a halt. At the moment there is no fund to acquire transport facilities for extension services and to pay allowances for extension workers. AETA is supposed to change this undesirable trend. Since its inception in 2013, the state has received 23 motor cycles for extension staff (who total about 300) and 200 knapsack sprayers. We have trained 100 youths on the use and maintenance of the sprayers, which later were supplied to the youths for use on their farms. They can also hire them out to other farmers who are in need. The federal government pledged to provide allowances for extension workers to enable them perform their jobs, re-introduce training for them, and provide them with transport facilities. However, the magnitude of federal government's intervention so far is far below expectation given the nature of activities indicated in the plan for the AETA.

PERFORMANCE OF GROWTH ENHANCEMENT SUPPORT SCHEME

The analytical framework stipulates that the collaborative process and management mechanisms should lead to an output. This in turn will give an indication of the effect of the quality of intergovernmental relations in the implementation of ATA and GES scheme. This section undertakes an assessment of the GES scheme implementation performance using three indicators: (1) effective rate of participation in the subsidy program, (2) input redemption rate, and (3) proportion of farmers targeted – which can also be referred to as the desired rate of participation in the subsidy program or the subsidy inclusion rate. The effective participation rate is the number of farmers who redeemed inputs as a percentage of the number of farmers registered; while the redemption rate is the number of farmers who redeemed inputs as a percentage of the number of farmers targeted for the input subsidy. The third indicator is the number of farmers targeted expressed as a percentage of the number of farmers registered. It is a measure of the extent to which the government has addressed the issue of inclusiveness in implementing the GES scheme.

The process of targeting farmers to benefit from the input subsidy program under the GES scheme started with the registration of 3.9 million farmers in 2012. The number increased to 9.5 million in 2013 and 10.5 million in 2014. The number of

farmers targeted for the subsidy benefit also continued to increase from 1.1 million in 2012 to 7.2 million in 2013 and 8.3 million in 2014 (Table 4.9). The proportion of registered farmers being targeted for the subsidy program trended upwards from 2012 to 2014, but at a decreasing rate. The redemption rate decreased from 67 percent in 2012 to 57 percent in 2013, but increased to an all-time high of 87 percent in 2014; while the effective participation rate has been growing at an increasing rate over the period.

Table 4.9—Farmers’ participation in the GES scheme

Year	Number of Farmers Registered (a)	Number of Farmers Targeted (b)	Number of Farmers Redeemed (c)	Participation Rate (%) [(c)/(a)]*100	Redemption Rate (%) [(c)/(b)]*100	Rate of Farmers’ Inclusion (%) [(b)/(a)]*100
2012	3,907,445	1,093,113	728,736	19	67	28
2013	9,511,674	7,236,274	4,121,091	43	57	76
2014	10,470,589	8,304,803	7,223,070	69	87	79

Source: Author’s computation using data from FMARD, Abuja.

A comparison of the performance indicators across the six geopolitical zones presents intriguing results in terms of farmers’ participation (Table 4.10) and zonal share of subsidized inputs distributed to farmers (Table 4.11). On an annual basis, the share of registered farmers is higher in the north than in the south. During the first year of the GES scheme (2012), 90 percent of farmers who redeemed their inputs came from the three northern geopolitical zones, compared with 9 percent from the three southern zones. In 2012, the lowest inclusion rates were recorded in the southern zones. Despite increases in the inclusion rates in 2013 and 2014, the percentage of redeemed farmers was much lower in the southern zones than the northern zones. Contrary to expectation, a more even distribution of the inclusion rates among the geopolitical zones in 2013 and 2014 has not been associated with high participation rates in the southern geopolitical zones, especially in 2013 (Table 4.10). Moreover, the divergence between the desired rate of participation and the effective rate of participation continued to widen in 2013 and 2014 compared with the situation in 2012. This is an indication of the difficulty in maintaining the redemption rate at a high level over the period. As shown in Table 4.10, the desired participation rate (subsidy inclusion rate) and effective participation rate rose in each of the geopolitical zones from 2012 to 2014. At the same time, the share of subsidized inputs has also been much higher in the north than the south on an annual basis.

The foregoing is a reflection of the economy of the northern zones being largely agrarian. A large proportion of the population depends on agriculture for their livelihood. Thus, it is little wonder that calls for farmers to register and to redeem their inputs elicited huge response in the northern states. These farmers may have been swindled by middlemen in the past; thus they were enthusiastic to participate in the GES scheme which not only guaranteed direct access to fertilizer, but also allowed the farmers to purchase inputs at subsidized prices.

Table 4.10—Zonal distribution of farmers participating in the Growth Enhancement Support scheme, 2012-2014, %

Zone	2012					2013					2014				
	Reg	Redm	Prate	RRate	Inc-Rate	Reg	Redm	Prate	RRate	Inc-Rate	Reg	Redm	Prate	RRate	Inc-Rate
North West	25	53	40	67	60	25	32	54	83	65	30	32	75	95	79
North East	24	16	13	67	19	23	24	46	53	87	22	22	71	89	80
North Central	20	21	20	67	30	18	21	50	61	82	17	18	74	92	80
South West	9	3	7	67	11	11	5	19	27	71	11	6	37	46	80
South East	11	3	6	67	8	10	8	35	42	83	9	8	62	78	80
South South	12	3	5	67	7	12	10	36	52	69	12	13	78	102	76
All zones	100	100	19	67	28	100	100	43	57	76	100	100	69	87	79

Source: Author’s computation using data from FMARD, Abuja.

Note: Reg = share of registered farmers; Redm = share of registered farmers that redeemed inputs; Prate = participation rate; RRate = redemption rate; IncRate = subsidy inclusion rate

As the implementation of the GES scheme progressed, compliance with the input allocation criteria rose, as evidenced by the comparison of the zonal share of participating farmers with the share of inputs (Table 4.11), the quantity of fertilizer received by a farmer in each of the states (Table 4.12), and the share of subsidy payment by the federal government (Table

4.13). The expected balance between the zonal share of farmers who redeemed inputs and the share of total inputs redeemed in each of the geopolitical zones did not occur in 2012. Ostensibly, this was in view of the fact that full compliance might have been stymied by initial difficulties in adjusting to a new scheme. Thus, in 2012, 53 percent of farmers who redeemed their inputs were in the North West zone. The participating farmers in this zone received 61 percent of all subsidized seeds and 71 percent of all fertilizer distributed nationally. This distribution seems out of proportion to other zones where the share of inputs fell sharply below the share of participating farmers. The exception to this pattern is South South zone, which also experienced a disproportionate distribution in which 3 percent of farmers who redeemed their inputs were in the South South zone, but these farmers received 17 percent of all subsidized seed nationally. The observed imbalances may have resulted from the distribution in seven states where the average quantity of fertilizer received by a farmer varied from the target.

Table 4.11—Comparison of zonal share of participants and inputs distributed under the Growth Enhancement Support scheme, 2012-2014, %

Zone	2012			2013			2014		
	Redm	Seeds	NPK	Redm	Seeds	NPK	Redm	Seeds	NPK
North West	53	61.2	70.5	32	34.2	30.2	32	33.5	33.1
North East	16	5.5	11.3	24	26.3	23.2	22	23.1	19.6
North Central	21	13.8	12.2	21	20.1	20.7	18	18.5	18.3
South West	3	1.8	2.1	5	5.1	5.0	6	5.9	6.3
South East	3	0.6	2.0	8	7.9	8.0	8	7.4	9.1
South South	3	17.1	1.9	10	6.4	12.8	13	11.5	13.6
All zones	100	100.0	100.0	100	100.0	100.0	100	100.0	100.0

Source: Author's computation using data from FMARD, Abuja.

With better targeting of farmers, improved management of supply chains, and monitoring of input distribution from 2013, significant improvement in compliance with input allocation criteria and better access to inputs by farmers has been achieved. As shown in Table 4.11, the observed imbalance in 2012 has been minimized and the share of inputs received in each of the geopolitical zones is commensurate with the share of participating farmers in 2013. As a matter of policy, each farmer is guaranteed access to two bags of fertilizer and a bag of seed – either maize or rice – under the GES scheme. Available data indicate that each of the farmers who redeemed their inputs had access to two bags of fertilizer, especially in 2013 and 2014. This is an improvement over the situation in 2012 when it was not possible to ensure full compliance at the inception of the GES scheme; especially in states such as Delta, Edo, Ekiti, Katsina, Kwara, Osun and Taraba (Table 4.12).

Compared with the situation before the GES scheme, access to fertilizer by small-scale farmers witnessed considerable improvement under ATA. During the pre-ATA era, it would not have been possible to have access to fertilizer distribution data in a form that could permit a determination of the quantity of fertilizer received per farmer, let alone ascertaining the share of each state on an annual basis, to guide any meaningful policy action. Providing the stipulated quantity of fertilizer to farmers who redeemed their subsidized inputs for two consecutive (2013 and 2014) years is at the heart of the success of the GES scheme in the view of farmers, policy makers, and analysts who have been associated with the scheme.

Table 4.12—Fertilizer distribution under the Growth Enhancement Support scheme, by state

State	2012			2013			2014		
	Farmers Redeemed	Quantity of fertilizer (50Kg Bag)	Fertilizer/ Farmer (50Kg Bag)	Farmers Redeemed	Quantity of fertilizer (50Kg Bag)	Fertilizer/ Farmer (50Kg Bag)	Farmers Redeemed	Quantity of fertilizer (50Kg Bag)	Fertilizer/ Farmer (50Kg Bag)
Abia	5,413	10,280	2	118,054	236,109	2	186,872	373,744	2
Adamawa	-	-	-	137,607	275,214	2	193,696	387,392	2
Akwa Ibom	100	200	2	114,807	225,047	2	261,776	523,552	2
Anambra	6,034	12,620	2	77,221	146,322	2	148,010	296,020	2
Bauchi	53,203	114,680	2	336,271	672,640	2	589,706	1,179,412	2
Bayelsa	192	300	2	54,146	108,292	2	115,486	230,900	2
Benue	29,881	59,520	2	176,512	334,887	2	213,590	427,180	2
Borno	6,828	13,660	2	95,722	187,005	2	222,505	445,010	2
Cross River	15,866	30,260	2	93,245	186,490	2	174,931	349,862	2
Delta	2,815	7,940	3	80,703	158,506	2	169,928	339,856	2
Ebonyi	5,591	11,060	2	55,818	111,636	2	105,252	210,504	2
Edo	2,433	3,220	1	49,090	91,755	2	133,761	267,522	2
Ekiti	3,115	11,360	4	46,239	91,308	2	39,610	79,220	2
Enugu	1,636	2,640	2	51,250	102,501	2	116,162	226,029	2
FCT	36,146	71,920	2	92,808	179,648	2	83,994	167,988	2
Gombe	51,232	102,460	2	126,790	251,261	2	152,722	305,444	2
Imo	5,107	10,060	2	23,763	43,615	2	34,611	69,222	2
Jigawa	100,513	199,820	2	110,958	221,818	2	199,190	398,380	2
Kaduna	81,000	162,000	2	416,556	815,378	2	418,312	916,917	2
Kano	125,291	250,580	2	250,389	500,777	2	435,853	871,706	2
Katsina	50,856	996,220	20	93,676	187,352	2	245,074	490,148	2
Kebbi	8,588	17,180	2	112,168	224,336	2	271,327	542,654	2
Kogi	14,204	28,440	2	128,356	247,328	2	187,304	374,608	2
Kwara	9,520	2,780	1	65,616	129,183	2	171,029	342,058	2
Lagos	2,179	4,360	2	15,814	27,191	2	17,814	35,628	2
Nasarawa	26,505	54,240	2	68,554	131,014	2	63,130	126,260	2
Niger	29,892	57,040	2	114,146	228,291	2	228,713	457,426	2
Ogun	3,048	5,880	2	22,185	44,370	2	66,218	132,436	2
Ondo	1,858	3,680	2	17,519	34,183	2	68,426	136,900	2
Osun	2,232	5,620	3	18,000	35,820	2	111,243	222,486	2
Oyo	11,006	18,460	2	90,959	174,896	2	127,834	256,806	2
Plateau	8,119	15,000	2	199,693	399,386	2	362,805	725,610	2
Rivers	1,177	2,460	2	34,270	65,187	2	95,021	190,042	2
Sokoto	18,041	35,720	2	198,107	396,215	2	298,505	597,010	2
Taraba	7,503	36,320	5	187,128	351,572	2	304,740	609,480	2
Yobe	62	120	2	125,377	250,754	2	151,011	302,022	2
Zamfara	1,550	2,920	2	121,574	237,189	2	456,909	913,818	2
Total	728,736	2,361,020	3	4,121,091	8,104,475	2	7,223,070	14,521,252	2

Source: Author's computation using data from FMARD, Abuja.

Table 4.13—Distribution of federal government spending on fertilizer subsidy under the Growth Enhancement Support scheme, by state

State	2012			2013			2014		
	Quantity of fertilizer (50 kg bags)	Subsidy Payment (₦ thousands)	Share (%)	Quantity of fertilizer (50 kg bags)	Subsidy Payment (₦ thousands)	Share (%)	Quantity of fertilizer (50 kg bags)	Subsidy Payment (₦ thousands)	Share (%)
Abia	10,280	28,270	0.4	236,109	649,299	2.8	373,744	1,027,796	2.5
Adamawa	-	-	-	275,214	756,838	3.3	387,392	1,065,328	2.6
Akwa Ibom	200	550	0.0	225,047	618,878	2.7	523,552	1,439,768	3.5
Anambra	12,620	34,705	0.5	146,322	402,385	1.8	296,020	814,055	2.0
Bauchi	114,680	315,370	4.7	672,640	1,849,761	8.1	1,179,412	3,243,383	7.9
Bayelsa	300	825	0.0	108,292	297,803	1.3	230,900	634,975	1.5
Benue	59,520	163,680	2.5	334,887	920,939	4.0	427,180	1,174,745	2.9
Borno	13,660	37,565	0.6	187,005	514,263	2.2	445,010	1,223,778	3.0
Cross River	30,260	83,215	1.3	186,490	512,848	2.2	349,862	962,121	2.3
Delta	7,940	21,835	0.3	158,506	435,893	1.9	339,856	934,604	2.3
Ebonyi	11,060	30,415	0.5	111,636	306,999	1.3	210,504	578,886	1.4
Edo	3,220	8,855	0.1	91,755	252,327	1.1	267,522	735,686	1.8
Ekiti	11,360	31,240	0.5	91,308	251,097	1.1	79,220	217,855	0.5
Enugu	2,640	7,260	0.1	102,501	281,877	1.2	226,029	621,580	1.5
FCT	71,920	197,780	3.0	179,648	494,032	2.2	167,988	461,967	1.1
Gombe	102,460	281,765	4.2	251,261	690,967	3.0	305,444	839,971	2.0
Imo	10,060	27,665	0.4	43,615	119,943	0.5	69,222	190,361	0.5
Jigawa	199,820	549,505	8.3	221,818	610,001	2.7	398,380	1,095,545	2.7
Kaduna	162,000	445,500	6.7	815,378	2,242,290	9.8	916,917	2,521,522	6.1
Kano	250,580	689,095	10.4	500,777	1,377,137	6.0	871,706	2,397,192	5.8
Katsina	996,220	2,739,605	41.2	187,352	515,219	2.2	490,148	1,347,907	3.3
Kebbi	17,180	47,245	0.7	224,336	616,923	2.7	542,654	1,492,299	3.6
Kogi	28,440	78,210	1.2	247,328	680,153	3.0	374,608	1,030,172	2.5
Kwara	2,780	7,645	0.1	129,183	355,253	1.6	342,058	940,660	2.3
Lagos	4,360	11,990	0.2	27,191	74,775	0.3	35,628	97,977	0.2
Nasarawa	54,240	149,160	2.2	131,014	360,287	1.6	126,260	347,215	0.8
Niger	57,040	156,860	2.4	228,291	627,801	2.7	457,426	1,257,922	3.1
Niger	57,040	156,860	2.4	228,291	627,801	2.7	457,426	1,257,922	3.1
Ogun	5,880	16,170	0.2	44,370	122,018	0.5	132,436	364,199	0.9
Ondo	3,680	10,120	0.2	34,183	94,003	0.4	136,900	376,475	0.9
Osun	5,620	15,455	0.2	35,820	98,505	0.4	222,486	611,837	1.5
Oyo	18,460	50,765	0.8	174,896	480,963	2.1	256,806	706,217	1.7
Plateau	15,000	41,250	0.6	399,386	1,098,311	4.8	725,610	1,995,428	4.8
Rivers	2,460	6,765	0.1	65,187	179,265	0.8	190,042	522,616	1.3
Sokoto	35,720	98,230	1.5	396,215	1,089,591	4.8	597,010	1,641,778	4.0
Taraba	36,320	99,880	1.5	351,572	966,822	4.2	609,480	1,676,070	4.1
Yobe	120	330	0.0	250,754	689,572	3.0	302,022	830,561	2.0
Zamfara	2,920	8,030	0.1	237,189	652,270	2.8	913,818	2,513,000	6.1
Total	2,418,060	6,649,665	100.0	8,332,766	22,915,108	100.0	14,978,678	41,191,365	100.0

Source: Author's computation using data from FMARD, Abuja

4.3 Factors influencing ATA implementation performance

Despite the design gaps associated with ATA, the implementation has been successful judging by the various performance indicators, such as the number of beneficiaries, quantity of modern inputs distributed to farmers, and increase in agricultural production. The number of farmers registered for input subsidy support has been increasing, the input distribution network expanding, the subsidy payment has been better delivered, crop production is increasing, the banking sector is more responsive, and official development assistance is rising steadily based on the investment drives under ATA. Within a collaborative framework, the performance can be associated with a number of factors; chief among which are a pre-history of intergovernmental cooperation, leadership, the roles of technical facilitators, and the supply chain management initiative.

PRE-HISTORY OF COOPERATION BETWEEN FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS

Cooperation between the federal and state governments in agricultural project implementation has a long history. As regards fertilizer policy, it dates back to the Third Plan Period (1975-1980) when input policy was very prominent in an attempt to achieve food self-sufficiency. Prior to this period, procurement and distribution of fertilizer fell within the purview of state governments. The federal government established the Fertilizer Procurement and Distribution Division within the Federal Ministry of Agriculture as the central fertilizer procurement and distribution unit. Following the inception of the Third Plan, various arrangements involving the participation of the federal government and the states in the transportation and distribution of fertilizer emerged. Specifically, while the federal government was involved in procurement of fertilizer, states were involved in the transportation and distribution of imported and domestically produced fertilizers. From 1977 the federal government implemented an annual programme of fertilizer procurement and distribution to the states. Fertilizer depots were established at various locations to serve as distribution points for this purpose. After years of foot-dragging on government's withdrawal, the inception of ATA in 2011 marked a definitive turning point in this arrangement when the input procurement and distribution was liberalized, the role of government re-defined in input supply to be that of facilitator and enabler, and the private sector assigned full responsibility to procure and deliver inputs to the farmers as enshrined in the GES scheme. It, therefore, is not too difficult for the states to go along with the implementation of the GES scheme, despite misgivings about securing their buy-in in terms of the development of the idea and the design of the scheme – misgivings that were expressed by study participants from state governments in describing the process of securing cooperation as “co-option” or “bulldozing”.

Moreover, there have been past experiences of joint implementation of projects by the federal and state governments involving joint financing and management. These are of different types reflecting varying experiences and challenges. The Fadama III and National Programme on Food Security (NPFS) projects, for example are common to the four states studied here (Table 4.14). These projects are usually implemented using funds from development partners, such as the World Bank, IFAD, and the African Development Bank, with the tiers of government involved also making their own financial contributions. The key common challenge faced by the states partnering in the implementation of these projects was delays in payment (and sometimes non-payment) of counterpart funds expected from the federal and state governments.

Table 4.14—Selected projects jointly implemented by federal and state governments

Zone	State	Joint Projects	Constraints
North West	Kebbi	Community Based Agriculture and Rural Development Programme (CBARDP); NPFS; and Fadama III Fertilizer Subsidy Programme	Delays in payments of counterpart funds by government Delivery delays, diversions and politicization
North Central	Niger	Fadama I, II, and III; NPFS Fertilizer Subsidy Programme	Delays in payments of counterpart funds by government Delivery delays, diversions and politicization
South West	Ogun	Fadama II & III; NPFS; Cassava: Adding Value for Africa project; Roots and Tuber Expansion Program Fertilizer Subsidy Programme	Delays in payments of counterpart funds by government Delivery delays, diversions and politicization
South East	Ebonyi	Fadama III, NPFS Fertilizer Subsidy Programme	Delays in payments of counterpart funds by government Delivery delays, diversions and politicization

Source: Author's compilation

The main issue is that state governments are not always committed to the payment of counterpart funds under these projects. As a rule, a state must provide its own funds before those of the federal government can be obtained. Moreover, these two components must be paid before donor funds can be released. This rule has been difficult to comply with by government, and no meaningful enforcement mechanisms have been put in place. Although the extent of violation varies from one state to another, in some states this problem is so serious as to frustrate any collaborative effort. In Kebbi state, for instance, counterpart funds for Fadama and IFAD projects in 2012, 2013, and 2014 had not been provided by the government. The relevant components of the projects to be funded appeared in the budget annually, but they were not funded and all operations have had to be halted.

In light of the foregoing, there are sufficient lessons from past experiences that may warrant the federal government to request that states sign necessary agreements regarding the mode of payment of their financial contribution to the GES scheme and to demand that such payment should be deducted upfront by the federal government from the statutory allocation to all states from the federation account. Of course in the aftermath of such deductions, the net statutory revenue transfer to the states, in view of other possible deductions, would need to be something that is carefully managed by the states.

Thus, any further externally imposed expenditure mandate can hardly be tolerated. This factor may explain the less than expected level of cooperation and participation from some states for certain ATA components, such as value chain development, despite the fact that they have the state leadership may have had the same political affiliation as the leadership of the federal government.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FACILITATIVE LEADERSHIP IN ATA

The success and level of cooperation achieved in the implementation of ATA so far depends largely on the coordinator of the process in the person of the Federal Minister of Agriculture, whose leadership at every stage of ATA has been widely recognized and respected. The acceptability and cooperation witnessed derives from the level of competence, forthrightness, and relentlessness that have attended the administration and coordination of the various programs under his leadership.

Right from the diagnosis of the challenges of the agricultural sector to the articulation of policies and design of implementation strategies, there is clear focus and understanding in the design of the ATA of the development trajectories from the past to the present and appreciation of what the destination should be. The Minister provides leadership in decision making and supervision. He also leads the way in mobilizing the human and material resources from state and non-state actors within and outside the country, as well as in developing the technical capabilities required for effective service delivery. What is more, the communication of the ATA strategies is sufficiently strong so as to break the walls of resistance and to forge the required cooperation to achieve the desired results.

INVOLVEMENT OF TECHNICAL FACILITATOR

The performance of the GES scheme and the success so far recorded cannot be dissociated from the services of Cellulant, who has been playing the role of a technical facilitator. Cellulant is a private sector technology consulting firm that is central to the design and operation of the GES scheme. The firm was charged with the responsibility of designing, developing, and operating the GES electronic wallet technology for delivering subsidized agricultural inputs to farmers in Nigeria. It has demonstrated the experience and competence to deploy the technology and to train supply chain managers on how it works. Cellulant serves as the interface for all stakeholders with a critical role to play under the GES scheme. It is the custodian of information on the flow of key inputs being supplied, including the flow of funds from banks to finance the agrodealers. It has links with supply chain managers, banks who are financing the agrodealers, input suppliers who are expected to make inputs and their agrodealer network available, states (ADPs) who work with input suppliers to set up redemption centers, and farmers whose records are registered on Cellulant's portal and used for identification and redemption purposes. The combination of its technical facilitation role with the coordinating role of the Federal Minister of Agriculture shapes the operation of the GES scheme and defines the guideposts for its overall performance. So far, the documentation provided by the firm through its technological innovations has been of vital importance for GES scheme monitoring and evaluation as well as for policy actions and reactions.

INTRODUCTION OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT

Bringing in supply chain management to the implementation procedures for the GES scheme since 2013 created improvement in documentation of transactions and transparency. The 2014 GES scheme is regarded as a success in terms of management and supervision. According to a respondent:

There is sanity in the selection of agrodealers in 2014. ...If you know you are not up to standard, you cannot come in. In previous years, there was no serious scrutiny of agrodealers, especially in terms of technical expertise, knowledge of the business, and financial capability.

Most of the HLS that work with the SCM are unemployed youths; thus the introduction of supply chain management has created employment opportunities and has exposed youth to agricultural business and other areas of interest in agricultural value chains. Besides, every farmer is sure of having access to at least one bag of fertilizer and feel satisfied that such direct access is created under the GES scheme.

4.4 Implementation challenges of ATA

Despite the level of success achieved under ATA, there are several challenges militating against collaborative governance and quick delivery of services. If the gains are to be sustained while at the same time maintaining an increase in the rates of

subsidy inclusion, participation, and input redemption, it is imperative to identify such challenges with a view to mitigating their impacts in order to achieve improved performance in the implementation of ATA.

Based on its focus on intergovernmental collaboration, this study identifies implementation challenges at federal and state levels. First, the challenges of a general nature which affect ATA's implementation nationwide are presented. They are the challenges that are not state-specific and should be addressed at national level with federal government providing the lead. The second category of challenges refers to those constraints that manifest at the state level based on the experiences of the four case study states. However, solutions to these state-level challenges can be found through actions by both federal and state governments. For proper focusing of remedial measures, the challenges are analyzed along three dimensions – technical, financial, and political.

The technical constraints are:

1. Limited coverage of rural areas by mobile phone networks: This was a major problem faced by farmers at redemption centers. Over 30 percent of farmers who turned out at the redemption centers were unable to redeem inputs due to poor mobile phone network coverage. The experience in Kebbi state shows that slow and irregular network services can reduce redemption activities from 100 farmers to less than 50 farmers per day.
2. The desire of some states to use scratch cards in order to avoid the problems of limited mobile phone networks in the rural areas. Upscaling the use of scratch cards will require a large number of human personnel and limit the cost-effectiveness of GES. An alternative technology, the smart card technology, that can work both on-line and off-line, is being piloted by FMARD in collaboration with a technology company from the UK and the UKaid agency, DFID (Adesina, 2013).
3. Low density and limited coverage of Nigeria by functional agro-dealers: Most of the upstream suppliers of agro-inputs do not have a national network of agro-dealers that can be relied upon for effective delivery of agro-inputs to every LGA or ward in Nigeria. Their networks generally are concentrated in a few urban cities or states.
4. Supply chain inventory and logistics issues: Upstream suppliers (producers and importers) of fertilizer and seeds could not consistently meet the demand for inputs at all redemption sites. Now that the basic structure of the national agro-input distribution system is in place, the 50 percent performance level of suppliers will be increased by the appointment of supply chain managers to coordinate delivery of inputs.

The major financial constraints are threefold:

1. Financial capacity of participating agro-dealers: The GES program at minimum requires an agro-dealer to be able to finance at least two trucks of agro-inputs in order to avoid out-of-stock problems at the redemption points. Two trucks of fertilizer cost at least ₦6 million. Most of the agro-dealers that are participating in GES are unable to finance this level of inventory. GES provides a lending opportunity for the financial sector. However, unfortunately the banks did not respond to it as desired. There needs to be sensitization of banks to the potential of the program to significantly increase lending to the upstream agro-dealer sector.
2. Slow provision of funding under the sovereign guarantee arrangement by banks to agro-dealers and low participation of the banks in the agro-financing component: To our knowledge, only five banks eventually provided funds to agro-dealers. However, their loans were given out late in the farming season.
3. The conceptual design was that upstream suppliers would be the ones making claims for GES scheme reimbursement from government. What happened in reality was that suppliers demanded payment upfront from agro-dealers, who then had to demand reimbursement from government. The process that was set up for a larger claimant, the suppliers, proved excessively complicated for smaller claimants, the agro-dealers. This represents a significant profit-loss risk for small agrodealers. Government is making efforts to simplify the payment processes and reconsidering other options, such as escrowing GES scheme funds, which can be administered by banks, and the introduction of an electronic payment system based on redemptions.

With regard to the major political constraints that have been faced in GES implementation, there seems to be an implicit political force driving the responses of states to the farmers' registration program of the federal government under the GES scheme. Many states continue to perceive fertilizer supply to farmers as a political weapon. The political leaders in such states regard mobilizing farmers for the registration exercise as a political party membership drive and a way of building up

political capital. In the process, attention is not often paid to authenticating the genuineness of the claims of those who show up as farmers. According to the recent scorecard report of ATA, states provided information on 4.3 million farmers; during implementation, it emerged that quite a number of registered farmers were not practicing farmers, but, rather, were involved in other parts of the farming business. This is being corrected through verification of the farmer lists and a better capture of authentic farmers (Adesina 2013). Unless the political motivations are underplayed, targeting of farmers for inclusion in the subsidy program will be sub-optimal and the tendency will be high among analysts to overestimate the inclusion rate, while the redemption rate is underestimated.

IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES AT THE STATE LEVEL

The various constraints adversely affecting the implementation performance of ATA at state level are presented in Table 4.15 for the four study states of Kebbi, Niger, Ogun, and Ebonyi. In Kebbi and Niger, the northern states, the state-level constraints are administrative, technical, financial, and social in nature, whereas in the southern states of Ogun and Ebonyi, there are administrative, technical, financial, and political constraints.

In Kebbi state, the constraints include:

1. Many farmers practice monocropping, especially of millet, rather than multiple cropping. Thus, they generate very meager incomes and cannot afford, therefore, to redeem all the subsidized inputs allocated to them at once, They can redeem one bag of fertilizer at a time and return later if they are able to sell the fertilizer to generate more money.
2. Limited access to finance by agrodealers slows down stocking of inputs and limit the quantity available for redemption. Usually major suppliers do not agree to sell inputs to agrodealers on credit.
3. Inadequate storage facilities slows down the redemption process. Some agrodealers do not have sufficient funds to rent warehouses with adequate storage capacity. Thus, until their stock is exhausted there is no space to store large quantities of inputs. Farmers have to wait for the stock to be replenished before redemption can resume. Sometimes farmers find only urea and have to wait for a long time before NPK is available.
4. Overcrowding of some RCs slows down the inputs redemption exercise. Farmers do not wait for the turn of their wards before they report at the RCs, as stipulated by the authorities, for fear that inputs may finish within a short period of time.

Besides, there are challenges arising from documentation lapses in Kebbi, which have tended to slow down the redemption rate. According to a respondent:

When GES first came in 2012, it was not loaded with too many personnel. Now, too many personnel are involved, and this is leading to abuses, delays in the supply of inputs, and poor quality of inputs. There are too many personnel involved these days – Cellulant here, Cellulant there; Helpline here, Helpline there. Thus, a web of collusions and confusion is created which tends to lower the quality of service delivery. I will encourage you to go to any of the redemption centers and see for yourself what is happening there. Farmers stay for a long time before they get their inputs redeemed. The hassle is just too much.

“Moreover, the process is now being inundated with excessive paperwork and bureaucracy. Currently there are lapses in the handling of farmers’ lists. Sometimes the lists of farmers that go to the redemption centers are not always complete. Mistakenly, lists of farmers from other states come to Kebbi state, while some of the Kebbi state lists go to other states. This makes it difficult for farmers to redeem their inputs. Sometimes lists of one LGA are taken to another LGA, thus creating confusion and delays in the redemption process.

In Ebonyi state the constraints include:

1. Unavailability of complete farmers’ registers – This posed considerable problems in the state. In 2014, some farmers could not find their names on the farmers’ register displayed at the RCs. Even some farmers who registered and redeemed their inputs in 2013 could not find their names on the register. The omissions were traced to Cellulant, who is the custodian of farmers’ register.

2. Re-mapping of farmers and redemption centers – Some farmers in Ebonyi state were transferred from their previous RCs to other RCs, which were quite far from the communities where they live. Some of the farmers might have decided not to redeem their inputs on account of the high transportation cost of travelling to where their RC was relocated. There is also the transportation challenge faced by the SCM and supervisors who have no vehicles to monitor the redemption. This tends to slow down monitoring activities, especially when there is rain.

Table 4.15—Comparison of ATA implementation constraints in the four study states

Category	Kebbi state	Niger state
Administrative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FMARD has not inaugurated the ATIC in Kebbi state 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ATIC inaugurated in 2013, but not functional since then
Technical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ATA demands more intensive extension services in the implementation of the various programmes. Number of extension workers grossly inadequate. Technical officers, from directors down the line to field officers, are not fully integrated into the programme. Poor communication network has negative effect on redemption rate. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of experienced technical staff in FMARD state office to serve as desk officers for each commodity value chain. Inadequate transport facilities for meaningful monitoring of GES activities. Office space is not adequate. There are 12 offices for 40 staff members, including 20 senior officers. Poor communication network has negative effect on redemption rate.
Financial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FMARD state offices face financial difficulties as more responsibilities are added, more value chains are developed, and facility maintenance requires more funds. State has not coped with the financing of extension services in terms of providing training, facilities to enhance mobility of frontline extension workers, and other logistics. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FMARD state offices face financial difficulties as more responsibilities are added, more value chains are developed, and facility maintenance requires more funds. Lack of adequate financial capacity of the state to meet the funding of the subsidy payment. Funding is not regular for the FMARD programmes and activities in the state.
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some farmers are reluctant to buy cell phones, A cell phone costs between ₦4000 and ₦5000. Farmers prefer spending such an amount directly on fertilizer purchase instead of buying a cell phone. Some may buy during registration but misplace the phones or SIM cards before redemption. This can slow down the redemption exercise since HLS have to rely on alternative means of identification. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Security challenges. The fear of rebel attack led RC to close for some time, resulting in delays in redemption Niger state has the largest land mass in the country with 51 RCs; so the distance farmers have to cover is quite long. This has discouraged input redemption.
	Ogun state	Ebonyi state
Administrative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FMARD has not inaugurated the ATIC in Ogun state. Uncoordinated approach to “specialized” GES implementation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FMARD has not inaugurated the ATIC in Ebonyi state.
Technical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poor communication network has negative effect on redemption rate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poor communication network has negative effect on redemption rate Lack of necessary equipment and tools – vehicles, tractors, irrigation facilities – for programme implementation
Financial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FMARD state offices face financial difficulties as more responsibilities are added, more value chains are developed, and facility maintenance requires more funds. Low volume of business of agro-dealers due to limited access to bank loans Delays in settling allowances of HLS contribute to abuse of redemption procedure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FMARD state offices face financial difficulties as more responsibilities are added, more value chains are developed, and facility maintenance requires more funds. Poor budgetary provision for agricultural programs in the state.
Political	--	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Discrepancy between interest of the dominant political class in Ebonyi state and ATA policies Lack of understanding of ATA tenets

Source: Author’s compilation based on 2014 survey data

In Niger state, the redemption process witnessed several problems including:

1. Conflict of interest among staff at the RCs – This posed a problem in Lapai LGA where self-interested storekeepers constituted a nuisance in the redemption process. According to the Director of Agriculture of the LGA:

When the redemption started in this LGA, we agreed that we all have a stake and we need to cooperate. But, it was not in the interest of the storekeepers to cooperate to have easy redemption. In 2012 and 2013, the storekeepers were hiding the names of farmers, and they ensured that they were the only one to screen the registered farmers and control the process. This had tended to slow down the redemption process and cause many farmers to be annoyed and to abandon the redemption of their inputs. The process was checked in 2014. The storekeepers were made to limit their role to merely opening and closing the stores without being involved in farmers' verification and arbitrary sale of inputs.

2. Missing names – Many farmers in Niger state did not find their names in the farmers' register sent to the state. So even when they reported with their identification cards, following alerts received to that effect, it proved difficult for them to redeem their inputs. This might have arisen from the quota system introduced in 2014.
3. Delays in paying for agrodealers' services – In Niger state, redemption and reconciliation were concluded in October, and agrodealers were supposed to be paid by November. However, they were not paid until around December. Those who took loans for their operations really found it difficult and highly discouraging.
4. Poor market price – When farmers compared the market price of their products with the price of inputs, they are not completely encouraged to buy the inputs. Some considered the ₦5,500 market price of a bag of fertilizer as being too expensive. In 2014, a bag of maize (₦3,200/75kg) (which sold for ₦5,000 the previous year) could not buy a bag of fertilizer in the open market.
5. Communication costs at Redemption Centers – For farmers who did not have a cell phone, the HLS and agrodealers offer assistance in redeeming their inputs. The telephone service providers charged ₦30 per text message sent to Cellulant in this regard. Where these helpers find the charges unbearable, it might be difficult for such farmers to participate fully in the redemption process, with adverse consequences in the redemption rate.

In Ogun state, many farmers did not receive text messages regarding the time and place of redemption due to communication network failure. Some farmers who received the messages could not activate the required redemption codes due to poor communication services. This problem has limited the number of farmers who benefited from the GES especially in 2014.

Other problems in Ogun state included farmers' hesitation to redeem their input due to poor cash flow situation; and poor quality of seeds purchased from the RCs and late arrival of inputs. In 2014, inputs arrived very late at the RCs. Many farmers in some LGAs in the state had already planted maize between March and May, whereas input distribution under the GES scheme took place between July and August. In some RCs, even when fertilizers are supplied on time, the required planting materials (seeds, cassava cuttings) may take a long time to arrive.

5. SUMMARY, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

This study is concerned with the cross-tier roles and responsibilities in the design and implementation of the Agricultural Transformation Agenda in Nigeria. It has examined the policy reforms, initiatives, implementation strategies, and innovations in managing the process. This is with a view to having a better understanding of the intergovernmental collaboration necessary to achieve the expected results. This section presents highlights of the findings, policy recommendations, and conclusions.

5.1 Summary of main findings

CROSS-TIER PARTICIPATION AND COLLECTIVE DECISION MAKING UNDER ATA

The ATA framework involves a wide array of stakeholders comprising state and non-state actors. This is consistent with the philosophy of collaboration. However, acceptance of the responsibilities and understanding the way they should be discharged depends on joint decisions of stakeholders in each category of partnerships. Two categories of stakeholders are missed out in the collaborative process – the local governments and representatives of farmers. The study observes that some non-state actors did not understand their roles at the beginning (e.g., the banking sector), but with persistent communication and interaction with the leadership of ATA, the situation improved considerably. Among state actors, the lack of a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities persisted during the implementation process, leading to delays in taking critical decisions relating to input delivery to farmers. Thus, despite the benefits of the subsidy program, untimely delivery to the target beneficiaries continues.

This study finds varying levels of interactions among the three tiers of government in the implementation of ATA. The intensity of intergovernmental interaction varies from one state to another on account of improper understanding of roles and deep-seated misgivings about the non-collective nature of the decisions leading to the assignment of stakeholders' roles. The cooperation in the implementation of the GES scheme between the federal and state governments has been more visible than that between the state and local governments. The weak cooperation in respect of local governments is due to the fact that in designing ATA and the GES scheme, partnerships were not inclusive of the local government. In consequence, during its implementation the participation of LGAs has been relatively marginal. The study finds that the level of cooperation with states and local governments depends largely on the extent to which the population in the state depends on agriculture for their livelihoods, the calculation of the political benefits of participation, and states' fiscal capacity. The more agriculture-dependent a state is, the more cooperative it will be in managing the ATA implementation process. States tend to hesitate to give full cooperation to those activities which offend their political authority, especially when there is no prior joint decision about such activities.

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND MANAGEMENT OF THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS

The study finds that the management mechanisms adopted by the federal government have contributed largely to the success of the GES scheme, especially in maintaining the technical credibility of the scheme, empowering the implementation process, and ensuring transparency. The management of the ATA implementation process has attracted less attention at the state level compared to the federal level. There are no remarkable innovative approaches at state level to empower the process (with the exception of Niger state) and to ensure transparency. Generally, efforts are concentrated on maintaining the technical credibility of the implementation process, especially in Kebbi and Ebonyi states.

ATA IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE AND CHALLENGES

The government has demonstrated a high level of commitment in articulating strategies for implementing the key components of ATA. The flagship components are the GES scheme, the commodity value chain development program (ACVCD), and NIRSAL. Although substantial achievements have been made in respect of these components, within a relatively short period of time, only gradual progress is being made regarding the others, including SCPZ, ACMTC, and AETA. The establishment of ACMTCs has reached an advanced stage, so and there is hope that four of the marketing corporations will emerge soon. With regard to AETA, the states are still expecting better performance so that, apart from paying the salaries of extension workers, they can have sufficient funds to revive the extension network and strengthen it to operate in an agricultural sector that is witnessing rapid technological changes and new business models.

The development of agricultural value chains have been extensive covering commodities in the crop, livestock, and fisheries sub-sectors. The focus since 2013 has been on soybean, ginger, groundnut, sorghum, sesame, oil palm, cotton, cashew, cocoa, poultry, sheep and goat, piggery, dairy, leather, beef, aquaculture, and artisanal fishery. With the exception of leather, which recorded full redemption of inputs supplied in 2013, the input redemption rates are generally lower in the livestock sub-sector than is the case in the crop sub-sector. In the same vein, aquaculture received a lot more attention than artisanal fishery.

The GES scheme is the most popular component of ATA and has received far more policy attention than any of the other components. The process of targeting farmers to benefit from the input subsidy program under the GES scheme started with the registration of 3.9 million farmers in 2012. The number increased to 9.5 million in 2013 to 10.5 million in 2014. The number of farmers targeted for the subsidy benefit also continued to increase from 1.1 million in 2012, to 7.2 million in 2013, to 8.3 million in 2014. Under the scheme, the quantity of fertilizer distributed to farmers increased from 121 thousand metric tons in 2012, to 467 thousand in 2013, and rose phenomenally to 749 thousand metric tons in 2014. For the fertilizer subsidy alone, the amount spent by the federal government rose from 6.65 billion naira in 2012, to 22.92 billion in 2013, to 41.19 billion naira in 2014. This implies that the total public spending on the fertilizer subsidy by both federal and state governments over the period increased from 13.30 billion naira in 2012, to 45.84 billion in 2013, to 82.38 billion naira in 2014. The number of farmers that benefited from the subsidy increased from 729 thousand in 2012, to 4.1 million in 2013, to 7.22 billion in 2014.

On the basis of these counts alone, the implementation of the GES scheme in particular and ATA in general has been very successful. As expected, the proportion of beneficiaries was much lower in the southern zones than the northern zones. Persistently, the North West zone recorded the highest share of 53, 32, and 32 percent in 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively, compared with the South West, which recorded the lowest share of beneficiaries of 3, 5, and 8 percent, respectively. With better targeting of farmers, improved management of supply chain, and monitoring of input distribution right from 2013, it has been possible to achieve significant improvement in the compliance with input allocation criteria and better access to inputs by farmers. The level of success achieved notwithstanding, challenges remain, but which are by no means insurmountable. There are administrative, technical, financial, social, and political constraints as well as weak collaborative processes, which often result in delays in service delivery. The ensuing section provides some remedial measures.

5.2 Policy recommendations

PLACE MORE EMPHASIS ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATION THAN COOPERATION

1. It is recommended that there should be more effective and meaningful use of existing institutional arrangements for collective decision making where cross-tier partnerships are required, as is the case under ATA. Such institutions include the National Economic and Development Council and the National Council on Agriculture. This also is where the issue of sequencing of actions must be strictly adhered to. Presentation of an already designed agenda to secure buy-in is consistent with cooperation, but violates the principle of collaboration, if indeed the other tiers of government are to be regarded as partners and are expected to show true commitment to the implementation of the agenda. The appropriate authority to convene a meeting of the National Council on Agriculture has the liberty to convene it whenever is it absolutely necessary. Thus, it should be possible to create opportunities for the other partners to participate in the required decisions for the design of collaborative programs under the ATA.
2. The federal and state governments should involve the LGAs in meaningful partnership to achieve ATA objectives.
3. The federal government within the shortest time possible should organize a policy forum involving service providers, platform operators, agro-dealers, commercial banks, state and local government officials, and farmers to review ATA performance so far and come up with ideas to consolidate the gains, chart a new course for subsequent phases, and ensure the sustainability of the policy initiatives.

ENSURE GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN ATA GES IMPLEMENTATION

1. Overhaul the payment system under the GES – The introduction of an automated payment system at the input redemption centers will minimize oligopsony abuses – that is, it will reduce collusion on charging farmers arbitrary fees. Specifically, government should mandate the use of POS machines for redemption. They are to be in the custody of the SCM and be operated by the HLS. The POS should be coded such that it has a specific time

frame during which it can operate – say 8 am to 5 pm. The issue of some agrodealers attempting to redeem as early as 7 am to abuse the redemption process then will not arise.

2. Ensure greater transparency and competitiveness in agrodealers' selection – Follow a competitive bidding process for all states in choosing who will be responsible for supplying the inputs. The procurement department should use relevant, achievable, and agro-industry-sensitive procurement criteria; rather than use models taken from other sectors, such as oil and gas.
3. Government should disallow multiple redemption – The practice whereby a farmer often collects inputs on behalf of other farmers (sometimes as many as ten) should be discouraged. This is because the absentee farmers cannot be verified and in some cases they many not exist at all.
4. Improve the farmer identification process – The rule of Cellulant that a farmer without a phone coming to collect inputs can have the village head or a well-known community leader vouch for the farmer's identity should be abolished. Not all farmers in a community are known to the leader. Due to personal relationships between agrodealers and some village heads or community leaders, agrodealers use this opportunity to fraudulently obtain the inputs allocated for a farmer. Farmers will not even be aware that agrodealers will simply insert the phone numbers of the community leaders and redeem the inputs for their own use from that allocated to as many farmers as possible. Agrodealers benefit from this practice in three ways:
 - a. For every two bags of fertilizer redeemed, they are entitled to N700 commission paid by the supplier.
 - b. They use the practice to harbor inputs, allowing them to request more inputs from suppliers, whereas the inputs that pass through this process of "ghost redemption" are still physically available in the agrodealers' store. Since the inputs have been regarded as redeemed, they will remit the equivalent of the farmers' cash payment of N5,500 (for two bags of fertilizer) into the account of the suppliers, but later sell off the inputs obtained in this fraudulent manner at the market price of N5,500 per bag.
 - c. If the agrodealers do not sell the inputs at market price, they might re-redeem the inputs later to genuine farmers following the actual redemption process and so obtain a second commission of N700 on the two bags (double commission).

STRENGTHEN REGULATORY AND MONITORING ACTIVITIES

1. Intensify the regulatory role of government – There should be more effective regulatory activity by the National Agricultural Seed Council and the Federal Fertilizer Department to improve the quality of inputs being supplied to farmers. Government, through the National Agricultural Seed Council, should monitor seed suppliers to ensure that seed supplied to agrodealers and distributed to farmers meets specified standards. Appropriate sanctions should be meted out to erring suppliers and agrodealers that adulterate seeds and to seed producers that produce sub-standard seed varieties.
2. Provide facilities for effective monitoring of ATA implementation – Emphasis should be placed on effective monitoring. In this regard, vehicles should be purchased and dedicated for the activity accordingly. Each tier of government should ensure availability of transportation facilities for monitoring all activities associated with the GES and other components of ATA.
3. De-bureaucratize the GES roll-out process to avoid delays in input supply to farmers

REDUCE OPERATIONAL COST TO ENHANCE IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE

1. Reduce GES operational cost through making supply chain management more cost effective. This can be achieved by involving the virtually redundant extension staff rather than spending additional funds to employ temporary staff for redemption purposes.
2. Depoliticize and reduce the cost of the farmers' registration exercise – The cost of farmers' registration is becoming increasingly unbearable for both the federal and state governments. The genuineness of many of the farmers registered is questionable in many states. To depoliticize the exercise and reduce cost, two measures are recommended:
 - a. Routinize the process and make it less expensive and less politicized. Farmers' registration should be made an ongoing annual exercise at the local government level. Desk officers should be designated for the exercise in each LGA and the responsibilities of such officers and their target registration numbers

should be clearly defined. Facilities should be provided for their accomplishment. By doing this, the episodic funding and political sensitization often associated with the exercise and the inherent inaccuracies and manipulations can be avoided.

- b. Involve farmers' associations in the identification and registration process. These should include state chapters of AFAN and commodity associations at the state and LGA levels.

REDUCE THE BURDEN OF SUBSIDY

1. Government should work out a strategy to refocus its input subsidy spending. This is to shift emphasis in the medium term from subsidizing private goods, such as seed and fertilizer, to subsidizing agriculture-related public goods, such as extension, research, irrigation facilities, and rural roads, among other public goods.
2. Bring in a new generation of young people into the agricultural business. This will lower demand for financing in terms of subsidy payments and shift the emphasis into equity and debt financing with increased participation by the banking sector.
3. States should avoid instituting parallel fertilizer subsidy programs. The funds saved in this process should be used to admit more farmers into the GES scheme.

DIVERSIFY SOURCE OF GES FINANCING

Government should promote trade credit in agrodealer financing to accommodate both medium and large-scale entrepreneurs. By supporting medium-scale agro dealerships, it should be possible to have a more reasonably distributed market share in the agrodealer sector and so reduce transportation costs, supply shortages, and delays in farm operations (Olo-mola, 2014).

INCREASE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION OF MODERN INPUTS TO AVOID CRITICAL SUPPLY SHORTAGES

1. The government and the private sector should give more attention to the expansion of the seed industry and production of improved seed. Currently the quantity of high quality seed is grossly adequate.
2. For effective operations of the livestock-related GES, vaccines and medicaments should be made available in all states where the rollout had commenced. The production of vaccine in the country should be decentralized. In this connection, there should be locations in various geo-political zones where animal vaccines should be produced so as to make them readily available to users.
3. Maintain an appropriate balance in promoting small and large-scale entrepreneurs in value chain development. This is particularly instructive in the case of rice mills. For instance, investment in large-scale rice mills is not advisable. Emphasis should be on medium-scale and small-scale mills in clusters (such clusters will better allow for quality certification) across the relevant agro-ecological zones. With large mills, it may not be possible for the investors to have adequate supply of paddy for smooth operation and for achieving the desired level of capacity utilization to enable them to operate competitively and profitably.

5.3 Conclusions

When considered against the backdrop of the theoretical framework of collaborative governance, intergovernmental relationships in the design and implementation of ATA manifest more in terms of cooperation rather than in terms of collaboration. Nonetheless, with the extent of cooperation achieved, it has been possible to implement the key components of ATA successfully on account of the pre-history of cooperation between the federal and state governments, effective leadership, coordination, institutional reforms, and the creditable roles of a technical facilitator and supply chain managers. A clear indicator of success in GES scheme implementation is the ability to ensure compliance with the stipulated quantity of inputs each of the participating farmers can receive under the subsidy program and to sustain this for two consecutive years. It is therefore, imperative to ensure that there is stability and credibility in the policy process to avoid unwarranted changes to GES based on individual and group interests. In this regard, public office holders must endeavor at all times to uphold the sanctity and integrity of the policy processes related to the ATA in general and the GES in particular. Once this culture is imbibed through appropriate legislation, any arbitrary change that offends the integrity of existing institutions may not easily be accepted by the policy community and the generality of stakeholders. The point must be stressed, however, that a policy does not have a

perpetual shelf life. Even if it is supported by legislation, its perpetual existence in the original form cannot be forced by legislation. Legislation should allow its being subjected to periodic assessment and revision.

This study found that despite increases in the rate at which farmers were being included in the GES subsidy program in 2013 and 2014, it has been difficult to close the widening gap between the desired and effective participation rates due to the fact that the redemption rate continued to fall below expectation. This calls for an inquiry into the causes of the varying rates and patterns of redemption across the geopolitical zones and what can be done to improve the redemption rate. Further research is recommended to unravel these issues. Finally, it is important to stress that intergovernmental collaboration will yield better results if, in addition to the cross-tier interests to share the benefits, there is also a similar interest and joint decision to share the costs.

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About the Author

Prof. Aderibigbe S. Olomola (as_olomola@yahoo.com) was until December 2014 a Senior Economist and consultant for the Nigeria Strategy Support Program of the International Food Policy Research Institute, Abuja, Nigeria .

INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE (IFPRI)

2033 K Street, NW | Washington, DC 20006-1002 USA | T+1.202.862.5600 | F+1.202.457.4439 | Skype: ifprihomeoffice | ifpri@cgiar.org | www.ifpri.org

IFPRI-ABUJA

c/o International Fertilizer Development Center | No.6 Ogbagi Street | Off Oro-Ago Crescent | Garki II, Abuja | Nigeria
ifpri-nigeria@cgiar.org | nssp.ifpri.org

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