www.climatesecurity.cgiar.orgAfrica Climate Crisis Security Observatory www.climatesecurity.cgiar.orgClimate Security Observatory Series INITIATIVE ON Climate Resilience 2024FACTSHEET How does climate exacerbate root causes of conflict in Somalia Climate Security Pathway Analysis This factsheet gives answers on how climate exacerbates root causes of conflict in Somalia using a pathway analysis. Four main pathways are identified: 1. Resource access and availability: illustrates how climate impacts affect natural resource availability, leading to different forms of resource-related conflicts. 2. Livelihood and food insecurity: examines how climate change impacts agricultural production and livelihoods in Somalia. 3. Disaster and conflict displacement: delves into the compounding effects of climate-induced and conflict-driven displacement on insecurity dynamics in Somalia. 4. Fragility, Conflict and exploitation: examines how climate change exacerbates existing socioeconomic inequalities, political representation, power dynamics and grievances within the country. Niklas Sax, Frans Schapendonk, Benson Kenduiywo, Victor Villa, Craparo Alessandro, Rym Benzid, Abdimajid Nunow, and Grazia Pacillo P H O TO : C ar ol in e R u st en 2 Climate Security Observatory Series : Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA KEY MESSAGES Climate shocks compound structural, institutional, and relational drivers of conflict, increasing the competition around access to natural resources. Extreme climatic events like droughts and floods reduce the availability of natural resources such as land, pasture, and water. Compounded with inconsistent land tenure and resource management systems governing access to resources, the reduced availability of natural resources contributes to tensions around land disputes and eviction of people. Climate impacts on pasture and water are altering pastoralists’ traditional grazing routes, leading to conflicts between pastoralists and among farmers and herders within areas where resources are relatively more abundant. Traditional reciprocal agreements of sharing resources in times of droughts are being eroded through the higher frequency and intensity of extreme events, affecting social cohesion and clan-related conflicts. Coping capacities of the populations vulnerable to climate change are overburdened, driving maladaptive behaviors with repercussive effects on insecurity dynamics. Climate change and variability significantly impact crop and livestock productivity on which Somalia heavily relies. Fluctuation in food prices and pressures on livelihoods leads the population to resort to maladaptive behaviors, such as charcoal production or overgrazing, criminal activities, or joining armed groups, exacerbating insecurity dynamics in the country. Climate and violence-induced displacement of people, mainly towards urban areas, are exacerbating conflicts and insecurity within receiving areas. Extreme climate events, such as droughts and floods, along with forced evictions, violence, and conflict, are the primary causes of displacement. Displaced populations strain resources and basic services available in receiving areas. This often results in increased competition and tensions, especially in urban settings, where internally displaced persons (IDPs) primarily relocate. Furthermore, the urgent needs of displaced individuals may push some towards engaging in illicit activities, making them vulnerable to recruitment by non-state armed groups. Climate impacts in fragile and conflict-affected areas are being strategically exploited by armed groups and militias, leading to significant repercussions for peace and security. Climate change exacerbates existing structural issues, such as socioeconomic inequalities, lack of political representation, unbalanced power dynamics, and grievances within the country. As resources and food become less available due to climate change, controlling their access can be used to solidify power. Al-Shabaab exploits climate-induced humanitarian crises to act as an alternative relief provider and impose taxes. Additionally, clan-based power-sharing has resulted in elite exploitation and resource grabbing, where climate impacts create opportunities for some while further marginalizing vulnerable groups. 1 2 3 4 5 3Climate Security Observatory Series: Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA 1. CONTEXT Climate, conflict and socioeconomic vulnerability Somalia is highly affected by climate change and variability, with climate hazards increasing its vulnerability (Craparo et al., 2024). The ND-GAIN Index ranks Somalia as one of the most vulnerable and least prepared countries worldwide (University of Notre Dame, 2021). According to historical data, annual mean temperatures are around 30°C throughout the country and have risen by 1°C (WBG, 2020). In a country characterized primarily by arid and semi-arid conditions, which experiences two distinct rainfall seasons, the average annual precipitation is approximately 200 mm. The northern coastline of the country records significantly lower rainfall, whereas the southwestern region receives the highest amounts of precipitation. The frequency and intensity of extreme events, such as drought and highly unpredictable floods, have increased, undermining rainfed agriculture and pastoralist systems (Rep of Som., 2013). From 2021 to 2023, Somalia experienced a devastating drought, the worst the country has seen in over four decades. This drought pushed nearly 8.3 million Somalis—almost half the population— into acute food insecurity. In 2023, as the population was still recovering, heavy rains during the “deyr” season resulted in widespread flooding across much of the country. This flooding caused significant damage and impacted around 700,000 people (OCHA, 2023). Future climate projections suggest a mean temperature increase of 0.3-0.7°C by 2035, along with significant variability in rainfall patterns. Overall, there is an expected rise in precipitation, which will exhibit high spatial and temporal differences (Ogallo et al., 2018). Somalia is a highly fragile and conflict-affected country, ranking first in the Fragile State Index. The country is currently experiencing an ongoing conflict between the Islamic militant group Al-Shabaab, controlling territories in central and southern Somalia, and a coalition of government forces, clan militias, and the African Union (Haken, 2019; ACLED, 2023). The country has been affected by conflict over several decades. However, there is still some disagreement about when to trace the beginning of this complex conflict dynamics. Various factors played into the collapse of the central state in 1991, including the aftermath of the Ogaden War with Ethiopia and various inter-clan conflicts fuelled by power struggles over strategic areas within the country (The World Bank, 2005). In the early 2000s, the conflict took a more religious dimension with the emergence of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and later its former military wing, Al-Shabaab. The radical Islamic terrorist group, aiming to seize control over the country, is confronted by a coalition of internal and international counterinsurgency forces. Despite this resistance, the group maintains control over territory in the southern part of the country, perpetuating violence and fear (Klobucita et al., 2022; ACLED, 2024). Since the establishment of the Transitional Federal Government and its successors, Somalia has been pursuing a challenging path of state-building to respond to the high level of fragility. The dominance of clan-based politics within Somali society, along with the presence of militant groups destabilizing the region, poses significant challenges for the government in its efforts to assert control over the entire territory (Keating and Waldman, 2018). Relational factors, such as the deep-rooted clan divisions, hinder national reconciliation, while the large-scale displacements through climate and conflict are reshaping demography and complex inter-clan relations in the country. Compounding effects of climate and conflict have led to high levels of food insecurity and large portions of the population living below the poverty line (IPC, 2024; Rep of Som., 2022). The economy is highly dependent on remittances from the Somali Diaspora and International Aid, which, while crucial, constitutes an unsustainable economic 4 Climate Security Observatory Series : Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA P H O TO : C ar ol in e R u st en system with high unemployment, particularly among youth (Majid et al., 2018). According to IOM data, in 2021, 33 percent of migrants in Somalia were youth aged 18 to 29, facing significant challenges such as lack of employment opportunities and increased exposure to violence (Villa & Belli, 2024). The local Somali economy predominantly depends on agricultural production, which is highly vulnerable to climate change and variability. As a result, increasing climate-induced livelihood insecurity is fuelling discontent and providing incentives for joining NSAG, further contributing to fragility and insecurity dynamics (Rep of Som., 2022; Erlöw and Krampe, 2019). Consequently, a substantial number of young people opt for irregular migration patterns as opposed to more regular or organized alternatives (Villa & Belli, 2024). To find suitable solutions to address the compounded risks of climate change and conflict dynamics, it is imperative to understand the various interlinkages that manifest climate, peace, and security risks in Somalia. To do so, this study has identified multiple pathways through which climate exposure and vulnerability affect social interactions. These pathways are regulated through structural, institutional, and relational factors (Lederach, 2014) at both localized and national levels that may compound existing insecurity dynamics within the country. This climate security pathways analysis is grounded in an extensive literature review and validated through expert knowledge of governmental and non- governmental actors gathered during a national workshop conducted in June 2024 in Mogadishu by CGIAR in partnership with FAO and IGAD Centre of Excellence for Adaptation and Environmental Protection (CGIAR et al., 2024). 5Climate Security Observatory Series: Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA 2. CLIMATE SECURITY PATHWAYS PATHWAY #1: Resource access and availability The resource access and availability pathway in Somalia illustrates how climate impacts affect natural resource availability, leading to different forms of resource-related conflicts. Climate change, including slow-onset changes and extreme events like droughts, diminishes resources such as land, pasture, and water. This results in two key sub-pathways: the first explores land availability, affected by drought, degradation and governance issues, leading to competition and conflicts. The second focuses on water and pasture availability, disrupted by climate changes and land-use changes, altering traditional migratory routes and intensifying conflicts between farmers and herders. Climate impacts on natural resources Climate change-induced droughts and prolonged dry spells have significantly reduced water availability and fertile land, decreasing the areas suitable for agriculture (Jalango et al., 2021). In a country with over 80 percent arid and semi-arid land, the available food, land, and water systems are already considered fragile and limited in their productive capacities (Rep of Som., 2022). Somaliá s topography supports various agricultural and agro-pastoral livelihood zones in the South along and between the Shabelle and Juba rivers, as well as within Somaliland. Additionally, coastal and fishing communities can be found along the shore of the Indian Ocean and vast areas of pastoral land stretching along the Horn from Galgadud to Togdheer (FSNAU, 2015). Drought hazards are particularly severe within the pastoral and agro-pastoral zones while flooding significantly impacts the coastal and riverine areas (Rep of Som., 2022). One of the most immediate and severe consequences of climate change in Somalia is the reduced availability of water. Climate impacts alter the conventional hydrological cycle, shifting rainfall patterns and reducing the available surface water (CGIAR et al., 2024). Lack of sufficient water sources has detrimental effects on irrigation patterns and cultivation prospects, causing wells to dry quickly and exacerbating challenges for communities who rely strongly on them (Rep. of Som., 2013). The most recent drought has severely exacerbated the scarcity of freshwater sources and grasslands, leading to long-term declines in vegetation cover and making it challenging for pastoral communities to find suitable grazing areas for their livestock (Maesho et al., 2021). Increasing temperatures and more frequent drought events were similarly linked to land degradation by increasing evaporation, reducing soil moisture, and causing the redistribution of plant and animal species (Rep. of Som., 2013; CGIAR et al., 2024). The increasing frequency and intensity of floods further induce significant impacts on the land, causing damage to crop production, soil fertility, and infrastructure (Jimale et al., 2023). Somalia is prone to three types of flooding: i) riverine flooding, ii) flash floods, iii) and coastal flooding. In the last decades, a combination of climate impacts and human-induced degradation has increased the intensity and frequency of flooding around the Juba and Shabelle rivers, with devastating effects on human lives and economic loss (Rep. of Som., 2022). Human-induced degradation The direct impact of climate change on the availability of natural resources is compounded by indirect factors. Communities experiencing the effects of climate change often resort to maladaptive behaviors, such as deforestation, the use of chemical fertilizers, and overgrazing, further contributing to land 6 Climate Security Observatory Series : Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA degradation (Jalango et al., 2021; CGIAR et al., 2024). Poor agronomic practices, including burning animal manure and lacking soil and water conservation, further compound these challenges (Mohamed and Nagaye 2021). Due to limited access to electricity in Somalia, a significant portion of the population continues to rely on traditional biomass and environmentally harmful practices such as charcoal production and illegal logging. These activities degrade rangelands, destroy biodiversity, and cause soil erosion, intensifying the deterioration of the vegetative base (Jalango et al., 2021). It is a subtle yet pervasive process that exhausts soils and erodes gullies, leading to land productivity depletion and necessitating species resettlement (Omuto et al., 2011). The Lower Juba area, for instance, lost 50% of its forest cover between 1993 and 2014, highlighting the rapid pace of deforestation and desertification (Ogallo et al., 2018). In addition, human-induced factors such as conflict, displacement, land grabbing, and changes in land use further exacerbate land degradation, impacting the amount of land suitable for cultivation and livestock (Ali et al., 2023). Land degradation significantly reduces agricultural production, with projections of losing vast hectares of land due to depletion, resulting in a significant decline in agricultural production within the country (Mohamed and Nagaye 2021). Resource management compounding human security and tensions Structural and institutional factors need to be embedded in the resource scarcity discourse, distinguishing between the actual (de facto) and perceived availability of resources. Water, for instance, may be physically available, but communities often perceive it as unavailable if they lack access to the source (CGIAR et al., 2024). In the case of the Juba and Shabelle rivers, for example, the water levels were very low in 2023 due to reoccurring droughts, which negatively impacted irrigation water availability and resulted in a decline in sesame production and export. However, a major reason for the water level reduction in the rivers was the lack of maintenance of canals and transboundary water management issues (CGIAR et al., 2024). Similar dynamics can also be witnessed regarding floods, whose impacts are amplified due to the lack of infrastructure and reservoirs as well as maintenance of canals downstream, compounding the intensity of natural hazards (Rep of Som. 2021). Land serves as another clear example of these dynamics. As arable land becomes scarcer, the tensions around land resources are increasing. However, how tensions may escalate into conflicts largely relies on the existing resource management mechanisms and dispute mediation. Somalia lacks clear and transparent land governance systems, with often competing claims over communal or private land and conflicting interests between providing livelihood and shelter and the desire for profit (Jama et al. 2018). Insecure tenure is increasing the vulnerability of communities, resulting in land grabbing and forced eviction of indigenous people without compensation, which contributes to tensions and grievances (Halakhe and Miller 2023). Land governance is strongly influenced by clan and political considerations, enabling political patronage and clan tribalism, which can exacerbate tensions around land into more significant violent conflicts (Jama et al. 2018; Chaudhry and Ouda 2021). Converting communal grazing land into croplands is a major driver contributing to land conflict. Communal land ownership has been shown to reduce accountability, resulting in insufficient investments in land management and decreasing sustainability for future use (CGIAR et al., 2024). Additionally, converting communal land into private property impacts pasture availability, increasing the vulnerability of pastoralists and sparking conflicts between farmers and herders (Chaudhry and Ouda 2021). The growing pressure on land resources requires urgent conflict resolution and mediation efforts to mitigate tensions and curb marginalization. However, the challenging security circumstances in various parts of the country, particularly in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab, complicate these efforts (Erlöw and Krampe 2019; CGIAR et al. 2024). 7Climate Security Observatory Series: Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA Resource-related tensions of pastoral communities Climate impacts on the availability of water and pasture are altering the traditional grazing routes of pastoralists, leading to human security risks and pastoral and farmer-herder conflicts. Reoccurring droughts have diminished the availability of freshwater sources and grasslands, leading to long- term declines in vegetation cover, making it challenging for pastoral communities to find suitable grazing areas for their livestock (Maesho et al., 2021). Irregular precipitation and temperature variations have made traditional grazing routes unusable, forcing herders to adapt and alter the patterns that communities have relied on for generations (Jalango et al., 2021). Consequently, pastoralists are migration longer distances in search of resources, often coming into contact with other groups in regions where water and pasture are more readily available. This influx can lead to overcrowding and overgrazing, which contribute to the loss of vegetative cover and significantly result in environmental degradation (Thulstrup et al. 2020). Some impoverished households also lack the resources necessary to move their animals, forcing them to remain in affected areas during drought seasons, leading to devastating losses, including human lives, due to lack of water, pasture, and fatigue (Chaudhry and Ouda 2021). Additionally, existing conflicts further complicate pastoral mobility by restricting herders’ access to traditional grazing lands, thereby reducing their ability to move and increasing their vulnerability to drought (Tarif et al., 2023). As pastoral communities expand into neighboring territories, livestock theft, competition with other pastoral groups, and conflicts with sedentary farmers increase in transition and destination areas (Rep of Som 2013; Chaudhry and Ouda 2021). Limited access to water points and grazing lands has increased local resource competition and food insecurity (Broek and Hodder, 2022). Droughts amplify tribal and clan conflicts due to resource scarcity, leading to clashes between pastoralists and agro- pastoralists as they move their animals through farms, some of which are semi-private (Chaudhry and Ouda 2021). In Somaliland, the challenge of accessing water is particularly acute, with only 3% of rural households having access to improved water sources, compared to 47% in urban areas (Jalango et al. 2021). The lack of improved water sources, especially in rural areas, exposes Somalis to a range of threats to human security, such as waterborne diseases but also risks, such as gender-based violence and human rights violations, due to the need to walk long distances (Thulstrup et al. 2020). As climate affects the water availability, some communities are migrating into the territory of other clans, building water catchments for their cattle called “Barkads”, often causing tensions between the communities (CGIAR et al. 2024). In Somalia, rural communities have established several traditional resource-sharing agreements that regulate access to pasture, land, and water. These reciprocal agreements support livelihoods by facilitating collaboration when communities in vulnerable areas seek assistance from their neighbours. However, as climate change is increasing the exposure within most of the country, less communities are able to share their resources. This erosion of traditional mechanisms, exacerbated by climate impacts, is leading to heightened tensions among communities, turning previously cooperative into conflictive behaviour, particularly in areas affected by conflict (CGIAR et al. 2024). An example is the traditional dispute resolution mechanism known as “xeer.” Its effectiveness is diminishing as the loss of livestock due to climate impacts rises, making it harder for clans to pay reparation fines. This situation increases the likelihood of retaliatory killings and clan conflicts (Farah, 2021). The proliferation of arms and weapons, facilitated by the lack of rule of law, has exacerbated inter- and intra-clan armed competition over scarce resources, including rangelands, forests, and water, resulting in a continuous rise in casualties (Erlöw and Krampe 2019; Broek and Hodder 2022). 8 Climate Security Observatory Series : Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA PATHWAY #2: Livelihood and food insecurity The livelihood and food insecurity pathway examines how climate change impacts agricultural production and livelihoods in Somalia. Droughts and erratic rainfall patterns significantly impact agricultural production in Somalia, a nation heavily reliant on natural resources and rainfed farming for its economic sustenance. Consequently, these climatic challenges exert considerable influence on food security, leading to fluctuations in food prices and disrupting livelihoods. Affected populations may resort to maladaptive coping strategies, some of which harm the environment, such as charcoal production and overgrazing. Others contribute to insecurity as people turn to crime, piracy, or join armed groups, emphasizing the complex interconnection between climate change, coping mechanisms, environmental impact, and insecurity dynamics. Climate impacts on agricultural systems Somalia typically experiences four distinct seasons throughout the year. The first is the dry season, known as “Jilaal”, which lasts from December to March. This is followed by the primary rainy season called “Gu”, which continues until mid-year, approximately from April to June. After Gu, the “Haggai” season brings cooler weather, followed by another rainy season known as “Deyr”, which lasts until November (FAO SWALIM 2020). Agriculture in Somalia operates on seasonal patterns closely linked to labour cycles, creating dependency on specific periods like the Gu and Deyr seasons for cultivation and harvest (FEWS NET 2021). However, Somalia has faced unprecedented challenges in recent years due to climate-induced droughts, marked by the failure of five consecutive rainy seasons in 2022, making it the worst drought in over four decades (IPC, 2022). Nearly 8.3 million Somalis were affected by drought in 2022, facing acute food insecurity at crisis levels or worse (IPC 2022). Irregular rainfall and temperature fluctuations are reducing agricultural output, with flooding damaging crops during heavy rainfall and causing severe food insecurity during prolonged dry spells (Said and Bashir, 2023). The country’s vulnerability to climate change is thereby exacerbated by the unpredictability of rainfall, particularly during the bimodal Gu and Deyr rainy seasons, exerting severe consequences on both crop and livestock production (Ali et al., 2023). While all rural livelihoods dependent on natural resources are impacted by climate change, the ramifications may look differently for among various livelihood options: Agriculture In 2023, Jowhar experienced heavy and unpredictable rainfall, which caused multiple flash floods that disrupted crop production in the area (OCHA, 2023; CGIAR et al., 2024). Increasing frequencies of floods and cyclones have also led to a rise in desert locust populations, where outbreaks in 2019 and 2020 have been the worst in 25 years (FAO, 2019). The country finds itself in the grip of multiple crises, including failed rainfall seasons, high dependency on agriculture, ongoing conflicts, and high grain prices, exacerbated by global grain price hikes (Majid et al., 2022). The high dependency of Somalia on agriculture under current climate impacts has devastating effects on the country’s economy and peoplé s livelihoods. Somalia’s economy and the livelihoods of its people are intricately intertwined with agriculture, pastoralism, forestry, and fisheries, with around 80 percent of the population employed in these sectors (MoAI 2024). The agricultural sector, which contributes approximately 75% to Somalia’s GDP and 93% to the country’s total income, has historically been the backbone of the nation’s economy (Said and Bashir, 2023). Somalia’s semi-arid climate, coupled with recurrent droughts every 3–4 years 9Climate Security Observatory Series: Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA and major droughts every 8–10 years, underscores the fragility of the agricultural sector in the face of climate change (Said and Bashir, 2023). Rising temperatures are projected to lead to a 3% decline in agricultural production per degree Celsius increase (Mohamed and Nagaye 2021). The impact of climate change on staple foods, such as maize, wheat, sorghum, and rice, is projected to decrease production by 2-16% by 2030 under the current climate change scenario. This decline underscores the challenges of malnutrition in Somalia (Jalango et al. 2021). Even sorghum, considered a more drought-resilient staple crop, is vulnerable to rising temperatures and water shortages, leading to decreasing yields (Warsame et al., 2022). Pastoralism Climate change poses risks and implications beyond crop yields, affecting livestock and rural livelihood patterns (Jalango et al. 2021). The dependence of nomadic pastoralists on seasonal rainfall for their livestock makes them highly susceptible to climate-induced fluctuations in precipitation (IOM/UNEP 2021). Drought conditions have severely impacted agro-pastoral incomes due to soaring water and fodder prices, coupled with dwindling livestock numbers, exacerbating poverty, property destruction, and the absence of livelihood opportunities (Warsame et al., 2022). Livestock sales, vital for many households, have suffered due to the deteriorating condition and reduced value of animals, with pastoralists losing up to 15% of the herd in the hardest-hit regions (Majid et al., 2022). Herders, facing extreme weather conditions like drought and high temperatures, are compelled to flood the market with livestock during extended dry seasons (Maystadt and Olivier, 2014). Given that 94 percent of Somalia’s nomadic population lives in poverty, this influx of animals destabilizes an already fragile market and increases their livelihood insecurity of pastoralist due to low prices (Ogallo et al., 2018). Fishing Climate hazards, such as rising temperatures, heat stress, sea level rise and coastal floods have also been linked to a reduction of fish species, fish availability and fishing activities, leading to a loss of coastal and marine livelihoods (Odhimabo et al., 2024). However, stronger international regulations and better management of fisheries that support local economies present a promising opportunity for many people. By transitioning from more climate-sensitive alternatives like agriculture and pastoralism to fishing, communities can sustain their livelihoods (WBG/FAO, 2018). However, without adequate training and equipment to adapt to changing conditions, fishermen face increasing pressure (Odhimabo et al., 2024). Socioeconomic conditions of fishers are, however, challenged by fishing regulations, land ownership, and inequalities between poorer and wealthier fishers, as well as gender disparities, increasing the vulnerability of marginalized groups (Hassan and Hossain, 2023). Nonetheless, as climate change, along with change-induced pests, diseases, and invasive plant species, are causing the loss of pastoralists and farmers livelihoods, many are relocating to coastal areas to engage in fishing activities as an alternative, occasionally leading to tensions with local coastal communities (CGIAR et al., 2024). There are some indications that climate-related impacts on coastal livelihoods are a driver for piracy, as many pirates have a background in fishing and are engaging as “occasional pirates” to make ends meet, which is becoming pressure as climate is contributing towards a decrease in fish population (Jiang and LaFree 2023). However, other factors, such as large-scale illegal fishing of international cooperation, have contributed towards a more immediate depletion of fish stock, contributing to lower opportunity costs for fishermen engaging in piracy activities (CGIAR et al. 2024). 10 Climate Security Observatory Series : Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA Maladaptive behaviour compounding human security and tensions In Somalia, climate change has significantly disrupted traditional coping mechanisms, pushing affected populations toward maladaptive behaviours that not only exert more pressure on natural resources (through deforestation or overgrazing, as elaborated above) but also can exacerbate violence and illegal activities (CGIAR et al., 2024). The loss of livelihood through climate impacts on agriculture and pastoralism is contributing to maladaptation, increasing illicit action and reducing the opportunity costs for recruitments into NSAG. As traditional adaptation mechanisms are overburdened, more actors are engaging in maladaptive behaviour to sustain their livelihoods (Jalango et al., 2023). The diminished livelihood options due to climate-induced impacts, compounded by weak governance, conflict, and corruption are thereby contributing to a rise of organized crime, especially in regions like Somaliland and Puntland (Chesson et al. 2017). The absence of viable livelihood options and increased poverty lead to societal pressures that fuel grievances and incentivize illicit activities, including human trafficking and charcoal trading (Maystadt and Olivier, 2014). The economic desperation resulting from climate- related losses in agricultural productivity and plummeting local market prices after droughts also makes recruitment offers from armed groups and engaging in livestock raiding more appealing to those struggling to support their families (CGIAR et al., 2024). Armed groups, particularly Al-Shabaab, capitalize on these dynamics by specifically targeting vulnerable populations and young men to join their ranks (Broek and Hodder, 2022). GENDER-RELATED CLIMATE SECURITY RISKS Vulnerability to climate and conflict differs along lines of gender, placing women at higher risk. In Somalia, the intersection of climate change and conflict amplifies the vulnerabilities faced by women, subjecting them to a multitude of social, economic, and physical challenges (Jalango et al., 2021). Women in Somalia are deeply entrenched in social and economic inequalities, a situation exacerbated by cultural norms (Croome and Hussein, 2020). They have limited access to essential resources and opportunities, including production technologies, healthcare, and education, in stark contrast to their male counterparts (CGIAR et al., 2024). Women in Somalia face significant disparities in representation and economic standing within governance and clan- based structures, falling victim to poverty and having limited rights to land ownership (Rep of Som., 2013). The consequences of conflict and climate-induced displacement weigh heavily on women, increasing their vulnerability to exploitation and violence (Tarif et al., 2023). When displacement occurs, families are often fragmented, with women and younger children becoming the primary movers, leaving men and adolescent boys behind to safeguard their assets in their villages of origin (Majid et al., 2022). During droughts, the burden on women intensifies as they are expected to stay at home, caring for other livestock, while men are tasked with finding water for their animals. This division of responsibilities adds to the vulnerability of women and children, increasing their exposure to abuse and exploitation, and adding to their already overwhelming daily workload (Erlöw and Krampe, 2019). The situation is exacerbated when women have to travel longer distances to fetch water and firewood, exposing them to direct security risks such as sexual violence and human rights violations. Areas like water points, livestock grazing zones, and firewood-collection areas pose significant dangers for women, who are often subjected to violence and assaults, partly due to insufficient shelter or lighting (Croome and Hussein 2020). Furthermore, as families struggle to secure their livelihood after droughts, a common practice is to marry off their daughters to wealthier men, contributing to a higher number of early child marriages (Croome and Hussein, 2020). 11Climate Security Observatory Series: Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA PATHWAY #3: Disaster and conflict displacement The disaster and conflict displacement pathway delves into the compounding effects of climate- induced and conflict-driven displacement on insecurity dynamics in Somalia. Extreme climate events like droughts and floods, coupled with violence and conflict, are the main drivers of displacement. As displaced populations move to new areas, they strain available resources and basic services, leading to intensified competition and tensions. Additionally, desperation may drive some displaced people towards illicit activities, making them susceptible to recruitment by non-state armed groups. The intricate interplay between climate, conflict, displacement, resource scarcity, and recruitment underscores the multifaceted nature of insecurity in Somalia. Climate-induced extreme events, such as frequent flooding, erratic rainfall, and prolonged droughts have far-reaching implications, disrupting livelihoods, heightening insecurity within the population and triggering internal displacement (Warsame et al., 2022; Jalango et al., 2021). From 2020 to 2023, there were 4.5 million reported cases of internal displacement attributed to natural disaster in Somalia, with the majority being induced by floods, followed by drought (IDMC, 2024). Flooding, a recurring natural disaster during the rainy season, wreaks havoc on communities, claiming lives, displacing large amount of people, and devastating crops. The destruction caused by these floods exacerbates vulnerability, compelling numerous families to abandon their homes in search of safer environments (Said and Bashir, 2023). High temperatures and escalating violence positively correlate with forced migration, driving individuals to seek refuge in more hospitable environments (Jalango et al., 2021). Low seasonal rainfall, such as from October to December 2016, were followed by high peaks of displacement (Yuen et al. 2022). Concurrently, temperature and precipitation shocks act as catalysts for internal displacement, with even minor changes leading to significant increases in predicted internal displacement (Thalheimer et al., 2023). South-Central Somalia, encompassing regions such as Hiraan, Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Shabelle Dhexe, Shabelle Hoose, Juba Dhexe, and Juba Hoose, facing the most out-migration, due to extreme weather events and their complex interplay with weak governance and socio-economic difficulties (Jalango et al., 2021). Additionally, conflict further induce displacement in the country. Armed groups, including clan militias and extremist organizations, have been perpetuating violence that led to widespread fear and insecurity among the population. In the same period, between 2020 and 2023, an additional 2.1 million people were displaced due to conflict and violence (IDMC, 2024). Armed groups play a central role in driving displacement, engaging in territorial disputes, controlling strategic areas, and imposing their own rules, which force local communities to flee their homes (Jalango et al., 2021). Thalheimer et al. (2023) have shown the correlation between violent events and occurrences of displacement. Their findings also predict a significant increase in the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to conflict events. Displacement caused by climate change and conflict is closely linked to the prevailing dynamics of violence driven by competition for natural resources. This competition often escalates into violence, resulting in increased displacement of affected populations (FAO, 2022; CGIAR et al., 2024). As agriculture and pastoralism are vital for livelihoods in Somalia, climate-induced challenges lead to competition over scarce resources, triggering conflicts between communities, that are being exploited by armed groups, exacerbating existing grievances and contributing to further displacement (Jalango et al., 2021; Eklöw and Krampe, 2019). Forced evictions are also compounding displacement dynamics, indigenous communities, for instance, are being displaced from their traditional land due to social 12 Climate Security Observatory Series : Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA grievances. Small-scale farmers are facing ownership exclusionary governance, losing their homes and fields without adequate compensation due to ineffective changing grazing or alternative methods, while national security forces have on multiple occasions, evicted communities or internally displaced persons without clear policies or regulations (CGIAR et al., 2024). Push factors for displacement can be found therefore in the aforementioned effects on natural resources and livelihoods and correlated insecurity dynamics (drought and flood, food insecurity, conflict and human insecurity, lack of income, and lack of pasture/livestock feed) so that this pathway can be viewed as a consequence emerging from the previous two pathways (FAO, 2022). Pull factors, on the other hand, include better livelihood opportunities, access to basic services, access to humanitarian assistance, and family reunification (FAO, 2022). These factors can be better accessed within urban and peri-urban areas so that most displacement occurs from rural towards urban areas, leading to unsustainable rates of urbanization (Halakhe and Miller, 2023). Conflict and climate change impacts, compounding rural livelihoods unsustainable, have driven millions of Somalis to seek stability and safety in urban centres, particularly in Mogadishu and Baidoa, where governance structures are relatively established (Chaudhry and Ouda, 2021). According to the UN, around 45% of Somalia’s population, approximately 6.83 million people, are settled in urban areas, and this number is expected to rise by 4 million by 2025 (UN-Habitat, 2018). The rapid urbanization is posing challenges for urban planning, leading to a rise in informal settlements, where most IDPs often relocate (Halakhe and Miller, 2023). IDP camps are often established on private lands in urban areas, leading to forced evictions and resulting in secondary displacements, as well as land disputes and conflicts among different clans and communities, aggravating social tensions and fostering animosities within the receiving areas (NRC, 2018). International aid is partly contributing to attracting displaced populations to urban areas, as safety net programs are incentivising IDPs to remain in receiving areas, relying on aid instead of pursuing alternative livelihood strategies, also leading to a lack of workforce within agricultural areas (CGIAR et al., 2024). Within urban areas, the rural skills of pastoralists and farmers do not immediately translate to urban life, leaving them struggling to find work in cities, where they lack social networks and knowledge about available services, often becoming trapped in a cycle of poverty and aid dependence with little hope or future, rendering them the ‘new urban poor’ (Halakhe and Miller, 2023). Desperation and limited opportunities in IDP camps push individuals towards illegal behaviours, making them susceptible to criminal influence, while the vulnerable situation of displaced populations in urban areas, coupled with the lack of security, has exacerbated sexual and gender-based violence (Eklöw and Krampe 2019). Some IDP camps have become hotspots for recruitment as the lack of social cohesion, frequent conflicts, and insecurity within these settlements make it easier for armed groups like Al-Shabaab to gain the trust of especially young men, while the camps’ disarray allows insurgents to assimilate into the environment, identifying potential recruits and offering them a sense of belonging, immediate protection, and income (CGIAR et al., 2024; Eklöw and Krampe, 2019). 13Climate Security Observatory Series: Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA PATHWAY #4: Fragility, conflict and Exploitation The fragility, conflict, and exploitation pathway examines how climate change exacerbates existing socioeconomic inequalities, political representation, power dynamics and grievances within the country. As resources and food become less available due to climate change, controlling access to resources and food is used strategically by military actors. Climate extreme events are leading to a humanitarian crisis, which Al-Shabaab learned to use to increase its legitimacy by acting as an alternative relief provider. Clan-based power-sharing has led to elite exploitation and resource grabbing, in which climate impacts are opening opportunities and marginalizing vulnerable groups further. Multiple reinforcing dynamics that compounded the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, including the severe droughts from 2021 to 2023, severe flooding in 2023, and the ongoing conflict between the government and Al Shabaab, have placed the country in a fragile situation (IRC, 2024). This volatile situation gives room for certain actors to use the induced loss and suffering for their own agendas. Humanitarian crises induced by climate hazards are being used by Al Shabaab to increase its legitimacy by taking advantage of the inefficient distribution of international aid within fragile and conflict-affected areas and acting as an alternative aid provider (CGIAR et al., 2024). The extent to which climate-induced food insecurity could escalate into famine largely depends on the effectiveness of governmental and international response mechanisms and their capacity to deliver food aid. In the 2011 famine, severe drought conditions coincided with a military offensive against Al Shabaab, creating a difficult environment for providing aid and facilitating migration. Several policies that restricted migration and humanitarian access further exacerbated the humanitarian crisis (Majid et al., 2022). Al Shabaab had manipulated humanitarian aid by controlling entry points and inducing taxation methods, as well as blocking aid deliveries, burning food, and committing other acts of sabotage (Harnisch, 2010). Heavy taxation and the presence of numerous militia checkpoints are constituting a major hurdle for the value chain of agricultural production, still standing in the way of tapping the full potential of Somalia’s agriculture and increasing pressure on farmers (SCALA, 2024). As the suffering caused by the famine grew, grievances increased, leading to a decline in support from the local population. In response, Al Shabaab revised its strategy. By presenting themselves as a provider for the people through their propaganda, Al Shabaab aims to boost its legitimacy. They have established new drought committees to serve as alternative relief providers during extreme climate events and humanitarian disasters (CGIAR et al., 2024). Exploiting the vacuum left by weak state services, as well as the high dependency on aid induced by the international aid system, Al Shabaab strategically acts as a provider for the population while collecting taxes, increasing their legitimacy and funds, contributing to insecurity dynamics in the country (Eklöw and Krampe, 2019). The methods used by Al Shabaab to secure funding have evolved over the years, demonstrating a high level of adaptability to changing circumstances (CGIAR et al., 2024). Initially, the group obtained external funding through connections with al-Qaeda and support from Somali diaspora communities, who viewed the Islamic Court Union (ICU) and its military wing, Al Shabaab, as a means to bring stability. However, the collapse of the ICU and international sanctions that designated Al Shabaab as a terrorist organization effectively cut off most external financial sources for the group (Levy and Yusuf, 2019). As a response, Al Shabaab shifted towards internal funding sources, relying on an elaborated taxing system, imposing taxes on businesses, illicit trade, farmland, livestock, and various other taxes (Mubarak 14 Climate Security Observatory Series : Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA and Jackson, 2023). Considering the devastating effects of climate impacts on small-scale farmers and pastoralists, the often exorbitant payments are putting strong burdens on rural livelihoods in territories controlled by Al Shabaab (Levy and Yusuf, 2019; CGIAR et al., 2024). This approach follows a dual purpose, not only to increase funds, but also to pressure people, who are not able to pay the taxes into working for the group and become new recruits (Levy and Yusuf, 2019). Climate-induced impacts are also altering and compounding the complex relationships between clans, affecting power dynamics and inducing human security risks and grievances (CGIAR et al., 2024). Vulnerability to climate impacts is also partly dependent on clan power hierarchies and the marginalization of certain groups within society. Somalia’s political landscape is deeply entrenched in clan-based power structures, where access to resources and political positions is determined by one’s clan affiliation (Keating and Waldman, 2018). Groups such as the Rahanweyn or Somali Bantu are marginalized due to their weak representation within diaspora communities, affecting their political visibility and economic security via remittances (Majid et al., 2022). Women within these vulnerable groups bear a disproportionate burden, being under-represented in governance and more susceptible to poverty, displacement, exploitation, and violence (Tarif et al., 2023). Security constraints further compound these challenges of addressing the needs of marginal groups, preventing access to certain exposed areas, hindering engagement, and exacerbating social fragmentation (Halakhe and Miller, 2023). The 2011 flood in the Shabelle River Basin serves as a striking example in which clan dynamics compounded climate impacts, as it induced displacement of weaker minority clans, only to have their lands seized by more powerful clan elites prior to their return (Tarif et al., 2023). Climate change, however, has also altered historical clan hierarchies, rendering new communities that are highly exposed to becoming displaced and entering the categorization of marginalizing groups (CGIAR et al., 2024). The rapid influx of displaced populations into new areas changes the demographic composition within the receiving area, bringing power-sharing agreements into question, which complicates national reconciliation and the broader state building (Eklöw and Krampe, 2019). The prevailing clan- based power structures in Somalia provide a convenient framework for elites to exploit grievances related to climate impacts. 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(2020). ”Uncovering the challenges of domestic energy access in the context of weather and climate extremes in Somalia.” Weather and Climate Extremes, Volume 27, 2020, 100185, ISSN 2212-0947, https://doi.org/10.1016/j. wace.2018.09.002. UN Habitat (2018). “Country Profile Somalia”. https:// unhabitat.org/somalia. University of Notre Dam (2021). „Country Ranking: Somalia“. https://gain-new.crc.nd.edu/country/somalia. Villa, V., Belli, A., (2024, June 5). “Youth on the move in Somalia: Perspectives, Vulnerabilities and Horizons”. IOM Blog Series: Youth Voices on Migration, Environment and Climate Change. https://environmentalmigration. iom.int/blogs/youth-move-somalia-perspectives- vulnerabilities-and-horizons. Warsame, A. A., Abdi, A. H., Amir, A. Y., & Azman-Saini, W. N. W. (2023). Towards sustainable environment in Somalia: The role of conflicts, urbanization, and globalization on environmental degradation and emissions. Journal of Cleaner Production, 406. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2023.136856. Warsame, A. A., Sheik-Ali, I. A., Jama, O. M., Hassan, A. A., & Barre, G. M. (2022). Assessing the effects of climate change and political instability on sorghum production: Empirical evidence from Somalia. Journal of Cleaner Production, 360. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. jclepro.2022.131893. World Bank Group (2020). “Climate Change Knowledge Portal: Somalia” https://climateknowledgeportal. worldbank.org/country/somalia/climate-data-historical. 17 Climate Security Observatory Series : Climate Security Pathway Analysis SOMALIA www.climatesecurity.cgiar.org About CGIAR FOCUS Climate Security CGIAR aims to address gaps in knowledge about climate change and food security for peace and security policies and operations through a unique multidisciplinary approach. Our main objective is to align evidence from the realms of climate, land, and food systems science with peacebuilding efforts already underway that address conflict through evidence-based environmental, political, and socio- economic solutions. P H O TO : S te vi e M an n / IL R I