

**The Implementation of the Productive Safety Nets Programme in Afar, Somali,
and selected lowland *woredas* in Oromiya**

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Acronyms

ACSI	Amhara Credit and Savings Institute
ARD	Agriculture and Rural Development
BOARD	(Regional) Bureau of Agriculture and Regional Development
BOFED	Bureau Office of Finance and Economic Development
CBPWD	Community-based participatory watershed development
CCI	Complementary community investment
CFI	Chronically food insecure
CFSTF	Community Food Security Task Force
CIS	Corrugated iron sheets
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CSA	Central Statistical Agency (Ethiopia)
DA(s)	Development Agent(s)
DPO	Disaster Prevention Office
DPPA	Disaster Preparedness and Prevention Agency
DPPO	Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Office
DS	Direct support
EAs	Enumeration areas
EW	Extension Worker
EWR	Early warning and response
FFT	Full family targeting
FG	Focus Group
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FSCD	Food Security Coordination Directorate
FSP	Food Security Program
FSS	Food Security Survey
FSTF	Food Security Task Force
GFDRE	Government of the Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GOE	Government of Ethiopia
HABP	Household Asset Building Programme

HVFB	High Value Food Basket
IDS	Institute of Development Studies
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
KAC	<i>Kebele</i> Appeals Committee
KFSTF	<i>Kebele</i> Food Security Task Force
KII	Key Informant Interview
KRDC	<i>Kebele</i> Relief Distribution Committee
MFIs	Microfinance institutions
MOARD	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
NRM	Natural Resource Management
OFSP	Other Food Security Program
OVC	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
PA	Peasant Association
PAP	Pastoral Area Pilot
PCDP	Pastoralist Community Development Programme
PIM	Project Implement Manual
PPS	Proportional to beneficiary populations
PSNP	Productive Safety Nets Programme
PW	Public Works
RPWFU	Regional public works focal units
RRT	Rapid response team
RUSACCO	Rural savings and credit cooperatives
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SNNPR	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People's Region
SWC	Soil and water conservation
TC	Technical Committee
TLU	Tropical Livestock Unit
TOR	Terms of reference
TOT	Training of trainers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

WARDO	<i>Woreda Agricultural and Rural Development Office</i>
WFSD	<i>Woreda Food Security Desk</i>
WFSO	<i>Woreda Food Security Office</i>
WFSTF	<i>Woreda Food Security Task Force(s)</i>
WOARD	<i>Woreda Office of Agriculture and Rural Development</i>
WOFED	<i>Woreda Office of Finance and Economic Development</i>
WPWFU(s)	<i>Woreda Public Works Focal Unit(s)</i>

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Executive Summary

1. This report documents progress in the implementation of the Productive Safety Nets Programme (PSNP) and the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP) in selected *woredas* in Afar and Somali regions. It also provides qualitative, comparative information on two pastoral *woredas* in Oromiya.
2. Results are based largely on primary data collected between November 2010 and January, 2011. Mixed methods—data collection techniques using both qualitative and quantitative methods—have been employed. Doing so provides a richer pool of data and greater analytic power than would have been available with either of these methods used alone. Third, a “cascading” approach is used whereby data are collected at all levels: regional, *woreda*, *kebele*, household, and individual. This makes it possible to triangulate results derived from different survey techniques and from different sources.
3. The sampling of *woredas* in Afar and Somali for the quantitative component was originally envisaged to generate a regionally representative sample of food-insecure households that were receiving PSNP benefits. However, CSA lacked capacity to implement such a survey in Somali. In Afar, a representative sample was constructed and ten *woredas* surveyed. Consequently, extrapolating results should be done with care.
4. The dominant theme that recurs throughout this report is that the implementation of the PSNP differs substantially from that outlined in the Program Implementation Manual (PIM). This reflects inadequate training, severe resource constraints, and the sheer difficulties of operating in a physically harsh environment where populations are dispersed and communications difficult. But it also reflects the tensions created by attempting—as the PSNP does—to superimpose particular management structures (such as *kebele* food security task forces (KFSTFs), highland-oriented public works, and new ideas (targeting) in pastoralist and agro-pastoralist societies where traditional structures (clans) and norms (sharing) exert powerful influences.
5. Chapter 4 assesses *woreda* capacity to implement the PSNP.
 - All six instruments—the *woreda* qualitative interviews, the quantitative survey fielded at the *woreda* level, the qualitative interviews done at the community level, the quantitative data collected at the *kebele* level, focus group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries and the quantitative data collected at the household level—provide clear and consistent evidence that, in Afar, the PSNP was fully operating in Teru *woreda*. In Elidar and Ewa *woredas*, a number of the institutional structures specific to the PSNP are in place; however, knowledge that these are specific to the PSNP, as opposed to being emergency food aids, is spotty. In the remaining seven *woredas*, there are divergent views about the operations of the PSNP. In six of these seven *woredas*, there is clear evidence that some form of food distribution has taken place. In the minds of program officials, these food transfers *are* the PSNP. However, there is a sense that at some levels, the full gamut of PSNP activities, as specified in the PIM, is not supposed to take place in Afar. This would

seem to explain the absence or confusion over task forces, difficulties in finding beneficiary lists, and so on.

- The two Afar *woredas* (Elidar and Teru), where there is some evidence of fuller PSNP operations, face especially difficult conditions with poor communications and electricity, and near-absent vehicle access.
 - Operational capacity in the eight *woredas* surveyed in Somali is limited. Only Shinile comes close to being adequately resourced as measured in terms of staffing, communications, electricity, vehicle access, and documentation.
 - While there is some awareness of the objectives of the PSNP, unsettlingly, this also comes with a view that the PSNP should promote a “work culture” and discourage dependency.
 - Complementary Community Investment has been introduced in one *woreda* in Somali and to a certain extent in the lowland areas of Oromiya.
 - Early warning systems are rudimentary.
6. Chapter 5 explores implementation of the PSNP from the perspective of *kebeles* and households.
- In all *woredas* where the quantitative survey was fielded, *kebele* food security task forces (FSTFs) exist. Composition varies somewhat from what is specified in the PIM, with the most notable case being that in Somali, 6 out of 23 KFSTFs lack an elected representative from women’s groups.
 - There is confusion in Afar about the role of the KFSTFs. During workshop discussions, regional officials indicated that these, or similar structures, did, in fact, exist, but that their role was much more limited than that specified in the PIM. Further, they indicated that beneficiary lists were often passed up to the *woreda* level, which would explain why they were not available when the locality level interviews were carried out.
 - While KFSTFs had general knowledge of the purpose of the PSNP, more specific understanding was lacking.
 - Both quantitative and qualitative data sources indicate that households’ have a relatively poor understanding of the objectives of the PSNP, seeing it largely as a transfer mechanism. In Afar, understanding of the PSNP was particularly weak.
 - Distance travelled to payment sites varies from 30 minutes to one full day. Problems in accessing payment sites are compounded by long waits at the collection point and the absence of transport. Particular problems were noted in Seweyna, where a single payment point was reported to serve nine *kebeles*.
 - It is perceived that the payment process does not interfere with herding patterns.
 - There is almost no knowledge of when payments will be received and limited knowledge of how much a household will get.

- Client cards had been distributed in only 7 out of 23 *kebeles* in Somali. No *kebeles* in Afar reported distributing cards.
7. Chapter 6 assesses targeting performance.
- In Afar, there is limited understanding of PSNP targeting principles among *woreda*-level officials and consequently, little systematic orientation is provided to *kebele* officials and clan leaders. Clan leaders, working with the KFDC or KFSTF, play an important part in determining the number of beneficiaries and the size of transfer per household.
 - In Somali and Oromiya, officials have a more complete understanding of targeting guidelines. Officials in these regions have the advantage of having been involved in implementing the PSNP Pastoral Area Pilot (PAP) as well as learning from NGOs working in some areas.
 - Understanding how targeting processes actually work is complex, given the competing narratives of the need to work within traditional structures, norms about the sharing of resources, understanding of the importance of allocating program resources to the poorest, claims about how it works in practice, and the widespread view that PSNP resources are insufficient, given need.
 - Despite stated claims and understandings, both qualitative and quantitative evidence points to the fact that, in practice, there is very little differentiation by wealth in terms of access to Public Works employment.
 - Households where the head holds an official position in the *kebele* is *more* likely to receive public works payments. The magnitude of these effects is sizeable; being an official raises the probability of getting paid employment for public works by 14.3 percentage points.
 - Women’s participation in targeting is limited. Clan leaders do not widely consult women. When women attend targeting meetings, their voices are rarely taken into account.
 - Targeting practices as they relate to polygamous households vary widely.
 - *Woreda* and *kebele* officials use a number of measures to cover excluded households, including emergency assistance and other development inputs (CCI), the PSNP contingency fund, practicing partial family targeting, as well as encouraging recipients to share their transfer with non-beneficiaries.
8. Chapter 7 explores aspects of the implementation of public works projects under the PSNP.
- Generally, public works activities are coordinated with *woreda* development plans.
 - Overall, participation rates in the selection of public works are, at 20 percent, high and compares favorably to the implementation of the PSNP in the highlands. However, there are marked gender differences. A female-headed household is 15.5 percentage

points less likely to participate than a male-headed household with the same characteristics. Wealthier households were also more likely to participate.

- At all levels, there is a perception that public works have had positive impacts. Roads, natural resource management, and improvements in water-related infrastructure were frequently noted as having favorable effects.
 - Women groups overwhelmingly indicated that public works (PWs) interfere with the domestic and childcare responsibilities. Across all *kebeles*, no special arrangements, such as provision of childcare services at PWs sites, are provided while women work.
 - While regional- and *woreda*-level PWs focal persons understood these guidelines regarding women's work when pregnant, and believed these were being implemented, discussions with women's groups revealed that in practice, these are poorly understood.
9. Chapter 8 discusses a number of aspects associated with payments for Public Works employment and Direct Support. Both qualitative and quantitative data sources provide consistent information on this.
- In Somali, the principle of FFT is reasonably well understood. But apart from Shinile *woreda*, it is simply not practiced. For a given amount of food available, authorities choose to increase coverage and reduce payment amounts. This also appears to be true in Teru in Afar.
 - Consistent with the absence of FFT, apart from Shinile (and to a lesser extent, Afdem and Teru), there is no relationship between household size and payments for public works.
 - In the *woredas* surveyed in Somali and in Teru, the concept of the Labor Cap is generally well understood. Quantitative data on how many days per month that individuals work show that the Labor Cap is being implemented.
10. Chapter 9 presents the qualitative findings of the appeals and complaints management process of the PSNP in the lowland areas of Ethiopia.
- The formal appeals process is badly underdeveloped. KACs are largely missing and it is not obvious that those that do exist function in a manner anywhere close to what was envisaged in the PIM.
 - Consequently, appeals are made informally to a variety of actors.
 - Exclusion is the dominant reason for appeal but these appear to be unsuccessful. In general, men appear more aware of the appeals and complaints process than women. Women reported that they did not feel that they were encouraged to complain and that there were instances where it was perceived that informal appeals processes (which are common in Afar and Somali) are biased against women.
11. Chapter 10 assesses the extent to which the HABP has been rolled out in Afar and Somali regions.

- As of December 2010, the HABP had not been rolled-out in Afar or Somali.
- There are few DAs in place who could support the HABP and access to financial services is nonexistent.

12. Chapter 11 presents qualitative findings on beneficiary preferences for how and when they would like to be paid, the intra-spousal nature of access and control over payments, and the consequences of unpredictable payments.

- Given the hypothetical choice between food and cash, there is an overwhelming preference to receive payments as food. This reflected limited access to grain markets, rising food prices, and conflicts over its use. While most respondents perceived that payments in wheat were appropriate, there was a desire for a mixed basket to include cereals, edible oils, and pulses.
- Food payments are usually collected by women.
- In the majority of cases, it is women who decide how to use the food payment. When food transfers are sold, the proceeds are used to buy other food items, such as pulses, oils, sugar, coffee, milk, and salt. When food payments are collected by men, there were cases reported where some of this payment was used to purchase *khat*.
- In all regions, focus groups unanimously reported powerful pressures to share food payments with relatives and neighbors who are not registered under the PSNP. Sharing of resources is widely practiced culture regardless of location, livelihood systems, or wealth status. In the case of polygamous households, where only one wife and her family are registered for the PSNP, sharing across multiple households is common.
- Payment delays force PSNP beneficiaries to sell assets. Other responses include going into debt and asking neighbors to share.

PROLOGUE

Donor Coordination Team, Productive Safety Net Programme

Results from this analysis were presented to government and donor representatives in workshops and meetings held in Addis Ababa, Awash and Jijiga. Those representatives felt that readers of this report would benefit from an enhanced understanding of the context surrounding the introduction of the PSNP in Afar and Somali. With this in mind, the Donor Coordination Team, Productive Safety Net Programme, has in consultation with the Government of Ethiopia, prepared this prologue.

1. Introduction

The following chapter is divided into two broad sections: 1) programmatic; and 2) non-programmatic [including cultural, socio-economic and environmental] context to situate this report within the events leading up to and running parallel to the baseline survey undertaken in 2010. Indeed, the report is entitled a “Baseline” report to further reflect the fact that this data provides a snapshot in time of the PSNP in Afar and Somali. This chapter also incorporates a number of comments of Afar Region and Somali Region, gathered during workshops on the report in Awash and Jijiga during September, 2011.

The Government of Ethiopia, in collaboration with development partners, has been implementing the PSNP since 2005 in Amhara, Oromia, SNNP and Tigray, Dire Dawa and Harar [highland areas]. The majority of lowland areas [particularly Afar and Somali regions] were not included in this initial stage of the programme due to the need for a separate program design that recognized the unique livelihood and socio-economic context of the lowland areas.

When interpreting the findings of this report, it is important to recognize that the PSNP in lowland areas has many distinct features and challenges, different to the PSNP implemented in highland areas. Notably, differences in lowland and highland PSNP relate to:

- 1) Socio-economics of pastoralist culture;
- 2) Targeting [especially related to full-family targeting];
- 3) Public Works (PW) with pastoral specific PW guidelines still yet to be developed;
- 4) Capacity in general in lowland areas is much less than that of highland areas; and
- 5) Budget was not allocated to Afar and Somali in 2010.

The findings of this Baseline report must be interpreted with the understanding that, at the time of the data collection in 2010, a full¹ PSNP had not been implemented in Afar. Full implementation in Somali is dependent woredas meeting the agreed minimum requirements.²

The expectation from the start of the highland PSNP (2006) was that a full PSNP in lowland areas would only be designed through learning lessons and design nuances from the Pastoral Areas Pilot (PAP). The PAP began in 2008 and was designed with the objective of testing different implementation modalities in different lowland areas. The PAP was implemented in Afar and Somali Regions in a total of 18 woredas, starting in January 2008³.

Adding an additional layer of complexity to an understanding of the 2010 Baseline report, it is important to recognize the difference in general capacity levels in PAP and non-PAP *woredas*. It is important to consider the date *when* *woredas* entered the PSNP (see detailed explanation in section 3, below) and whether they were *woredas* that were included in the previous PAP or not. The 18 *woredas* included in the PAP would clearly have had a better understanding of the PSNP in 2010 and capacity to implement it as a result of their experiences through the PAP from 2008-2010.

As the following section will explain, the full PSNP was expected to start in 32 *woredas* in Afar and 13 *woredas* in Somali in 2010. However, it was only in mid-2010 that an official decision was made on the roll-out, meaning that Regions and *woredas* had a very short time (approx 6 months) to put in place the mechanisms for a ‘full’ PSNP to be implemented. The following section will explore these events in more detail by region, situating the CSA/IFPRI/IDS survey appropriately within the 2010 context.

Considering this context and delay in ‘full’ roll-out of the PSNP, the 2010 lowland household survey should be read as a baseline.

2. Programmatic Context

Phase I [2005 – 2006]

In 2005, the government planned to run the highland PSNP in all parts of the country. However, immediately after this decision was reached, it was realized that lowland areas have particular needs and circumstances which require a different type of PSNP design. As lowland areas have specific livelihood strategies and socio-economic options that are very different to highland

¹ “Full” implementation of the PSNP can be defined as occurring when four areas of work are completed: (a) delivery of appropriate, timely and predictable transfers – food and/or cash – to client, (b) a targeting exercise has been completed and is in operation., in line with the Project Implementation Manual (PIM), (c) an awareness raising of community members, for both PSNP clients and non-PSNP clients, relating to the PSNP design, implementation modalities, expectations from the PSNP, targeting, etc. (d) the Region, *woredas* and communities have the agreed institutional arrangements in place to deliver the PSNP as designed.

² See page 4 for details on minimum requirements.

³ In Afar Region, the *woredas* where the PAP was piloted were: Fantale, Berhale, Dawe, Teru, Gulina and Chifra. In Somali Region, the *woredas* where the PAP was piloted were: Afdem, Babile, Bare, Filtu, Dolo Ado, and Dolo Ba.

strategies, specific design issues needed to be incorporated into the PSNP to ensure that the programme did not harm existing livelihood strategies in the Regions.

Furthermore, woreda government and other actors had limited capacity in these areas. As a result, PSNP implementation in lowland areas was delayed for a period during which the design of the PSNP would be amended to reflect the specific context of these Regions.

Phase II [2006 – 2009]

2006

2006 - Afar

In 2006, a Joint Review & Implementation Supervision (JRIS) Mission decided that Afar would be included in the PSNP and that PSNP clients would begin receiving 9 months of transfers as Direct Support. Prior to 2006, there had been a long history of Afar Region receiving food aid for, typically, 9 months of the year. The decision to move food aid recipients to the PSNP as Direct Support was documented in the Aide Memoire of the JRIS Mission in [] 2006.

2006 - Somali

During the 2006 JRIS, there was a decision not to include Somali region in the PSNP in 2006. However, there was increased attention to improving the humanitarian response in Somali Region, and this increase in attention led to the establishment of the so-called Hubs and Spokes mechanism, which was a delivery mechanism of food designed by WFP for use with Government.

2006 – Federal level issues

It was also in 2006 that the Federal level Pastoral Taskforce (PTF) was formed and took responsibility for providing advice and technical support to the PAP. PTF membership of the taskforce included the Food Security Coordination Directorate (FSCD), USAID, WFP, DCT, FAO and NGOs (SC/US, SC/UK, and CARE Ethiopia). There were attempts to replicate this taskforce at the regional level, though little was achieved (and there continues to be no Regional Taskforces in 2011), due to a number of issues, including limited capacity and poor institutional arrangements.

It was in 2006 that the compatibility of pastoralism with the design of the PSNP was questioned. A strong argument against extending the PSNP into pastoral areas was made. This argument took a number of turns, including:

- 1) Implementation of PW will be difficult due to the mobile nature of the pastoralists; and
- 2) Targeting was seen as a challenge due to the strong customary institutions and organisation of pastoral groups.
- 3) Capacity constraints and recognition of the fundamentally different livelihood strategies employed by people in pastoral areas meant that a different programme design would be required.

2007

2007 – Federal level

In 2007, a *Comprehensive Situation Assessment* was completed for both Afar and Somali Regions. The assessment concluded that many aspects of pastoral society have the potential to benefit considerably from implementing the PSNP. It was also recognized that pastoral issues and concerns must be addressed and that several innovations would be required to address:

- 1) *Institutional linkages*: Appropriate institutional links between the programme and other related development and emergency efforts in the pastoral areas;
- 2) *Identification and targeting of beneficiaries*: Food insecurity takes many forms in the pastoral areas of Ethiopia. Poor pastoral households may be the most prevalent and prominent candidates for PSNP assistance;
- 3) *Alternative delivery mechanisms*: Fostering resilience rather than simply building assets will demand innovations in the way the PSNP delivers benefits. A careful re-examination of the virtues for pastoralists of cash transfers and a possible recommitment to cash rather than food transfers will also be part of the pilot exercise; and
- 4) *Definition of Graduation*: Given the instability inherent in pastoral environments, the goal of the PSNP in pastoral areas should be the building of household resilience to external perturbations.

As part the process to prepare to implement a Pilot Phase of the PSNP (PAP) in pastoral areas, in 2007 the PTF led two comprehensive assessments on:

- 1) food management; and
- 2) general institutional capacity.

This assessment based on the *Comprehensive Situation Assessment*. This together with an additional PTF-led assessment concluded that a PAP (together with implementation guidelines) should be designed and undertaken.

2008

In January 2008, the PAP was launched in 18 pastoral *woredas*⁴ across four pastoral and agro-pastoral regions (Afar, Oromia, SNNP and Somali). It was agreed that the PAP would be implemented over a 2 year period [2008 – 2009]. The PAP was supported by two consultancies to:

- 1) design an M&E system; and
- 2) to document lessons learned.

⁴ The PAP woredas were: Somali [Afdem, Babile, Bare, Filtu, Dolo Ado, and Dolo Ba]; Afar [Fantale, Berhale, Dawe, Teru, Gulina and Chifra]; Oromia: [Daweserar, Chinakson and Arero]; and SNNP [Dasenech, Nyangatom and Hammer].

Immediate lessons from the PAP urged PSNP stakeholders to thoroughly understand and recognize the diversity and complexity of pastoral issues in order to effectively implement the PSNP in pastoral areas, and to document lessons that would lead to a more realistic and credible 'full' pastoral PSNP. Major considerations and design features explored in the PAP included:

- 1) targeting;
- 2) resource transfer;
- 3) understanding social networks in pastoral areas;
- 4) seasonality;
- 5) Public works
- 6) Capacity Issues; and
- 7) planning, resource management, M&E and overall programme management.

2009

In 2009, preparations began for the design of the next phase of the PSNP [including HABP], which was to last from 2009-2014. In the build-up to 2009, a number of detailed reviews, appraisals and design missions at both regional and federal levels were completed. To feed into this design process, a *Feasibility Assessment of Scaling Up the PSNP in pastoral areas* was undertaken.

In June-July 2009, two joint GoE-Development partner Pre-Appraisal and Appraisal Missions resulted in the development of a *Pastoral Roll-out Report*. This report defined a set of agreed minimum requirements to be met by Regions, zonal and woredas before a roll-out could be effected. Among others, the agreed minimum requirements included:

- 1) strengthening program management at federal, regional and *woreda* levels;
- 2) putting in place the minimum human resource requirement to roll-out the PSNP in Regional, zonal and *woreda* offices;
- 3) strengthening food management and control systems (documentation, accounting, and reporting) at all levels;
- 4) establishment of program implementation modalities and approaches (appropriate targeting mechanism based on the lessons from the pilot, awareness creation of communities as to the modalities of PSNP, etc), and
- 5) obtain consensus by all stakeholders as to the roll-out.

This *Pastoral Roll-out Report* would become an important tool central to decision making around the roll-out. This Report outlined the following strategies for Afar and Somali:

Afar: To follow a two-pronged strategy. The two phases of this strategy would see:

- 1) The roll-out of the PW in 17 *woredas* (6 PAP + 11 additional *woredas* including Eldat, Mille, Addar, Afambo, Abaala, Kuneba, Dulecha, Amibara, Yallo, Awra, Dalifage) starting in January, 2010. However, it was agreed that Afar would receive special support to facilitate this roll-out process.
- 2) The full roll out of the PSNP to the remaining *woredas* in the Region (a further 17 *woredas*) during 2011.

Somali: To follow a two pronged strategy. The two phases of this strategy would see:

- 1) the roll-out of the PSNP in 15 *woredas* (6 PAP + 9 additional *woredas* including Jijiga, Awbere, Gursum, Harshin, Kebribeyah, Erer, Shinile, Aysha, and Hudet), starting in January, 2010.
- 2) similar to Afar, the region should receive special support (i.e., training in PW planning, M&E, etc) in preparation for this roll-out. At this time, it was agreed that the Region would expand the PSNP to the remaining 17 identified *woredas* in 2011.

Following a series of Missions⁵ between May–August 2009, agreements led to the development of the new PSNP design. In October 2009, DRMFS sent an official letter to Afar and Somali regions confirming the roll-out and explaining some minimum requirements, which had to be met by each Region in order that the roll-out could take place. The letter from DRMFS requested that relevant Regional Bureaux:

- 1) officially confirm their commitment to fulfilling these minimum requirements;
- 2) each region was asked to submit a detailed implementation plan for the roll-out activities;
- 3) put in place the agreed minimum requirements for the PSNP roll-out;
- 4) confirm fulfillment of the minimum requirements officially.

Later that year, in November 2009, DRMFS met personally with the regional Governments of Afar and Somali to reiterate and reconfirm the four issues above.

The period 2006 – 2009 can therefore be interpreted as a time of piloting, learning lessons, design and decision making relating to the roll-out of the PSNP across Afar and Somali Regions. This period would eventually shape the implementation of the ‘full’ PSNP in Afar and Somali.

⁵ Formulation Support Mission, [10 – 21 May, 2009], Pre-Appraisal Mission [26 June – 10 July, 2009], Appraisal Mission [30 July – 14 August, 2009].

Phase III [2010 onwards]

Afar

In January 2010, a high-level meeting took place in the capital of Afar Region, attended by the DRMFSS State Minister, HE Ato Mitiku Kassa and FSCD Director, Ato Berhanu Woldemichael. This meeting was to assess the readiness of the Region to roll-out, the commitment of the Regions to implement the PSNP and to ensure that any necessary additional federal support was provided.

Federal level

The PTF was very active during 2010. For example, in January 2010 the PTF developed a reporting template which was shared with both Afar and Somali Regions. Based on this template, Regions submitted progress reports detailing the status of the agreed minimum roll-out requirements and the PTF prepared a written update on the progress of the roll-out in Afar and Somali. Following this report, the PTF organised a *Special Mission* to relevant *woredas* across Afar and Somali Regions to verify whether regions fulfilled the agreed minimum requirements for the roll-out.

This *Special Mission* to assess whether *woredas* in Somali and Afar had met, or were on target to meet, the minimum requirements, took place in March. The Special Mission concluded that, consistent with progress reports submitted by Regions in January, the agreed actions of Appraisal Missions, regional consultations and November/December JRIS Mission had been steadily implemented. Findings from the Special Mission included:

- 1) improved awareness regarding the programme objective, implementation arrangements and implementation modality (targeting criteria, public works planning, etc.) at different levels;
- 2) regions took major steps to put in place the required institutional arrangements (i.e., the establishment of FSTFs and Appeal Committees as outlined in the PSNP design document);
- 3) regions met the minimum staffing requirement at regional, zonal, *woreda* and *kebele* levels; and
- 4) targeting and public works planning activities are on track.

Roll-out decision

Based on the *Special Mission* to Afar and Somali, a decision was made on the 19th March, during a meeting of the Mini-Joint Strategic Oversight Committee. At that meeting, it was agreed that:

Somali: The region and the *woredas* expected to join the PSNP in 2010 would receive three months of humanitarian relief (January-March), followed by PSNP transfers from April-June 2010. Additionally, PW plans should align with the EFY and be implemented for three months (April-June). It was agreed that WFP would handle food distribution to all PSNP clients.

Afar: It was agreed that PW be implemented in the agreed 17 *woredas* for two months (May-June).

In June of 2010, the PTF provided an update on the roll-out decision and related issues. These included an update on the nature and scale of the technical support required to enhance capacity of the pastoral regions in order to roll-out the PSNP from May to December 2010.

The November 2010 JRIS Mission noted that while significant progress to roll-out to pastoral *woredas* had been made (i.e., institutional arrangements, training and materials availability, SWC and NR rehabilitation and PW monitoring visits), the guidelines for PW in pastoral areas had still not been completed as scheduled. It was agreed that the guidelines should be completed as soon as possible. In addition it was agreed that the federal level PW Coordination Unit should provide clear guidance and follow-up support to the pastoral regions for the implementation of PWs.

Therefore, 2010 can be viewed as a time when the PSNP was still in the process of rolling-out and that the agreed timetable for the roll-out was delayed. Despite the attempt to clarify the scheduled roll-out, there remained some uncertainty related to when *woredas* would be included in the full roll-out and in terms of capacity, *Afar* and *Somali* were still without core programme guidelines.

It is also important to note that up to this point, there had still not been an adequate budget allocation from the federally-managed programme budget. In *Afar*, the 11 non-PAP *woredas* did not receive their management budget at all, and so could not be expected to have undertaken PSNP related activities without financial assistance. In *Somali*, 15 *woredas* had received their management budget and so roll-out activities had been implemented. Furthermore, capacity issues of each region had not been properly addressed, despite the agreements to do so, and fund the additional support from federal level.

It was in October-December 2010 that CSA undertook the *woreda* and household survey for this report, in [] *woredas*.

3. Specific Features of Somali and Afar Programmes

There are variations between regions related to implementation capacity and each region attempted to address its own specific challenges in its own way. It is important to clearly outline the specific features of the *Somali* and *Afar* programmes separately, providing more depth to the context to the decision-making and preparedness for PSNP roll-out in lowland areas. It is important to understand this to be able to clearly understand the data presented in the Baseline Report.

Somali

Somali region has a long history of humanitarian relief with many households receiving repeat assistance year after year. The main challenges concerning the PSNP roll out are related to implementing proper targeting, PW participation and a shift in food transfer types, although

most areas of implementation of the PSNP also exist. The transition from relief assistance to implementing the PSNP required continuous awareness creation at different levels to bring about a common understanding of the PSNP objectives. Furthermore, a shift from a relief mode to a development oriented approach was necessary, but inevitably time consuming, difficult and complex.

Positively, regional and local governments and communities were well-prepared and committed to the implementation of the PSNP. Communities were also eager to engage themselves in PW activities, especially those that had seen the contribution of PWs activities in nearby Oromia region. Commitment was present in Somali, from the beginning. Indeed, the reflection of BoA Head during the Somali regional workshops reflected this. The BoA visited some PSNP *woredas* to ask questions to clients related to their programme understanding and perception of the PSNP compared to relief. Clients shared stories of their work on PW subprojects and their feeling that the PSNP is changing their lives because it has two benefits: 1) food assistance, and 2) “making development”.⁶

The programme in Somali began with a combination of the PAP pilot. Unlike Afar, the roll out in Somali has always intended to be partial - of a possible 53 *woredas* in the region, 32 are covered by the PSNP. Security and other factors have limited the PSNP roll-out to the other *woredas*. In Somali, the PSNP roll-out decision was always linked to the implementation of the full PSNP, including PW.

Significant attention was provided to Somali, to ensure that minimum capacity requirements had been met. Indeed, additional resources from federal level’s Institutional Strengthening budget line was used to ensure that the correct level of TAs were provided to the Region, zone and *woredas*. Somali performed well in terms of trying to meet the agreed minimum requirements. For example, the region provided significant follow up to *woredas* in relation to meeting the minimum requirements and held high level discussions at the Regional capital as well as in Addis Ababa. The result of the attention given by Somali officials meant that Somali region, zones and *woredas* were in a reasonable position to roll-out at the agreed time. This focused attention led to improvements in understanding of the PSNP. Awareness of the PSNP, its operational modalities, targeting and institutional arrangements was created at all levels (communities, *woredas*, zones and region), prior to the roll-out.

The implementation of the PSNP in Somali was postponed in 13 implementing *woredas*, until the end of EFY 2003 (June 2011).

⁶ BoA Head, Dr. Sultan Wali, Jijiga, September, 2011

Somali: Timeline of inclusion in PAP and PSNP

2008

PAP began in six *woredas* [NGO: Filtu, Dolo Ado, Dolo Bay, Bare; GoE: Afdem, Babile].

2010

Roll-out to the full PSNP began in these six PAP *woredas* [Filtu, Dolo Ado, Dolo Bay, Bare, Afdem, Babile] along with nine other *woredas* [Jijiga, Awbere, Gursum, Harshin, Kebribeyah, Erer, Shinile, Aysha, and Hudet]. During 2010, 15 *woredas* were implementing the PSNP in Somali Region.

2011

The intention is that during 2011, plans to scale up to the remaining 17 identified *woredas* will reach fruition. However, the additional scale-up only included four *woredas* [Aisha, Deguhabor, West Emay, Maisu] due to the fact that minimum requirements were not met by the other *woredas*. Furthermore, the severe drought affecting the Horn of Africa meant that existing food pipelines to those *woredas* expecting to join the PSNP could not be risked for an administrative switch from humanitarian food assistance to PSNP assistance.

Afar: Timeline of inclusion in PAP and PSNP

2006

The PSNP in Afar was implemented in the form of Direct Support since 2006. The region was included in 2006 as Direct Support to all emergency beneficiaries [in all 32 *woredas* of the region] for 9 months of the year.

The expectation from Federal level was that the capacity related to targeting of clients had already been met in 2006. As a result, PSNP transfers started in 2006, although not including the implementation of PW.

However, while Afar had received resources since 2006, there was limited attention given to capacity building in the Region. Management and administrative budgets were not released to regions by the federal level [with the exception of the PAP *woredas*] between 2006 and 2010.

2008

Six *woredas* were included in the PAP from 2008. These 6 PAP *woredas* received their due budget to implement the PSNP. The first PW was piloted through the PAP in 6 *woredas* of the region in 2008 [NGO: Teru, Dawe, Chifra, SC UK; GoE: Awash Fentalle, Berhale].

The other *woredas* (officially in the PSNP since 2006, implementing Direct Support only) did not receive their management budgets. For this reason the capacity of most Afar *woredas* was still not well developed even in 2010.

2010

The intention in 2010 was to roll-out the PSNP PW, keeping in mind that the PSNP had officially been implemented in the form of DS since 2006. From 2006, the transfer of PSNP resources in Afar had not been linked to fulfilling the minimum capacity requirements. This is highly likely to have compromised the understanding of the PSNP across the Region. Consequently, understanding of the PSNP, the capacity required for effective implementation and institutional arrangements at *woreda* and community levels vary across *woredas*.

The second round of *woreda* inclusion in PWs took place in May, 2010 when 11 *woredas* were included [Eldat, Mille, Addar, Afambo, Abaala, Kuneba, Dulecha, Amibara, Yallo, Awra, Dalifage].

2011

During the September 2011 Regional Workshops, Afar region clarified that administrative structures [*woreda* and *kebele* FSTFs], targeting/retargeting, awareness raising and training about the programme have been implemented. However, while the structures do exist, there are concerns related to their level of functionality.

A third round of inclusion in PW will take place in 2011, when the remaining 15 *woredas* are expected to be included in PWs.

4. Key Actors

WFP

WFP was implementing humanitarian relief across Afar, prior to 2006. WFP accepted the responsibility to work with the Afar Regional Government to assist the shift from humanitarian relief caseload, to PSNP caseload. In doing so, it was responsible for:

- Food management capacity building
- Monitoring food distribution
- Participation in Special Missions of the PSNP
- Allocation of food to be distributed
- Manages the Hubs and Spokes mechanism in Somali region and thus it is essentially managing the distribution of PSNP food resources in this region.

NGOs

Afar: Save the Children UK [Teru, Chifra and Dawe] and CARE [Dawe] implemented the PAP in partnership with Afar Regional Government.

Somali: Save the Children US [Dolo Ado, Dolo Bay] and local NGOs, PCAE Pastoral Concern Association Ethiopia and ARDA [Filtu, Bare *woredas*].

NGOs support *woredas* and communities with regard to targeting, planning, capacity building, institutional arrangements and all other aspects of the PSNP. NGOs also manage the food resource for these *woredas*.

5. Non-Programmatic Context

a. Livelihood Context

Pastoral livelihoods in Ethiopia are defined by their primary economic activity, and these include livestock-based, agro-pastoral, sedentary farming and ex-pastoral ('drop-outs'):

Livestock-based livelihoods are the most common, where households rely on rearing camels, cattle, sheep and goats. The survival, quantity and condition of these livestock determine a household's wealth and ability to continue their traditional livelihood patterns. Mobility (usually within recognized and well defined long-standing migration routes) and the ability to access natural resources, such as pasture and water, are fundamental to the continuation of this livelihood. Those households engaged in livestock-base livelihoods are often referred to as 'pure' pastoralists.

Agro-pastoral livelihoods combine extensive livestock rearing and rain-fed cereal production (typically sorghum, wheat, and barley) for household consumption. The area under agricultural cultivation is mainly restricted by the availability of labour within the household. Mobility remains important for these households.

Sedentary farmers practice mixed farming, cultivating food crops (sorghum, wheat or other cereals) along with modest flocks of sheep and goats. Wealth is determined by land holdings and oxen ownership.

Ex-Pastoralists are comprised of households who have lost their livestock and now depend largely on the 'sale' of family labour. Ex-Pastoralists are settled on the periphery of major urban centres and in internally displaced person camps. The majority remain on the margins performing low-skilled labour intensive activities value activities such as casual labour and the collection and sale of bush products.

b. Environment and Climate Context

Pastoral communities of Ethiopia, particularly Afar and Somali regions, depend on livestock and to some extent on opportunistic farming for their livelihoods and food security. However, they remain vulnerable to food insecurity because they have been seriously affected by recurrent drought and other climatic change induced factors.

The sources of vulnerability in pastoral areas of Ethiopia are:

- Deterioration of grazing/range land due to natural (encroachment of grazing land by invasive plants) and human made factors (population pressure and competition of grazing land for crop land),

- Drought: production and productivity of grazing/rangeland diminishes from time to time,
- Deforestation of rangeland due to charcoal making and increase in farmland,
- Epidemic diseases: human and livestock diseases,
- Market failure (lack of market facilities and failure of market function due to different factors),
- Poor socio-economic infrastructures: health, education, and market facilities, and rural road connection,
- Conflict over resource competition; and deterioration of customary institutions (such as networks and linkages, trust and solidarity, cooperation and generosity).
- At present, human population increases pressure on natural resources while conflict and insecurity often make these resources inaccessible.

Therefore, it is necessary to consider the effectiveness of PSNP, within this context of vulnerability and over-all environmental and climatic dynamics.

c. Implications of Cultural Factors on Programme Implementation

In the run up to the PSNP roll-out, two workshops took place in Afar and one in Somali. In the case of Afar in particular, the Region strongly asserted that the critical building blocks had been implemented in Afar [i.e., transfers, awareness, etc.]. A second meeting, in which *woreda* administrators of *woredas* surveyed attended, clarified many of the disputed issues. For example, transfers are going to PSNP clients, some *woredas* have structures in place to deliver transfers effectively.

However, there is a lack of understanding among clients, there is dilution in addition to the fact that targeting is not as effective as it should be. The issues arising from these regional workshops serve to illustrate that there are a number of ways in which lowlands culture differs from that of the highlands in Ethiopia. Many of these unique cultural characteristics are important to keep in mind when interpreting the findings of this Baseline Report.

Targeting

From the beginning of the roll-out, it was recognized that targeting is a complex issue which may not be easy to implement in the absence of the right institutional arrangement (for instance, there is a need to involve and link customary institutions to the formal institutions). Targeting/retargeting has not done properly and clan leaders (as opposed to *woreda* and *kebele* Food Security Task Forces) continue to play a significant role in targeting.

Appeals

The functioning of the Appeal's Committee's are affected by a lack of written documentation which may be linked to the strong tendency towards oral tradition in these areas, as well as possible reliance on clan leaders to resolve disputes.

Full-family targeting

The food transfer as PW and DS was reported to be effected but the quantity was found far below the full entitlement of each client. Understanding social networks in pastoral areas is important to managing resource dilution. In pastoral areas, resource dilution (in all categories of the pastoral livelihood groups) is not only unavoidable but is a traditional coping mechanism which should be encouraged.

Gender

While ensuring gender considerations in PSNP implementation are taken into account, it is also useful to put this issue in pastoral context where there exists a complex socio-cultural and traditional setting. Due to cultural context, it is very hard to bring women and men together to participate in the planning of PW subprojects, for example. There are also entrenched divisions of labour in Afar and Somali which present additional challenges to the implementation of PWs. The great majority of pastoral societies continue to be dominated by men, making women's participation in decision-making processes is limited.

Public Works

Woredas entered the PSNP at different stages and so understanding of the full PSNP is variable. In particular, the understanding of *woredas* that PSNP is the same as PW is important. Many associate the PSNP exclusively with the PW. As the roll-out was not planned in the same way as that of the highland areas, many *woredas* in Afar and Somali are still in the process of rolling out, aiming to meet minimum requirements in 2011.

Because the pastoral livelihood system is fundamentally different from highland areas, public works need to reflect the pastoral livelihood zones, and a pastoral specific Environmental Social and Management Framework was to be developed as a matter of priority in 2009, in which "Do No Harm" principles should be central to ensure security and peaceful social relations. There is concern in 2011 that the lack of a lowland specific guideline remains a challenge for Somali and Afar regions.

d. Capacity Context

Implementation of PSNP in pastoral areas followed five years after highland regions. For this reason, capacity development through the PSNP capacity building component has been very limited. This implies that the assessment and interpretation of capacity in pastoral areas needs to consider the historical perspective as well as the pastoral context. In this regard, implementation of PSNP in pastoral areas required extensive attention to address capacity gaps.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Persistent food insecurity remains a major problem in many parts of Ethiopia. To address this, the last ten years has seen a shift away from *ad hoc* responses, such as those that characterized the major drought in 2002, to a planned, systematic approach. Central to this is the Government of Ethiopia's Food Security Programme (FSP) launched in 2005. While much initial effort focused on its implementation in Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPR, it has now been extended to other regions, including Afar and Somali. The document describing the FSP notes that a strength of the program has been the willingness of all stakeholders to ongoing learning processes, taking information from monitoring reports and evaluation studies to strengthen implementation (GFDRE 2009a). In this spirit, the new phase of the FSP pays particular attention to ensuring that this learning continues through a mixture of monitoring and evaluation work.

This report has its origins in the intention of the Government of Ethiopia (GFDRE 2009a, 77) to carry out a biannual household survey to assess outcomes and impacts of all components of the FSP in chronically food-insecure *woredas*. In 2006, 2008 and 2010, surveys of approximately 3,700 households located in 66 food-insecure *woredas* served by the PSNP in Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNPR. In 2010, these household surveys were extended to Afar and Somali. This was complemented by the inclusion of a suite of qualitative data collection techniques conducted in 12 *woredas* (six in Afar, four in Somali and two in lowland areas of Oromiya) where the quantitative survey was fielded. There are considerable benefits to combining quantitative and qualitative research methods. Doing so maximizes the advantages of the relative strengths of each method, and provides a richer pool of data and greater analytic power than would have been available with either of these methods alone. The main motivations for use of qualitative research is the recognition that (1) processes of program implementation and how these are received at the local level involve complex interactions, and may be different than anticipated by program planners. Understanding these interactions and their effects on outcomes require the use of qualitative research methods that develop trust and rapport between researchers and respondents, allow for open-ended responses, and triangulation through multiple respondents and participant observation; and that (2) qualitative methodologies can provide insights into the reasons and causes of certain impacts that will not necessarily be uncovered by quantitative approaches alone; and that (3) views, opinions, and interpretations of the program held by beneficiaries are important, credible, and worth listening to.

1.2 Objectives and Structure of the Report

This is the third of three reports that will be produced using data collected in 2010. It documents livelihoods and the implementation of the PSNP and HBP in Afar, Somali, and

pastoral localities in Oromiya.⁷ The report addresses the following evaluation objectives found in the FSP Log Frame and the Terms of Reference for this study.

Table 1.1 Evaluation objectives covered in this report

Evaluation objective	Issue	Chapter in this report	Link to Log Frames and TOR
<i>Document progress in the implementation of the PSNP</i>			
	Are Public Works payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	5, 8	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 39
	Are Direct Support payments timely and predictable? Do clients receive complete entitlement?	5, 8	PSNP Log frame Output 1.1 PSNP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 35
	Pregnant female participants are moved from Public Works to Direct Support	7	PSNP Log frame Output 1.4
	Transfers are received at a place no more than three hours from home	5	PSNP Log frame Output 1.5
	Why are there <i>woreda</i> -level differences in timeliness of transfers?	4	TOR, para 36
	How are contingency budgets used, including as a response to the <i>Kebele</i> Appeals system?	6, 9	TOR, para 41
	Can gender dimensions of access be better captured?	5, 6, 7, 9, 11	TOR, para 42
<i>Document progress in the implementation of the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP)</i>			
	Can gender dimensions of access be better captured?	10	HABP Log frame Output 1.2 TOR, para 42
	HAB clients have access to financial services	10	HABP Log frame Output 2.1
	HAB clients have access to desired input	10	HABP Log frame Output 3.2
<i>Assess trends in perceptions of the effectiveness and transparency of the PSNP and HABP among different groups of clients</i>			
	Beneficiaries understand how the program works	5, 6, 7, 8	PSNP Log frame Output 4.4
	Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries report that targeting and graduation processes are fair	6	PSNP Log frame Output 4.5

Below we summarize the topics covered in each chapter.

Chapter 2: Data sources and methods. This chapter describes the data sources and methods that underpin this report.

⁷ The first report documents progress in the implementation of the PSNP and the HABP in Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNPR Berhane et al. (2011). A second report, currently being prepared will use matching methods that measure the impact of the PSNP on the well-being of the chronically food-insecure population and the complementary roles played by the PSNP and HABP in achieving positive and negative outcomes for the food insecure and the reasons behind this.

Chapter 3: Food Security, Assets and Coping Strategies. This chapter provides descriptive information on food security, assets, livelihoods and coping strategies.

Chapter 4: Woreda perspectives on implementation. This chapter documents issues specific to the implementation of the PSNP in Afar. In addition, for *woredas* where fuller implementation has taken place, this chapter considers resources available to *woredas* for implementation and examines differences in the timeliness of payments. It also considers the implementation of the Complementary Community Investment component of the Food Security Program.

Chapter 5: Kebele and household perspectives on implementation. This chapter focuses on implementation, but here the perspective is largely that of the *kebele* and the household. It considers the following topics: Are local administrative structures such as *Kebele* and Community Food Security Task Forces in existence and functioning as envisaged in the Program Implementation Manual (PIM). Are households aware of these Task Forces and do they understand how the PSNP is supposed to operate? Are there issues associated with access to distributions points? Have client cards been distributed?

Chapter 6: Targeting. The chapter considers regional and *woreda* perspectives on targeting. It assesses how targeting is completed at the *kebele* and household levels, considering such as the participation of women in targeting processes, targeting of polygamous households, and inclusion/exclusion errors in targeting.

Chapter 7: The implementation of public works projects. This chapter discusses a number of aspects associated with the implementation of public works projects in surveyed *woredas* in Afar and Somali. It explores whether public works activities have been coordinated with *woreda* development plans. It assesses the extent to which those activities that are chosen have incorporated feedback from communities and whether these activities are linked to livelihoods. It summarizes the extent to which gender considerations have been incorporated into the implementation of public works activities and perceptions of the usefulness of public works.

Chapter 8: Payments for public works and direct support. This chapter discusses a number of aspects associated with payments for Public Works employment and Direct Support. We provide information describing regarding transfer levels for public works with particular attention to their relationship with Full Family Targeting. We examine the extent to which the Labor Cap is understood and implemented and transfer levels given to Direct Support beneficiaries.

Chapter 9: Appeals and complaints. This chapter presents the qualitative findings of the appeals and complaints management processes. It looks into a range of issues including, local knowledge of the appeals and complaints process, the role of local institutions and authorities in appeals and complaints management, the current status of Kebele Appeals Committee (KAC), sources of appeal and complaints, who people appeal to against the decisions of the PSNP targeting, the process of appeals and complaints, the gender dimension of the appeal

process, time taken (duration) of appeals and complaints to be resolved and the transparency of the appeal and complaints process

Chapter 10: The Household Asset Building Programme. This chapter examines the extent of preliminary HABP activities in Afar and Somali.

Chapter 11: Preferences for payments, use and control of transfers and timeliness of payments. This chapter presents qualitative findings on beneficiary preferences for how and when they would like to be paid, the intra-spousal nature of access and control over payments, and the consequences of unpredictable payments.

Chapter 2: Data Sources and Methods

2.1 Introduction

There are three distinguishing features of the data sources and methods used in this report. First, nearly all results are based on primary data collection undertaken between November 2010 and January 2011. Second, mixed methods—data collection techniques using both qualitative and quantitative methods—have been employed. Doing so provides a richer pool of data and greater analytic power than would have been available with either of these methods used alone. Third, we adopt a “cascading” approach whereby data are collected at all levels: regional, *woreda*, *kebele*, household, and individual.

The two qualitative methods used most frequently were focus groups and key informant interviews. Key informant interviews were carried out at regional, *woreda*, and *kebele* levels. Focus groups were held at the *kebele* level. Quantitative surveys were undertaken at the *woreda* level, in *kebeles*, and with households. We begin with a description of the quantitative survey instruments and their implementation. We then describe the qualitative fieldwork.

2.2 Quantitative Methods

The following quantitative survey instruments were fielded: a *woreda*-level quantitative capacity survey; a quantitative community survey; a community price questionnaire; and a household survey instrument. We begin by describing the sampling procedures that were designed and how these were implemented in practice. We then describe the quantitative survey instruments.

Sampling

The original sampling plan was designed to mimic that successfully implemented in the quantitative surveys implemented in Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNPR. The ‘universe’ to be sampled from was planned to be all *woredas* where the PSNP was operating in Afar and Somali as of June 2010 with the intention of drawing samples representative at the regional level. Based on discussions with the Central Statistical Agency (CSA), the sample would include three *kebeles* or (EAs) per *woreda* with 30 households sampled in each EA. As survey work proceeded, however, several changes occurred.

In Afar, a list of all 45 *woredas* with the numbers of PSNP beneficiaries was constructed. Ten *woredas* were randomly sampled proportional to beneficiary populations (PPS). In those *woredas* selected, CSA attempted to obtain lists of beneficiary households, both to aid EA selection and also the identification of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. It was not possible for CSA to obtain these. Consequently, three EAs in each *woreda* were randomly selected. Within each EA, household lists were compiled and checked and 30 households selected at random. For reasons that remain unclear, there was a small further change whereby four EAs were selected in Dubti and only two in Kori. *Woredas* selected and sample sizes are shown in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 Sampled woredas, Afar

Zone	Woreda	Woreda Number	Number of kebeles sampled	Number of households interviewed
1	Dubti	20101	4	120
1	Elidar	20102	3	90
1	Kori	20107	2	60
2	Erebt	20201	3	91
2	Megale	20204	3	90
2	Dallol	20206	3	90
3	Bure Mudayitu	20305	3	90
4	Ewa	20402	3	90
4	Teru	20403	3	90
5	Semurubia Gebele	20502	3	90
Totals			30	901

In Somali, there were also changes to the sampling plan. As of June 2010, CSA did not have the capacity to implement a quantitative survey in all *woredas* where the PSNP was operating. After a lengthy series of discussions, a much smaller list of *woredas* was generated that met three criteria: the PSNP operated in the *woreda*; there were no security issues associated with fielding a survey; and CSA had the capacity to implement the survey in that *woreda*. The last criteria meant that the 'universe' of *woredas* to be sampled from was biased towards agro-pastoral areas and with more purely pastoral areas excluded. A sample of 10 *woredas* was drawn from all *woredas* that met these criteria using randomly sampled proportional to beneficiary populations (PPS). However, just as the survey was about to go into the field, CSA indicated that it could not implement the survey in two of the 10 *woredas* that had been selected. Consequently, only eight *woredas* were surveyed in Somali. Given the process by which this sample was selected, it should not be seen as statistically representative of PSNP activities in Somali. *Woredas* selected and sample sizes for Somali are shown in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Sampled woredas, Somali

Zone	Woreda	Woreda number	Number of kebeles sampled	Number of households interviewed
1	Shinle	50103	3	90
1	Erer	50104	3	90
1	Afdem	50106	3	77
2	Gursum	50202	3	90
2	Harshin	50207	3	90
9	Filtu	50901	3	90
9	Dollo Odo	50902	3	89
9	Hudet	50904	3	90
Totals			24	706

The Woreda Quantitative Capacity Survey

The objective of this instrument was to provide data that clarify how resources flow from regions to beneficiaries works in practice. It included questions on

- Staffing and resources (number of cashiers and accountants dedicated to the PSNP; use of the automated payroll and attendance sheet system (PASS); availability and training on computers; transport constraints, and so on);
- Interactions between WOFED staff and the Food Security desk;
- Flow of funds—“following the money” and “following the food” - from the region to the *woreda* to the beneficiaries.

This survey instrument was intended to be implemented in the 18 *woredas* where implementation of the quantitative household survey was planned: 10 in Afar; and 8 in Somali. Interviews were completed by experienced survey supervisors who were instructed to meet with staff associated with the *Woreda* Food Security Office as well as those knowledgeable of the payment system. Ideally, they were supposed to speak with the Head of the Food Security Office, the WOFED chief accountant, the PSNP accountant, and the PSNP cashiers. However, this ideal was seldom met as Table 2.3 shows.

Table 2.3 Informants participating in the quantitative *woreda* survey

Region	Woreda	Head, Woreda Food Security Office	WOFED Chief Accountant	Other member, Woreda Food Security Office	PSNP accountant	PSNP cashier	Remarks
Afar	Bure Mudayitu	N	N	N	N	N	PSNP not operating
	Dallol	N	N	N	N	N	PSNP not institutionalized
	Dubti	N	N	N	N	N	PSNP not institutionalized
	Elidar	Y	Y	Y	N	N	
	Eribati	N	Y	N	N	N	PSNP not institutionalized
	Ewa	N	N	N	N	N	PSNP not institutionalized
	Kori	N	N	N	N	N	PSNP not institutionalized
	Megale	N	N	N	N	N	PSNP not institutionalized
	Semurubia Gebele	N	N	N	N	N	PSNP not institutionalized
	Teru	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	
Somali	Shinile	Y	N	N	Y	Y	
	Erer						Survey not completed; no reason given
	Afdem	Y	N	N	N	Y	
	Gursum	N	N	Y	N	N	
	Harsin	Y	N	N	N	N	
	Filtu	N	N	N	N	N	One person interviewed, position not known
	Dolo Odo	N	Y	N	Y	Y	
	Udet	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.

Several factors account for the relatively few successfully completed *woreda* quantitative surveys. First, as discussed extensively in chapter four, there was only limited

implementation of the PSNP in Afar. Second, two *woredas* in Somali had to be dropped just as the survey went to the field and it was not possible to replace them (see below). Third, often key individuals were not interviewed either because positions were not filled or because they were never available for interview. This meant that the quantitative data collected at the *woreda* level were often incomplete with their being particularly limited information on payment processes.

Quantitative Community and Price Questionnaire

In this questionnaire, the community is defined as the *kebele* or peasant association (PA). Enumerators were instructed to interview at least five people, perhaps together, who are knowledgeable about the community (e.g., community leaders, PA chairmen, elders, priests, teachers). Ideally, they were to include at least one member of the *Kebele* Food Security Task Force and at least one woman and enumerators were instructed that they might need to meet with other members of the *Kebele* Food Security Task Force in order to complete some sections of this questionnaire. In practice, this proved difficult where KFSTFs were absent.

The community questionnaire covers the following topics: location and access; water and electricity; services; education and health facilities; production and marketing; migration; wages; prices of foodgrains in the last year; operational aspects of the PSNP, including questions about the operations of the FSTFs, public works, and direct support. In addition, a price questionnaire obtains detailed information on current food prices.

The Quantitative Household Questionnaire

The household questionnaire was designed to be comparable to the questionnaire fielded in Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNPR. In particular, questions on household demographic structure, measures of food security such as the food gap, shocks, perceptions of poverty and participation in the PSNP and the HABP are identical to those that appear in the Highlands survey. Additional questions were included on livestock given their importance to livelihoods in Afar and Somali. Given the time constraints within which the survey was fielded, other sections that appeared in the Highland survey – such as those relating to crop production, nonagricultural activities and pre-school nutritional status - were dropped or shortened.

2.3 Qualitative Methods

The qualitative assessment of the Ethiopian Food Security Programme (FSP) was conducted in 12 *woredas* of Afar, Oromiya and Somali Regional States. The field data collection was carried out in November and December 2010. A group of 10 interviewers took part in the fieldwork with support from senior research staff from IDS, Sussex. The field data collection and preliminary data analysis were coordinated by Dadimos Development Consultants. It has two components: (1) a livelihoods analysis and (2) an assessment of the Food Security Programme. The livelihood analysis captured trends in livelihood systems and coping strategies while the FSP assessment component dealt with PSNP and to some extent with other associated interventions.

This assessment applied two key qualitative methods: key informant interviews (KII) and focus group discussions (FGD) to obtain data from primary sources, and at multi-levels including regional, *woreda*, *kebele* and community. The different assessments utilized a different set of instruments. These were:

- i) Livelihood analysis
 - FGD with community leaders and knowledgeable informants;
 - FGD with men on vulnerability, coping strategies and informal social assistance;
 - FGD with women on vulnerability, coping strategies and informal social assistance;
 - FGD with men on vulnerability, coping strategies and informal social assistance;
- ii) FSP assessment
 - Regional level KII or FGD with regional food security task force (RFSTF);
 - Regional level KII or FGD with early warning committee or focal person;
 - Regional level KII or FGD with public works (PW) and Complementary Community Investments (CCI) coordinators or focal persons;
 - *Woreda* level KII or FGD with *woreda* food security task force (WFSTF)⁸;
 - *Woreda* level KII or FGD with early warning committee or focal person;
 - *Woreda* level KII or FGD with public works (PW) and Complementary Community Investments (CCI) coordinators or focal persons;
 - *Kebele* level KII or FGD with *kebele* food security task force (KFSTF)
 - *Kebele* level KII with rural development agent (DA);
 - FGD with households who always need supports including direct support beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, but labourless and poor;
 - Community FGD with women;
 - Community FGD with men;
 - Community FGD with non-PSNP beneficiaries.

Based on the instruments above, the assessment was carried out with a total of nine key informants or focus groups at regional level; twelve WFSTFs, and early warning and response committees/experts; and nine public works *woreda* focal persons. At *kebele* level eight focus groups with KFSTFs, 2 *kebele* relief distribution committees (KRDC) and 11 DAs were conducted. The field data collectors performed a total of 36 FGDs on livelihood analysis and 53 community and FSP assessments.

Twelve lowland *woredas* were included in the qualitative assessment. These were sampled from a set of *woredas* covered by the quantitative household survey. Their selection took into account different livelihoods, the extent to which the PSNP has been implemented and security considerations. Six, four and two *woredas* were visited in Afar, Somali and Oromiya, respectively (Table 2.4).

⁸ In two Afar *woredas* (Buremudaitu and Semurobi) where there are no food security task forces both at *kebele* and *woreda* levels discussions were held with relief distribution committees at both levels. In Dubti the assessment team could not find an entity organized as a committee or a task force to talk with at either the *woreda* or *kebele* levels. Instead the discussion was held with the *woreda* administrator.

Table 2.4 Woredas included in the qualitative assessment

Afar	Somali	Oromiya
Buremudaitu (Zone 3)	Dolo Odo (Liben Zone)	Moyale (Borena Zone)
Dubti (Zone 1)	Hudet (Liben)	Saweyna (Bale Zone)
Elidar (Zone 1)	Gursum (Jijjiga Zone)	
Ewa (Zone 2)	Shinile (Shinile Zone)	
Semurobi (Zone 5)		
Teru (Zone 4)		

Two criteria were used to select *kebeles* within these *woredas* selection. The primary criteria were *kebeles* with highest population of PSNP beneficiaries and availability of diverse and large number of public works.⁹ This was further refined by secondary criteria including accessibility, availability of majority of the community members at the time of assessment and safety of fieldworkers. Using these criteria the *kebele* selection was carried out with *woreda* officials and knowledgeable experts. One *kebele* was selected per *woreda*. At the *kebele* level, the assessment team collaborated with DAs, KFSTFs and community leaders to bring a representative number of households and individuals from each village within the *kebele*. In the case of Direct Support beneficiaries, the team assisted in bringing them to the sites where discussions took place.

⁹ In *woredas* where public works had not commenced, the second criterion was disregarded.

Table 2.5a Sources of Information for the Qualitative Assessment, Afar

Region	Woreda	WFSTF	EWR committee	PW focal person	Local leaders	Men	Women	KFSTF	DA	DS	Men	Women	Non-beneficiary	Remarks
FSTF, EWR, PW	Buremudaitu	No WFSTF. WFDC interviewed	X	No PW and no PW focal person	X	X	X	No KFSTF KFDC Instead	X	X	p	p	Not Done. All community members get transfer	
	Semurobi	No WFSTF. WFDC interviewed	X	No PW and no PW focal person	X	X	X	No KFSTF KFDC Instead	X	X	X	X	Not Done. All community members get transfer	
	Elidar	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	No DA in the kebele
	Dubti	No WFSTF. Administrator interviewed	X	n.a.	X	X	X	No KFSTF	X	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	
	Teru	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
	Ewa	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	

Notes: X means that qualitative survey instrument was successfully implemented. p means that it was partially completed; n.a. = not available.

Table 2.5b Sources of Information for the Qualitative Assessment, Somali

Region	Woreda	WFSTF	EWR committee	PW focal person	Local leaders	Men	Women	KFSTF	DA	DS	Men	Women	Non-beneficiary	Remark
FSTF, PW, EWR	Shinille	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	PSNP rolled out four months before survey
	Dolo Odo	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	
	Hudet	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	PSNP rolled out four months before survey
	Gursum	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	

Notes: X means that qualitative survey instrument was successfully implemented. p means that it was partially completed.

Table 2.5c Sources of Information for the Qualitative Assessment, Oromiya

Region	Woreda	WFSTF	EWR committee	PW focal person	Local leaders	Men	Women	KFSTF	DA	DS	Men	Women	Non-beneficiary	Remarks
PWFU, EWR, FSTF,	Moyale	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
	Saweyna	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	

Notes: X means that qualitative survey instrument was successfully implemented. p means that it was partially completed.

Chapter 3: Livelihoods and well-being

3.1 Introduction

This chapter provides descriptive information on food security, assets, livelihoods and coping strategies for the households in our survey.

3.2 Community infrastructure

We begin by describing the infrastructure that exists in these villages. Generally, these are poor, isolated locations which lack many basic forms of infrastructure.

We have information from 30 *kebeles* in Afar and 23 in Somali. Of these, only one has electricity, seven have piped water and 18 have wells. Road quality is poor (Table 3.1) and during the rainy season, virtually all villages are inaccessible to vehicular traffic (Table 3.2).

Table 3.1 Materials used to construct road leading to village

	Afar	Somali
Tarmac/Concrete	4	1
Dirt track	19	20
Other	3	0
No road	4	2
Totals	30	23

Source: *Kebele* quantitative survey.

Table 3.2 Village accessibility

	Rainy season		Outside rainy season	
	Afar	Somali	Afar	Somali
Well accessible to any vehicle	2	1	3	4
Reasonable access to any vehicle	6	0	6	8
Good access to trucks and buses	0	2	0	2
Reasonable access to trucks and buses	1	1	1	2
Access to carts/animals	3	2	3	2
Only walking	18	17	17	5
Total	30	23	30	23

Source: *Kebele* quantitative survey.

Most *kebeles* have a primary school: 25/30 in Afar and 19/23 in Somali but few have a secondary school. Two thirds of the Afar *kebeles* have a health post as do half the *kebeles* surveyed in Somali. These typically have either one or two health workers. Banks and agricultural cooperative offices are largely absent.

Table 3.3 describes access to daily and periodic food markets in these survey sites. Market access in Afar is poor with more than half these localities having no daily or periodic markets and with mean distance to the closest market approximately 25 km. Market access is

somewhat better in the sites surveyed in Somali with most having access to at least periodic markets.

Table 3.3 Market access, Afar and Somali

Number of daily markets	Number of periodic markets		Total	(If none in <i>kebele</i>) Mean distance (km) to closest	
	Zero	One or more		Daily market	Periodic market
Afar					
Zero	18	6	24	24.6	25.7
One	4	2	6	–	–
Total	22	8	30	–	–
Somali					
Zero	6	11	17	28.8	32.6
One	2	4	6	–	–
Total	8	15	23	–	–

Source: *Kebele* quantitative survey.

3.3 Household characteristics: Demographics, housing and durables

In our quantitative sample, households average 5.5 persons with size slightly higher in Somali than in Afar. Most households (67.3 percent) have between three and seven members with 12.6 percent of the sample having only one or two persons and 20.3 percent having more than seven members (Table 3.4). Consistent with what is found in the most recent Ethiopian census, there are slightly more males than females. The population is young with individuals aged less than 15 years comprising more than half of the sampled population. There are few people aged over 60.

Table 3.4 Household size, by region

Age group		Region		
		Afar	Somali	All
All	Household size	5.33	5.76	5.52
All	Number of:			
	Males	2.77	2.96	2.86
	Females	2.56	2.80	2.67
0-6 years	Males	0.59	0.79	0.68
	Females	0.57	0.78	0.67
7-15 years	Males	0.93	0.94	0.93
	Females	0.69	0.81	0.74
16-60 years	Males	1.18	1.12	1.15
	Females	1.24	1.11	1.18
> 60 years	Males	0.07	0.08	0.07
	Females	0.04	0.08	0.06

Virtually all heads (98.4 percent) are Muslim. In Afar, 73(27) percent of households are headed by men (women). In Somali, 75(25) percent of households are headed by men (women). The marital status of household heads is given in Table 3.5. Notably, in both Afar and

Somali Regions, married, single spouse households are the predominant household type among male-headed households in our sample. In both regions, among the female-headed sample, there is a near even split between married, single spouse households and single/divorced/widowed households.

Table 3.5 Marital status of head by sex of head, Afar and Somali

	Male-headed	Female-headed	All
Afar			
Married, single spouse	558 (84.9)	125 (51.9)	683 (76.1)
Married, polygamous	97 (11.0)	0 (0.0)	72 (8.2)
Single, divorced or widowed	27 (4.1)	116 (48.1)	143 (15.7)
Total	657	241	898
Somali			
Married, single spouse	416 (78.3)	95 (54.3)	511 (72.4)
Married, polygamous	72 (18.3)	0 (0.0)	72 (13.7)
Single, divorced or widowed	18 (4.5)	80 (45.7)	143 (13.9)
Total	531	175	706

Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages.

Table 3.6 provides information on the distribution of heads' completed schooling by region and sex of head. In both regions, a large majority of men and women alike have not completed any schooling. In Afar, male heads average 0.48 grades of schooling while female heads have 0.25 grades. In Afar only 13 out of 241 females have any schooling. Grade attainment is only slightly better in Somali where male heads average 1.07 grades of formal schooling and female heads 0.42 grades.

In both Afar and Somali, most households live in traditional dwellings with earthen floors and thatched or mud roofs (Table 3.7). Ownership of basic consumer durables is low but, perhaps surprisingly, just over ten percent of households have a mobile phone (Table 3.8).

Table 3.6 Schooling of household heads, by region and sex of head

	Afar			Somali		
	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All
Did not complete any schooling	590	229	819	429	163	592
1st Grade	11	0	11	11	2	13
2nd Grade	8	4	12	11	2	13
3rd Grade	12	3	15	20	2	22
4th Grade	10	1	11	15	0	15
5th Grade	8	1	9	9	0	9
6th Grade	6	2	8	5	1	6
7th Grade	3	1	4	13	0	13
8th Grade	6	0	6	9	0	9
9th Grade	1	0	1	2	0	2
10th Grade	2	0	2	5	4	9
11th Grade	0	0	0	0	0	0
12th Grade	0	0	0	1	0	1
Incomplete higher education	1	0	1	1	1	2
Completed higher education	1	1	2	0	0	0
All	659	242	901	531	175	706

Table 3.7 Housing quality, Afar and Somali

Roof materials	Floor materials			Total
	Earth	Cow dung	Concrete, tile, or brick	
Afar				
Thatched roof	12.5	0.1	0.4	13.0
Corrugated metal roof	1.3	0.0	0.5	1.8
Mud, sand or stone	81.0	0.9	0.1	82.0
Plastic sheeting	3.2	0.0	0.0	3.2
Total	98.0	1.0	1.0	100.0
Somali				
Thatched roof	27.5	1.4	0.0	28.9
Corrugated metal roof	5.7	0.4	0.7	6.8
Mud, sand or stone	53.3	0.6	0.1	54.0
Plastic sheeting	10.2	0.1	0.0	10.3
Total	96.7	2.5	0.8	100.0

Source: Household questionnaire.

Table 3.8 Ownership of consumer durables

Households owning	Afar	Somali
	(percent)	
Kerosene stove	8.8	9.1
Improved charcoal or wood stove	8.7	16.4
Bed	65.7	33.6
Mobile phone	13.1	11.9
Jewelry	14.5	6.1
Wristwatch	44.6	23.9
Radio	27.7	24.9

Source: Household questionnaire.

3.4 Livelihoods: Overview

Our qualitative survey instruments provide a rich source of information on livelihoods. We begin with the ‘big picture’ that they describe followed by regional-specific insights from both the qualitative and quantitative surveys.

The dominant theme that emerges from the qualitative work is the sense that the pastoral lowlands of Afar, Somali and Oromiya are experiencing a significant transformation. In spite of still limited road infrastructure over large areas of these regions, investments aimed at improving the road network are opening up these regions to increased trade, economic activity and investment by the state as well as domestic and international actors. The expansion of the mobile telephone network has also improved accessibility and supported the flow of goods and people [as the quantitative survey indicates, just over 10 percent of our sample in Afar and Somali Regions own a mobile phone]. The opening of the pastoral lowlands has allowed capital to penetrate ever deeper into livestock-keeping areas, providing opportunities for new wealth accumulation and value-added diversification. Outlying towns such as Negale, Moyale and Gode are booming. Improved accessibility has coincided with a boom in domestic and export markets for livestock. Since the conflict in Darfur in neighboring Sudan flared, shutting down a vital supply of camels for markets in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, there has been a significant increase in exports from Ethiopia. Livestock keepers in Somali region, who have long been connected to broader regional markets through cross-border trade into Somaliland, have seized the opportunity. Commercialization processes have also gathered pace in Oromiya, as Boran herders supply cattle to the burgeoning domestic market.

But not everyone has been able to access new opportunities to create wealth and add value to herds. Social differentiation is worsening alongside commercialization and the regions’ deepening economic ties to markets in Ethiopia and beyond. Livelihoods of the poor and destitute have become more insecure as prime grazing environments have come under cultivation for sugar and fodder. The growth of small towns in the pastoral lowlands has provided a vital outlet for poorer sections of society to deepen their involvement in various tasks for cash such as collecting and selling fuelwood and grass, burning charcoal, or working as guards and house-help for the better off. But the income generated from these activities is typically meagre and do not provide a basis for creating a new sustainable livelihood.

Sections of the population considered to be ‘better-off’ in the three regions pursue broadly similar livelihood activities (Table 3.9). Livestock production for marketing and trade is the most important activity for those who are considered to be better-off, particularly camels (in Somali and Afar) and cattle (in Oromiya) but small-stock as well. The livestock assets of those who are better-off are significantly greater than they are for other groups; indeed, local perceptions of wealth in these regions are defined by livestock holdings. The better-off in agro-pastoral areas such as in Buremudaitu and Dubti *woredas* (Afar) and Dolo Odo and Shinile *woredas* (Somali) focus on farming of small irrigated plots in addition to keeping livestock. The better-off in agro-pastoral areas like Gursum in Somali Region that are well-connected to larger

markets in regional towns concentrate on cash crops such as *khat*, vegetables, fruits and groundnuts.

Table 3.9 Major livelihood activities, by wealth groups

Region	Woreda	Better off ^a	In the middle ^b	Poor ^c	Poorest of the poor/destitute ^d
Afar	Buremudaitu	Livestock keeping, irrigated agriculture and trading	Livestock keeping, farming, trading	Trading, charcoal burning, casual labor	Selling fuelwood and charcoal, casual labor
	Dubti	Livestock keeping, irrigated agriculture and trading	Livestock keeping, cultivate small plots	Livestock keeping, cultivate small irrigated plots	Livestock keeping, cultivate small irrigated plots
	Elidar	Livestock keeping	Livestock keeping	Selling fuelwood	
	Ewa	Livestock keeping	Livestock keeping	Livestock production sharing, PSNP	PSNP, petty trading
	Semurobi	Livestock keeping	Livestock keeping	Herding small animals, farming, trading of goats	Customary social support (<i>zekat</i>)
	Teru	Livestock keeping	Livestock keeping	Livestock production, casual labor, PSNP, petty trading	Casual labor, herding animals for the better-off, selling fuelwood and water
Somali	Dolo Odo	Livestock keeping, farming	Working on the farms of the better off	Causal labor	
	Gursum	Production of cash crops (<i>khat</i> , vegetables, fruits), fattening animals	Farming, petty trading, fattening of animals	Share cropping, casual labor, Petty trading	
	Hudet	Livestock keeping		Farming	
	Shinile	Livestock keeping, farming	Selling fuelwood and charcoal, farming, livestock production	Herding livestock for <i>Tajir</i> , begging, selling charcoal	
Oromiya	Moyale	Livestock keeping	Livestock keeping, trading	Begging, support from the community	
	Seweyna	Livestock keeping	Livestock keeping, farming	Selling fuelwood, collecting water for a fee, community support and aid	

Source: Qualitative survey.

^a Called 'Gadali' in Afar, 'Badhadha' in Oromiya and 'Tajir' in Somali

^b Called 'Fanti Gadali' in Afar, 'Giddugalessa' in Oromiya and 'Dheeg' in Somali

^c Called 'Ididu' in Afar, 'Iyyeessa' in Oromiya and 'cayr' in Somali

^d Called 'Ididu Ididi' in Afar, 'Kollee' in Oromiya and 'Maskiin' in Somali

Groups that are considered to be 'in the middle' focus on livestock-keeping but compared to the better-off they have smaller herds particularly of camels and cattle. Like the better off, those considered to be 'in the middle' in agro-pastoral areas also engage in

cultivation of small irrigated plots (including Burmudiatu and Dubti in Afar, Dolo Odo and Shinile in Somali, and Seweyna in Oromiya). Those in the middle also engage in market activities such as grain trade (Buremudaitu), petty trade and animal fattening (Gursum), as well as sale of fuelwood and charcoal (in Shinile).

Those considered to be poor similarly engage in livestock keeping but focusing on small-stock (goats and sheep). They also engage in farming, though on plots of poorer drainage and soil quality and further from the source of irrigation water. To compensate for the fewer returns from small herds and farm plots of poor quality, they engage in a wide array of tasks for cash, including casual labour, selling charcoal and fuelwood, and petty trade. During difficult times, the poor will also rely on customary support networks (such as *zeka*) as well as assistance provided by the government and NGOs. The poorest of the poor, the 'destitute', have few physical or financial assets. According to local leaders, those who are destitute do not have able-bodied labour to carry out work. While they depend greatly on tasks for cash, they also rely on assistance provided by the government and NGOs. In one *woreda* included in the qualitative study (Dubti) did local leaders indicate that the poorest also engage in livestock keeping and the cultivation of small irrigation plots.

3.5 Livelihoods: Afar

Social differentiation is significant to understanding livelihood trends, according to local leaders. Teru leaders explained that while there are new opportunities to generate wealth, particularly for selling camels, not all are benefiting from the newly important trade and strengthening ties to domestic and export markets. In general, camel keepers and men are faring better in the face of multiple uncertainties and economic transformation than are cattle-keepers and women, according to leaders in Ewa. Some of the quotes below indicate the very different livelihood trajectories of the better off compared to the poor and poorest:

The livelihoods of the poor have been getting worsen over time. Goats have died. The poor are also more vulnerable when the livestock die belonging to their neighbors, from whom they get support. [AF_S/FG-5]

It is the poor who are most affected by deteriorating conditions. The haves can sell their livestock in time of shocks. [AF_S/FG-5]

Cattle keepers are becoming more vulnerable as compared to camel keepers. But, camels are not in the hands of the poor and the poor of the poorest. As a result, their situation is getting worse due to their lack of access to assets. [AF_T/FG-5]

The growth of small towns has provided new opportunities in many areas. For example, the growth of Elidar town has provided an outlet for some of the poor and poorest of the poor to begin new survival activities such as collecting water for a fee and selling charcoal. In Ewa, petty trade has expanded as people have to compensate for decreasing herd sizes and the loss of income and livelihood from livestock.

Key informants and focus groups both indicated that multiple uncertainties have negatively affected livelihoods, including drought, flooding of the Awash River, conflict, livestock and human diseases. According to some local leaders, the invasion of 'Weyane' Tree (or *prosopis* weed) has also caused considerable stress on pastoral livelihoods. This is because goats feed on the tree, which eventually causes teeth rot leading to death. Local leaders in Eldiar described the changes they have observed in their community:

When we were children the grass was above our heads. We used to look after the goats by climbing on top of the tallest trees. There were many trees with different names in this area during our childhood. Today they are gone and we are left with a barren land. If grass is not growing after rains then we could not get pasture for our animals. This threatens our lives. Households that lost their animals are now moved to Elidar town to support their lives. [AF_EL/FG-5]

Elders in Teru and Bure-Madaitu explained the multiple pressures that have affected livestock production:

Drought coupled with animal external parasites led to the loss of animal production (milk and meat). Productivity was significantly reduced. A camel disease locally called Galibati led to low milk production. Goat Tuberculosis - locally called 'Gobilo' - caused the death of goats and the decline of production. [AF_T/FG-5]

'There was a big flood in this area (Bure-Madaitu) in 1991 when the government changed. Livestock suffered from the lack of grazing. Flooding covered all of the pastures and villages, we didn't even have anywhere to stay. The following year (1992) there was a bad drought as well as camel disease. We lost many camels. Only some remained with the help of veterinary treatment assistance provided by the government and nongovernmental organizations. There was a long drought between 1994 and 1995 and to make matters worse the Weyane tree began spreading during this time. Livestock that browsed this tree became sick and lost their teeth, especially goats. They became very thin like HIV patients and finally died. As a result the number of livestock declined in our village.' [AF-B/FG-5]

A lack of options and opportunities to cope with these uncertainties has meant that the livelihoods of most people are highly insecure. Mutual support and sharing has declined in importance as poverty has become widespread. A majority of the population has suffered from diminishing livestock assets, which has necessitated the search for new activities to compensate for the loss of livelihood and income from livestock. Some have shifted into farming, largely because of government support. Local leaders in Bure-Madaitu explained: "We are forced to find money from the earth. Why? We realized we purchased grains that were produced in other places. This convinced us that we could also farm and produce our own grain if people in other regions were able to do so" [AF_B/FG-5] Although some who are considered

to be better-off have acquired prime irrigation plots on schemes, some wealthier Afar continue to concentrate on livestock-keeping, as elder in Bure-Madaitu described:

Those people having money are benefiting more from new livelihood opportunities. Those who are engaged in trade are doing particularly well. Wealthier Afar with large herds are not taking part in new livelihood activities. Rather, it is the middle, the poor and the poorest of the poor who are farming because they were pushed to find an alternative source of income. If someone owns a large herd (more than 10 camels) then why should he dig land? To farm you have to clear the Weyane trees (prosopis). This is not his concern. He can sell some of his animals to buy grain. [AF_B/FG-5]

Land use changes associated with large development projects have greatly affected livelihood trajectories in some areas. For example, land uses in Dubti have changed greatly as prime grazing areas were converted to sugar plantations following construction of the Awash Dam and Tendaho Sugar Factory. Some have benefitted from employment on the plantations, mainly as guards. Poorer pastoralists have benefited from aid programming whereby poor households received support under the Pastoralist Community Development Programme (PCDP) to form associations and begin cultivation on irrigation plots along the Awash River. But local elders report many adverse impacts of the dam and the failure of planners to deliver promised benefits for local populations.

What I say is this: twenty years ago when there was rain. The Awash River used to bring a sufficient quantity of water. That water helped us to grow grass for our cattle and goats. During that time we had cattle and goats that were in a good condition and could be sold for a good price. We were better off. When the Awash Dam came into being we asked, "What is it?" They [development planners] told us that it would bring us good things. When we asked what this meant, they told us that it would help generate pasture for our animals and farm land would be made available for the community. This is what they told us. So far we did not get anything. What was promised was not delivered. [AF_D/FG-5]

We were told that we would receive piped water after the dam was constructed but this has not materialized. [AF_D/FG-5]

A number of these livelihood features are reflected in data drawn from the household quantitative survey. Table 3.10 lists the main occupations as reported by household heads in Afar.

Table 3.10 Main occupation of household head, by *woreda* and sex, Afar


	<i>Woreda</i>										Total
	Dubti	Elidar	Kori	Erebti	Megale	Dallol	Bure Mudayitu	Ewa	Teru	Semurubia Gebele	
Male heads											
Farmer	31.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	13.1	0.0	24.1	0.0	8.1	8.2
Pastoralist	39.1	100.0	90.0	86.1	91.3	65.6	84.9	55.2	82.5	69.4	75.3
Homemaker	4.6	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	3.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
Laborer	9.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	3.0	0.0	2.5	0.0	2.1
Trader	2.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	4.9	1.5	0.0	3.7	0.0	1.5
Salaried	3.4	0.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	1.7	7.5	3.2	2.6
Not in labor force	1.2	0.0	0.0	3.1	1.4	9.8	0.0	12.1	0.0	1.6	2.7
Other	9.2	0.0	4.0	9.2	5.8	0.0	7.6	6.9	3.8	17.7	6.5
Female heads											
Farmer	36.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.4
Pastoralist	42.4	69.0	20.0	11.5	9.5	44.8	29.2	3.1	10.0	75.0	34.7
Homemaker	21.2	27.6	80.0	84.6	85.7	51.7	62.5	96.9	60.0	3.6	54.1
Laborer	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.1	0.00	10.0	3.6	1.2
Trader	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	3.6	1.2
Salaried	0.0	3.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.6	0.8
Not in labor force	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4
Other	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.8	0.0	4.2	0.0	0.0	10.7	2.1

Source: Quantitative household survey

The dominant reported occupation is pastoralist. There are exceptions, however. As noted in the qualitative work, the PCDP in Dubti has led to some households engaging in farming and this is reflected in the 31(36.4) percent of male(female) headed households in Dubti who indicate that their principal occupation is farming.


Running through the qualitative narrative is the themes of increasing differentiation within pastoral communities in Afar. While mean household livestock holdings measured at the time of the survey (December 2010), 14.5 TLU, appear high, this mean value masks enormous differentiation as Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show.

Figure 3.1 Mean livestock holding (TLU), by TLU decile, Afar



Source: Household survey

Figure 3.2 Distribution of livestock holdings, by TLU decile, Afar



Source: Household survey

Figure 3.1 shows that mean livestock holdings among the second richest and richest TLU deciles are 30.4 and 61.8 respectively. By contrast, the bottom four deciles have, on average, less than 4.2 animals. Not surprisingly then, as Figure 3.2 shows, the wealthiest 30 percent of households own more than 75 percent of livestock while the poorest 50 percent have only 10.8 percent of all livestock. Consistent with the information coming out of the qualitative work, while ownership of small stock is widespread, there is a strong correlation between being in the wealthier TLU quintiles and camel ownership as Table 3.11 shows.

Table 3.11 Ownership of livestock types, by TLU quintile, Afar

Livestock quintile	Percentage of households owning:							
	Oxen	Bulls	Cows	Heifers	Sheep	Goats	Donkeys	Camels
1	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	18.8	76.8	23.2	2.8
2	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.6	33.9	98.9	36.1	26.1
3	4.4	1.7	26.7	5.0	62.8	97.8	53.3	61.7
4	11.1	11.1	50.0	18.3	76.7	97.2	65.0	71.7
5	28.3	36.7	78.9	43.9	76.1	92.8	64.4	81.1
All households	8.8	9.9	33.5	13.5	53.6	92.7	48.4	48.6

Source: Household survey.

Finally, we note that livestock is unequally distributed when we consider sex of household head. In Afar, 73(27) percent of households are headed by men (women). If livestock were equally distributed across male and female-headed households, we would expect to see similar proportions of male and female-headed households in each TLU quintile. Table 3.12 addresses this question. If there is equal distribution, the share (or percentage) of female-headed households in a given quintile should be the same as the share (or percentage) of female-headed households in the full sample, implying that the ratio of these should equal one. Table 3.12 shows that this is not the case in Afar with female-headed households disproportionately found in the lower quintiles and male-headed households disproportionately found in the wealthier quintiles.

Table 3.12 Distribution of headship, by TLU quintile, Afar

Livestock quintile	Percentage of quintile that are		Ratio of percentage of quintile to sample share of	
	Male-headed households	Female-headed households	Male-headed households	Female-headed households
1	66.3	33.7	0.91	1.25
2	71.1	28.9	0.97	1.08
3	71.1	28.9	0.97	1.08
4	73.9	26.1	1.01	0.97
5	83.3	16.7	1.14	0.62
Total	73.1	26.9		

Source: Household survey.

The qualitative work also indicated that while livestock predominates as the source of livelihoods, crop production, particularly small, irrigated plots was important in some localities. Table 3.13 gives a further sense of this, looking at the distribution of cultivated land across the 10 *woredas* included in the quantitative study. While most households, 71.6 percent, have some cultivable land, the modal plot size is very small, a homestead plot of less than 0.25 hectare.

Table 3.13 Distribution of amount of cultivated land, by *woreda*, Afar

<i>Woreda</i>	Amount of cultivated land (hectare)					
	None	0-0.25	0.25-0.50	0.50-1.00	1.00-5.00	> 5.00
Dubti	0.0	51.7	3.3	9.2	35.0	0.8
Elidar	1.1	98.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kori	0.0	91.7	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
Erebt	0.0	16.5	1.1	0.0	1.1	81.3
Megale	0.0	64.4	5.6	27.8	0.0	2.2
Dalol	0.0	78.9	3.3	2.2	13.3	2.2
Bure Mudayitu	0.0	72.2	25.6	2.2	0.0	0.0
Ewa	98.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0
Teru	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Semurobia Gelale	84.4	0.0	1.1	12.2	2.2	0.0
All	28.4	46.1	4.7	5.7	6.4	8.8

Source: Household survey.

3.6 Livelihoods: Somali

Drought, conflict and livestock disease have weakened pastoral livelihoods in Somali. Conflict in particular has shaped livelihood trajectories in the region. Conflict between the Boran and Guji over pasture land has claimed the lives of a significant number of people in the region in recent years. Conflicts have also occurred within these groups over common property resources. In Gursum conflict has led to out-migration by economically productive adults with adverse consequences for farming and livestock rearing. According to local leaders, when crops have failed, people have survived on cactus. Children have also been given up for adoption. Livestock disease is another shock that has contributed to the loss of herds. Livestock assets are depleted for most of the displaced population, with many relying on charcoal burning and providing labour in Hudet town. Local leaders in Hudet commented:

The war has affected all of us. But the group that is suffering the most is those who were rich previously (*taajir*). These people were living a better life than others; they did not experience any hardship before. But when we came here things changed. They lost everything and they have to do things they never did before. It is difficult for these people. [SM_H/FG-5]

Yet the region is also undergoing considerable economic change. Ties to domestic and cross-border markets have strengthened across the region, providing opportunities to add value to livestock and crop production. Important markets in Harar, Jijiga and Mandera continue to expand, as a livestock-keeping elite becomes increasingly commercialized, fueling processes of value-added diversification. In Gursum, strong ties to these markets in Harar and Jijiga are an important driver of innovation and change in agricultural activity and livestock-keeping. Many agro-pastoralists have focused on sorghum in the past but are shifting to vegetable and khat as markets for these continue to expand. Fodder production and livestock fattening are also increasingly important in the make-up of local livelihoods. Remittances from kin living in Djibouti and Hargeisa are an important income source for some of the local population, as well.

Farming has become more important throughout the region as the government continues to support the creation of agricultural schemes in areas that were previously prime grazing environments. Extension services for agro-pastoralists have improved, and have encouraged some agro-pastoralists to shift to cash crops in areas like Gursum. However, although there are opportunities to create new wealth through new land uses as well as trade and economic activity, some respondents believe that relatively few are currently benefiting. In Dolo Ado, leaders explained that landowners are well-positioned to take advantage of deepening ties to local markets but many landowners lack water pumps for irrigation and other farm equipment. In Hudet, a large agricultural scheme is planned in the *woreda* but there is limited expectation that the displaced population will benefit from the scheme.

Table 3.14 lists the main occupations as reported by household heads in Somali. Consistent with the descriptions found in the qualitative work, pastoralism as a primary source of livelihood is reported frequently in Afdem and Hudet but not elsewhere. That said, for

reasons explained in chapter two, it is important to remember that this is not a random sample of Somali households.


Comparing Figures 3.1 and 3.3, we see that livestock holdings are smaller in sampled Somali households than in Afar for households in the upper half of the distribution of TLU (Figure 3.4). Holdings in Somali are unequally distributed. The wealthiest 30 percent of households own 71 percent of livestock while the poorest 50 percent have only 12.5 percent of all livestock. Consistent with what we observe in Afar, while ownership of smallstock is widespread, the richest households own oxen, cows and especially camels (Table 3.15).

Table 3.14 Main occupation of household head, by *woreda* and sex, Somali

	<i>Woreda</i>								Total
	Shinile	Erer	Afdem	Gursum	Harshin	Filtu	Dolo Odo	Hudet	
Male heads									
Farmer	0.0	76.0	0.0	90.9	85.7	84.4	64.6	14.3	57.1
Pastoralist	38.3	13.3	92.0	0.0	8.3	3.1	16.9	64.3	25.4
Homemaker	1.7	0.0	2.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.9
Laborer	8.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.2	3.6	2.6
Trader	13.3	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.0	1.8	2.3
Salaried	5.0	1.3	4.0	2.6	2.4	3.1	1.5	3.6	2.8
Not in labor force	11.7	1.3	0.0	0.0	2.4	0.0	3.1	3.6	2.6
Other	21.7	4.0	2.0	3.9	1.2	7.8	3.1	8.9	6.2
Female heads									
Farmer	0.0	0.0	0.0	15.4	0.0	7.7	8.3	0.0	3.4
Pastoralist	23.3	53.3	40.7	7.7	50.0	3.9	4.2	17.6	21.7
Homemaker	30.0	20.0	55.6	23.1	50.0	84.6	66.7	67.7	53.7
Laborer	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.2	2.9	1.1
Trader	30.0	20.0	0.0	23.1	0.0	0.0	4.2	0.0	9.1
Salaried	3.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.6
Not in labor force	3.3	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1
Other	10.0	0.0	3.7	30.8	0.0	3.9	12.5	11.8	9.1


Source: Household survey.

Figure 3.3 Mean livestock holding (TLU), by TLU decile, Somali



Source: Household survey.

Figure 3.4 Distribution of livestock holdings, by TLU decile, Somali



Source: Household survey.

Table 3.15 Ownership of livestock types, by TLU quintile, Somali

Livestock quintile	Percentage of households owning:							
	Oxen	Bulls	Cows	Heifers	Sheep	Goats	Donkeys	Camels
1	3.5	0.7	7.7	2.1	16.2	45.1	14.8	0.7
2	14.8	5.6	52.8	8.5	46.5	77.5	55.6	9.2
3	20.7	17.9	59.3	7.9	60.0	84.3	59.3	26.4
4	23.4	18.4	62.4	18.4	78.7	92.9	69.5	52.5
5	39.7	26.2	68.8	28.4	88.7	94.3	74.5	82.3
All	20.4	13.7	50.1	13.0	57.9	78.8	54.7	34.1

Source: Household survey.

In Afar, we found that female-headed households were disproportionately found in the lower quintiles and male-headed households disproportionately found in the wealthier quintiles. Table 3.16 shows that this is also true in Somali, particularly for the poorest livestock quintile. While female-headed households comprise 24.8 of sampled households in Somali, 40.9 percent of households in the poorest quintile are female-headed.

Table 3.16 Distribution of headship, by TLU quintile, Somali

Livestock quintile	Percentage of quintile that are		Ratio of percentage of quintile to sample share of	
	Male-headed households	Female-headed households	Male-headed households	Female-headed households
1	59.1	40.9	0.79	1.65
2	76.8	23.2	1.02	0.94
3	76.4	23.6	1.02	0.95
4	80.9	19.1	1.08	0.77
5	83.0	17.0	1.10	0.69
Total	75.2	24.8		

Source: Household survey.

Finally, consistent with qualitative narratives, we see the households cultivating much larger holdings in Somali than in Afar (Table 3.17).¹⁰

¹⁰ Because of the need to significantly shorten the survey instrument fielded in the lowlands, many questions on nonfarm livelihoods were dropped from the quantitative household survey instrument. Given the qualitative results, some of these will need to be reinstated in the 2012 survey round.

Table 3.17 Distribution of amount of cultivated land, by *woreda*, Somali

<i>Woreda</i>	Amount of cultivated land (hectare)					
	None	0-0.25	0.25-0.50	0.50-1.00	1.00-5.00	> 5.00
Shinile	47.8	45.6	3.3	1.1	2.2	0.0
Erer	13.3	11.1	15.6	18.9	38.9	2.2
Afdem	1.3	96.1	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.3
Gursum	5.6	14.4	12.2	24.4	43.3	0.0
Harshin	1.1	2.2	8.9	54.4	31.1	2.2
Filtu	5.6	5.6	11.1	38.9	37.8	1.1
Dolo Odo	14.6	38.2	20.2	14.6	6.7	5.6
Udet	51.1	13.3	8.9	13.3	11.1	2.2
All <i>woredas</i>	17.9	27.1	10.2	21.3	21.8	1.8

Source: Household survey.

3.7 Livelihoods: Oromiya

We also collected qualitative data on the lowland localities in Oromiya. These have experienced many of the same shocks found in Afar and Somali. Multiple pressures have resulted in significant displacement and relocation within the region as people move in search of new sustainable livelihoods. Elders in Moyale explained the different pressures that have affected peoples' livelihoods:

We have drought (*Olaa*) every 5 years. There was a severe drought about 15 years ago during the Liben Jeldessa Geda leadership. Many animals died. The government collected the hides from the dead animals at the time. During the Gedaa Boru Medha leadership (1983 E.C), we migrated to Yabello due to drought and conflict. From 1984 E.C – 1986 E.C, there were good rains for three consecutive years. There were droughts again in 1987 E.C and 2001. Currently we are living with fear of drought as you see the short rain season (September – October) failed. We are concerned. [Oro_M/FG-5].

While all households are threatened by drought and other shocks such as conflict between the Boran and Somali, the poor and poorest have suffered disproportionately. Leaders in Moyale explained:

The first to be affected when drought occurs is the destitute (*Kollee*) then the poor (*Hiyessa*). One can't be safe when others are affected in the area. No one is free of the impact of drought. The livelihoods of the destitute are getting more vulnerable because they are not able to sell firewood and charcoal owing to government restrictions. [ORO_M/FG-5]

Although the poor are the worst-affected, Moyale local leaders stressed that differences in wealth among the population are decreasing as everyone becomes poorer. As in Afar, the changing economy of the lowlands, while providing new opportunities for accumulation for the better-off, is also providing new opportunities for survival work for the poor and poorest. The growth of small towns such as Moyale is one manifestation of the changing economy. There

have been some new opportunities in farming and construction. Other opportunities to add value to herds have been created, mainly milk, butter and meat to supply small towns in the region. Some have formed cooperatives for marketing milk to take advantage of expanding markets. Local leaders noted:

The very few whose livelihoods are improving have moved to town (Moyale). Those who have changed their livelihoods or mixed with other activities like trading are doing better. [ORO_M/FG-5]

There are a lot of changes in our area over the last ten years. Previously selling fuel wood was a shame in our area. It is only the *garba* (to mean slaves) who do that. Now people sell fuel wood to get money. Herding cattle on payment was not also practiced. Now there are people who herd cattle for somebody else and get money. Also, working as *serategna* (day laborer) was not common. Now people work as day laborers such as unloading trucks to get paid. There are also people who grow different crops, fruits and vegetables (oranges, khat, etc.) and get money by selling those products to the market. [ORO_S/FG-5]

3.8 Food security

Magnitudes and correlates of the food gap

Tables 3.18 and 3.19 provide some basic descriptive statistics on food security taken from the household quantitative survey. In Afar, the mean food gap is 2.37 months and in Somali it is 2.54 months. In Afar, however, there are considerable differences in the food gap across and within *woredas*. In Elidar, the mean food gap is only 0.40 months and 76 percent of households report no food gap. Kori and Teru have the highest food gaps but in Kori, 51 percent of sampled households have no food gap while another 40 percent report a gap of six months or more. In Somali, there are three *woredas* – Gursum, Filtu and Udet – where virtually all households report a food gap while in Erer, Harshi and Dolo Odo, between 63 and 75 percent of households report a food gap of two months or less.

Table 3.18 Mean food gap (months), by region and *woreda*

Afar		Somali	
<i>Woreda</i>	Mean Food Gap (months)	<i>Woreda</i>	Mean Food Gap (months)
Dubti	2.96	Shinile	2.24
Elidar	0.40	Erer	1.77
Kori	4.22	Afdem	2.52
Erebtu	2.63	Gursum	3.07
Megale	2.57	Harshin	1.52
Dalol	2.82	Filtu	3.31
Bure Mudayitu	1.07	Dolo Odo	1.65
Ewa	2.97	Udet	4.16
Teru	3.74		
Semurobia Gelale	0.71		
Total	2.37	Total	2.54

Source: Household survey.

Table 3.19 Distribution of food gap, by *woreda*, Afar and Somali

<i>Woreda</i>	Food gap (months)						
	0	1	2	3	4-5	6-8	9-12
	(percent)						
Afar							
Dubti	35.0	3.3	23.3	10.0	1.7	22.5	4.2
Elidar	76.1	12.5	6.8	4.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kori	51.7	0.0	0.0	3.3	5.0	15.0	25.0
Erebtu	0.0	12.1	42.9	23.1	20.9	1.1	0.0
Megale	13.3	12.2	22.2	27.8	16.7	7.8	0.0
Dalol	1.1	4.4	24.4	54.4	15.6	0.0	0.0
Bure Mudayitu	55.6	8.9	18.9	10.0	5.6	1.1	0.0
Ewa	28.7	4.6	13.8	10.3	14.9	27.6	0.0
Teru	8.9	17.8	8.9	14.4	13.3	34.4	2.2
Semurobia Gelale	75.3	2.3	7.9	10.1	3.4	1.1	0.0
All	33.9	7.9	17.8	17.1	9.6	11.3	2.5
Somali							
Shinile	35.6	7.8	15.6	16.7	11.1	12.2	1.1
Erer	42.2	6.7	15.6	16.7	13.3	5.6	0.0
Afdem	24.7	5.2	22.1	18.2	19.5	10.4	0.0
Gursum	3.4	3.4	22.5	44.9	21.4	4.5	0.0
Harshin	35.6	21.1	10.0	26.7	4.4	2.2	0.0
Filtu	3.3	3.3	8.9	45.6	33.3	5.6	0.0
Dolo Odo	28.1	26.8	25.6	11.0	2.4	4.9	1.2
Udet	4.4	1.1	5.6	33.3	24.4	30.0	1.1
All	22.1	9.3	15.5	26.9	16.3	9.5	0.4

Source: Household survey.

Both the quantitative and qualitative survey instruments provide information on who is vulnerable to food insecurity. In all four *woredas* in Afar where this was discussed (Buremudaitu, Ewa, Semurobi and Teru), orphans were always mentioned as a vulnerable group. Pregnant and lactating mothers were also seen as vulnerable along with the elderly and the disabled. Poor households, defined as those households with few livestock, were also identified in two of the 12 focus groups. A member of a men's group in Buremudaitu described the different members of society who are most vulnerable to food shortages this way:

There is no one that does not face a food gap among those who were used to surviving on livestock production. However, children who have families and who do not have families are not equal. Those who do not have a family starve first and others with families follow. Families with limited or no able bodies and disabilities are also among the families with critical food gaps. Elderly people who do not have livestock also face a similar problem [Af_B/FG-7].

In Somali Region Men and women have different views on which households are the most vulnerable to food shortages. According to the responses of the women's focus groups, the most vulnerable households are those without a water pump for irrigation, those who live on barren land, households with disabled or chronically ill members, households without livestock or access to farming plots, and the poor (*ayiid*). According to men, the most

vulnerable are: households with elderly members, polygamous households, households without livestock, and households with disabled or chronically ill members.

Men’s groups in Oromiya identify the following groups as being the most vulnerable to food shortages: child-headed households, households lacking assets, households with elderly or chronically ill heads, widowed women with less than three cattle and female-headed households. Women’s groups in Oromiya report the following groups as being the most vulnerable to food shortages: female-headed households, widowed women, polygamous households, poor families with few or no livestock assets, and households with elderly or chronically ill heads.

Tables 3.20–3.24 cross-tabulates a number of the demographic characteristics identified by these respondents against the size of the food gap as reported in the household quantitative survey.

Table 3.20 Food gap (months), by region and sex of head

Food gap (months)	Afar		Somali	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
0	33.6	34.4	22.5	20.8
1	7.8	8.3	10.5	5.8
2	16.9	19.9	16.2	13.3
3	17.3	16.6	28.4	22.5
4-5	8.4	12.9	13.3	25.4
6-8	12.5	7.9	8.8	11.6
9-12	3.4	0.0	0.4	0.6

Source: Household survey.

Table 3.21 Mean food gap, by region and sex of head

Sex of head	Afar	Somali
Male	2.49	2.43
Female	2.05	2.87

Source: Household survey.

Table 3.22 Mean food gap, by region and marital status

Marital status	Afar	Somali
Married, single spouse	2.42	2.44
Widowed	2.51	2.81
Married, polygamous	2.39	2.98

Source: Household survey.

Table 3.23 Mean food gap by region and age of head (quintiles)

Age of head, quintile	Afar	Somali
Youngest quintile	2.24	2.46
2	2.49	2.39
3	2.85	2.78
4	2.15	2.52
Oldest quintile	2.12	2.52

Source: Household survey.

Table 3.24 Mean food gap, by region and household size

Household size	Afar	Somali
1	1.93	1.69
2	1.41	2.09
3	2.47	2.30
4	2.20	2.60
5	2.63	2.54
6	2.57	2.62
7	2.72	2.39
8	2.50	2.81
9	2.17	3.20
10	2.17	2.67

Source: Household survey.

The dominant sense provided by these tables is the absence of any marked correlation between demographic characteristics and the size of the food gap. While there are observable variations, these are not uniform across regions or within a given demographic category. While the mean food gap is larger for female-headed households in Somali, it is smaller in Afar. In both regions, the smallest households (as measured by household size) have a smaller food gap than other households. But in Afar, the food gap for the largest households is also relatively small while in Somali, the mean food gap for 6 and 10 person households is nearly identical.

By contrast, as Tables 3.25 and 3.26 both show, there are strong correlations between asset holdings and the mean food gap. In Afar, the poorest wealth quintile as measured by TLU have a food gap of 3.01 months, more than double the food gap of the richest quintile. In Somali – again mindful of the nonrepresentativity of the sample – we see that while the food gap falls slowly as livestock holdings increase, the change in food gap is more pronounced as the amount of cultivated land increases.

A limitation of these cross-tabulations is that they consider household characteristics individually. To remedy this weakness, we estimate linear regressions where the dependent variable is the food gap. We explore the relationship between the food gap and household demographic (age, sex, education of the household head; household size), wealth (livestock measured in TLU, cultivable land) and locational characteristics. We do this separately for Afar and Somali. Results are reported in Tables 3.27 and 3.28. Where the estimated coefficient is statistically significant, we also provide an interpretation of its magnitude.

Table 3.25 Mean food gap, by region and livestock holdings

Livestock quintile	Afar	Somali
Poorest quintile	3.01	2.48
2	3.49	2.81
3	2.27	2.67
4	1.84	2.63
Richest quintile	1.29	2.33

Source: Household survey.

Table 3.26 Mean food gap, by region and land cultivated

Land cultivated (hectare)	Afar	Somali
None	2.60	3.17
0-0.25	2.49	2.39
0.25-0.50	1.83	2.35
0.50-1.00	1.90	2.59
1.00-5.00	1.19	2.28
> 5.00	2.47	2.17

Source: Household survey.

After accounting for household location, Table 3.27 shows that education, livestock holdings and access to cultivable land all have a statistically significant effect on reducing the food gap in Afar. For these statistically significant variables, we also provide an interpretation of the magnitudes of their estimated coefficients. Having larger livestock holdings as measured by TLU, does reduce the food gap but the magnitudes are not large. For example, compared to a household with less than 5 TLU, a household with more than 20 TLU has a food gap that is only 0.50 months smaller. Consistent with the qualitative reports, having some cultivable land, relative to having none, reduces the food gap but more cultivable land does not have a larger effect than smaller quantities. One possible explanation for this is that there are likely to be quality differentials with smaller plots being more fertile than larger ones – possibly because they are more likely to be nearer the source of water for irrigation and have better drainage.

Table 3.27 Correlates of the food gap, Afar

	Estimated coefficients and t statistics	Interpretation		
		Holding other characteristics constant	A household in this category has a food gap that is	
Household head is female	0.203 (1.546)			
Age of head	-0.005 (-1.171)			
Head has formal schooling	-0.372* (-1.934)	Compared to a household where the head has no formal schooling	<i>Smaller by</i>	0.37 months
Household size	0.086 (1.022)			
Household size squared	-0.005 (-0.660)			
Household has between 5 and 20 TLU	-0.294** (-2.079)	Compared to a household with less than 5 TLU	<i>Smaller by</i>	0.29 months
Household has more than 20 TLU	-0.503*** (-2.954)	Compared to a household with less than 5 TLU	<i>Smaller by</i>	0.50 months
Household has 0 - 0.5 ha cultivable land	-1.369*** (-4.490)	Compared to a household with no cultivable land	<i>Smaller by</i>	1.37 months
Household has 0.5 - 1.0 ha cultivable land	-0.901*** (-2.657)	Compared to a household with no cultivable land	<i>Smaller by</i>	0.90 months
Household has more than 1 ha cultivable land	-1.061*** (-2.604)	Compared to a household with no cultivable land	<i>Smaller by</i>	1.06 months

Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level. Model estimated using *kebele*-level fixed effects. Sample size is 821.

Table 3.28 provides comparable estimates for Somali. Unlike Afar, when we control for all other household characteristics, female-headed households have slightly larger food gaps, 0.31 months. Relative to households with less than 5 TLU, there is no additional impact of more animals on the food gap. Households with cultivable land, compared to those with none, have a smaller food gap. Households with more than one ha of cultivable land have a food gap that is smaller by one month compared to those households with no such land.

Table 3.28 Correlates of the food gap, Somali

	Estimated coefficients and t statistics	Interpretation		
		Holding other characteristics constant	A household in this category has a food gap that is	
Household head is female	0.311** (1.997)	Compared to a male-headed household	Larger by	0.31 months
Age of head	-0.000169 (-0.0368)			
Head has formal schooling	-0.280 (-1.539)			
Household size	0.210** (1.967)	Each additional household member	Larger by	0.21 months
Household size squared	-0.0118 (-1.331)			
Household has between 5 and 20 TLU	0.258 (1.623)			
Household has more than 20 TLU	0.147 (0.846)			
Household has 0 - 0.5 ha cultivable land	-0.603** (-2.558)	Compared to a household with no cultivable land	<i>Smaller by</i>	0.60 months
Household has 0.5 - 1.0 ha cultivable land	-0.511* (-1.951)	Compared to a household with no cultivable land	<i>Smaller by</i>	0.51 months
Household has more than 1 ha cultivable land	-0.999*** (-3.898)	Compared to a household with no cultivable land	<i>Smaller by</i>	1.00 months

Notes: t statistics in parentheses. * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level. Model estimated using *kebele*-level fixed effects. Sample size is 694.

Seasonal dimensions

As is the case in the Highlands, there is a seasonal dimension to hunger in Afar and Somali (Table 3.29). Afar has a lengthy dry season extending from late September to February. During this period, pastoralists move in search of pasture and water. Milk is rarely available due to the lack of pasture and poor production. Hence, pastoralists search for wild foods and depend on food aid to compensate for the lack of livestock products. Livestock-keeping units that have moved to distant grazing sites return to their home ranges during the *Sugum* season. The short rains in this season helps to generate new pasture growth. Milk is more available during *Sugum* and *Karma* (June-August) due to improved availability of pasture and water. The few agro-pastoralists in Afar engage in cultivation during the rainy seasons.

In Somali, the *Jillaal* (September – February) and *Hagaa* (May – June) seasons are the main dry seasons. Collecting wild foods, tasks-for-cash and aid are important sources of livelihood during these seasons. The poor migrate to small towns in the region to engage in tasks-for-cash. Access to livestock products and produce from irrigated plots is better during the two wet seasons – *Gu* (May – April) and *Dyr Karan* (July – August). On-farm activity for agro-pastoralists reaches a peak in the *Gu* season. In the quantitative survey, respondents are asked to identify the month of peak food insecurity. Consistent with these descriptions, the quantitative data show that the months of peak food insecurity are mostly likely to occur during the beginning months of the rainy seasons in both Afar and Somali.

Table 3.29 Agricultural seasons in Afar and Somali and peak month of food insecurity

Afar

	Tahisis	Tir	Yekatit	Megabit	Miazia	Ginbot	Sene	Hamle	Nehase	Meskerem	Tikmit	Hidar
Season	Dry season			<i>Sugum</i> (short rains)		Dry season	<i>Karma</i> (rainy season)			Dry season		
Percent	5.7	4.4	3.4	4.7	5.4	11.2	18.4	16.9	11.0	5.9	5.1	7.9

Somali

	Tahisis	Tir	Yekatit	Megabit	Miazia	Ginbot	Sene	Hamle	Nehase	Meskerem	Tikmit	Hidar
Season	<i>Jillaal</i> (dry season)			<i>Gu</i> (rainy season)		<i>Hagaa</i> (dry season)		<i>Dyr karan</i> (rainy season)		<i>Jillaal</i>		
Percent	10.6	15.3	11.7	6.9	5.8	6.9	12.4	19.9	2.4	1.3	3.1	3.8

Source: Seasonality descriptions from PSNP PAP lesson learning report (2010). Percentages based on information found in quantitative household survey.

3.9 Coping strategies

Mobility and flexibility are how pastoralists cope with uncertainty. Variation in rainfall is an altogether normal characteristic of pastoral rangelands, necessitating wide movements across social and ecological borders to access high value fodder and water where and when they are available. Key resources are concentrated in patches such as along rivers and on hilltops in the more arid reaches of the lowlands. These key resource sites have long supported an array of complementary livelihood activities to livestock-keeping such as harvesting wild foods, flood retreat farming, hunting and beekeeping, which become more important during drought years. As noted above, trade and exchange relations have also traditionally been an important coping strategy for pastoralists in the lowlands. Somali herders have long been connected to regional markets and participate in a vibrant cross-border livestock trade linking Somali Region with Somaliland, Somalia and further afield in the Arabian Peninsula. Pastoralists living near the Rift Valley escarpment in Afar, Somali and Oromiya regions have benefitted from their proximity to highland areas and opportunities to sell livestock products, purchase hay and grains and acquire agro-ecological knowledge to diversify into growing dryland crops and fodder, as well.

These intensifying market connections and opportunities for livelihood diversification are apparent in patterns of coping for both men and women in Afar, Oromiya and Somali regions (see Tables 3.30–3.32). For women, the most frequently reported coping strategy were tasks for cash such as charcoal burning, collecting and selling fuelwood and fodder, and providing househelp to better-off town-dwellers and shopkeepers. Two out of four men’s focus groups in Somali Region reported that tasks-for-cash are important for coping. Three of six men’s groups in Afar and both men’s focus groups in Oromiya mentioned the receipt of food aid as an important coping strategy. Three out of six men’s focus groups in Afar mentioned safety net public works, the only region where focus group members indicate safety net activities in the context of coping. Four of six men’s groups in Afar mentioned movements of livestock to distant grazing and water sites as an important coping strategy to support livestock.

Table 3.30 Men's and women's coping strategies in Afar

Coping strategy	Who reports this coping strategy in:					
	Bure-Mudayit	Dubti	Eldiar	Ewa	Semurobia Gelale	Teru
Safety net public works	–	–	Men	Men	–	Men
Food aid	–	Men	–	Men	Men Women	–
Other federal government support	Men Women	–	–	–	–	–
Slaughter or sell livestock	–	Men	Men, Women	–	Men Women	–
Begging						
Mutual help (sharing food, labour, animals on loan/as gift)	Women	Women		–	–	Men
Reduce consumption	–	–	–	–	–	Women
Tasks for cash (i.e., working as guard, carrying and selling salt, cutting and selling grass, burning charcoal)	Women	Men	Men, Women	–	–	Women
Seek loan	–	–	–	–	–	Women
Digging wells/ponds	–	–	–	–	–	Men
Distant movements to access grazing or water	–	Men	Men	Men Women	Men Women	–
Zero grazing livestock	–	–	–	Men Women	–	–
Religious leaders' teaching	Men	–	–	–	–	–

Source: Qualitative survey.

Table 3.31 Men's and women's coping strategies in Somali

Coping strategy	Who reports this coping strategy in:			
	Dolo Ado	Gursum	Hudet	Shinile
Food aid	–	–	–	Men
Slaughter or sell livestock	–	–	–	Men, Women
Begging	Men	–	Women	–
Mutual help (sharing food, labor, animals on loan/as gift)	–	–	–	Men, Women
Reduce consumption	–	Women	–	–
Harvesting wild products for own consumption/hunting	Men, Women	Women	–	–
Tasks for cash (i.e., working as guard, carrying and selling salt, cutting and selling grass, burning charcoal)	Women	Men, Women	Men, Women	Women
Migrate to other areas in search of labor work to generate income	Men	–	–	–
Seek loan	–	–	Women	–
Digging wells/ponds	Men	–	–	–

Source: Qualitative survey.

Table 3.32 Men’s and women’s coping strategies in Oromiya

Coping strategy	Who reports this coping strategy in:	
	Moyale	Saweyna
Safety net public works	–	–
Food aid	Men, Women	Men, Women
Other federal government support	–	–
Slaughter or sell livestock	–	Men, Women
Mutual help (sharing food, labour, animals on loan/as gift)	–	Men
Sending children to wealthier kin	Women	–
Harvesting wild products for own consumption/hunting	–	Men
Tasks for cash (i.e., working as guard, carrying and selling salt, cutting and selling grass, burning charcoal)	Men, Women	Women
Distant movements to access grazing or water	Men	Women

Source: Qualitative survey.

The growth of small towns and participation in markets is an important feature of coping strategies in some areas. A women’s group in Dolo Ado in Somali Region explained,

During droughts we sell grass in the market (in Mandera, a large border town on the Ethiopia-Kenya border). We collect grasses from the riverside and sell it in the market. Those buying grasses in the market are those who keep livestock at home. Selling grass in the market is our best method for coping during droughts. There are many people who are making money out of this.
[SM_D/FG-6]

In Gursum, a member of a women’s group explained:

We are more involved in selling khat and cereals because there are more opportunities to sell these. But the market for selling tea, injera and ashara is declining. Profits are greater for selling khat and cereals, and this is how we are coping. [SM_G/FG-6]

A member of a women’s group in Teru also highlighted the importance of small-town markets:

Selling water and fuelwood is becoming more important as a coping strategy because of the growing market in nearby Teru town. [AF_T/FG-6]

In Saweyna (Oromiya Region), women in one group commented:

The market has improved and we can sell animals at a higher price and buy food locally. We also can sell fuelwood and charcoal. [ORO_S/FG-6]

Although charcoal burning and selling bundles of fuelwood is banned by authorities, it remains an important coping strategy for poorer women in many pastoral areas. A women’s group member in Moyale offered:

The sale of charcoal and fuel wood is ranked third because even though it is prohibited we still rely on it. We hide it from government officials. [ORO_M/FG-6]

3.10 Coping and informal social support

There was considerable interaction during focus group discussions around the topic of informal forms of social support, a consequence stemming from cultural views surrounding sharing norms and the prominence given to alms giving in Islamic religious thought. In Afar, participants noted that:

Afar community has unique culture in supporting each other. If he takes one sip/nip for himself he gives the next for other person [AF-B/MEN].

We support each other in terms of labor, money and food. People who have food, milk, even tea and salt give for those who may not have. We share everything we have for each other. This type of support among the Afar community, we call it *Etel Kumaliyo* [AF-B/women].

In our culture no one eats alone. We share what we have [AF-EL/MEN].

In Afar culture the one who has better asset supports the one who does not have or the poor [AF-S/WOMEN].

Informal support takes a variety of forms including the provision of grains, cooked meals, gifts of livestock, and labor exchange. It is provided at specific times in the year, such as at the end of Ramadan and in response to specific events such as marriage or orphanhood.

In Afar the basic support is giving animals for the poor and for people facing problems. It is the first cultural support in our community. As far as support in food is concerned ... if anybody comes to us we share to him. ... In the Afar context children that do not have mother and father are given big concern. Supporting children who don't have both parents is totally the responsibility of the community and they get special support. In Islam during *solat* ... money is collected for the support of *yetims* (children without parents). The first thing before the *solat* is taking place is to collect this money. The money is mainly given for the *yetim* and only a fraction of it to the very poor people. There is also another animal contribution, which is called *zakat* to support *yetim*. *Zakat* is contribution in animals by those who have many livestock for the poor [AF-S/MEN].

In Borena (Oromiya), *Buusa Gonoffa* is the name given to clan based social support.

The common informal social support mechanisms we use are *Bussa Gonfafa* – the cultural social support mechanism within a clan. Every clan member has an

obligation to support any member of the clan that is in need. We also use sharing. We share cash, cattle and grain. We also share milk, blood of cattle (if there is nothing to feed someone who is Borana) [ORO-M/MEN].

Temporary transfer of resources (meaning lending) was also frequently mentioned in the Borana focus group discussions. This could take a variety of forms with borrowing cash and milk cows being the most common ones. “Temporary transfer includes many types of wealth transfers including milking cow, *nasu* (felling very bad about someone and helping him) - support given out of good will and borrowing and lending” [ORO-M/WOMEN].

Table 3.33 summarize the three most important informal social support structures as identified during men’s and women’s focus group discussions.¹¹

During these focus groups, there was discussion about changes in the nature and size of informal social support. One driver of change is change in livelihood systems. Falling herd sizes, and concomitantly declines in the availability of livestock products, due to recurrent drought and animal diseases is seen as a major factor affecting informal support. Consequently, there has been a rise in the provision of food and cash rather than sharing animals or livestock products.

In the past support with animal was taking the largest share. But nowadays since the life expense is increased the amount of animal provision is reduced. As money is scarce now people could not have money beyond their household and share only small amount of money to each other. As the community becomes poor, traditional support systems are deteriorating. Currently we support each other mainly by sharing food. Previously the Afar community have livestock loan but it is not common today [AF-B/WOMEN].

There were a large number of cattle and camels and there were rich people in the community, but today you cannot find such households. As a result the size of support has shown a decreasing trend that is shared among communities [AF-D/MEN].

The culture remains the same. It is our fathers’ culture and we never change it. However there are some changes. The amount of the support has reduced. Our concern to support each other is not like our fathers, they love each other and support each other whatever they have. We were supporting each other by animals only but now some people started support in each other in cash [AF-S/MEN].

¹¹ This topic was not considered in the focus group discussions in Elidar.

Table 3.33 Informal social support structures identified during focus group discussions

Region	Woreda	Rank	Men	Women
Afar	Buremudaitu	1	Food support	<i>Idido/Yetim aba</i>
		2	Livestock support	Food Support
		3	<i>Zakat</i> - obligation of Muslims to share assets with the poor	Support in Cash
	Dubti	1	Livestock	
		2	Lending money	
		3	<i>Zakat</i>	
	Ewa	1	<i>Alaa</i> - giving gifts to friends	<i>Edbonta</i> - clan based system of restocking herds of households who suddenly lost livestock
		2	<i>Zakat</i>	<i>Zakat</i>
		3	<i>Edbonta</i>	<i>Aboodi</i> (Lending)
	Semurobi	1	Animal Support	<i>Yetim</i>
		2	Money support	<i>Zakat</i>
		3	<i>Yetim</i>	Assistance in livestock
	Teru	1	<i>Edbonta</i>	<i>Edbonta</i>
		2	<i>Harati</i> - gift to new couples provided by relatives	<i>Harati</i>
		3	<i>Amaki</i> - in-kind credit provided during times of acute shortage	<i>Zakat</i>
Oromiya	Moyale	1	<i>Buusa Gonoffa</i>	Temporary transfer
		2	Credit	<i>Buusa Gonofa</i>
		3	Sharing	Lending and borrowing
	Sewena	1	<i>Yatama</i> -money or livestock given to female-headed or widowed households	Food sharing
		2	Sharing	Loan/Lending
		3	<i>Zakat</i>	Gift
Somali	Dolo Odo	1	<i>Cayma</i> – gift of livestock to man at time of marriage	<i>Goob</i> - labor sharing during planting or harvesting
		2	<i>Zakat</i>	<i>Hori dhess</i> – women providing assistance in the construction of traditional houses
		3	<i>Xoolo-goyn</i> - livestock given to poor families from relatives)	<i>Roob doon</i> - remittances
	Gursum	1	<i>Zakat</i>	<i>Kaallo</i> - gift of livestock at time of marriage
		2	<i>Kaallo</i>	<i>Zakat</i>
		3	Fidri (religious payment at the end of Ramadan to the poor)	<i>Karsinta</i> -gift to the poor in the name of Allah
	Hudet	1	<i>Irr</i> -relatives of a poor person contribute livestock to help him	Providing donkey for transportation services (to take charcoal or firewood to the market)
		2	<i>Zakat</i>	<i>Hori dhess</i>
		3	<i>Dabarso</i> - a custom where someone asks for lactating camel	Getting blood money compensation

Source: Qualitative survey.

The need for sharing is increasing because of more households have lost their animals to droughts and disease. Yet help extended is decreasing because people are poorer. [AF_T/FG-7]

The practice *zakat* is there but the quantity of asset given out reduced due to poverty [SM-G/WOMEN].

One men's focus group suggested that changes in perceptions of needs had also affected norms around sharing.

There is big difference, even in my age what I know before regarding *arbada* - when an individual came back from town buying consumable goods, he would distribute these to others in the village, even those who had cattle and goats ... When other individuals went to town, they followed a similar practice. When you come around towns nowadays, such a thing has been reduced. This is because the community has adapted the *Amhara* life style [meaning highland or urban life style]. However, even if *arbada* has been declining overtime, it has not completely disappeared. Difference has happened since in early time the community love each other, rather than cash/money the community had milk, meat and butter assets. At that time the community would slaughter *dasiga* [fatted camel or ox] and eat together (9 or 10 individuals). I go to the ceremony taking one friend to eat what I have paid for. Now days individuals start to live in town; they become money lovers/greedy. Everybody cannot get money. Nowadays rather than individuals around town, the pastoralists that live in rural area are better in supporting each other. Now days around town, an individual sleeps on family bed (to mean modern or good quality bed) while his neighbor starved [AF-B/MEN].

However, not everyone agreed that informal support had declined. "There is not much change in the informal social support mechanisms used" [ORO-M/MEN]. "There is none that is left out. Otherwise we could not have survived" [ORO-M/WOMEN]. "We know this informal social supports for a long period of time and still there has been no change in the last twenty years. This method informal social supports is at a standstill [unchanged]. It is long-lasting and in general it has not transformed to other types of informal social support" [SM-D/WOMEN]. In some locations, the form of informal support has changed – in Shinile, for example, the practice of *skash* – support to farming activities – has become more common as agro-pastoralists become more involved with farm activities.

3.11 Summary

- The provision of basic services in Afar and Somali Regions is poor, not least due to the remoteness of most areas in these regions. A majority of kebeles surveyed have a health post and primary school but no secondary school or banking facilities. Road access is limited to these sites, and most are far from markets [over 20 km].
- In spite of being remote, distant from markets and having poor basic service provision, commercialization processes are transforming parts of Afar and Somali Regions. But the benefits of these changes are unevenly distributed. Wealthier livestock owners are tapping into demand in export markets, and generating new wealth. By contrast, levels

of vulnerability and food security are stubbornly high among the poor, who rely on a variety of tasks-for-cash, which provide mostly meager earnings.

- This social differentiation is starkly apparent in the ownership of livestock among different wealth groups. In Afar, the wealthiest 30 percent of households own more than 75 percent of livestock while the poorest 50 percent have only 10.8 percent of all livestock. In Somali, the wealthiest 30 percent of households own 71 percent of livestock while the poorest 50 percent have only 12.5 percent of all livestock.
- There are prominent gender differences, as well. In Afar, female-headed households are disproportionately found in the lower wealth quintiles based on livestock holdings and male-headed households disproportionately found in the wealthier quintiles. In Somali, while female-headed households comprise 24.8 of sampled households, 40.9 percent of households in the poorest quintile are female-headed.
- In Afar, the mean food gap is 2.37 months and in Somali it is 2.54 months. There is an absence of any marked correlation between demographic characteristics and the size of the food gap. While there are observable variations, these are not uniform across regions or within a given demographic category.
- Improving access to markets in some areas and opportunities for livelihood diversification in growing small towns have availed new ways of coping with multiple uncertainties. For women, the most frequently reported coping strategy were tasks-for-cash such as charcoal burning, collecting and selling fuelwood and fodder, and providing househelp to better-off town-dwellers and shopkeepers.
- Informal support remains important in both Afar and Somali. It takes a variety of forms including the provision of grains, cooked meals, gifts of livestock, and labor exchange.

Chapter 4: *Woreda* Perspectives on Implementation

4.1 Introduction

The PSNP PIM states that “The *woreda* is the key level of government that determines needs, and undertakes planning and implementation of safety net activities.” Under the FSP, there has been a deliberate strategy to increase implementation capacity at the *woreda* level and in the Highlands, significant resources have been dedicated to implementing this strategy. This chapter assesses *woreda* capacity in Afar and Somali.

The planning and implementation of these survey instruments was predicated on the understanding that the PSNP was operating in all surveyed *woredas*. In analyzing these data, however, it became apparent that in Afar this was not the case. Initial concerns about this were communicated to members of the Donor Working Group in June 2011 (shortly after the quantitative data had been received from CSA). Subsequently, we reviewed information collected from six instruments: the *Woreda* qualitative interviews (*Woreda – Qual*); the quantitative survey fielded at the *woreda* level (*Woreda – Quant*); the qualitative interviews done at the community level (*Kebele – Qual*); the quantitative data collected at the *kebele* level (*Kebele – Quant*); focus group discussions with beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (*Beneficiary FGD*); and the quantitative data collected at the household level (*HH – Quant*). This included whether *woreda* and *kebele* food security task forces exist, was it possible to interview members of these task forces, was there evidence that households were being selected to receive benefits and do beneficiaries report receiving transfers.

Table 4.1 summarizes the results.¹² There is clear and consistent evidence that the PSNP was operating in Teru *woreda* (zone 4). In Elidar (zone 1) and Ewa (zone 4) *woredas*, it is likely that the PSNP is functioning. However, communications about the program have been so poor that many beneficiaries do not recognize the term “PSNP” or understand what the program seeks to do or how it operates. In the remaining seven *woredas*, there is confusion about what is meant by PSNP operations. In three of these seven *woredas* (*Erebt*, *Megale*, and *Dallol*) *woreda* officials provided letters suggesting that the program was not operational. In six of these seven *woredas*, there is, however, evidence that some form of food distribution was taking place. Additional details supporting the information summarized in Table 4.1 is found in Annex 4.1 of this chapter.

This sense of partial program implementation was extensively discussed in two workshops (held in September 2011) with Afar regional and *woreda* program staff. These officials took the view that they are implementing the PSNP. However, it appears that there are considerable divergences of views as to what is meant by the phrase “implementing the PSNP.”

¹² The qualitative survey work was done in six *woredas*. A shaded cell in Table 4.1 indicates that that particular survey instrument was not fielded.

Table 4.1 Summary of evidence of PSNP operations in Afar woredas

Zone	Woreda	Evidence of PSNP activities						Evidence of any other form of food distribution
		Woreda – QUAL	Woreda - QUANT	Kebele - QUAL	Kebele - Quant	Beneficiary FGD	HH – QUANT	
1	Dubti	No	No	No	No	No	No	Kebele Quant data indicate that food was distributed in one kebele in 2009 and 2010
1	Elidar	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Beneficiaries had been doing some food for work but could not identify program
1	Kori		No		No		No	Kebele Quant data indicate that food was distributed in two kebeles in 2009 and 2010
2	Erebt		No		No		No	Kebele Quant data indicate that food was distributed in three kebeles in 2009 and 2010
2	Megale		No		No		No	Kebele Quant data indicate that food was distributed in two kebeles in 2009 and 2010
2	Dallol		No		No		No	Kebele Quant data indicate that food was distributed in three kebeles in 2009 and one kebele in 2010
3	Bure Mudayitu	No	No	No	No	No	No	Woreda, kebele and FGD surveys indicate that some sort of food distribution occurred. Kebele Quant data indicate that food was distributed in three kebeles in 2009 and in 2010
4	Ewa	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Likely that food was distributed. “Clan leaders facilitate targeting.”
4	Teru	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Kebele Quant data indicate that emergency food assistance was distributed in one kebele in 2009 and in 2010
5	Semurubia Gebele	No	No	No	No	No	No	Unclear if any food was distributed. KFDC stated that “clans chose beneficiaries.”

Afar officials at both regional and *woreda* levels suggested that their understanding is that, apart from localities like Teru, the PSNP is really about transferring food aid. Further discussion revealed that *woreda* and *kebele* task forces do exist but that their role is simply to oversee food distribution. They also recognized that there are ongoing misunderstandings even at the *woreda* level about what the PSNP is. For example, it was suggested that the letters provided to CSA confused the absence of the public works component of the PSNP with the PSNP itself.

In Berhane et al. (2011), data on *woreda* capacity to implement the PSNP was presented at the regional level or aggregated across all regions. With data available for only two *woredas* in Afar and with a sample of only eight *woredas* in Somali, presenting data aggregated at the regional level would not be informative. Instead, below we summarize information by *woreda*. We consider resources available to *woredas* to implement the PSNP and examine differences in the timeliness of payments. We also consider the implementation of the Complementary Community Investment component of the Food Security Program.

4.2 Woreda Resources for the PSNP

We begin by describing the characteristics of key *woreda* staff involved in the implementation of the PSNP (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2a Staffing, Head *Woreda* Food Security Office

Region	<i>Woreda</i>	Status		Training	
Afar	Elidar	Not filled	–	–	–
	Teru	Full Time	Introduction to the PSNP	Using the PIM	Handling food transfers
Somali	Shinile	Full Time	–	–	–
	Erer	Not filled	–	–	–
	Afdem	Full Time	–	–	–
	Gursum	Not filled	–	–	–
	Harshin	Full Time	Introduction to the PSNP	Using the PIM	Handling food transfers
	Filtu	Not filled	–	–	–
	Dolo Odo	Not filled	–	–	–
	Udet	Temporary Contract	Introduction to the PSNP	–	–

Table 4.2b Staffing, PSNP accountant

Region	Woreda	Status	Training		
Afar	Elidar	Not filled	–	–	–
	Teru	Temporary Contract	Financial management	Risk financing	Procurement
Somali	Shinile	Temporary Contract	Financial management	Introduction to the PSNP	Using the PIM
	Erer	Not filled	–	–	–
	Afdem	Not filled	–	–	–
	Gursum	Not filled	–	–	–
	Harshin	Not filled	–	–	–
	Filtu	Not filled	–	–	–
	Dolo Odo	Full time	PASS	–	–
	Udet	Temporary Contract	Financial management	Introduction to the PSNP	–

Table 4.2c Staffing, PSNP cashier

Region	Woreda	Status	Training		
Afar	Elidar	Not filled	–	–	–
	Teru	Temporary Contract	Financial management	Risk financing	Procurement
Somali	Shinile	Temporary Contract	–	–	–
	Erer	Not filled	–	–	–
	Afdem	Temporary Contract	–	–	–
	Gursum	Not filled	–	–	–
	Harshin	Not filled	–	–	–
	Filtu	Not filled	–	–	–
	Dolo Odo	Full time	–	–	–
	Udet	Temporary Contract	–	–	–

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.

The striking feature of Table 4.2 is that key positions in many PSNP *woredas* are unfilled though it is possible that some of this (for example, for cashier positions) may be a function of the timing of the survey (December 2010) and the type of payment being made. While staff are well-educated – all surveyed individuals had at least grade 10 education – their training on aspects of the PSNP is limited. All heads of Food Security Offices were men as were three of the four PSNP accountants.

Table 4.3 describes resources available to *woreda* food security offices.

Table 4.3 presents a sobering picture of resources available in these *woredas* to support the implementation of the PSNP. Only Shinile in Somali comes close to being adequately resourced as measured in terms of staffing, communications, electricity, vehicle access and documentation. The two Afar *woreda* offices face especially difficult conditions with poor communications, electricity and near-absent vehicle access.

Table 4.3a Communications resources available to *woreda* food security offices

Region	<i>Woreda</i>	Access to a landline	Cell phone coverage	Quality of cell phone coverage	Internet access
Afar	Elidar	Yes	Yes	Okay (available half the time)	No
	Teru	No	No	–	No
Somali	Shinile	Yes	Yes	Good (available most of the time)	No
	Erer	Yes	No	–	No
	Afdem	Yes	No	–	No
	Gursum	No	No	Erratic(rarely available)	No
	Harshin	Yes	Yes	Excellent (available all the time)	No
	Filtu	Yes	No	–	No
	Dolo Odo	Yes	Yes	Good (available most of the time)	Yes
Udet	No	Yes	–	No	

Table 4.3b Access to electricity

Region	<i>Woreda</i>	Has access to mains electricity	Quality of supply. Electricity is available:	Does <i>woreda</i> office have a generator
Afar	Elidar	No	–	No
	Teru	No	–	Yes
Somali	Shinile	Yes	Most of the time	No
	Erer	Yes	Most of the time	No
	Afdem	Yes	About half the time	No
	Gursum	Yes	Rarely available	No
	Harshin	Yes	Rarely available	Yes
	Filtu	Yes	Most of the time	Yes
	Dolo Odo	Yes	–	Yes
Udet	No	–	No	

Table 4.3c Computers and printers

Region	<i>Woreda</i>	Computers		Printers	
		For the exclusive use of the PSNP	Currently working	For the exclusive use of the PSNP	Currently working
Afar	Elidar	0	0	0	0
	Teru	0	2	1	1
Somali	Shinile	3	3	3	3
	Erer	5	0	3	0
	Afdem	5	3	2	2
	Gursum	4	0	1	0
	Harshin	3	0	3	0
	Filtu	2	2	2	2
	Dolo Odo	2	2	1	1
Udet	0	0	0	0	

Table 4.3d Vehicle access

Region	Woreda	Availability of government vehicles
Afar	Elidar	Rarely available
	Teru	Can never be used
Somali	Shinile	Usually available with a few days notice
	Erer	Usually available with a few days notice
	Afdem	Sometimes available, sometimes not available
	Gursum	Sometimes available, sometimes not available
	Harshin	Available at all times
	Filtu	Sometimes available, sometimes not available
	Dolo Odo	Can never be used
	Udet	Sometimes available, sometimes not available

Table 4.3e Access to manuals

Region	Woreda	Does the <i>woreda</i> food security office have the following manuals?			
		PIM	Targeting	Graduation	Financial Management
Afar	Elidar	Yes	No	No	Yes
	Teru	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Somali	Shinile	Yes	Yes	No	No
	Erer	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Afdem	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
	Gursum	Yes	Yes	No	No
	Harshin	No	No	No	No
	Filtu	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Dolo Odo	No	No	No	No
	Udet	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: *Woreda* quantitative questionnaire 2010.

Given that most *woredas* have a copy of the PIM and that some food security staff have had training on the PIM or an introduction to the PSNP, it is of interest to see whether there is an understanding of the objectives of the PSNP. *Woreda* officials' perceptions of the PSNP focus on the following four areas:

- A source of food and employment for poor people,
- A means for local infrastructure development and environmental protection,
- A way of reducing household asset depletion, and
- An approach to teach communities about labor works and promote work culture.

Most of these ideas are part of the formal definition of PSNP indicating reasonable understanding of PSNP objectives. But it was striking how often *woreda* authorities also mentioned that the PSNP would promote “work culture” and discourage dependency.

PSNP is a development activity that benefits the community through payment for their labor contributions. In addition, PSNP supports poor people with disabilities and the retired. [AF-EW/W-FG-1].

The objective of PSNP is to ensure access to food, contribute to the local development and reduce household asset depletion. [SM-G/W-FG-1]

[the PSNP provides] assistance to people with food shortages and a means to develop community infrastructures.[SM-S/W-FG-1]

[The PSNP] teaches people to work and not to be dependent. [SM-Do/W-FG-1].

[The PSNP is] a means to fight dependency by improving local infrastructure and protecting the environment. [SM-Sh/W-FG-1]

Promote working culture and attitude among the rural population. [OR-My/W-FG-1]

To help the community so that they can support themselves so as to overcome dependency syndrome. [OR-SW/W-FG-1]

4.3 Making food payments¹³

In Berhane et al. (2011), *woreda* food security officials were asked to construct a chronology of the payment process, starting with the receipt of attendance sheets from *kebeles* and running through the last trip to make payments. As part of the *woreda* quantitative work in Afar and Somali, *woreda* officials were also asked these questions. However, there was not a single *woreda* where it was possible for officials to construct a chronology, a result that is not surprising given the absence of key staff. However, the qualitative study uncovered recognition that there were often payment delays.

Payment is not regularly made because we receive the food late. It depends on the release of the fund or the grain from the region. Last time it took 4-5 months to pay the beneficiaries. [ORO-M/K-KI-2]

Distributions are not done regularly. One of the reasons for the delay is that a number of activities are undertaken at the same time but not completed at the same time. In other cases the planned volume of public works may not be achieved within scheduled time. Late transfers have actually become a way of life. We have only two cashiers in the *woreda* and they have to cover 29 *kebeles* this is one of the main reasons for not paying timely and regularly. [ORO-S/W-FG-2]

But sometime there is delay when the *woreda* officials are not present in their office to sign on the papers. [AF-EL/FG-4]

¹³ No cash payments were made in these *woredas*.

We did, however, provide some descriptive statistics on aspects of the payment process for which it was possible to obtain information.

Five *woredas* (Shinile, Afdem, Gursum, Harshin and Udet), all in Somali, reported using the PASS. That Gursum, Harshin and Udet report this is slightly surprising given that both reported that they had no working computers or printers and, in the case of Udet, it was indicated that there was no access to electricity. None of these five *woredas* reported that they had any staff trained on PASS.

Eight out of 10 *woredas* reported having food storage facilities available locally. In nearly all *woredas*, NGOs were responsible for transporting food to distribution sites. While delays were often reported in arranging transport, these were typically of one, two or three days duration. On average, *woredas* reported making 4.4 trips to pay beneficiaries.

4.4 Complementary Community Investment

Complementary Community Investment (CCI) is one of the four components of Ethiopia's FSP. It is specifically seen as a means to promote graduation in lowland areas. The qualitative study included discussions with regional and *woreda* officials about their understanding and rollout status of CCI.

As of December 2010, the CCI had not been introduced in Afar. Regional authorities stated: "We didn't start CCI yet. We have information about it and the regional government has decided to implement CCI. We are conducting feasibility studies of different kinds of projects focussed on water development for irrigation, livestock and human consumption." [AF-R/KI-PW]. No *woredas* in Afar could provide information or display any understanding of the CCI.

In Somali, different officials provided different views of the CCI. The RFSTF indicated that basin development (which they consider as part of the CCI) was introduced two years ago. The Region has a plan to expand the program to the different *woredas* to ensure food security by combining with voluntary resettlement for instance by moving people to irrigable areas developed through CCI. "In this region we call it (CCI) basin development. The objective of the basin development is to make the pastoral community food secure through facilitating voluntary settlement, by availing infrastructure like irrigation, which will enable them to produce crop." [SM-R/FG-1]. However, according to the Regional Public Works Coordination Unit (RPWCU), CCI is a capital intensive project, but they do not clearly know the purpose of CCI. They also do not have clear understanding on the rollout status in the Region. "We are not clear if CCI is already introduced to this region or in the pipeline. Also, we do not know the status of CCI." [SM-R/KI-PW]. Of the four *woredas* in Somali that were included in the qualitative study, only Shinille reported the introduction of CCI projects in five *kebeles* in 2010. The PWs focal persons in the other *woredas* indicated that CCI had not been introduced.

The RFSTF in Oromiya believes that CCI has contributed in critical ways to improving the livelihood of lowland communities: "In pastoral areas, a single year drought may devastate the livelihoods of the people. A pastoralist that owns 100 cattle and the one that has a few are

equally affected. There are limited diversified livelihood sources. Thus, in our region we have taken water supply and irrigation development through CCI as an entry point towards solving the problem of drought in pastoral areas. If moisture constraint is solved, the community will have pasture and water for their livestock and this will enable them to transit to sustainable livelihoods.” [OR-R/FG-1]. Despite this positive outlook, a KII with a PWs official suggested that the lack of clearly defined objectives and national level guidelines were drawbacks for the implementation CCI. “CCI has no clear objectives, has no national guideline and no information on sources of funding, it is not clear at all.” [OR-R/KI-PW].

In Oromiya, CCI was first introduced in 2007 with the Fentale Gravity Irrigation Project. It and the Dodota Spate irrigation projects have been completed and are now operating. The Borena water networks, and Saweyna and Sof’oumer gravity irrigation projects were (as of December 2010) under construction.

4.5 Early warning systems

The PSNP PIM clearly indicates that the PSNP program will incorporate the information from the findings of the Early Warning System while preparing a contingency plan to effectively respond to the imminent risks in a given area. The KIIs and FGDs with regional and *woreda* level early warning focal personnel indicate that the early warning information is collected on a regular basis. However, some degree of variability is observed in regions how often the early warning information is collected. For instance, in Somali and Oromiya regions the information is collected on weekly basis where as in Afar region it is collected on monthly basis. Further variation was observed across the regions and *woredas* in terms of collecting the early warning information and utilization of the information to prepare a contingency plan. Information collected includes:

- Weather condition, rainfall distribution, amount and coverage
- Pasture condition, water availability , coverage and efficiency
- Livestock health, milk productivity
- Human health condition
- School drop outs
- Market information (terms of trade), basic household items prices
- Malnutrition reports
- Conflict
- Seasonal migration in search for casual jobs

Despite collecting the early warning information on such various indicators, most of the *woreda* level early warning experts indicated that they do not use this information to prepare the PSNP contingency planning. When asked “How does the *woreda* prepare contingency plans to monitor risks and respond to shocks accordingly?” the *woreda* early warning response focal personnel in different *woredas* responded as follows:

We haven’t started preparing yet.[AF-D/W-FG-2]

We didn't implement it. [AF-EW/W-FG-2]

We prepare contingency plan based on our past experience. [SM-S/W-KI-2]

In PSNP *woredas* contingency plan is prepared at the *woreda* level starting from the *kebele*. When there is shock the response is given from that resource. There is also risk financing mechanism but not applied in this region. [AF-R/KI-2]

Further, regional and *woreda* level early warning experts had mixed opinions regarding the reliability and timeliness of the collected information.

The information is not timely due to delay from the *woredas*. Degree of accuracy of information is relatively better. [AF-R/KI-2]

Yes the reliability is questionable but, I think there is no problem with the timeliness of the information. [SM-R/KI-1]

Our information collection is limited only to the four accessible *kebeles*. I cannot go to the 11 *kebeles* on the other side of Awash River. This has affected the quality of the report we prepare. [AF-B/W-FG-2]

The information we collect are reliable and timely. [SM-S/W-KI-2]

It is reliable because we only report the existing situation in each area. But there is problem with the time because we don't have the means to send the report, now we have prepared this report before a week but we couldn't send. [SM-H/W/KI-1]

The problem is the timing. This information collected is not usually reach to the region on time. Our *woreda* is very far from the region capital. We send messages in person, these people may not give it on time or sometimes they forget to give it and also sometimes the report might come back. [AF-SM/W-FG-2]

4.6 Summary

This chapter has examined *woreda* level capacity to deliver PSNP transfers.

- In Afar, the PSNP is operating in Teru *woreda* (zone 4). In Elidar (zone 1) and Ewa (zone 4) *woredas*, it is likely that the PSNP is functioning. However, communications about the program have been so poor that many beneficiaries do not recognize the term "PSNP" or understand what the program seeks to do or how it operates. In the remaining seven *woredas*, there are divergent views about the operations of the PSNP. In six of these seven *woredas*, there is clear, evidence that some form of food distribution has taken place. In the minds of program officials, these food transfers

'are' the PSNP. However, there is a sense that at some levels, the full panopoly of PSNP activities, as specified in the PIM, is not supposed to take place in Afar. This would seem to explain the absence or confusion over task forces, difficulties in finding beneficiary lists and so on.

- The two Afar *woredas* (Elidar and Teru) where there is some evidence of more full PSNP operations face especially difficult conditions with poor communications, electricity and near-absent vehicle access.
- Operational capacity in the eight *woredas* surveyed in Somali is limited. Only Shinile comes close to being adequately resourced as measured in terms of staffing, communications, electricity, vehicle access and documentation.
- While there is some awareness of the objectives of the PSNP, unsettlingly, this also comes with a view that the PSNP should promote a "work culture" and discourage dependency.
- CCI has only been introduced in one *woreda* in Somali and to a certain extent in the lowland areas of Oromiya.
- Early warning systems are rudimentary.

Annex 4.1: Evidence on the presence of the PSNP, by zone and *woreda*, Afar region

Woreda: Dubti (ID Number: 20101)

Data source	Topic or group interviewed	Response
<i>Woreda</i> qual data	Has WFSTF been established	No
	Does WFSTF hold regular meetings?	No
	Are minutes kept?	No
	If no WFSTF, was <i>Woreda</i> Relief Committee (WRDC) interviewed?	No
	Did WFSTF/WRDC describe targeting?	No
<i>Woreda</i> quant survey	Was <i>woreda</i> -level questionnaire completed?	No
<i>Kebele</i> qual survey	Was either KFSTF or KFDC interviewed	Neither existed
	Could they describe targeting	No
<i>Kebele</i> quant survey	Does KFSTF exist?	No
	Is there a list of PSNP participants	No
	Food was distributed under PSNP	No
	Food was distributed under drought relief in 2009	Yes, in 1 of 4 surveyed kebeles
	Food was distributed under drought relief from Jan-Jun 2010	Yes, in 1 of 4 surveyed kebeles
	Food was distributed under risk financing from Jan-Jun 2010	No
Comm. FGD on purpose of PSNP	DS beneficiaries	Not interviewed
	Women	Not interviewed
	Men	Not interviewed
	Non-beneficiaries	Not interviewed
Household quant	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP PW	No
	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP DS	No

Woreda: Elidar (ID Number: 20102)

Data source	Topic or group interviewed	Response
<i>Woreda</i> qual data	Has WFSTF been established	Yes, 2010
	Does WFSTF hold regular meetings?	No
	Are minutes kept?	Yes
	If no WFSTF, was <i>Woreda</i> Relief Committee (WRDC) interviewed?	n/a
	Did WFSTF/WRDC describe targeting?	n/a
<i>Woreda</i> quant survey	Was <i>woreda</i> -level questionnaire completed?	Yes
<i>Kebele</i> qual survey	Was either KFSTF or KFDC interviewed	KFSTF
	Could they describe targeting	Yes
<i>Kebele</i> quant survey	Does KFSTF exist?	Yes, in 2 of 3 surveyed <i>kebeles</i>
	Is there a list of PSNP participants	No
	Food was distributed under PSNP	No
	Food was distributed under drought relief in 2009	No
	Food was distributed under drought relief from Jan-Jun 2010	No
	Food was distributed under risk financing from Jan-Jun 2010	No
Comm. FGD on purpose of PSNP	DS beneficiaries	"Do not know purpose only mentioned activities"
	Women	"We dug water holes and construct roads and we get food aid for our work"
	Men	"It is a program that brings food security"
	Non-beneficiaries	Heard about it as not free food distribution through food for work."
Household quant	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP PW	No
	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP DS	No

Woreda: Kori (ID Number: 20107). No qual work undertaken in this *woreda*.

Data source	Topic or group interviewed	Response
<i>Woreda</i> qual data	Has WFSTF been established	
	Does WFSTF hold regular meetings?	
	Are minutes kept?	
	If no WFSTF, was <i>Woreda</i> Relief Committee (WRDC) interviewed?	
	Did WFSTF/WRDC describe targeting?	
<i>Woreda</i> quant survey	Was <i>woreda</i> -level questionnaire completed?	No
<i>Kebele</i> qual survey	Was either KFSTF or KFDC interviewed	
	Could they describe targeting	
<i>Kebele</i> quant survey	Does KFSTF exist?	No
	Is there a list of PSNP participants	No
	Food was distributed under PSNP	No
	Food was distributed under drought relief in 2009	Yes, in 2 of 2 surveyed <i>kebeles</i>
	Food was distributed under drought relief from Jan-Jun 2010	Yes, in 2 of 2 surveyed <i>kebeles</i>
	Food was distributed under risk financing from Jan-Jun 2010	No
Comm. FGD on purpose of PSNP	DS beneficiaries	
	Women	
	Men	
	Non-beneficiaries	
Household quant	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP PW	No
	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP DS	No

Woreda: Erebti (ID Number: 20201). No qual work undertaken in this *woreda*.

Data source	Topic or group interviewed	Response
<i>Woreda</i> qual	Has WFSTF been established	
	Does WFSTF hold regular meetings?	
	Are minutes kept?	
	If no WFSTF, was <i>Woreda</i> Relief Committee (WRDC) interviewed?	
	Did WFSTF/WRDC describe targeting?	
<i>Woreda</i> quant survey	Was <i>woreda</i> -level questionnaire completed?	<p>No.</p> <p>Following letter was sent to CSA:</p> <p>Date: 5/5/2003 (Jan 13, 2011) Subject: Safety net program in Erebti <i>woreda</i> The non existence of safety net program in Afar zone 2, Erebti <i>woreda</i> is obvious. However, this is to let you know that the enumerators and their supervisors that came to collect data have done their work, and at the same time we are letting you know that there is no safety net program in our <i>Woreda</i>. <i>Stamped and signed by Ukban Humed, Chief woreda Administrator</i> <i>Note that there is some uncertainty as to whether this letter refers to the PSNP or solely to the Public Works component.</i></p>
<i>Kebele</i> qual survey	Was either KFSTF or KFDC interviewed	
	Could they describe targeting	
<i>Kebele</i> quant survey	Does KFSTF exist?	No
	Is there a list of PSNP participants	No
	Food was distributed under PSNP	No
	Food was distributed under drought relief in 2009	Yes, in 3 of 3 surveyed kebeles
	Food was distributed under drought relief from Jan-Jun 2010	Yes, in 3 of 3 surveyed kebeles
	Food was distributed under risk financing from Jan-Jun 2010	No
Comm. FGD on purpose of PSNP	DS beneficiaries	
	Women	
	Men	
	Non-beneficiaries	
Household quant	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP PW	No
	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP DS	No

Woreda: Megale (ID Number: 20204). No qual work undertaken in this *woreda*.

Data source	Topic or group interviewed	Response
<i>Woreda</i> qual data	Has WFSTF been established	
	Does WFSTF hold regular meetings?	
	Are minutes kept?	
	If no WFSTF, was <i>Woreda</i> Relief Committee (WRDC) interviewed?	
	Did WFSTF/WRDC describe targeting?	
<i>Woreda</i> quant survey	Was <i>woreda</i> -level questionnaire completed?	No. Following letter was sent to CSA: Subject: To let you know of the non existence of safety net program in the <i>woreda</i> Due to the non existence of the safety net program, our <i>Woreda</i> has remained backward in many development activities. Therefore, we respectfully request concerned bodies [of the Government] to look into this matter, and begin implementing the safety net program in our <i>Woreda</i> . <i>Stamp of Megalee Woreda</i> <i>Signed by Woreda Chief Administrator- Ahmed Saleh</i> Note that there is some uncertainty as to whether this letter refers to the PSNP or solely to the Public Works component.
<i>Kebele</i> qual survey	Was either KFSTF or KFDC interviewed	
	Could they describe targeting	
<i>Kebele</i> quant survey	Does KFSTF exist?	No
	Is there a list of PSNP participants	No
	Food was distributed under PSNP	No
	Food was distributed under drought relief in 2009	In 2 of 3 surveyed kebeles
	Food was distributed under drought relief from Jan-Jun 2010	In 2 of 3 surveyed kebeles
	Food was distributed under risk financing from Jan-Jun 2010	No
Comm. FGD on purpose of PSNP	DS beneficiaries	
	Women	
	Men	
	Non-beneficiaries	
Household quant	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP PW	No
	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP DS	No

Woreda: Dallol/Dalul (ID Number: 20206). No qual work undertaken in this *woreda*.

Data source	Topic or group interviewed	Response
<i>Woreda</i> qual data	Has WFSTF been established	
	Does WFSTF hold regular meetings?	
	Are minutes kept?	
	If no WFSTF, was Woreda Relief Committee (WRDC) interviewed?	
	Did WFSTF/WRDC describe targeting?	
<i>Woreda</i> quant survey	Was <i>woreda</i> -level questionnaire completed?	No. Following letter was sent to CSA: Subject: to let you know that Dallul <i>Woreda</i> is a non beneficiary of safety net program. Even though it is believed that there are many benefits of the safety net program to our <i>woreda</i> communities, starting such a program in our community requires the support of higher authorities. Since there has not been any safety net program in our <i>woreda</i> over the past years, [we] are unable to fill out most of the questionnaires that were sent to us. <i>Stamped and signed by Haji AhmedHabib Juhar, head of the ...(tsihifet bet)</i> <i>Note that there is some uncertainty as to whether this letter refers to the PSNP or solely to the Public Works component.</i>
<i>Kebele</i> qual survey	Was either KFSTF or KFDC interviewed	
	Could they describe targeting	
<i>Kebele</i> quant survey	Does KFSTF exist?	No
	Is there a list of PSNP participants	No
	Food was distributed under PSNP	No
	Food was distributed under drought relief in 2009	Yes, in 3 of 3 <i>kebeles</i>
	Food was distributed under drought relief from Jan-Jun 2010	Yes, in 1 of 3 <i>kebeles</i>
	Food was distributed under risk financing from Jan-Jun 2010	No
Comm. FGD on purpose of PSNP	DS beneficiaries	
	Women	
	Men	
	Non-beneficiaries	
Household quant	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP PW	No
	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP DS	No

Woreda: Bure Mudayitu (ID Number: 20305)

Data source	Topic or group interviewed	Response
Woreda qual data	Has WFSTF been established	No
	Does WFSTF hold regular meetings?	No
	Are minutes kept?	No
	If no WFSTF, was Woreda Relief Committee (WRDC) interviewed?	Yes
	Did WFSTF/WRDC describe targeting?	"The Woreda Relief distribution Committee is responsible for deciding the size of the quota for each <i>kebele</i> ." [AF-BM/WRDC/WFSTF]"
Woreda quant survey	Was woreda-level questionnaire completed?	No
Kebele qual survey	Was either KFSTF or KFDC interviewed	KFDC
	Could they describe targeting	Yes, "Targeting is made based on the clan. Everyone in the <i>kebele</i> is assisted. What matters is the amount of assistance they receive. The decision on the ration size depends on the size of the family."
Kebele quant survey	Does KFSTF exist?	No
	Is there a list of PSNP participants	No
	Food was distributed under PSNP	No
	Food was distributed under drought relief in 2009	Yes, in 3 of 3 surveyed <i>kebeles</i>
	Food was distributed under drought relief from Jan-Jun 2010	Yes, in 3 of 3 surveyed <i>kebeles</i>
	Food was distributed under risk financing from Jan-Jun 2010	No
Comm. FGD on purpose of PSNP	DS beneficiaries	We did not hear about its purpose. The <i>kebele</i> chairman selected us to get food.
	Women	We do not know about this, but we are getting the support as one of the <i>kebele</i> residents.
	Men	We do not know about it. It is the <i>kebele</i> chairman who knows this. We know only the assistance coming to our <i>kebele</i> .
	Non-beneficiaries	Not completed; just about everyone was receiving some assistance
Household quant	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP PW	No
	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP DS	No

Woreda: Ewa (ID Number: 20402)

Data source	Topic or group interviewed	Response
<i>Woreda</i> qual data	Has WFSTF been established	Yes, 2004
	Does WFSTF hold regular meetings?	No
	Are minutes kept?	Limited
	If no WFSTF, was <i>Woreda</i> Relief Committee (WRDC) interviewed?	n/a
	Did WFSTF/WRDC describe targeting?	"The <i>woreda</i> received a beneficiary quota from the region. The <i>woreda</i> divided the quota for all kebeles equally. The <i>kebele</i> FSTFs assigned clan leaders at the village level to lead household targeting at the grassroots."
<i>Woreda</i> quant survey	Was <i>woreda</i> -level questionnaire completed?	No. Following letter was sent to CSA: In the past years, we were not covered by Safety net program. But, in the meeting that was held in Ayisha, we were told that the program will start on Tir 2003(January 2011), and we are looking forward to it. <i>Stamped and signed by Ali Wede Ali, Deputy Woreda Administrator</i> <i>Note that there is some uncertainty as to whether this letter refers to the PSNP or solely to the Public Works component.</i>
<i>Kebele</i> qual survey	Was either KFSTF or KFDC interviewed	KFSTF
	Could they describe targeting	Yes, "the clan leader Dalla Aba (Sub <i>Kebele</i> structure) and KFSTF facilitated a discussion on targeting. Community members together identified who is poor, poorest of the poor and who is active and able to work."
<i>Kebele</i> quant survey	Does KFSTF exist?	No
	Is there a list of PSNP participants	No
	Food was distributed under PSNP	No
	Food was distributed under drought relief in 2009	No
	Food was distributed under drought relief from Jan-Jun 2010	No
	Food was distributed under risk financing from Jan-Jun 2010	No
Comm. FGD on purpose of PSNP	DS beneficiaries	To help elders, handicaps, disabled, orphans, pregnant, and the families with no animals as well as the people who are active and able to work for getting food in the form of PW.
	Women	Participate in Safety Net activities and get food aid in return but not aware the purpose.
	Men	PSNP serves the poor through DS and PW. Not all of us have equal understanding about PSNP. Some of us know it others do not.
	Non-beneficiaries	The purpose is supporting elders, disabled, orphans; and constructing ponds, roads, and area closures for pasture.
Household quant	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP PW	No
	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP DS	No

Woreda: Teru (ID Number: 20403)

Data source	Topic or group interviewed	Response
<i>Woreda</i> qual data	Has WFSTF been established	Yes, 2006
	Does WFSTF hold regular meetings?	Yes, every three months
	Are minutes kept?	Yes
	If no WFSTF, was <i>Woreda</i> Relief Committee (WRDC) interviewed?	n/a
	Did WFSTF/WRDC describe targeting?	-
<i>Woreda</i> quant survey	Was <i>woreda</i> -level questionnaire completed?	Yes
<i>Kebele</i> qual survey	Was either KFSTF or KFDC interviewed	KFSTF
	Could they describe targeting	Yes, stated that clans selected beneficiaries
<i>Kebele</i> quant survey	Does KFSTF exist?	Yes
	Is there a list of PSNP participants	Yes
	Food was distributed under PSNP	Yes
	Food was distributed under drought relief in 2009	Yes, in 1 of 3 surveyed <i>kebeles</i>
	Food was distributed under drought relief from Jan-Jun 2010	Yes, in 1 of 3 surveyed <i>kebeles</i>
	Food was distributed under risk financing from Jan-Jun 2010	Yes, in 1 of 3 surveyed <i>kebeles</i>
Comm. FGD on purpose of PSNP	DS beneficiaries	To help the poor and those who don't have anyone to help them
	Women	Is government donation that helps the poor, the poorest, the elders, blinds, widows and handicaps, orphans and people like us
	Men	PSNP taught us to engage in engage in labor works, which we were never used to do
	Non-beneficiaries	Benefit the poor, the elder, the disables and orphans
Household quant	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP PW	Yes
	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP DS	Yes

Woreda: Semurubia Gebele (ID Number: 20502)

Data source	Topic or group interviewed	Response
<i>Woreda</i> qual data	Has WFSTF been established	No
	Method of selecting members	No
	Regular meetings held?	No
	If no WFSTF, was <i>Woreda</i> Relief Committee (WRDC) interviewed?	Yes
	Did WFSTF/WRDC describe targeting?	
<i>Woreda</i> quant survey	Was <i>woreda</i> -level questionnaire completed?	No
<i>Kebele</i> qual survey	Was either KFSTF or KFDC interviewed	KFDC
	Could they describe targeting	Yes, stated that clans selected beneficiaries
<i>Kebele</i> quant survey	Does KFSTF exist?	No
	Is there a list of PSNP participants	No
	Food was distributed under PSNP	No
	Food was distributed under drought relief in 2009	No
	Food was distributed under drought relief from Jan-Jun 2010	No
	Food was distributed under risk financing from Jan-Jun 2010	No
Comm. FGD on purpose of PSNP	DS beneficiaries	We do not know
	Women	Do not know
	Men	We have not heard about safety net
	Non-beneficiaries	No interview because "almost all are benefitting from PSNP"
Household quant	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP PW	No
	Did any household receive payment for doing PSNP DS	No

Chapter 5: *Kebele* and Household Perspectives on Implementation

5.1 Introduction

The sustainability of any program—the PSNP included—depends in part on whether it is successfully implemented. As with Chapter 4, this chapter also focuses on implementation, but here the perspective is largely that of the *kebele* and the household. It considers the following topics. Are local administrative structures such as *Kebele* and Community Food Security Task Forces in existence and functioning as envisaged in the Program Implementation Manual? Are households aware of these Task Forces and do they understand how the PSNP is supposed to operate? Are there issues associated with access to distributions points? Have client cards been distributed?

5.2 *Kebele* Food Security Task Forces

All *kebeles* should have a Food Security Task Force (KFSTF). Tasks undertaken by the KFSTF include:

- Community mobilization activities so as to identify and prioritize community needs;
- Plan prioritized activities with community members;
- Targeting beneficiaries and participants for public works and direct support with input from the community;
- Prepare a *Kebele* Safety Net Plan in consultation with *woreda* sectoral offices;
- Maintaining minutes of KFSTF meetings on Safety Net issues, lists of participants, and progress reports;
- Establishing and training Community Food Security Task Forces; and
- Participating in the monitoring and evaluation of safety net activities (GFDRE 2010).

Tables 5.1 to 5.2 document the existence and activities of the KFSTF drawing on information collected as part of the community questionnaires.

Table 5.1 Composition of the *Kebele* Food Security Task Force (KFSTF), by region

Region	Number of <i>kebeles</i>	Number of KFSTF that contain:							
		Chairperson of <i>kebele</i> council	A member of the <i>kebele</i> council	An elected representative from elders		An elected representative from youth			
Afar	6	4	4	6		5			
Somali	23	13	16	17		14			
Number of elected representatives from women's groups									
Number of Development Agents									
		0	1	2	> 2	0	1	2	> 2
Afar	6	0	4	1	1	0	5	1	0
Somale	23	6	6	9	2	10	6	5	2

Source: Community questionnaire, 2010. Afar sample are *kebeles* found in Elidar and Teru *woredas*. Data from one *kebele* in Gursum *woreda*, Somali region is missing.

Table 5.2 *Kebele* Food Security Task Force (KFSTF) record keeping, by region

Region	Number of <i>kebeles</i>	Does the KFSTF keep:					
		Records or minutes of meetings?	Records or minutes of meetings and at least one was seen?	Progress reports of activities?	Progress reports of activities and at least one was seen?		
Afar	6	2	0	2	0		
Somali	23	13	2	15	0		
		Keep a list of:		When was the list of participants last updated?			
		Participants?	Participants and at least one was seen?	Not known	Before January 2010	January-September 2010	After September 2010
Afar	6	3	1	1	1	0	0
Somali	23	20	8	7	5	7	4

Source: Community questionnaire, 2010. Afar sample are *kebeles* found in Elidar and Teru *woredas*. Data from one *kebele* in Gursum *woreda*, Somali region is missing.

In both surveyed *woredas* in Afar (Elidar and Teru) and all *woredas* in Somali, *Kebele* FSTFs exist. Composition varies somewhat from what is specified in the PIM with the most notable case being that in Somali six out of 23 KFSTFs lack an elected representative from women's groups. As noted in chapter 4, there is confusion in Afar about the role of the KFSTFs. During workshop discussions, regional officials indicated that these, or similar structures, did in fact exist, but that their role was much more limited than that specified in the PIM. Further, they indicated that beneficiary lists were often passed up to the *woreda* level which would explain why they were not available when the locality level interviews were carried out.

Qualitative interviews with KFSTFs were undertaken to assess understanding of PSNP objectives. Their responses included the following:

- A means to help poor people through direct support and public works mechanisms for their survival,
- A development program that creates local infrastructures and develops rangeland,
- A way of promoting work culture in the community, and
- Get people get out of poverty and become self-sufficient

These suggest some basic understanding of the objectives of the PSNP. However, closer examination of their responses suggested that detailed knowledge was variable.

Safety Net is a means for helping poor people through DS and PW mechanism. People including elders and the blind get free food. Those who have labor get paid by contributing labor in PW. [A-Ew/K-FG-1]

Safety Net is a development program that constructs access to road and improves rangeland. It is a joint development program between the government and the local community. [Af-Tr/K-FG-1]

It is assistance to the people by providing employment and food. It's objective is to get people out of poverty and become self-sufficient in food. [Sm-Hd/K-FG-1]

The main objective of the Safety Net is to assist people to survive food insecure people. It has also other objectives including promoting work culture among community members; creating community ownership on local development; and helping the community to become self sufficient in food. [Sm-Sh/K-FG-1]

Safety Net is a food for work program that helps people to access food. Some of the beneficiaries participate in PWs and get supported. These people eventually graduate from the program after 5 years. Others who have no labor receive free food. [Or-My/K-FG-1]

Key informant interviews with DAs also revealed varied understandings, particularly among those interviewed in Afar where it is confused with emergency relief support. DAs did not reveal any knowledge of the household asset protection and market stimulation roles of PSNP. The following quotations provide a good sense of how DAs perceive the objectives of the PSNP:

To get people out of dependency on aid and improve their lives by providing income to our community. [Af-El/K-KI-2]

It is a program that supports poor people by involving them in public work activities. [Af-Tr/K-KI-2]

Safety Net is a component of the Food Security Program. It provides the community with improved seeds of like maize and vegetables and animal health activities. [Af-Bm/K-FG-2]

To teach the people how to work and the other purpose is to help the elderly, aged and very sick people. [Sm-Do/K-KI-2]

The objective is to help the poor people. It provides employment opportunity for those capable to work in order to help themselves without being dependent on government food aid in the future. [Sm-Hd/K-KI-2]

Safety Net helps the community by providing food for labor contribution in public works that would give service to the community. It enables the community to be food secure. [Or-My/K-KI-1]

To, help the poor to improve their living conditions through PWs whereby they will be given food or cash. [Or-Sw/K-KI-2]

5.3 Beneficiary and non-beneficiary understanding of the PSNP

Understanding of the PSNP at the household level relies on effective, Community Food Security Task Forces (CFSTF), whose roles are to:

- Identify potential participants for the PSNP;
- Undertake needs assessments so as to identify those households who can participate in public works and those without sufficient labor or other support who will need direct support;
- Ensure that the proposed list of participants is commented on and endorsed by the general meeting of the village residents;
- Finalize the list of participants and submit it to the KFSTF;
- Prepare a pipeline of projects; and
- Monitor periodically public works projects to ensure that they are undertaken as prioritized.

Table 5.3 summarizes household data on awareness of CFSTFs and the extent to which there has been contact with them (Table 5.4).

Table 5.3 Household knowledge of the role of the Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF), by region and beneficiary status

	Afar	Somali
Percentage of households who indicated that one purpose of the CFSTF was to mobilize the community for public works		
PSNP beneficiary	41	59
Non-beneficiary	0	28
Percentage of households who indicated that one purpose of the CFSTF was to identify individuals to participate in public works		
PSNP beneficiary	39	19
Non-beneficiary	0	10
Percentage of households who indicated that one purpose of the CFSTF was to identify direct support beneficiaries		
PSNP beneficiary	27	14
Non-beneficiary	0	9
Percentage of households who indicated that one purpose of the CFSTF was to monitor public works activities		
PSNP beneficiary	41	42
Non-beneficiary	0	19

Source: Household questionnaire, 2010. Afar sample are respondents found in Teru *woreda* only.

Table 5.4 Household contact with the Community Food Security Task Force (CFSTF), by region, year, and beneficiary status

PSNP beneficiary status:	Afar	Somali
	(percent)	
	Aware that the CFSTF exists	
Non-beneficiary	4	42
Public Works	77	74
Direct Support	–	60
Public Works and Direct Support	–	83
	Aware that the CFSTF exists and had contact with the CFSTF	
Non-beneficiary	0	38
Public Works	54	73
Direct Support	–	50
Public Works and Direct Support	–	60

Source: Household questionnaire, 2010. Afar sample are respondents found in Teru *woreda* only. Direct Support results are excluded for Afar as there were less than five respondents.

About half of PSNP PW beneficiaries in Teru (Afar) had had contact with their KFSTF as had nearly three-quarters of PSNP PW beneficiaries in Somali. Contact rates were lower among those receiving Direct Support and non-beneficiaries. The principle contact, however, would appear to be the mobilization of labor and the monitoring of work on public works activities. Knowledge that the CFSTF was supposed to identify beneficiaries was low.

We complement the quantitative data with information taken from the qualitative study. Discussions were held with 44 community groups including women, men, direct support and non-beneficiaries to assess their understanding of the PSNP. The responses of these community groups are found summarized in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5 Understanding of the PSNP, summary of FGDs

Region	Woreda	Men	Women	Direct Support	Non Beneficiary
Afar	Elidar	It brings food security.	We dug water holes and construct roads and we get food aid for our work.	Do not know purpose, only mentioned activities.	Heard about it as not free food distribution but food for work.
	Ewa	PSNP serves the poor through DS and PW. Not everyone has equal understanding. Some of us know it others do not.	Participate in Safety Net activities and get food aid in return but not aware the purpose.	To help elders, handicaps, disabled, orphans, pregnant, and the families with no animals as well as people who are active and able to work for getting food in the form of PW.	The purpose is supporting elders, disabled, orphans, and constructing ponds, roads, and area closures for pasture.
	Teru	PSNP taught us to engage in engage in labor works, which we never used to do	Is government donation that helps the poor, the poorest, elders, blinds, widows and handicaps, orphans and people like us.	To help the poor and those who don't have anyone to help them.	Benefit the poor, elders, the disabled and orphans.
Somali	Dolo Odo	It is work that we do: dig water wholes and maintain roads. It supports poor people.	We didn't hear about the name PSNP but we call the program as food for work.	Heard it is a means of support for the poor. But we do not know much about it.	People call it food for work
	Gursum	Purpose is development, to help people while they are involved in development activities and so that people don't leave the country.	It is support provided for the poor. It helps us not to sell our assets to buy food.	Do not know.	It is government support (they didn't understand that much about the program). It is intended for the poor, especially those who cannot work and earn.
	Hudet	It is a support from the government to help people while they do community works which improves the productivity of area. Poor and laborless are direct beneficiaries.	Support for the poor or helpless by participating in labor works.	We know the safety net from Oromiya region. It helps poor people.	Food for work payments. Assistance to the poor and laborless, very aged people and the handicapped.
	Shinile	It is an assistance or food aid (<i>Gargar</i>) to poor and sick (<i>most of the participants not clear</i>).	Helps the poor to get food for their families.	It is a food aid from the government. Safety net helps the poor who have labor and cannot work.	It helps the poor through food for work and free food to the sick, old, female-headed households and the disabled. We call it the " <i>New project</i> ".
Oromiya	Moyale	We know the Safety Net. It helps the poor through work. They told us to work and get food.	The objective of safety net is food aid and hunger prevention for the poor. It allows people with labor to work and receive payment while weak people that cannot work such as the elderly and the disabled get paid for free.	It is a government help to the poor and to those who can't work.	It helps the poor to survive.
	Saweyna	It is food assistance. Weak and disabled get free food and those who can work get by contributing labor. It helps overcome drought and help the poorest. It is government support to the poor.	We know the Safety Net Programme. It is to help people that are poor and have food shortage.	A support to poor and weak people through labor contribution or for free.	Safety Net is source of living and a means to prevent sale of cows and other animals, so that people can produce more and live better life in the future.

Source: Compiled from FGDs, 2010.

The following points summarize FGDs understanding of the PSNP:

- A source of livelihood or survival for the poor (17 FGD);
- A safety net that targets poor people through public works if they have labor or free support if they have no labor (14 FGD);
- A food-for-work program (6 FGD);
- A gift from the government for the poor people (2 FGD);
- Teaches people how to participate in public works for local development (2 FGD);
- A means to protect household assets (1 FGD); and
- Do not know (8 FGD);

Focus group participants largely perceive the PSNP as a social service providing a transfer. This may reflect their experience with earlier relief activities such as the Employment Generation Scheme, whereby about 80 percent of food insecure communities were paid through food-for-work schemes. Public works activities are largely seen as a means for payment than the creation of community infrastructures that protect and promote livelihoods. Missing is an understanding of the objectives of the PSNP in terms of asset protection and market promotion. In Afar, understanding of the PSNP was particularly weak.

Responses to the question, “How well informed were you about how assistance is allocated” triangulates these FG reports as seen by Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Household perceptions of knowledge of how assistance was allocated, Afar and Somali

How well informed were you about how assistance was allocated?	Non-beneficiary	Beneficiary	All
Afar			
Was well informed	0.0	10.9	9.5
Had some idea	0.0	29.7	25.7
Had no idea	100.0	59.4	64.8
Number of observations	10	64	74
Somali			
Was well informed	9.9	20.0	17.4
Had some idea	14.2	32.0	27.5
Had no idea	75.9	48.0	55.1
Number of observations	162	471	633

Source: Household questionnaire, 2010. Afar sample are respondents found in Teru *woreda*.

5.4 Access to payment sites

The location of food collection points is determined based on the availability and dispersion of stores in the sampled *woredas*. In Teru and Eldiar *woredas* (Afar), there are four food payment points in each *woreda*. In Moyale (Oromiya), there are six collection points but only one in Seweyna (Oromiya). In Somali region, it was reported that payment collection points are found at the *kebele* centres.

Distance travelled to collect PSNP food payment varies between regions and *woredas*, depending on the location of the food distribution site. In focus groups, participants reported that they travel anywhere between half an hour and up to five hours to reach the distribution site to collect their food payment.¹⁴ In Somali, reported times varied from half an hour to one full day to reach the payment centre. In the two Oromiya *woredas*, reports ranged from 1.5 to ten hours. Respondents in Seweyna noted that their travel times were especially long.

We receive here in this village but there are people from other villages who travel up to 10 hours. 10 hours? Yes up to 10 hours because other *kebeles* also receive their food payment from here in this *kebele*. You have to know that this distribution centre is not only for our *kebele* there are more than eight to nine *kebeles* who come here to get their food payments. *Kebeles* are large and highly dispersed. ... It is the only distribution centre for the dry season. In the rainy season we also have to go to Micha (*woreda* capital) which is 35 Km from here, to receive food. When we receive in Micha, we have to stay and wait for some time. At such times we will be forced to sell part of the food for covering expenses while waiting for the payment.... [ORO-S/FG-4]

The typical mode of transport is the pack animal and 'human shoulder. People use donkeys to transport food payments. The men's-only focus group in Dolo Odo (Somali) stated that the use of vehicles is rare." Those who can pay can use car which costs 120 shillings. Others use donkeys. We use donkeys but others borrow donkeys from us to collect their food." [SM-D/FG-4] Focus group participants were asked whether they are paying or being assisted by someone to transport their food payments. It was only in Dolo Odo that men reported that they pay someone else to collect the food payment. Certainly, we pay someone to help us in collecting food and we normally pay 20 to 30 birr to the person who helped us. [SM-D/FG-3]

Direct support beneficiaries were more likely to report relying on relatives or neighbors to collect their food payments. They gave the following reasons: difficulties in waiting very long hours at the food collection points; delays in delivery at the collection points; lack of transport to their villages; and the distance they had to travel.

We pay for laborers to collect the transfer a minimum of 5.00 birr. This is a difficult for us. We stay on sun (hot) waiting for the transfer paid to us. [AF-EW/FG-1]

Yes, we experienced problems like waiting for long time at a collection point. We wait for people to check attendance. [AF-T/FG-1]

The problem is the collection point is far and some of us do not have someone to support and do not have donkey to transport the food to our homes. [S-D/FG-1]

¹⁴ Questions of access to payment sites in the quantitative household survey were inadvertently dropped. This will be rectified in the next survey.

Three FGDs in Somalia and two in Oromiya reported that they did not face difficulties in collecting their food payment. In Moyale, it was stated:

We don't pay anyone to collect the food. We can send a relative or neighbor if we cannot go and collect by ourselves. You can see we don't have energy so other community members help us by collecting our food and bringing to our houses. [ORO-M/FG-1]

When Direct Support beneficiaries were able to collect payment themselves, they reported that the KFSTF were pleasant and helpful in facilitating food payment collection. They indicated that there was no problem in getting their support to facilitate the collection.

Woreda and *kebele* officials were asked if collecting payments interfered with herding activities. Ten out of eleven claimed that it did not interfere with herding patterns. One key informant stated:

The collection point does not interfere with the herding patterns because not everyone moves with livestock The family members that are remaining at home will collect the transfer. [AF-T/W-KI-2]

The one exception was Shinile where it was noted that:

When people migrate in search of water and pasture, the distance they travel to the distribution centre increases, so it interferes with the herding patterns. In this respect we need to establish more distribution centers. [S-S/W-KI-2]

5.5 Timeliness and predictability of payments

Only four out of 33 focus groups knew when they would receive their next payment, see Table 5.7. The quotations below give a sense of how much beneficiaries knew about when their payments would be made:

We do not know the time for next pay. What we know is the amount of payment that reaches us. [AF-T/FG-4]

No we don't know, nobody told us. Yes we know how much we will get it is 15 Kg per person per month. [ORO_M/FG-3]

"We do not know when we will be paid.-We do not even know whether we are going to be paid or not. [ORO-S/FG-1]

We didn't receive for six month now and no one knows when it will come. [SM-D/FG-1]

The *woreda* administration itself does not know when it will come when we ask them they don't tell us anything. [SM-H/FG-1]

Table 5.7 Predictability of payment dates and quantities to be received

Type of FGD	Region	Number of FGD	Do you know when you will receive your next payment?		Do you know the quantity of food payment will be?	
			Yes	No	Yes	No
Men	Afar	5	2	3	3	2
	Oromiya	2	1	1	2	-
	Somali	4	-	4	1	3
	Subtotal	11	3	8	6	5
Women	Afar	5	-	5	1	4
	Oromiya	2	-	2	1	1
	Somali	4	-	4	4	-
	Subtotal	11	-	11	6	5
Direct Support	Afar	5	1	4	1	4
	Oromiya	2	-	2	2	-
	Somali	4	-	4	4	-
	Sub total	11				
	All	33	4	29	19	14

Source: Compiled from FGDs, 2010.

Focus groups were also asked whether they know the quantity of food they would receive. Responses were mixed (see above). Nineteen groups indicated that they knew how much they would receive, the remaining 14 did not.

We do not know the next pay and do not know how much we get. This is because we are not directly collecting the food. The clan leaders first receive from the government and then they in turn give us. As a result, they give us 100kg per month for some months and 50kg for another. [AF-EW/FG-3]

We don't know how much it will be. [AF-EW/FG-1]

Yes we know it from our experience, the quantity and quality of the food payments is all the same. [SM-D/FG-3]

We know how much we will receive; it is 15 Kg per person per month as before. [ORO-M/FG-1]

5.6 Client cards

An important innovation in the newest phase of the PSNP has been the provision of client cards. These cards serve several functions. They are a means of allowing beneficiaries to keep track of payments they receive while also providing a brief summary of important features of the program. Client cards are supposed to be free.

As of June 2010, in the Highland regions, there had been only a limited roll-out of client cards. This is also true in Afar and Somali. No *kebeles* in Afar reported distributing cards and only seven out of 23 *kebeles* in Somali had done so. In three of these *kebeles*, it was reported

that a small fee, two Birr, was charged. It is possible, however, that this cost was for the photograph that goes on the card and not the card itself.

5.7 Summary

This chapter examines the implementation of the PSNP from the perspective of *kebeles* and households. Key findings are:

- In all *woredas* where the quantitative survey was fielded, *Kebele* FSTFs exist. Composition varies somewhat from what is specified in the PIM with the most notable case being that in Somali six out of 23 KFSTFs lack an elected representative from women's groups.
- There is confusion in Afar about the role of the KFSTFs. During workshop discussions, regional officials indicated that these, or similar structures, did in fact exist, but that their role was much more limited than that specified in the PIM. Further, they indicated that beneficiary lists were often passed up to the *woreda* level which would explain why they were not available when the locality level interviews were carried out.
- While KFSTFs had general knowledge of the purpose of the PSNP, more specific understanding was lacking.
- Both quantitative and qualitative data sources indicate that households' have a relatively poor understanding of the objectives of the PSNP, seeing it largely as a transfer mechanism. In Afar, understanding of the PSNP was particularly weak.
- Distance travelled to payment sites varies from 30 minutes to one full day. Problems in accessing payment sites are compounded by long waits at the collection point and the absence of transport. Particular problems were noted in Seweyna where a single payment point was reported to serve nine *kebeles*.
- It is perceived that the payment process does not interfere with herding patterns.
- There is almost no knowledge of when payments will be received and limited knowledge of how much a household will get.
- Client cards had been distributed in only seven out of 23 *kebeles* in Somali. No *kebeles* in Afar reported distributing cards.

Chapter 6: Targeting

6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines targeting processes for the PSNP in the lowlands. Compared to the highlands, there is greater variation in targeting practices in the lowlands due to differences in the livelihoods of client groups and institutional set-up and capacity at the *woreda* and *kebele* levels. The chapter considers regional and *woreda* perspectives on targeting. It assesses how targeting is completed at the *kebele* and household levels, considering such as the participation of women in targeting processes, targeting of polygamous households, and inclusion/exclusion errors in targeting.

6.2 Regional Perspectives

Regional officials explained that relief histories (caseload numbers) and bi-annual food security assessments of population, rainfall and drought conditions are used to identify *woredas* and determine quotas for these. In Afar, “We used to have direct support/emergency relief beneficiaries prior to the introduction of the PWs program. In that program we already had identified beneficiaries, but we refined the number in each *kebele* level again and discovered that there are a total of 472,229 beneficiaries. Therefore, from that number we decided who should be involved in the public works and who should be in the direct support” [AF-R/KI-2].

In Somali, a regional official explained:

The process of targeting in our region has the following steps: First, the regional DPP Office collects the relief history of the *woreda* on the size of the beneficiary population. This is submitted to the federal government. Then, the federal government approves the number submitted by the *woredas* (through the regional level) and federal officials allocate a quota to the region. Finally, regional officials determine a quota for each *woreda*. *Woreda* officials determine a quota for *kebeles*. [SM-R/KI-1]

At the household level, the targeting principles stated in the most recent PIM were based on experiences in implementing the PSNP in the Highlands. Some regional officials indicated that they were drawing on these as well as experiences with the PSNP Pastoral Area Pilot (PSNP-PAP). “PSNP is a new program in our region, we started it recently. Our starting point is the highland experience, but in the process we are improving the targeting approach. We are also applying the experience from Teru *woreda* where the PSNP pilot was carried out” [AF-R/KI-1]. However, given the very different social and livelihood settings in the lowlands, regional officials were asked to describe what if any adjustments they had made in their targeting approaches.

One issue that arose was the difficulty of targeting nomadic households. In Somali, it was noted that some eligible nomadic households were excluded due to their movements at the time targeting was being done:

Limited beneficiary quota as compared to the extent of food insecure population is the challenge of targeting in our region. Moreover, there are some poor people excluded from PSNP due to migration in search of feed and water for livestock, and food for family consumption at the time of targeting. [SM-R/KI-1]

A widespread issue was the need to account for what was described as accounting for community values and customary norms. This was reflected, in part, by the inclusion of community leaders (i.e., elders, important local opinion-makers) in selecting beneficiaries.

There is no major difference in the targeting approach being used in highland and pastoral areas. However, in pastoral areas, customary leaders are heavily involved in targeting. [OR-R/KI-1]

Yes, there were adaptations in targeting approach in practice. For example, community values-based have been considered during household targeting. However, we did not develop specific guideline or the modified version of targeting. [SM-R/KI-1]

According to officials in all regions, the most significant targeting conundrum relates to the culture of sharing in pastoralist societies.¹⁵ In Afar, regional officials stressed the limitations of understanding and addressing food insecurity as a household issue since customary values of sharing and extending support remain strong, even if it means that only limited amounts can be given to each household:

In our society especially in rural areas there is a resource sharing culture. Moreover, there are no significant wealth variations among a majority of the community members. Thus, in our case we believe that food security can be realized at the community level not at the household level as it is stated in the program document (PSNP PIM). When it comes to Afar food security has to be viewed in this way. In Afar almost everything is communal. [A-R/KI-1]

6.3 Woreda perspectives

In Afar, targeting at the *woreda* level is based on a quota provided by regional authorities. This is allocated either by: giving an equal allocation to each *kebele*; allocating resources proportional to a *kebele's* population size; or by allocating based on population size and level of vulnerability to food insecurity.¹⁶ In Buremudaitu and Ewa *woredas*, equal allocations were made so as to avoid disputes:

¹⁵ This has implications for graduation. It also means that the implementation of full family targeting has been challenging. An official in Oromiya commented: "People share whatever they are getting. Thus, full family targeting is difficult." [OR-R/KI-1]

¹⁶ We have this qualitative information for five *woredas* in Afar. Dubti could not provide this information.

Previously the distribution to the *kebeles* was based on the size of the needy population but as this approach created a dispute between *kebeles* currently the relief is equally distributed to all *kebeles* in the *woreda*. [AF-B/FG-1]

The *woreda* received a beneficiary quota from the region. The *woreda* divided the quota for all *kebeles* equally. The *kebele* FSTFs assigned clan leaders at the village level to lead household targeting at the grassroots. [AF-Ewa/WFSTF]

In Eldiar, the *kebele* quota was proportional to the size of the population of a respective *kebele*. This approach was also taken in Seweyna in Oromiya, and Hudet in Somali. The third approach, using both population size and the estimated size of the chronically food insecure population to determine different quotas for different *kebeles* is followed in Moyale in Oromiya, Teru and Semurobi in Afar, and Shinile, Dolo Odo and Gursum in Somali. However, as the quotations below suggest, it is not always clear how food insecurity has been assessed.

The *woreda* beneficiary quota was divided for *kebeles* based on their population size and food insecurity problem. [AF-T/W-FG-1]

We know all the *kebeles*. The level of problem is not the same they don't have the same population size. Even if you consider them as pastoral and farming areas they are not the same. So we considered these issues when we were giving quotas to each *kebele*. Actually the community was told about the number of beneficiaries they have, no further explanation was made to them. [SM-D/W-FG-1]

Beneficiary allocation for *kebeles* was made based on the level of poverty as well as relief history in the *kebeles*. Similarly, beneficiary allocation for villages follows a similar process. [SM-G/W-FG-1]

The allocation is based on the severity of food insecurity in the *kebele*. [Or-My/W-FG-1]

There is limited understanding of PSNP targeting principles among *woreda*-level officials and consequently, little systematic orientation is provided to *kebele* officials and clan leaders. Of the six Afar *woredas* included in the qualitative study, officials in only two (Teru and Eldiar) had received training on the PSNP. Consequently, household targeting was not carried out following the PIM in Buremudaitu, Dubti and Semurobi *woredas*, where the pre-existing WRDC structures assign the responsibility of targeting to the KRDC and clan leaders. According to *woreda* officials in these areas, the *kebele* committee hands over the food to the clan, whose leaders determine which households are needy and what amount particular households should receive. In general, *woreda* officials were confident that this targeting process was done fairly. Yet, it was evident from discussions with *woreda* officials in Buremudaitu, Dubti and Semurobi that as they were not fully involved in selecting beneficiaries that they lacked adequate knowledge to minimize exclusion and inclusion errors. As explanation for these shortcomings, officials explained that PSNP structures and procedures were still being introduced:

We simply assign the assistance to the *kebele*. Then the *Kebele* Relief Distribution Committee and the clan leaders distribute the relief according to their own criteria. The clan leaders decide based on the problems of every household in their clan. The clan leaders are thinking like a single family. They even see who is facing a specific problem. [Af-Bm/W-FG1 WRDC]

We simply assign a quota to *kebeles* and the *kebele* distribution committee and the clan leaders distribute the relief according to their criteria. After the *kebele* committee assigns food relief to a clan, the clan leaders then decide who is targeted based on the problems of every household in their clan. [AF-BR/WRDC]

The food aid resource is coming to this *woreda* in the name of Safety Net Programme, but the proper safety net is not implemented yet. As a preparatory measure we have formed FSTFs both at the *woreda* and *kebele* levels and finalized household selection for the program. When the budget is released and experts are assigned to our *woreda*, we will properly launch the safety net program this year. [Af-Db/W-FG1 WRDC]

This reflected, in part, an absence of training. I know in other Safety Net *woredas* like Gulina (in Afar) where my friends are working the first thing is training. The DAs first got training before implementing the program. Here in our *woreda* there is no training, so far. [AF-B/K-FG-2]

There is no training provided to me. There is some guideline at the *woreda* level on whom and how many PSNP beneficiaries to select. [AF-S/K-KI-1]

Training was provided neither to WFSTF nor to KFSTF members. [AF-EW/W-FG-1]

By contrast, in Somali, officials in three of four *woredas* reported having received some training on targeting.¹⁷

We gave the *kebeles* the guidelines and organized awareness creation meetings. No training was given but it will be organized to provide the training on how to implement the PSNP including targeting. [SM-S/W-FG-1]

Targeting training was provided for KFSTF members. [SM-G/W-FG-1]

In Somali and Oromiya Regions, experience from the PSNP PAP as well as this training and the presence of NGOs involved in implementing the PSNP have helped inform *woreda* officials of targeting principles, eligibility criteria and their implementation:

¹⁷ By contrast, in both *woredas* visited in Oromiya, officials reported having participated in repeated training. Community members have also participated in awareness-raising events on targeting processes.

During the re-targeting we used a combination of administrative and community targeting approaches. We asked communities to select trusted individuals to participate in targeting. Then we divided them into three groups. Each group selected the people they consider to be poorer. They were given a quota. Then we brought the groups together and asked them to read the names of the people they selected. As a first choice we selected those households whose names appeared in all three groups. Then we went for those who appeared only in two groups. [SO-DO/WFSTF]

We followed a four step process during targeting. In the first step, the WFSTF visited *kebeles* to raise awareness of the targeting process. In the second step the WFSTF mandated the KFSTFs, DAs and clan leaders to select eligible households. In the third step the community discussed potential beneficiaries and endorsed the list. The fourth step involved sending the final PSNP beneficiary list endorsed by the community to the *woreda* for approval. [SO-GR/WFSTF]

The latest re-targeting was done as per the guidelines in the PIM. In the first place the poorest were targeted. It was done with full community participation. It is based on wealth status of households starting from the poorest of the poor. [OR-MY/WFSTF]

6.4 Kebele Perspectives

In Afar, officials stated that the number of beneficiaries and the size of transfer per household are determined by clan leaders who work closely with the KFDC or KFSTF, both of which include the *kebele* chairperson and DAs. In workshop discussions with regional and *woreda* officials, it was stressed that while traditional leaders play a key role, they are not supposed to supplant formal targeting structures. Development agents serve as interlocutors between the *woreda* and *kebele*. In *woredas* where KFSTFs had not been established, pre-existing relief structures coordinated targeting with local leaders:

We have a representative from each clan and they select the pastoralists to carry out the selection of beneficiaries. [Af-BM/K-KI-1-KRDC]

Targeting is made based on the clan. Everyone in the *kebele* is assisted. What matters is the amount of assistance they receive. The decision on the ration size depends on the size of the family. Larger families or families raising orphaned children get more assistance. For households with sick members, sometimes we give them more grains and help them to get to the health center. They can sell the grain and use the money for medical purposes. The clan determines who needs assistance the most. [Af-BM/K-KI-2-DA]

We distribute the relief based on a household's livestock holdings and the size of the family. We give more grain to larger households but that have small herds or no livestock at all. Larger households with large herds receive smaller rations. [Af-SR/K-KI-2-DA]

The *Woreda* Pastoral Development Office told us to do something, to work for food. But we had no understanding on the purpose, plan and design of the work. Those who are able to work and were interested were selected in a community meeting called by the *kebele* administration and DA. Obviously, if an individual has assets then he is not included. We selected those who have nothing. [Af-SR-K-KI-2-DA]

Targeting at the *kebele* level is organized more formally in Ewa, Eldiar and Teru *woredas* where KFSTFs had been established. There, community members were involved in selecting members of Targeting Committees, which were responsible for identifying beneficiary households at the *kushet* (sub-*kebele*) level.

A community gathering was called, in which the clan leader Dalla Aba (*sub-kebele* structure) and KFSTF facilitated a discussion on targeting. Community members together identified who is poor, poorest of the poor and who is active and able to work. [Af-EW/K-KI-1-KFSTF]

Targeting was conducted by the *Kebele* targeting committee. The *Kebele* level clan leader, who is also member of the *Kebele* FSTF and targeting committees, has played a key role in targeting. The sub clan leaders at the village level screened potential beneficiaries and provided the list to the *Kebele* Targeting Committee through the *Kebele* level clan leader for approval. Mobility was considered during the targeting process to ensure that nomadic households were fairly included in the screening process. The whole process was overseen by the *Kebele* FSTF. Beneficiaries were selected based on their livestock holdings. Those with few or no animals were selected." [Af-TR/K-KI-1-KFSTF]

KFSTF are responsible for targeting. It is done by ranking community members as being poor, poorest of the poor or other. This is determined according to guidelines and the number of animals owned by a household. [Af-TR/K-KI-2-DA]

Elderly, weak, blind, sick but poor households were registered to receive the transfer freely while those who are poor and can work were registered for public works. Then the PSNP list was prepared. There is a taskforce at the *kebele* level to do all of this. This taskforce assigned foremen for the villages while the DA was assigned by the *woreda* office. The foremen were trained by the *woreda* officials. The taskforce is supervising public works and payments on a monthly basis. [Af-TR/K-KI-1-KFSTF]

In Somali, targeting was carried out through the KFSTF with the support of DAs as the following quotation indicates:

We were told (by the *woreda*) to establish the KFSTF and *Kebele* Appeals Committee. Then one DA was sent to help the KFSTF to select the beneficiaries based on the program criteria. We (KFSTF and DA) went to each person's house and checked what he/she has. Based on the quota we were given from the *woreda*, we identified beneficiaries. The KFSTF knew better than us who is the poor in each community. [Sm-Gr/K-KI-2-DA]

The FSTF divided the *kebele* beneficiary quota among villages based on the village population. Two representatives from each village (a clan representative and village administrator) together with the KFSTF carried out the household screening based on livestock holdings. [Sm-Gr/K-KI-1-KFSTF]

We created awareness by holding a community meeting. Community members and elders helped to prepare the list. A *woreda* representative was present when we were preparing the list. First we prepared village lists and finally we called a general community meeting and read out the names of potential beneficiaries. [Sm-Sn/K-KI-1-KFSTF]

In Oromiya, *kebele*-level informants explained that targeting of PSNP beneficiaries was done in community meetings. All members of the community were invited to attend and asked to identify poorer people to receive PSNP support. This task was led by the KFSTF:

Targeting was done at *kebele*-level meetings. We started from people who have nothing and those that have few livestock. The list was prepared in this way and passed to the *woreda*. [Or-My/K-KI-1-KFSTF]

The targeting was done at community meetings using the quota given by the *woreda*. The targeting was done after the KFSTF was trained by the *woreda* experts and we in turn trained community representatives. Every member of the *kebele* participated in the targeting process. [Or-My/K-KI-2-DA]

The *woreda* gave us a beneficiary quota. Then we called a community meeting and explained the purpose of the safety net and the targeting criteria. Based on the criteria, the community was given the chance to name people that are poor and experience food shortages. The names were registered only if the community agrees that he/she should be included. The lists of the names are taken based on wealth levels starting from the poorest of the poor until the quota is filled. [Or-My/K-KI-1-KFSTF]

6.5 Participation of women in targeting processes

Do women participate in the process of selecting beneficiaries? This question was explored in women's focus groups in Afar, Somali and Oromiya. In both Oromiya *woredas*, women indicated that they did take part.

We were fully involved in the selection of Safety Net beneficiaries. We are part of the community and we participate as other community members do. Our voices are heard very well. We can say what we feel is correct and it is considered. We are all given equal opportunity. [ORO-M/FG-3]

We were present in the meeting during beneficiary selection. We voted on a decision on whether a specific household should be included or not. [ORO-S/FG-3]

In Afar and Somali, women's participation was generally – though not always – much more limited.

We are not as involved in selecting beneficiaries as are men. The village clan leaders often call and discuss with men. On the rare occasion that they'll call us, we do not have the time to meet with them as we have many household responsibilities at home. Water fetching alone takes up much of our time (up to 7 hours a day). [AF-EW/FG-3]

Not much. We don't have that much voice in selecting beneficiaries. We don't have a representative in the KFSTF and Appeals Committee. [AF-T/FG-3]

As I know, no attention was given to us in our *kebele*. Nobody ever listens to us, including when beneficiaries are being selected. We are uneducated people. Who wants us for a discussion? Nobody. [SM-D/FG-3]

Everything having to do with the safety net is dominated by men. [SM-H/FG-3]

Exceptions to this were found in Eldiar (Afar) and Shinile (Somali). A woman in a focus group in Shinile stated:

We are heard and we are members of the community. Yes we have expressed our opinions in different occasions. I'm the head of a family and I told them that I cannot work. I have small children so I am allowed free food. We all expressed our views. There are individuals who were included in the safety net on the basis of women's suggestions. [SM-S/FG-3]

6.6 Targeting of polygamous households

The PIM indicates that in the case of polygamous households, the household should be treated as the man, one wife and their children, while other co-wives and their children are registered

separately as female-headed households. Community focus groups indicate that, in practice, polygamous households are treated in one of three ways across the twelve *woredas* surveyed:

- (a) Targeting as per the PIM, reported in four *woredas*;
- (b) The husband registers with one of the wives and her children while the other wives are excluded (three *woredas*); or
- (c) The husband and all his wives and children are registered as one household (five *woredas*).

In Moyale and Sawenya (Oromiya), Eldiar in Afar, and Shinile in Somali, polygamous household are targeted according to rules set out in the PIM:

They are registered as separate households. Each wife is evaluated against other households based on the property they have. Mostly the second or the third wives are selected as they have no wealth compared to the older wives. If the senior wife is also poor she can be included in the emergency assistance, if not in the PSNP. In most cases, senior wives have children to help them, whereas the younger ones may have small children that need help. [ORO-M/FG-3]

The man registered with one of his wives and the rest registered as female-headed households with their children. [AF-EL/FG-4]

He (the head of the polygamous family) may be included or excluded depending on the criteria. I'm a good example to your question. I have two wives. The first wife has nine children and no property. But the second wife has eight children and four cows. So I'm targeted with my first wife and her children. [ORO-S/FG-4]

In Buremudaitu, Semurobi and Dubti in Afar, all wives and children in a polygamous household receive the PSNP transfer under the name of the household head, the husband:

The assistance is for the household and in the name of the husband. If he has two wives he will be given accordingly but the two wives are not registered separately. Mainly the women are responsible to collect the assistance. Young children also can be represented by the family and can collect the assistance for the family. [AF-B/FG-4]

Only the husbands get registered. He registers the number of wives (homes) and he will receive for all his wives and children. If for instance a person having one wife gets one sack of grain, a person with two wives will get two sacks of grain. [AF-S/FG-3]

Polygamous households get support based on the size/amount of support available for the community as a whole. If the available support is small they

get one container only (50 kg). If the available support is more than there is enough for each wife to receive separately. But in both cases the resource is shared among the different wives. [AF-S/FG-4]

In Ewa and Teru (Afar) and Dollo Odo, Hudet, Gursum in Somali, a third method of targeting polygamous households is practiced in which the husband is registered with one of the wives and children. In both regions the husbands decide how to share out the transfer among the rest of the wives, often depending on the size of each unit. There are occasions in which the husband will hand over the transfer to his favoured wife, as some focus group participants pointed out:

Personally, my husband has four wives and many children. It's only me that is registered in the PSNP. There are many polygamous household in this *kebele*. All the wives are not registered even if they are poor. [SM-D/FG-3]

In most cases, the family unit with the youngest wife is given priority in polygamous households. This is because the husband gives priority to the youngest wife. We locally say, 'half of the husband's brain works because of the youngest wife.' Sometimes the poor wife and her children are given priority during the beneficiary selection. In this case, this family unit is registered as a female-headed household. This situation happens when the woman insists to be considered for the PSNP because her family is poor. [SM-G/FG-3]

Often only one wife is going to be included. There are also some cases where more than one wife is included. This is mainly true when the wives are living in different communities. [SM-G/FG-4]

In our *kebele* there are a few polygamous households registered in the PSNP. A majority of them are not registered in the safety net because of PSNP food shortages for the area. There are many needy polygamous households and they didn't get any opportunity to register their household for the PSNP in this *kebele*. [SM-H/FG-4]

The wives are not the same. Some are poorer than others. Therefore, the poor wife is the one selected. [SM-H/FG-4]

6.7 Quantitative and qualitative perspectives on targeting: Errors of inclusion and exclusion

The two themes that recur in these narratives are the use of livestock as a wealth indicator and the need to share resources widely within the community. We use information from the quantitative household survey, specifically the data on Public Works and Direct Support payments in Teru (Afar) and the eight surveyed *woredas* in Somali to triangulate these themes.

Table 6.1 lists, by *woreda*, the number of surveyed households and the numbers and percentages who report receiving Public Works payments and Direct Support transfers

between Tir EC02 (January 2010) to Hidar EC03 (November 2010). The percentage of households receiving any type of transfer is, in many *woredas*, strikingly high. The *woreda* with the lowest coverage rate (PW plus DS) is Afdem with just over 50 percent of households receiving a PSNP transfer. In four *woredas*, coverage exceeds 70 percent and in Shinile, it is nearly universal. Of course, some of this high coverage reflects the fact that these are very poor localities but it is likely, given the discussion above, that this reflects pressure to share PSNP resources.

Table 6.1 Percentage of households receiving Public Works payments and Direct Support transfers, by *woreda*

Region	<i>Woreda</i>	Number of households			Percentage of households receiving	
		(1) Surveyed	(2) Receiving PW	(3) Receiving DS	(4) PW payments	(5) Direct Support
					(percent)	
Afar	Teru	90	61	4	67.8	4.4
Somali	Shinile	90	75	12	83.3	13.2
	Erer	90	60	14	66.7	15.6
	Afdem	77	31	8	40.3	10.4
	Gursum	90	48	5	53.3	5.6
	Harsin	90	68	0	75.6	0.0
	Filtu	90	40	11	44.4	12.2
	Dolo Odo	89	49	8	55.1	9.0
	Udet	90	64	0	71.1	0.0
	All	796	496	62	62.3	10.0

Source: Household survey 2010.

Next, we consider the relationship between livestock holdings and access to the PSNP. Specifically, we take data collected on livestock holdings as of Tahisis EC02 (December 2009) and from these construct Total Livestock Units (TLU). We aggregate these into deciles and compare them to the likelihood that a household received Public Works or Direct Support payments in the eleven month period that followed (January – November 2010). Results are shown in Figure 6.1.

Given the qualitative information presented in sections 6.2-6.4, we would expect that, for the poorest quintile, participation in Public Works would be relatively low and access to Direct Support relatively high. There is evidence to support this in Figure 6.1. The public works participation rate for the poorest households, as measured by TLU, is lower than it is for wealthier households and the likelihood of getting Direct Support is highest for this decile. However, we would expect that, especially for the wealthier quintiles, coverage rates for public works would be low and this is not the case. For example, 61.3 percent of households in the third poorest quintile receive public works payments but so do 72.6 percent of the eighth (third richest) decile.

Figure 6.1a Relationship between livestock holdings, deciles of TLU, and participation in Public Works





Figure 6.1b Relationship between livestock holdings, deciles of TLU, and receipt of Direct Support payments



One objection to these descriptive findings is that given that PSNP coverage rates differ by *woreda* (Table 6.1) and if livestock holdings are higher on some *woredas* than others, then the absence of a declining relationship between participation rates and livestock might be confounded by these location or possibly other confounding effects. To explore this further, we estimate a probit regression where the dependent variable equals one if the household was paid for employment in Public Works, zero if it did not. We model this as a function of characteristics of the household head (sex, age, schooling), wealth (as measured by livestock holdings) and location. We also include whether the household head holds an official position within their village and whether they have a relative holding such a position. Results are shown in Table 6.2. Note that we express TLU livestock holdings as a quadratic to see if these increase, then decrease the likelihood of PW participation.

The numbers shown in Table 6.2 are the marginal effects of these characteristics on the probability that the household participates in the selection of public works. For example, the number -0.155 in the first row means the following. After controlling for other household characteristics (age, education of head; wealth; location), a female-headed household is 20.1 percentage points less likely to participate in Public Works than a male-headed household with the same characteristics. This effect is statistically significant.

There are two especially noteworthy findings in Table 6.2. First, it is the case that participation in Public Works first increases then decreases with TLU –the marginal effect of the linear term is positive and the marginal effect of the quadratic terms is negative. However, the size of these effects is small. For example, the marginal effects reported in Table 6.2 imply that moving from a household with 10 TLU to a household with 20 TLU, and keeping all other characteristics the same, increases the likelihood of participation in PW by 0.5 percentage points. Moving from a household with 10 TLU to a household with 50 TLU, and keeping all other characteristics the same, decreases the likelihood of participation in PW but only by 0.1 percentage points. Second, again taking into account characteristics like wealth, location and sex, age and education of head, households where the head holds an official position in the *kebele* is *more* likely to receive public works payments. The magnitude of these effects is sizeable; being an official raises the probability of getting paid employment for public works by 14.3 percentage points.

Table 6.2 Correlates of receipt of payments for Public Works

Household head is female	-0.201*** (0.048)
Age of head	-0.002 (0.001)
Head has some formal schooling	-0.016 (0.010)
Household size	0.027*** (0.009)
Head has official position	0.143*** (0.054)
Relative of head has official position	0.062 (0.038)
Livestock holdings (TLU)	0.007** (0.003)
Livestock holdings (TLU) squared	-0.0002*** (0.00005)
Household lives in: Shinile	0.169** (0.073)
Erer	-0.169* (0.092)
Afdem	-0.440*** (0.077)
Gursum	-0.339*** (0.090)
Harshin	-0.132 (0.093)
Filtu	-0.392*** (0.084)
Dolo Odo	-0.258*** (0.095)
Udet	-0.136 (0.094)
Observations	728

Notes: Impact of covariates is expressed in terms of marginal effects.

Numbers in parentheses are *kebele* clustered standard errors.

* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 6.3 repeats this analysis but sets the dependent variable equal to one if the household received Direct Support payments, zero if it did not. Here, we only include a linear term for wealth reflecting our assumption that access to Direct Support should fall as household wealth rises. It shows that the likelihood of receiving Direct Support is higher for female-headed households and increases with the age of the household head. These effect sizes are reasonably large. A female-headed household is 6.5 percentage points more likely to get Direct Support than a male-headed household with the same characteristics. A household where the head is 70 years old is 12 percentage points more likely to get Direct Support than a comparable household where the head was 40 years old. However, increasing wealth levels do not affect the probability of being a Direct Support beneficiary.

Table 6.3 Correlates of receipt of Direct Support transfers

Household head is female	0.065*** (0.019)
Age of head	0.004*** (0.001)
Head has some formal schooling	-0.015** (0.006)
Household size	-0.009* (0.005)
Head has official position	0.038 (0.045)
Relative of head has official position	0.031 (0.019)
Livestock holdings (TLU)	-0.001 (0.001)
Household lives in: Shinile	-0.027 (0.036)
Erer	0.015 (0.049)
Afdem	-0.011 (0.037)
Gursum	-0.023 (0.035)
Filtu	0.004 (0.048)
Dolo Odo	-0.015 (0.036)
Observations	554

Notes: Impact of covariates is expressed in terms of marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are *kebele* clustered standard errors.

* significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level. Harshin and Udet are excluded as they have no Direct Support beneficiaries.

One way of thinking about these results is that they imply errors of inclusion (for example, wealthy households receiving public works payments) and errors of exclusion (for example, from Figure 6.1b, we see that only 13.2 percent of households in the poorest wealth quintile received Direct Support.) The qualitative survey revealed interesting perspectives on these.

Woreda officials in Afar, Somali and Oromiya acknowledged the existence of exclusion errors. The most frequently reported reason was that the *woreda* quota received from regional authorities was inadequate. Other reasons cited include unexpected shocks after targeting has taken place (mentioned by officials in one *woreda*), poor targeting practices (mentioned in one *woreda*), absenteeism during targeting (mentioned in one *woreda*), action taken to achieve FFT by reducing the number of households targeted (mentioned in two *woredas*), and being outside of the dominant clan (mentioned in one *woreda*).

Because of the resource limitation we exclude some of the people from receiving support. [Af-EI/W-FG1]

Yes, many are left out. This is because the quota was not enough to cover all the poor people who should have been included. In addition, for obvious reason situations change very significantly in short period of time so many people become poor after the selection is completed. [Sm-DO/W-FG1]

Yes there are exclusions because of a resource shortage. There are also a few people excluded from the safety net which were not in the area at the time of targeting for different reasons. Exclusion has happened during the implementation of full family targeting. [Or-My/W-FG1]

Yes, there are excluded households. Although they were poor, because they were not members of the clan some people are excluded. [Or-Sw/W-FG1]

Woreda officials in the three regions had different views about the prevalence of inclusion errors. Officials in Buremudaitu, Dubti and Semurobi had insufficient information to make an accurate determination. In three *woredas* (Eldiar, Ewa and Teru), officials claimed that inclusion errors were not a problem, whereas officials in Gursum, Hudet, and Shinile *woredas* in Somali and Saweyna and Moyale *woredas* in Oromiya explained that inclusion errors existed before but had been addressed during retargeting exercises. Officials in Dolo Odo were uncertain whether there were targeting errors. The quotes below are taken from discussions with WFSTF officials on inclusion errors.

Yes, we had problems during targeting. There are better-off people included in the program. But, we are working to correct this problem. [Sm-Gr/W-FG1]

We are not sure. But if you go deep in the community you might find such errors exist. I don't know this but as he said you might find it if you make an assessment. [Sm-DO/W-FG-1]

No, there are no better-off people included in the Safety Net. After the targeting we re-checked and corrected such things. [Sm-Hd/W-FG-1]

Yes there were a few better-off households that were included but we corrected them based on findings by the Appeals Committee as they investigate appeals. [Sm-Sh/W-FG-1]

Kebele-level informants offered no uniform view of the prevalence of exclusion errors. In *kebeles* visited in Buremudaitu and Semurobi *woredas*, KRDC officials indicated that a transfer is provided to most of households regardless of their food security or poverty status. However, better-off households receive a small amount of grain compared to poorer households who receive more.

Unless the transfer resource is limited, we distribute the food to those who should receive it. If the transfer is not enough we give priority to those who are most needy. [Af-Bm/K-FG1]

Although the amount might be small we distribute the food to all the community members. We don't say the poor and the better-off. [Af-Sr/W-FG-1]

In *kebeles* visited in Eldiar, Ewa and Teru as well as all *kebeles* visited in Somali and Oromiya regions, *kebele* officials reported there were exclusion errors. A common explanation for these was a limited quota. In Eldiar, some households who had left to seek work elsewhere were excluded because they were not present at the time of targeting. "Yes there are some who are poor and were not present at the time of the PSNP selection and who were excluded. These people were in Dobi to work as laborers in the salt fields. They are now being supported from emergency resources." [Af-El/K-FG1]

Kebele officials were also asked if they were aware of inclusion errors. Officials in all areas reported that these were not a problem. In Dubti, Buremudaitu and Semurobi targeting is not done according to the PIM and better-off households do receive a transfer, albeit small. In the *kebele* visited in Teru, *kebele* officials indicated that some better-off households were included due to their high social or administrative profile in the community:

We give more grain to those households having a large size and small or no livestock. We give smaller rations to those households owning many livestock and/or having few members. [Af-Sr/K-FG1]

There are some better-off community members included into the program. E.g. the clan leaders and people in the *kebele* structure are all PSNP beneficiaries. [Af-Tr/K-FG1]

No, it's totally forbidden to include better-off members in PSNP. [So-Hd/K-FG1]

No better-off households are included in the Safety Net. This was a problem during the first targeting. Now it is corrected through the recent retargeting done with the participation of every member of the community. [Or-My/K-FG1]

Given these errors of inclusion and exclusion, it is instructive to see how *woreda* and *kebele* officials responded. Table 6.4 summarizes data from *woreda*-level interviews; Table 6.5 is taken from *kebele* interviews. At the *woreda* level, partial family targeting is practiced in some areas as a way to manage the problem of limited resources. The use of the contingency fund and other development inputs were also reported as was the use of emergency assistance. *Kebele* officials adopted similar methods; no *kebele* official reported that they were successful in receiving greater resources from the *woreda* following an appeal.

Table 6.4 Approaches taken by *woreda* officials to manage limited PSNP resources

Approach	<i>Woreda</i>
Informed community to reduce the number of beneficiaries they put forward during targeting	Eldiar, Dolo Odo
Reported to the region and expecting a response	Hudet, Shinile
Resorted to emergency assistance to cover excluded households	Gursum, Moyale
Used PSNP contingency fund to cover excluded households	Sewaina, Moyale
Used other development inputs, including CCI, to assist excluded households	Dolo Odo
Partial family targeting to cover a greater number of households	Ewa, Teru
Encouraged recipients to share with non-beneficiaries	Ewa

Table 6.5 Approaches taken by *kebele* officials to manage limited PSNP quota

Approach	<i>Woreda/kebele</i>
Appealed to the <i>woredas</i> and expecting a response	Eldiar, Hudet, Shinile
Resorted to emergency assistance to cover excluded households	Gursum, Moyale, Sewaina
Encouraged recipients to share with non-beneficiaries	Ewa, Teru
Reduced the number of beneficiaries by including the most poor	Bure
Partial family targeting to cover a greater number of households	Teru

6.8 Summary

This chapter has examined targeting processes for the PSNP in the lowlands. Key findings are:

- In Afar, there is limited understanding of PSNP targeting principles among *woreda*-level officials and consequently, little systematic orientation is provided to *kebele* officials and clan leaders. Clan leaders, working with the KFDC or KFSTF, play an important part in determining the number of beneficiaries and the size of transfer per household.
- In Somali and Oromiya, officials have a more complete understanding of targeting guidelines. Officials in these regions have the advantage of having been involved in implementing the PSNP PAP as well as learning from NGOs working in some areas.
- Understanding how targeting processes actually work is complex given the competing narratives of the need to work within traditional structures, norms about the sharing of resources, understanding of the importance of allocating program resources to the poorest, claims about how it works in practice and the widespread view that PSNP resources are insufficient given need.
- Despite stated claims and understandings, both qualitative and quantitative evidence points to the fact that, in practice, there is very little differentiation by wealth in terms of access to Public Works employment.
- Households where the head holds an official position in the *kebele* are *more* likely to receive public works payments. The magnitude of these effects is sizeable; being an official raises the probability of getting paid employment for public works by 14.3

percentage points. This differs from targeting in the Highlands where holding an official position has no effect on participation.

- Women's participation in targeting is limited. Clan leaders play a more important role in targeting in these areas but they do not widely consult women. When women attend targeting meetings, their voices are rarely taken into account.
- Targeting practices as they relate to polygamous households vary widely
- *Woreda* and *kebele* officials use a number of measures to cover excluded households, including emergency assistance and other development inputs (CCI), using the PSNP contingency fund, practicing partial family targeting, as well as encouraging recipients to share their transfer with non-beneficiaries.

Chapter 7: The Implementation of Public Works Projects

7.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses a number of aspects associated with the implementation of public works projects in surveyed *woredas* in Afar and Somali. It explores whether public works activities have been coordinated with *woreda* development plans. It assesses the extent to which those activities that are chosen have incorporated feedback from communities and whether these activities are linked to livelihoods. It summarizes the extent to which gender considerations have been incorporated into the implementation of public works activities. While it includes perceptions of the usefulness of public works, it does not provide a technical assessment of their quality.¹⁸

7.2 Coordinating the Implementation of Public Works

Public Works undertaken as part of the PSNP should be integrated into *woreda* development plans and planned on an inter-sectoral basis (GFDRE 2009a). In all 12 *woredas* where qualitative work was carried out, key informants were asked about the extent of this integration. In eight *woredas*, these discussions revealed that the ongoing public works were linked to *woreda* development plans.

Yes, the PWs fit within the *woreda* development plan. PW activities were planned jointly and linked with the sector office plans as well. [AF-T/W-KI-2]

Yes they are part of the *woreda* development plan. Sector offices were actively involved to ensure the *woreda* development plan of their sector as part of the overall safety net plan. [ORO-M/W/KI-2]

Yes it fits very much; if you see the number of adult and basic schools built by the projects, it is clear that it fits the district development plan because now the attention of the government is to increase school coverage and the project is doing good in this area. Also, the project has built *birkas* which are a source of water, so I think it fits well." [SM-D/W-KI-2]

However, in Elidar and Shinile *woredas* the PWs focal persons indicated that currently the public works are not linked with the *woreda* development plan for various reasons.

In the past we couldn't integrate it because we did not have full information about the program. However, for the next plan we are preparing to integrate it with the *woreda* plan. [AF-E/W-KI-2]

¹⁸ Such an assessment is beyond the Terms of Reference for this study. A number of other instruments assess the quality of public works subprojects, such as the Public Works Reviews and Public Works Impact Evaluation.

Public works are running side-by-side with the *woreda* development plan but they do not have strong linkage. In the future the WFSTF should consider fitting public works into the *woreda* development plan. [SM-S/W-KI-2]

In all *woredas*, a watershed approach was used for planning even though the actual understanding of the approach varied. Public works key informants said that similar planning approaches were used despite the different livelihood orientations. Their responses were indicative of (1) an incomplete understanding of the approach, (2) weak *woreda* capacity and, (3) the absence of clear guidelines for implementation. “We know the safety net program should be based on the watershed approach but it is not practical here because we don’t have a complete understanding of the watershed approach and low attention is given to it. There was a training but not well focused. We don’t know the other approaches.” [OR-S/W-KI-2]

7.3 Planning Public Works

The PSNP PIM (2010) stresses that optimal implementation of public works relies on the involvement of the community during their selection, planning, monitoring and evaluation. Key informant interviews with regional level PWs focal units and committees indicated an understanding of this important principle.

It [the type of public work] is decided by the KFSTF and then sent to the WFSTF but, the community participates in prioritizing the public works. [AF-R/KI-2]

The community decides which public works have to be carried out in their respective *kebeles*. [SM-R/KII-2]

It is decided by the community. [ORO-R/KI-2]

In five out of nine *woredas*, key informants disclosed that the decision about the type of the PWs activities is made by the community. One interesting exception, however, was Moyale in Oromiya where the *woreda* public works focal person stated, “It is the WFSTF and KFSTF who decides on which PW should be undertaken. The WFSTF provides the KFSTF with a quota on PW and DS numbers.” [ORO-M/W-KI-2]

Seven of nine discussions with the KFSTFs indicated that the selection of public work activities is carried out through the involvement of community elders, community, DAs and the food security task forces and that *woredas* do not send indicative plans to the *kebeles* while planning the public works. A somewhat different approach was taken in Hada and Adada *kebeles*, in Sewayne and Gursum *woredas* respectively. “Based on the types of PWs identified at Woreda level, the community will make decisions on the type of public works to be undertaken in their zones (cluster of villages) or villages. However, sometimes the decision on public works such roads, schools ... that benefit the whole community is made at the *kebele* level.” [OR-S/K-KI-1]

Consistent with the information gleaned from key informant discussions, focus groups with men and women indicated varying degrees of participation in the selection, implementation, and monitoring of public works projects. Responses to the question, “As men/women do you feel that you have any influence over decisions about which public works to do? Who often decides the type and location of the public works?” produced the following answers:

Yes, we participate when the decisions about the location and type of public works are made at the *kebele* level meetings. [ORO-M/K-FG-4]

We participated in the discussion and negotiated on which public works are best for the community. We discussed by villages and it is the community who made a final decision. [ORO-S/K-FG-4]

We are invited to meetings during which decisions on the type and location of public works are made. We express our views and we are involved in the decisions.” ORO-S/K-FG-3]

“Yes, we have a say. We gather and decide what kind of public works we have to do.” [SM-D/K-FG-4]

First we participated on public works planning and now we are doing what we have planned. [SM-S/K-FG-4]

Yes we had influence on decisions about which public works activities to do, we participated in the discussions. But, it is the *kebele* who decides. [SM-S/K-FG-3]

Our involvement was more during the implementation stage, not during the planning stage. [AF-T/K-FG-4]

We don’t have any role in making such decisions. We just participate in light works and provision of water and food. AF-T/K-FG-3]

We do not have control over PWs planning because the plan is send to us from the *woreda* through the *kebele* structure. But, sometimes they consult us for public works site selection. [AF-EW/K-FG-4]

We do not have any influence over planning and implementation decisions. We are involved after they call us to do the public works activities. [AF-EW/K-FG-3]

The DA tells us what to do and then we do that work. Whether it is a gully closure or soil bund, he tells us and then we do it. Sometimes we tell him that certain works are not appropriate. [SM-G/K-FG-4]

Everything is under the influence of men and no one considers our (women) feelings or reaction to public works projects. [SM-D/K-FG-3]

No, government officials came and told us what to do, then we did that work, even if it is digging holes. [SM-H/K-FG-4]

We triangulate this information from the qualitative fieldwork with data collected in the quantitative household survey. Respondents were asked if they had participated in the selection of public works projects undertaken in their *kebeles*. Responses were obtained in Teru (Afar) and all sampled localities in Somali. Results by *woreda* and disaggregated by sex of head are reported in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1 Percentage of households participating in the selection of public works, by *woreda* and sex of head

Region	Woreda	Percentage participating		
		All households	Male-headed	Female-headed
Afar	Teru	11.1	12.5	0.0
Somali	Shinile	28.9	36.7	13.3
	Erer	28.9	30.7	20.0
	Afdem	9.1	14.0	0.0
	Gursum	5.6	6.9	0.0
	Harshin	40.0	42.9	0.0
	Filtu	6.7	9.4	0.0
	Dolo Odo	11.2	15.4	0.0
	Udet	27.8	30.4	23.5
	Total	18.9	22.3	8.1

Source: Quantitative household survey.

Across the nine *woredas* for which we have quantitative data, 19 percent of households report participating in the selection of public works. This compares favorably with participation rates in the Highlands which reached a comparable level in 2008, four years after the start of the PSNP. Consistent with the qualitative data, there is considerable variation in participation across *woredas* and female-headed households are much less likely to have a say in the selection of public works that are undertaken.

Are there other factors which affect the likelihood that a household participates in this decision making? To explore this, we estimate a probit regression where the dependent variable equals one if the household took part in the choosing of public works, zero if it did not. We model this as a function of characteristics of the household head (sex, age, schooling), wealth (as measured by livestock holdings) and location. We also include whether the household head holds an official position within their village and whether they have a relative holding such a position. Results are shown in Table 7.2.

The numbers shown in Table 7.2 are the marginal effects of these characteristics on the probability that the household participates in the selection of public works. For example, the number -0.155 in the first row means the following. After controlling for other household characteristics (age, education of head; wealth; location), a female-headed household is 15.5 percentage points less likely to participate than a male-headed household with the same characteristics. This effect is statistically significant. Table 7.2 indicates the probability of

participating rises about one percentage point per additional year of age of the household head. Schooling has no effect on participation but wealth does. Each 10 additional TLU raises the probability of participating in decision making by three percent. Some of this wealth effect, however, may reflect the fact that households where the head holds an official position within the village are, on average, wealthier. When we take this into account – see the results found in column (2) – the impact of livestock wealth becomes slightly smaller.

Table 7.2 Correlates of household participation in the selection of public works

	(1)	(2)
Household head is female	-0.155*** (0.039)	-0.122*** (0.038)
Age of head	0.013** (0.006)	0.010* (0.006)
Age of head squared	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Head has some formal schooling	0.008 (0.009)	0.004 (0.009)
Head speaks Amharic	0.032 (0.059)	-0.010 (0.054)
Head has official position		0.286*** (0.064)
Relative of head has official position		0.041 (0.036)
Livestock holdings (TLU)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Household lives in: Shinile	0.336** (0.155)	0.240 (0.150)
Erer	0.209 (0.143)	0.136 (0.137)
Afdem	-0.028 (0.063)	-0.043 (0.065)
Gursum	-0.047 (0.102)	-0.079 (0.081)
Harshin	0.314 (0.211)	0.285 (0.206)
Filtu	-0.075 (0.048)	-0.104*** (0.039)
Dolo Odo	0.022 (0.077)	-0.022 (0.075)
Udet	0.265** (0.114)	0.175* (0.101)
Observations	727	722

Notes: Impact of covariates is expressed in terms of marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are kebele clustered standard errors. * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level.

7.4 Public Works and Local Livelihoods

Regional and *woreda* officials were asked to describe how public works had supported people's livelihoods. Activities undertaken in these localities included natural resource management

(afforestation), soil and water conservation (bunds, terraces, trenches, check dams), water sources development (ponds, springs and water wells (*ella*)), irrigation development, road construction, rangeland management, maintenance and construction of social and economic services such as schools and health posts, veterinary clinics, farmers training centers and bush clearing. Regional public works focal persons and committees noted that the popularity of different projects varied significantly across the different livelihood groups. When asked “Which public works projects have been most popular with pure pastoralists, with pastoralists doing some farming, with agro-pastoralists and with ex-pastoralists?” they responded as follows:

The watershed management is the most popular with pure-pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, whereas exotic bush (*prosopis*) clearing is most popular among ex-pastoralists. [AF-R/ KI-2]

Popular public works projects with pastoral areas include feeder roads, and water and rangeland management. Feeder roads and soil and water conservation activities are popular with agro-pastoral areas. [SM-R/KI-2]

The *woreda*-level public works committee in all the study *woredas* commended the positive impacts of the public works on the livelihoods of different community groups. Seven of the twelve *woredas*’ public works focal persons interviewed agreed that ongoing public works are responding and supporting the livelihoods of different groups. Asked, “How do public work projects respond and support the livelihoods of different groups?” *woreda* focal persons responded:

In all *kebeles* in this *woreda*, we have pure pastoral communities. Public works activities such as rangeland management and water development activities have helped the pastoralists in drought risk reduction. The access road construction has improved access to social services and market for the community. [AF-T/W-KI-2]

Ponds provided access to drinking water for both human beings and livestock, for both pastoralists and agro pastoralist; they are also used by agro-pastoralists for irrigation that increased their income and improved their nutritional status. The improvement of ponds has also saved time spent for fetching water by women. [ORO-M/W-KI-2]

The roads constructed are benefiting both pastoralists and agro-pastoralists by providing access to markets for their produce. They also facilitated access to health services as the community can travel to the nearby towns for medication. [ORO-S/W-KI-2]

Rangeland management is important for the pastoralists; bush clearing and gully control benefits agro-pastoralists. All PWs activities benefit the community in different ways. [SM-S/W-KI-2]

Three of six *kebele* FSTFs in Afar region indicated that water development activities (water ponds and dams) and rangeland management are the most popular with pastoralist groups. Road construction and alternative basic education school infrastructures are also crucial. Discussions with three of six KFSTFs in Gursum, Hudet and Shinile (Somali region) revealed that soil and water conservation, bush clearing, school construction, latrine digging and water harvesting activities are the most popular public works projects. KFSTFs stressed the need to clearing the exotic bush (*prosopis*), which was introduced some years back by NGOs to 'support' pastoral livelihoods. This tree is aggressively encroaching on farmlands and causing a wide range of problems for the livelihoods of people. "Bush clearing is the most popular work, because the bush has reduced farmlands and poisoned animals. For instance, donkeys get abdominal intoxication and die in few days after consuming the leaves." [SM-S/K-KI-1] The KFSTFs in the two Oromiya *woredas* indicated that ponds and water wells (*ella*) are most popular among pastoralists and agro-pastoralists, and roads are most popular among pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and ex-pastoralists.

Eight out of twelve KFSTFs perceived that public works projects were having a positive impact on livelihoods. FGD with Development Agents concurred with this assessment. The majority of respondents highlighted repeatedly that developing water sources for both livestock and human consumption helped in the lowland areas and that improved road access created better opportunities to access market centers, to sell their products and purchase goods for consumption.

While there were some variations across *woredas*, most women's focus groups indicated that they preferred activities such as road construction, water development, latrine construction, bush clearing and construction of schools and health posts. In Shinile women's groups gave high emphasis to road construction as it saves lives, particularly pregnant women approaching their due date can easily get transport to health centers. Additionally, they noted that better roads would make it possible to sell vegetables in larger markets such as Dire Dawa. "Road construction – is a way to life (e.g. we can take pregnant woman to hospital quickly)." [SM-S/FG-3]

Men's focus groups also prioritized projects. In Elidar (Afar), flood protection (*gabion boxes*), wells, dams, health posts and schools were the most preferred activities. In Ewa, it was water development for irrigation, potable water for human and livestock consumption and school construction are activities of community preference. In Teru, water development, health post construction and veterinary clinics were mentioned as their priority. In Somali region, Dolo Odo *Woreda*, the order of preferences is as follows: roads, pond (human drinking water), and latrine construction; and in Gursum soil and water conservation, roads, school, health posts and animal health centers. In Hudet, schools, health centers, more latrines and animal health posts were mentioned. In Shinile bush clearing, road construction and irrigation canal construction were prioritized. The order of preference in Oromiya region Moyale *Woreda* was pond, roads, and water wells (*ella*) and boreholes; whereas in Seweyna *Woreda*, ponds, roads, soil and water conservation activities and fencing of various institutions were important.

The household survey produced quantitative data consistent with the qualitative results. Just over 70 percent of household heads who stated that they benefitted from public works, with male heads being more likely than female heads to indicate this both for any public works activity (74 percent of male heads; 59 percent of female heads). The percentage of heads saying that they benefitted from specific public works is given in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3 Household perceptions of whether they benefitted from public works

	Male		Female		All	
	Percent who say they benefit from:	Sample size	Percent who say they benefit from:	Sample size	Percent who say they benefit from:	Sample size
	(percent)		(percent)		(percent)	
Road	72.8	441	52.3	109	68.7	550
Water harvesting	82.2	45	37.5	8	75.5	53
SWC, communal land	62.4	101	79.3	29	66.2	130
Other NRM	65.5	29	76.5	17	69.6	46
Schools	71.0	131	55.2	29	68.1	160
Health posts	82.6	23	62.5	8	77.4	31
Wells	74.4	43	41.7	12	67.3	55
Other	75.5	286	61.0	77	72.5	363
Any public works activity	73.7	555	59.3	150	70.6	705

Source: Quantitative household survey. SWC on private land excluded as there were almost no observations.

7.5 Gender Considerations

The revised PIM (June 2010) incorporates principles to ensure that implementation of public works is gender sensitive. For example, priority is to be given to projects that will reduce women’s work burden. Work is to be organized in a way that considers women’s domestic responsibilities. Focus groups with the KFSTFs and Women groups across the three regions overwhelmingly indicated that PWs do interfere with the domestic and child care responsibilities of women. We also found across all *kebeles* that no special arrangements, such as provision of childcare services at PWs sites, are provided while women work. This was especially problematic for female-headed households with young children as these women were expected to fully participate in public works. Some KFSTFs indicated that they have taken special measures to solve these problems and the communities generally are more accommodating towards women in terms of time management – for instance, letting them arrive and leave early as needed. In a number of cases, women interviewed said that although there are no gender specific works to be undertaken, they are not doing the same type of work as men.

They are allowed to work fewer hours when compared with men because at home she has to fetch water and do milking goats. Therefore communities arrange appropriate working hours for women. [AF-E/K-KI-1]

Yes, it may interfere. But, we understand women’s domestic roles. We do not force women to strictly respect working hours for PWs. [SM-G/K-FG-1]

Yes, for example if men are digging the hole we take out the soil from the hole. We feel that if we work together, it is a good thing. [AF-E/FG-3]

Women work lighter/easier works and men work more heavy. No specific work is assigned to men or women. [SM-H/FG-3]

Hard/heavy work is for men and light work is for women – this is our culture. We are equal but, we know that we women are delicate (men would always want us to be beautiful) so, we shouldn't do hard work. [ORO-M/FG-3]

The PSNP PIM indicates that women in their fourth month (or later) of pregnancy as well as lactating mothers (up until the 10th month after birth) are exempt from public works. They should be shifted to direct support (DS) if there is no able-bodied labor in their household to compensate for their labor contribution. The regional and *woreda* level PWs focal persons stated that these guidelines were adhered to and implemented as per outlined in the PIM. However, FGD with women groups provided a different story. In addition, their understanding of PSNP guidelines for moving from Public Works to Direct Support when pregnant was limited as reflected by the following quotations.

Lactating women after 40 days of delivery and pregnant women up to 7 months of pregnancy are required work. [ORO-M/FG-3]

We shouldn't be working after 3 or 4 Months of pregnancy and up to 1 year after delivery. [ORO-M/FG-3]

Personally, I have been working for eight month during my pregnancy until six months ago; just before I gave birth to this child I am carrying now. [SM-H/FG-3]

Yes the pregnant women are required to work until they give birth. [SM-H/FG-3]

7.6 Summary

This chapter has discussed a number of aspects associated with the implementation of public works projects in surveyed *woredas* in Afar and Somali. It reviewed the extent to which public works activities were coordinated with *woreda* development plans, the extent to which those activities that are chosen have incorporated feedback from communities and whether these activities are linked to livelihoods. It also examined the extent to which gender considerations were incorporated into the implementation of public works activities.

- Generally, public works activities are coordinated with *woreda* development plans.
- Overall, participation rates in the selection of public works are, at 20 percent, high and compares favorably to the implementation of the PSNP in the Highlands. However, there are marked gender differences. After controlling for other household

characteristics (age, education of head; wealth; location), a female-headed household is 15.5 percentage points less likely to participate than a male-headed household with the same characteristics. Wealthier households were also more likely to participate.

- At all levels, there is a perception that public works have had positive impacts. Roads, natural resource management and improvements in water-related infrastructure (water harvesting, wells) were frequently noted as having favorable effects.
- Women groups overwhelmingly indicated that PWs interfere with the domestic and child care responsibilities. Across all *kebeles*, no special arrangements, such as provision of childcare services at PWs sites, are provided while women work.
- Women in their fourth month (or later) of pregnancy as well as lactating mothers should be exempt from public works. While regional and *woreda* level PWs focal persons understood these guidelines and believed they were implemented, FGD with women's groups revealed that in practice, these are poorly understood.

Chapter 8: Payments for Public Works and Direct Support

8.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses a number of aspects associated with payments for Public Works employment and Direct Support. We provide information describing regarding transfer levels for public works with particular attention to their relationship with Full Family Targeting. We examine the extent to which the Labor Cap is understood and implemented and transfer levels given to Direct Support beneficiaries.

8.2 Full family targeting: Insights from qualitative fieldwork

Payments for Public Works are supposed to follow the principle of Full Family Targeting (FFT). “If a household is identified as chronically food insecure and eligible for PSNP all household members will be listed as clients of the program” (GFDRE 2010, 25). Officials at the regional, *woreda* and *kebele* levels were asked to state their understanding of FFT. Community-level views were also ascertained in focus group discussions.

Regional officials in Oromiya and Somali understand FFT. The Oromiya Food Security Works official explained that FFT requires that all family members in an eligible household are targeted. Other regional officials in Oromiya explained that retargeting is used to ensure that all members of eligible PSNP households are covered but that new births in targeted households and limited resources compared to need meant that FFT was not always practiced. Regional officials in Somali explained that FFT is being followed in six *woredas* and plans are in place to expand it further.

Full family targeting is the process of including all members of eligible households into the program. We tried to implement full family targeting in six *woredas* during the retargeting exercise carried out in 2010. Full family targeting is not realized in other *woredas* where we have not conducted retargeting. [Sm-R-FG-1]

Across the lowlands, there are variations at the *woreda* and *kebele* levels in term of understanding of FFT. Some of these reflect the timing of the PSNP roll out: levels of awareness are greater in PSNP PAP *woredas* and *woredas* where the PSNP is being implemented by NGOs compared to *woredas* where the PSNP was rolled out last year. In Afar, FFT is not widely known or practiced at the *woreda* level. There was no awareness of FFT in three of six *woredas* in Afar included in the qualitative study. In Elidar, it was claimed that FFT was being implemented but *kebele* officials did not confirm this. In Somali Region, while *woreda* and *kebele* officials were aware of FFT, it was being implemented in only two *woredas*. It was stated that FFT was being implemented in both *woredas* visited in Oromiya.

The advantage of FFT is that it protects the assets and households graduate from the PSNP. Targeting a greater number of households by avoiding FFT may

not help protect assets. The households may not also graduate. [Or-Sw/W-FGD 1]

We realized that if we do not practice full family targeting, graduation will not happen. And if graduation is not happening, the whole objective of the program will not be met. So this is why we tried to go with the full family targeting by leaving out some needy people. [Sm-DO/W-FGD 1]

The principle reason why FFT was not more widely followed, as stated in both key informant and focus group discussions, was the tension between implementing FFT and the need to cover a large number of chronically food insecure households. This led to some members of PSNP households being excluded from when transfer levels were calculated - what officials referred to as 'partial family targeting'. Officials noted that a low quota made this trade-off challenging.

Yes, we know about FFT but it is not being implemented due to the limited quota for the *woreda*. The failure to implement FFT is affecting the contribution of the program to reducing the food gap at household level. [Af-EW/W-FGD 1]

Yes this (FFT) was included in the awareness creation during the targeting. However, it is not practiced because the quota was very small and we want to include as many families as possible; they divided the resource among themselves. [Sm-Hd/K-FGD 1]

It is good to target a large number of households instead of concentrating on fewer households. It is in line with the traditional value of sharing for the Afar community. We prefer targeting a greater number of households. It is a good approach. [Af-El/K-FGD 1]

In Buremudaitu, Dubti and Semurobi, decisions on ration sizes were made at the point of food distribution. KFDC officials in Buremudaitu explained:

Not all members of a family get the transfer. We usually give 50kg (a bag of wheat) for a family whether they are five or ten members. Sometimes, if there is enough grain we give them 100kg. There is no distribution based on family size using a measuring scale or other small container. We simply give a bag or two. For example we give 50kg each for disabled people and very poor families who have no support. For the medium people we give 50kg for three households to share among themselves. Next to this, for the better-off people, we give one container (50 kg) to divide among ten households. [Af-Bm/K-FGD 1]

According to our culture and society, we believe that what we are doing now is good. You eat from my pocket and I eat from your pocket. Those who have

nothing to eat take from those who have. But the right way of giving support for the community is to give for each family member by measuring in kilo. [Af-Bm/K-FGD 1]

In these three *woredas*, the amount of grain distributed to households is based loosely on criteria such as sickness, household size and livestock assets.

It (PSNP transfer) comes in the name of the family, not individual family members. Usually one family gets one bag of wheat. Households having children get one full bag (50kg) each. If the person has no children and lives alone s/he gets half a bag of wheat. If there are two households one with four members and the other with six, they both get one bag. [AF-B/FG-2]

In Ewa and Teru, household size was taken into consideration when allocating rations. However, in both *woredas* FFT was not been implemented because, given resource levels, officials opted to spread among a larger number of households. In Ewa, an administrative decision was taken to limit to four the maximum number of persons per household that can be registered.

In Somali Region, only in Shinile did community focus groups state that FFT was being implemented. Partial family targeting was reported in all other *woredas*. Furthermore, community members attributed the partial family targeting to a low *kebele* quota.

Up to now no household receives a full transfer for all of its members. There is no difference made for a large household or for a polygamous household and we normally share what we receive from the safety net. [Sm-Do/FG-2]

This cannot happen. The number that is given to our kebele is very small. What else can we do? [Sm-Do/FG-3]

Not all family members are entitled to receive it. Partial targeting is commonly observed due to a limited beneficiary quota. [Sm-Gr/FG-2]

8.3 Public works payments

The survey instrument recorded the amount of grain payments received, by month, between Tahisis EC02 (December 2009) to Hidar EC03 (November 2010). As payments are based on the western calendar, we use the information that we have for the eleven month period running from January to November 2010. Table 8.1 shows the number of Public Works beneficiaries for each *woreda* where at least one household reported receiving payment for undertaking Public Works. It also shows the mean amount, in kilograms, of grains received, mean household size and the mean number of payments Public Works beneficiaries received.

Columns (1), (2) and (3) are no surprise given the discussion found in Chapter 6 and the discussion of FFT above. Coverage – the percentage of surveyed households receiving public works payments – is high in all nine *woredas* where data were obtained. Mean payments, in

terms of kilograms of grain, range from 19.9 (Harsin) to 178.1 (Afdem). However, once we account for household size, payment levels are low in most *woredas*. The exception is Afdem which also has the lowest coverage.

Table 8.1 Public Works payments

Region	Woreda	(1) Number of households receiving PW	(2) Number of households surveyed	(3) Percentage of households receiving PW payments (percent)	Mean			
					(4) Payment (kg of grain)	(5) Household size	(6) Payment per capita (kg)	(7) Number of payments
Afar	Teru	61	90	67.8	42.9	7.1	6.3	2.5
Somali	Shinile	75	90	83.3	40.4	4.9	8.8	1.9
	Erer	60	90	66.7	60.1	6.2	10.4	2.8
	Afdem	31	77	40.3	178.1	6.6	28.4	6.6
	Gursum	48	90	53.3	73.1	6.2	13.7	2.9
	Harsin	68	90	75.6	19.9	6.4	3.6	1.5
	Filtu	40	90	44.4	75.9	6.9	11.9	3.1
	Dolo Odo	49	89	55.1	43.5	5.7	8.3	2.7
	Udet	64	90	71.1	57.3	6.5	10.2	3.9
All		496	796	62.3	57.4	6.2	10.1	2.9

Source: Household survey 2010.

Figure 8.1 builds on this observation, plotting coverage rates at the *woreda* level against per capita grain payments. As coverage rates rise, per capita grain payments fall. This is consistent with the trade-off described by *woreda* and *kebele* officials; the tension between implementing FFT and the need to cover a large number of chronically food insecure households.

Next, we graph the relationship between household size and mean grain payments for each *woreda* (Figure 8.2).¹⁹ The quotations taken from various focus group discussions suggest that—apart from Shinile—we should see little evidence of grain payments increasing with household size.

¹⁹ We only include mean values when we have at least five observations for a given household size in each *woreda*.

Figure 8.1 Scattergram of coverage and per capita transfers




Figure 8.2a Total grain payments, by household size and *woreda*, Teru




Figure 8.2b Total grain payments, by household size and *woreda*, Shinile




Figure 8.2c Total grain payments, by household size and *woreda*, Erer




Figure 8.2d Total grain payments, by household size and *woreda*, Afdem




Figure 8.2e Total grain payments, by household size and *woreda*, Gursum




Figure 8.2f Total grain payments, by household size and *woreda*, Harsin




Figure 8.2g Total grain payments, by household size and *woreda*, Filtu




Figure 8.2h Total grain payments, by household size and *woreda*, Dolo Odo





Figure 8.2i Total grain payments, by household size and *woreda*, Udet



This is precisely what we observe. Apart from Shinile, and to a lesser extent Afdem and Teru, there is no relationship between household size and payments for public works. So while there is awareness of the concept of Full Family Targeting, in most *woredas* it is not practiced.

8.4 Employment

Across the lowlands, there are variations in understanding about the Labor Cap. In the two *woredas* in Oromiya where qualitative work was undertaken, it was stated (correctly) that the labor cap was five days per person per month, noting that there was a maximum number of days that one person could provide:

There is no limit on the number of household public works participants, if they are targeted and entitled. The maximum number of days one person works in a month is 20 days. [ORO-S/W-KI-2]

In Somali, KFSTFs indicated that the maximum number of days that an individual undertakes public works was 20 days per person per month with the exception of Hudet where the labor cap was stated to be 25 days per person per month. However, apart from Teru, the labor is poorly understood, or not understood at all.

It is 5days/person/month. [AF-T/K-FG-1]

All able-bodied members within families are registered for the PSNP to participate in PWs. The maximum number of working days is 20days/person/month. [AF-T/W/KI-2]

If they can work, all of them can participate. A person can work about 20 days per month because this is the guideline of the PSNP. [AF-E/W-KI-2]

It is decided by the community themselves and depends on the situation. [AF-E/K-FG-1]

There are no fixed days. [AF-EW/K-FG-1]

How are these perspectives on employment and the labor cap reflected in the quantitative data? We begin with some basic descriptive on the amount of work reported by individuals who report doing any PSNP Public Works between January and November 2010 (Tir EC02 – Hidar EC03). Table 8.2 gives us some basic information. In Teru, most individuals who report doing any Public Works do so in the first part of the year, with most individuals reporting that they work in February through June. Individuals average just under 25 days employment. In the eight Somali *woredas*, work is concentrated in the second half of the year (for example, of the 477 individuals who report doing any PSNP Public Works, 347 report doing so in September 2010). On average, individuals in these eight *woredas* report receiving 65 days employment over this period.

Table 8.2a Days worked on PSNP Public Works by individuals, Teru *woreda*

	Number of observations	Mean days worked
January 2010	35	8
February	83	6
March	45	8
April	51	7
May	76	7
June	73	7
July	40	8
August	17	6
September	4	5
October	2	5
November	2	5
All individuals who report working	121	24.8

Table 8.2b Days worked on PSNP Public Works by individuals, Somali, all *woredas*

	Number of observations	Mean days worked
January 2010	73	17
February	79	16
March	85	16
April	99	15
May	100	17
June	134	18
July	186	18
August	224	19
September	347	16
October	329	16
November	213	15
All individuals who report working	477	65.3

While Table 8.2 is informative about averages, it does not tell us if the Labor Cap is being enforced. Figure 8.3 yields this information, showing on a monthly basis, the distribution of days worked by those individuals who do PSNP Public Works. Here, for brevity, we aggregate across all *woredas*.

Figure 8.3a Distribution of days worked, Tir 2002 (January 2010)




Figure 8.3b Distribution of days worked, Yekatit 2002 (February 2010)




Figure 8.3c Distribution of days worked, Megabit 2002 (March 2010)




Figure 8.3d Distribution of days worked, Miazia 2002 (April 2010)




Figure 8.3e Distribution of days worked, Ginbot 2002 (May 2010)




Figure 8.3f Distribution of days worked, Sene 2002 (June 2010)




Figure 8.3g Distribution of days worked, Hamle 2002 (July 2010)




Figure 8.3h Distribution of days worked, Tir 2002 (August 2010)




Figure 8.3i Distribution of days worked, Meskerem 2003 (September 2010)




Figure 8.3j Distribution of days worked, Tikimit 2003 (October 2010)





Figure 8.3k Distribution of days worked, Hidar 2003 (November 2010)



Several features are apparent. Most importantly, there is little evidence of individuals reporting working more than 20 days per month, indicating that the Labor Cap is indeed being adhered to in most localities. The modal number of days worked per individual in most months is 20, suggesting that one person per household is meeting the Labor requirement.

Table 8.3 disaggregates employment by *woreda* and sex. In Teru, Shinile and Udet, women account for 37 to 45 percent of the individuals who report receiving employment. In the remaining *woredas*, women make up less than 20 percent of those employed and in Afdem and Harsin, their numbers are negligible. Conditional on working however, women average approximately the same number of days worked as men.

Table 8.3 Days worked, by *woreda* and sex

	Males			Females		
	Mean number of days worked	Median number of days worked	Number of observations	Mean number of days worked	Median number of days worked	Number of observations
Teru	23.8	10	73	25.1	15	47
Shinile	58.7	60	46	79.9	90	27
Erer	110	120	54	102	120	13
Afdem	133	160	27	120	130	4
Gursum	77.2	80	44	63.3	60	6
Harshin	14.4	16.5	68	15	15	2
Filtu	65.4	75	36	63.3	60	8
Dolo Odo	41.8	30	44	49.4	55	8
Udet	64.3	36	49	47.2	36	41
Total	58.3	44	441	53.7	36	156

8.5 Payments for Direct Support

Table 8.4 shows the number of Direct Support beneficiaries for each *woreda* where at least one household reported receiving Direct Support. It also shows the mean amount, in kilograms, of grains received, mean household size and the mean number of payments Direct Support beneficiaries received.

Table 8.4 Direct Support payments

Region	<i>Woreda</i>	Number of households receiving DS	Number of households sampled	Percentage of households receiving Direct Support (percent)	Mean			
					Payment (kg of grain) (kg)	Household size	Payment per capita (kg)	Number of payments
Afar	Teru	4	90	4.4	21.7	5.0	4.3	1.8
Somali	Shinile	12	90	13.2	32.6	3.3	9.9	2.4
	Erer	14	90	15.6	27.8	4.9	5.7	2.8
	Afdem	8	77	10.4	102.2	3.1	33.0	8.5
	Gursum	5	90	5.6	80.1	5.0	16.0	3.0
	Filtu	11	90	12.2	81.8	6.2	13.2	3.5
	Dolo Odo	8	89	9.0	19.8	4.3	4.6	1.4
	All		62	616	10.0	50.7	4.5	11.3

Source: Household survey 2010.

We begin by noting that only one *woreda* in Afar – Teru – reports any Direct Support. The proportion of households receiving Direct Support is less than five percent and the amount transferred per capita, 4.3 kg per person, is tiny.

In Somali, there is one *woreda* – Afdem – where the proportion of the population receiving Direct Support is reasonably high (10.4 percent) and where a meaningful level of

payment is made (33kg per person). There are three *woredas* where coverage is close to or exceeds ten percent (Shinile, Erer and Dolo Odo) but where per capita payment levels are small. Gursum and Filtu fall in between these first two sets of *woredas*. Finally, no Direct Support payments were reported in Harshin or Udet.

8.6 Summary

This chapter has discussed a number of aspects associated with payments for Public Works employment and Direct Support based on qualitative information collected at the *woreda* and *kebele* levels as well as through focus group discussions with men and women. This information is complemented by quantitative data and both qualitative and quantitative sources tell a similar story.

- In Somali, the principle of FFT is reasonably well understood. But apart from Shinile, it is simply not practiced. For a given amount of food available, authorities choose to increase coverage and reduce payment amounts. This also appears to be true in Teru.
- Consistent with the absence of FFT, apart from Shinile (and to a lesser extent Afdem and Teru), there is no relationship between household size and payments for public works.
- In the *woredas* surveyed in Somali and in Teru, the concept of the Labor Cap is generally well understood. Quantitative data on how many days per month that individuals work shows that the Labor Cap is being implemented.
- Apart from one *woreda* in Somali, Afdem, few households receive Direct Support and the amount they receive is often tiny.

Chapter 9: Appeals and Complaints

9.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the qualitative findings of the appeals and complaints management process of the PSNP in the pastoralist areas of Ethiopia.²⁰ It looks into a range of issues including, local knowledge of the appeals and complaints process, the role of local institutions and authorities in appeals and complaints management, the current status of Kebele Appeals Committees (KAC), sources of appeal and complaints, who people appeal to against the decisions of the PSNP targeting, the process of appeals and complaints, the gender dimension of the appeal process, time taken (duration) of appeals and complaints to be resolved and the transparency of the appeal and complaints process.

9.2 Local knowledge of appeals and complaints and the current status of KAC

The PSNP PIM clearly states that individuals and groups have a right to appeal against the decisions of the PSNP targeting. Further, the revised PIM (June 2010) clarified that the *Kebele* Council, CFSTF and KAC members use every opportunity to inform PSNP clients and non-clients about the availability of appeals and complaints mechanisms, how it functions and the timing of KAC meeting (GRDRE 2009, 110–117).

It is on these principles that the community knowledge on the appeals and complaints process was assessed. In total, 72 FGD were conducted with various community members and food security actors at *woreda* and *kebele* levels in the study area. The findings show that people have appealed against the decisions of the PSNP targeting since the rollout of the program. However, the community knowledge on the appeals and complaints process varies from region to region, *woreda* to *woreda* and even from community group to community group. Interestingly, the community focus groups across the three regions indicate significant gender variations in overall knowledge about the existence of the appeals process. In general, men's groups are more aware of the appeals and complaints process than women groups. The response pattern was similar across the three regions on this aspect. Given the patriarchal nature of pastoralist communities in Ethiopia, this outcome is unsurprising. The following responses from womens' group reflect their lack of awareness or knowledge of appeals and complaints structures or process.

If we have cases, we forward our issues to the *kebele* administrator and elder men. But, this doesn't mean that we get fair treatment from these people. As men, often listen more to men than to women. But, the *kebele* chairperson is more important to us than the clan leader/elder. The elder/clan leader often favors men, not women. [AF-EW/FG-3]

²⁰ The quantitative survey did not collect information on appeals or complaints.

For us, we never complain to this committee or to *kebele* clan elders and we can't tell you the process regarding appeals in our *kebele* or *woreda* level, for the reason that it's a new phenomena to us. [SM-H/FG-3]

We go and complain to the *Kebele* administration. If we are not happy with the response we go to the *Woreda* level. [ORO-S/FG-3]

The focus groups with men across the regions affirmed that they have a better understanding of the appeals process, as the following quotes demonstrate:

We first appeal to the *kebele* officials and if the *kebele* officials could not respond properly we go to the *woreda*. [AF-B/FG-4]

There is no problem, one can directly go and explain his case (complain). [ORO-S/FG-4]

There is appeals committee "*Gudiga Abishada*", it has 5 members selected from elders the youth and women. Appeals are made to the KAC. If there is a need we can appeal to the *kebele* or *woreda* administration." [SM-S/FG-4]

Non-PSNP beneficiaries have a better understanding about the appeal and complaints process than either the men and women groups. The possible reasons for this are that these groups are economically better off and actively involved during the targeting stage of the PSNP beneficiaries in their *kebeles*. In addition because these groups (non-PSNP) had opportunities of visiting the *kebele* administration to ask the reasons why they were excluded from the program and were informed about PSNP and the appeals process. Further, there is nothing to lose if they appeal against the PSNP decisions while the PSNP beneficiaries may have no confidence to appeal even if they have complaints. Direct Support beneficiaries are less knowledgeable about the appeals and complaints process, compared to other community groups across the study areas.

For the people like us it is difficult to see the committee members as we are weak, old and ill and staying around our home. Though you have some complaints if you don't have the strength to appeal you should keep quit. [AF-S/FG-1]

The PSNP PIM specifies that the appeals and complaints process should be managed by an independent team of the KAC, comprised of men and women member of the community. FGD and KIIs investigated the presence and functionality of the KAC in 12 *kebeles* covered. In general, KACs are nonexistent or, at best, minimally active. In Afar, a KAC existed only in the *kebele* of Teru *Woreda*. In Somali, all four WFSTF's stated that there were KACs in each *kebele*. However, this could only be confirmed in three *kebeles* (in Gursum, Hudet and Shinile) and none appeared active.

Yes, appeal committee established at *kebele* level but not active so far. [SM-H/K-KI-1]

I think it is only two months and half or it's like that since the KAC established. [SM-G/KI-1]

The KAC is not active because they didn't receive any training. [SM-S/K-KI-1]

Further, when asked, most community members were not aware of the existence of KACs.

There are KACs in every *Kebele*, appeals are submitted to the KAC in writing. The committee meets every month. [SM-S/W/KI-1]

Yes there are appeals committees. As they still have not given training, we don't visit them often either. The regional experts told us that training will be provided to all committees but still there is nothing. [SM-H/W-KI-1]

There is no process here anybody who wishes can go to the *kebele* or agricultural office. [SM-H/FG-4]

We do not have anyone to complain to. Sometimes we take our cases to the DA but they do not give us positive response. [AF-G/FG-3]

No appeal committee or focal person exists at *kebele* level. [AF-EW/W-KI-1]

We heard there are committees but we don't know the detail on how to complain. [AF-T/FG-3]

9.3 Reasons for appeals and complaints

The focus group discussion with various community groups across the three regions indicated various reasons for appeals and complaints. These are summarized in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1 Reasons for appeals

Sources of appeals and complaints	Number of respondent focus groups by region			Total for all by sources
	Afar	Oromiya	Somali	
Food taken away by somebody else	1	0	0	1
Exclusion from the program	3	2	13	18
Favoritism by targeting committee	1	0	0	1
Partial family targeting	1	0	1	2
Conflict at the time of distribution	1	0	0	1
Theft by <i>Kebele</i> officials	1	0	0	1
Insufficiency of food	1	0	0	1
Receive PSNP support as DS not PW	2	0	0	2
Delays in receipt of food	1	0	0	1
Total by region	12	2	14	28

Source: Qualitative survey, 2010.

The following quotes tell the various reasons why people appealed and/or complained:

Yes, there were many complaint cases related to exclusion from the PSNP. But, there was no positive response to such case due to a limited beneficiary quota for the *kebele*. [AF-EW/FG-4]

People complain when the food support is not sufficient for all. [AF-B/K-KI-1]

There are also people who complain about not all their family members being targeted. [SM-H/K-KI-1]

For instance in Rabena Sagento *Kebele*, the *Kebele* committee assigned the chairperson of the *Kebele* to collect the food assistance. But he took five sacks of grain for his personal use. The *Kebele* relief distribution committee appealed to us and the person sent to prison and also brought back the grain to the *Kebele* relief distribution committee. AF-B/W-KI-1]

While many appeals relate to exclusion from the PSNP, these were rarely successful.

He presented his case to the *kebele* and then to the *woreda* appeals committees. Each *kebele* has got its own quota so he was not able to be included. [AF-E/FG-2]

There are people who complained, but the answer always was that there are no more places. SM-D/FG-1]

The complaints occurred during the selection process, and were mostly submitted to the committee, but there were people who were going to the *kebele* and *woreda* to complain. But nobody got a solution. The answer was always the same - no additional place for anyone. [AF-H/FG-4]

I myself complained to Daniel (the DA), he told me that the quota was full and I have to wait. There are many people who complained to the *kebele* administration all were told the quota is finished. [SM-G/FG-2]

9.4 The Appeals process

Given the limited reach of the KACs, appeals and complaints are made to a variety of actors. This was discussed during focus groups with men and with women.

Table 9.2 Who appeals to whom?

Focus group	Appeals made to:								
	KAC	KFSTF	DA	<i>Kebele</i> administrator or committee	<i>Woreda</i> officials	Clan leaders (<i>Dalla</i>)	Sub-clan leader (<i>Kedo Aba</i>)	Do not know to whom to complain	Do not complain
Men's group	1	1	0	7	3	3	1	0	1
Women's groups	1	0	1	3	2	0	0	1	6

Men's groups reported making appeals to a wide range of actors, both formal and informal. Some women's groups reported that complaints were made to formal bodies (such as the KAC or *kebele* officials) but many indicated that they simply did not complain, in some cases using the phrase "preferring to keep quiet." One women's group noted:

Nobody encourages us to voice our concerns. In addition, we have a huge work burden that demands much of our time. [AF-EW/FG-3]

The role of traditional authorities in the appeals process is worth noting, especially in pastoral regions where they continue to play a significant role in governing the way of how people live and act. As suggested in table 9.2, there is evidence that they play a role in dealing with appeals and complaints management in majority of the *woredas* assessed in this study. Focus group discussions with WFSTFs revealed their role in appeals management as follows:

There is a strong social structure and procedure that can solve every complaint and problems related to these kinds of issues and provide benefit to the whole community. [AF-T/FGD-2]

Clan representatives are members of the *Kebele* appeal committee. So, they are playing a key role in resolving cases. [AF-T/W-KI-1]

Local institutions have a key role. Elders and clan leaders are members of appeal committees at *kebele* and *woreda* levels. For example, 3 out 5 *woreda* appeal committee members are clan leaders and religious elders. [SM-G/W-KI-1]

Clan leaders as member of *kebele* FSTF sometimes deal with grievances coming from the community. But, these are not formally mandated to deal with targeted related complain cases. [AF-EW/W-FG-1]

Interestingly, in Moyale (Oromiya) and Shinile (Somali), WFSTFs indicated a contrasting response regarding the roles of the local institutions and authorities.

Local institutions don't have a role in the appeal process. [ORO-M//W-FG-1]

There is an appeals committee both at *Woreda* and *Kebele* levels, so local institutions don't have a role in the appeal process if they are not included in the appeals committees. [SM-S/W-FG-1]

Asked “Are the processes for appeal and complaint transparent and easy to use?” focus groups responded:

No, because the clan elders/clan leaders decide based on their own judgment and this often biases against women. [AF-EW/FG-3]

No, it is not transparent and easy to use, as far as we don’t have a representative and supporter to complain about our problem. [AF-T/FG-3]

We do not know what process exists. We do not know who is concerned. So, this discourages us to bring our concerns to the public. [SM-G/FG-3]

We don’t know, nobody knows how appeals are handled. [ORO-M/FG-1]

If problems happen it is possible to appeal orally or in written. There are individuals called ‘*Re’ema*’ here. In Afar culture, these are individuals believed that they have natural authority to resolve complaints. They rule on various problems and everyone accepts their decisions. [AF-S/FG-4]

The overwhelming majority of appeals and complaints are undertaken verbally. On rare occasions, the appeal cases can be presented in writing, if the person who is appealing wants to do so. But given low levels of literacy (see chapter 3), assistance is needed for written appeals. Several male FGDs indicated that this was not a problem.

If he wants to write, he can and there are people in the *kebele* who can help with the writing without any payment. [ORO-S/FG-4]

Yes, we are required to present our cases in writing. But, the DA or other *kebele* structures can help us as need arise. [AF-T/FG-4]

By contrast, support for women was largely absent. In focus groups, respondents remarked, “Nobody supports women to appeal.” [SM-S/FG-3] “Nobody supports us to forward our cases.” [SM-G/FG-3] “No one is here to support to appeal.” [AF-T/FG-3]. However, in two *woredas* in Somali where women had access to support through a Women’s Association, assistance was available.

There is women’s affair. We can go to them after appealing to the committee if they do not appropriately respond to our cases. [SM-S/FG-3]

It’s recently that the *kebele* leaders formed for us the Women’s Association which is led by Luley Abdi (she was also participant of the focus group) and she supported this idea of recent establishment of the party and I am the chairman of the group and we didn’t started the true-life function of the Association. [SM-D/FG-3]

Finally, it is worth noting that appeals should be heard and resolved in a timely fashion. But when asked, “How long did it take from complaint to resolution?” not a single community focus group could provide a specific time span for case that was considered and resolved.

9.5 Summary

The formal appeals process is badly underdeveloped. KACs are largely missing and it is not obvious that those that do exist function in a manner anywhere close to what was envisaged in the PIM. Consequently, appeals are made informally to a variety of actors. Exclusion is the dominant reason for appeal but these appear to be unsuccessful. Women appear to be disadvantaged in the appeal process in multiple ways. In general, men appear more aware of the appeals and complaints process than women. Women reported that they did not feel that they were encouraged to complain and that there were instances where it was perceived that informal appeals processes (which are common in Afar and Somali) are biased against women. Where they do choose to put forward a complaint, unlike men, support is often lacking.

Chapter 10: Implementation of the Household Asset Building Programme

10.1 Introduction

The Household Asset Building Programme (HABP) is one of four components of the Food Security Programme. At its core, the HABP focuses on the development of improved on and off-farm income generating activities. These are based on business plans developed by client households or groups of households and supported through the provision of technical assistance (from the Extension Service, the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Agency and others) and enhanced access to financial services (GFDRE, 2009b). The Government of Ethiopia has indicated that pastoral and agro-pastoral areas in Afar, Oromiya, SNNPR and Somali will be included in the HABP (GFDRE, 2009b, p. 10).

Roll out of the HABP was not formally planned for 2010. Mindful of this, thus chapter assesses whether there had been any preliminary HABP-related activities in Afar and Somali.

10.2 Regional and *woreda* perspectives

Understanding of the goals of the HABP at the regional and *woreda* levels is nonexistent in Afar. The chairman of the RFSTF in Afar responded to our question on the understanding and rollout status of HABP with the following statement. “To me it seems that HABP is a new program, not yet started.” [AF-R/KI-1]. A *woreda* official in Elidar stated, “We have little knowledge about it. It is a program like microfinance program”. [AF-EL/W-FG-1]. Regional and *woreda* authorities did not know when and how this program was going to be rolled out through capacity building and allocation of loan funds and no training had taken place.

Table 10.1 Understanding of the HABP, by RFSTFs and WFSTFs in Afar, Somali, and Oromiya

Region	Regional/ <i>Woreda</i> Level		Understanding of the HABP	Training on the HABP
Afar	Regional Level		No	No
	<i>Woreda</i>	Buremudaitu	No	No
		Dubti	No	No
		Elidar	No	No
		Ewa	No	No
		Semurobi	No	No
		Teru	No	No
Somali	Regional Level		Yes	Yes
	<i>Woreda</i>	Dolo Odo	No	No
		Gursum	No	No
		Hudet	No	No
		Shinille	No	No
Oromiya	Regional level		Yes	Yes
	<i>Woreda</i>	Moyale	Yes	Yes
		Saweina	Yes	Yes

Source: Qualitative survey, 2010.

The situation on Somali was somewhat different. Although the HABP had not yet been rolled out, there was some understanding of the program among regional authorities and the intention of implementing it over the next two years. The RFSTF members have explained the purpose of HABP as follows; “It intends to build assets for PSNP beneficiaries. In doing so, it speed up graduation.” [SM-R/FG-1]. They also indicated that some regional officials had attended training provided by the federal government in HABP. This information had not yet been conveyed to the *woredas*. “We do not have information on HABP.” [SM-G/W-FG-1]. “We know the name but we don’t know what it consists of as a package, so we don’t know the purpose of HABP” [SM-S/W-FG-1]. No training had been to *woredas* included in the qualitative study.

By contrast, understanding of the HABP was much better in Oromiya at both the regional and *woreda* levels where it had in fact been implemented. The regional authorities explained it as follows: “It is similar to OFSP. The main difference is that in HABP, clients have to come-up with business plans to request for funding and train supports. OFSP was mostly supply driven. HABP has two components. One is capacity building and the other is related to credit financing” [OR-R/FG-1]. Training had been provided to *woredas*. However, it was noted by one focus group that, “A year ago we have attended training about HABP but no action followed, since then. We have not provided any other support in the form from the FSP.” [OR-M/W-FG-1].

10.3 Access to Development Agents

Development Agents have a key role to play in the overall food security and livelihood program of the Government of Ethiopia, including the implementation of the HABP. This includes, among others, the following tasks: (1) be member of both the KFSTF and CFSTF; (2) support the CFSTF in prioritizing community needs and preparing annual HABP plans; (3) assist households in the preparation and implementation of business plans, ensuring that the business plans are the outcome of household decisions, not the supply (package) driven approach of the past (GFDRE, August, 2009b, 65).

Relative to the Highlands, access to Development Agents is much more limited in Afar and Somali. Information obtained from the community (*kebele*) quantitative survey indicated that 17 out of 30 surveyed *kebeles* in Afar had a DA office. In Somali, seven out of 20 *kebeles* had a DA office. The median distance to DA office if one did not exist in the *kebele* was 20km in Afar and 16.5 in Somali. In Afar, the community survey listed 22 DAs (15 men, 7 women), an average of 1.3 DAs per DA office. In Somali, there were 9 DAs (6 men, 3 women), an average of 1.3 DAs per DA office. Staffing levels are much lower than in the Highlands. In Tigray, Amhara and SNNPR, for example, 90 percent of *kebeles* had two or more DAs. The majority of DAs in Afar are livestock specialists while there was only one livestock specialist in Somali.

10.4 Access to Financial services

Access to financial services in Afar is nearly nonexistent. Only two *kebeles* report having a bank and the median distance to a bank outside surveyed *kebeles* is 42km. There is no institution in any *kebele* providing credit for agricultural or nonagricultural purposes.

One *kebele* in Somali has a bank. The median distance to a bank outside a *kebele* is 15km. This shorter distance, relative to Afar, is likely a reflection of the fact that the process by which *woredas* were selected for inclusion in Somali was biased towards the more densely populated parts of the region. Only one *woreda* reported that a government body was providing agricultural credit.

Chapter 11: Preferences for payments, use, and control of transfers and timeliness of payments

11.1 Introduction

This chapter presents qualitative findings on beneficiary preferences for how and when they would like to be paid, the intra-spousal nature of access and control over payments, and the consequences of unpredictable payments. One of the expected outcomes of PSNP transfer payment is to assure food security and prevent household asset depletion for food insecure households. (FSP, 2010-2014). The underlying assumption of program theory of change of transfer payments is 1) that a regular and predictable payment will allow households to smooth consumption and thus reduce food insecurity, and; 2) enable households to better plan for the future in terms of savings and investments, due to the predictable and long-term nature of the payments. Below we investigate these outcomes, drawing on the qualitative data collected from sampled pastoralist communities and implementing entities in Afar, Oromiya, and Somali Regions.

11.2 Payment type and preference

Participants of 33 focus groups (direct support, women and men focus groups) were asked to indicate the type of payment they receive. All, except respondents in Seweyna reported that they receive their transfer in food only. In Moyale, Direct Support respondents reported that they used to receive cash payment but were presently receiving their payment in food only. Focus groups were asked to indicate their preference for payment modality (food or/and cash). Thirty-one of the groups revealed a food only preference, while the remaining two focus groups replied that their preference is a combination of food and cash. None of the groups indicated a preference for cash alone. The main reasons why respondents prefer food over cash include:

- limited access to grain market in their localities
- raising food prices
- low purchasing power of birr
- the perception that people may be tempted to buy non food items instead of making food available for the family members.

The strong preference for food was expressed in all three regions, and illustrated as follows:

We prefer food because we are hungry for food, not for cash. The payment can save our lives when we receive it in the form of food. [AF-EW/FG-3]

We prefer food. If we get cash we must go far distances to buy food. If we are assisted in cash we may spend it for other things like buying of clothes which is not as important as food for our children. [AF-B/FG-4]

Our preference is food, because the money is not enough to buy food so we prefer the food. We do not find wheat in the nearby market. Even if it is available, the money is not enough to buy sufficient quantity of food. [ORO-S/FG-1]

We all prefer food. What would we do with cash? The money can buy very small quantity so we want the food. The value of Birr 100 has become Birr 10 now, having a reduced purchasing power. At present the Birr can buy 10 times less than what it used to buy three or four years ago. Cash is spent fast and is source of conflict (dispute) within the family over its use. Cash can be misused for other things which are not important to the family. [SM-S/FG-1]

There were two focus groups (Direct Support in Afar and men's focus group in Somali) who prefer a combination of food and cash. Their reasons for this included (1) the ability to use cash on other expenses than food; and, (2) the fact that cash could help solve the problem of multiple food payments being delivered at the same time (leading to wastage). Further enquires were made of these focus group participants: if the cash amount was increased seasonally when prices are higher would you still prefer food. All respondents (except for the two groups where cash and food was the stated preference) agreed that they still prefer food payment over the cash.

We still prefer food, money brings too many friends. If a relative knows that we received cash they come to ask for loan, we have to buy *khat* when guests come. This is our tradition. So we prefer the food. [SM-S/FG-4]

Food transfer is less susceptible to spending as compared to cash. This is partly due to our limited cash saving habit. [AF-T/FG-4]

If I receive cash I have to travel far distance to buy food. Better to have food without additional expense. Food is expensive and we want to have food. [ORO-S/FG-4]

We prefer food over cash because of lack of market and grain unavailability in the area. There is no local cereal production in the area. [AF-E/FG-4]

We can triangulate these responses to data provided in the quantitative household survey. Respondents were asked if they would like to receive their payments in cash only, 75 percent cash and 25 percent food, half cash and half food, 25 percent cash and 75 percent food or in food only. Responses by *woreda* are given in Table 11.1.

Table 11.1 Preferences for payments in cash or as food

Region	Woreda	All cash	75% cash and 25% food	Half cash, half food	25% cash and 75% food	All food
Afar	Teru	12.1	0.0	21.2	12.1	54.6
Somali	Shinile	1.1	10.1	12.0	18.0	58.4
	Erer	11.5	1.3	9.0	1.3	76.9
	Afdem	2.5	0.0	32.5	5.0	60.0
	Gursum	16.4	1.2	22.8	1.3	58.2
	Harshin	0.0	14.4	34.2	17.1	34.2
	Filtu	3.4	5.7	17.2	0.0	73.6
	Dolo Odo	20.0	26.2	25.0	1.2	27.5
	Udet	44.9	27.0	25.8	0.0	2.3

Source: Quantitative household survey.

Across all *woredas*, the majority of respondents prefer to receive all payments as food. There is some variation, however, across *woredas* and in one – Udet – the modal preference is for food. Given the concerns expressed about market access, we examine data taken from the *kebele* quantitative survey on road quality in and outside the rainy season. Results are shown in Table 11.2.

Table 11.2a Road quality as reported by *kebeles*, rainy season

Region	Woreda	Number of <i>kebeles</i> reporting that roads are:						
		Easily accessible by any vehicle	Accessible by any vehicle	Good access by trucks and buses	Accessible by trucks and buses	Accessible by carts and animals only	Walking only	Not stated
Afar	Teru	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
Somali	Shinile	0	0	1	1	0	1	0
	Erer	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
	Afdem	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
	Gursum	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
	Harshin	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
	Filtu	0	0	1	0	0	2	0
	Dolo Odo	0	0	0	0	1	2	0
	Udet	1	0	0	0	1	1	0

Source: Quantitative *kebele* survey.

Table 11.2 shows road quality varying across space and time. That said, a number of *woredas* where there was a marked preference for food payments (Erer, Afdem, Filtu) are those where rainy season access is poor. Udet is the only *woreda* where there is good road quality access in both rainy and non-rainy seasons. It is also the only *woreda* where any *kebeles* report access to a paved road.

Table 11.2b Road quality as reported by *kebeles*, outside of the rainy season

Region	Woreda	Number of <i>kebeles</i> reporting that roads are:						
		Easily accessible by any vehicle	Accessible by any vehicle	Good access by trucks and buses	Accessible by trucks and buses	Accessible by carts and animals only	Walking only	Not stated
Afar	Teru	0	0	0	1	0	2	0
Somali	Shinile	0	0	1	2	0	0	0
	Erer	0	2	0	0	0	1	0
	Afdem	0	2	0	0	0	1	0
	Gursum	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	Harshin	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
	Filtu	2	0	1	0	0	0	0
	Dolo Odo	0	2	0	0	1	0	0
	Udet	2	1	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Quantitative *kebele* survey.

11.3 Appropriateness of food basket

Discussions with regional and *woreda* level officials indicated that, except in NGO *woredas*, the food transfer comprises wheat only. In NGO *woredas* the food transfer includes oil and pulses along with wheat.

In Afar region the food transfer includes grain only, but in the NGO *woredas* they get pulses and oils along with the wheat. [AF/R-KI-2]

Food transfer is only wheat, the rate is 15 Kg per person per month. There is a lot of complaint about the food transfer. Beneficiaries are demanding for oil and pulses to be included. At present we distribute wheat only. In this regard emergency relief is better because it has oil and pulses in addition to wheat. [ORO-M/R-KI-2]

Food transfers include wheat 15 Kg, Oil 0.46 Kg and Pulse 1.5 Kg in a month. [SM/R-KI-2]

Focus groups were asked about the appropriateness of the type of food within the food payment. Out of thirty three groups, approximately 90 percent of them replied that the food they receive is appropriate. It was only two men's groups and one direct support group that responded that the food is inappropriate. Respondents indicated that wheat was appropriate for a variety of reasons:

We have grown up here with wheat. It has become our traditional food. [AF-E/FG-4]

Wheat can be used to prepare different type of food including bread. We can make *basso* out of it too, whereas we cannot make bread out of sorghum. [ORO-M/FG-4]

Yes it is appropriate because we are used to it, we have been eating wheat for many years. [SM-S/FG-1]

Wheat is good because bread can be made from it without other additives. Wheat is good but some people like sorghum. It would have been better if it is mixed with sorghum. [ORO-M/FG-3]

The three groups that expressed their concern on the appropriateness of the food payment held very strong views, particularly in regard to the health problems that they attribute to wheat consumption.

Wheat is not appropriate for us. People who eat wheat get thin, look very old, exposed to stomach ache (gastritis). Why are you asking us such a question? It is not important for our health. We are eating food that leads us to death. [AF-B/FG-4]

Wheat is difficult for us we don't like it, because we never used it. We used to sell livestock and buy maize" "We dislike wheat because there is no grain mill we cannot use it without milling. It will be better if we are given rice and flour. If there is grain mill here it would have been ok but now it is difficult, people find it very difficult to use it. [SM-H/FG-1]

Mostly disease attacks us when we eat wheat. I stayed on bed for 3 months. I got stomach ache eating wheat. Most of the time there is a problem associated with eating wheat. [AF-B/FG-1]

11.4 Preference for composition of food basket

Focus groups participants were asked a hypothetical question, "What is your preference for food within the transfer (teff, maize, sorghum, oil, etc)?" Most identified multiple food items in their reply. Wheat, beans and flour were mentioned most frequently followed by rice and oil. Sorghum and teff were the least preferred items. Many groups indicated that they would prefer a mixture of different food types— usually combining cereals, edible oil, flour and beans as a package instead of a single food item.

If you go with our preference we want flour, rice, along with wheat because these foods have vitamins, wheat alone do not have vitamins. Old people like rice [AF-EL/FG-1]

We like if oil is coming together with the wheat. [AF-S/FG-1]

We like rice and bur (wheat flour). The mix is better. It is difficult to consume only wheat. We mix it with beans otherwise it does not have good taste. [SM-D/FG-1]

We like the wheat but if sometimes it is mixed or replaced/changed for sorghum we like the mix more. Oil, haricot bean and pulse/misir are very important, we want these food items to be added to the transfer. [ORO-D/FG-3]

Yes, some of us who doesn't have enough milk at home prefer the wheat with oil and pulses. While others who have milk at home need the increment of wage wheat rate rather than bringing oil/pulses. [AF-EW/FG-4]

11.5 Access, control and use of food transfers

Food can be collected from distribution points by men, women, relatives or neighbors. But in the majority of cases in the qualitative survey, it is women who take responsibility for food collection. Direct Support beneficiaries who are unable to travel to the food distribution sites reported that their children, relatives or neighbors collected on their behalf. Women-only FGs below explained:

Of course, it's us who collect the food from the food payment points. [SM-H/FG-3]

The one who is registered is the one who collects. Mostly we the women collect the food. Only those who have the ID (*bono*) are the once who collect. We know each other and they will allow a representative who is delegated to collect if someone is not able to come for her/himself. [ORO-M/FG-3]

The women collect the food payment. It is our gender role. Men do not know how to tie sacks on the back of camel or donkey. Relatives support the disabled/ aged DS beneficiaries to collect the food. [AF-EW/FG-3]

In a minority of cases men collect the food transfers. Women-only FGs were asked the question: "What are the reasons why men in your household collect the food?" The major reasons given by these focus group participants include: inconvenient location of distribution points for women, long distance to be travelled for food collection, women being burdened with additional responsibilities at home like child care, fetching water etc.

Women focus groups were asked, "When you get home with the food payment you received, does your husband ask you to give him the food?" In 7 out of 11 women's focus groups, they reported that the husband does not ask for food. In the few cases where men did ask for food it was for a small amount to "sell, and then to buy *chat*". In polygamous households the husband often decides on the use of the transfer at the overall household level. "He is the one who shares for the sub family units in polygamous families." [AF-EW/FG-4] "Yes, the husband orders the women to share part of the food for neighbors. Also, he divides for sub family units in polygamous families." [AF-S/FG-3]

Men and women focus groups were asked who decides on how the food will be used. From twenty-two focus groups, 15 explained that it is women who decide how to use the food payment. Three groups replied that it is the men who decide the use of food and a further four groups indicated that they felt it was a joint decision. Women-only groups were asked who decides on the use of food payment when it is collected by men. The majority of groups replied that it is women who decide on the use of payment while the remaining three and five groups indicated that the decision is made by men and through discussion with the husband respectively.

Opinion was split about whether there was a difference between men and women with regard to the use of food payment. Some participants believed that when food payment is collected, and its use is decided, by the men there is a tendency on the part of men to use the food resource for unintended purposes, in particular for the purchase of *khat*. In fact the majority of those perceiving a difference identified *khat* purchase as the key issue. Two other groups felt that women were better at saving than men.

Earlier when we used to receive aid ... men used to go and use certain portion of the payment to buy things like *khat*. [S-G/FG-4]

It all depends. In most cases the decision is made on consensus. But there are cases where the men sell a portion of the food received and buy *khat*. [ORO-M/FG-4]

Yes there is difference in the way men and women use food transfers. We women think about our family only but for men there are other things like chat. Women use resources economically, men don't and women think of their children are their priority. [S-S/FG-3]

Women use the food only for the family but some men use it for different purpose like buying *khat* if not controlled. We care and think more about family than men. [ORO-M/FG-3]

The women are more concerned and use the payment more wisely.-There are men that sell the grain and buy *khat*. [ORO-S/FG-3]

Focus group participants were asked if they sold any part of the food transfer. Out of 33 focus groups 14 stated that they sell the food transfer they receive while the remaining 19 indicated that they did not. Groups reported that they sold food to buy items like sugar, coffee, soap, chat, clothes and shoes for themselves and for their children, cooking utensils, pulses (*misir*), oil, salt, pepper, milk and other consumables.

11.6 Use of cash payments (Oromiya)

The two Oromiya *woredas* (Moyale and Sewenya) included in the qualitative study received, or received in the past, both food and cash payments. In Moyale, it was reported that cash was

paid in the past but was no longer being provided. In Seweyna, both cash and food are currently provided.

Focus group indicated a range of food and non food items that were purchased with cash payments. The largest portion of the cash payment is used to buy food items such as maize, oil, onion, salt, pulses, and meat. Other expenditures included animal feed, school fees and learning materials for children, repaying debt, buying clothes for women and shoes for men, and buying household utensils.

11.7 Sharing of payments

In all the three regions, focus groups unanimously reported that they share food payments with relatives and neighbors who are not registered for the PSNP. Sharing of resources is a widely practiced culture in pastoralist communities regardless of their location, livelihood systems or wealth status. The size of resource/food shared with non-PSNP households varies from household to household. A respondent in Sewenya reported that he received 7 bags of wheat for 3 months payment and out of this he gave away 3 bags of wheat to his brother. A focus group participant In Gursum (Somali) indicated that she gave 50kg of food out of her 150kg food payment to her mother.

Yes of course, we give to neighbors and relatives, we can't eat alone, we have to eat/finish it together (*Fitnus wolumanii*). Sharing is our culture. Sharing is prohibited by the *kebele* but we share anyway. We were told not to share but actually we do sharing. [ORO-S/FG-3]

We are not allowed to share it is restricted by the *kebele*, but we share anyway with family members in secret. I can't eat alone while my relative or neighbor is starving so I share with them. [ORO-M/FG-1]

Relatives come from other places when they hear that we have received food and we give away some portion of the food. [S-S/FG-3]

Yes we give from the food we receive; we share with relatives and other family members. Sharing is our culture, we can't eat alone. We share with neighbors that are not targeted. We know we are all similar but it was due to the targeting that we get food and they don't, so we have to help each other. [ORO-S/FG-4]

In our culture we eat together we share, no lending, what we have we eat with our neighbors. For example when I receive one sack of wheat I share with my neighbor whether she/ he asks me or not. It is our culture to share what we have. [AF-EL/FG-4]

We do not lend, instead we are sharing among ourselves. I have children and there are my neighbors, we all eat together whether it is safety net resource or bought from the market. [AF-EL/FG-1]

In the Oromiya *woredas* where cash was received, focus groups were asked if they give away or lent a certain portion of their cash payment. Four groups reported giving away or lending their cash payment to others; the remaining two groups stated that they did not do because the cash transfer they received was too small to give to others.

11.8 Consequences of irregular payments

During the qualitative work, many focus group participants complained bitterly about the fact that they are not receiving their payment regularly. Respondents insisted that the food transfer should be paid regularly on monthly basis. "... It is our preference to receive the food payment each month without delay, because it helps us not to sell our goats to buy food. [AF-EL/FG-1] Participants were asked what they did when payments were delayed. A range of actions were mentioned, including: selling goats, sheep or cattle, employment as a casual laborer, and sharing or borrowing from neighbors and relatives.

We live on community support. We get food from the "haves" we depend on our neighbors. [AF-B/FG-1]

We sell firewood but it is not enough to buy food. The money obtained from selling firewood is not even enough to buy food for the person who takes the fire wood to the market place. [AF-EL/FG-1]

We sell our livestock, we sell goat and cattle and buy crop. [AF-S/FG-3]

There are households that starve. We share from others who have something. We take loan, some sell milk, fire wood and charcoal in secret because it is illegal (We do it in dark, it is considered as theft). [ORO-S/FG-3]

We survive by *zeka*; we use our saving; we borrow. [ORO-S/FG-1]

We go for credit or borrowing. [SM-G/FG-3]

We borrow. There are some people who beg on Fridays at *Suuf*. Others go to *Mandhera*. [SM-D/FG-1]

11.9 Summary

A number of important findings emerge from these qualitative data.

- There is an overwhelming preference to receive payments as food. This reflected limited access to grain markets, rising food prices, and conflicts over its use. While

most respondents perceived that payments in wheat were appropriate, there was a desire for a mixed basket to include cereals, edible oils and pulses.

- Food payments are usually collected by women, though there are instances where men, women, relatives or neighbors collect these payments. Where men collect food (in the few cases that they do), reasons given for this include: inconvenient location of food payment points for women, long distance to be travelled by women, and women being burdened with responsibilities at home such as child care or fetching water.
- In the majority of cases, women who decide how to use the food payment. When food transfers are sold, the proceeds are used to buy other food items such as pulses, oils, sugar, coffee, milk and salt. When food payments are collected by men, there were cases reported where some of this payment was used to purchase *khat*.
- In all regions, focus groups unanimously reported powerful pressures to share food payments with relatives and neighbors who are not registered under the PSNP. Sharing of resources is widely practiced culture regardless of location, livelihood systems or wealth status. In the case of polygamous households, where only one wife and her family are registered for the PSNP, sharing across multiple households is common.
- Payment delays force PSNP beneficiaries to sell assets. Other responses include going into debt and asking neighbors to share.

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Appendix A: Tag System for Direct Quotes

Region	Woreda	Method	Respondent
AF	Buremudaitu [B]	R-KI-1 <i>or</i> R-FG-1	Regional key informant or focus group FSTF/coordination
	Dubti [D]	R-KI-2 <i>or</i> R-FG-2	Regional Special committee (EW, HABP or PW)
	Elidar [EL]	W-KI-1 <i>or</i> W-FG-1	Woreda key informant or focus group FSTF
	Ewa [EW]		
	Semurobigelalo [S]		
	Teru [T]		
SM	Dolo Odo [D]	W-KI-2 <i>or</i> W-FG-2	Woreda special committee (EW, HABP, PW)
	Gursum [G]	K-KI-1 <i>or</i> K-FG-1	Kebele FSTF
	Hudet [H]	K-KI-2 <i>or</i> K-KI-2	Kebele DA interview (KI or FG)
	Shinille [S]		
ORO	Moyale [M]	K-KI-3	Other kebele-level key informant interview
	Sewena [S]		
		FG-1	Direct Support Focus Group
		FG-2	Non-Beneficiary Focus Group
		FG-3	Women's Focus Group
		FG-4	Men's Focus Group
		FG-5	Traditional Leaders' Group on livelihood
		FG-6	Women's Group on livelihood
		FG-7	Men's Group on livelihood

Appendix B: Characteristics of *Woredas* Surveyed Using Qualitative Methods

B.1 Introduction

This annex provides a description of the livelihoods found in *woredas* surveyed using qualitative methods.

Oromiya region

Saweyna woreda

This *woreda* is located in the southeast part of the Oromiya region. The *woreda* has pastoral and agro-pastoral areas. The pastoral area is characterized by *kola* or lowlands agro ecology with dominantly plain topography while the agro-pastoral part is divided into dry midlands or *woinadega*. The *woreda* is divided into two livelihood zones. The pastoral area falls within Bale Pastoral (BPA) livelihood zone while the agro-pastoral part falls in Bale Agro-pastoral livelihood zone (AAP).

Crop and livestock production occur in both pastoral and agro-pastoral areas. Wheat, maize and teff are important crops grown for food and cash in agro-pastoral area of the *woreda* while sorghum, maize and teff are grown in pastoral areas. However, the pastoral area is marginal and not as such suitable for crop production. Cattle, goats and camels are produced in both pastoral and agro-pastoral areas and sheep and mules are raised in the pastoral areas. Livestock and livestock products are important income sources in both livelihoods. The poor groups own goats, sheep, chickens, beehives and some cattle in pastoral area. However, the poor mainly depend on crop production in agro-pastoral area. Access to market is limited due to poor roads and long distances to urban centers. Frequent shocks include drought, livestock disease and crop pests in pastoral area while the principle shocks in the agro-pastoral areas include drought, crop pests, livestock diseases and bush encroachment.

Moyale woreda

Moyale is located on the border of Ethiopia and Kenya and is part of the east African Rift Valley system. It is characterized by lowland or *kola* with topography consisting predominantly of plains. The *woreda* is divided into two livelihood zones: Moyale Agro-pastoral, Labor and Cross-border Trade (MCB) Livelihood Zone, and Moyale Cattle, Camel & shoat Pastoral (MCP) Livelihood Zone.

Livestock production is the major source of earning in both livelihood zones of the *woreda*. Camels, cattle, sheep and goats husbandry is important sources of food and cash in the areas. Milk marketing is important source of income while cropping contributes little to household income in both livelihood zones. The very poor tend only to own a very small amount of livestock, perhaps a few goats and chickens. The market access in the area is generally good, as all *kebeles* are connected with the main town of Moyale. Different hazards strike the *woreda* at different times. Shocks in the MCB zone include drought, conflict, livestock

disease, crop pests and fluctuations in the market while those in shocks most often experienced in the MCP zone include drought, bush and scrub encroachment, animal disease prevalence, poor veterinary access and the conflict between clans.

Somali region

Shinile woreda

Shinile woreda is located within Shinile zone. The topography of the *woreda* is characterized by undulating hills, stony outcrops interspersed with plains of loose soil covered by bush and woody grasses. It belongs to two livelihood zones: Shinile Agro-pastoral Livelihood Zone (LZ3) and Shinile Pastoral Livelihood Zone (LZ2).

Sorghum and maize are both grown. Cattle and sheep are the predominant forms of livestock with camels and goats found in more mountainous or rugged areas. Pastoralists have poor market access and consequently consume more of their livestock production during times of surplus production. Agro-pastoralists have access to markets for livestock in Dire Dawa, Miaeso and Denbel. Poor households obtain most of their income from selling shoats and from remittances. The main risk factors frequently observed in the area include failure of rainfall, market failures, conflict, market shocks, and ongoing environmental degradation.

Dolo Ado woreda

Dolo Ado lies between the Ganale (perennial) and Dawa (seasonal) rivers. The climate is semi-arid to arid with the landscape dotted with drought-resistant bushes and acacia trees. The *woreda* encompasses three livelihood zones: Dawa-Ganale Riveriane Livelihood Zone (LZ8); Liban Agro-pastoral Livelihood Zone (LZ10); and Liban Agro-pastoral Livelihood Zone (LZ12).

Crop and livestock production are important sources of livelihoods. Maize is produced as the main crop in riverine areas, sorghum in rain-fed areas. Vegetables and fruit (tomato, onion, banana, papaya and mango) are grown mainly as cash crops. Irrigated farming is also practiced. Cattle and goats/sheep production are important sources in all livelihood zones. Camel production is limited to LZ10 and LZ12. Main source of income sources for the poor include the sale of livestock and livestock products, cereal crop sales, and collection and sale of bush products. Access to markets is reasonably good. Negelle, Mandera and Moyale are the main livestock markets. Negelle is also a key transit point for goods (cereals, wheat flour, kerosene, soap, candles) coming from other parts of Ethiopia. Dolo Ado is vulnerable to different hazards that include droughts, deforestation and environmental degradation, Crop disease, malaria, flooding, insecurity, livestock diseases and market shocks.

Gursum woreda

Gursum woreda is located in the eastern part of Ethiopia along the major road from Harar town to Jijiga. It is located within the Jijiga Agro-pastoral Livelihood Zone (LZ15), which has two

distinct agro-ecological areas - valleys and mountains in the west and vast plains in the north-east and south.

Mixed farming is practiced in the area. Cropping is mainly rain fed. Maize, sorghum, barely and groundnut are commonly produced. Crops such as oats, lentils, Irish and sweet potatoes, onions, garlic, and chat (some as cash crops) are grown in smaller quantities. Livestock - mainly sheep/goats (shoats) and cattle are produced in the area. While poor households have some livestock and grow crops, they mainly rely on the collection and sale of bush products, especially fire wood and charcoal, for their income. Access to markets is good, as the *woreda* is connected with different market centres including Jijiga, Dire Dawa, Hartasheik, and Babile. The main items traded within the zone include cereals (sorghum, maize, and wheat), livestock (mainly oxen for export) and shoats, and also small quantities of oil seeds, pulses and vegetables. Gursum is vulnerable to many shocks, the most important ones being drought, Hamaday frosts (October/November), pests (locusts, birds, army worms), livestock diseases, conflict and market price fluctuations.

Hudet *woreda*

Hudet *woreda* is located within Moyale Wayamo Pastoral Livelihood Zone (LZ14) of Somali region. Most of the district is lowland plains with scattered hills, thick-type bushes; wayamo associated with Acacia species. Livestock production is the key source of livelihood. Camels, goats/sheep and cattle are widely produced and livestock sales are the predominant source of income for pastoralists. The poor also earn some income through casual labor and collection and sale of incense. Moyale is major market town for the community. The major risk factors affecting the *woreda* include rainfall failure or delay, conflict (between Somali and Oromo clans in the west, over water and grazing) and livestock diseases.

Afar region

Elidar *woreda*

Elidar *woreda* is located in EliDaar pastoral livelihood zone, 720km north east of Addis Ababa, on the Addis -Sumara –Assab (the port city in Eritrea) highway. It is bordered by Eritrea to the north, Djibouti to the east and other Afar *woredas* in the south and south west. It is predominantly semi-arid lowland. The *woreda* is inhabited with highly scattered pastoralist communities. Elidar *woreda* is characterized by high temperatures reaching 50°C during *hagai* (May to June). Sources of water are hand-dug wells (*ellas*), ponds, and surface water. The vegetation is mainly drought resistant plants such as *eebto* (*acacia tortilis*), *halito* (*balanitusrotondofolia*) and *oudayto* (*balanitus aegyptica*).

Pastoralists in this *woreda* are fully engaged in the production of livestock. The main livestock kept are camel and goats. Due to the harsh climatic conditions, only a limited number of households keep cattle. Salt trading is practiced in small scale by few households. In addition to livestock products such as meat and milk, households source their food from purchases of maize, wheat and sorghum. Poor households sell fire wood to buy food. They also receive

assistance from relatives.” The better off” engage in goat production and look after their goats and sell their goats and milk. The “middle wealth” group is also engaged in livestock production. Able bodied persons are employed at Dobi salt mining fields. All wealth groups spend most of their income on food; the rest goes for household items, clothes and for medical treatments

The main local markets at Buree, Manda, Elidar, Galafi and Dichoto are where pastoralists sell small livestock and purchase staple foods. Camel and cattle are sold in major livestock markets such as Assaiyta, Yallo and Chiffra. Despite close proximity to Djibouti, cross-border livestock sales are minimal. Migration is practiced within the zone when there is water and pasture, but during the dry *gilaal* period when there is shortage of water; households migrate into neighboring zones, often towards the banks of the Awash River, Teru and Chiffra areas. In the past, livelihoods were supported, in part, by the movement of people, goods and services between the port city of Assab and Addis Ababa. Following the 1998 war, the Ethiopian-Eritrean border has been closed and this has had an adverse economic impact on the *woreda*.

Dubti *woreda*

Dubti *woreda* lies in the Awsa ke Gewane Agro-pastoral Livelihood Zone. The area has an average altitude ranging between 330-350m and an average annual rainfall of 122m. There are two rainy seasons, the *sugum* rains (February-March) and *karma* rains (July-September). The Awash River is the main source of water and a means of producing irrigated crops. Vegetation is a mix of shrubs, bushes and pastureland. Invasive weeds, particularly *prosopis juliflora*, are a major threat to rangeland. A big developmental project, the construction of Tendaho sugar factory is underway in Dubti *woreda*. This project has become a source of casual employment for *woreda* pastoralists.

While the major livelihood activity in this *kebele* is livestock production, pastoralists living along the banks of the Awash River have started irrigated farming. This is done by all wealth groups who organize in associations. They are producing maize, onion and tomatoes. Maize is for home consumption while onion and tomato are delivered to the market. A large number of pastoralist households are being attracted by this farming activity. Production of charcoal from invasive *prosopis* weed trees is increasingly becoming one of the livelihood activities in the area. Food consumption is mainly from own crops and livestock products, supplemented by food aid and gifts from relatives. Most of the households purchase additional cereals/grains from the markets. Food aid is important for all wealth groups. Very poor households receive food in kind from ‘middle’ and ‘better-off’ households. Very poor and poor households spend a large proportion of their income on the purchase of cereals/grains from markets. Dubti and Logia towns are important market places in the *woreda*, trading food and non food items. Both towns are easily accessible for communities. Households supply the market with goats, milk, vegetables and charcoal to earn income. During ‘normal’ periods, livestock tend to stay within the original grazing areas but during droughts they move towards *Asayita woreda* in search of pasture.

Buremedaitu woreda

Buremedaitu *woreda*, located in Namalefane Ke Baadu Pastoral Livelihood Zone has a semi-arid climate characterized by erratic rainfall. The *woreda* is suitable for production of maize and cash crops such as cotton. Vegetation is a mix of shrubs, bushes and pastureland. Most *kebeles* in Buremodaitu are located on the sides and between two streams of the Awash River. There are private investors that undertake large scale cotton production in the area. The Middle Awash Agriculture Development farm is one of the largest state farms; it provides casual employment opportunities to the local Afar community.

Pastoralism is the main livelihood activity combined with agricultural activities and labor employment in big farms. Camel, cattle and shoats (sheep/goats) are the most important species. A number of isolated *kebeles* practice agro-pastoralism. All wealth groups spend most of their income on food; the rest goes on household items, clothes, social services and inputs. The two major livestock markets are Dalifage and Melka Werer. Livestock traders come from outside the region. Other neighbouring markets include Awash Sebat Kilo, Metehara and Nazareth. Along the Ethiopia-Djibouti road there are a number of towns (Gewane, Awash, Werer and Amibara) where pastoralists sell small livestock and purchase cereals. Pastoralists and their livestock migrate to Araamis ke Adaar and Teru pastoral livelihood zones before the Awash River floods (July-September) and return when the floods subside in October-November. For most of the year, migration tends to be within the livelihood zone, especially along the banks of rivers. During bad seasons, migration tends to be towards Awash National Park.

Semurobi woreda

Semurobi is located in the Araamis ke Adaar Pastoral Livelihood Zone, found in the western and south-western part of Afar with Amhara bordering to the west. The climate is generally dry with an annual average temperature in excess of 30°C and a total annual rainfall of 250-400 mm. The landscape is diverse; undulating hills traversed by numerous seasonal and a few permanent streams, extensive low flat lands and depressions. It is surrounded by four rivers namely; Awash, Jeweha, Asgefien and Robi rivers. However, few households practice irrigation agriculture although this may change given support from government and NGOs to expand the amount of irrigated land.

Pastoralism is the main livelihood activity. Cattle, shoats (sheep/goats) and camels are the most important livestock species. Food sources for all wealth groups are predominantly purchases of cereals such as maize, wheat and sorghum in addition to livestock products such as meat and milk. Income is derived from the sale of livestock and self-employment. The poor engage in self-employment such as collecting and selling firewood. All wealth groups spend most of their income on food; the rest goes on household items, clothes, social services and inputs. Major markets are located outside the *woreda*, in neighbouring Amhara: Sembete, Abay Atir-Mafud and Shewa Robi-Kewet. These markets are important for the purchase of food crops and the sale of livestock and livestock products. As a coping strategy to drought, the community moves to other areas with livestock in search of pasture and water, including

neighbouring areas of Amhara, Oromiya (Kemmise) and Somali regions. At times, this has brought them into conflict with Amhara, Oromo and Somali peoples.

Teru and Ewa *woredas*

Teru and Ewa are located in Teru Pastoral Livelihood Zone which receives, on average, less than 500mm of rainfall per year. Like other *woredas* in this livelihood zone, Teru and Ewa are livestock-dependent – mainly cattle, camels, goats and sheep. In these *woredas* a traditional, extensive livestock rearing system is practiced. While there are both permanent and seasonal rivers in the livelihood zone, there is no permanent river in Teru *woreda*, hence chronic water shortages exist.

The main sources of food are buying cereals from market and livestock products like meat and milk. Tigray and Amhara regions supply the major cereals such as maize and *teff*. Various varieties of wild foods are also consumed, both in normal and bad years, during the dry months. The sale of livestock is the only source of cash income for middle and better-off households. Cash income in poor households is generated through livestock sales and supplemented by self-employment (casual labor) and *zakaat* (gifts). Access to markets is generally poor due to: lack of and poor quality roads; lack of transportation; lack of information about markets, and the long distances to major markets. As a result, the selling price of livestock tends to be low and the purchase price of goods tends to be high. The main market is located at Yalo, a *woreda* town, and is a major livestock market. There are also important markets such as Chifra, as well as markets in neighboring *woredas* in Amhara and Tigray regions. In normal years the movement of livestock starts in October and is generally to the closest grazing areas. In bad years there is migration to different grazing areas inside the zone and also movement to the neighboring regions of Tigray and Amhara.