Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment

Saak, Alexander E.

doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.014

Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment

Authors

Saak, Alexander E.

Date Issued

2015-10-02

Metadata

Full item page

Citation

Saak, Alexander E. 2015. Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment. Economic Letters 136(November 2015):88 - 9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.014

Abstract/Description

This paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static model where the buyer has private information about quality, sellers have private information about the cost and choice of effort, and quality is not contractible.