Educator incentives and educational triage in rural primary schools

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cg.authorship.typesCGIAR single centre
cg.contributor.crpPolicies, Institutions, and Markets
cg.contributor.donorInternational Growth Centre
cg.contributor.donorAbdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab
cg.contributor.donorSpencer Foundation
cg.coverage.countryUganda
cg.coverage.iso3166-alpha2UG
cg.coverage.regionAfrica
cg.coverage.regionSub-Saharan Africa
cg.coverage.regionEastern Africa
cg.creator.identifierDaniel Gilligan: 0000-0002-3530-0148
cg.creator.identifierNaureen Karachiwalla: 0000-0001-6662-106X
cg.identifier.projectIFPRI - Poverty, Health, and Nutrition Division
cg.identifier.publicationRankNot ranked
cg.identifier.urlhttps://ftp.iza.org/dp11516.pdf
cg.number11516
cg.placeBonn, Germany
cg.reviewStatusInternal Review
dc.contributor.authorGilligan, Daniel O.
dc.contributor.authorKarachiwalla, Naureen
dc.contributor.authorKasirye, Ibrahim
dc.contributor.authorLucas, Adrienne M.
dc.contributor.authorNeal, Derek
dc.date.accessioned2024-06-21T09:09:00Zen
dc.date.available2024-06-21T09:09:00Zen
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/146838
dc.titleEducator incentives and educational triage in rural primary schoolsen
dcterms.abstractIn low-income countries, primary school students often fall far below grade level and primary dropout rates remain high. Further, in some countries, educators encourage their weaker students to drop out before reaching the end of primary school. These educators hope to avoid the negative attention that authorities direct to a school when its students perform poorly on the primary leaving exams that governments use to certify primary completion and eligibility for secondary school. We report the results of an experiment in rural Uganda that sought to reduce dropout rates in grade six and seven by offering bonus payments to grade six teachers that rewarded each teacher for the performance of each of her students relative to comparable students in other schools. Teachers responded to this Pay for Percentile (PFP) incentive system in ways that raised attendance rates two school years later from .56 to .60. These attendance gains were driven primarily by outcomes in treatment schools that provide textbooks for grade six math students, where two-year attendance rates rose from .57 to .64. In these same schools, students whose initial skills levels prepared them to use grade six math texts enjoyed significant gains in math achievement. We find little evidence that PFP improved attendance or achievement in schools without books even though PFP had the same impact on reported teacher effort in schools with and without books. We conjecture that teacher effort and books are complements in education production and document several results that are consistent with this hypothesis.en
dcterms.accessRightsOpen Access
dcterms.bibliographicCitationGilligan, Daniel; Karachiwalla, Naureen; Kasirye, Ibrahim; Lucas, Adrienne M.; and Neal, Derek. 2018. Educator incentives and educational triage in rural primary schools. IZA Discussion Paper No. 11516. Bonn, Germany: Institute for the Study of Labor. http://ftp.iza.org/dp11516.pdfen
dcterms.isPartOfIZA Discussion Paperen
dcterms.issued2019-12-13
dcterms.languageen
dcterms.publisherInstitute for the Study of Labor
dcterms.relationhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w24911en
dcterms.relationhttps://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.57.1.1118-9871R2en
dcterms.replaceshttps://ebrary.ifpri.org/digital/collection/p15738coll5/id/7013
dcterms.subjectrural youthen
dcterms.subjecteducationen
dcterms.subjectless favoured areasen
dcterms.subjectteachingen
dcterms.subjectprimary educationen
dcterms.subjectcapacity developmenten
dcterms.subjectincentivesen
dcterms.subjecteducational statusen
dcterms.subjectdeveloping countriesen
dcterms.subjectbonusesen
dcterms.typeWorking Paper

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