Buyer-side gender discrimination in bargaining: Evidence from seed sales in Uganda

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cg.authorship.typesCGIAR single centre
cg.authorship.typesCGIAR and developing country institute
cg.contributor.affiliationInternational Food Policy Research Institute
cg.contributor.affiliationOne Acre Fund
cg.contributor.donorCGIAR Trust Fund
cg.contributor.initiativeMarket Intelligence
cg.contributor.initiativeSeed Equal
cg.contributor.programAcceleratorBreeding for Tomorrow
cg.contributor.programAcceleratorGender Equality and Inclusion
cg.coverage.countryUganda
cg.coverage.regionEastern Africa
cg.coverage.regionSub-Saharan Africa
cg.coverage.regionAfrica
cg.creator.identifierBjorn Van Campenhout: 0000-0003-2404-7826
cg.creator.identifierLeocardia Nabwire: 0000-0002-6877-5748
cg.howPublishedFormally Published
cg.identifier.dataurlhttps://github.com/bjvca/bargaining_for_seed
cg.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2025.102404
cg.identifier.projectIFPRI - Innovation Policy and Scaling Unit
cg.identifier.publicationRankB
cg.isijournalISI Journal
cg.issn2214-8043
cg.journalJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
cg.number102404
cg.reviewStatusPeer Review
cg.subject.impactAreaGender equality, youth and social inclusion
cg.volume119
dc.contributor.authorVan Campenhout, Bjorn
dc.contributor.authorNabwire, Leocardia
dc.date.accessioned2025-07-18T16:02:39Z
dc.date.available2025-07-18T16:02:39Z
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10568/175690
dc.titleBuyer-side gender discrimination in bargaining: Evidence from seed sales in Ugandaen
dcterms.abstractHaggling over prices is a common feature of economic transactions in many societies. This study examines whether the gender of the seller influences buyers’ negotiation strategies and outcomes in bilateral price bargaining. Using a bargaining experiment in eastern Uganda, we analyze interactions between smallholder maize farmers and either a male or female seed seller. Our findings reveal that buyers negotiating with female sellers are less likely to accept the initial offer price and respond with lower counter-bids compared to those bargaining with male sellers. Negotiations also last, on average, one round longer when the seller is a woman, and final transaction prices are nearly 9 percent lower. These results are particularly relevant for rural economies, where restrictive gender norms limit women’s financial autonomy. Given that small agribusinesses often provide one of the few viable income-generating opportunities for women, gender biases in market interactions can have substantial implications for economic empowerment and household welfare.en
dcterms.accessRightsOpen Access
dcterms.audienceAcademics
dcterms.available2025-07-17
dcterms.bibliographicCitationVan Campenhout, Bjorn; and Nabwire, Leocardia. 2025. Buyer-side gender discrimination in bargaining: Evidence from seed sales in Uganda. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 119(December 2025): 102404. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2025.102404
dcterms.issued2025-12
dcterms.languageen
dcterms.licenseCC-BY-4.0
dcterms.publisherElsevier
dcterms.relationhttps://doi.org/10.2499/p15738coll2.137074
dcterms.subjectgender
dcterms.subjectdiscrimination
dcterms.subjectseeds
dcterms.subjectbargaining power
dcterms.typeJournal Article

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